Chad Tensions Strain RSF Supply Lines; African DRC Peace Efforts; Fano Merger: Africa File, January 22, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted an attack on Chadian forces in Chad, increasing tensions with a key partner in the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE’s) supply chain to the RSF. Pro–Sudanese Armed Forces actors’ disruptions to other RSF supply lines have raised the stakes of the RSF’s attack, as the RSF and UAE must now rely more on Chad as a transit point.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The African Union is trying to strengthen its ability to facilitate the implementation of struggling peace agreements in the eastern DRC. Efforts by African institutions to revitalize their role come as the Washington and Doha processes face numerous challenges, despite US pressure leading M23 to fully withdraw from Uvira town in South Kivu province.
• Ethiopia. The two strongest Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano militias unified and established a joint military and political leadership, improving operational and potentially strategic planning. Fano’s centralization could also enable the group to strengthen ties with Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front against the Ethiopian federal government.
• Somalia. Al Shabaab has intensified operations along the Somali coastline north of Mogadishu, the Somali capital. Al Shabaab’s activity gives the group greater control over supply lines between Mogadishu and parts of central Somalia amid cuts to Emirati funding to Somali security forces.
• Togo. Togo extradited the former Burkinabe junta leader to Burkina Faso, as it continues to grow closer to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Togo’s efforts to hedge between the AES and the Economic Community of West African States could strain Togo’s ties with neighboring countries given the increasing existential competition between the two rival blocs.

Figure 1. Africa File, January 22, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted an attack on Chadian forces in Chad, raising tensions with a key partner amid disruptions to RSF supply lines. The RSF and the Joint Forces, which are aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), have repeatedly clashed in Jargeira—located on the Chadian border 30 miles south of Tine—since January 9, as the RSF tries to seize the final SAF-aligned pocket in western Sudan.^[1] The RSF claimed that it unknowingly pursued Joint Forces’ units from Jargeira into Chad and unintentionally engaged Chadian forces—killing seven Chadian soldiers—on January 15, although Chadian officials said that the attack was “premeditated.”^[2]

The attack has strained already complicated relations between Chad and the RSF. Chadian security officials have reportedly criticized Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby for allowing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to transit supply shipments, which include weapons such as drones, to the RSF through Chad.^[3] Déby’s ethnic Zaghawa political allies and RSF-linked Arab militias have long-standing border tensions, and the RSF has committed atrocities against Zaghawa in western Sudan.^[4] Chad has consequently scaled back its support of the RSF in 2025, with the UAE instead relying on supply routes through Libya.^[5] Chad said that it would respond to future air and ground border breaches in the aftermath of the RSF attack, although it accused both the RSF and SAF of violations and claimed neutrality in Sudan’s civil war.^[6] Sudanese news outlet Darfur24 reported that RSF deputy leader Abdel Rahim Dagalo—brother of RSF head Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)—traveled to Chad to ease tensions on January 19.^[7]

Figure 2.  RSF Supply Lines into Darfur from Neighboring Countries

Sources: Kathryn Tyson; United Nations Security Council and Thomas Van Linge.

UAE–RSF supply routes are under increased pressure as pro–Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) actors enforce airspace closures, leaving Chad as a vital transit point. The UAE uses two air routes to supply RSF rear bases in and across the border with western Sudan: a northern one through Egyptian and Saudi airspace to Libya and a southern one through Ethiopian, Somali, and South Sudanese airspace to Chad and Libya.^[8] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia began denying the UAE overflight permission in January 2026.^[9] Somalia also canceled all bilateral agreements with the UAE on January 12, which would prevent the UAE from using Puntland’s Bosaso Airport as a transit point if enforced.^[10] Eastern Libyan authorities under Egyptian diplomatic pressure also temporarily closed the al Kufra Airport on January 19, which became the main RSF supply node after Chad scaled back its support in 2025.^[11] Emirati-linked cargo shipments to the RSF in January have gone through Chad due to these constraints.^[12]

The UAE is continuing efforts to open a new supply route via Ethiopia, but this route would not link directly to the RSF’s main rear support zones in western Sudan. Emirati-linked flights to Ethiopia transporting suspected weapons shipments have drastically increased since November 2025.^[13] SAF officials have claimed that the UAE is using Ethiopian territory to supply RSF allies in eastern Sudan, however.^[14] Open-source analyst Rich Tedd identified an Emirati shipment transiting to western Ethiopia near the Sudanese border.^[15] SAF officials have also accused Ethiopia of hosting an RSF training camp in western Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region.^[16] The SAF has sent reinforcements in preparation for an RSF offensive from the east and conducted airstrikes against RSF allies near the Ethiopian border on January 11.^[17]

Figure 3.  Emirati-Linked Weapons Shipments in the Horn of Africa

Source: Liam Karr; Flightradar24 and Middle East Eye.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

The African Union (AU) is trying to strengthen its ability to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé, the AU mediator for the eastern DRC file, hosted the five AU co-facilitators, foreign ministers from several countries, and representatives from regional and international bodies for a conference in Lomé, the Togolese capital, on January 17.[18] The high-level conference focused officially on the “coherence and consolidation” of mediation efforts for the various peace processes.[19] Gnassingbé had replaced Angolan President João Lourenço as the AU-designed mediator in April 2025, after Angolan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed and Lourenço stepped down. The East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) agreed in February 2025 to merge their respective peace tracks under AU oversight and, the following month, appointed a five-member panel of facilitators to handle key aspects of the conflict.[20]

The Lomé conference aimed to strengthen the ability of African mediators to support and complement ongoing peace efforts. The final communiqué urged renewed talks under the Washington process and called for the relaunch of Qatari-mediated peace talks between the Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels to negotiate the six remaining pillars of the framework peace agreement from November 2025.[21] The conference restructured the organization and leadership of the mediation team, delineated the clear role of each facilitator, and took further steps to establish an independent joint secretariat to better facilitate meetings and coordination.[22] French state media reported on January 18 that the conference outlined an “action plan” for the upcoming diplomatic calendar, with the facilitators expected to travel to the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi for a regional tour ahead of the AU heads of state summit in mid-February.[23]

Figure 4. Peace Processes Multiply in the African Great Lakes Region

Source: Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

These efforts may still not be able to overcome regional political divides on the conflict within the AU. Perceived institutional bias toward the DRC and Rwanda and differing regional approaches to the conflict have weakened African-led mediation efforts in the last several years. Angola, a close DRC ally, led mediation efforts in the Luanda process between the DRC and Rwanda from 2022 to 2024. This process collapsed in December 2024, when the DRC refused to negotiate directly with M23 at Rwanda’s demand and insisted that the eastern DRC conflict is strictly a state-to-state issue.[24] Kenya launched the Nairobi process, which aimed to facilitate dialogue between the Congolese government and armed groups in the eastern DRC, in 2022. The DRC refused to dialogue directly with M23 and criticized Kenya for mismanaging the initiative and “taking up Rwanda’s cause” after the Kenyan president entered office in 2022, however.[25] Kenya has functioned as a political safe haven for opponents to the Congolese government, hosting platforms and coalitions launched by M23, former DRC President Joseph Kabila, and even current President Félix Tshisekedi before he came to power. Tshisekedi forced the withdrawal of the EAC Regional Force for being too soft on M23 within a year of its deployment and then invited the SADC to replace EAC forces in December 2023.[26] Rwanda and M23 repeatedly accused the SADC and South Africa, a major troop contributor to SADC, of exacerbating the conflict with its offensive mandate and fighting alongside anti-Rwandan government militia groups that Rwanda views as security threats. M23 and Rwanda then defeated and forced the withdrawal of SADC troops from the eastern DRC after they captured Goma, the North Provincial capital, in early 2025.

The AU has tried to develop a more cohesive strategy, but these political divides and a lack of urgency could continue to hamper its effectiveness. The DRC and Rwanda signed onto a joint EAC-SADC communiqué in early 2025 that merged the two processes into a single diplomatic framework under the AU and called for the implementation of measures to immediately halt the fighting in the eastern DRC.[27] M23 and Rwanda captured Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital, a few days later, however, and African-led efforts have still been unable to meaningfully influence the trajectory of the conflict and or its belligerents. Paul Simon Handy, a senior analyst for the Institute for Security Studies Africa, assessed that regional differences in the AU continue to limit its effectiveness and that the single framework was the result of a “political compromise” that allowed the two blocks to delegate the dossier to the AU while retaining a degree of influence over it.[28] Gnassingbé’s appointment as a more neutral mediator strengthened the credibility of the process, but logistic constraints and poor coordination meant that it took nearly a year—until the Lomé conference—for the AU to establish the necessary technical mechanisms to support the peace efforts.[29]

The AU’s efforts to revitalize its role come as the DRC-M23 Doha process faces numerous challenges, despite US pressure leading M23 to fully withdraw from Uvira town in South Kivu province. M23’s political head, Corneille Nangaa, had announced that the group would vacate Uvira in mid-December, after major US diplomatic pressure on the group and Rwanda, but M23 maintained control of key points and installed interim military and political personnel in the town.[30] Nangaa told the UN that M23 would leave the city and defer responsibility for its security to the international community on January 15, and the group withdrew the last of its reported 200 to 300 personnel on January 17.[31] M23 reportedly withdrew to between 12 to 20 miles north of Uvira, near Sange village on the RN5 in the Ruzizi Plain, although the Congolese government and pro-Congolese government sources accused the group of maintaining a presence south of Uvira and in the mid-level highlands above the town.[32] Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters retook control of the city’s key points—with multiple reports of widespread looting, violence, and attacks on ethnic Banyamulenge civilians—followed by Congolese army units and special forces on January 18.[33]

Figure 5. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu

M23’s withdrawal eases tensions in the short term, but it may not spur new negotiations and does nothing to address issues that are stalling the Doha process. Both sides have repeatedly violated their ceasefire commitments and have still not exchanged prisoners, two key confidence-building measures. The November 15 peace framework charted a path toward reaching a comprehensive, long-term deal, but CTP assessed that it did not go much further than what was already achieved.[34] The two sides have yet to reconvene talks since November, presumably due to the Congolese government’s refusal after losing Uvira, and M23 and Rwanda have blamed the DRC and accused it repeatedly of undermining the process, despite their own lack of faith and escalatory military actions.

Technical disagreements and continued mutual distrust have similarly stalled the Washington Accords between the DRC and Rwanda. The security aspects of the Washington Accords, which are central to the peace deal’s full implementation, revolve around a military plan for the Congolese government to degrade the Hutu extremist Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Rwanda to fully withdraw its troops and military equipment from the eastern DRC.[35] The DRC and Rwanda have participated in eight total meetings under mechanisms established by the US-brokered peace agreement to implement the military plan and resolve disputes since late July 2025.[36] Discussions have not progressed past initial conversations to plan anti-FDLR operations, however, and the mechanism committees have not met since November or publicly set a date for the next meeting. Issues such as the sequencing of anti-FDLR operations, FDLR’s presence in M23-controlled areas, and defining valid FDLR targets have hindered implementation.[37] Continued distrust between the DRC and Rwanda and mutual political attacks, including in international forums, have additionally complicated the implementation of the security provisions.

Figure 6. DRC Peace Roadmap

Source: Yale Ford.

Regional cooperation through the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) could support the implementation of the Doha and Washington ceasefire in North and South Kivu in 2026. Defense ministries from several ICGLR member states, including from the DRC and Rwanda, reviewed the terms of the October 14 ceasefire agreement between the DRC and M23 and took measures to revamp and restaff the ICGLR’s Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) during a summit in early January.[38] The EJVM was previously established by the ICGLR to address the 2012 M23 rebellion and is the main mechanism with UN support for ceasefire compliance efforts in the Great Lakes between the DRC, Rwanda, and M23.[39] The revamp of the EJVM would be a positive development for both the Washington and Doha processes, as all sides have already negotiated and agreed to the EJVM and view it as politically acceptable.

Ethiopia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The two strongest Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano militias merged after months of talks. The Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF) and Amhara Fano Peace Organization (AFPO) announced their unification on January 17, naming their joint organization the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM).^[40] The AFNF and AFPO had discussed merging since at least October 2025.^[41] The AFNM established a leadership structure with appointees, the first Fano joint command.^[42] The AFNM defined its goals as furthering a “framework of national democratic unity, to ensure the survival of our people and protect their rights and interests, while also establishing a system in which the collective and individual rights of other Ethiopians are respected.”^[43] The AFNM pledged to fight against Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party and the continued rule of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.^[44]

The merger indicates that a December peace agreement between an AFPO splinter and the Amhara regional government is not representative of a majority of Fano. A former member of the AFPO Executive Committee signed the agreement, which the AFPO denounced.^[45] The Amhara regional government claimed that the agreement was the first step in a broader peace process.^[46] CTP assessed that the agreement was likely the result of a splinter rather than widespread Fano support given other Fano factions’ lack of support and the federal government’s lack of a public role in the deal.^[47]

Greater Fano cohesion improves the group’s operational planning and could unite it under a policy platform. Fano has historically been a decentralized group of militias with varying goals and levels of coordination. The goals ranged from overthrowing the Ethiopian federal government to negotiating for greater regional autonomy to controlling contested land.^[48] Fano militias often conducted operations independently of each other and even clashed occasionally, making it difficult to sustain offensives.^[49] The merging of four militias into the AFNF in May 2025 enabled a sustained offensive in eastern Amhara region, making August to October the most active three-month stretch of the Fano insurgency since it began in April 2023.^[50] The AFNF and AFPO also began conducting joint operations in October 2025, and the AFMN has built on these efforts by creating a military command to better coordinate operations.^[51]

Figure 7.  The AFNF Launches a New Offensive Around Woldia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Figure 8.  Fano Escalates Operations Across Amhara Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The AFNM’s establishment of a common political leadership and set of goals could allow Fano to also coordinate political action, which the group has been unable to do in the past. Fano militias’ differing goals previously led to a lack of a common leadership and policy platform, preventing potential negotiations with the federal government in 2024.^[52] The AFNM’s declared goal is to achieve Amhara interests within a broader Ethiopian national framework.^[53] This broad goal is not a comprehensive policy platform yet, but the merger does provide policy parameters and a leadership structure that did not previously exist.^[54] The formation of the AFNF in May 2025 did not immediately lead to cohesion and coordinated action, however, as the AFNF dealt with internal divisions.^[55]

Fano’s centralization could also improve its ability to engage with Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), as the three parties have reportedly increased ties amid their alignment against the Ethiopian federal government. Eritrea trained Fano forces during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022.^[56] The Ethiopian federal government accused Eritrea and the TPLF of supporting the AFNF’s eastern Amhara offensive in a complaint to the United Nations in October 2025.^[57] The Economist reported in mid-November that officials from Eritrea, Fano, and the TPLF had discussed military collaboration at a meeting in Sudan.^[58] The Ethiopian federal government again accused Eritrea of supplying Amhara militants after conducting a large-scale ammunition seizure in Amhara region in mid-January.^[59] Fano and Tigrayan officials have declared that their main enemy is the federal government and seemingly left open the possibility of collaboration despite their historic animosity stemming from the Tigray war, when they fought against each other.^[60]

Eritrea’s and the TPLF’s alleged growing ties with Fano come as their relationships with the Ethiopian federal government have steadily deteriorated. Ethiopian officials’ repeated claims to Eritrea’s port of Assab have prompted Eritrea to accuse Ethiopia of warmongering.^[61] Eritrea declared a nationwide military mobilization in February 2025 and massed forces on the border with Ethiopia, with Ethiopia also massing forces in March.^[62] A hardline TPLF faction launched a de facto coup against the federal government-backed Tigray Interim Administration in March.^[63] The TPLF has since repeatedly claimed that the federal government has violated the Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the Tigray war, including by imposing a semi-blockade of fuel shipments to Tigray.^[64] The federal government also halted budgetary transfers to Tigray’s regional government in late 2025.^[65]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Al Shabaab has intensified operations around a coastal district capital near Mogadishu, the Somali capital, although Somali forces have launched counterattacks. Al Shabaab has advanced toward Warsheikh—located 40 miles northeast of Mogadishu in Middle Shabelle region—since late December, seizing several villages in Warsheikh district.^[66] Al Shabaab has established positions around Jabad Godane—a crossroads village located approximately 15 miles northwest of Warsheikh—to support further operations into Warsheikh district.^[67] Local anti–Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) news outlet Baidoa Online reported that al Shabaab has also limited transit on the northbound coastal road from Mogadishu to Warsheikh after Ceel Macaan, which is located approximately 25 miles northeast of Mogadishu, although the report is unverified.^[68] Al Shabaab and Somali forces have clashed more in Warsheikh district from December to January than in the rest of 2025 combined.^[69]

Figure 9.  Al Shabaab-Somali Forces Clashes in Warsheikh District

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Somali forces with US air support have temporarily halted al Shabaab’s advance at Jabad Godane, however.^[70] Al Shabaab launched a coordinated assault on multiple military bases in the area on January 18, claiming to capture the bases.^[71] The Somali Ministry of Defense and multiple independent news outlets refuted al Shabaab’s claim, stating that Somali forces repelled the assault and conducted clearing operations near Jabad Godane.^[72]

Figure 10. Al Shabaab Contests the Somali Coastline

Source: Liam Karr and Hannah Ochs; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data and Michael DeAngelo.

Al Shabaab has also cut off lines of communication between two district capitals further northeast of Warsheikh, expanding the group’s support zones along key roads in Middle Shabelle. Al Shabaab captured Nuur Dugle—a village located between Adale and el Dheere, district capitals in Middle Shabelle and Galgadud regions, respectively—on December 18.^[73] Al Shabaab’s seizure of Nuur Dugle, which Somali forces originally captured in 2022, cuts the main road connecting Mogadishu to the coastal Middle Shabelle and Galgadud.^[74] Baidoa Online reported that al Shabaab has since advanced five miles southward on the road toward Adale, which is located approximately 100 miles northeast of Mogadishu, capturing multiple villages.^[75] Al Shabaab has conducted more attacks in Adale district from December to January than the group did from June to November 2025.^[76] Al Shabaab attempted to seize el Dheere in mid-September and has since tightened its de facto siege of the town.^[77]

Al Shabaab’s efforts give the group greater control of supply lines between its central Somalia havens and Mogadishu, leaving the capital vulnerable to attacks amid cuts to Emirati funding to Somali security forces. Al Shabaab had already conducted a series of attacks in Mogadishu in mid-December, including a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on a military base.^[78] Al Shabaab had also reportedly bolstered its presence in Mogadishu and near Afgoi, a district capital on the outskirts of Mogadishu, remaining active despite pressure from Somali forces.^[79] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has halted payments to the approximately 3,500 Somali soldiers that it supports after Somalia canceled all bilateral agreements with the UAE on January 12.^[80] The cuts affect units responsible for securing Mogadishu and surrounding areas, although Qatar will reportedly provide at least temporary support to the forces after signing a defense agreement deal with Somalia on January 19.^[81] Al Shabaab has previously utilized ground lines of communication into Mogadishu to support VBIED operations in the capital.^[82]

Togo

Author: Liam Karr

Togo extradited the former Burkinabe junta leader to Burkina Faso in the latest sign of growing economic and political ties between Togo and the Russian-backed Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Togo extradited former Burkinabe junta leader Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba to Burkina Faso at the request of the Burkinabe government on January 20.[83] Damiba led the coup that overthrew Burkina Faso’s democratic government in January 2022, before current junta leader Ibrahim Traoré overthrew Damiba in October 2022. The AES states left ECOWAS in January 2025, and ECOWAS appointed Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé as a mediator to bring the AES states back into the regional bloc.[84]

Togolese authorities said that they arrested Damiba on January 16, after the Burkinabe junta claimed on January 7 that Damiba had tried to orchestrate a plot to kill Traoré and retake power.[85] The Burkinabe security minster claimed that the plotters discussed plans to use explosives to assassinate Traoré and other key officials and had support from segments of the military, civilian population, and Cote d’Ivoire.[86] Traoré had previously accused Damiba and Côte d’Ivoire of plotting another coup attempt in September 2024, and Burkinabe authorities have claimed to thwart multiple coups per year since Traoré took power.[87] Experts have repeatedly questioned these thwarted plots and labeled them as self-promotion to help boost Traoré’s cult of personality in Burkina Faso and around the world.[88]

Togo has been growing closer to the AES since 2024, and the landlocked AES states and its sponsor—Russia—would greatly benefit from preferential sea access via Togo. Atlantic port access via Togo would strengthen the AES and Russian logistic network in the landlocked Sahel. Russia had previously relied on port access in Conakry, Guinea, for large military equipment shipments to the Sahel.[89] Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey said in early 2025 that Togo was “considering joining the AES” to strengthen regional cooperation and offer sea access to the landlocked Sahel countries.[90] AES representatives met with Togolese leadership to discuss regional economic integration and trade reforms in October 2025.[91] Political tensions between Niger and Benin have also stopped oil exports through the Benin–Niger pipeline.[92] Salafi-jihadi groups still pose a major challenge, however, as insurgent control of roadways between Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo has hampered Nigerien efforts to export uranium yellowcake to Russia via Lomé port.[93]

Togo’s efforts to hedge between the AES and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a mediator could strain Togo’s ties with ECOWAS given the increasingly zero-sum and existential competition unfolding between the two blocs. ECOWAS deployed air and ground forces to thwart a coup attempt in Benin in December 2025.[94] Pro-AES commentators expressed open support for the coup and spread disinformation on social media as the attempt unfolded.[95] French media cited Beninese and Nigerien sources who claimed that Niger had advanced knowledge of the plot and even coordinated with the coup plotters, and Togo helped the leader of the coup—Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri—flee to Niger via Togolese territory.[96] CTP previously assessed that ECOWAS states saw the Benin coup as an existential threat given the proliferation of coups across the region since 2020, including an alleged plot in Nigeria in October 2025.[97] Traoré has also accused Cote d’Ivoire of sheltering opposition figures in addition to supporting coup plots.[98] Burkinabe militias have also conducted repeated incursions across the Ivoirian border since 2025.[99]

Africa File Data Cutoff: January 22, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.