Ethiopian Counteroffensive into Tigray; Internal Tensions Within M23: Africa File, October 1, 2026

The Ethiopian military (Ethiopian National Defense Forces, ENDF) has largely repelled the rebel offensive in northern Ethiopia and launched a counteroffensive consisting of three different lines of advance toward the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)–controlled regional capital, Mekele. Afar and Tigrayan rebel forces initially made gains in northern Afar region, where they are likely aiming to consolidate control over a buffer zone and rear supply networks along the Eritrean border.[1] The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF/Ugugumo) and the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF, the TPLF’s military wing) captured Abala—a district capital approximately 30 miles east of Mekele, the Tigray regional capital—on September 22.[2] The rebel forces then took Erebti—a district capital 75 miles east of Mekele—on September 27 from federally backed forces, including the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), an anti-TPLF Tigrayan rebel group.[3] Multiple open-source mappers and pro-rebel sources reported that rebel forces also captured Dallol district, which is 115 miles northeast of Mekele on the Eritrean and Tigray borders, on September 29.[4] The rebels reportedly controlled at least three—and possibly up to six—of the eight total districts in Afar’s northernmost zone by September 30, based on unverified reports from Al Jazeera and Agence France-Presse.[5]

The ENDF has launched successful counterattacks to reverse rebel gains to the east, however, opening a line of advance toward Mekele. The ENDF reportedly retook Erebti on October 1.[6] The recapture of Erebti precludes a rebel advance to cut the strategically important Ethio-Djibouti highway (A1), which is 225 miles southeast of Erebti, via a secondary road that links to the A1 near the Afar regional capital, Semera. The Ethio-Djibouti highway connects Ethiopian domestic markets to the port of Djibouti, which handles over 90 percent of Ethiopian imports and exports.[7] The ENDF reportedly continued its advance from Erebti and took Abala on October 1, completely undoing rebel gains on the secondary road.[8]

Figure 2. Ethiopian Military Counteroffensive into Tigray

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Alexander Brown; Ziv Zellars.

The ENDF has simultaneously halted Amhara rebel and TDF advances in the northeastern Amhara region and counterattacked north, advancing on main roads toward Mekele.[9] The ENDF repelled an initial Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) and TDF advance south toward Woldia—the capital of the North Wollo zone and a crossroads town connecting several major highways in Amhara—near Kobo, which is 30 miles north of Woldia, by September 25.[10] The ENDF and TPF then began advancing north into Tigray’s Southern zone via the A2 highway, which connects Woldia to Mekele.[11] The federal forces captured several towns along the A2 by September 30, including Alamata and reportedly including Korem, the latter of which is approximately 60 miles north of Woldia and 100 miles south of Mekele.[12] The ENDF has since continued its advance and clashed with the TDF on the A2 between Korem and Maychew, which is 25 miles north of Korem, on September 30.[13] ENDF forces have also advanced on a secondary road linked to the A2 in a flanking or bypass maneuver and reportedly captured Mekoni, which is approximately 10 miles east of Maychew, on the night of September 30 to October 1.[14]

The ENDF has advanced quickly toward Mekele through difficult terrain on the A2, although potential challenges remain. The stretch from Kobo to Alamata is on a plain, but it becomes mountainous on the approximately 115-mile stretch from Alamata to Mekele. The ENDF has already advanced approximately a quarter of the distance between the two localities in three days. Reports from an open-source mapper and a conflict reporter suggest that the TDF has tactically withdrawn from positions along this stretch of the highway, presumably to fortify other positions surrounding the A2 and Mekele, however.[15] The ENDF’s simultaneous advance on the secondary road linked to the A2 indicates that it is also seeking to consolidate control of both routes before a final approach to Mekele.

The ENDF has also opened another alternative line of advance to Mekele on a secondary road west of the A2. The ENDF retook Sekota, which is 70 miles west of Alamata, on September 27 after the AFNM and TDF had entered the town on September 25.[16] The ENDF and TPF then reportedly advanced 40 miles north to capture Abergele, which is on the Tigray regional border approximately 60 miles southwest of Mekele, on September 28.[17]

Rebels have launched a deep penetration drone strike campaign targeting key federal facilities in and around Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, likely to degrade and stretch Ethiopian assets and symbolically demonstrate the rebels’ ability to expand the conflict across the country. Rebels launched numerous drone strikes targeting air facilities across Ethiopia on September 27. Rebel drones reportedly targeted Harar Meda Air Base in Bishoftu airport in the Oromia region, which is the Ethiopian Air Force headquarters approximately 35 miles southeast of Addis Ababa.[18] The strikes allegedly killed multiple ENDF soldiers and possibly damaged airport assets according to satellite imagery analysis by open-source analyst Rich Tedd and separate reporting from investigative Egyptian outlet Mada Masr, although CTP could not independently corroborate any damage in its own review of low resolution satellite imagery.[19] Strikes also reportedly targeted the Kombolcha airport near Dessie in Amhara and the Semera airport in Afar on September 27.[20] Federal authorities temporarily halted airport operations at Kombolucha, and videos on social media claim to show firefighters putting out a fire at the airport, while low resolution satellite imagery shows possible damage at the Semera airport.[21] Pro-rebel media claimed that the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival (Alliance for Survival) conducted the strikes and also targeted the Bahir Dar airport, although CTP could not confirm any damage or disruption to airport activity.[22] Lack of damage confirmation could mean that drones either missed their target, were intercepted, or were too small to register visible damage on satellite imagery.

Figure 3. Possible Damage at Semera Airport, October 1, 2026

Source: Brady Africk; European Union.

Suspected drone strikes then reportedly targeted multiple locations in Addis Ababa, including the ENDF headquarters, on the night of September 30 to October 1.[23] An anonymous security source told Mada Masr that Ethiopian air defenses had downed suicide drones attempting to target the ENDF headquarters and possibly the 24th Infantry Division headquarters in the Kirkos district.[24] The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service subsequently suspended drone flights around Addis Ababa.[25] Rebel-linked sources told Reuters that the Alliance for Survival had conducted the strikes.[26] CTP was unable to corroborate any visible damage in low resolution satellite imagery.

Figure 4. Ethiopian Rebel (Alliance for Survival) Deep Penetration Drone Strike Campaign

Source: Liam Karr.

The campaign likely aims to degrade and stretch ENDF assets. All the strikes have targeted military installations. The first wave of strikes particularly targeted air bases, presumably to degrade ENDF air capabilities, which played a decisive role in the Tigray war. A former Ethiopian intelligence official told Mada Masr that deep-penetration strikes also likely aim to tie down ENDF assets outside of the main battlefields in northern Ethiopia.

This campaign also likely aims to symbolically demonstrate the rebel coalition’s capabilities and reach across the country. The strikes are the first well-documented instances of any of the rebel coalition members conducting drone attacks. Addis Ababa and Bishoftu are within Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) areas of operation, Bahir Dar and Kombolcha are within AFNM areas of operation, and Semera is closest to AFNM, ARDUF, and TPLF areas of operation.

The TPLF is facing more internal discord now than it did during the first Tigray war, which is undermining its current war effort. The TPLF previously took advantage of popular discontent among Tigrayans toward the federal government and its Eritrean and Amhara ethno-nationalist allies to advance the war effort in the Tigray war from 2020–22. The TPLF leadership publicly presented a united front, and there were few defections from the TPLF.[27] Former high-ranking Tigrayans in the Ethiopian security forces formed the TDF in coordination with the TPLF leadership.[28] The TDF then mounted a mass mobilization campaign, building its forces potentially up to 250,000 fighters, although Reuters reported that the TDF forcibly recruited fighters as the war went on.[29]

The fallout from the first Tigray war and the ensuing 2022 Pretoria peace agreement sparked divisions within the TPLF and among Tigrayans that are undermining the TPLF’s current war effort. TPLF hardliners, led by TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael, opposed the Pretoria agreement from the outset and worked to undermine Pretoria agreement supporters within Tigray, resulting in several high-ranking Tigrayan officials defecting to the federal government.[30] Former Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) head Getachew Reda and senior TDF and TIA official Tsadkan Gebretensae left the TPLF in early 2025 and aligned themselves with the federal government after the TPLF deposed Getachew’s administration.[31] Getachew’s successor, former TDF head Tadesse Worede, resisted TPLF efforts to nullify the TIA and reinstate the pre-Tigray war regional government in May 2026, leading the TPLF to depose him as well.[32] The TPLF reportedly arrested Tadesse and three other TDF officials shortly after the ongoing war broke out on September 22.[33] Tigray police commissioner Gebre Dilla also reportedly defected to the federal government on September 23.[34] The TDF has also relied on mass conscription since June to replenish its ranks amid greater popular reluctance to join the TDF.[35] The TPLF has dealt with rising dissatisfaction among Tigrayans from its governance shortcomings since 2022.[36]

The Alliance for Survival has also more broadly demonstrated a lack of cohesion across all members since the war resumed, highlighting the initial limitations of the rebel coalition. Three smaller members of Alliance of Survival have indicated that they will not contribute to the rebel military effort.[37] A spokesperson for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) stated in an interview with Al Jazeera the ONLF only supports the Alliance for Survival’s political goals, not its military aims.[38] Deutsche Welle Amharic also reported that spokespeople from the Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement and the Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement separately denied that their groups were members of the Alliance for Survival at all.[39] The Sidama National Liberation Front, which is a minor rebel group based in the southern Ethiopia’s Sidama region, announced on September 24 that it had joined the Alliance for Survival, however.[40]

Figure 5. Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival

Source: Emily Bjerke; Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

Limited military participation by the originally announced coalition members demonstrates the coalition’s lack of cohesion, which will continue to challenge coordination. The three smaller members have limited military capabilities, but their abstinence from military action supports the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP’s) previous assessment that the different rebel groups will likely cooperate insofar as it serves their individual interests.[41] The internal tension extends to the primary members of the coalition, the AFNM, OLA, and TPLF, each of which have long-standing disputes and strategic differences with each other.[42] The OLA acknowledged the tensions among the coalition members on September 17 and stated that the coalition was a “procedural consensus” as opposed to a cohesive strategic alliance.[43] CTP has not recorded OLA participation in the rebel military effort thus far.

Eritrea may become more directly involved in the conflict as fighting spreads north. Eritrea could launch a major intervention against the ENDF should certain thresholds be crossed, such as the ENDF capture of Mekele or a broader ENDF advance toward the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. Eritrea has formed an alliance of convenience with the TPLF, despite their fighting on opposite sides in the first Tigray war from 2020 to 2022, due to Eritrean dissatisfaction from the Ethiopian federal government excluding it from the first war’s settlement and the Ethiopian government’s overt determination to gain sea access via Eritrea’s port of Assab.[44] Eritrea’s partnership with the TPLF aims to address these concerns by using the TPLF and other rebel groups to undermine stability in Ethiopia and establish a buffer zone between its border and Ethiopian federal forces.[45] High-level Eritrean and TPLF officials have repeatedly engaged since at least January 2025, when Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki personally promised to back the TPLF in the event of a conflict with Ethiopia, according to French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence.[46] Eritrea has also provided political and military support to the TPLF, and Eritrean officials made public appearances during visits to Tigray as recently as early August 2026.[47]

Eritrean forces may already be present in northern Ethiopia and could send further reinforcements. Eritrea never fully withdrew from Tigray at the end of the first Tigray war and has implemented a nationwide military mobilization and maintained an enhanced posture on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border since early 2025.[48] Unverified reports from pro-Ethiopian federal government sources claim that Eritrean forces sent reinforcements into Tigray following isolated clashes between Tigrayan and ENDF forces in early 2026 and are now active in the current fighting in Afar.[49]

Ethiopia has publicly accused Eritrea of supporting the rebels and taken retaliatory diplomatic measures, which could signal an imminent escalation from either side. ENDF Chief of Staff Birhanu Jula stated on September 25 that Eritrea was financially supporting the TPLF and facilitating support from external actors to the rebel group.[50] The federally backed Afar regional president stated in an interview with Al Jazeera shortly after fighting began that the Eritrean military was directly participating in the rebel offensive.[51] Ethiopia then closed its embassy in Asmara and declared 10 Eritrean diplomats persona non grata on October 1.[52]

International actors have thus far not publicly sponsored peace efforts, leaving a long-stalled African Union (AU) process as the only pathway to de-escalation. Key international actors have largely called for an end to the hostilities and offered rhetorical support for AU peace efforts. The AU chairperson called on September 23 for both sides to engage in AU-sponsored dialogue to return to the Pretoria agreement, which the AU brokered.[53] The European Union and UN Secretary-General separately affirmed their support for de-escalation and AU efforts.[54] The United States and United Arab Emirates, which is a key backer of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, also separately declared their support for de-escalation and dialogue, although both explicitly condemned the TPLF as well.[55]

The AU process has been largely defunct for 18 months, however, and there have not been additional processes to fill the gap. The Pretoria agreement had not been functional since the TPLF’s de facto coup of the TIA in March 2025.[56] The Ethiopian federal government’s subsequent revocation of the TPLF’s legal status as a political party and the TPLF’s reinstatement of the pre-Tigray war regional government in May 2026 effectively voided the deal and returned the situation to the status quo before the Tigray war.[57] AU envoy for the Horn of Africa Olusegun Obasanjo’s separate meetings with the Ethiopian federal government and TPLF since June, the most recent being with TPLF head Debretsion in late August, have not yielded progress toward dialogue.[58]

Other international actors have failed to step in. The United Nations General Assembly did not produce any tangible de-escalation efforts, despite the session not ending until September 28, six days after the war began. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, both of which have positive relations with the Ethiopian federal government, have not publicly commented on the renewed war. Both countries undertook extensive diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between the Ethiopian federal government and TPLF amid a military standoff on the Tigray regional border in February 2026.[59]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

M23 security services reportedly arrested a senior political official and launched an investigation in recent weeks into an alleged internal plot to reorganize the movement’s leadership. Anonymous M23 military and intelligence officials told the French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence that the group recently foiled an internal “conspiracy.”^[60] The September 23 report claimed that the plot, led by political official Théo Binamungu and involving several “political figures and military personnel,” sought to oust M23 military chief Sultani Makenga and reassign key political and military positions.^[61] These positions included the military intelligence chief and the governorships of North and South Kivu provinces within M23’s parallel government in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).^[62] Binamungu is an adviser to Corneille Nangaa—the head of M23’s political wing, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)—and the North Kivu provincial coordinator for the political party of former DRC presidential candidate Moïse Katumbi. Africa Intelligence claimed that the plan had been in the works since early 2026 but that the plotters were working to finalize the details and had presented the scheme to “members of Rwanda’s security apparatus.”^[63] M23 security services moved to quash the plot discreetly after uncovering it, with the report framing the subsequent investigation led by M23’s military intelligence chief, John Nzenze, as a “highly sensitive matter” to avoid causing discord within the group’s ranks.^[64]

The alleged power struggle is the latest example of long-standing fault lines within M23’s military leadership and between elements of the movement and Rwanda. Tensions among the M23 military elite first surfaced around 2009. Rwanda arrested Laurent Nkunda, the leader of M23’s predecessor movement, the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), and helped dismantle the CNDP in exchange for joint Rwandan-Congolese military operations against Rwandan Hutu extremist rebels known as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in the eastern DRC in 2009. The rivalry between circles close to Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda reportedly dates to the period of Nkunda’s arrest, which contributed to the emergence of two wings, one aligned with Nkunda and the other with Ntaganda.^[65] Ntaganda was a former rebel leader in Ituri province before he became the chief of staff of the CNDP, which maintained parallel military and political networks in the Kivus after the group’s integration into the Congolese army (FARDC) in 2009. Makenga defected from the FARDC in May 2012 to join M23, which was a new mutiny led by Ntaganda, and Makenga became the public face of M23 as Ntaganda’s deputy. Ntaganda and Makenga fell out in late 2012, however. Makenga’s political chief, Bertrand Bisimwa, dismissed in February 2013 the political head of the Ntaganda faction, Jean-Marie Runiga, whom he accused of siding with Ntaganda, after Runiga had unilaterally promoted Baudoin Ngaruye—an ally of Ntaganda and longtime Congolese rebel officer—to the same rank as Makenga.^[66]

Open military confrontation escalated between the two factions in North Kivu in late February 2013, and Ntaganda’s wing lost.^[67] Makenga’s forces clashed with Ntaganda after allegedly believing that Ntaganda was planning to kill him.^[68] Ngaruye led a large-scale attack on Makenga’s base in Rutshuru during the fighting.^[69] The UN Group of Experts claimed in July 2013 that Rwandan officials reversed their support for Ntaganda, moved to dismantle Ntaganda’s support networks in Rwanda, and provided limited material support to Makenga against Ntaganda.^[70] Several hundred fighters under Ntaganda, including his associates Runiga and Ngaruye, then fled to Rwanda, where Ntaganda surrendered to the US Embassy. Makenga’s faction, which controlled the bulk of M23’s forces and weaponry, fled to Uganda after the FARDC and an international coalition defeated the group in November 2013. The collapse of the rebellion and the rebels’ subsequent flight into exile solidified M23’s splinter into two factions, one aligned with Rwanda and the other with Uganda.

Nkunda’s arrest and Rwanda’s decision to let M23 collapse contributed to growing mutual distrust between Rwanda and Makenga, despite limited Rwandan support for Makenga in the internecine war. The history of conflictual relationships since the wars in the 1990s had already sown the seeds of rocky relations between Congolese Tutsi military leaders and Rwanda. Many former CNDP officers were reportedly “deeply unhappy” with the 2009 deal signed with the DRC government, and Makenga, who was a brigade commander in the CNDP and loyal to Nkunda among ex-CDNP members, allegedly briefly considered rebelling against Rwanda after Nkunda’s arrest.^[71] Many Rwandan officers reportedly view Makenga as “insubordinate,” while Makenga and some rebels reportedly feel expendable, a sentiment underscored by Rwanda’s past exclusion of them from political deals and Rwanda’s willingness to protect its own interests above those of M23.^[72]

M23 returned to the DRC and gradually patched up differences to form a reconstituted movement in the early 2020s. Makenga and a small contingent of his forces left a demobilization camp in Uganda in early 2017 and established a remote base on a mountain on the border between the DRC and Uganda.^[73] The US-based Congo Research Group (CRG) cited a source close to Makenga who claimed that senior Ugandan military officers “quietly facilitated” Makenga’s return to the DRC.^[74] Makenga and several senior officers began recruiting fighters in Uganda, and fighters from Rwanda joined Makenga after Rwanda reportedly had reached out to Makenga and helped broker peace between him and the Rwanda-aligned faction that included former Ntaganda ally Ngaruye by 2020, according to CRG.^[75]

The alleged plot to reorganize AFC-M23 underscores tensions that have deepened along a third rift between M23’s military and civilian wings as the group has expanded the scope and scale of its rebellion. M23 is a two-tiered movement, with a national political umbrella under the AFC and an army and security services led by core M23 military commanders, both of which take strategic direction from Rwanda. Nangaa has used the AFC to expand M23’s alliances with other armed groups in the DRC and to try to attract Congolese politicians and business leaders who have become disillusioned with the regime of DRC President Félix Tshisekedi. Former DRC President Joseph Kabila is informally aligned with M23 and has made frequent visits to M23-controlled areas since May 2025. The movement’s military wing is led by veteran Congolese Tutsi commanders from the CNDP and earlier rebellions, while also including defected and captured FARDC soldiers and other officers alienated from Tshisekedi’s regime. The UN Experts have claimed that the political and military leadership receives “instructions and support” from Rwanda, which has the final say on military strategy.^[76] Makenga has significant sway over the AFC and the administration of M23 territory, however, as the UN Experts claimed in December 2024 that the AFC required specific approval from Makenga for its actions.^[77]

The AFC’s declared aim is to overthrow Tshisekedi’s regime and rebuild the Congolese state. Nangaa frequently states this publicly and highlights AFC-M23’s intention to march on Kinshasa, the Congolese capital over 1,000 miles away from North and South Kivu, and other major Congolese cities and politically sensitive areas in the DRC. Overt regime change is distinct from M23’s older demands for amnesty, refugee return, and integration into Congolese security services, although these objectives are folded into AFC-M23’s demands for formal recognition through negotiations with the Congolese government and de jure control of the Kivus through a federalism-style political arrangement. Kabila, whom the US Treasury Department sanctioned in April 2026 for allegedly supporting M23, and his political platform have called for regime change in line with AFC objectives.^[78] CTP and other organizations have assessed previously that Kabila and Nangaa likely aim to use AFC-M23 as a springboard to relaunch their national political careers and support the goal of broadening the group’s political constituencies outside the Kivus.^[79]

The military wing likely maintains a more limited strategic objective to consolidate territorial control in the eastern DRC. M23 has launched a systematic state-building project to translate its military gains in the Kivus into a de facto autonomous region.^[80] AFC-M23 has dropped its previous key demand to integrate into the FARDC and now proposes creating a new national army into which FARDC forces would integrate. These extensive state-building efforts and demands for federalism in political negotiations suggest that its primary ambition is subnational—securing a self-governing region separate from Kinshasa—rather than the amnesty-and-integration or national power-sharing terms of past settlements. The UN Experts also claimed in July 2026 that “most M23 leaders opposed participating in military operations” beyond the Kivus.^[81] A military campaign far beyond the Kivus would almost certainly stretch the group’s forces and supply lines, drawing them away from rear support zones near the border with Rwanda and its traditional heartland in North Kivu. Such a campaign would put at risk the control of territory and influence that M23 has acquired in recent years and deviate from its core stated aim to protect the interests of the Congolese Tutsi community in the Kivus. A national campaign would also shift influence toward the political wing’s leaders, such as Nangaa and Kabila, and away from the military elite.

Figures 6 and 7. Senior Military and Political Leadership of M23-AFC

Source: Yale Ford.

Rwanda may act as an arbiter on the side of territorial consolidation. Rwanda’s strategic objectives appear to align more closely with the military wing’s than the AFC’s, based on claims from the UN. The UN Experts claimed in July 2025 that Rwanda’s main objective was to control territory in the DRC and that Rwanda and M23 were opposed to an offensive on Kinshasa, although not the notion of regime change.^[82] The report claimed that M23’s control over the Kivus secured access for Rwanda to land and resources in the eastern DRC, degraded the FDLR, and served to increase Rwanda’s political influence in the DRC.^[83] The UN Experts claimed in July 2025 that Rwanda had “gradually sidelined” Nangaa because of his “personal ambition” and repeated statements in the media about taking Kinshasa by force.^[84] The UN Experts claimed in July 2026 that Makenga and Ngaruye “only tolerated each other” at Rwanda’s request.^[85] Rwanda does not appear to have backed the alleged plot to oust Makenga, which would indicate that Rwanda prioritizes the cohesion of the military command over a change in leadership or may have not have needed to take sides after Nzenze had already penetrated the plot.^[86] This is also consistent with the view that Rwanda may be reluctant to empower the political wing to a certain extent, given its efforts to check Nangaa and the AFC.

Current tensions within M23 reflect the military-civilian divide but also a mix of factionalism, long-standing disputes, and rivalries that cut across the two wings and their foreign partners in Rwanda and Uganda. Strains among M23’s military cadres reportedly persist. Former Ntaganda associate Ngaruye became M23’s commander of operations after rejoining Makenga but was later moved to command the group’s northern sector from Rutshuru town in North Kivu for unclear reasons by mid-2025.^[87] CRG and the UN Experts claimed in 2026 that relations between Makenga and Ngaruye deteriorated and that their associates and family members quarreled over revenue collection and patronage.^[88] The report from Africa Intelligence said that the alleged plotters wanted to install Ngaruye as M23’s top commander, but it remains unclear whether Ngaruye was directly involved in the plot.^[89] The report said that senior M23 figures and officers suspected of involvement in the plot were being “dealt with” but not arrested.^[90]

Discord between Makenga and Rwanda reportedly has also persisted into the current iteration of M23. The UN Experts claimed in July 2024 that Rwanda trusted Ngaruye and other M23 commanders more than Makenga, whom Rwanda reportedly views as less reliable.^[91] The UN Experts claimed in July 2025 that Rwanda planned to bring Nkunda back and appoint him to an “important position” in M23 to “restore cohesion” within the group, although this has not occurred.^[92] CRG claimed in April 2026 that Makenga rejected Rwanda’s attempt to install Runiga, who is close to Ngaruye, in a senior political role, indicating that bad blood remains and Makenga maintains control over the appointments of administrative positions within AFC-M23’s political structures.^[93] Makenga’s position was reportedly “increasingly contested within the movement and by Rwanda” in 2026, according to UN Experts, with Rwanda allegedly considering his replacement, due to his ties to Uganda and rocky history with Rwanda—but ultimately deciding against it.^[94] The UN Experts claimed in July that Rwanda’s alleged move to reshuffle M23 in favor of Rwanda-aligned M23 leaders “deepened mistrust” among Makenga’s associates.^[95]

Both the political wing and Makenga have close ties to Uganda, which has long provided M23 with state support. This has notably included artillery support and the deployment of 100 to 150 troops to fight alongside M23 and Rwandan troops during the battle for Bunagana town in Rutshuru in July 2012, according to the UN Experts.^[96] Makenga settled in Kampala, used Uganda as a political and recruitment rear base to build the network M23 now has, and cultivated ties with senior Ugandan army officers, including Ugandan military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba, during their time in exile.^[97] Uganda, which has denied links with M23, has reportedly allowed M23 free passage and access to use Uganda’s territory for multiple purposes since M23’s resurgence in late 2021.^[98] The UN Experts claimed in 2024 that Ugandan soldiers and military trainers deployed to M23-controlled areas in North Kivu and that Ugandan military intelligence officials had been actively supporting M23 with coordination and logistics since at least late 2023.^[99] The UN Experts claimed that the FARDC destroyed an aircraft in Walikale town in early 2025, when the area was under M23 control, and that a Uganda-based company operated the aircraft and made three trips with it between Uganda and Walikale before being destroyed.^[100] Makenga, Nangaa, Bisimwa—who is now the AFC deputy head—and M23’s political spokesperson have reportedly made multiple trips to Uganda, where they have spent notable time, established some form of residency, and have held political meetings with Kabila, Katumbi, and officials within the inner circle of the Ugandan president since mid-2024.^[101]

Several reports attribute growing tensions within AFC-M23 to disagreements over strategy, leadership, resource distribution, and relationships among key figures. Africa Intelligence claimed that the alleged plot to reassign top positions, which drew support from both wings and involved Ngaruye ally Runiga, may have been driven by tensions between the two wings and Makenga’s tight control over AFC’s activities, but also beyond these two wings into “opportunistic alliances.”^[102] Africa Intelligence claimed that Binamungu had fallen out with Joseph Bahati, the North Kivu governor who has a military background and is close to Makenga.^[103] The report also claimed that one of the military officers implicated in the plot had lived in exile in Uganda before joining M23.^[104] The report noted that Ngaruye and Runiga, who would become South Kivu governor in the alleged plot, had “favored the strategy of broadening demands nationwide” in 2013.^[105] The UN Experts claimed in July 2025 that internal tensions had initially risen within AFC-M23, driven in part by controversial political appointments, notably with Bahati, and Kabila’s publicized return to Congolese politics through M23-controlled territory.^[106] The report claimed that these tensions also rekindled divisions among the factions aligned with Rwanda and Uganda, prompting Rwanda’s alleged plan to bring back Nkunda.^[107] CRG claimed that Nangaa and Makenga fell out over the broader direction of AFC-M23 in 2025.^[108] CRG claimed that tensions within AFC-M23 had increased after Kabila’s guards reportedly disarmed Makenga and made him wait several hours during a visit to Kabila in Goma in May 2025, while Nangaa received “immediate access.”^[109] The UN Experts claimed in July that Makenga “did not trust Kabila, and the two did not have a good relationship.”^[110] The UN Experts’ July 2026 report claimed that M23 senior leadership also quarreled over access to and distribution of resources.^[111]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 1, 2026, at 1:00 p.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.