US Sanctions Sudanese Islamists; ISWAP Ramadan Offensive: Africa File, March 12, 2026

Contributor: Elliot Nazar

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The United States designated Sudanese Islamist factions affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces as terrorist organizations due to their civilian targeting and ties to Iran. The designations have spurred calls from Sudanese and US officials to levy similar measures against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and could further complicate US-led peace efforts without further action against the RSF.
• Nigeria. Islamic State West Africa Province launched a Ramadan offensive in northeastern Nigeria in late February and has conducted several complex coordinated attacks that have overwhelmed Nigerian security forces in early March.
• Togo. The Russian defense minister met with the Togolese president to discuss implementing recently signed agreements. Russia likely plans to use cooperation with Togo to expand its sphere of influence from the landlocked central Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean.
• Niger. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) attacked the Tahoua air base in western Niger, its second attack on a Nigerien air base after the January attack on the Niamey air base. The attacks are likely part of an ISSP campaign to degrade Nigerien air capabilities and have inflicted serious damage on Niger’s transport and surveillance aircraft.
• Benin. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen has launched an offensive in northern Benin since February, ending a monthslong lull in attacks.

Figure 1. Africa File, March 12, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Sudan

Authors: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr and Elliot Nazar

The United States designated Sudanese Islamist factions affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as terrorist organizations due to their civilian targeting and ties to Iran. The US Department of State designated the Sudanese Islamic Movement and al Baraa bin Malik Brigade as Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations on March 9 and said that additional Foreign Terrorist Organization designations would take effect on March 16.^[1] The US Department of State stated that both factions have targeted civilians—including through mass executions—during Sudan’s civil war and accepted training and supplies from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to advance their “violent Islamist ideology.”^[2] US Senior Adviser for African Affairs Massad Boulos, who leads the Quad peace process involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), separately said that the designations hold the factions accountable for civilian targeting and reaffirmed his call for a humanitarian ceasefire.^[3] The US Department of the Treasury previously sanctioned the al Baraa bin Malik Brigade and Sudanese Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, who leads an Islamist political party, for civilian targeting, undermining the peace process, and ties to Iran in September 2025.^[4] Those sanctions blocked the al Baraa bin Malik Brigade and Ibrahim from doing business with US citizens or in the United States and holding property in the United States.^[5]

The Sudanese Islamic Movement is an umbrella Islamist political faction associated with the Muslim Brotherhood that has long held influence in the Sudanese government.^[6] The faction included former Sudanese President Omar al Bashir’s political party—the National Congress Party—and had members hold key positions in the government and SAF.^[7] The Sudanese Islamic Movement has historic ties with Salafi-jihadi groups such as Hamas and al Qaeda, with Bashir’s regime harboring former al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996.^[8] The faction has retained influence despite Bashir’s regime collapsing in 2019 thanks to its presence within the SAF, which has progressively consolidated control of the Sudanese government since its coup against civilian leaders in 2021 and relied on Islamist militias since the war broke out in 2023. The al Baraa bin Malik Brigade serves as the Sudanese Islamic Movement’s armed wing and has at least 20,000 fighters fighting against the RSF, helping the SAF retake Khartoum in March 2025.^[9]

Both the warring parties and the Quad members have accepted the designations with varying levels of approval. The SAF-led Sudanese government “followed” the designations and reaffirmed its opposition to terrorism.^[10] SAF backers Egypt and Saudi Arabia support the designations.^[11] Saudi Arabia’s and Egypt’s foreign ministers separately spoke with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 10 and 11, respectively, and stated that the designations further the stability of Sudan.^[12] The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and RSF-led parallel government stated that designations further freedom and justice in Sudan.^[13] The UAE, which is the RSF’s primary backer, said that the designations demonstrate the United States’ commitment to countering the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempts to obstruct the peace process.^[14]

The SAF has made slow progress in limiting Islamist influence since mid-2025, amid pressure from its Egyptian and Saudi allies and the United States. The SAF began the process by temporarily halting the supply of weapons to Islamist militias—including the al Baraa bin Malik Brigade—in May 2025.^[15] Boulos then met with SAF and Sudanese government head Abdel Fattah al Burhan in August to persuade Burhan to remove Islamists from the government and SAF, according to Africa Intelligence.^[16] Burhan removed several SAF officials affiliated with Islamist actors in the following weeks and announced that the SAF would integrate militias—including Islamist ones—into the SAF’s command structure.^[17]

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have pressured the SAF directly and through the Quad peace process. Saudi Arabia briefly detained al Baraa bin Malik leader al Misbah Abu Zaid Talha in June 2024.^[18] Egypt also arrested Talha in Cairo—the Egyptian capital—in August 2025 before releasing him after a high-level Sudanese government official reportedly intervened.^[19] Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a Quad statement in September affirming that Islamist factions could not have a role in postwar Sudan and that Quad parties must collaborate to limit Islamist influence.^[20]

Islamist militias have leveraged the SAF’s reliance on their battlefield capabilities to resist integration, however. The SAF has reportedly continued to allow the militias to use SAF weapons, including drones.^[21] The SAF had only begun the limited integration by December, but the al Baraa bin Malik Brigade still called the plan “catastrophic” and reportedly advocated for the replacement of senior SAF officials.^[22] The process has remained stalled, with militias such as the al Baraa bin Malik Brigade remaining semiautonomous.^[23]

The SAF has tried to distance itself from Islamist ties to Iran since the Iran war began while reaffirming its integration plan. A militia commander affiliated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement stated that Sudanese Islamists were prepared to fight against Israel and the United States in Iran.^[24] The SAF condemned the statement, portrayed the commander as being unaffiliated with the SAF, and reportedly arrested the commander.^[25] Sudan’s government has also condemned Iranian strikes against all countries in the Middle East except the UAE and accepted the United States’ designations.^[26] The SAF deputy chief then stated on March 6 that the SAF would increase efforts to integrate militias into the SAF’s command structure.^[27]

The designations have spurred calls from Sudanese and US officials to levy similar measures against the RSF. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the United States to designate the RSF as a terrorist organization in its statement accepting the US designations.^[28] US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch stated that the US must also “seriously consider” designating the RSF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.^[29] The designation statement cited “unrestrained violence against civilians to undermine efforts to resolve the conflict in Sudan” and “mass executions of civilians,” both of which the RSF has also committed.^[30] The RSF has committed multiple genocides since the beginning of the war, including a systematic mass starvation campaign in western Sudan.^[31]

The designations could spur SAF resentment and stymie US peace efforts without further action against the RSF. The RSF and UAE have publicly prioritized limiting Islamist influence in Sudan’s government, conditioning peace talks on the stipulation.^[32] Burhan already accused Boulos of favoring Emirati and RSF interests in peace talks after the SAF received conflicting Quad ceasefire drafts deemed favorable to the RSF in November 2025.^[33] The SAF believes the peace process legitimizes the RSF and is biased against the SAF, which has hindered SAF willingness to engage in the process.^[34]

Nigeria

Author: Liam Karr and Alexis Thomas

IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) has conducted a Ramadan offensive in northeastern Nigeria since late February. ISWAP has resumed its “burn the camps” campaign during this year’s Ramadan, increasing the rate, severity, and complexity of attacks against Nigerian military camps across Borno state.^[35] ISWAP has conducted simultaneous, coordinated attacks on multiple Nigerian army positions across northeastern Nigeria as part of the offensive.^[36] ISWAP militants attacked four Nigerian military camps in Konduga, Marte, Jakana, and Mainok, Borno state, on the night of March 5 into March 6.^[37] Smaller groups of militants simultaneously targeted several other nearby camps with mortars, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and small-arms fire to slow Nigerian forces or deny their sending reinforcements, and a lone ISWAP suicide bomber also detonated a suicide vehicle-borne IED at another Nigerian army camp that night.^[38] ISWAP militants carried out major attacks against three military camps in Goniri, Yobe state, and Kukawa and Dalwa, Borno state, the night of March 8 into 9, while smaller groups of militants carried out another set of diversionary attacks on camps in Marte and Doron Baga camps.^[39]

Figure 2. ISWAP Launches Ramadan Offensive

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data and Alexis Thomas.

ISWAP launched this offensive shortly after the beginning of Ramadan, following the release of the first speech from the IS central spokesperson in nearly two years on February 21.^[40] ISWAP has carried out at least 17 attacks against Nigerian security forces in Borno state since February 26. The group had averaged roughly seven attacks per week on Nigerian security forces in Borno thus far in 2026. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data recorded only 11 attacks against Nigerian security forces in February and March 2025.

The offensive is overwhelming and overstretching Nigerian security forces, leading to several attacks that have overrun bases and resulted in mass casualties. The Nigerian Air Force reportedly could intervene in only one of the four attacks on March 5.^[41] IS claims, Nigerian media reporting, and satellite imagery indicate that ISWAP overran the Goniri and Kukawa camps on March 8.^[42] The Guardian reported on March 11 that at least 65 Nigerian soldiers had been killed in jihadist attacks across northeast Nigeria in the past two weeks, and at least four officers are among these casualties.^[43] ISWAP claimed it had killed at least 90 soldiers since March 5.[44]

Togo

Authors: Liam Karr and Alexis Thomas

The Russian defense minister met with the Togolese president to strengthen defense cooperation and work toward implementing recently signed military agreements. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in Lomé on March 8 to meet with Togolese President Fauré Gnassingbé.^[45] The talks reportedly discussed military and technical cooperation, arms supplies, military training, and joint counterterrorism efforts.^[46] The two leaders also discussed previous military agreements. President Gnassingbé visited Moscow in November 2025, when Russian and Togolese leaders officially approved a bilateral agreement providing for intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, and the possibility for the Russian navy to dock in the port of Lomé.^[47] CTP previously assessed that military agreements could also eventually lead to the deployment of Russia’s Africa Corps, given previous visits from Yunus-bek Yevkurov—the Russian deputy defense minister and de facto Africa Corps head—and the previously reported presence of Russian military advisers.^[48]

Russia is strengthening its partnership with Togo as part of efforts to expand its sphere of influence from the landlocked central Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean. CTP previously assessed that the Kremlin likely seeks Atlantic port access in littoral West Africa to strengthen its logistic network in the Sahel.^[49] Russia had previously relied on port access in Conakry, Guinea, for large military equipment shipments to the Sahel.^[50] This involved numerous shipments in early 2025 that were part of the transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps in Mali.^[51] The Wagner Group similarly uses the port in Douala, Cameroon, to import and export goods and equipment into and out of the Central African Republic.^[52]

Figure 3. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia has also sought to strengthen military ties with other littoral countries, such as Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe.^[53] São Tomé and Príncipe—an island nation off the coast of West Africa—ratified a military agreement with Russia in April 2024 that allows Russian ships to refuel at São Toméan ports.^[54] At least 200 Russian Africa Corps troops have been in Equatorial Guinea since December 2024 to provide regime security for President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and train his elite forces. President Obiang has visited Moscow three times since November 2023, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yevkurov has visited Malabo multiple times since November 2024.^[55]

Niger

Author: Liam Karr and Zoe Sommer

IS Sahel Province (ISSP) attacked the Tahoua airport in western Niger, marking the second ISSP attack targeting Nigerien air assets following the January attack on the Niamey air base. Likely Islamic State militants conducted an attack on Air Base 401, at the Tahoua airport, in the early morning of March 9.[56] The militants stormed the airport compound, while a second group of militants attacked the Tahoua city center.[57] Witnesses reported hearing both explosions and gunfire, with some sources reporting the attackers used one-way attack drones.[58] The militants clashed with the Nigerien soldiers defending the base for nearly 45 minutes before briefly withdrawing.[59] The attackers then regrouped and attacked the headquarters of the 42nd Combined Arms Battalion near Tahoua, which the Nigerien army eventually repelled.[60] Nigerien state news claimed that security forces arrested five suspects and killed an unspecified number of militants following the attacks.[61] ISSP had already been active in the Tahoua region but had not attacked Tahoua city before, although ISSP has not yet claimed the attack.

The attack explicitly targeted drones at the base. The militants first targeted the base’s military facilities, including drone hangars. The Tahoua regional governor admitted that the attackers damaged some unspecified equipment.^[62] Unverified reports on social media from Nigerien opposition figures claimed that the fighters may have damaged a Turkish Aksungur drone and a Bayraktar TB2 drone and disabled the ground-control station, which rendered the base’s two remaining drones unusable.^[63]

ISSP launched a similar complex attack on Air Base 101, at the Diori Hamani International airport, in late January. The attack used kamikaze drones, mortar fire, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices with ground forces to target the air command headquarters and drone facilities.^[64] The attackers burned several civilian and military aircraft, vehicles, and at least three hangars.^[65] Local sources reported that the attack killed three Russian soldiers, 24 Nigerien soldiers, and wounded 18 others, while the Nigerien junta leader praised Nigerien and Russian forces for killing over 20 militants and detaining a dozen suspects.^[66] The Diori Hamani International Airport is roughly five miles from the city of Niamey and 6.2 miles from the Nigerien presidential palace.^[67]

Figure 4. ISSP Attacks Nigerien Air Bases

Source: Liam Karr.

ISSP is likely launching a concerted campaign to degrade Nigerien air capabilities. In the Niamey attack, ISSP reportedly destroyed one of two Mil Mi-17 SH combat-transport helicopters, one of three Hurkus military training and observation aircraft, one of two Diamond Aircraft DA42 surveillance planes, and one or possibly two of Niger’s four Cessna 208 Caravan reconnaissance aircraft.^[68] The attackers also destroyed a Turkish drone, which would be Niger’s only Aksungur drone, or one of its six Bayraktar TB2 drones.^[69]

The damage has severely weakened Niger’s transport and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The MI-171 SH combat-transport helicopter is Niger’s biggest multi-role helicopter, capable of carrying 36 troops and 4,000 kilograms of cargo.^[70] Niger’s remaining transport helicopters—two Bell 412HP Twin Hueys and five SA342 Gazelles—can accommodate roughly 14 and five people, respectively.^[71] The destroyed Cessna and Diamond aircraft represent at least a third of Niger’s ISR aircraft.^[72] The Hurkus C combat aircraft combines ISR and attack capabilities and uses infrared and optical imaging.^[73]

Benin

Author: Liam Karr and Zoe Sommer

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has conducted an offensive in northern Benin since February, ending a monthslong lull in attacks. JNIM has increased the scale and rate of its attacks in northern Benin in recent weeks. JNIM conducted at least three attacks since February 24, marking its most active two-week period since early August 2025.^[74] An attack on Kofouno village in the Alibori region killed at least 15 soldiers and wounded four others, which is the group’s deadliest attack in Benin since April 2025.^[75]

Figure 5. JNIM Resumes Attacks in Benin

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The offensive follows a lull of several months in JNIM activity in Benin. JNIM attacks significantly decreased after June 2025, and the group carried out only one attack between August 22, 2025, and January 14, 2026.^[76] JNIM had averaged at least seven attacks per month in the first half of 2025.^[77] The rainy season in northern Benin typically runs from June to October, but JNIM was still more active during the second half of 2024, when it launched over 49 attacks between July and December 2024, than it was in 2025.^[78]

The lull may have been due to a truce between JNIM and Benin that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) mediated. A JNIM commander in eastern Burkina Faso and brother of the JNIM subgroup leader in Niger defected to ISSP in February 2026, citing alleged JNIM peace deals with Benin and Côte d’Ivoire as part of his reason for leaving.^[79] The commander claimed AQIM forced JNIM to accept a truce with Benin and send forces to Benin from eastern Burkina Faso to prevent ISSP expansion into Benin.^[80] JNIM has previously negotiated government-backed peace agreements with local communities in Mali to lift blockades, ease restrictions, and facilitate prisoner releases.^[81]

Several factors could be driving the offensive, including JNIM’s rivalry with ISSP and the December coup. The intensity of JNIM-ISSP infighting surged in Burkina Faso in February 2026, with three clashes between the groups killing over 41 fighters, marking the deadliest month of infighting since November.^[82] JNIM has launched offensives in both eastern Burkina Faso and Benin since the defections, indicating it may be attempting to restore its legitimacy among alienated fighters to prevent further dissent.^[83]

JNIM could also be attempting to exploit gaps created by the thwarted coup in Benin in December 2025. Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, the coup leader, commanded Benin’s Special Forces corps, and some of the mutineers were members of Benin’s National Guard and Special Forces Corps.^[84] These troops are Benin’s best armed and trained forces and have been regularly deployed to northern Benin.^[85] Beninese Armed Forces have claimed that their operational capabilities in northern Benin improved in early January, however, and they said that they killed 45 militants during the last quarter of 2025.^[86]

Africa File Data Cutoff: March 12, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.