M23 Captures Uvira; Benin Coup; RSF Captures Key Sudanese Oil Hub: Africa File, December 11, 2025

Contributor: Hannah Ochs

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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23 rebels captured Uvira town with significant Rwandan army support, marking the defeat of the Congolese government in South Kivu province and a significant escalation of the conflict that heightens the risk of a regional war. M23 can use Uvira as a launching pad for future offensives into the interior of the DRC, while the fall of Uvira is Burundi’s gravest national security threat in years.
• Benin. Beninese soldiers attempted to depose President Patrice Talon in West Africa’s second attempted coup in a week. The Economic Community of West African States deployed military assets to help stop the coup, which is a more aggressive posture that signals a recognition of the existential threat the proliferation of military led West African states poses to the body’s legitimacy and its democratic governments, including Nigeria.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured Sudan’s largest oil hub, which threatens to disrupt the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF’s) fuel access and revenue streams and destabilize South Sudan. The area was also the last remaining SAF pocket in west-central Sudan, which will enable the RSF to focus its offensive on the main front lines in central Sudan, likely in South Kordofan state, south of SAF headquarters in el Obeid.
• Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen has resumed attacks on fuel tankers along one of the main transit corridors connecting Bamako to Côte d’Ivoire following the end of a reported truce with the junta.
• Ethiopia. A splinter faction of an Amhara ethnonationalist Fano militia and the Amhara regional government signed the first peace agreement between a Fano faction and an Ethiopian government body. The federal government’s support for the agreement comes amid increasing coordination between and within the two largest Fano coalitions, which has escalated the Amhara-based insurgency and raised fears that the group is pursuing an alliance with Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
• Somalia. The Jubbaland state government is increasing efforts to assert de facto autonomy from the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as part of a broader campaign with other opposition-led states and politicians to counter SFG election and constitutional reforms. The increasing polarization over the format of upcoming 2026 elections will likely lead to election disputes and violence and hinder Jubbaland’s counterterrorism cooperation with the SFG.

Figure 1. Africa File, December 11, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

M23 rebels captured Uvira town in South Kivu province with Rwandan army support in the group’s most consequential offensive since March. M23 launched a large-scale offensive on pro-Congolese government forces—the Congolese army (FARDC), Wazalendo militia fighters, and the Burundian army (FDNB)—on the frontlines south of Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on December 2.^[1] M23 and Rwanda had reportedly mobilized reinforcements and equipment in the days before attacking enemy positions on the RN5 and in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu district.^[2] M23 had been waging several smaller offensives south of Bukavu in southern Walungu, Mwenga, and Shabunda districts to extend its territorial control and supply lines since late April. The front line on the RN5—the main route from Bukavu to Uvira on the Ruzizi Plain—had largely been frozen between M23-controlled Kamanyola and Katagota towns since March.

Figure 2. Bukavu-Uvira Corridor on the RN5

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 faced initial resistance in its offensive but successfully broke through key enemy positions on the RN5 and in Kaziba, opening lines of advance on Uvira town. Pro-Congolese government forces had counterattacked and deployed thousands of reinforcements to the front line when M23 launched the offensive.^[3] M23 heavily shelled and overpowered pro-Congolese government forces, capturing key positions in Kaziba and the adjacent Bafuliru chiefdom in the highlands, roughly 13 miles west of the frontline on the RN5, between December 4 and 6.^[4] These gains on the high ground allowed M23 to reposition its artillery and support a ground assault on Katagota, Lubarika, Luvungi villages on the RN5—the latter a crucial FDNB-FARDC forward position—on December 5, triggering a sudden FDNB withdrawal from Ruzizi on December 6.^[5] FARDC-Wazalendo coordination crumbled as M23 advanced, with FARDC special forces clashing directly with Wazalendos.^[6]

M23 ground forces advanced about 40 miles to Uvira in four days after it took Luvungi. The group captured at least eight main villages on the RN5 with some resistance from lingering FARDC and Wazalendo units as fighting also occurred in the western highlands.^[7] Thousands of FDNB and FARDC soldiers—and even local Wazalendo generals—fled Uvira on December 9.^[8] CTP reported that M23 entered Uvira as early as December 9 and took control of key positions in the city by December 10, possibly waiting for FARDC-Wazalendo elements to withdraw.^[9] The UN reported on December 8 that over 200,000 people had been displaced since the fighting intensified on December 2.^[10]

Figure 3. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu.

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

The Rwandan army (RDF) reportedly aided M23’s advance, violating its commitments under the recently signed Washington Accords peace framework. Security sources told French media that Rwanda began deploying reinforcements to support the offensive in late November.^[11] The United States and several European countries condemned Rwandan support for M23’s offensive and called on the RDF to halt offensive operations on December 9.^[12] The UN has reported on the RDF’s deployment of thousands of military troops and long-range artillery, armed drones, and anti-aircraft defense systems to support M23 offensives on multiple occasions since early 2024.^[13] The group’s latest offensive reportedly involved this kind of advanced weaponry that exceeds M23 capabilities, such as signal jammers, artillery and GPS-guided mortars, multiple rocket launcher systems, suicide and multirole drones, and anti-drone weaponry.^[14] The international community specifically expressed concern about the increased use of attack and suicide drones in their statements on the offensive.^[15] Rwanda committed to not “engage in, support, or condone any military incursions or other acts” in the eastern DRC as part of the Washington Accords.^[16]

The fall of Uvira is the defeat of the DRC coalition in South Kivu, which is a strategic setback for the Congolese government that will likely erode its domestic credibility and further weaken its military strategy against M23 in the eastern DRC. Uvira was the last major government foothold and FARDC military hub in South Kivu. M23’s control of Uvira cuts off the FARDC’s supply route for troops and military equipment in the region. M23’s advance also severely constrains if not completely cuts Burundian support, which had been the FARDC’s most important ally and main deterrent force against M23 and M23-aligned rebel militias in South Kivu. The FDNB initiated a full withdrawal and extraction of its roughly 18,000 troops from South Kivu and closed its two main border posts with the DRC due to M23’s Uvira assault.^[17] The Congolese government had used Bujumbura—Burundi’s economic capital about 16 miles to the east of Uvira—and its airport as a rear base for FDNB-FARDC ground and air operations against M23 in South Kivu for months. Bombing runs launched from Bujumbura had aimed to degrade M23’s supply lines on several axes in South Kivu since fighting had escalated in South Kivu in September.

The Congolese government could face political pressure from its domestic base and the political opposition after the fall of Uvira. The DRC had relocated official institutions and the seat of government in South Kivu to Uvira after M23 captured Bukavu in mid-February. CTP assessed in late October that a successful M23 offensive on Uvira could cause a legitimacy crisis for the Congolese president and further expose his inability to roll back M23’s and Rwanda’s gains or resolve the conflict through various military or diplomatic solutions.^[18]The political opposition had increased calls for Tshisekedi to convene a national dialogue to address the driving causes of armed conflict and underdevelopment across the DRC after M23 staged its early 2025 offensive. CTP has assessed that Tshisekedi is managing the risk of a coup linked to the M23 conflict and likely views any effort to reorganize power structures in the DRC as a threat to his control.^[19]

The Congolese government still does not face an immediate military threat from M23, however. M23 still only controls two remote provinces in the east of the DRC’s 26 provinces. The group would have to travel roughly 500 miles to reach the DRC’s economic engine in the mineral-rich former Katanga region and nearly 1,000 miles to Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, across poor roads to pose an existential threat. CTP assessed that the Congolese government would likely remain in a maximalist negotiating stance in peace talks even if M23 captured Uvira.^[20]

M23’s control of Uvira augments its military and political leverage. M23 will be hard to dislodge from Uvira given the surrounding geography. Uvira is situated on a lakeside plain pinched between the highlands and Lake Tanganyika, with the only viable land routes being through Burundi and south on the RN5. M23 took control of and sealed off the DRC-Burundi border on December 9, and the group and Rwanda will likely deploy air defenses and close the airspace above Uvira to prevent cross-border attacks.^[21] An FARDC official had told Reuters in mid-September that M23 would be “impossible to dislodge” if it pushed south along the ridgelines and gains control of key positions above Uvira, which are key due to the lack of land corridors.^[22]

M23 will likely establish a parallel administration in Uvira—a town of 700,000 residents—and use its control of the town and surrounding areas as a bargaining chip in peace talks.^[23] Uvira is a major economic and commercial hub for the area, the interior DRC, and Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia, with a port, access to several roads, and a customs post with Burundi. The group could expand its revenue streams by taxing and regulating regional trade, transportation, and commerce in the Lake Tanganyika area. The group said that it would launch a “vast” state-building effort after taking control of the Kalundu port on the south side of Uvira on December 10.^[24] CTP continues to assess that M23’s state-building efforts strengthens its leverage in peace efforts, making the group more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that sees M23 gradually enter a power-sharing system with the Congolese government.

M23 will likely use its control of Uvira to bolster its military strength for future offensives. M23 had demobilized and then trained and redeployed thousands of ex-FARDC and militia fighters to the group’s police and military forces after it captured Goma and Bukavu. The group has been conducting a mass recruitment and forced conscription campaign in urban and rural areas throughout 2025, at least tripling its force deployment since earlier this year.^[25] CTP estimates that the group has at least 25,000 combatants in its security services. New M23 recruits reportedly participated in the Uvira offensive.^[26] M23 reportedly captured weaponry and military equipment and many Burundian and FARDC-Wazalendo fighters during its advance on the RN5.^[27]

Figure 4. Rwandan-Backed Rebellion Force Deployments in the Eastern DRC

Note: The estimate for RCD-Goma is from Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford University Press, 2009). The estimate for M23 in 2025 is based on UN reporting and the group’s recent claims.

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 will likely focus on securing and consolidating control over Uvira in the short-to-medium term. The UN and Burundi said that more than 30,000 Congolese civilians fled Uvira to Burundi in the past week.^[28] Civilians have also fled on the RN5 toward Baraka town in Fizi district.^[29] The absence of urban combat in Uvira means that many civilians will likely return to the M23-controlled city, similar to what occurred in Bukavu in mid-February. M23 began asking civilians to return to their homes and resume their normal activities on December 10.^[30]

The group could face challenges securing the town. M23 had progressively strengthened its grip on Goma but had to deal with urban insecurity fomented by defeated FARDC-Wazalendo militants who embedded themselves in the town in early 2025. Uvira had been a Wazalendo stronghold with more than 80 distinct militia groups claiming the town as its base.^[31] Wazalendo militias operating in the highlands above Uvira had sporadically clashed with FARDC throughout 2025. Many Wazalendo generals retreated from Uvira in the face of the group’s advance, but some “leaderless” Wazalendo and FARDC troops reportedly remained in the city and the surrounding highlands.^[32] M23 called on Wazalendo elements to submit to M23 authorities after it had effectively taken control of the city on December 10.^[33] M23 claimed that some FDNB troops did not withdraw and “entrenched themselves” in the highlands on December 11.[34]

M23 could use Uvira to as a launchpad for an offensive toward southern and south-central DRC, although this is unlikely in the short term due to capacity and political constraints. The Burundian foreign minister accused M23 on December 8 of intending to march on Fizi district in South Kivu and reach Kalemie town—the Tanganyika provincial capital about 285 miles further south on the RN5—before December 25.^[35] Uvira was the last major defensive FARDC position before Kalemie, which is a key logistic hub that connects the eastern DRC to the former Katanga region in the south. Some pro-Congolese government forces in Uvira reportedly fled south on the RN5 to Fizi district while others redeployed to Kalemie, where Burundian troops are also stationed.^[36] The group could use its control of Uvira and Lake Tanganyika as a staging area for a Kalemie offensive and would likely face little resistance aside from Wazalendo counterattacks if it advanced on the RN5.

Figure 5. M23 Expands from the Kivu Provinces

Source: Yale Ford.

M23’s control of Uvira could also strengthen its ability to conduct an offensive toward south-central DRC. The group could use Uvira as a logistic hub to support ongoing offensives in Mwenga and Shabunda districts on the RN5. M23’s advance in these areas could enable it to degrade FARDC air capabilities, which has been a major vulnerability for the group. Kindu in Maniema province lies roughly 135 miles west of M23’s current position on the RP503 via Shabunda town. Kindu is the administrative and commercial capital of Maniema province and an important FARDC command center that houses FARDC air assets and the FARDC’s 31st Rapid Intervention Brigade.^[37] Kindu is one of the two main airports and staging grounds in central DRC for the FARDC’s air and ground operations against M23 in the east. M23 regularly accuses the Congolese government of using Kindu to deploy foreign mercenaries in the conflict and conduct drone strikes on its positions and civilians. Burundi will reportedly extract its forces deployed in Shabunda soon.^[38]

M23 faces political and capacity constraints, however, especially in the immediate term. The group is still trying to fully secure Uvira and protect areas under its control in the eastern DRC from FARDC-backed Wazalendo insurgents. Further advance would also stretch M23’s supply lines hundreds of miles and extend them further from its rear support zones along the Rwandan border. The group and Rwanda are also facing international backlash, which has previously contributed to de-escalation and deterred M23 from advancing further, as happened when Rwanda directed M23’s withdrawal from Walikale town in North Kivu in early April. The United States reportedly has a sanctions package prepared on Congolese and Rwandan officials.^[39]

M23 launched its Uvira offensive after relations with Burundi collapsed, heightening the risks of a regional war. M23’s capture of Uvira is Burundi’s gravest national security threat in years. Burundi and Rwanda are rivals in the eastern DRC, and both view their competition as potentially existential. The Burundian foreign ministry denounced attacks on Burundian territory during the fighting and Rwanda’s “belligerent attitude” on December 8.^[40] Rwanda has accused Burundi of “sabotaging the peace process” and condemned it for the “systematic bombing” of villages on the Rwandan side of the border.^[41] Senior M23 officials said that the group does not have territorial claims on Burundi on December 9.^[42] The Burundian foreign minister still said that “what threatens Uvira also threatens Bujumbura” and that “all options are on the table” for a response on December 10.^[43]

M23’s control of Uvira and key areas along the Burundi-DRC border cuts off Burundi from DRC territory and poses a major security and economic risk to the Burundian government without a détente.^[44] The closure of the border and the eviction of its forces from South Kivu will likely significantly hinder Burundi’s ability to fend off cross-border attacks on its western provinces from Burundian rebel groups who have bases in the highlands—the original stated goal for its intervention in the DRC. M23’s control of the border also has dire economic implications for Burundi, as it relies heavily on the Bujumbura–Uvira corridor to transport the 90 percent of its total exports to the DRC.[45] The spillover and refugee influx from the large-scale fighting will additionally further strain the struggling Burundi economy, which has slid even further in 2025 due to chronic fuel shortages and the war in the eastern DRC.[46]

For full analysis of regional implications and the potential impact on peace talks, read What M23’s Capture of Uvira Means for the DRC, Wider Region, and Peace Talks: Africa File Special Edition.

Benin

Authors: Miles Charles and Chris Dayton

Beninese soldiers attempted to depose President Patrice Talon in the second attempted coup in West Africa within a week. Beninese soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri announced through state media on December 7 that they had seized control of the country and deposed Talon.[47] The soldiers called themselves the Military Committee for Refoundation (CMR) and cited Talon’s lack of governance and the worsening Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the north as justification.[48] The CMR kidnapped the chief of staff of the army and the head of the national guard and had attempted to kidnap Talon as part of its coup.[49] Colonel Tigri released a video demanding the public’s support and calling on France to refrain from intervening.[50] Pro-coup protestors reportedly took to the streets to support the CMR.[51]

Beninese authorities quickly neutralized the CMR after the army remained loyal to the government. President Talon and his minister of defense announced hours after the coup that the government remained in control of Cotonou, the capital.[52] The Beninese has military arrested up to 14 coup plotters and secured the release of the two hostages.[53] The remaining members of the CMR, excluding Tigri, fortified themselves inside the national television station and Togbin military camp.[54] Republican Guard Commander Colonel Dieudonné Djimon Tévoédjrè was instrumental to the government’s counter-coup efforts.[55] Talon promoted Tévoédjrè to colonel-major in 2025.[56] Beninese authorities had questioned Tévoédjrè in 2024 for his alleged involvement in a coup attempt.[57]

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed military assets into Benin to stop the coup at the request of the Beninese government. ECOWAS announced on December 7 that it was deploying standby troops from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire into Benin.[58] The Nigerian government responded first, deploying ground and air forces into Cotonou. Nigerian jets provided aerial intelligence and struck CMR-affiliated soldiers who had barricaded themselves in the Togbin military camp.[59] Ivorian troops entered the country on December 9.[60] France also deployed air and ground assets, based in the Côte d’Ivoire, to provide intelligence and logistic support.[61]

Figure 6. Beninese Soldiers Attempt to Overthrow the Government

Source: Miles Charles; Chris Dayton

ECOWAS likely saw the coup as an existential threat to its legitimacy amid the growing number of military-run states and the hostile military-run Alliance of Sahel States (AES) bloc, prompting the strong response. ECOWAS has faced a legitimacy crisis amid the wave of coups across West Africa—and its failure to respond—over the last five years.[62] The regional bloc has had a zero-tolerance clause toward unconstitutional changes in governance since 2001 and reportedly expanded upon it in 2025 to permit the nonconsensual deployment of forces into member states when faced with a military coup, the suspension of constitutional institutions, or mass atrocities.[63] ECOWAS’s last successful intervention to stop a coup was in Gambia in 2017.[64] ECOWAS sent a delegation to Guinea-Bissau following its coup on November 26 but made no progress toward returning civilian governance.[65] The regional bloc and Nigeria had announced plans to intervene in the 2023 Nigerien coup but ultimately failed to act.[66] The military regimes in the Sahel have rejected ECOWAS’s overtures and formed the AES as a direct challenge to ECOWAS.[67]

The AES and AES-aligned states are likely sympathetic to the coup plotters. Reuters reported on December 10 that Colonel Tigri had taken refuge in Lomé, Togo.[68] Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé had reportedly flown to Niger on December 9 to meet with the Nigerien junta leader Abdourahamane Tiani.[69] Togo has maintained amicable relations with AES, expressing an interest in joining the bloc in 2025.[70] Pro-AES commentators have expressed their support for the coup and spread disinformation over social media.[71] Niger’s junta in particular was presumably sympathetic to the coup plotters due to its ongoing oil and border dispute with Benin.[72]

Nigeria also likely considered the coup a major threat to its domestic survival and regional foreign policy interests. The Nigerian government views the proliferation of regional military rule as an existential threat to its own domestic survivability, particularly after its own coup scare in October.[73] Nigeria’s democratic government has repeatedly branded the wave of coups in West Africa as a threat to West African democratic governance.[74] This view has presumably grown since President Tinubu replaced several senior military officials in October and arrested others believed to have planned a coup.[75] The government has denied any rumors of a coup, however.[76]

The Nigerian government has an acrimonious relationship with the AES due to their fraught relationship, which stems from threats to intervene in the 2023 Nigerien coup. The three central Sahelian juntas formed the AES in 2023 largely in response to the threat of external military intervention. The bloc has remained particularly hostile toward Nigeria, with Niger accusing Nigeria of supporting Salafi-jihadi groups to destabilize the junta.[77] The Burkinabe junta detained eleven Nigerian soldiers forced to make an emergency landing in southwestern Burkina Faso on December 8.[78] The AES accused Nigeria of violating Burkinabe airspace and threatened to shoot down any unauthorized aircrafts seen violating their borders.[79]

Benin is a major US ally amid the escalating regional Salafi-jihadi insurgency, spread of hostile authoritarian governments, and competition with Russia. The United States named Benin a key partner in bolstering resilience to security threats in West Africa and is heavily engaged with Benin via programs such as the US Global Fragility Act (GFA) and the US-German Coastal States Stability Mechanism.[80] Both initiatives aim to enhance security through political, humanitarian, and military efforts that increase community resilience and address the root political cause of instability, such as a lack of social cohesion and effective governance. Benin is one of five coastal countries that receive support from the GFA.[81]

Benin has emerged as one of the primary US defense partners in West Africa since the US withdrew from Niger in 2024.[82] The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2024 that the United States spent $4 million to refurbish an airfield in Parakou, Benin.[83] US Africa Command has stationed helicopters and medics in Parakou to evacuate Beninese soldiers who are wounded in clashes with insurgents in northern Benin and a special forces team station in Cotonou to advise Beninese troops.[84] Beninese military leaders have praised their partnership with the US and said that the US remains Benin’s preferred security partner.[85] Benin is also one of the few West African countries to sustain a French military presence, with French military instructors present at the Allada military camp 25 miles northwest of Cotonou.[86]

Russia has courted greater engagement with Benin and has partnered with the other military regimes in West Africa. The Russian Ambassador to Benin announced in July 2025 that the two governments were finalizing an intergovernmental military cooperation agreement on training and Russian access to Beninese ports, although no agreement has yet materialized.[87] Russia has particularly entrenched itself within AES, deploying up to 2,500 Africa Corps mercenaries across the three countries.[88] Russia also hosted the AES defense ministers on April 3 and has explored various areas of economic cooperation in recent years.[89]

The Kremlin has also strengthened defense ties with Togo, Benin’s neighbor, since at least 2022. Togolese president Faure Gnassingbé met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2025 to discuss security and trade.[90] The Russian parliament ratified two Togolese military cooperation agreements on training, joint exercises, and intelligence sharing in the months leading up to the meeting.[91] French-based investigative news site Africa Intelligence reported in 2024 that a contingent of 30 Russian military advisers had arrived in Togo and are helping Togolese troops build a military camp on the Burkinabe border.[92] Togo also received three MI-35M attack helicopters and two MI-17 transport helicopters from Russia in 2022.[93]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the largest oil hub in Sudan, which was also the last remaining Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) pocket in west-central Sudan. The SAF withdrew from Heglig into neighboring South Sudan after securing a guarantee of protection from South Sudan, allowing the RSF to capture the town’s oil facilities and surrounding areas without damaging key infrastructure on December 8.^[94] The RSF also struck deals with South Sudan and the West Kordofan regional administration to cooperate in securing oil facilities.^[95] The RSF, SAF, and South Sudan agreed that the South Sudanese military is responsible for securing the facilities. The RSF remains in the area, however, and an SAF drone strike on RSF positions around Heglig killed seven South Sudanese soldiers on December 9.^[96]

The RSF’s capture of Heglig threatens the SAF’s fuel supply and revenue streams while bolstering the RSF’s. SAF-controlled Khartoum and Port Sudan are without fuel from Heglig in the short term after engineers and operators halted facility operations and evacuated into South Sudan before the RSF’s capture.^[97] The RSF and South Sudan are working to resume facility operations.^[98] RSF control of the facilities will affect the SAF’s fuel provision and fuel export revenue.^[99] Middle East Eye reported that the RSF wants a larger portion of the earnings from Heglig, which allegedly aligns with other revenue-sharing agreements between the RSF and SAF.^[100] The Heglig facilities have the capacity to produce up to 64,000 barrels of oil per day and process 130,000, although the war has likely reduced operations by at least 50 percent.^[101]

Disruptions to Heglig’s operations could also destabilize South Sudan, which is already facing economic and security crises. Oil exports account for 90 percent of the South Sudanese government’s revenue.^[102] The exports are reliant on pipelines through Sudan due to South Sudan’s landlocked status. Heglig is a primary transit point for the exports, which is why the South Sudanese Army—led by its chief of staff—immediately deployed to Heglig to secure the facilities after the RSF captured them.^[103]

The Sudanese civil war has already disrupted Heglig’s operations, worsening South Sudan’s economic crisis. The United Nations reported in early 2025 that South Sudan’s oil exports had fallen by 70 percent in 2024, and numerous RSF attacks halted operations at Heglig for multiple days in 2025.^[104] South Sudan’s economy contracted by almost 25 percent in the 2025 fiscal year and hyperinflation ensued, with 91 percent of the population living in extreme poverty, an increase of three million people from 2024.^[105]

The deteriorating security situation has intensified the crisis and brought South Sudan to the brink of war. The forces responsible for the South Sudanese civil war from 2013 to 2020 have escalated clashes in 2025. A Nuer ethnic militia linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO)—the Nuer-dominated opposition party of First Vice President Reik Machar—attacked a South Sudanese military base in March.^[106] The fighting between factions linked to SPLM-IO and those linked to the government, which is dominated by the Dinka ethnic group, has continued at an elevated rate since.^[107] The government responded by placing Machar under house arrest and is currently trying him for murder, treason, and crimes against humanity.^[108] The United Nations and other international organizations have warned that a full-scale civil war could break out.^[109]

The RSF will now focus its offensive on the main front lines around el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan, likely the southern axis in South Kordofan. The SAF partially broke the RSF’s siege of Dilling and Kadugli—the South Kordofan state capital—by linking the 90-mile stretch of road between the towns in February 2025, creating an SAF-controlled pocket.^[110] Dilling is located approximately 75 miles south of SAF-controlled territory on the outskirts of el Obeid. The RSF and the allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu militia are mobilizing forces in preparation for an offensive on the pocket, according to an SLPM-N al Hilu official and local sources.^[111] The RSF has redeployed forces to Dabibat—located approximately 35 miles northeast of Dilling—and stationed air defense systems in Abu Zabad, which is located 70 miles northwest of Dilling.^[112] Local sources also reported that the RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu captured an SAF forward operating base north of Kadugli and are preparing to cut off the Dilling-Kadugli road around al Kiwek, which is located approximately 20 miles north of Kadugli.^[113] The RSF conducted drone strikes around al Kiwek on December 11.^[114]

Figure 7. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

Mali

Author: Miles Charles

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has resumed attacks on fuel tankers along one of the main transit corridors connecting Bamako to Côte d’Ivoire. JNIM attacked two fuel convoys along the Bougouni axis on December 6 and 10, its first such attack in nearly a month.[115] The junta had transported up to six convoys of 300–400 tankers along the axis since late October.[116] JNIM released videos on November 16 and December 11 warning that it would strengthen its blockade on the southern half of Mali, however.[117] Mali imports 57 percent of its fuel from Côte d’Ivoire, with the capital particularly reliant on the Bougouni axis.[118]

Figure 8. JNIM Enforces Blockade Across Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The attacks follow the end of a reported truce between the junta and JNIM to temporarily reopen the Bougouni corridor. The Wall Street Journal and French media reported that the Malian junta agreed to exchange up to 115 JNIM prisoners in exchange for JNIM temporarily lifting its fuel blockade on the Bougouni axis.[119] The junta reportedly released the final 45 prisoners on December 3, two days before the end of the alleged truce.[120] Unconfirmed reports on social media indicate that the truce was finalized behind the scenes of negotiations between the United Arab Emirates and JNIM for the release of two high-value Emirati hostages in late October.[121] JNIM released the Emirati hostages in late October in exchange for more than $20 million and the reported release of 25 JNIM members, potentially the first batch of prisoners released as part of the truce.[122] JNIM had attacked tankers along the corridor 11 times between the start of the blockade on September 3 and the hostage release in late October, but only once from late October to the reported end of the truce.[123] JNIM has recorded two attacks on tankers along the route in the five days since the alleged truce ended.[124]

Figure 9. JNIM Decreases Fuel Tanker Attacks During November Truce

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The junta had also increased efforts to degrade JNIM’s presence along the corridor. The Malian junta has conducted 14 counterinsurgency operations in western Sikasso since the start of the blockade on September 3 after having conducted none in the previous several years.[125] Malian forces have claimed to kill 40 militants and destroy up to eight encampments that militants had used to attack tankers in western Sikasso.[126] The junta has also begun providing air support to convoys, allowing the Malian army to eliminate JNIM militants before they attack.[127]

Figure 10. JNIM Contests Key Roadways in Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Ethiopia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Hannah Ochs

A splinter faction of an Amhara ethnonationalist Fano militia and the Amhara regional government signed a peace agreement, the first between a Fano faction and an Ethiopian government body. Masresha Setie—a former member of the Amhara Fano Popular Organization (AFPO) Executive Committee—and the Amhara region president signed an African Union (AU) and agreement mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on December 4 after a monthslong negotiation.^[128] Setie stated that the agreement involves the return of displaced people and limited prison releases and reintegration of Fano members.^[129] The Ethiopian deputy prime minister backed the agreement, with the Amhara regional government claiming that the deal is the first step of a broader process.^[130]

The AFPO quickly denounced the agreement, however, indicating a splinter within Fano rather than a widely supported peace deal. The AFPO—one of the largest Fano coalitions—suspended Setie on November 29, and pro-government sources reported his surrender to the federal security forces on November 30, both of which occurred nearly a week before December 4 agreement.^[131] The AFPO stated that the agreement was “fraudulent” on December 5.^[132] AFPO leader Eskinder Neda also denied the AFPO’s involvement in negotiations despite previously acknowledging contact with the AU and IGAD in January.^[133]

Fano is a decentralized network of militias, making splinters common. Fano lacks a shared leadership or platform that unites the many factions, who have often clashed with each other.^[134] Some factions are pursuing goals that contradict each other’s, including overthrowing the federal government versus engaging in peace talks. There has been increased coordination among the militias in 2025, however.^[135] The newly formed Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF) announced in mid-October that it had ceased hostilities with the AFPO.^[136] The AFPO had refused to join the May merger that established the AFNF.^[137] The militias are reportedly discussing the creation of a unified command structure, which would merge the two strongest Fano coalitions.^[138] The AFNF and AFPO began conducting joint operations in late October.^[139]

Fano’s internal divisions and the federal government’s limited approach to negotiations remain major roadblocks to wider peace deals. Divisions between Fano factions have obstructed attempted negotiations in the past.^[140] Neda has stated that Fano cannot negotiate with the federal government until it unites under one platform.^[141] The federal government also seems unwilling to publicly advocate widespread negotiations. The federal government likely at least tacitly approved the recent agreement, given its influence over the Amhara regional government, but did not admit to having any role in the process.^[142] The AU, IGAD, and regional government have called for negotiations with more Fano factions, but Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has not reported talks since late October 2024, when he said there was limited progress.^[143]

The federal government’s support for the recent agreement comes amid an escalating Fano insurgency and fears that the group is pursuing an alliance with other anti-federal government forces in the region. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has launched several counterinsurgency offensives over the last several years only for Fano militias to launch larger offensives months later after regrouping in rural safe havens.^[144] The most recent Fano offensives occurred across central, eastern, and northern Amhara region, making August to October the most active three-month stretch since the insurgency began in 2023.^[145] The AFNF was largely responsible for the escalation, which was concentrated in eastern Amhara’s Wollo zones, but AFPO also sustained activity in central and northern Amhara’s Gondar zones despite an ENDF counteroffensive in September.^[146] Fano’s activity has tapered off in the latter half of November and December in the face of an ENDF counteroffensive, although the reduction also coincides with the stated conclusion of the Wollo offensive.^[147]

Figure 11.  The AFNF Launches a New Offensive Around Woldia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Figure 12.  Fano Escalates Operations Across Amhara Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The federal government has accused Fano of aligning with Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the federal government. Eritrea has trained Fano forces for several years, and they fought on the same side against the TPLF during the Tigray war.^[148] Eritrea and the TPLF have since pursued rapprochement, however.^[149] The Ethiopian foreign minister filed a complaint to the United Nations in early October alleging that Eritrea and the TPLF were supporting Fano’s offensive.^[150] The Economist reported on November 13 that representatives from the three parties had recently met in Sudan to discuss military collaboration.^[151]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Jubbaland state government is increasing efforts to assert de facto autonomy from the Somali federal government (SFG). Jubbaland’s legislature amended the state constitution to refer to Jubbaland as a “state” rather than a “federal member state” on December 7, requiring state officials to use the new title in government affairs.^[152] The name change differentiates Jubbaland from the four pro-SFG federal member states (FMSs)—Galmudug, Hirshabelle, North East, and South West—although it is unclear whether it will have policy implications.^[153]

Jubbaland made the decision amid a year-long dispute with the SFG over election formats. Jubbaland withdrew from the National Consultative Council—a body comprised of the Somali president, prime minister, and the six non-Somaliland FMS presidents to address major federal issues, such as elections—in October 2024 over SFG plans to implement a one-person, one-vote election system despite Jubbaland’s objections.^[154] Jubbaland proceeded to hold state elections in November 2024 over SFG objections.^[155] The SFG has not accepted the results, which saw Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam—known as Madobe—win a third term, leading to clashes between SFG and Jubbaland state forces.^[156] Madobe and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met in early October but failed to reach a resolution.^[157] The SFG then announced on October 8 that it would create a rival Jubbaland administration based in Gedo region.^[158]

The legislature’s move on December 7 brings Jubbaland’s status closer to that of the Puntland state government, which has exercised de facto autonomy from the SFG since 2023. Puntland declared in January 2023 that it would act “as an independent state” until the completion of a permanent constitution and consensus-based referendum after accusing the SFG of trying to centralize power through the constitutional reform process.^[159] Puntland then withdrew its recognition of the SFG and recalled its SFG parliamentarians in March 2024 after the SFG moved ahead with its plans to alter the constitution and electoral system.^[160]

Figure 13.  Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr.

Jubbaland, Puntland, and the Somali opposition have increased coordination against the SFG before planned federal elections in 2026, which will likely lead to election disputes and political violence. The election disputes are fundamentally a power-sharing issue, as the shift to presidential, one-person one-vote elections would upend Somalia’s current clan-based quota parliamentary system, known as the “4.5 formula.” State legislatures and clan leaders select parliamentary representatives, who then select the president.^[161] The shift to one-person, one-vote elections would allow Somalis to directly elect local, state, and national representatives, causing Jubbaland, Puntland, and affiliated clans to fear losing influence over the process.^[162] State opposition contributed to the SFG delaying the format change, which was supposed to take effect in June 2025 local elections.^[163]

The coalition is planning their own roadmap for the upcoming elections, which could lead to stalled elections, parallel elections, or an election boycott. Madobe, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, and opposition leaders established the Somali Future Council—a political alliance opposing the SFG’s implementation of the one-person, one-vote election system and other constitutional changes—on October 2.^[164] The coalition stated on November 12 that the SFG’s recent changes to the interim constitution are invalid and is planning to discuss their own elections roadmap at a December summit.^[165] Madobe is hosting the summit, and Deni and former Somali presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—known as Farmaajo—will also attend, although a local source reported that the coalition has delayed the summit due to disagreements over Farmaajo’s attendance.^[166] The SFG has accused the Somali Future Council of acting against the national interest and refused to change its election plan.^[167]

Election disputes between the SFG and opposition groups, especially in Jubbaland, have led to violence in the past and continue to pose a risk. SFG forces loyal to then-President Farmaajo clashed with SFG forces loyal to opposition leaders in Mogadishu due to a delayed presidential election in April 2021.^[168] SFG forces and Jubbaland state forces clashed over disputed Jubbaland elections in 2020, when Farmaajo pitted Gedo and the Jubbaland state government against each other, and during the latest election dispute in 2024.^[169] The SFG has again weaponized Gedo, leading to more clashes in July, and recently threatened to create a parallel Jubbaland government, reportedly with the support of local leaders.^[170] The SFG deployed 45 personnel from the National Intelligence and Security Agency—the SFG’s primary intelligence agency with paramilitary capabilities—to Gedo in late November for an unspecified purpose.^[171] Jubbaland officials accused the SFG of meddling in their affairs and warned that they would stop unapproved deployments.^[172]

The deepening rift between Jubbaland and the SFG will likely hamper counterterrorism operations against al Shabaab. Jubbaland suspended cooperation with the SFG during the 2024 election dispute and claimed that the SFG was obstructing progress against al Shabaab.^[173] Jubbaland has since resumed cooperation with the SFG despite lingering tensions, and the two parties launched an offensive to clear al Shabaab safe havens in Lower Juba region in mid-November.^[174] The offensive is one of the largest joint SFG-Jubbaland operations against al Shabaab ever.^[175] Security forces have cleared several al Shabaab bases and captured villages, advancing to positions across the Jubba River from Jamame, an al Shabaab-held district capital for the last 16 years.^[176] The ongoing dispute threatens to disrupt cooperation at any time, however, as evidenced by Jubbaland’s reaction to the SFG’s unapproved deployments to Gedo.^[177]

Figure 14. Somali Operations Against al Shabaab in Lower Juba Region

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Africa File Data Cutoff: December 11, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.