Russian Nuclear Energy Diplomacy; New Fano Offensive in Ethiopia: Africa File, October 2, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Russia. Russia signed an agreement with Ethiopia to construct a nuclear power plant. The Kremlin is using nuclear energy diplomacy to expand and strengthen long-term partnerships across Africa.
• Ethiopia. Amhara ethno-nationalist militias known as Fano have conducted offensives across northern Ethiopia’s Amhara region since August and encircled a key town in eastern Amhara. Ethiopian federal forces have repeatedly been able to contain but not defeat Fano, while Fano has been too fragmented to translate its military success into achieving its wide-ranging political aims.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. The DRC and Rwanda advanced a US-backed plan to begin military operations against an ethnic Hutu extremist militia group and withdraw Rwandan troops from the eastern DRC. The plan will likely face challenges to its successful execution, however, and the long-term success of the US-backed peace framework will likely be contingent on separate and more fragile Qatari-mediated talks between the Congolese government and M23.
• Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and aligned forces launched a new offensive in central Sudan, advancing west and capturing a key town near the West Kordofan state border. This gain relieves pressure on el Obeid—the capital of North Kordofan state—and could enable SAF-aligned forces to advance toward Rapid Support Forces–controlled western Sudan.

Figure 1. Africa File, October 2, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Russia

Author: Liam Karr

Russia signed an agreement with Ethiopia to work toward constructing a nuclear power plant, as the Kremlin continues to advance its nuclear energy diplomacy across Africa. Ethiopian officials signed an agreement with Russian state–owned energy company Rosatom on September 25 to construct a nuclear power plant in Ethiopia.[1] The agreement took place as part of a meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the World Atomic Week conference in Moscow.[2] The agreement outlines an action plan to develop and construct a nuclear power plant, advancing a prior 2023 agreement that aimed to explore the “potential” construction of a nuclear power plant.[3] The 2025 action plan includes a roadmap for future technical and economic discussions, intergovernmental agreements, educational training, and broader nuclear infrastructure development.[4]

Russia has positioned itself as a global leader in the nuclear energy market, including in Africa.[5] Ethiopia is one of 21 African countries to have signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia in the past decade.[6] These deals include at least eight proposed, in progress, or completed large-scale nuclear power plants. Many of these proposed power plants are in the nascent stages, as large-scale power plant projects can take more than decade to complete due to surrounding funding, infrastructure, and regulatory processes.[7] The Russian-backed el Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt plans to become partially operational in 2026 and fully operational in 2030, more than a decade after 2015, when Egypt and Russia initially signed agreements.[8] Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Uganda have all signed initial roadmap deals with Rosatom to construct nuclear power plants in the past three years, but none have yet entered the roughly five-year physical construction period.[9]

Figure 2. Russian Nuclear Energy Cooperation in Africa

Source: Liam Karr; The Independent.

The Kremlin has developed a comprehensive nuclear diplomacy approach that it uses to expand and strengthen long-term Russian partnerships in Africa and worldwide. Russia’s nuclear projects create African dependence on Russian financing and tech, strengthening the Kremlin’s long-term influence in Africa.[10] Russia finances a significant portion of these projects and offers favorable repayment plans to ensure it can engage competitively with all potential partners.[11] Nuclear power plants will rely on Russian experts to operate and maintain them or on the Russian training of an initial group of domestic experts.[12]

The Kremlin is also pursuing uranium-mining deals in Africa to increase its grip on the nuclear energy market, which has caused dependency problems for the West.[13] Africa holds 20 percent of global uranium reserves. Russia has signed deals on uranium mining with Niger, which is the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer, is the second-largest producer on the African continent, and has the highest-grade uranium ores in Africa.[14] The Kremlin is trying to seal an agreement with Namibia, which has the largest uranium reserves on the continent.[15] Countries in Africa and around the globe will continue to be reliant on Russia for nuclear fuel, even if Russia trains local specialists to operate the plants.[16]

Nuclear energy deals create multiple revenue and export-market opportunities for the Kremlin. Nuclear cooperation enables Russia to export nuclear energy technology, secure power plant construction projects, and sell the fuel that the power plants need to operate.[17]

The Kremlin’s nuclear energy advantage will strengthen Russian influence on the continent in the coming decades, as energy production is a leading concern for African countries as they seek to develop their economies and provide electricity for a rapidly growing population. 600 million Africans lack access to electricity, comprising nearly 40 percent of the continent’s population.[18] This energy shortage both diminishes quality of life and restricts economic development. Large-scale mines, data centers, and other economic projects driving economic growth on the continent require vast amounts of energy.[19] The International Energy Agency estimates that economic growth in Africa cause electricity demand to grow by 40 percent by 2030 and to reach almost seven times its current level by 2050.[20] Renewable energy sources such as solar energy and wind can electrify rural areas and smaller projects.[21] Larger economic projects require a larger baseload, however, leaving hydro, geothermal, and nuclear energy as leading options.[22]

Ethiopia

Authors: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr and Hannah Ochs

Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano militias are waging major offensives across Ethiopia’s Amhara region and have encircled a key crossroads town in eastern Amhara. Fano has carried out more attacks from August to September than it has in any other two-month period since the Fano insurgency began in April 2023.[23] A sizable portion of the attacks are concentrated in the North and South Wollo zones in eastern Amhara, where the Menelik Command of the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF) is reportedly leading an offensive named after a former Fano commander.[24] The AFNF is a coalition of four Fano militias spread across Amhara region, but other Fano factions have increased attacks since August as well.[25]

Figure 3. Fano Attacks in the North and South Wollo Zones, May–September 2025

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The AFNF offensive has reportedly encircled Woldia, the largest town in North Wollo and a key crossroads town linked to Addis Ababa and the Amhara and Tigray regional capitals.[26] Pro-Fano sources claim that the group captured large parts of the districts surrounding Woldia, including villages in Gidan, Guba Lafto, Habru, and Lasta.[27] A pro-Fano source claimed on September 26 that local officials had fled Woldia, while Deutsche Welle stated on September 28 that local officials had not responded to requests for comments.[28] The A2 road goes north from Woldia through territory disputed by the Amhara regional government and the federal and Tigray governments. The road connects to Mekele—the capital of Tigray region—150 miles north of Woldia. Woldia is also located on the B22 road, which connects to Bahir Dar—the capital of Amhara region—220 miles to the west via another road.

Figure 4. Fano Launches a New Offensive in Amhara Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Figure 5. The AFNF Launches a New Offensive Around Woldia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) will likely prevent Fano from capturing and holding major population centers, such as Woldia. The ENDF has increased operations targeting Fano since the offensives began in August.[29] The EDNF has recently conducted counterattacks using drones and ground forces in North and South Wollo. The EDNF also has reportedly conducted at least 10 drone strikes in the North and South Wollo in the past week.[30] Pro-Fano sources reported that the ENDF has stationed fighter jets in Amhara region and tried to reinforce Woldia with ground and artillery forces.[31]

Past ENDF counteroffensives have temporarily removed Fano from seized areas and reduced the group’s activity. Fano previously launched offensives in July 2023, September 2024, and February 2025, taking control of key roads and attacking and briefly seizing population centers such as Bahir Dar.[32] The ENDF responded with air and ground campaigns, forcing Fano to retreat from population centers.[33] The following months saw decreased Fano attacks, but the group reconstituted in rural areas and eventually launched another offensive.[34]

The ENDF is unlikely to militarily defeat Fano, however, due to ENDF capacity constraints and popular ethno-nationalist and anti-government sentiments in Amhara. The ENDF is committing resources to other theaters, most notably Tigray region and the border with Eritrea. The EDNF reportedly deployed troops and heavy weaponry to Afar region, which borders Tigray region and Eritrea, in March 2025.[35] Ethiopia deployed these resources amid heightened political instability in Tigray and tensions with Eritrea. Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces launched a de facto coup against the federal government–backed Interim Regional Administration of Tigray in March 2025.[36] Eritrea began a nationwide military mobilization in February 2025.[37] Ethiopia-Eritrea relations have continued to worsen throughout 2025 over continued Eritrean meddling in Tigray and Ethiopian threats to seize Eritrea’s port of Assab to gain Red Sea access.[38]

A heavy-handed ENDF counteroffensive is also unlikely to defeat Fano, as it would exacerbate the ethno-nationalist and anti-government sentiments driving the insurgency. Former ENDF soldiers and Amhara region special forces members launched the Fano insurgency against the federal government in 2023 due to land disputes and security concerns in the wake of Tigray war.[39] Fano members felt that the federal government had failed to support Amhara region’s land claims over Tigray region and hold the TPLF accountable for alleged abuses against Amhara during the war.[40] Fano members also felt that the federal government was trying to marginalize and subjugate Amhara when it moved to disband Amhara regional forces after the war.[41] ENDF operations have already caused civilian causalities, including a drone strike on a health clinic in Sanka, located in North Wollo, that reportedly killed at least four people on September 27.[42]

Fano will likely struggle to achieve military and political breakthroughs due to internal divisions. Fano has failed to translate military gains into political success during past offensives. The group has a decentralized structure, lacking a singular leader or entity that unifies factions under the same strategic aim and can negotiate on behalf of all factions.[43] Factions’ goals range from overthrowing the federal government to engaging in peace talks.[44] Fano leaders have repeatedly attempted to create a unifying structure to dictate policy and negotiate, but internal fissures and a lack of trust in the federal government remain.[45] The most recent effort in May 2025 involved four Fano militias merging to form the AFNF.[46] The AFNF does not have singular leader, has struggled with internal divisions, and does not represent all Fano militias, however.[47]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford with Anping Zhu

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda advanced a US-backed plan to begin military operations against an ethnic Hutu extremist militia group and withdraw Rwandan troops from the eastern DRC. The DRC and Rwanda, along with members of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM)—Qatar, Togo as the African Union representative, and the United States—met in mid-September and agreed to implement a plan to begin military operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) on October 1.[48] The operations are part of a US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda from late June, which stipulates that Rwanda will withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC as the Congolese army “neutralizes” the FDLR.[49] The FDLR is an ethnic Hutu armed group that Rwanda views as a threat due to the FDLR’s ties to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and a history of targeted hate speech against Rwandaphone communities in the eastern DRC.[50] Rwanda deployed at least 6,000 troops in early 2025 and has provided material support to back M23 rebels in the eastern DRC, in part to combat the FDLR.[51]

The dual plan has unclear benchmarks and a compressed timeline, which could create obstacles to its successful execution. The plan contains four-stages that will occur across three months. First, military officials will conduct a threat analysis of the FDLR’s current area of operations, fighting capability, and known affiliate groups.[52] Rwanda is required to cease “cross-border operations” and provide information on the scaling back of its “defensive measures,” which refers to Rwandan troops and military equipment in the eastern DRC.[53] Second, the Congolese army (FARDC) will attack the FDLR, and Rwanda will fully withdraw its troops.[54] Insider sources told Reuters in late September that this phase will occur between October 21 and 31, in line with the agreement’s timeline.[55] Third, the DRC and Rwanda will conduct a general review of the plan’s execution and jointly assess its outcome.[56] Finally, the DRC and Rwanda will work to repatriate and reintegrate demobilized FDLR fighters to Rwanda.[57] Insider sources told Reuters that the DRC and Rwanda aim to complete the plan by the end of 2025 and that the plan remains on track despite minor delays.[58]

The lack of clarity concerning the sequence and measures of success in the first and second phases risks sparking disagreements between the stakeholders. Rwanda reportedly conditioned its withdrawal from the eastern DRC on the “success” of FARDC operations against the FDLR.[59] Senior Rwandan officials have said repeatedly that Rwanda will not withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC until after the FARDC degrades the FDLR—not before or in parallel with anti-FDLR operations.[60] The DRC and Rwanda have been unable to agree on the nature of the FDLR threat, however, much less clearly define benchmarks for success. The Congolese and Rwandan delegations disagreed on the security situation on the ground and the FDLR’s operational capacity.[61]

Many FDLR positions are in areas under Rwandan-backed M23 control, which will likely be an obstacle to the FARDC’s campaign. FDLR combatants remain active on the front lines against M23, particularly in North Kivu, where key FDLR leaders and fighters are based in Masisi, Nyiragongo, and Rutshuru districts.[62] M23 has escalated its own anti-FDLR operations in Rutshuru since May, which the group says negates the need for the US-backed plan. French state media reported that Rwanda rejected the Congolese government’s proposal for operations against the FDLR that involved M23’s participation at the JSCM meeting.[63]

Figure 6. M23 Counterinsurgency Operations Against Extremist Hutu Militias in M23-Controlled North Kivu

Source: Yale Ford.

Previous FARDC counterinsurgency operations resembling the US-backed plan failed to defeat the FDLR. The FARDC conducted military campaigns against the FDLR in 2002–7, 2009, 2010–12, 2015, 2020, and 2024. The FARDC conducted the 2009 and 2015–20 campaigns jointly with Rwanda—the latter of which was done informally and was the last major offensive against the FDLR, aside from M23’s operations in 2025.[64] The campaigns pushed the FDLR out of its main bases but failed to significantly degrade the group’s command and support structures and prevent its retreat into desolate and hard-to-reach mountainous areas or stop retaliatory attacks on civilians.[65] The UN has reported that compressed timelines and the FARDC’s combat ineffectiveness held back the success of previous operations.[66]

Close ties between the FARDC and FDLR will almost certainly undermine the upcoming campaign. Past anti-FDLR operations suffered because of FARDC tolerance and active collaboration with the FDLR. The DRC has long relied on the FDLR as an anti-Rwandan proxy force, and previous efforts to integrate the FDLR into the FARDC mean that there are FDLR ties throughout the Congolese army. Senior FARDC officers have undermined anti-FDLR operations by warning FDLR fighters of future attacks—most notably in late 2024, when the FARDC North Kivu military governor leaked operational plans to the FDLR, which allow the group’s high command to evade death or capture.[67] The July UN report said the FARDC restored relations with the FDLR after brief anti-FDLR operations in late 2024, transferred more money and weapons to the FDLR, and has continued to rely on the FDLR “systematically” to fight M23 in 2025.[68]

The long-term success of the US-backed peace framework in the eastern DRC will likely be contingent on separate and more fragile Qatari-mediated talks between the Congolese government and M23. Qatar has been mediating direct peace talks between the DRC and M23 since late March. The talks are separate from the US-led initiative between the DRC and Rwanda but are closely coordinated. The DRC and M23 signed a preliminary peace agreement with a formal ceasefire provision in late July before Qatar proposed a draft peace agreement in mid-August.[69] Both sides rejected the peace proposal, however, and minor disagreements have stalled talks intended to build trust for higher-level talks aimed at reaching a final deal.[70] Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, said in late September that a sustainable deal between the DRC and M23 is the “last piece of the puzzle.”[71]

Figure 7. Peace Processes Multiply in the African Great Lakes Region

Source: Yale Ford.

The Qatari-brokered ceasefire between M23 and the FARDC has effectively collapsed, however, and both the Congolese and Rwandan governments have failed to uphold their commitments to the US-backed agreement. M23 is conducting an offensive toward Shabunda district in South Kivu after it captured a key gateway town in Walungu district in late September.[72] The FARDC has conducted counteroffensives and destroyed an important bridge on the RP1030 road in North Kivu to block M23’s advance toward an FARDC military and logistics hub in late September, while pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters continue to attack M23 positions, mostly in North Kivu.[73] The Qatari-brokered ceasefire provision prohibited new attacks, attempts to conquer new territory, and acts of sabotage and committed both sides to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict” in the eastern DRC.[74] Both the Congolese and Rwandan governments have failed to put pressure on their respective allies under the US-brokered peace agreement to “ensure that all armed groups within the conflict area cease engaging in hostilities.”[75]

Any final peace deal will also need to address M23’s demands, given the strong grip it has secured on the eastern DRC and its efforts to become more autarkic. M23 has created a centralized parallel government in areas that it controls and devoted significant resources to provide basic services, establish an alternative financial system, secure and police large population centers, adjudicate social and legal matters, and facilitate transportation and trade in the eastern DRC in 2025.[76] Reuters reported in mid-September that M23 has at least 14,000 troops deployed across North and South Kivu, which is almost three times as many active troops the group had in April, according to the UN.[77] Corneille Nangaa, M23’s political chief, claimed that the group does not need support from Rwanda because it has its own fighting force in late September.[78] The group’s bolstered military and political strength have led it to raise its demands to now include autonomy and “comanagement” of North and South Kivu with the Congolese government as part of any peace deal.[79]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured um Sumeima, advancing in central Sudan on a key road that leads into Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-controlled western Sudan. The SAF took control of al Ayara village—located 10 miles west of el Obeid—on September 26 before overwhelming RSF defenses in um Sumeima, which is 40 miles west of el Obeid.[80] Um Sumeima is located in North Kordofan state near the border with West Kordofan state along a major east-west highway. The highway leads to Darfur region, approximately 185 miles to the west, via RSF-controlled West Kordofan. The SAF and RSF have repeatedly fought over um Sumeima due to its key location along the road, exchanging control multiple times.[81]

Figure 8. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; and Thomas Van Linge.

SAF control of um Sumeima relieves pressure on el Obeid, the SAF’s logistic hub in Kordofan region. The SAF uses el Obeid as its primary staging ground for offensives in Kordofan region. The RSF has repeatedly used areas under its control west of el Obeid to stage attacks on the city. The RSF advanced from al Ayara village to attack SAF positions in el Obeid on September 18.[82] The SAF’s advance westward—along with recent gains to the north and south of el Obeid—strengthens its control of the city.

The SAF will likely attempt to consolidate control over um Sumeima and use it as a launching pad to advance farther toward Darfur. Conflicting reports among Sudanese sources dispute whether the SAF has advanced further west, with some sources claim that the SAF is now 30 miles west of um Sumeima and others reporting that the RSF is preparing a counterattack in the um Sumeima outskirts.[83] The SAF has used its control of um Sumeima to advance westward into RSF-controlled territory in the past. The SAF took control of el Khawai and continued west to capture an Nahud—a town located 90 miles west of um Sumeima—during an offensive in February 2025.[84] The RSF recaptured an Nahud and el Khawai from the SAF in May 2025.[85] An Nahud is a logistic hub located 215 miles east of besieged el Fasher, the only city in Darfur region still under partial SAF control.

Figure 9. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

The RSF may be preparing to launch another wave of retaliatory drone strikes to disrupt SAF logistics and degrade SAF governance efforts. Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab reported on September 29 that the RSF has massed suicide drones near Nyala Airport in South Darfur state, which is confirmed by satellite imagery.[86] The drones have the range to strike anywhere in Sudan, including past targets in Khartoum and Port Sudan.[87] The increase in RSF drone strikes has coincided with SAF gains, especially following the capture of Khartoum after March 2025.[88] CTP continues to calculate that the RSF conducts drone strikes on military and civilian infrastructure to hamper supply lines to Kordofan region and undermine SAF governance.[89]

Figure 10. RSF Drone Strikes, September 2024–September 2025

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 2, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.