Ethiopia Reaches Eritrean Border; M23 Rebrands with Kabila: Africa File, October 15, 2026

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Contributors: Alexander Brown and Victoria Hutchinson

Key Takeaways:

• Ethiopia. Ethiopian federal forces have advanced toward the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, which will likely result in a low-intensity border war in the short term. Ethiopia has set conditions to legally justify a regime-change war, however, and would likely use a border war to set military conditions for a possible large-scale invasion in the medium to long term, including weathering several capacity constraints in Ethiopia that currently disincentivize a full-scale invasion. Ethiopia is also unlikely to pursue a limited invasion to seize Assab alone in the short term, as this would undermine its legal self-defense case, although any Ethiopian military action in Eritrea risks being a strategic failure even if initially successful militarily due to international blowback.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). FRN is more likely a political rebranding of the Alliance Fleuve Congo and M23 than an extensive restructuring of the rebellion, as it formalizes an uneasy alliance of convenience between Kabila and M23 that remains constrained by internal power dynamics and diverging strategic objectives.
• Sahel. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) have engaged in several large, deadly clashes in the Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger tri-border area in recent weeks as part of a retaliatory cycle that has escalated into the deadliest period of fighting between the two groups since at least 2022. The latest fighting is likely partially connected to competition for influence over and access to support corridors via eastern Burkina Faso to border areas further south and ISSP efforts to capitalize upon and undermine JNIM’s other region-wide efforts.

Assessments:

Figure 1: Africa File, October 15, 2026.

Source: Emily Bjerke

Assessments:

Ethiopia

Authors: Liam Karr with Alexander Brown

Ethiopian federal forces consolidated control over all major cities in Tigray and advanced toward the Ethiopia-Eritrea border before taking an operational pause since October 12. Federal forces advanced along several axes to capture the remaining belt of key Tigrayan cities and pushed toward the Eritrean border. The Ethiopian military (Ethiopian National Defense Force, ENDF) and allied Tigray Peace Force (TPF) captured the North Tigray zone capital Adigrat on October 9 and 10 and had advanced 20 miles north to the Ethiopian border town of Zalambessa by October 12.[1] Eritrean forces had controlled the town since the end of the Tigray War in 2022.[2] Ethiopian federal forces on the central axis rapidly advanced 50 miles between October 10 and 11 to capture the Central Tigray zone capital, Adwa.[3] Federal forces further to the west captured the North Western zone capital, Shire, on October 8 and advanced nearly 40 miles east to take the city of Axum by October 12.[4] ENDF forces separately advanced more than 50 miles northwest from Shire toward the Ethiopian border town of Sheraro and reached the town’s outskirts on October 12.[5]

Figure 2. ENDF Continues Advances in Tigray

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Alexander Brown and Ziv Zellars.

Note: ENDF is short for Ethiopian National Defense Force, TPLF is short for Tigray People’s Liberation Front, TDF is short for Tigray Defense Forces.

Ethiopian and Eritrean forces are approaching an armed standoff along their border, which will likely result in a low-intensity border war that would involve an Ethiopian air campaign, in the immediate to short term. Tigrayan rebels and reported Eritrean forces have withdrawn to defensive positions along the border on several axes under heavy Ethiopian air pressure. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and Deutsche Welle (DW) Amharic reported that the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF’s) military wing—and rumored Eritrean forces had preemptively withdrawn from the Ethiopian city of Adigrat before Ethiopian federal forces took it.  Tigrayan fighters and rumored Ethiopian forces eventually withdrew across the Eritrean border on October 12 as Ethiopian federal forces advanced to the city of Zalambessa.^[6] ACLED reported that TDF troops previously stationed in Zalambessa moved toward Debre Damo and Irob, which are Ethiopian localities southwest and east of Zalambessa, respectively, while the open-source analyst Ethiopian Conflict Map reported on October 13 that Eritrean forces have now “entrenched” themselves north of Zalambessa on the Eritrean side of the border.[7] The Ethiopian Conflict Map also reported that TDF forces fled from Adwa toward defensive positions near the Ethiopian border town of Rama, and TDF and alleged Eritrean forces have retreated from the Sheraro area toward defensive positions near the Eritrean border town of Badme.[8]

There are isolated reports that Ethiopian and Eritrean forces have exchanged fire near multiple segments of the border. There were conflicting reports about isolated exchanges of fire between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces along the eastern axis in the Bure area in Ethiopia’s Afar region, which is 13 miles from the Eritrean border along the A1 highway toward Assab in Eritrea, on October 11 and 12.[9] ACLED reported that the ENDF deployed heavy weaponry and tanks from Adigrat in the direction of Zalambessa along the northern axis on October 13.[10] Pro-Ethiopian federal government sources accused Eritrean forces of shelling the Mereb–Rama border bridge along the central axis on October 14.[11]

Ethiopian and Eritrean officials have made several statements indicating that they view themselves as being at war. The Ethiopian foreign minister wrote a letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on October 9, calling Eritrean actions in northern Ethiopia an “all-out invasion” and “blatant act of aggression” that granted Ethiopia an “inherent right to self-defense” and called for international support for Ethiopian preventive measures.[12] The Eritrean information minister called Ethiopia’s allegations of an Eritrean invasion part of a plan to justify a war against Eritrea and accused Ethiopia of pursuing an “unprovoked war of aggression” against Eritrea for more than three years since Ethiopia “demanded” sea access via Eritrea’s port of Assab in 2023.[13] The Eritrean foreign minister then wrote his own letter to the UNSC on October 10 that called Ethiopia’s letter tantamount to a declaration of war and cited belligerent statements from Ethiopian officials that threatened Eritrean sovereignty.[14]

Ethiopia has set conditions to justify a regime-change war to eliminate what it views as an enduring strategic threat posed by the Eritrean regime. Ethiopian officials and think tanks have sought to frame any future Ethiopian military action into Eritrea as a necessary act of self-defense.[15] Ethiopian officials have since presented foreign weapons allegedly seized from TPLF forces to foreign diplomats and military officials in Addis Ababa and noted that the same regional actors plan to continue surrounding Ethiopia and threatening its sovereignty.[16] Jawar Mohamed, an Ethiopian politician and former political ally of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, claimed on October 15 that Ethiopian officials had conditioned military restraint on Eritrea meeting demands on TPLF sanctuary, support for other armed groups, and broader security arrangements in recent discussions with international officials.[17]

Ethiopian arguments have sought to justify actions up to and including regime change as legally justifiable to dismantle any threat Eritrea can pose to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government-funded Institute for Foreign Affairs published an article in August articulating the legal case outlined by Ethiopian officials that Eritrean violations of Ethiopian sovereignty through support for proxy actors “invites a security response . . . not merely to repel the immediate threat but to eliminate the capacity behind it,” which could extend to regime change in Eritrea “if necessary.”[18] Ethiopian think tank Horn Review said in an October 15 article that “Ethiopia may cross into Eritrea and neutralize every capability it considers imminently threatening to its national security” and pointed to the 2022 Pretoria Agreement as an example of “incomplete conflict termination,” in which a premature ceasefire can “stop active hostilities without resolving the conditions that sustain conflict.”[19]

Ethiopia would likely use a low-intensity border war period to address several capacity constraints in Ethiopia and set military conditions for a possible large-scale invasion in the medium to long term. The Ethiopian federal government has publicly signaled that it is prioritizing consolidating federal political control over Tigray and facilitating a return to normalcy over immediate war plans, however. Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights to the Tigrayan regional capital of Mekele on October 11, as Ethiopian intelligence chief Redwan Hussein, prime ministerial adviser and former TPLF spokesperson Getachew Reda, and other senior Tigrayan political and military officials led a high-level federal delegation to the regional capital and Adigrat.[20] The delegation members talked to local residents and officials and emphasized the widespread desire for peace among Tigrayans and federal forces.[21] Getachew noted that the federal government would directly rule Tigray via a command post for a six-month period before regional elections to create stable administrative and security conditions.[22] Federal forces have also reopened demobilization centers for TDF forces that were originally created as part of the Pretoria agreement.[23] Abiy has also not directly acknowledged the fighting in public while sustaining communications and meetings on various economic and diplomatic activities.

Federal forces still face challenges from TPLF remnants that could threaten federal control over parts of Tigray and degrade federal supply lines to Eritrea. The TPLF has extensive historical experience waging mountain insurgencies and has signaled that it is fighting an asymmetric-style defense campaign with plans for a counteroffensive. TPLF forces launched their first major counterattacks from their historical sanctuaries in the Kola Tembien mountains on October 12 and 15.[24] These counterattacks included the TPLF claiming to recapture Abiy Addi and Werkamba, key gateway towns along the central axis.[25] The TPLF successfully launched a counteroffensive that retook Mekele and nearly reached Addis Ababa during the first Tigray War, although CTP has previously assessed that the TPLF faces various challenges that have undermined the group’s current strength compared to the first Tigray War.[26]

The federal government is also grappling with internal tensions among federally aligned armed groups in recently captured disputed areas of southern Tigray that limit its ability to outsource security to auxiliary groups to free ENDF capacity. Federally aligned Amhara and Tigrayan forces clashed with each other in disputed areas in southern Tigray after taking control of the area from the TPLF in early October, when the TPF and Ethiopian federal police attempted to disarm Amhara Raya Zeb militias.[27] An Amhara ethnonationalist opposition party then accused the TPF of attacking internally displaced people (IDPs) returning to southern Tigray from Amhara and attempting to unilaterally set up a political administration to control the disputed area.[28] The party’s October 10 statement demanded that the federal government remove its Tigrayan auxiliaries from the disputed area “immediately and unconditionally” to keep the area clear of all nonfederal security personnel until the “historical questions of identity and political administration are resolved.”[29]

The federal government faces similar challenges in disputed parts of western Tigray near the borders with Eritrea and Sudan. Getachew, who is linked to the TPF, said that the federal government would prioritize the return of IDPs to disputed areas, including western Tigray, where the continued presence of federally aligned Amhara militias since the Tigray War ended in 2022 has prevented the return of nearly one million Tigrayans.[30] Amhara ethnonationalist sources interpreted the statements as plans to disarm militias in western Tigray, as the TPF has with the Raya Zeb in southern Tigray.[31]

The Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) has separately captured substantial swaths of territory in southeastern Amhara region, likely capitalizing on vacuums left by ENDF deployments northward toward Tigray that would remain and grow in the event of a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The AFNM has captured several villages in rural districts of the South Wollo and North Shewa zones since early October.[32] AFNM-affiliated sources claim Fano has taken Mehal Meda, Zemero, Dogolo, and at least eight other towns across the two zones, with The Ethiopian Conflict Map also reporting that AFNM has established full control of nearly 2,500 square miles of territory, which would be the largest-ever continuous territorial control established by the group.[33] The AFNM has also attacked key towns along major roadways throughout Amhara to disrupt ENDF ground lines of communication along the A2, B21, and B30 highways.[34] The A2 and B30 are north–south highways that link Addis Ababa to the Eritrean border via Amhara and Tigray.

These existing constraints make Ethiopia unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion in the short term if Ethiopian officials calculate that there is a substantial risk of a prolonged war, which is heavily dependent upon their perceptions of ENDF air power and Eritrea’s regional allies. Eritrea has sought to compensate for its technological and size disadvantages by pursuing an attritional, defense-in-depth strategy, including inside Ethiopia. Eritrea used this approach during the Ethiopia-Eritrea war from 1998 to 2000. Eritrean troops were outnumbered nearly three to one and possessed 50–75 percent as many tanks as Ethiopia before the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998.[35] Eritrea pursued a war of attrition premised on trench warfare throughout much of the conflict, as it sought to protect gains from the initial weeks of fighting. Today, the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) has 350,000 active personnel compared to the ENDF’s over 500,000, according to the military research website GlobalFirepower (GFP).^[36] The EDF also possesses significantly fewer air and land assets, including artillery, fighter aircraft, drones, and tanks.^[37] The EDF relies heavily on Soviet-era equipment, while the ENDF has undertaken extensive modernization.^[38] Eritrea sought to strengthen ties with the TPLF to augment its force capacity and effectively create a buffer zone in northern Ethiopia as part of a defense-in-depth approach.

Ethiopia’s numerical and technological advantages could lead Ethiopian decision-makers to believe that the ENDF could launch a blitzkrieg-like offensive that makes quick gains and forces Eritrea to accede to key Ethiopian demands or topples the Eritrean regime entirely. Ethiopian air and drone power in particular have been decisive in tactical engagements during the first Tigray War and the renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia. Eritrean air and drone capabilities are largely unknown, although regional experts assume that Eritrea has been upgrading its military capabilities as tensions with Ethiopia have risen.[39] GFP estimates that Eritrea’s one fighter jet is not operational and only seven of Eritrea’s other 19 aircraft are operational, whereas GFP estimates that the ENDF has approximately 15 of its 25 fighter jets operational and 47 of its other 79 aircraft.[40] Ethiopia has also built up an extensive drone fleet that includes at least four Turkish TB2 Bayraktar armed medium altitude long endurance (MALE) drones, one Russian Kronshtadt Orion armed MALE drone, undisclosed numbers of Chinese Wing Loong multi-role drones, Turkish Bayraktar Akıncı heavy strike drones, Iranian Mohajer 6 armed MALE drones, and possibly thousands of cheap, locally produced first-person view drones, some of which have fiber-optic capabilities.[41] Ethiopian air superiority would enable Ethiopian attacks on targets throughout Eritrea, such as mechanized columns, artillery positions, supply routes, Eritrea’s limited air assets, and rebel leaders and sanctuaries.[42]

Eritrea would likely receive military support from regional partners, particularly Egypt, which would challenge Ethiopia’s ability to achieve its operational objectives, however. Eritrea has multiple regional allies who have signaled they would militarily support Eritrea in a conflict that threatened Eritrea’s Red Sea coastline. The most notable of these partners is Egypt, which signed a deal with Eritrea to help develop Assab that also reportedly included provisions to build military facilities and allow Egyptian naval ships to dock at the port.[43] Egyptian officials already stated that Egypt agreed to coordinate military and intelligence efforts if the conflict in Ethiopia “escalated to neighboring states,” and Egypt has also shown a willingness to provide material assistance to regional partners, including arms and Egyptian-based air and drone support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in neighboring Sudan.[44] Regional actors have also stationed their own air and drone assets outside their national territory to protect them from being destroyed. The SAF has reportedly stationed fighter jets in Eritrea, for example, and accused the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces of launching drones into Sudan from Ethiopia.[45]

Ethiopia is unlikely to pursue a limited, blitzkrieg-style invasion to seize Assab alone in the short term, despite its operational advantages, as this would leave Ethiopia’s claimed security concerns unaddressed and undermine its legal self-defense case. Isolated and unverified reports claimed that the ENDF has launched a military buildup in the Afar region along the A1 highway to Assab. DW Amharic and an open-source conflict analyst on X claimed on October 12 that the ENDF had deployed a large number of troops and heavy weaponry in Bure, Bododa, and Elidar.[46] The villages are two, 13, and 56 miles from the Eritrean border, respectively, along the A1. An isolated Ethiopian media source and conflict trackers claimed that there had also been some fighting or shelling near Bure, although another Ethiopian source cited locals who said that ENDF mechanized forces are “not even close” to Bure.[47] The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War confirmed there were vehicle tracks on the Eritrean side of the border around Bure but were not able to confirm what kind of vehicle made the tracks in a review of satellite imagery from October 13.

Ethiopian officials and state media outlets have continued to espouse nationalistic rhetoric since fighting in northern Ethiopia began in late September that sea access is existential and inevitable. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy reiterated that Ethiopia’s Red Sea access was a civilizational and economic imperative and a “matter of time” as he was sworn in to his third term as prime minister on October 5.[48] State media outlets published articles on October 14 and 15 calling sea access a “defining” and “existential” imperative for this generation of Ethiopians.[49] The Fana State Media Corporation specifically framed the quest for sea access as a patriotic duty that “demands a willingness to place the country’s long-term interests above narrow personal considerations and to undertake the difficult work required to advance the national cause.”[50] Both articles hedged that these pursuits must all be undertaken in accordance with international law and through peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation that respects the sovereignty of neighboring states, however.

Assab is geographically isolated from Eritrea’s center of gravity, which makes it hard for Eritrea to defend and vulnerable to a quick Ethiopian campaign to seize the port and establish air supremacy, but harder for Ethiopia to justify as a self-defense objective. Most of Eritrea’s military installations are in central and western Eritrea, meaning that Eritrean reinforcements would have to travel roughly 300 miles to reach Assab. Vehicles and mechanized units would be vulnerable to airstrikes as they travel through open desert terrain along the one coastal highway that connects Assab with the rest of Eritrea, just as Ethiopian drones have destroyed numerous Tigrayan and alleged Eritrean vehicles in northern Ethiopia.[51] Ethiopia would also use its overwhelming air assets to launch a strike campaign against the EDF’s limited air and drone capabilities to secure the port for use.

Any Ethiopian military action in Eritrea risks being a strategic failure even if initially successful militarily, however, due to international blowback. Ethiopian efforts to annex Assab would likely lead to sanctions that would cripple the Ethiopian economy, as occurred during the Tigray War, and undermine any effort to develop Assab into a viable commercial port. Ethiopia is nearly halfway through a four-year, $3.4 billion extended credit agreement reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2024 to help address Ethiopian foreign currency shortages, high inflation, and debt relief and restructuring efforts.[52] The IMF program has helped facilitate bilateral and multilateral debt negotiations that aim to secure nearly $3.5 billion in debt relief and helped secure direct support from the World Bank, which has provided Ethiopia with roughly $2.5 billion in direct budget support since 2024 as part of its nearly $16 billion portfolio in Ethiopia.[53] Assab itself would also need significant investment to modernize and expand the port and connect logistics networks after mostly falling into disuse after the Eritrea-Ethiopia war from 1998 to 2000.[54] The United States and Europe paused hundreds of millions of dollars in budget support and other non-humanitarian aid during the Tigray War, including French defense assistance to build up the Ethiopian navy, and led multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank to pause key financing programs.[55]

The international community has strongly pressured both sides to de-escalate. Foreign diplomats met with Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders in Addis Ababa on October 11 and 12, urging the federal government to show restraint and not invade Eritrea. The European Union called for de-escalation on October 5, and the UK published a similar statement on October 15 that called on all parties to respect each other’s territorial integrity.[56] The UNSC also held closed consultations on the situation on October 13, which followed additional closed consultations on September 30 held at France’s request.[57] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio encouraged all sides to de-escalate and reengage in dialogue as agreed in the 2018 Ethiopia-Eritrea peace framework and stressed that all countries must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors during a phone call with Abiy on October 14.[58]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Liam Karr

Former Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Kabila and several senior officials from M23 and its now-former political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), announced the launch of FRN from Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, on October 12.[59] Claude Ibalanky, a former special envoy and diplomat for DRC President Félix Tshisekedi who had joined M23 in early 2026, presented the group’s political declaration at a press conference.[60] FRN denounced Tshisekedi’s regime and said that the movement aims to “coordinate all resistance forces to end tyranny by all means, including force” and rebuild the state.[61] FRN designated Kabila as its president and Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa, who were the two most senior political figures in AFC, as vice presidents, with several senior AFC officials taking other political posts.[62] Sultani Makenga, a veteran military commander, retained the position of chief of staff of the Armée Révolutionnaire du Congo, M23’s army.[63]

Figure 3. Senior FRN Leadership

Source: Yale Ford.

Kabila likely garnered at least tacit backing for FRN from several regional states. Kabila lived between South Africa and Zimbabwe, both of which have shielded him politically, after going into exile in 2023. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa said in August 2025 that the treason case against Kabila that opened in mid-2025 was unfair and that they had tried to persuade Tshisekedi to drop it.[64] Kabila’s closest regional partner is Zimbabwe, where he lived in the Zimbabwean capital with his wife and has set up several businesses in the country. Kabila’s ties to Zimbabwe date back several decades, and Zimbabwean soldiers have long been part of his personal security detail.[65] Angola has maintained contact with Kabila, despite being a strategic partner to Tshisekedi, as its frustration with Qatar’s role in mediating the Doha process and Tshisekedi’s maximalist conditions for a Congolese national dialogue has mounted.[66] Uganda, which cooperates with the Congolese army in Ituri province and had a long and difficult relationship with Kabila, has long provided state support to M23 and maintained an ambiguous public stance toward the group.

Kabila likely saw formally joining M23 as the last card to play to protect his interests and influence and emerge as a serious contender for power against the US-backed Tshisekedi regime. Kabila’s return to armed rebellion seeking to overthrow the central government is almost certainly driven in part by his bitter personal feud with Tshisekedi. This feud stems from several years ago, when Tshisekedi reneged on a backroom power-sharing deal with Kabila that paved the way for Tshisekedi’s rise to power following fraudulent elections in 2018. Tshisekedi became president and entered a shaky coalition with Kabila’s political platform, which retained parliamentary and provincial majorities, the premiership, and significant influence over the security services and state-owned enterprises, allowing Kabila to trade a figurehead presidency for continued control. Tshisekedi broke with Kabila in late 2020 and began moving against his business interests and eroding his political influence, however. Tshisekedi co-opted Kabila’s parliamentary allies, ousted the Kabila-aligned National Assembly speaker and prime minister, and had purged Kabila’s remaining loyalists from the government and military by 2021.[67] Kabila reportedly wanted to run for president again in 2023, but he went into exile that year.[68]

Kabila likely hastened his return to Congolese politics after the Congolese government began targeting him and his family aggressively in early 2025. Kabila maintained a low public profile until late 2024, when he began mobilizing support within his network and broke his silence in an op-ed in a South African newspaper.[69] The Congolese government seized Kabila’s assets and banned and began harassing members of Kabila’s political party and anyone associated with him in April 2025, as part of wider efforts to coup-proof the regime amid heightened tensions following M23’s early 2025 seizure of Goma and Bukavu in the eastern DRC.[70] Kabila then staged his return to M23-controlled Goma in May 2025, after which he began openly denouncing the Congolese government and calling for regime change in line with AFC-M23’s agenda, while keeping his own role ambiguous and stopping short of explicitly endorsing the movement. A former minister for Kabila said in May that Kabila’s return to the scene intended to shift the “balance of power” in Congolese politics toward Kabila and his camp.[71]

The Congolese government further expanded its campaign against Kabila in late 2025. Military prosecutors backed by the Congolese government secured a death penalty conviction against Kabila in absentia on charges of treason in a rigged trial in late September.[72] Congolese prosecutors accused Kabila of hiding his identity as a true “Rwandan” and a “spy” during the trial.[73] The DRC targeted and arrested some opposition figures, banned a dozen opposition political parties linked with Kabila, and conducted another wave of arrests of senior military officials between September and November 2025.[74] Congolese agents linked to the Conseil national de cyberdéfense (CNC), a surveillance and intelligence unit reporting directly to Tshisekedi, abducted the two most senior officials in Kabila’s political party from their homes in Kinshasa in December 2025 and January 2026 and have since held them incommunicado.[75] The CNC reportedly began arresting, abducting, and intimidating anyone suspected of disloyalty to the regime or sympathy for the opposition, Kabila, and M23 in early 2026.[76] DRC-employed private military contractors were then almost certainly responsible for drone attacks on a residential neighborhood in Goma in an attempt to assassinate Kabila in mid-March 2026.[77]

Tshisekedi has further blocked Kabila’s path back to power by refusing to include him in a Congolese national dialogue. A national dialogue is a state-convened forum that brings together political actors, armed belligerents, and civil society members to negotiate solutions to various crises, with such a process often resulting in power-sharing agreements. The Congolese government has repeatedly ruled out including either M23 or Kabila in a dialogue, despite calls from non-Kabila-aligned Congolese opposition figures and from Angola, which has acted as an interlocutor for a dialogue, since early 2025. Kabila gave a speech in May before he returned to Goma that adopted an aggressive tone but left the door open to a dialogue.[78] Kabila launched his own opposition bloc, Sauvons la RDC, with close allies and several members of the exiled political opposition in October 2025 and began calling for an inclusive dialogue, two weeks after the death penalty conviction.[79] The International Crisis Group (ICG) cited certain regional observers a few months later in December 2025 who assessed that Sauvons la RDC was ineffective and unable to affect political change, however.[80] Tshisekedi formally launched the dialogue process in late August 2026 after more than 18 months of slow-walking the process but set narrow political conditions and drew a red line by ruling out the participation of Kabila and AFC-M23. Sauvons la RDC formally rejected the format of the announced dialogue and accused Tshisekedi of using it to preserve his power.[81] Kabila delivered his second public address three days before he joined M23 and launched FRN that accused Tshisekedi of rigging the dialogue and signaled his rejection of any compromise with the government.[82]

Kabila also likely views Tshisekedi’s efforts to circumvent constitutional term limits to stay in power indefinitely as further narrowing his political opportunities. Tshisekedi’s second term expires in 2028, unless he replaces the 2006 constitution—Kabila’s most important political legacy—or sidesteps its key provisions to reset his term limits. Tshisekedi began setting political conditions to change the constitution in late 2024, but the M23 rebellion slowed these efforts. Tshisekedi’s inner circle has allegedly plotted since 2024 to either replace the constitution entirely or repeal an article on term limits to then force through a term-limit amendment that could establish renewable seven-year terms to be elected indirectly by the parliamentary majority, potentially enabling him to remain in power at least into the early 2040s.[83] The ruling majority began accelerating efforts to change the constitution in early 2026, after the DRC signed a strategic partnership agreement with the United States and the United States sanctioned the Rwandan army. Tshisekedi said in early May that the Congolese government cannot organize popular elections in 2028 while M23 controls North and South Kivu, but that he would accept a third term through a popular referendum.[84] A bill ratified by the DRC’s parliament in June and validated by the constitutional court in July gives Tshisekedi the legal pretext to circumvent the current constitution’s restrictions and stay in power.[85] Sauvons la RDC has repeatedly denounced the constitution project as a power grab, and FRN enshrined the right to resist constitutional violations in its founding political declaration.[86]

US pressure likely removed most remaining disincentives that Kabila had for joining M23 and further narrowed his prospects of returning to power without gaining more leverage to secure US approval. Kabila and the political opposition bloc both said that a dialogue was a prerequisite to peace and criticized the US- and Qatari-led peace processes as exclusionary and ineffective in early 2025.[87] The French magazine Jeune Afrique quoted an insider source on partnership negotiations between the DRC and the United States in early 2025 who noted that a finalized US-DRC partnership would isolate Kabila and strengthen Tshisekedi by allowing the US to “sanction anyone who undermines the contract that binds them with the DRC.”[88] Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, cast doubt on Kabila’s remaining political influence and described his return to politics as a “purely internal matter” in July 2025.[89] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Kabila in late April 2026 for backing AFC-M23 with financial and political support.[90] This effectively left Kabila with few remaining options beyond joining M23 as a means of reclaiming leverage, including through military action. Kabila’s inner circle reportedly tried to reassure the United States that the DRC would honor its commitments under the US-DRC partnership, and Kabila himself said in his speech before launching FRN that the DRC-US partnership agreement was “guaranteed by the continuity of the state, and not by the permanence of the regimes in place.”[91]

FRN represents an alliance of convenience between Kabila and M23 that gives Kabila a path back to power, allows M23 to gain legitimacy and access to Kabila’s network, and challenges the political balance of power that favors Tshisekedi. FRN illustrates the fluidity and opportunism of the political actors involved in the alliance, given that Kabila has a checkered past with M23’s military elite, and the phenomenon of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Kabila backed an armed anti-Tutsi extremist group, allegedly wanted to kill Makenga, and crushed the first M23 rebellion, which Tutsi officers launched after Kabila abrogated a previous deal in 2009 as president. Kabila maintains close ties with Nangaa, whose falling-out with Tshisekedi is closely intertwined with Kabila’s own rift with the president. Nangaa was a close Kabila ally who oversaw the 2018 elections as head of the electoral commission. Nangaa admitted before he joined AFC-M23 in 2023 that a “political agreement” reached in 2018 had spared the DRC a “bloodbath” and later claimed that he had helped broker the deal between Tshisekedi and Kabila.[92] Tshisekedi reportedly sought to assassinate Nangaa in a drone strike in late 2023 after numerous disputes drove a rift between Nangaa and Tshisekedi’s inner circle, prompting Nangaa to flee to Kenya before emerging as the head of AFC alongside Bisimwa in December 2023.[93] ICG cited an unnamed Congolese politician living in South Africa in December 2025 who saw Kabila’s dramatic return to the DRC via M23-controlled Goma in May 2025 as “stamping his authority on the AFC, in particular on Nangaa.”[94]

FRN boosts Kabila’s leverage by giving him a direct seat in the peace process and a credible threat of force against the government. The FRN has said that it will inherit AFC-M23’s place and obligations in the Doha process, and the United States called on the DRC and the new FRN to build on earlier progress and finalize the remaining protocols signed in Doha in November 2025 and at the UN Security Council (UNSC) on October 13.[95] The Congolese government said that it was still committed to the Doha process at the UNSC hearing.[96] An M23-aligned journalist claimed that talks previously scheduled for late October between the Congolese government and AFC-M23 could be postponed indefinitely after FRN’s creation, however.[97] Kabila now also de jure leads a military apparatus that controls significant territory—including the provincial capitals and largest cities in the Kivu provinces—and enjoys major support from Rwanda. Kabila’s veiled message to the United States that his return to power would not jeopardize US interests signals that he wants to be seen as a viable future partner, not just a spoiler.

FRN gives M23 greater political legitimacy. Kabila serving as FRN president undermines the Congolese government’s narrative that M23 is exclusively a foreign-backed, Rwandan problem. Kabila’s background as a former Congolese president who ruled for nearly two decades and was a foe of M23 and Rwanda’s aims to shift focus away from Rwanda and lend greater weight to FRN claims to be a “revolution” with legitimate and widely held domestic and national grievances against Kinshasa.

M23 will also gain access to Kabila’s network and resources. Kabila accrued enormous wealth within an extensive patronage network that he built in the DRC and abroad that also enabled him to exert formal and informal control over the government during his presidency.[98] These resources give him considerable influence and room to maneuver that now extend to the FRN. FRN’s manifesto suggests that the movement intends to draw on these combined political and material resources, stating that its members had decided to “pool their forces, resources, and means” to achieve their objectives.[99] FRN can use Kabila’s network to activate sleeper cells within the army and security services, try to provoke a coup, and attract disgruntled military and political opposition leaders who may have been hesitant to join AFC-M23.[100] The strength and reach of Kabila’s extant network and his ability to encourage these defections are unclear, however, particularly in Kinshasa and his former political stronghold in the southern DRC.

FRN also attempts to create a political and military pole to attract other Congolese opposition actors that could break Tshisekedi’s strategy of dividing the armed and political opposition. Tshisekedi has excluded AFC-M23 and Kabila from the national dialogue while negotiating with M23 separately in Doha and insisting that those negotiations remain separate from the dialogue. CTP has assessed that Tshisekedi likely seeks to control the dialogue to buy time, co-opt the opposition, and avoid concessions that could weaken him.[101] The Congolese government simultaneously continues to pursue a military solution against M23 while avoiding concessions in the Doha process, including failing to honor a vital confidence-building measure.[102] Christian-Géraud Neema, a nonresident scholar in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Africa Program, has noted that this separation has prevented AFC-M23 and the opposition from forming a coalition that could shift the balance of power, and it leaves the political opposition with little leverage of its own in the dialogue. Neema noted that the dialogue’s open-ended nature, controlled by the government, buys Tshisekedi time to pursue a military solution and rely on the United States to sanction Rwanda and weaken AFC-M23 enough to limit or avoid concessions in Doha. This strategy depends on the opposition not aligning with AFC-M23, which Neema noted would be politically costly for opposition figures even as they tacitly rely on rebel military pressure to extract concessions from the Congolese government.[103]

FRN is more likely a rebranding of AFC-M23 than an extensive restructuring of the rebellion, however, as it remains constrained by internal power dynamics and diverging strategic objectives. FRN obscures underlying cleavages rooted in divergent strategic aims that continue to threaten the rebellion’s cohesion. These disagreements center on the extension of military operations beyond the Kivus, with political leaders advocating territorial expansion and the M23’s core military elite favoring the consolidation of control over the region. The UN Experts claimed in July 2026 that “most M23 leaders opposed participating in military operations” beyond the Kivus.[104] CTP assessed in early October 2026 that a recent internal plot to reorganize AFC-M23’s leadership before Kabila’s formal accession to FRN underscored deepening tensions between M23’s military and civilian wings as the group has expanded the scope and scale of its rebellion. These divisions may cut across the military-civilian divide and also reflect preexisting internal fractures, however.[105]

FRN appointed Kabila as its titular head but by and large kept the same leadership structure as AFC-M23. Kabila is not particularly popular in Goma and within Tutsi circles, and his accession to a leadership role adds another major political actor with decision-making authority and a direct stake in an already fractious rebellion. The UN Group of Experts claimed in July 2025 that internal tensions had initially risen within AFC-M23, driven in part by Kabila’s publicized return to Congolese politics through M23-controlled territory.[106] FRN issued a statement on October 14 that announced the dissolution of AFC but made no mention of M23, raising the possibility that this schism persists and FRN could remain a less influential political wing attached to M23.[107]

Rwanda undoubtedly endorsed FRN, likely in part to further its efforts to give the M23 rebellion a more distinctly Congolese character, as it continues to steer the broader direction of the movement to align with Rwanda’s objectives in the eastern DRC. FRN’s creation implicitly signals that Rwanda views Kabila as a politically useful ally. Rwanda initially propped up Kabila’s father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), which marched across the DRC and captured power during the First Congo War in 1997, before Kabila then expelled Rwandan forces in 1998, sparking the Second Congo War. Kabila, who succeeded his father after his assassination in 2001, maintained channels of engagement with Rwanda throughout his presidency despite periods of acrimony and periodically negotiated with Rwanda and its allied rebellions in the eastern DRC. Officials in central and southern Africa noted in early 2025 that Tshisekedi had proved too “mercurial and unpredictable” for Rwandan President Paul Kagame and that Rwanda likely preferred Kabila, because bilateral relations were better under his tenure.[108] Kabila reportedly visited Kigali in April 2025, and his first appearance in Goma a few weeks later signals that he received approval from the Rwandan government.[109] The UN Experts claimed in June 2026 that James Kabarebe, a longtime adviser to Kagame and strategist behind Rwanda’s DRC policy, has been the principal link for Rwanda and AFC-M23 with Kabila.[110]

Rwanda likely does not fully trust Kabila, given their convoluted history, however, and may see him as an unreliable opportunist with only tactical political alignment against Tshisekedi. Joseph Kabila fought Rwanda in the Second Congo War and Rwandan-supported rebel movements later in his presidency, in part by funding and equipping militia groups and extremist groups opposed to Rwanda. Kabila periodically cooperated with Rwanda on security matters, but he still espoused anti-Rwanda rhetoric for domestic political purposes and accused Rwanda of trying to destabilize the DRC. Jeune Afrique cited regional observers in mid-2025 who had said that Rwanda and other countries in the region may not have preferred Kabila over the Tshisekedi regime due to Kabila’s unfavorable reputation.[111]

Kabila may have been the only remaining viable choice for Rwanda to place a Congolese political figure at the helm of the rebellion. Rwanda has been trying to shed its public connection to M23 and broaden M23’s support base for several years. Multiple sources told the UN Experts in June 2024 that M23 and Rwanda saw the AFC as a way to legitimize M23 and its claims while reducing Rwanda’s visible role.[112] ICG noted that the creation of the AFC also signaled that regional powers—particularly Uganda and Kenya, some of whose senior officials helped establish the AFC—were “growing tired” of Tshisekedi’s refusal to negotiate with M23 and hoped that a new alliance could pressure him to shift his strategy.[113] The UN Experts claimed in July 2025 that Rwanda had “gradually sidelined” Nangaa, however, in part because of his “personal ambition” and repeated statements in the media about taking Kinshasa by force.[114] The UN Experts claimed in the same report that Rwanda planned to bring back Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the first M23’s predecessor movement, the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, and appoint him to an important position in AFC-M23 to bolster popular support and improve cohesion within the movement, although this did not occur.[115]

There is no indication that Rwanda wants to use FRN to significantly expand the war outside of the eastern DRC. The July 2025 UN report claimed that M23’s control over the Kivus secured access for Rwanda to land and resources in the eastern DRC, degraded armed Hutu extremists, and served to increase Rwanda’s political influence in the DRC.[116] M23’s extensive state-building efforts and demands for federalism in political negotiations suggest that Rwanda is primarily backing M23 military leadership, who want to focus on the subnational  objective of securing a self-governing region separate from Kinshasa, rather than expanding operations beyond the Kivus or pursuing the amnesty-and-integration or national power-sharing terms of past settlements. A national military campaign would need Rwandan approval, significant Rwandan matériel and troops, as well as a degree of regional diplomatic support to be successful, all while putting the territory and influence that M23 and Rwanda have cultivated in the last five years at risk. Rwanda withdrew 2,500 troops from the eastern DRC under the Washington Peace Accords peace process in July 2026.[117]

Sahel

Author: Liam Karr with Victoria Hutchinson

IS Sahel Province (ISSP) and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) have engaged in several large, deadly clashes in the Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger tri-border area in recent weeks as part of an escalatory cycle that began in mid-2026 and has escalated into possibly the deadliest period of fighting between the two groups since at least 2022. ISSP likely initiated a major attack on JNIM fighters across the Mali-Burkina Faso border area on October 9. The bulk of the reported fighting occurred in Oudalan province in far northeastern Burkina Faso’s Sahel region, but there was also fighting reported further west near Arbinda in Soum province and across the border near Tessit in the southern portion of Mali’s Gao region after JNIM mobilized reinforcements to counter the attacks.^[118] Initial reports indicated at least 60 fighters had been killed in total, including 50 JNIM fighters.^[119] ISSP claimed on October 12 that the group had killed over 400 JNIM fighters during clashes in Oudalan province.^[120]

JNIM has mobilized a large force to retaliate against ISSP since October 12.^[121] JNIM had already reportedly sent forces from Kidal to the border area during the initial phase of fighting on October 9 and reportedly reallocated another 150 reinforcements from Kidal to Tin Akoff in northern Burkina Faso on October 13.^[122]

Figure 4. ISSP and JNIM Battle in the Tri-Border Area

Source: Liam Karr; Victoria Hutchinson and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The retaliatory cycle began in July 2026, as JNIM likely attempted to crack down on ISSP expansion in northeastern Burkina Faso. JNIM assassinated an ISSP commander in Burkina Faso known as Sadou, who had defected from JNIM in February 2026, in July near the Burkina Faso–Niger border.^[123] The group accused Sadou of being a traitor, and pro-al Qaeda channels published pictures and videos showing JNIM fighters dragging Sadou’s dead body. JNIM then killed high-ranking ISSP leader Abu Zayd and another commander in attacks on ISSP fighters in Oudalan province in mid-August.^[124] JNIM claimed that the leader was the “emir” of ISSP in Burkina Faso, while other conflict analysts reported he may have been Sadou’s successor, and JNIM-affiliated media channels published photos and videos of JNIM fighters kicking Abu Zayd’s dead body.^[125]

ISSP has now launched at least two major offensives in retaliation. ISSP attacked several JNIM positions along the Burkina Faso-Mali border in Oudalan province on September 1, specifically in retaliation for JNIM killing Sadou and Abu Zayd.^[126] ISSP claimed it killed more than 200 JNIM militants, including commanders, wounded dozens, and captured and subsequently executed over 30 more.^[127] IS-affiliated media published videos showing fighters dragging the body of a killed JNIM commander, mirroring what JNIM fighters had done to the late ISSP commanders.^[128] The deadliest ISSP and JNIM engagement killed a total of 173 fighters from both groups in December 2022, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[129] This clash was part of a period of sustained, large-scale fighting between the groups in 2022 that killed hundreds of militants and resulted in ISSP establishing dominance over much of the Mali-Niger border area.

The latest fighting is likely partially connected to competition for influence over and access to support corridors via eastern Burkina Faso to border areas further south, as both groups compete to be the dominant actor in northern Benin and northwestern Nigeria. ISSP and JNIM are directly competing for influence and access in border areas in northern Benin, southeastern Burkina Faso, southeastern Niger, and northwestern Nigeria. These southern border areas link JNIM-dominated territory in Burkina Faso, Benin, and southwestern Niger and are the main areas of operations of the ISSP Lakurwara faction, which has become the dominant Salafi-jihadi actor along most of the western Niger-Nigeria border and serves as a key logistics node between ISSP and Nigeria-based IS West Africa Province.^[130] CTP has assessed since late 2025 that both groups’ expansion toward the border area shared by Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria could make the area a new theater for infighting.^[131] CTP noted in April 2026 that fighting between the two groups “is gradually expanding further south in Burkina Faso and Niger, away from their border with Mali and toward their borders with Benin and Nigeria.”^[132]

Figure 5. Sahelian Salafi-Jihadi Infighting Shifts South

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Greater dominance in the Burkina Faso–Niger border area affects who controls access and support networks for these southern zones, as some of the recent fighting in the tri-border region has been directly connected to the competition for border areas further south. Sadou accused JNIM of pursuing peace deals with Benin and Côte d’Ivoire so it could concentrate forces in northern Benin and prevent ISSP from expanding into Benin from Niger and Nigeria when he defected to ISSP.^[133] Journalist and researcher Wassim Nasr told the French outlet France 24 in April that locals claimed ISSP has been stockpiling weapons for a major battle with JNIM in southeastern Burkina Faso, and one of JNIM’s leaders in Burkina Faso specifically said the group killed Sadou because he was planning to attack JNIM positions along the Benin-Niger border.^[134]

ISSP may also be seeking to capitalize upon and undermine JNIM’s other region-wide efforts, which has led JNIM to deprioritize directly fighting ISSP but bolstered its status over ISSP as the dominant group in the region. JNIM has sustained pressure across the entirety of Mali throughout 2026. The group launched two offensives that involved simultaneous attacks in multiple parts of the country, including southern Mali, in April and July.^[135] The April offensive targeted Bamako, killed the Malian defense minister, and resulted in JNIM and its Tuareg rebel partners capturing the Malian regional capital of Kidal.^[136] JNIM has sustained pressure across central and southern Mali as it seeks to disrupt economic and military activity along key roadways and consolidate control over rural areas with limited government presence that rely on militia forces.^[137] JNIM has dispatched reinforcements from Kidal to fight ISSP despite the Malian government and its partners launching an offensive to retake Kidal town in early October.^[138]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 15, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.