RSF Mobilizes Around SAF’s Central Sudan Stronghold; Tshisekedi’s Power Grab: Africa File, June 18, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are setting conditions for an offensive on the Sudanese Armed Forces–controlled city of el Obeid in North Kordofan, which is a major operational objective for both sides, as it is key to control of central Sudan and breaking the current stalemate. Emirati support received through neighboring countries continues to enable the RSF's war effort.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Security services and militias linked to the regime of DRC President Félix Tshisekedi forcibly cracked down on opposition protests against the government’s push to change the Congolese constitution. Tshisekedi almost certainly aims to amend or replace the constitution to enable him to stay in power beyond the end of his constitutionally limited second term in 2028.

Figure 1. Africa File, June 18, 2026

Source: Yale Ford.

Assessments:

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are setting conditions for an offensive on el Obeid, the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF’s) headquarters in central Sudan. The RSF has begun organizing logistics for an el Obeid offensive. RSF forces have redeployed from western Sudan to main roads to the south and west of el Obeid, including to frontline positions near Kazgil and um Sumeima.^[1] Several dozen armored vehicles have accompanied the redeployments, which may also include air defense systems, according to multiple open-source analysts.^[2] The SAF has responded with drone strikes and reportedly conducted ground operations against RSF positions near el Obeid, according to multiple pro-SAF sources.^[3]

The RSF has also increased drone strikes around el Obeid as part of operations that have inflicted fuel shortages and weakened SAF defenses. The RSF has expanded its targeting of population centers on Sudan’s main east–west highway and conducted daily drone strikes in el Obeid since June 10, a rate not seen since March 2026, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[4] The drone strikes have reportedly destroyed at least eight SAF fuel depots and several fuel tankers en route to el Obeid, causing widespread fuel shortages and disrupting SAF supply lines into el Obeid.^[5] The RSF has also targeted the SAF’s command headquarters in el Obeid and reportedly destroyed weapons depots.^[6] The RSF has previously increased drone strikes prior to successful ground offensives in cities such as Babanusa and el Fasher.^[7]

Figure 2. RSF Pressures SAF in Central Sudan

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Angus Muldoon; Sudan Tribune.

The RSF may attempt to capture a key town south of el Obeid to tighten the siege on the city prior to any offensive. The SAF partially broke the RSF’s two-year siege of Dilling, located approximately 100 miles south of el Obeid, by reconnecting Dilling to el Obeid via a side road in January 2026.^[8] The RSF has repeatedly contested control of the side road since March, however, effectively reimposing its siege on Dilling.^[9] The RSF has further isolated Dilling by nearly doubling its monthly artillery shelling and drone strikes on the town since March, compared with January and February.^[10] The RSF has also launched numerous ground operations to advance to the outskirts of Dilling, although the SAF has repelled the advances.^[11] The RSF’s recent redeployments south of el Obeid in the area of Kazgil could serve an advance north toward el Obeid or south toward Dilling.^[12]

The SAF has repeatedly repelled RSF attempts to take el Obeid, which is a major operational objective for both sides, as it is key to control of central Sudan and breaking the current stalemate. The RSF had prioritized capturing el Obeid since the start of the Sudanese civil war in April 2023, completely besieging the city until the SAF broke the siege in February 2025.^[13] El Obeid serves as both a SAF command headquarters and logistics hub, as the city is at the juncture of two east–west and north–south highways that connect the front lines to the SAF-controlled Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and the Nile River Valley, which is the most populous area of Sudan. The north–south highway also stretches south through contested population centers in south-central Sudan, including Dilling, before reaching Sudan’s largest oil hub on the South Sudanese border, which the RSF captured in December 2025.^[14]

The RSF refocused on el Obeid after consolidating control of western Sudan in late 2025. The RSF redeployed forces to central Sudan after it captured el Fasher, the final SAF-controlled population center in western Sudan, in October.^[15] The RSF has since imposed a partial siege on el Obeid from the north, south, and west.^[16] The SAF sent reinforcements, reportedly including senior commanders, to el Obeid in October and November.^[17] The SAF redeployed forces from central Sudan in April and May to counter an RSF offensive that opened a secondary front in southeastern Sudan, however.^[18]

Emirati support received through neighboring countries continues to enable the RSF’s war effort. The United Arab Emirates has been the RSF’s indispensable backer since the war began, providing equipment, personnel, and weaponry, such as drones and armored vehicles, to the RSF through supply lines that mainly run through Chad, Ethiopia, and Libya.^[19] Emirati-linked flights carrying suspected weapons shipments have continued to land at multiple airports in Chad and Libya, with shipments then transiting to RSF-controlled western Sudan.^[20] The open-source analyst Rich Tedd reported in late May 2026 that the RSF has recently received several shipments of suspected Emirati armored vehicles via Libya, although it is unclear whether the vehicles are the same ones involved in the current buildup around el Obeid.^[21] The SAF conducted a drone strike near the Chadian border on June 9, damaging a bridge that Tedd identified as a key point on an RSF supply line from Chad.^[22] The United States and United Nations separately condemned the strike for disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid, however.^[23]

Figure 3. RSF Regional Smuggling Supply Lines

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Flightradar24.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

Security services and militias linked to the regime of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi forcibly cracked down on opposition protests against the government’s push to change the Congolese constitution. At least a thousand supporters of the political opposition organized a protest on June 12 against a proposed constitutional reform, marching toward the parliament building in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, in defiance of a government ban.[24] At least 100 Congolese security forces, equipped with armored vehicles, riot trucks, water cannons, rocks, and tear gas, alongside youth militia members from Tshisekedi’s political party, Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UPDS), intervened to shut down the demonstration.[25] Former presidential candidate Martin Fayulu and several other high-profile opposition figures sustained injuries during the clashes, and the opposition claimed that at least two people died.[26] Police reportedly detained some of the protestors, and local citizen groups accused Congolese intelligence services of arresting political activists amid the crackdown.[27] UPDS members also vandalized and looted the headquarters of Fayulu’s party.[28]

Tshisekedi’s allies have accelerated efforts to change the constitution over the last four months. The UPDS head said publicly in early March that the party would seek to change the constitution and that there would be no discussion about a potential successor to Tshisekedi.[29] Tshisekedi’s majority coalition, the Union sacrée de la nation (USN), which controls both the National Assembly and the Senate, started gathering proposals for constitutional review from a range of stakeholders and displaying pro-constitutional change slogans on public buildings in late April.[30]

Tshisekedi’s coalition is now setting the legal framework to revise the constitution. A lawmaker in the USN introduced a bill in the National Assembly in late April that would allow Tshisekedi to establish a national commission tasked with drafting new constitutional provisions and temporarily transform the parliament into a constituent assembly that debates and adopts the commission’s proposal, which must then be approved by a three-fifths parliamentary majority, before being voted on by referendum.[31] Tshisekedi then said in early May that he would accept a third term through a referendum.[32] The National Assembly and Senate adopted the final bill in early and mid-June, respectively, and now awaits Tshisekedi’s signature.[33]

The crackdown and parliament bill are the latest signs that Tshisekedi aims to stay in power beyond the end of his constitutionally limited second term in 2028. Tshisekedi’s second term expires in 2028, unless he replaces the constitution or sidesteps its key provisions to reset his term limits. The current constitution, which was finalized in 2006 after a settlement to the Second Congo War and subsequent political transition under former President Joseph Kabila, established democratic institutions and limits Congolese presidents to a maximum of two five-year terms. Article 220 of the constitution lists several “locked” features of the political system that cannot be subject to a constitutional amendment, including the Congolese president’s number and length of terms.[34] Constitutional review also cannot occur during periods of war or martial law, according to Article 219.[35] Tshisekedi was a staunch opponent of Kabila’s bid to change the constitution when Tshisekedi was in the opposition.[36]

Tshisekedi began setting political conditions to change the constitution in late 2024, but the M23 rebellion slowed these efforts. Tshisekedi announced in October 2024 that he would seek to change the constitution and appoint a commission in 2025 that would study the issue.[37] The security crisis then escalated significantly as M23 captured major cities in the eastern DRC with Rwandan support in early 2025. The offensive preoccupied the government and put a pause on constitutional reform. The project remained a priority in Tshisekedi’s inner circle, however, and Tshisekedi’s allies began ousting officials whom they likely viewed as disloyal or obstacles to the project in late 2025.[38]

Tshisekedi’s efforts have partially benefited from increased US involvement in the region. The United States and the DRC signed an economic and security partnership, which CTP assessed previously has strengthened Tshisekedi politically and enabled Tshisekedi to leverage regime continuity as good for long-term US economic interests in the DRC to extend his grip on power.[39] Tshisekedi has said that constitutional revision is necessary to implement “certain reforms” requested by the United States to advance the US-DRC partnership, although critics have noted that these reforms are mostly related to fiscal and anti-corruption measures, not an overhaul of the political system. [40] The security situation with M23 in the eastern DRC has also markedly improved for the regime since early 2026, partially thanks to US policy, as M23 and Rwanda halted and reversed their military campaign in South Kivu following extensive US sanctions and political pressure.

Proponents of constitutional revision argue that is necessary to stabilize and modernize the country. Tshisekedi and his allies have said that the 2006 constitution is “outdated” and must be “adapted to Congolese realities,” reflecting the view among supporters that the constitution has limited the government’s ability to respond to the country’s various governance challenges, including security challenges in the eastern DRC.[41] These proponents have not clarified any specific mechanisms, tools, or principles beyond centralized rule and arguments based on “popular sovereignty” that would achieve these goals, however.

Regime supporters argue that Tshisekedi should remain in office because he is popular among the electorate but has faced constraints in fully implementing his agenda. Tshisekedi has also falsely said that the current constitution should be discarded because it was “written by foreigners,” despite non-Congolese nationals playing an insignificant role in drafting the 2006 constitution.[42] Tshisekedi claimed in a speech on June 17 that Rwanda replaced Laurent Kabila with his son Joseph Kabila, who was elected the first president under the new constitution in 2006 and ruled until 2019, to manipulate and control him at the expense of the Congolese people.[43]

Tshisekedi now has the legal pretext to circumvent the current constitution’s restrictions and stay in power. The bill ratified by parliament in June allows Tshisekedi to trigger a constitutional review through the constituent assembly if a “major dysfunction of the [state] institutions” has taken place, but it does not define what this means.[44] This leaves interpretation to the Tshisekedi-controlled Congolese parliament and provides a loophole around Article 220. The bill says that the referendum voted on by the public at the end of the process can be open to any “matter of fundamental importance” to the country, not just a new constitution, in line with the regime’s arguments that popular sovereignty and the right to create a new constitution should transcend the limitations of the current one.[45]

The bill allows Tshisekedi to call the referendum by decree when he chooses, and Tshisekedi’s advisers and political analysts have said that he could call it as early as fall 2026.[46] Tshisekedi and his allies have said that the war with M23 must end before a referendum and elections can take place, however, despite Tshisekedi securing his second term in elections during a lower-intensity phase of the M23 crisis in late 2023.[47]

Regime opponents and critics view the proposed reform as a “constitutional coup” that will enable Tshisekedi to entrench his rule and further centralize power under the guise of reform. The Brussels, Belgium–based Egmont Institute assessed previously that the Congolese constitution project is tied to ambitions within the UPDS, which was locked out of power under previous regimes, and Tshisekedi’s ethnic community to consolidate power and retain national leadership for decades.[48]

Critics argue that the country has more important priorities and Congolese governance challenges are rooted in the poor execution of existing laws and institutions, as well as systemic corruption and bad leaders, rather than shortcomings in the constitution itself.[49] Critics have also warned that any attempt to change core elements of the constitution would further weaken democratic guardrails introduced during the post-war transition, erode the government’s legitimacy, and potentially destabilize the country.[50] Sources within M23 told the French magazine Jeune Afrique in early June that M23 would declare itself independent if Tshisekedi changes the constitution, illustrating how the issue impacts the ongoing security crisis in the eastern DRC.[51]

Africa File Data Cutoff: June 18, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.