Ethiopian Rebels Launch Major Offensive; China Expands Djibouti Base; Deadly JNIM Attacks in Central Mali: Africa File, September 24, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Ethiopia. A recently announced rebel coalition has launched a large-scale offensive against the Ethiopian federal government, which may be the first move in a renewed full-scale war in northern Ethiopia. The rebel offensive likely aims to consolidate the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s control of Tigray and pressure key federal supply lines, although strategic differences will challenge coordination among the disparate coalition members.
• China. The People’s Republic of China is expanding its ability to monitor military activity and collect signals intelligence across the Middle East and Africa from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Support Base in Djibouti. The PLA could use its enhanced intelligence collection capabilities to monitor US and US-allied military capabilities and activity in the region.
• Mali. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is intensifying pressure on Malian and Russian forces in central Mali. The group is pursuing several lines of effort that aim to consolidate and expand its support zones in central and northern Mali.
• Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched an offensive to expel the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from its remaining positions in central Sudan’s North Kordofan state. An RSF offensive on a secondary front in southeastern Sudan is likely distracting the SAF from the main effort in central Sudan, however.
• Somalia. The United States reportedly plans to extend its backing of a United Nations counterterrorism office in Somalia, which is vital to the African Union’s key counterterrorism force remaining in Somalia into 2027.

Figure 1: Africa File, September 24, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke

Assessments:

Ethiopia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

A rebel coalition has launched an offensive against the Ethiopian federal government across northern Ethiopia, beginning with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF’s) seizure of the three main airports in Tigray region. The TPLF seized the airports in Axum, Shire, and Mekele, the Tigray regional capital, from federal police forces on the night of September 22 to September 23.^[1] The TPLF reportedly seized the airports without substantial resistance and detained federal officials.^[2] The state-owned national airline Ethiopian Airlines canceled flights to the three cities beginning on September 23.^[3] The TPLF’s military command center portrayed its efforts as “defensive” and accused the federal government of launching an “invasion” of Tigray.^[4]

An Afar rebel group and the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), the TPLF’s military wing, then conducted offensive operations on multiple axes on the Afar-Tigray regional border in Afar. The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF/Ugugumo) most notably captured Abala, which is a district capital approximately 30 miles east of Mekele on a secondary highway that connects Mekele to the Afar regional capital—Semera—via northern Afar.^[5] Agence France-Presse (AFP) cited a former TPLF “senior” official who claimed that rebel forces had also captured five other Afar towns across the Afar-Tigray regional border, although AFP could not verify the claims.^[6] The ARDUF and TDF clashed with federal forces in Tonsa, an area located approximately 50 miles southeast of Mekele.^[7] Fighting also reportedly occurred in Berahile, Dallol, and Erebti; the first two are northeast of Mekele and the latter is east of Mekele on the secondary highway.^[8] The clashes have continued across the Afar-Tigray regional border on September 24, and the open-source analyst Majakovsk reported that the Ethiopian military (ENDF) has conducted airstrikes against rebel forces.^[9] The Afar regional government accused the TPLF of starting a war in Afar amid the offensive.^[10]

Figure 2. New Rebel Coalition Launches Offensive Against Ethiopian Federal Government

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Alexander Brown; Ziv Zellars.

The ethno-nationalist Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) and TDF have also clashed with the ENDF on multiple axes on the Amhara-Tigray regional border in Amhara. Fighting has occurred around the A2 highway between Alamata—a town in southern Tigray approximately 115 miles south of Mekele—and Woldia, which is the capital of the North Wollo zone in Amhara.[11] The rebel forces also tried advancing to Sekota, which is 70 miles west of Alamata, but the ENDF reportedly repelled the rebel advance.[12] The ENDF claimed that it killed 272 TDF fighters and wounded 260 more during its counterattacks in Amhara, although no independent source has verified the casualty counts.^[13] Fighting near Lalibela, which is approximately 85 miles southwest of Alamata, has separately caused the ENDF to close the Lalibela airport, with two pro-Fano sources claiming that the AFNM interdicted two ENDF helicopters near the town.[14]

The fighting has reportedly expanded to western Tigray, which is largely under federal control. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and a pro-Fano source separately reported that the ENDF and TDF clashed near Tselimoy, which is approximately 60 miles southwest of Shire, on September 24.^[15] The ENDF also conducted airstrikes in the area.[16] The previous most intense flare-ups between the ENDF and TPLF since the end of the Tigray war erupted in western Tigray in January and August 2026, as the TPLF has disputed ENDF and allied control of the area.[17]

The attacks are likely part of a premeditated rebel offensive, and the rebels have described the fighting as part of a war with the federal government. ACLED has reported in mid-September that the TPLF had reinforced several areas along the Afar border and in Tigray’s Southern Zone, which borders the Amhara region.^[18] Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos and top intelligence official Redwan Hussein then held a conference call with the US Embassy in Ethiopia and several European embassies on September 17 to warn of an imminent attack from Tigrayan forces.^[19] The Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival (Alliance for Survival) announced its formation on September 20 after months of discussions, with the TPLF, AFNM, ARDUF, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and three other groups as its initial members.^[20] The Alliance for Survival then accused the federal government on September 23 of initiating a “renewed war” and alleged that all coalition members were counterattacking, emphasizing efforts in Afar and Amhara.^[21]

Figure 3. Ethiopian Rebel Coalition Members

Source: Emily Bjerke; Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

The rebel offensive likely aims to consolidate the TPLF’s control of Tigray and its rear supply lines, relieve federal pressure on the region, and pressure key federal supply lines. The TPLF now fully controls three key cities in Tigray and their airports, which the federal government was supposed to control under the Pretoria peace agreement that ended the first Tigray war.^[22] The airports were effectively the last federally controlled areas outside of disputed areas in Tigray’s Southern and Western zones. Controlling the airports positions the TPLF to deny the ENDF the ability to send reinforcements directly to Tigray. The fighting in southern and western Tigray further indicates that the TPLF is seeking to gain control of the entirety of Tigray.^[23]

The offensive could bolster rebel supply lines. Control of the airports in Tigray opens a potential air bridge, depending on TPLF air defenses. Western Tigray is key for the TPLF’s rear supply lines to Eritrea and especially eastern Sudan, where some TPLF units are based and fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces in the Sudanese civil war.[24] The ENDF and TPLF engaged in major fighting in August after TPLF forces based in eastern Sudan crossed into Ethiopia and attempted to move toward Humera, an ENDF-controlled town near the borders with Eritrea and Sudan.^[25] The A2 highway also links Eritrea to Amhara via Tigray. Eritrea likely backs the Alliance for Survival, despite the AFNM and Eritrean denials, while Sudan had facilitated meetings between the different rebel groups and Eritrea to discuss collaboration beginning at least in late 2025.[26] Eritrea and Sudan have directly supported the TPLF, including by providing weapons to the group.^[27] Eritrea also has direct ties with the AFNM and trained and armed precursor Fano groups.[28]

Much of the fighting in Afar and Amhara is concentrated in areas where the ENDF had deployed forces as part of a wider buildup and blockade on the Tigray regional border. The ENDF has partially blockaded Tigray since at least late 2025, causing fuel and other supply shortages.^[29] The ENDF then amassed forces on the southern Tigray border and the Afar-Tigray regional border near Mekele in early 2026 after a Tigrayan offensive to uproot the ENDF and allied forces from southern and western Tigray.[30] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) assessed at the time that the ENDF would likely launch an offensive to neutralize the TPLF and its role in the rebel coalition that became the Alliance for Survival.^[31] The ENDF maintained an elevated posture in the border areas in the months leading up to the ongoing offensive.[32]

The offensive threatens vital federal road corridors. Fighting along the north–south A2 highway in Amhara is only approximately 30 miles north of Woldia. Woldia is a key choke point in northeastern Amhara, as it lies at the junction of the A2, a secondary bypass highway linking the A1 and A2 known as the C11, and the B22, which is the main east–west highway in Amhara.^[33] The A2 runs from Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, to the Tigray border with Eritrea and is also a road link to Djibouti via Afar and Amhara.^[34] The rebel capture of Abala and fighting around Erebti separately opens a potential rebel line of advance toward the strategic A1 highway, which is also known as the Ethio-Djibouti highway. Ethiopia relies on the highway as a trade corridor to the port of Djibouti, which handles over 90 percent of Ethiopian imports and exports.^[35] Erebti is approximately 225 miles northwest of the A1 junction near Semera.

Preexisting tensions and strategic discrepancies will challenge coordination among disparate rebel coalition members, which will likely cooperate insofar as it serves their individual interests. The three primary coalition members—the AFNM, TPLF, and OLA—have substantial differences with each other. The AFNM has separate land disputes with both the OLA in Oromia region and the TPLF in Tigray, the disputes with the latter centered around southern and western Tigray. Amhara ethno-nationalist forces, including those that now make up the AFNM, fought against the TPLF in the first Tigray war and have since asserted control over some of the disputed areas, which has been a key point of contention for the TPLF.^[36]

The AFNM also has strategic discrepancies with both other leading groups. The AFNM opposes ethnic federalism—Ethiopia’s current governing system—and likely wants to restore a centralized system with Amhara at the helm.[37] The OLA and TPLF, meanwhile, support ethnic federalism for different reasons. The TPLF wants to retain control of Tigray and possibly seeks to regain its political dominance federally, while the OLA seeks Oromo self-determination.[38] The Alliance for Survival effectively acknowledged the stark differences between coalition members on September 20 despite laying out coalition objectives: overthrowing the Ethiopian federal government and sponsoring a “popular and constitutional dialogue” on Ethiopia’s governing system.^[39] The statement delegated the resolution of issues between coalition members to the dialogue, which would only take place after the overthrow of the federal government and establishment of a transitional government, however.^[40]

The rebel offensive has so far underscored that operational coordination in the Alliance of Survival is guided by pragmatic self-interest among coalition members, which will likely continue to coordinate with each other insofar as it serves their individual interests. The fighting has been largely contained to areas near the Tigray regional border. CTP has not recorded coordinated efforts by the other four coalition members outside of northern Ethiopia—the OLA, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement (BPLF/Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Front), and Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement (GPDM)—despite the coalition stating on September 23 that all its members were conducting counterattacks.^[41] These groups’ continued lack of involvement would indicate a lack of will or capability to open additional fronts, which would drain ENDF resources and help the northern offensive but likely not result in tangible gains for these groups. The AFNM’s and the ARDUF’s involvement in the offensive, however, has simultaneously advanced their individual objectives separate from the TPLF. The AFNM benefits from disrupted federal supply lines as it seeks to exert more influence over key roads and population centers in Amhara. The ARDUF benefits from TPLF assistance in its operations given that it is a relatively smaller group with limited capabilities.

China

Author: Julia Irvin

The following section is from the American Enterprise Institute and Institute for the Study of War (AEI-ISW) China and Taiwan Update, September 22, 2026. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project.[42]

US think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported on September 17 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is expanding its ability to monitor military activity and collect signals intelligence (SIGINT) across the Middle East and Africa from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Support Base in Djibouti. The PRC’s base is located nine miles from the Gulf of Aden, 35 miles from Bab al Mandeb, and within ten miles of US, French, Italian, and Japanese military bases.[43] The PRC appears to have constructed two new communications facilities, featuring antennas, towers, and radomes capable of capturing high-frequency, very/ultra-high frequency, and satellite communications.[44] The PRC laid additional reinforced cable trenches in 2025, which could be used to install additional antennas later on.[45] The PRC presents its base in Djibouti as a hub for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in Africa and Western Asia.[46]

The PLA could use its enhanced intelligence collection capabilities to monitor US and US-allied military capabilities and activity in the region. This infrastructure is likely to increase PLA internal communications infrastructure in the region and may also increase the PLA’s ability to gather intelligence on regional conflicts and United States and Japanese military activity and communications.[47] The PRC is likely seeking to monitor activity from the Houthis, threats to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and United States regional military activity. The United States has diverted a significant portion of its military assets and capacity to the Middle East and out of East Asia, and the PRC could use its base in Djibouti to monitor the latest United States military capabilities and build-up in the region, including military assets and resources that could eventually be diverted back to East Asia.[48] Commercial PRC satellites have aided Houthi targeting in the Red Sea, and the PLA has benefited from gathering data on how United States naval forces track and react to missile and drone attacks in real-world modern warfare.[49]

Mali

Author: Liam Karr

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is intensifying pressure on Malian and Russian forces in central Mali. JNIM has launched several attacks throughout mid-September that have inflicted heavy costs on security forces and their equipment in central Mali. JNIM militants overran a rural Malian-Russian forward operating base in Dioura village in Mopti region on September 10.[50] Separate diplomatic and security sources told Reuters that the attackers killed between 120 and 130 soldiers, making it the single deadliest attack ever in Mali, and took around another 100 hostages.[51] JNIM claimed similar figures and also noted that it seized nearly two dozen heavy machine guns, and also took other weapons, ammo, and vehicles.[52] Malian and Russian forces temporarily returned to the base on September 13 and have launched at least four drone strikes targeting JNIM militants in the area but have not retaken control of the base at the time of publishing.[53]

Figure 4. JNIM Inflicts Heavy Costs in Central Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

JNIM then launched a series of attacks targeting key bases on the main highways west of Dioura in Mopti region. JNIM shelled Air Base 200 in Sévaré for at least six consecutive nights between September 14 and 19.[54] Various reports say the shelling damaged air defense systems, aircraft, a drone battery, and aviation equipment, while JNIM claimed to have destroyed four Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones.[55] JNIM then attacked a forward operating Base in Konna, which is 30 miles north of Sévaré along the RN16 highway, on September 20. JNIM claimed on September 20 to kill over 30 soldiers Malian and Russian soldiers across both Konna and Sévaré.[56]

JNIM is pursuing several lines of effort to consolidate and strengthen its support zones in central and northern Mali. JNIM is targeting Malian drone capacity, likely to undermine Malian and Russian air support in central Mali. The Sévaré air base is the main hub for Malian drone and air assets in central Mali, and JNIM may have targeted the base to prevent Malian forces from providing effective air support in Dioura or Konna. JNIM previously targeted Sévaré during its countrywide offensive on April 25, during which it captured the regional capital town of Kidal in northern Mali, in part to prevent the Malian military from scrambling air support to northern Mali.[57] JNIM damage to Malian drone systems has also degraded Malian air capacity more broadly. Serial numbers and publicized transfers indicate that Mali has eight of the high-altitude, long-endurance Akinci drones and at least 17 of the medium-altitude, long-endurance TB2 drones.[58]

JNIM is also likely attempting to degrade Malian ground supply lines as part of its efforts to undermine security forces’ ability to support a counteroffensive in northern Mali. Sévaré hosts the main Malian army base in central Mali and lies at the intersection of the RN16 and other major highways connecting northern and southern Mali. Konna is regarded as the gateway between central and northern Mali as it lies at another key RN 16 junction, which runs east to the town of Gao in northern Mali. Gao has been the primary staging base for Malian and Russian forces and allied Tuareg forces seeking to prevent further gains by JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and launch a counteroffensive to overturn their advances.[59] JNIM has already significantly increased the rate of improvised explosive device (IED) and ambush attacks in central Mali since its April offensive as part of efforts to degrade these supply lines, including in a July ambush that killed at least 50 soldiers.[60] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) has recorded at least 32 JNIM IED attacks on Malian security forces, government-aligned militias, or civilians since the April 25 offensive after recording only one such attack in the first four months of 2026.[61] At least 10 of these IEDs targeted joint Malian and Russian convoys, and the vast majority of these attacks targeted convoys traveling north, either between Sévaré and Konna or between Konna and Gao.[62]

Figure 5. JNIM Targets Ground Lines of Communication in Central Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

JNIM is simultaneously likely seeking to strengthen its support zones extending to the Mauritanian border area. The other major highway that links at Konna is the RN38 highway, which is one of three major highways connecting central and southern Mali to northern Mali’s Timbuktu region that borders Mauritania. JNIM has established strong support zones over large portions of rural Mopti, Timbuktu, and Segou regions that extend northwest of the RN38 and into the Wagadou forest along the Mauritanian border with central and southern Mali.[63] Dioura is one of the only forward operating bases that lies within these rural support zones and off the main highways, with the nearest base nearly 40 miles away at Nampala.[64] JNIM has repeatedly overrun Dioura since 2019 and besieged Dioura since March 2025 after striking local agreements with nearly all other villages in Dioura’s commune.[65] JNIM has further strengthened these support zones after forging a favorable nonaggression pact with the FLA in 2024—before formalizing their alliance—and overrunning one of the other isolated rural forward operating bases in Farabougou village and reaching an agreement with the local population in August 2025.[66] JNIM uses these support zones to engage in licit and illicit trade, including of arms and fuel, with cross-border trafficking networks and to organize assembly points for attacks on key roadways and garrison towns.[67]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched an offensive to expel the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from its remaining positions in central Sudan’s North Kordofan state. The SAF has captured several villages in North Kordofan since September 14 as it seeks to advance west and consolidate its control over an operationally significant highway that links the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, to el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan and the North Kordofan state capital. The SAF claimed on September 17 to have taken 11 villages in the North Kordofan desert, although the investigative news outlet Sudan War Monitor could not verify that the SAF had taken all the villages.^[68] The SAF’s advances stretch as far as Tna, which is approximately 105 miles northwest of el Obeid.^[69] The RSF had used its positions in these areas to stage counterattacks to retake the Khartoum–el Obeid highway, which the SAF captured on July 26.^[70] The RSF had attacked SAF positions on the highway from the west at Jabrat al Sheikh, which is approximately 105 miles north of el Obeid, using over 200 combat vehicles on August 13, although the SAF repelled the attack.^[71]

The SAF is now seeking to uproot the RSF from its remaining key positions in the North Kordofan desert. The SAF’s offensive has enabled it to advance toward al Mazrub and Sodari, which are approximately 95 and 135 miles northwest of el Obeid, respectively. The two towns are local RSF supply hubs for the desert areas north of Sudan’s main east–west highway. The SAF has reportedly deployed additional forces to the axis amid its advances.^[72] The RSF has responded by sending reinforcements to both towns.^[73] The RSF also conducted a series of drone strikes on el Obeid, including the airport and SAF headquarters, on September 20.^[74]

Figure 6. SAF Launches North Kordofan Offensive

Source: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.

These gains are setting conditions for the SAF’s primary effort to advance west along Sudan’s main east–west highway toward RSF-controlled western Sudan. The RSF has repeatedly repelled SAF attempts to advance along the highway toward RSF-controlled um Sumeima, which is approximately 40 miles west of el Obeid, as recently as mid-September 2026.^[75] SAF gains further north create opportunities for the SAF to flank and envelop Um Sumeima or other RSF positions on the highway, however. The villages that the SAF captured connect to the highway via secondary roads. Al Mazrub and Sodari also connect to um Badr and Hamrat al Sheikh, both of which are gateway towns to RSF’s heartland in western Sudan. Sudan’s wet season from June to September typically stalls advances on secondary roads due to poor conditions, but there have been lower-than-normal rainfall totals this year.^[76]

An RSF offensive on a secondary front in southeastern Sudan is likely distracting the SAF from the main effort in central Sudan, however. The RSF has opened two axes of advance toward key agricultural areas and population centers in the Nile River Valley.^[77] The RSF has advanced on the main north–south highway in southeastern Sudan toward the Blue Nile state capital, Ad Damazin, since mid-August 2026. The RSF captured an SAF base at Sirkum—approximately 85 miles south of Ad Damazin—on August 28 and has repeatedly attempted to take a nearby SAF base at al Keili.^[78] The most recent attempt happened on September 18, but the SAF reported that it had conducted a successful preemptive attack to halt the RSF advance.^[79] The RSF has separately advanced via secondary roads in Geisan district that connect to the main highway. The RSF captured Bakori, which is approximately 80 miles southeast of Ad Damazin, on August 28 and then took nearby Jabal Kadam on September 16.^[80] The RSF supplemented its ground offensive with a series of drone strikes targeting fuel depots and other key infrastructure in Ad Damazin from September 13 to 14.^[81] The SAF also shot down two RSF drones in Blue Nile from September 18 to 20.^[82] The SAF has diverted resources, including special forces units, to Blue Nile since late August to counter the RSF’s offensive.^[83]

Figure 7. RSF Offensive in Blue Nile State

Source: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The United States reportedly plans to extend its backing of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which is vital to the African Union’s key counterterrorism force remaining in Somalia, into 2027. Reuters reported on September 18 that the United States has circulated a diplomatic note indicating that it will extend its support to UNSOS through 2027.^[84] The United States had previously announced in July 2026 that it would not extend its support to UNSOS into 2027.^[85] The note reportedly states that the United States “is willing to support a 12-month drawdown” of UNSOS “followed immediately by liquidation” at the end of 2027.^[86]

The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) would be unable to sustain its key operations against al Shabaab without UNSOS. UNSOS fulfills a vital support for AUSSOM, supplying the forces with water, food, and fuel—and providing other logistics, medical, and technical support.^[87] UNSOS’s $500 million annual budget dwarfs AUSSOM’s annual budget, which is less than $200 million.^[88] The African Union (AU) has said that UNSOS’s closure would have “significant implications for logistical sustainment, operational posture and financing” of AUSSOM, with the AUSSOM commander stating that “UNSOS provides about 85% of AUSSOM’s support requirements.”^[89] AUSSOM plays a key role in countering al Shabaab, as it leads counterterrorism missions against al Shabaab across swaths of central and southern Somalia in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).^[90] AUSSOM is also responsible for securing key infrastructure, such the main roads into the Somali capital of Mogadishu.^[91]

UNSOS is still slated to draw down and end in 2027, meaning that the AU and UN must look for external sponsors or the FGS must assume greater security responsibilities. AUSSOM’s Concept of Operations planned for a gradual handoff of responsibility to the Somali military throughout 2028 in advance of the mission end date in December 2029.^[92] The stated US intent to close UNSOS by the end of 2027 would force the AU to reduce its footprint quicker than planned, unless UNSOS secures additional funding. The AU held a summit on July 31 on obtaining additional funding for AUSSOM, among other related topics, but it has not yet found additional sponsors either.^[93] AUSSOM began an accelerated handoff of bases to the Somali military in August, although it is unclear whether the handoff will slow if the United States extends its support into 2027.^[94] The Critical Threats Project previously assessed that the FGS has ongoing capacity concerns that cast doubt on its ability to maintain pressure on al Shabaab in AUSSOM’s absence, however.^[95]

Africa File Data Cutoff: September 24, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.