Russia, US Compete in West Africa: Africa File, July 31, 2025

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Contributors: Miles Charles, Edlawit Tesfaye, and Calvin Hodges

Key Takeaways:

• West Africa. Russia and the United States are competing for influence among a handful of countries in West Africa. Russia has recently strengthened its partnerships in the central Sahel and looked to expand its influence into coastal West Africa, particularly Togo, while the United States has looked to reengage the central Sahel states and strengthen ties in littoral West Africa.
• Somalia. The United States and local partner forces are having success against IS Somalia Province in northern Somalia but are facing severe setbacks against al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab in central Somalia. The operations in northern Somalia are degrading key IS global administrative and financial apparatuses, but al Shabaab’s resurgence threatens regional stability in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.
• Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are building out their respective parallel governments, bringing Sudan closer to a de facto partition. The RSF has likely timed its military and political efforts partially to gain maximum leverage before US-led peace talks and will likely culminate its offensive in central and western Sudan in the coming weeks.
• Burkina Faso. IS Sahel Province and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate each carried out one of their deadliest attacks in 2025 in Burkina Faso on July 28.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) conducted its deadliest single attack in the eastern DRC since February 2025, likely in retaliation for joint DRC-Uganda operations against the group and to redirect joint forces’ attention from ISCAP’s largest and most important cell.

Figure 1. Africa File, July 31, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

West Africa

Author: Liam Karr

Russia is strengthening its ties in littoral West Africa, particularly with Togo, to expand its influence in West Africa and the Atlantic Ocean. The Russian parliament ratified a military cooperation agreement with Togo on July 22.[1] The agreement will facilitate joint military exercises, training, weapons and equipment exchanges, and support for hydrography, navigation, and combating piracy.[2] Some unconfirmed reports claim that the agreement will give Russia “unfettered” access to the port of Lomé.[3] The agreement follows growing ties between Togo and Russia in recent years as Togo has attempted to distance itself from France.[4]

The deal likely involves the deployment of Russia’s Africa Corps. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus bek Yevkurov visited Togo and discussed “military-technical” cooperation with Togolese officials in November 2024, when the sides likely agreed to the deal initially.[5] Unconfirmed French media reports claimed that dozens of Russian military advisers deployed to Togo in early 2024 to help construct forward operating bases.[6] The presence of Yevkurov and Russian advisers are both standard precursors to previous Africa Corps deployments. French media reported on July 23 that Togo plans to construct additional security posts along its border, which would create opportunities to scale this prior cooperation.[7]

Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé may also seek political support from the Kremlin. The National Resistance Center of Ukraine—a Ukrainian Special Forces–run information operation and partisan support organization—said in February 2024 that Russia planned to provide political support, such as information operations, for Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé’s 2025 reelection campaign.[8] Gnassingbé is no longer running for reelection after transitioning Togo to a parliamentary system in a manner that will enable him to remain head of state without term limits or a general election.[9] Opposition groups and Togolese civil society accused Gnassingbé of carrying out a constitutional coup and have staged large protests, however.[10] Russia’s “regime security package,” which includes information operation assistance and training of elite protection units to insulate autocratic regimes, could help address these challenges.[11]

Russia has also sought closer ties with countries such as Benin and São Tomé and Príncipe. The Russian ambassador in Benin said on July 30 that Russia is “in discussions” to sign an agreement similar to the Togo deal with Benin.[12] These talks are likely much more nascent, however. Key Russian defense officials have not yet met with Beninese leaders, and there have not been any rumors of Russian advisers in Benin. São Tomé and Príncipe—an island nation off the coast of West Africa—also ratified a military agreement with Russia in April that allows Russian ships to refuel at São Toméan ports.[13]

The Kremlin likely seeks Atlantic port access in littoral West Africa to strengthen its logistic network in the Sahel. Russian port access in Lomé would create a logistics corridor connecting the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—the Russian-backed, authoritarian bloc of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—to the Gulf of Guinea. Russia had previously relied on port access in Conakry, Guinea, for large military equipment shipments to the Sahel.[14] This involved numerous shipments in early 2025 that were part of the transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps in Mali.[15] The Wagner Group similarly uses the port in Douala, Cameroon, to import and export goods and equipment in the Central African Republic.[16]

Figure 2. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia may have the long-term goal to use West Africa to support naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean, which would threaten the United States and NATO’s flank. Russia deployed an Admiral Gorshkov–class frigate—which has a seaworthy range of 5,580 miles—to conduct a computer simulation hypersonic cruise missile strike exercise in the Atlantic Ocean in January 2023, underscoring its intention to project naval power into the Atlantic.[17] There are myriad challenges to establishing a naval base in West Africa, including African countries’ hesitancy to pick a side and alienate the West.[18] Russia can still use its agreements with Togo and São Tomé and Príncipe to make port calls and conduct maritime exercises to increase its presence in the Atlantic, however. The refuel provision in São Tomé and Príncipe also allows Russian ships to remain in the area for longer periods.[19]

Russia also likely wants Togo to join the Alliance of Sahel States to bolster its effort to supplant Western influence in the region. The AES serves as a pro-Russian economic, military, and political bloc and conduit for Russia’s efforts to supplant the West elsewhere, such as Togo.[20] Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey said in 2025 that Togo was “considering joining the AES” to strengthen regional cooperation and offer sea access to the landlocked Sahel countries. Chad and Togo conducted combined military drills with the AES in 2024.[21] Togo joining the AES pulls it deeper into the Russian orbit and undermines neutral regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States.

Greater Russian influence in Togo threatens the US partnership with Togo. US military officials have described the US-Togo partnership as “essential” and key to ensuring a “united and effective approach to addressing the complex security challenges we face together.”[22] The Togolese and US militaries participate in joint operations related to counterterrorism and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.[23] The United States has also invested millions of dollars to support border security and community building efforts in northern Togo as part of the Global Fragility Act.[24] A stronger Russian presence in northern Togo would create logistic challenges to US-Togolese intelligence sharing and military cooperation. Russia’s forceful, military-first counterinsurgency approach also runs counter to the population-centric US counterinsurgency approach that the Global Fragility Act helps support.

Russia is simultaneously strengthening its partnerships with the Alliance of Sahel States. A high-level Russian delegation visited Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to discuss greater cooperation in multiple areas, including defense, energy, mining, and satellite technology. The intergovernmental delegation arrived in Niger on July 28, Mali on July 29, and Burkina Faso on the evening of July 29 before departing on July 30.[25] The delegation consisted of eight Russian ministers and officials from several Russian companies, most of which are state owned.[26] The trip to Mali involved the first meeting of the Mali-Russia trade commission, which the two countries established in June 2025, when Malian junta leader Assimi Goïta visited Moscow.[27] CTP has previously assessed that the AES is a strategic project for Russia that advances its goals to supplant western influence in Africa and assert itself as a revitalized great power.[28]

Figure 3. Russia Strengthens Influence in the Sahel

Source: Liam Karr.

Russian defense officials likely discussed the expansion of Africa Corps in Niger. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus bek Yevkurov and Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate Lieutenant General Andrei Averyanov met with their Nigerien and Malian counterparts. Averyanov and Yevkurov have led the Russian Ministry of Defense’s takeover of Wagner Group structures under Africa Corps and have met with African officials on numerous occasions prior to agreements related to Africa Corps deployments.[29] Kremlin-linked Russian milbloggers said that Nigerien and Russian officials discussed expanding the presence of Russian military “advisers,” training Nigerien officers, and equipment transfers.[30] Russia currently only has 100–200 Africa Corps personnel in Burkina Faso and Niger, compared with nearly 2,000 in neighboring Mali.[31]

Russia discussed greater energy cooperation with Niger, including nuclear energy efforts. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev and officials from state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom signed an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation with Niger’s junta leader during the visit. Kremlin-linked Russian milbloggers said that the agreement includes the extraction of uranium and other minerals, the construction of nuclear power plants and nuclear medicine infrastructure, and personnel training.[32] Burkina Faso and Mali had already signed agreements with Rosatom on peaceful nuclear cooperation in October 2023 and July 2024, respectively, and several follow-on road map and framework agreements.[33] Officials from state-owned power company Inter RAO were also part of the Russian delegation. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger all face electricity challenges, with just over 20 percent of Burkinabe and Nigerien civilians having electricity access due to a lack of supply and adequate infrastructure.[34]

Russia pursued greater mining cooperation in Niger, particularly uranium and possibly lithium mining. Russian milbloggers said that the Rosatom agreement included the extraction of “raw materials, mainly uranium,” implying that other resources are included.[35] Mali signed a deal on lithium mining with a Rosatom subsidiary in July 2024, setting a template for such an agreement.[36] Niger has also sought to boost lithium mining in recent years, and Niger’s mining minister said in November 2024 that the country was discussing the exploitation of uranium and “other natural resources” with Russian companies.[37]

The United States has attempted to reengage the Alliance of Sahel States in 2025. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Will Stevens has led US efforts to rebuild partnerships with all three AES states since April 2025. Stevens met with high-ranking Burkinabe and Nigerien officials as part of a regional tour in late May.[38] Stevens returned to the Sahel on July 22 to visit Mali to discuss security and trade cooperation with Malian officials. Stevens specifically highlighted opportunities to highlight terror financing networks and share intelligence in the defense sector.[39]

Other US diplomatic and military officials have engaged the AES throughout 2025. The Nigerien prime minister visited Washington, DC, in late April to discuss strengthening bilateral and commercial ties.[40] The US ambassador to Niger formally presented her credentials to Nigerien junta leader Tiani in May 2025 for the first time since Tiani took power in 2023 and expelled US forces in 2024.[41] US Africa Command General Michael Langley said in a May press briefing that he invited the Burkinabe chief of defense to the US-led African Chiefs of Defense Conference and that the United States still wants to collaborate with Burkina Faso on counterterrorism challenges.[42] The Malian foreign minister met with the US ambassador and counterterrorism adviser Rudy Atallah in early July to discuss bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Pro-junta sources said the meeting discussed technical and logistic support for Malian troops, anti–improvised explosive device training, and intelligence cooperation.[43]

The littoral states are also pushing for greater defense and economic cooperation with the United States despite growing ties with Russia. Togolese Foreign Minister Dussey wrote an op-ed in The Hill in late July advocating greater Togolese-US security cooperation.[44] Dussey framed Togo as the United States’ “most engaged and capable defense partner in coastal West Africa” and noted that Togo aligns with the Trump administration’s efforts to burden share with capable regional partners and reengage the Sahel states at the epicenter of the insurgency.[45] The Beninese army chief of staff said in April that the United States is Benin’s first choice and top priority.[46]

Togo has also framed itself as a regional economic partner as the United States seeks to increase business ties with Africa. The US chargé d’affaires in Togo toured the port of Lomé in late July.[47] The chargé d’affaires explored opportunities for US private sector investment and touted Lomé as an ideal entry point for US businesses and goods into West African markets.[48]

The United States faces several obstacles to strengthening its partnerships with these West African countries, however. Multiple US laws restrict defense aid and sales to the Sahel states due to their poor democratic and human rights records. US laws known as the “Leahy law” prohibit US government assistance to foreign security forces credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.[49] Burkinabe and Malian forces have perpetrated several activities explicitly listed in the Leahy law as gross violations, namely torture, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances.[50] US law also restricts most types of foreign aid, including military aid, to coup governments until a democratically elected government has retaken office.[51] The junta leaders in all three countries have repeatedly delayed elections and extended their terms in power.[52]

Other US priorities, such as immigration, also create tension points. The US embassy in Niger suspended the issuance of new nondiplomatic visas to Nigerien nationals on July 25.[53] A US official told Reuters that the decision was due to the overstay rate of Nigerien visa holders in the United States—8 percent for visitor visas and 27 percent for student visas.[54] The United States already partially restricted the entry of Togolese citizens to the United States in June.[55] Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger were three of the 36 countries that Reuters reported in June could face a full or partial travel ban to the United States.[56]

Russia could conduct information campaigns to turn public sentiment against US reengagement. Russia previously ran information operations to rally public support against the United States in the Central African Republic to sabotage talks between the Central African government and US defense contractors.[57] The Kremlin could replicate these efforts to pressure the Sahelian governments against further engagement with the United States.

Somalia

Author: Liam Karr

The United States and partner forces in northern Somalia’s Puntland state are continuing to degrade IS Somalia Province (ISS)—a key node in the global IS network. US forces reportedly captured the ISS finance chief, who may have also been the finance chief for the IS East Africa regional office—al Karrar. US Africa Command said on July 26 that it “conducted an operation against the ISIS-Somalia terrorist network in Somalia.”[58] Security forces in northern Somalia’s Puntland State said that the operation targeted Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf, who the US Treasury Department had sanctioned as the ISS financier in 2023.[59] Puntland officials and security forces said that Yusuf is part of the al Karrar office, which aligns with elements of the US Treasury designation that noted Yusuf met with the al Karrar emir, directed the delivery of foreign fighters, supplies, and ammunition on behalf of IS, and facilitated financial transfers for IS.[60]

Figure 4. Islamic State Somalia Area of Operations in Northern Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The United States and other regional allies including the United Arab Emirates have been supporting Puntland’s counter-ISS offensive since the beginning of 2025.[61] The US has provided air support for the offensive and airdropped supplies to Puntland forces active in the mountains.[62] The president of Puntland previously announced in late April 2025 that the offensive was near the end of its final phase.[63]

ISS plays an outsized in the IS global network due to hosting the al Karrar office, which has emerged as a key administrative and financial hub for IS’s global operations in recent years.[64] Unspecified US officials said in 2024 that ISS leader Abdulqadir Mumin serves as the Islamic State’s “global leader.”[65] Al Karrar disperses funds and trainers around the world from Somalia, including IS affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Yemen.[66]

Figure 5. The Islamic State Somalia Province’s Financing Networks

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab, has overturned major US-backed counterterrorism gains from 2022 and expanded its territory in central Somalia, however. Al Shabaab captured Mahas, a district capital in central Somalia that the Somali government and its allies had controlled since 2014. Al Shabaab overran Somali forces and allied local militias in a complex attack that involved multiple suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.[67] Mahas is a key crossroads town that connects al Shabaab–controlled areas to major government-controlled district capitals in the Shabelle River Valley and along the Ethiopian border in central Somalia.[68]

Al Shabaab has recaptured swaths of central Somalia in 2025 as part of an offensive that has overturned US-backed Somali government gains from 2022. The group reconnected its territory in central Somalia and southern Somalia for the first time since 2022 in March and recaptured the district capitals Adan Yabal and Moqokori in April and early July, respectively.[69] The capture of Mahas and Moqokori has opened an additional two lines of communication between al Shabaab–controlled territory in central and southern Somalia, with Mahas serving as the most direct link to the group’s administrative center in central Somalia—el Bur.

Figure 6. Al Shabaab Retakes Central Somalia

Source: Liam Karr; Kathryn Tyson; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Al Shabaab’s resurgence threatens regional stability in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa. Al Shabaab’s gains set conditions for it to threaten the Ethiopian border, at a time when Ethiopia is distracted by various other internal and external security issues. The group regularly attacked security forces and towns along a major highway that runs near the Ethiopian border from Beledweyne to northern Somalia prior to the 2022 Somali government offensive.[70] Al Shabaab invaded Ethiopia from this area in central Somalia in early 2022 as part of its first-ever offensive into Ethiopia.[71] The 2022 Somali offensive helped Ethiopian forces enforce a relatively stable buffer zone, but al Shabaab has continued to probe the Ethiopian border in the years since.[72]

Al Shabaab could take advantage of potential conflict in northern Ethiopia. Tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and rival factions in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region, have risen throughout 2025. Increasingly bellicose rhetoric and mobilizations along the border have increased the risk of a low-intensity proxy war in Tigray or a full-scale regional war.[73] Al Shabaab capitalized on the Tigray war to take advantage of distracted and overstretched Ethiopian forces to launch its 2022 offensive.

Sudan

Authors: Liam Karr and Ellery White

The RSF began filling positions in its parallel government, which is part of the RSF’s effort to frame itself as a legitimate governing actor. The RSF and its allies formed the Sudan Constitutive Alliance—known as Tasis—and signed its initial charter in Kenya in February.^[74] This group then signed a new transitional constitution in March, enabling RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s—known as Hemedti—to announce plans for a new “Government of Peace and Unity” in Nyala, South Darfur, in April. The government includes a 15-member presidential council, with eight representatives from Sudan’s provinces and seven from allied political forces, in addition to a prime minister and an executive cabinet.^[75]

Figure 7. RSF-Backed Government in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr and Ellery White.

The RSF began filling government positions in July, likely to preempt US-led peace talks. Tasis appointed Hemedti as the president of the new government and the leader of the RSF’s largest ally—the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N)—vice president.[76] RSF-aligned commanders and civil servants hold nearly half of the posts in the new government, while SPLM-N figures hold another quarter.^[77] The remaining positions have all gone to smaller militia groups in the alliance.^[78] The African Union and Arab League both condemned the new government an illegal threat to Sudan’s integrity and urged other nations against engaging with or recognizing the body.[79] The United States planned to hold peace talks in late July with the major external actors that are supporting the warring sides—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—but postponed the talks until at least September after last-minute disagreements.[80]

The SAF has appointed more officials to its government in recent months as it battles the RSF for political legitimacy. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister of the SAF’s new government in May, following through on a promise to establish a new government after recapturing the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. Idris announced in mid-June that he would appoint a 22-member technocratic government called the “Government of Hope” in Port Sudan.^[81] Several key ministers in the army, police, and pro-SAF armed groups retained their former positions in the new government.^[82]

Figure 8. SAF-Backed Government in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr and Ellery White.

The SAF’s ties with Islamist factions could lead to Islamists playing a substantial role in the new government. The SAF is partially reliant on Islamist militias with ties to the Bashir regime as part of its military coalition.[83] Leading members of Bashir’s old party told Reuters that they view their ties with the SAF as a path back to power.[84] The new government includes at least two former Bashir-era officials.^[85]

The RSF’s offensive to consolidate military control over the Western half of Sudan may culminate in the coming weeks as the rainy season approaches. Fighting in recent months has centered on the Kordofan region, which links Sudan’s east–west and north–south transit corridors. The RSF has intensified attacks against several besieged SAF positions in central and western Sudan and the North Kordofan capital, El Obeid, which has been the SAF’s westernmost hub since it broke the RSF siege on the town in February 2025.^[86]

Al Jazeera reported that the coming weeks could see an RSF offensive to recapture El Obeid.[87] The RSF claimed to overrun the SAF’s perimeter defenses west of the town on July 30, although this area has traded hands multiple times over the last month.^[88] The pending rainy season provides temporary cloud cover from SAF air support and a limited window for a final push before roads are unusable.^[89] This period is also an opportunity for the RSF to gain more leverage before US peace efforts possibly resume in September. The RSF secured this window after the United Arab Emirates—the RSF’s main backer—reportedly introduced a last-minute clause that Egypt—an SAF ally—rejected, leading to the delay of the July talks.[90]

Figure 9. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr; Thomas van Linge; Vista Maps; Kathryn Tyson.

Control of central Sudan is key to both sides’ strategic objectives. The RSF seeks to capture the SAF holdouts in the western half of Sudan and isolate El Obeid as part of a broader strategic effort to consolidate military and political control of the western half of the country and solidify at least a de facto partition. The SAF aims to open multiple potential lines of advance through Kordofan to threaten the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur, in part by breaking the RSF sieges throughout the region.

Figure 10. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr; Thomas van Linge; Vista Maps; Kathryn Tyson.

Burkina Faso

Authors: Liam Karr with Miles Charles

IS Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) each carried out a large-scale attack in northern Burkina Faso. ISSP ambushed Burkinabe soldiers traveling between Dori and Gorom-Gorom—two besieged towns in northeastern Burkina Faso—on July 28. The attack killed at least 50 soldiers and civilians.^[91] JNIM overran a Burkinabe army post in Dargo—less than 90 miles (145 kilometers) east of the Burkinabe capital Ouagadougou—on the same day.^[92] Over 100 militants participated in the attack and killed at least 40 Burkinabe soldiers.^[93]

The attacks were two of the deadliest attacks in Burkina Faso in 2025. ISSP and JNIM have carried out several deadly attacks on convoys attempting to reach besieged towns in parts of Burkina Faso in recent years, but the Dori attack is one of the deadliest and the first to kill more than 20 people since August 2024.[94] The Dargo attack was the deadliest in the Centre-Nord region since the Barsalogho massacre—when JNIM killed over 300 civilians helping security forces dig a trench in August 2024—and the deadliest against security forces in the region since May 2024.[95]

Figure 11. Major Insurgent Attacks on Convoys in Burkina Faso

Source: Liam Karr

The attacks are part of ongoing campaigns to restrict security forces’ presence outside of major towns in ISSP and JNIM’s respective areas of operations. ISSP is attempting to isolate besieged government-controlled population centers to consolidate control over the Burkina Faso-Niger border. The group had already set up multiple checkpoints on the road between Dori and Gorom-Gorom in early 2025, where it taxed civilians using the road.[96]

JNIM is attempting to isolate major Burkinabe provincial centers that house security forces in northern and eastern Burkina Faso. JNIM has repeatedly attacked Dargo in recent years. Dargo lies on the RN2, which is one of two roads linking the N15 and N18—two major north–south roads linking northern and eastern Burkina Faso. The N15 and N18 run through Kaya and Fada N’Gourma, respectively, two of the largest urban areas in northern and eastern Burkina Faso. The two towns are regional security buffers around the Burkinabe capital and host security forces that conduct operations in the surrounding areas of the country.[97] Eliminating the Burkinabe presence in Dargo will allow JNIM to increase pressure on the N15 and N18 to degrade security forces’ ability to project pressure outside of Kaya and Fada N’Gourma. JNIM also disrupts the local economy by attacking both roads, undermining Burkina Faso’s fragile junta.

Figure 12. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in Eastern Burkina Faso

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford with Calvin Hodges

IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) conducted its deadliest single attack in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since February 2025. ISCAP, known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), killed at least 49 civilians in an attack on Komanda village in Irumu district in Ituri province on July 26.[98] The attack marks ADF’s single deadliest attack in the eastern DRC since early February.[99] Various domestic authorities and international actors, including the DRC’s prime minister and the Vatican, condemned the attack.[100] The UN reported on July 29 that the attack displaced an estimated 30,000 people around Komanda.[101]

Figure 13. ISCAP Area of Operations in the DRC

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data

ADF likely conducted the attack in retaliation for joint DRC-Uganda operations that reportedly degraded the group in July. ADF conducted several attacks on civilians in southern Ituri province in mid-July after the Ugandan army (UPDF) and Congolese army (FARDC) launched a major offensive under Operation Shujaa against ADF in early July.[102] ADF typically increases the rate and scale of its attacks on civilians in response to intensified pressure from Operation Shujaa.[103] ADF conducted 22 attacks and killed at least 157 civilians in July, which is the group’s most active and deadliest month since January.[104]

Figure 14. ISCAP Attacks on Civilians, January–July 2025

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Figure 15. Civilian Fatalities Caused by ISCAP, January–July 2025

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

ADF likely aims to redirect the operational focus of Operation Shujaa away from ADF’s largest and most important cell.[105] ADF likely aimed to draw Operation Shujaa’s attention away from ADF’s main camp with the attack in Komanda. Joint forces targeted the camp of ADF leader Sesa Baluku as part of the Shujaa offensive and claimed to drive Baluku’s subgroup out of its base of operations near Lolwa, about 25 miles west of Komanda, in mid-July.[106] The UPDF military chief claimed that Baluku’s cell fled further north and west toward Haut-Uélé province after FARDC-UPDF forces captured Baluku’s campsite.[107]

Baluku’s camp is ADF’s largest and most administratively important subgroup. Baluku authorizes all large operations by ADF subgroup commanders, and his subgroup comprises the ADF’s top leadership and an estimated 2,000 individuals, including at least 200 fighters.[108]

ADF may have attempted to draw Shujaa’s attention to a distinct subgroup that protects Baluku’s camp. The UN reported in July 2025 that two smaller supply and support groups flanked Baluku’s camp in Lolwa to the south and that one operated in Komanda to the southeast.[109] The Congolese media outlet Radio Okapi reported on July 27 that the ADF militants who perpetrated the attack in Komanda came from about eight miles east of Komanda near Mount Hoyo in Irumu district.[110] The UN reported in late 2024 that this subgroup was one of ADF’s main cells that operated near Mount Hoyo in between the RN4 and RS431 roads in Irumu district.[111]

ADF has previously used diversionary tactics to help ADF subgroups try to evade Shujaa’s area of operations. The UN assessed in mid-2024 that Baluku’s group has used northward and westward movements deeper into Ituri province as a strategy to evade Shujaa’s official area of operations, reestablish supply lines, and reconstitute its attack capabilities.[112] ADF previously conducted highly lethal attacks on civilians, often targeting urban areas, in mid-2024 and before to divert Shujaa’s operational focus from Baluku’s and other main ADF cells in the eastern DRC.[113]

Africa File Data Cutoff: July 31, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.