DRC-M23 Doha Peace Framework; Togo-Russia Ties: Africa File, November 20, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels signed a peace framework roadmap agreement, but most key provisions remain unresolved, face many challenges, and are far from implementation. The framework charts a path toward reaching a comprehensive, long-term deal but itself is nonbinding and does not include any new concrete agreements.
• Togo. Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow as Togo and Russia continue to develop a strategic partnership. The Kremlin likely views Togo as pathway to greater Atlantic influence and to expand its sphere of influence in the Sahel, while Gnassingbé is trying to balance between the West and various other countries as he seeks to maintain his hold on power.
• Central Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces are separately prioritizing efforts to secure supply lines and rear areas around central Sudan. These campaigns likely aim to enable both sides to concentrate resources on their main focus—a decisive battle in the North Kordofan state capital, el Obeid.
• Darfur. The Rapid Support Forces are likely continuing to commit systematic crimes against humanity in El Fasher, which include acts of ethnic cleansing and potentially acts of genocide.
• Ethiopia. Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano militias are sustaining their offensives across northern Ethiopia despite increased Ethiopian National Defense Forces pressure. Greater cohesiveness may be enabling Fano’s gains, which the Ethiopian federal government is concerned indicate a Fano alliance with Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
• Mali. The Malian junta has successfully reopened one of the main transit corridors connecting Bamako to Côte d’Ivoire through southern Mali. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen has doubled down on its blockade, however, and continued to escalate attacks around the city of Sikasso, the second largest city in Mali.
• Tri-Border. Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) have engaged in the deadliest period of inter-jihadi fighting since 2022. ISSP may have launched its latest offensive to bolster its legitimacy and status vis-à-vis JNIM following JNIM’s monthslong blockade on Mali’s capital.

Figure 1. Africa File, November 20, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

The Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels signed a peace framework agreement. Senior representatives from the two sides signed the framework agreement in Doha, the Qatari capital, on November 15.[1] The Congolese and Rwandan governments welcomed the signing in separate statements.[2] The Qatari mediation team and Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, saluted the signing as “an important step” to peace efforts.[3] The African Union and several senior European officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, also welcomed the signing on social media.[4]

The agreement was a prerequisite to finalizing the US-backed peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The United States is expected to host the Congolese and Rwandan presidents for a formal head of state signing ceremony to consummate the US-backed framework, which was initially agreed to in June, following the DRC-M23 agreement. The resolution of the M23 conflict is reportedly central to significant investment from US companies in the DRC-Rwanda border region.[5] Boulos has said previously that a sustainable deal between the two sides is the “last piece of the puzzle” to the US-led peace framework.[6]

Figure 2. DRC Peace Roadmap

Source: Yale Ford.

The signing of the peace framework charts a path toward reaching a comprehensive, long-term deal but itself is nonbinding and does not include any new concrete agreements. The framework agreement contains eight pillars or separate negotiating tracks to address specific key issues. Two of the pillars had already been signed—the prisoner exchange agreement on September 14 and the ceasefire verification mechanism agreement on October 14.[7] The framework outlines six additional pillars that have yet to be agreed upon: humanitarian access and judicial protection, the return of state authority and governance reforms, security, identity and citizenship and return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, economic recovery and social services, and a justice commission.[8]

The two parties will negotiate the pillars one by one and debate the “timelines, zones, sequencing, security parameters, legal measures and provisions” necessary for implementation, according to the framework.[9] Togo, which is the African Union representative; the United States; and Qatar may participate as observers in the agreement’s implementation.[10] The resolution of all six additional pillars will represent a comprehensive peace deal, referred to as the Global Peace Agreement.

The framework agreement is nonbinding and does not go much further than what has already been achieved. The various categories of issues in the framework are similar to what Qatar proposed in a draft from August, which both sides originally rejected. Topics of negotiation in several of the new pillars account for M23’s reported demands from earlier rounds of talks but are broad and deep-seated issues that individually could take months to negotiate. The ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreements took three months to finalize. The head of M23’s delegation in Doha said that the framework was nonbinding, that it would not change the lines of territorial control in the short-to-medium term, and that the “path is still long.”[11] Boulos said that the framework was a “starting point,” despite months of talks and consistent pressure from American and Qatari mediators.[12]

Negotiations have been tense and slow, with neither side having much incentive to abandon its maximalist positions, and will almost certainly drag well into 2026. The two sides released their first joint statement on April 23, committing to dialogue and working toward a ceasefire.[13] They then signed a declaration of principles agreement on July 19, which had a formal ceasefire provision and several confidence-building measures that would facilitate talks on deeper issues when resolved.[14] Slow progress on negotiating the ceasefire and prisoner exchange and mutual accusations of violating the ceasefire meant that they did not discuss extensively the more fundamental aspects—or the “root causes”—of the conflict in successive rounds of talks.

The DRC has maintained a maximalist negotiating stance throughout the talks partially because M23 does not pose a direct military threat to the Congolese government. CTP has assessed that DRC President Félix Tshisekedi is managing the risk of a coup linked to the M23 conflict, but the group does not pose a direct military threat.[15] M23 would have to advance roughly 500 miles to reach the DRC’s economic engine in the mineral-rich southern region and nearly 1,000 miles to Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, across poor roads.

M23 has similarly refused to budge from its maximalist stance, as it has spent most of 2025 strengthening its leverage through building a de facto autonomous region in the eastern DRC. [16] M23 has focused inward as it has not faced an external military threat to its control of the Kivus since its early 2025 offensive or pressure from Rwanda to agree to demobilize and withdraw. Many of M23’s state-building efforts overlap with the objectives and end goal of the six additional pillars in the framework agreement. An entrenched M23 administration would be even more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that sees M23 gradually incorporated into the Congolese government. M23’s control over the eastern DRC aligns with Rwanda’s long-term strategy to protect and strengthen its political and economic influence and establish a buffer zone on the border with Rwanda.

Read CTP’s full report on M23’s parallel administration efforts in M23’s State-Building Project: Africa File Special Edition.

Continued disagreements on contentious issues could drag pillar negotiations well into 2026. Immediate and long-term challenges remain to peace efforts as the two sides begin the process of negotiating and implementing the November 15 framework. Both the ceasefire and prisoner exchange mechanisms have not yet even been implemented, the latter being stalled over technicalities.[17] The ceasefire mechanism committee has met only once, on November 5, and clashes continue between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces on the ground.[18] The next round of talks will not happen until November 29, when the two sides committed to reconvene to restart negotiations.[19] M23 has meanwhile showed no indication of slowing down its expansive efforts to construct a parallel state with Rwandan backing in the east.

For full analysis of each of the six unresolved pillars, read DRC-M23 Doha Peace Framework—A Long Road Ahead: Africa File Special Edition.

Read the one-page executive summary of the report here.

Togo

Authors: Chris Dayton and Liam Karr

Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé met with Russian President Vladimir Putin as Togo and Russia continue to develop a strategic partnership. The talks will focus on security developments in the Sahel amid al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate’s encirclement of Mali’s capital city, Bamako. The two also discussed increased cooperation on transportation, infrastructure, and agriculture and agreed to open embassies in 2026.^[20] Togo is an importer of Russian grain and wants to cooperate on the importing of fertilizer to West Africa, Russia being the world’s second-largest exporter.^[21]

Togo and Russia have been strengthening defense ties since at least 2022. Togo received three MI-35M attack helicopters and two MI-17 transport helicopters from Russia in 2022.^[22] French-based investigative news site Africa Intelligence reported in 2024 that a contingent of 30 Russian military advisers had arrived in Togo and are helping Togolese troops build a new military camp on the border with Burkina Faso.^[23] The Russian parliament recently ratified a bilateral military cooperation agreement with Togo in October.^[24] The agreement says that Russia and Togo will cooperate on military training, joint exercises, and intelligence sharing.^[25] The Russian parliament ratified another military cooperation agreement with Togo in July.^[26]

Gnassingbé and the Kremlin have also strengthened their political relationship in recent years. A Ukrainian Special Forces–run information operation and partisan support organization said in 2024 that Russia planned to provide political support, such as information operations, for Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé’s 2025 reelection campaign.^[27] Gnassingbé has since ended his bid for reelection after transitioning Togo to a parliamentary system in a manner that will enable him to remain head of state without term limits or a general election.^[28] Gnassingbé’s move has been described as a “constitutional coup” and has been met with months of protests around Togo.^[29]

The Kremlin likely views Togo as pathway to greater Atlantic influence and to expand its sphere of influence in the Sahel. Atlantic port access via Togo would strengthen Russia’s logistic network in the landlocked Sahel. Russia had previously relied on port access in Conakry, Guinea, for large military equipment shipments to the Sahel.^[30] Malian media has reported that Russia also agreed to deliver up to 200,000 tons of petroleum and agricultural products to Bamako amid the ongoing blockade, which will presumably have to go through a West African port.^[31] The Wagner Group similarly uses the port in Douala, Cameroon, to import and export goods and equipment to the Central African Republic.^[32]

Russia may have the long-term goal to use West Africa to project naval power in the Atlantic Ocean, which would threaten the United States and NATO’s flank. Russia deployed an Admiral Gorshkov–class frigate, which has a seaworthy range of 5,580 miles, to conduct a computer simulation hypersonic cruise missile strike exercise in the Atlantic Ocean in 2023.^[33] São Tomé and Príncipe—an island nation off the coast of West Africa—also ratified a military agreement with Russia in April that allows Russian ships to refuel at São Toméan ports.^[34]

Russia would also benefit from Togo joining the Russian-backed Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The AES serves as a pro-Russian economic, military, and political bloc and conduit for Russia’s efforts to supplant the West elsewhere, such as Togo.^[35] Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey said in 2025 that Togo was “considering joining the AES” to strengthen regional cooperation and offer sea access to the landlocked Sahel countries.^[36] Chad and Togo conducted combined military drills with the AES in 2024.^[37] AES representatives met with Togolese leadership to discuss regional economic integration and trade reforms in October.^[38]

Gnassingbé is trying to balance between the West and various other countries and likely views his ties Russia as useful to helping insulate himself both domestically and internationally as he seeks to maintain his hold on power. Russia’s political support is similar to the “regime security package” it has offered other autocratic African leaders. Russia’s package includes information operation assistance and training of elite protection units to insulate autocratic regimes.^[39] This support would help the Togolese government crackdown on opposition and protestors.^[40]

Balancing between Russia and the West helps insulate Gnassingbé from Western pressure. Dussey wrote an op-ed in The Hill in late July advocating greater Togolese-US security cooperation.^[41] Dussey framed Togo as the United States’ “most engaged and capable defense partner in coastal West Africa” and noted that Togo aligns with the Trump administration’s efforts to burden share with capable regional partners and reengage the Sahel states at the epicenter of the insurgency. Togo has also framed itself as a regional economic partner as the United States seeks to increase business ties with Africa. The US chargé d’affaires in Togo toured the port of Lomé in late July.^[42] Togo has also taken a greater role in the US-backed DRC peace process in 2025 as the African Union representative in the process.[43]

Togo is separately expanding its economic and security partnerships with middle powers. Togo hosts Turkish military instructors, who helped repel a JNIM attack last year.^[44] Togo also debuted their recently acquired Kasser II mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles, purchased from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), during a military parade in April.^[45] Togo has also acted as a transit hub for the UAE in exporting gold from Sahel countries.^[46]

Central Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are securing key ground lines of communication north and south of its central Sudan headquarters in the North Kordofan state capital, el Obeid. The SAF recaptured um Dam Haj Ahmed on November 15 and advanced into Bara on November 17, but the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) repelled the Bara attack.^[47] The RSF previously captured the towns, which are located approximately 40 miles north of el Obeid, on October 26.^[48] The recapture of um Dam Haj Ahmed gives the SAF control over the areas east and south of Bara, which lies on the road that links el Obeid and the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.

The SAF also recaptured Kazgil—located 30 miles south of el Obeid—on November 15.^[49] The RSF previously captured the town on September 13.^[50] Kazgil lies off the road linking el Obeid to Dilling and Kadugli, which are SAF-controlled towns located approximately 95 and 185 miles south of Kazgil, respectively. The SAF partially broke RSF sieges of Dilling and Kadugli—the South Kordofan state capital—by linking the approximately 80 mile stretch of road between the two towns in February 2025.^[51] The RSF has continued to impose a partial siege on the two towns and connecting corridor, leading to famine in at least Kadugli and likely Dilling.^[52]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps and Thomas Van Linge.

The SAF’s advances coincide with reported redeployments to el Obeid and a general mobilization following the RSF’s capture of el Fasher on October 27. A local source claimed that the SAF is sending senior officers and reinforcements to el Obeid.^[53] SAF head and government leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan, the Sudanese Minister of Defense, and the government’s High Committee for Mobilization and Popular Resistance have also separately declared a general mobilization following the RSF’s capture of el Fasher.^[54] The mobilization committee announced on November 6 that it would reopen training camps for new volunteers, including in North Kordofan.^[55]

The RSF has separately intensified efforts to capture the final remaining population center held by the SAF in west-central Sudan. The RSF massed forces outside of Babanusa—located 250 miles southwest of el Obeid—in early November, including redeployed units from el Fasher.^[56] The RSF has launched multiple complex assaults on the town since November 10, utilizing ground forces, drones, and artillery.^[57] The SAF has prevented the RSF from capturing the 22nd Infantry Division headquarters, but the RSF has gradually advanced from the north toward central Babanusa.^[58]

The RSF’s capture of Babanusa would allow the group to prioritize concentrating its forces on the front lines around el Obeid. CTP has previously assessed that the RSF is giving priority to capturing Babanusa while still preoccupying and isolating the SAF in North Kordofan.^[59] Some of the RSF fighters supporting the Babanusa offensive are usually stationed in al Khawai and an Nahud, which are located 70 and 135 miles west of el Obeid on Kordofan’s main east-west highway, respectively.^[60] Local news outlet Darfur24 claimed to have obtained an RSF document detailing plans to assault el Obeid using forces redeployed from Darfur to Kordofan, although the report is unverified.^[61]

The RSF could alternatively focus on capturing partially besieged Dilling and Kadugli to further isolate el Obeid before any offensive on the city. The RSF had conducted six attacks in Dilling in November as of November 10 compared to two attacks in October.^[62] The RSF clashed with the SAF around Kadugli on November 17.^[63]

Darfur

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Alexandria Johnson

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are likely continuing to commit systematic crimes against humanity in El Fasher, which include acts of ethnic cleansing and potentially acts of genocide. The RSF has systematically trapped civilians from in el Fasher, spending months constructing a 40 mile berm completely encircling the city.^[64] The RSF closed one of the only berm openings in northwest el Fasher in early November to prevent civilians from escaping.^[65] The United Nations reported on November 10 that approximately 89,000 out of 250,000 civilians had fled el Fasher, leaving over 160,000 civilians unaccounted for amid a communications blackout.^[66]

The RSF has reportedly established detention sites, where the group is systematically holding civilians near mass burial sites.^[67] The Sudan Tribune reported that the RSF is holding thousands of civilians in several detention centers across el Fasher, although the exact number of detained civilians is unconfirmed.^[68] Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified multiple mass burial sites near alleged detention centers, including near el Fasher University and the Saudi hospital, where the RSF killed approximately 460 people in one of the worst confirmed atrocities since taking el Fasher.^[69] Another site is located in a neighborhood where the RSF conducted house-to-house executions of non-Arab civilians immediately after capturing el Fasher.^[70] These burial sites are growing, indicating that the group is still disposing of bodies and could be continuing mass killings.^[71]

The RSF’s systematic actions before and since capturing el Fasher are crimes against humanity, acts of ethnic cleansing, and possibly acts of genocide. International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes committed during a major attack against civilians that violate human dignity, including murder, extermination, false imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, and disappearance.^[72] A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”^[73] Acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.^[74]

Figure 3. RSF Atrocities in El Fasher

Source: Michael DeAngelo and Hannah Ochs; Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab and Sudan War Monitor.

Ethiopia

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Hannah Ochs

Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano militias are sustaining their offensive in eastern Amhara despite increased Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) pressure. Fano had its most active three-month stretch from August to October since the insurgency started in April 2023.^[75] Increased activity in the Wollo zones drove the elevated attack rate in September, prompting an ENDF counteroffensive.^[76] The ENDF redeployed mechanized units, heavy weaponry, and drones from other areas, including the Afar and Oromia regions, according to pro-Fano sources.^[77] The ENDF tripled its attack rate against Fano in Wollo from August to October.^[78] The ENDF has concentrated efforts on the A2 highway from Woldia to Dessie, as the road connects Addis Ababa to Mekele—the regional capital of Tigray—via Amhara region.^[79]

Fano has continued operations in Wollo at an elevated rate and reportedly consolidated control over towns. Fano is on pace to conduct roughly the same number of attacks in Wollo in November that the group did in October.^[80] The Menelik Command of the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF)—a coalition of Fano militias across Amhara—claimed to have repelled some ENDF attempts to retake roads and towns in Wollo, including Gashena, a key town located on the B22 highway leading to western Amhara.^[81] Fano officials claimed to have met with residents of several localities to establish governance structures.^[82]

Figure 4. ENDF and Fano Attacks in Wollo, May—November 2025

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Figure 5. Fano Escalates Operations Across Amhara Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Fano has also sustained activity in central and northern Amhara in the face of an ENDF counteroffensive. Fano conducted an offensive in the Gondar zones from July to August before the ENDF launched a counteroffensive.^[83] The ENDF counteroffensive coincided with reduction in Fano activity, but Fano has still sustained an elevated attack rate compared the months before the offensive.^[84] The Amhara Fano Popular Forces (AFPO)—a coalition of Fano militias concentrated in central and northern Amhara—reportedly repelled ENDF attempts to uproot them and continued coordinated operations, including on the B22 highway, according to a pro-Fano source.^[85]

Figure 6. ENDF and Fano Attacks in Gondar, March—November 2025

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Greater cohesiveness among certain Fano factions may be enabling the group’s resilience to the ENDF’s counteroffensive. The militias that comprise the AFNF merged in May and faced internal divisions that reportedly almost ended the merger.^[86] The AFNF reaffirmed the merger in September, however, and launched the Wollo offensive soon after.^[87] The AFNF has created special forces units and graduated a new cohort of fighters in early November.^[88] The AFNF also announced in mid-October that it ceased hostilities with the AFPO, which is notable given that the two major factions had clashed in previous years.^[89] The AFNF and AFPO are reportedly discussing the creation of a unified command structure.^[90]

The Ethiopian federal government is concerned about a potential anti-federal government alignment between Fano, Eritrea, and Oromo and Tigrayan ethno-nationalist forces. The federal government has recently intensified rhetoric against Eritrea and the TPLF due to their growing ties. The federal government filed a complaint to the United Nations in early October alleging that Eritrea and the TPLF are supporting Fano.^[91] Senior government officials have threatened war against Eritrea and the TPLF, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declaring that Ethiopia would win a war against Eritrea in late October.^[92] The ENDF also reportedly conducted a drone strike on Tigrayan forces on November 7 for the first time since the end of the Tigray war.^[93]

The anti-government actors have increased collaboration among themselves in 2025. The Economist published a report on November 13 stating that representatives from Fano, Eritrea, the OLA, and the TPLF recently met in Sudan to discuss military collaboration.^[94] Eritrea has already trained Fano forces for years.^[95] Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) officials have met with Eritrean officials multiple times in 2025 and declared their intention to strengthen ties.^[96] Fano and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) representatives reportedly met in the United States in June to ease hostilities.^[97]

The federal government has not declared a desire to negotiate with Fano since the group’s ongoing offensive began, but it has been open to negotiations with Fano in the past. Abiy said in August 2024 that the federal government was in contact with Fano following the creation of a peace council to facilitate dialogue between the two sides.^[98] Fano’s decentralized structure complicated potential negotiations, as there is no unified leadership or platform among the various factions.^[99] Fano remains decentralized, but there is increasing collaboration between factions.^[100] The Amhara regional government declared an openness to negotiations in late October.^[101]

Mali

Author: Miles Charles

The Malian junta has successfully reopened one of the main transit corridors connecting Bamako to Côte d’Ivoire through western Sikasso region. The junta has successfully transported five convoys of 300-400 tankers each along the Bougouni axis from Côte d'Ivoire in western Sikasso since October 27.[102] Mali imports 57 percent of its fuel from Côte d’Ivoire, the majority of which destined for the capital travels along the Bougouni axis, the shorter corridor.[103] The junta had only successfully transported three similar-sized convoys along this route prior to October 27, as JNIM had burned at least 100 tankers across 12 attacks along this corridor since the start of its blockade on September 3.[104]

Malian counterinsurgency operations and convoy air support have likely degraded JNIM’s ability to enforce its blockade in western Sikasso. The Malian junta has conducted 14 counterinsurgency operations in western Sikasso since the start of the blockade on September 3 after having conducted none in the previous several years.[105] Malian forces have claimed to kill 49 militants and destroy up to eight encampments that militants had used to attack tankers in western Sikasso.[106] The junta has also begun providing air support to convoys, allowing the Malian army to eliminate JNIM militants before they attack.[107]

Figure 7. JNIM Contests Key Roadways in Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

JNIM has doubled down on its blockade, however. JNIM’s spokesperson released a video on November 16 warning that JNIM will intensify its blockade on the southern half of Mali.[108] The group said that it would consider fuel truck drivers military targets and execute them as part of this effort.[109] The group explicitly threatened the Niangadou Distribution Company, one of Mali’s largest fuel suppliers, and demanded they stop transporting fuel to Bamako.[110] JNIM similarly threatened the Diarra Transport Company on September 3 due to the company frequently transporting Malian security forces, forcing it to suspend operations on September 8.[111] The company struck a deal with JNIM on October 17, allowing it to resume operations.[112] The Malian army suspended the company's operations on October 22 due to the agreement, however.[113]

JNIM has sustained an ongoing campaign to isolate Sikasso city. The group has drastically escalated the scale, rate, and severity of its attacks in eastern Sikasso region since the second half of 2025. JNIM has attacked security forces in the Kadiolo, Koutiala, Sikasso, and Yorosso cercles, which surround Sikasso city, twice as many times in the second half of 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 combined and inflicted nearly six times as many fatalities.[114] The group has conducted 80 percent of these attacks in the second half of 2025.[115]

Figure 8. JNIM Escalates Attacks around the City of Sikasso

Source: Miles Charles; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

JNIM has leveraged its attack campaign to degrade government control of major roadways around Sikasso, restricting military activity and controlling some economic activity. JNIM has attacked within nine miles of the RN7, RN10, and RN11 in nearly 90 percent of its attacks in the second half of 2025.[116] JNIM has particularly targeted mobile units on these roadways in these attacks, attacking mobile forces more frequently than entrenched positions.[117] These attacks restrict the movement of troops along the roads, isolating security forces to major towns, and enabling the group to strengthen support zones. The group also damaged three separate cell towers 80 miles west of Sikasso, disrupting communication in some rural areas outside of the city.[118]

JNIM has increasingly controlled economic activity along these three key economic arteries connecting Sikasso to Bamako, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. JNIM established two checkpoints along the RN10 linking Sikasso to Burkina Faso in the second half of 2025, controlling cross-border commerce, an essential economy for border cities.[119] JNIM is known to tax drivers along these border communities and participate in local markets, both buying and stealing goods.[120] JNIM also coerced four towns on key road junctions around Sikasso to pay tax in the second half of 2025.[121] The group has separately targeted the Ivorian–Sikasso–Bamako trade corridor as part of its broader fuel blockade on the southern half of Mali. JNIM has attacked fuel trucks six times along the Sikasso axis since the start of its blockade on September 3.[122]

JNIM overran the city of Loulouni, the closest large population center, in the latest stage of its campaign. JNIM seized control of Loulouni, a key town 30 miles south of Sikasso, on November 12, following clashes with Dozo militiamen in the preceding month.[123] JNIM militants from Burkina Faso crossed into Mali to support the offensive.[124] CTP has assessed since June 2025 that strengthened cross-border support zones along the Burkinabe-Mali border could facilitate JNIM subgroup cooperation.[125] JNIM held the town for four days until the Malian army retook the city in a clearance operation on October 16.[126] JNIM’s presence along the road between Sikasso and Loulouni forced the Malian clearance operation to clear every village in between the two cities.[127]

JNIM has degraded government and militia control of the RN7 segment between Sikasso and Loulouni and the surrounding area throughout the second half of 2025, particularly since October. JNIM attacked Malian forces along the segment 18 times since June 2025.[128] The group targeted Dozo militiamen in nearly half of those attacks, including an attack on the militia headquarters in the city.[129] JNIM’s spokesperson urged citizens in Sikasso not to join militias in the siege-update video on November 16, threatening to burn their villages in punishment.[130] JNIM had released a similar video on October 17, urging Malian citizens to join the army instead of militias to make their stance clear.[131]

Tri-Border

Author: Miles Charles

Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) have engaged in the deadliest period of inter-jihadi skirmishes since 2022. The latest uptick started following ISSP claiming it killed seven JNIM fighters for raiding villages in ISSP’s area of operations on November 3.[132] This clash sparked a cycle of retaliatory attacks in far northeastern Burkina Faso near the tri-border with Mali and Niger over the next several days. ISSP clashed with JNIM militants 35 miles northwest of Dori on November 7.[133] ISSP then retaliated on November 8, killing 14 JNIM militants and capturing another six in the same area. ISSP continued its assault west of Dori on November 9, seizing control of five JNIM positions and killing 46 fighters, including a commander.[134]

Both sides have reportedly sent hundreds of reinforcements to northeastern Burkina Faso in November. Roughly 500–700 ISSP reinforcements traveled from ISSP strongholds in neighboring Niger to support the offensive.[135] JNIM convened a council meeting on November 10 on how to counter ISSP’s offensive, deciding to send reinforcements from Gossi, Mali, to Arbinda, Burkina Faso.[136] Ousmane Dicko, deputy and younger brother to the leader of JNIM’s Burkina Faso–based Ansaroul Islam affiliate was reportedly in attendance.[137] Ousmane Dicko released an audio on November 12, threatening to retaliate against ISSP.[138]

Figure 9. ISSP-JNIM Clashes in the Tri-Border Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The recent spate of attacks is a part of a broader escalation in tensions since June 2025. JNIM and ISSP clashed eight times from June 22 to July 24 in what was the deadliest spate of inter-jihadi clashes since 2022 at that time.[139] ISSP and JNIM claimed to have killed 14 and seven militants, respectively. All but one of the skirmishes took place in Burkina Faso’s Sahel region.

ISSP may have launched its latest offensive in an attempt to regain media attention following JNIM’s months-long blockade on Mali. JNIM and ISSP are major rivals and have gone through various iterations of fighting that have resulted in hundreds of casualties.[140] This rivalry extends to the media and propaganda realm, where each group tries to paint itself as the more legitimate alternative.[141] ISSP’s propaganda presence has declined since the start of JNIM’s blockade on September 3, with IS including ISSP activity in its al Naba newsletter 5 times in the three-month span since the blockade began, a 37 percent decrease from the prior three-month period.[142]

Africa File Data Cutoff: November 20, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.