Russia Operationalizes Military Presence in Togo; SAF Seizes Key Central Sudan Supply Line; Congolese National Dialogue Takes Shape: Africa File, July 30, 2026

Co-Authors: Aleksandar Wiebler, Alexandre Colas des Francs, and Abigail Taylor

Contributor: Angus Muldoon

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Key Takeaways:

• Togo. Russia recently deployed Africa Corps forces to Togo and shipped military equipment bound for Mali via the Togolese port of Lomé for the first time, highlighting the operationalization of the growing security partnership between Togo and Russia. The partnership allows Russia to diversify its military logistics networks across West Africa while helping President Faure Gnassingbé insulate his regime from international and domestic political pressure and contain Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen in northern Togo.
• Central Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) took control of a supply line vital to any SAF offensive to consolidate control of central Sudan and advance toward areas of western Sudan controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF’s advance makes it unlikely to engage in the US-led peace process and could increase the RSF’s intransigence, leading to further RSF human rights abuses.
• Western Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are setting conditions to capture a key town in the final pocket aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in western Sudan, which could strain RSF relations with Chad and disrupt the group’s supply lines. The SAF may also be increasing efforts to disrupt RSF supply lines from Libya.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). DRC President Félix Tshisekedi committed to hold a Congolese national dialogue. The Congolese government will likely use the dialogue process to counter and co-opt the opposition while avoiding concessions that could weaken Tshisekedi, as he buys time to change the Congolese constitution and reorganize for the war in the eastern DRC against M23.

Figure 1. Africa File, July 30, 2026

Source: Yale Ford.

Assessments:

Togo

Authors: Liam Karr, Aleksandar Wiebler, and Alexandre Colas des Francs

Russia shipped military equipment for Mali via the Togolese port of Lomé for the first time in the latest sign of growing security ties between Togo and Russia. The US-sanctioned Mikhail Britnev Russian cargo vessel docked in Lomé on July 9.^[1] This was the first Russian military maritime shipment to Togo, although a Russian cargo ship unsuccessfully attempted to export Nigerien uranium yellowcake via Lomé in December 2025.^[2] The Mikhail Britnev delivered around 50 military vehicles intended for Africa Corps forces in Mali: three BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), eight BMP-3 IFVs, four BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, 20 trucks and motorcycles, 14 4X4 Tigr-M mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, Chinese VP-11 MRAP vehicles, and two antiaircraft cannons.^[3] A group of Africa Corps soldiers based in Mali arrived in Lomé on July 10 to escort the military convoy to Bamako.^[4] The convoy then crossed Togo and southwestern Burkina Faso before reaching the Mali border near Sikasso on July 23 and arriving in Bamako on July 25.^[5]

The transit of a Russian military ship through Togo represents the latest signs of the two countries’ strengthening security relations. CTP previously assessed that Togo and Russia began deepening defense ties as early as 2022, when Togo received five Russian attack and transport helicopters.^[6] Leading Russian and Togolese officials have met three times since late 2024, including a meeting in which Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bilateral defense agreement in November 2025 and a meeting between the Russian defense minister and Gnassingbé in March 2026 to work toward implementing the agreement. The deal includes intelligence sharing, weapons sales, joint military exercises, and authorization for Russian ships to dock in the port of Lomé.^[7] CTP previously assessed that Gnassingbé may seek Russian regime security support as part of growing security cooperation after he revised the constitution in April 2024 to prolong his rule in what Togolese opposition groups have called a constitutional coup.^[8]

Africa Corps personnel have also deployed to Togo in 2026 as part of the growing defense relationship. CTP has assessed since as early as 2024 that Russian-Togolese defense agreements likely included provisions for Africa Corps deployments based on the presence of Russian advisers in Togo and a visit to Togo from Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus bek Yevkurov, who oversees Africa Corps.^[9] A group of Africa Corps officers first arrived in Lomé in January 2026 to prepare the deployment of troops in Togo.^[10] There are currently around 300–350 Africa Corps soldiers present in Lomé and in military bases across northern Togo.^[11] Russian forces primarily support training, intelligence gathering, and secure unspecified critical sites rather than directly engaging Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) insurgents, who use northern Togo primarily as a rear base.^[12]

The opening of a new maritime corridor via Lomé is part of Russian efforts to diversify military logistics networks across West Africa as Moscow reinforces its presence across the Sahel. Russian cargo ships have played a key role in transporting bulkier equipment, such as artillery and armored vehicles, to the Sahel to support Africa Corps deployments.^[13] Seaborne shipments normally carry tanks, MRAPs, and armored personnel carriers that subsequently travel over land to their respective recipients across West Africa.^[14] Russia has provided naval escorts to cargo vessels bound for West Africa, likely to discourage European authorities from stopping or boarding sanctioned ships.^[15] The British Royal Navy monitored the Britnev and the Ropucha-class large landing ship Aleksandr Shabalin—which escorted the Britnev at least to the English channel—before the two disabled their automatic identification system (AIS) on June 23 off the coast of Brittany, France.^[16] The ships violated Russia’s obligations as a signatory and member of the International Maritime Organization, which requires the use of AIS for internationally bound vessels with gross tonnage over 300.^[17]

Russia has used air links to transfer smaller and often more valuable assets, such as drones, radar systems, and personnel.^[18] Heavy lift aircraft operating under secretive civilian airlines registered in Russia have frequently stopped to refuel in Algeria and Libya before continuing to the Sahel.^[19] Russian cargo planes have also frequently turned off their transponders to avoid detection.^[20]

Numerous bases and ports serve as hotspots for Russian logistics in Africa. Conakry in Guinea previously served as Russia’s only port for military shipments in West Africa.^[21] Satellite tracking shows that the Mikhail Britnev had stopped at Conakry before proceeding to Lomé, although it is unclear why the Britnev docked at Conakry or whether any equipment was moved on or off the ship.^[22] Russian aircraft carrying suspected weapons shipments to the Sahel have frequently used military airstrips in North Africa as layover points en route to West Africa. Antonov-124 heavy lift aircraft registered to civilian carriers in Russia flew between Libya’s al Khadim airbase and Sahelian capitals throughout 2025.^[23] Algerian airbases in Oum el Bouaghi, Ain Oussera, Annaba, Laghouat, and Bechar have also received Russian cargo flights bound for the Sahel.^[24]

Figure 2. Russia Pursues Mediterranean Sea to Atlantic Ocean Corridor

Source: Liam Karr.

The logistics corridor via Togo is less efficient than the Guinea route, but it diversifies Russia’s logistics options in terms of redundancy, exposure to JNIM, and capacity. The Russian convoy traveled nearly 1,144 miles (1,842 kilometers) to Bamako after departing Lomé—double the distance normally covered by shipments to Mali from Guinea. The Togolese route via southern Mali enters Malian territory nearer to Bamako than supply lines via western Mali from Guinea, which are more exposed to JNIM’s ongoing blockade of Malian supply lines across southern and western Mali as a result. Large Russian shipments via Togo also avoid any potential capacity problems at Conakry’s port, which ranks poorly in performance indices.^[25]

President Gnassingbé continues to diversify Lomé’s regional and international security partners to insulate himself from political pressure as he seeks to maintain his hold on power, contain JNIM in northern Togo, and diversify economic partnerships. Turkey has also emerged as a major security partner alongside Russia, deploying roughly 300 mercenaries from the SADAT private military company in the northern Savanes region since December 2023 to train Togolese special forces.^[26] The presence of foreign troops on Togo’s soil sparked controversy, prompting three Togolese opposition political parties to call for a public debate on July 21.^[27] Lomé has also imported military equipment and collaborated on intelligence and training with France, Israel, the United States, European Union member states, and the United Arab Emirates in recent years.^[28] The Togolese foreign minister advocated for deeper Togo-US security cooperation and sustained US engagement in West African stability in a 2025 op-ed.^[29]

Togo continues to hedge between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to maximize its economic flexibility.^[30] Togo has positioned itself as an alternative coastal trade hub for the landlocked AES states as traditional corridors suffer from regional instability. Togo’s trade with Sahelian states increased by 74 percent between 2023 and 2024, and around 92 percent of goods transiting Lomé’s port went to AES states in 2024.^[31] Lomé sought to benefit from the 2023 closure of the Benin-Niger border, through which 80 percent of Nigerien imports had transited.^[32] Benin, Niger, and Nigeria reopened a regional trade route in February 2026, however, while Cotonou and Niamey recently committed to reopening their shared border.^[33] Burkina Faso and Mali also increased imports from Côte d’Ivoire in 2025 despite heightened diplomatic tensions between the two AES states and the Ivorian government in recent years.^[34]

Gnassingbé also seeks to maintain strong ties with the AES to address regime security concerns. Security cooperation with the AES, particularly Burkina Faso, is critical to Togo’s ability to secure northern Togo from JNIM and its strengthening support zones along the border with Burkina Faso. Togo participated in the 2024 Tarha Nakal military exercises alongside the AES and Chad in 2024 and expressed its willingness to expand cooperation against insurgent groups in its 2026-2028 Sahel strategy.^[35] Ties with the AES also serves as a hedge or counter to ECOWAS pressure on Gnassingbé for his constitutional revisions. ECOWAS’ Court of Justice ruled in January 2026 that the 2024 constitutional reform constituted an unconstitutional change of government since a legislative assembly whose mandate had expired passed it.^[36] Togolese officials have not publicly reacted to the ruling.

Central Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Angus Muldoon

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) took control of an operationally significant supply line that links the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, to el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan and North Kordofan state capital. The SAF and allied Joint Forces militia launched the operation on July 25, when they attacked both the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) front and rear defenses on the highway simultaneously.^[37] The SAF advanced approximately 55 miles southwest from Rahid al Nuba to capture Jabrat al Sheikh, which is approximately 150 miles southwest of Khartoum and 105 miles north of el Obeid.^[38] The SAF also advanced north from el Obeid to capture Bara, which is the second-largest largest town in North Kordofan and approximately 40 miles north of el Obeid.^[39] The SAF captured several other localities in the process and repelled RSF counterattacks on Bara and Jabrat al Sheikh.^[40] The SAF consolidated its control of the highway by July 26, marking the first time the SAF has held the supply route since the Sudanese civil war began in April 2023.^[41] SAF head and leader of the SAF-led Sudanese government Abdel Fattah al Burhan acknowledged the victory by visiting Jabrat al Sheikh with allied militia leaders Minni Minnawi and Abu Agla Keikal on July 27.^[42]

Figure 3. Control of Terrain in Central Sudan

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Angus Muldoon.

SAF control of the supply line relieves pressure on el Obeid and is vital to any SAF offensive to consolidate control of central Sudan and advance toward RSF-controlled western Sudan. The RSF was using the highway as a staging ground to enforce a partial siege of el Obeid and set conditions for an offensive on the city. The RSF cut off a key water pipeline flowing from Bara to el Obeid when it controlled Bara.^[43] RSF control of the highway forced the SAF to reroute supplies to the east of el Obeid via two highways, as the RSF also controlled sections of the highways south and west of the city. The RSF proceeded to target the sole remaining supply line with drone strikes as it set conditions for an offensive on el Obeid throughout June 2026, causing food, fuel, and water shortages in the city.^[44] The RSF also sent reinforcements to Bara as it amassed forces around el Obeid in June.^[45] A Joint Forces offensive in western Sudan beginning in late June 2026 caused the RSF to redeploy some of its front line forces from Kordofan to Darfur region, however, potentially creating an opening for the SAF to launch the recent operation.^[46]

Strengthened supply lines into el Obeid will support SAF efforts to consolidate control of central Sudan and potentially target the RSF’s heartland in western Sudan. The front lines around el Obeid had remained largely stagnant since the RSF halted the SAF’s westward advance and pushed the SAF back to el Obeid by mid-2025.^[47] The SAF can now try to reconnect el Obeid to the key towns of Dilling and Kadugli to the south via central Sudan’s main north–south highway, building on past attempts throughout 2025 and 2026.^[48] The RSF and allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North al Hilu militia have increased pressure on Dilling, which is approximately 100 miles south of el Obeid, since March 2026 through artillery strikes and ground assaults.^[49] The SAF also attempted to push west from el Obeid along Sudan’s main east–west highway in late 2025, but the RSF stymied the advance at um Sumeima, a current front line town approximately 40 miles west of el Obeid.^[50] Burhan and SAF Chief of Staff Yasser al Atta separately reaffirmed on July 26 and July 27 the SAF’s objective to regain control of all RSF-held territory.^[51]

The SAF may struggle to secure the Khartoum-el Obeid highway, however. The RSF has prioritized disrupting SAF efforts to consolidate control of supply lines in central Sudan. The SAF partially lifted the RSF’s siege on Dilling via a secondary road in January 2026, but the RSF has contested the road since March, preventing the SAF from consistently resupplying Dilling.^[52] The RSF also retook Bara from the SAF twice between October 2025 and April 2026.^[53] The RSF is adept at desert warfare and has maintained positions in desert areas connected to the highway from the west throughout the war.^[54] Sudan’s wet season from June to September typically stalls ground assaults from such areas due to poor off-road conditions, but this year’s wet season is projected to yield lower rainfall totals.^[55] The SAF has not yet made a concerted attempt to uproot the RSF from the desert areas off the main highways.

The SAF’s advance makes it unlikely to engage in the US-led peace process amid US pressure on the SAF to ease its maximalist position. The United States applied sanctions on the SAF in June and July 2026, likely to push the SAF to engage in the peace process.^[56] The US sanctions imposed export and financing restrictions on the Sudanese government and targeted Sudan’s largest defense company, which is SAF-controlled.^[57] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that the sanctions showed the US’s “commitment” to ending the war by targeting the actors “profiting” from the war and undermining the peace process.^[58]

The SAF has continued to condition its engagement in the peace process on the RSF’s demobilization and is unlikely to change its position while advancing on the battlefield, however. Reuters reported on July 9 that the SAF has conditioned its acceptance of a US-proposed ceasefire on the RSF withdrawing from all population centers that it controls, including in Darfur.^[59] US Senior Adviser for African Affairs Massad Boulos, who is leading the US peace efforts, stated on July 13 that the peace process had “multiple substantive issues yet to be accepted and/or that have been outright rejected.”^[60] The SAF’s position is consistent with its past stances, which have sought to avoid legitimizing the RSF.^[61]

The SAF’s advance could also increase the RSF’s intransigence in the immediate term and lead to further RSF human rights abuses as the group looks to maintain its increasingly strained patronage system. The RSF relies on a patronage system that enables commanders to keep a share of their earnings from battlefield advances and subsequent resource exploitation to bind its diffused network of allied militias and armed groups.^[62] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data reported in May 2026 that the patronage system had become less lucrative amid the battlefield stalemate, contributing to infighting among various RSF factions.^[63] The latest setback north of el Obeid has only exacerbated the situation, and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) has responded by giving RSF commanders autonomy to conduct their own operations.^[64] Hemedti also said that he would lead operations from the battlefield and called on RSF fighters to root out alleged SAF sympathizers.^[65]

Hemedti’s order increases the risk of widespread RSF retaliation against Sudanese civilians. The RSF has repeatedly acted with impunity throughout the war, committing mass killings, sexual violence, and other atrocities. The Guardian reported on the discovery of a suspected RSF mass grave with 500 corpses in Khartoum in early 2025, and the United States and the United Nations have separately found that the RSF committed acts of genocide in Darfur in 2023 and 2025, respectively.^[66] The RSF often accuse the affected civilians of collaborating with the SAF.^[67] The RSF has reportedly already begun retaliating against civilians in localities west of the Khartoum-el Obeid highway since July 27, looting homes and markets and arresting alleged SAF sympathizers.^[68] The Sudan Doctors Network reported that one attack had killed seven people.^[69]

Western Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are setting conditions to capture a key town in the final pocket aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in western Sudan. The RSF has mobilized forces near Tine—a town on the Chadian border approximately 130 miles north of el Geneina, the West Darfur state capital, which serves as the hub of the SAF-aligned pocket—since mid-July.^[70] The RSF has concentrated its forces in Kulbus, which is approximately 55 miles south of Tine.^[71] The Sudanese news outlet Darfur24 reported that the RSF has stationed over 100 combat vehicles in Kulbus.^[72] The RSF also conducted its first drone strikes in Tine in nearly two months in mid-July, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, including a strike on a water well that reportedly killed 21 people and injured 30 others.^[73] The Joint Forces, a Darfuri militia that controls the SAF-aligned pocket, have responded by mobilizing its own forces in Tine.^[74] The Sudanese investigative outlet Ayin reported that the Joint Forces, backed by SAF air support, had deployed almost 200 combat vehicles to Tine.^[75]

Figure 4. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Angus Muldoon.

The RSF has redeployed forces from central Sudan to consolidate control of western Sudan in response to Joint Forces advances since late June. The Joint Forces launched an offensive to advance south along the Chadian border toward el Geneina, capturing Kulbus on June 29.^[76] The offensive marked the Joint Forces’ first major advance in West Darfur in over a year.^[77] The offensive caused the RSF to divert forces from its effort to set conditions for an offensive on el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan.^[78] The RSF retook Kulbus on July 10 and has since turned its focus toward Tine.^[79]

Increased RSF activity on the Chadian border raises the risk of spillover into Chad, which could further strain RSF relations with Chad and disrupt the group’s supply lines, although past spillover has not caused permanent disruptions. Chad has controversially supported the RSF throughout the Sudanese civil war, serving as a primary transit point for Emirati weapons shipments, including drones, to the RSF.^[80] Chadian support for the RSF does not have consensus approval within the Chadian government. Chadian President Idriss Mahamat Déby reduced support for the RSF in 2025 under pressure from Chadian security forces, especially members of the influential Zaghawa ethnic group.^[81] Zaghawa comprise a prominent portion of the Joint Forces and have long-standing disputes with the RSF.^[82] Zaghawa have been key stakeholders in the Chadian government since Mahamat Déby’s father—himself Zaghawa—was the Chadian president.^[83] Chad eventually increased support for the RSF in early 2026 despite Zaghawa opposition as overflight restrictions from other countries and a Libyan airport closure disrupted other nodes in the Emirati-RSF supply chain.^[84]

The RSF conducted multiple drone and ground operations targeting Joint Forces positions in Chad in 2026, complicating relations with its Chadian ally. The RSF clashed with Chadian soldiers after pursuing Joint Forces units into Chad in separate incidents in January and February, killing a combined 12 Chadian soldiers.^[85] RSF deputy leader Abdul Rahim Dagalo—brother of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)—reportedly traveled to Chad to ease tensions after the January clash, and the Chadian government warned that future RSF or SAF incursions would prompt a Chadian response.^[86] Chad proceeded to temporarily close its border with Sudan after the February clash.^[87] The RSF conducted drone strikes on the Chadian side of Tine after clashes with the Joint Forces in March, killing 20 people and causing the Chadian military to send forces to reinforce the border.^[88]

The RSF has conducted drone strikes on the Chadian border, likely in Chad, as part of its efforts to set conditions for an offensive on Tine. The RSF likely conducted drone strikes in Bamina, a Chadian town approximately 25 miles north of Tine just across the Sudanese border from Joint Forces–controlled territory, on July 21.^[89] The Joint Forces, which includes Chadian Zaghawa fighters, has rear bases in Chad due to its links to Zaghawa border communities.^[90] The Sudanese news outlet Sudan Tribune reported that a Chadian military commander, a local government official, and several Zaghawa leaders visited Bamina to inspect the damage from the strikes, including to the town market, on June 22.^[91]

Spillover into Chad could prompt Chad to again reduce its support for the RSF, although Chad’s reliance on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has likely influenced its continued support despite internal opposition and past spillover. The UAE has provided Déby’s cash-strapped regime with billions of dollars in loans since 2023.^[92] Chad did not follow through on past warnings to take military action against the RSF and has not yet enforced a long-term border closure. Emirati-linked flights carrying suspected weapons shipments to the RSF have continued to the main airport in N’Djamena, the Chadian capital.^[93] The Chadian officials who visited Bamina after the recent drone strikes did not explicitly blame it on the RSF, aligning with past Chadian government statements that avoided solely denouncing the RSF for border violations.^[94] Darfur24 reported that Chad had closed the Adré border crossing, which is the primary crossing on the Chad-Sudan border, on July 28.^[95] The report indicated that an separate issue from the drone strikes caused the closure, however, and Chad reportedly reopened the border crossing on July 29.^[96]

The SAF may also be increasing efforts to disrupt RSF supply lines from Libya. Libya is another primary transit point for Emirati weapons shipments, particularly combat vehicles, via parts of eastern Libya under the control of Emirati-backed Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army.^[97] Emirati-linked flights carrying suspected weapons shipments to the RSF via eastern Libyan airports increased to their highest level in June since al Kufra airport, which had been the primary Emirati-RSF node in southeastern Libya, temporarily closed in early 2026.^[98] Sudan Tribune reported that the SAF began redeploying forces to the “border triangle” area with Egypt, Libya, and Sudan in mid-July 2026 to cut off RSF supply lines.^[99] Ayin separately reported on July 21 that the Joint Forces had recently ambushed multiple convoys in the border area.^[100] Open source analyst Rich Tedd previously reported that the SAF had likely conducted the most airstrikes in the border area since November 2025 from mid-June to early July.^[101]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford and Abigail Taylor

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi committed to hold a Congolese national dialogue. Tshisekedi met with Congolese religious leaders in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, on July 17 and announced that he was willing to organize an “inclusive, peaceful, and resolutely republican national dialogue, aimed at strengthening national cohesion in respect for institutions and the Constitution.”^[102] A national dialogue is a state-convened forum that brings together political actors, armed belligerents, and civil society members to negotiate solutions to various crises. The religious leaders then met with the Congolese political opposition Article 64 Coalition (C64) to brief them and discuss next steps on July 18.^[103] The French foreign minister and the European Union’s mission in the DRC released statements acknowledging the dialogue announcement.^[104]

Congolese religious leaders have begun laying the groundwork for dialogue in advance of an official presidential decree that would finalize the dialogue’s contours. The religious leaders have begun consultations, reportedly also including with M23, its Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) political coalition, and AFC-linked former DRC President Joseph Kabila down the line, and said that they would soon develop a roadmap that would “become clearer as we go along.”^[105] Pastor Éric Senga, one of the religious leaders, said that the format of the dialogue will be a “joint process” and a “mix” of proposals previously put forth by the religious leaders and the Congolese government.^[106] Tshisekedi will formally launch the process by decree, which would establish the format and timetable, and appoint the facilitators and define their mandate.^[107] A member of the Congolese government had told the French state media outlet Radio France Internationale (RFI) in mid-July that Tshisekedi could issue the decree before the end of July.^[108]

Figure 5. Key Players in the Congolese National Dialogue

Source: Yale Ford.

Increased political and diplomatic pressure from the DRC’s regional allies and the opposition likely contributed to Tshisekedi moving forward with the dialogue, which he had delayed for a year and a half. Tshisekedi has inconsistently supported growing calls for dialogue efforts since early 2025. Tshisekedi had numerous disagreements with the religious leaders pushing for a dialogue in 2025 and slow-walked their effort for months. Tshisekedi’s administration attempted to placate the opposition without agreeing to the dialogue, sideline opponents he could not co-opt, and criticized the dialogue effort as M23-backed “subversion” to displace him from power.^[109] The fall of Uvira in South Kivu province to Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in December 2025 forced Tshisekedi to shift his stance and accept the dialogue in principle.^[110] Tshisekedi had effectively reversed his position by February 2026, however, as CTP assessed that the Congolese government began using its growing partnership with the United States to undo battlefield losses and avoid making concessions.^[111] Angolan President João Lourenço tried to organize a dialogue at Tshisekedi’s request between February and May 2026, but Tshisekedi blocked the process and made a counterproposal that Lourenço reportedly perceived as bad faith.^[112]

Tshisekedi’s efforts to change the Congolese constitution are fueling political instability and pressure from the opposition, which may have led him to agree to a dialogue in response. The ruling coalition has taken action since early 2026 to change the constitution, which CTP assessed previously would allow Tshisekedi to remain in power beyond the end of his constitutionally limited second term in 2028.^[113] The opposition launched the C64 coalition in mid-May to derail the effort.^[114] The issue came to a head in June, when the opposition led a general strike across the DRC and Congolese security services cracked down violently on a C64-led protest against constitutional change in Kinshasa.^[115] European journalists have noted that the opposition-led protests likely caught Tshisekedi by surprise and sent a “strong message” that the coalition could pose a challenge.^[116] A source in Tshisekedi’s office implied that another C64 nationwide protest scheduled for July 22 may have influenced Tshisekedi’s decision to cancel his plans to travel to the United States for the FIFA World Cup final and to chair a UN Security Council briefing on natural resource exploitation in late July.^[117] One C64 member claimed that Tshisekedi agreed to the dialogue in direct response to the increased pressure from the C64.^[118]

Tshisekedi’s close allies have urged him to accept a dialogue in recent weeks. An official from the UN mission in the DRC told Belgian journalist Hubert Leclercq in mid-July that Tshisekedi’s regional allies are “advising him to heed the voice of wisdom” and “not to be stubborn.”^[119] Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou-Nguesso met separately with Tshisekedi and the religious leaders in Brazzaville to discuss a dialogue in early July, due to Sassou-Nguesso’s concerns that a crisis linked to the constitution issue could destabilize Kinshasa and affect Brazzaville, which sits across the Congo River from Kinshasa.^[120] Alpha Condé, the former president of Guinea, also reportedly attended the meetings in Brazzaville and has advised Tshisekedi on the dialogue.^[121] Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye hosted the religious leaders and C64 members in Burundi to discuss a potential dialogue in early July.^[122] Lourenço has urged Tshisekedi repeatedly to convene an inclusive dialogue and reportedly has concerns about the risk of instability spilling over from Kinshasa.^[123]

The Congolese army’s (FARDC’s) recent military setback against the M23 coalition in South Kivu province additionally may have influenced Tshisekedi to opt in to the dialogue. The Congolese government began deploying reinforcements, including Burundian army (FDNB) troops, for military operations against AFC-aligned Twirwaneho fighters in the South Kivu highlands around Minembwe town in late May and early June.^[124] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence cited a memo in late July from Rwandan intelligence services that claimed that over 1,100 DRC coalition troops, including FARDC special force units, deployed to the Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu and Kalemie town further south in Tanganyika province in early June.^[125] The memo said that boats carrying troops to Kalemie were also transporting mortar parts, one-way attack drones, and ammunition.^[126]

DRC coalition forces then launched a major offensive against Twirwaneho.^[127] DRC coalition forces made territorial gains and reportedly advanced to within roughly a mile of the Minembwe airfield.^[128] Twirwaneho launched a successful counteroffensive, however, recapturing several operationally significant positions and forcing coalition forces to retreat as fighting continued in June and into early July.^[129] Coalition forces reportedly took heavy losses, with AFC and FDNB sources telling Leclercq in mid-July that between 100 and 150 FDNB troops died in a single battle.^[130] Several senior M23 military and political officials publicized a rare visit to Minembwe after the counteroffensive in early July, indicating AFC’s control of the area.^[131] Congolese government–aligned sources confirmed that some FARDC soldiers deserted from Baraka town, a logistic hub roughly 30 miles from the front line, after they refused to go to the front line to fight Twirwaneho in mid-July.^[132] Twirwaneho then repelled another DRC coalition attempt to retake an operationally significant position near Minembwe in late July.^[133]

Figure 6. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford and Abigail Taylor.

Rwanda and the M23 coalition’s use of air power and technology likely gave Twirwaneho a decisive advantage. The FARDC issued an internal statement calling on troops engaged in operational areas to turn off their mobile phones in early July, possibly due to the M23’s coalition increased intelligence collection abilities.^[134] The Congolese government and government-aligned media sources claimed that the Rwandan army (RDF) and M23 supplied matériel to Twirwaneho and deployed and operated drones that conducted a significant number of attacks that helped Twirwaneho fighters capture operationally significant positions throughout June and early July.^[135] M23-allied forces reportedly conducted up to eight separate drone attacks that targeted military convoys and killed 19 troops from the FARDC and FDNB, reportedly including an FDNB colonel and a major, on a key position in early July.^[136] Africa Intelligence reported that Rwandan forces are using KT6 drones and separately cited an FARDC intelligence memo in mid-July that estimated that the RDF conducted an average of five drone strikes per day in North and South Kivu since mid-June using Turkish-made Bayratkar TB2 medium-altitude long-endurance drones.^[137] The FARDC has reportedly struggled to counter these air attacks due to a lack of air defense systems and jamming technology.^[138]

The Congolese government will likely use the dialogue process to counter and co-opt the opposition while avoiding concessions that could weaken Tshisekedi. Tshisekedi has eased the political pressure by entertaining the idea of a dialogue. C64 agreed on July 20 to postpone its march for a second time to August 15 after Tshisekedi agreed to the dialogue to “give [it] a chance.”^[139] The coalition had postponed it to July 22 from July 8, because of their meeting with Ndayishimiye. C64 said after visiting Burundi that it would still march on July 22 and refused to engage in discussions unless Tshisekedi renounced his bid to change the constitution.^[140] The religious leaders asked the opposition to postpone it again to “secure the buy-in of the various parties” in their July 18 meeting, however, despite the opposition’s specific concerns about the “handling of the constitutional issue.”^[141] Kabila’s political platform, Sauvons la RDC, criticized C64 for postponing the march again.^[142]

Tshisekedi may be trying to further divide the opposition and co-opt those that he can. The opposition is already divided with different agendas and rival leaders. The request from the churches to postpone the march again reportedly led to conflict among C64, with some leaders fearing a volte-face from Tshisekedi that would weaken their ability to mobilize.^[143] The Congolese government said that it wanted to form a “national bloc” against Rwanda and M23 amid the ongoing war after Tshisekedi announced the dialogue.^[144] The evangelical churches, which are close to Tshisekedi and support the constitutional project, have echoed a similar line with respect to national solidarity.^[145] A source involved in the discussions told the French magazine Jeune Afrique in late July that Tshisekedi likely aims to further isolate Kabila and M23 and “rally as many actors as possible to his narrative” against Rwanda.^[146] Sauvons la RDC rejected the dialogue and claimed that it serves mainly to “bring together those willing to side with Tshisekedi.”^[147]

The Congolese government is trying to organize a favorable participant list and location for the dialogue. The government spokesperson said that the dialogue was open only to participants who demonstrate “patriotism” and are willing to take a clear stance rejecting “Rwandan aggression.”^[148] The DRC has long opposed holding a national dialogue that includes M23 and some members of the opposition, whom it accuses of complicity with M23. The government is arguing that a platform already exists to negotiate with M23 through the Doha process.^[149] The Congolese government also maintains that the dialogue must take place on Congolese soil and has rejected calls from Angola and the opposition to hold the talks abroad.^[150] CTP assessed previously that holding the dialogue in Kinshasa and excluding M23 and Kabila would likely stymie its overall effectiveness.^[151] Corneille Nangaa, the head of AFC, denounced the proposed dialogue initiative and said that M23 would not participate in a speech on July 19.^[152]

The government is also seeking to control the mediation by sidelining or co-opting the religious leaders. The religious leaders will reportedly play a “supporting role” but have no authority over the dialogue’s outcome.^[153] The Congolese government is likely trying to “dilute” the influence of the Catholic and Protestant churches, which have been important counterweights to successive Congolese administrations, by including other religious denominations, according to a Congolese think tank based in Kinshasa.^[154] The government has also sought to co-opt the Catholic and Protestant church leaders after they publicly opposed the constitution project in late June, which led to criticism from the ruling majority.^[155] The Archbishop of Kinshasa, Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo, shifted his position and explicitly linked the need for a dialogue to the DRC’s unity in the face of what he claimed was Rwandan aggression in the eastern DRC in remarks on July 17.^[156] The remarks came after reported “tense exchanges” between Tshisekedi’s office and the religious leaders before Tshisekedi announced the dialogue.^[157] Senga reaffirmed the “neutrality” of the religious leaders after C64 and Sauvons la RDC questioned their impartiality following Ambongo’s statement.^[158]

Constitutional change will likely be a significant issue before and during the dialogue. An opposition official told RFI that the religious leaders insisted in their meeting with Tshisekedi that he consider all topics in the dialogue.^[159] Senga said that Tshisekedi was committed to addressing “all issues of national interests” in the dialogue.^[160] The Congolese government did not explicitly rule out addressing the issue of constitutional change in the dialogue in public statements, and the participants could reportedly raise it during the process.^[161] C64 has conditioned its participation on Tshisekedi renouncing his ambitions for another term and said that its “red line” is the dialogue serving as a “pretext” for changing the constitution, however.^[162] The July 17 announcement of the dialogue did not resolve this issue. Tshisekedi had said in a speech in late June that the dialogue could not become an “instrument of pressure” that “circumvents institutions” and questions his own legitimacy.^[163]

The government has not yet committed to opposition demands for pre-dialogue confidence-building measures, which would boost opposition buy-in and representation in the dialogue. Angola and the political opposition have been calling for de-escalation measures for months.^[164] The top Congolese military court had sentenced Kabila to death for “treason” for his alleged ties to M23 in September 2025.^[165] Many opposition members are imprisoned in Kinshasa, and the Congolese government has confiscated the passports of some who are in exile.^[166] A C64 official told RFI on July 20 that they needed “guarantees.”^[167] A member of the Congolese government told RFI that anyone sentence to death for acts deemed “proven” would not be able to participate in the dialogue, however.^[168] Another insider source told Jeune Afrique that the government has ruled out commuting the “most sensitive” sentences.^[169] The government source told RFI that the government would possibly consider de-escalation measures to “reassure” certain participants but that they would not change the framework of the dialogue.^[170]

Tshisekedi and his allies may be using the dialogue to buy time and political space, as they are simultaneously advancing unilateral efforts to change the constitution and reorganize for the war in the eastern DRC, both of which could alienate opposition factions in the dialogue. The ruling majority is moving ahead with efforts to change the constitution. A lawmaker in ruling coalition had introduced a bill in the National Assembly in late April that would allow Tshisekedi to establish a national commission tasked with drafting new constitutional provisions and temporarily transform the parliament into a constituent assembly that debates and adopts the commission’s proposal, which must then be approved by a three-fifths parliamentary majority, before being voted on by referendum.^[171] Tshisekedi said in early May that he would accept a third term through a referendum.^[172] The National Assembly and Senate adopted the final bill in early and mid-June, respectively.^[173] The Constitutional Court validated and declared the referendum law constitutional in a ruling on July 28, paving the way for Tshisekedi to run for another term.^[174]

The FARDC continues to rearm and reinforce its positions in the eastern DRC. Tshisekedi and Ndayishimiye reportedly agreed to reinforce troop deployments, expand drone capabilities, and strengthen military intelligence during Ndayishimiye’s state visit to Kinshasa in late June.^[175] An M23-aligned journalist cited a source close to Tshisekedi’s office in mid-July who claimed that the FARDC recently received three Turkish-made Bayraktar AKINCI high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) drones for the first time.^[176] HALE drones can operate at extreme altitudes for multi-day mission durations. The FARDC commissioned the first of several thousand newly formed special combat troops in late July, following an intensive training program reportedly led by Israeli advisers.^[177] Flight tracking data indicates that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) possibly transported military equipment to Kinshasa on July 23.^[178] CTP assessed previously that these shipments, which increased in late June, are part of the growing DRC-UAE relationship, in which the Congolese government likely aims to acquire matériel and other forms of security assistance for the war with M23.^[179]

Africa File Data Cutoff: July 30, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.