Ethiopia Averts Tigray War, For Now; Ethiopia Announces New Dams on Nile; Russia Establishing New Foothold in Madagascar: Africa File, April 9, 2026

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Key Takeaways:

• Ethiopia—Tigray. The Ethiopian federal government extended the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration by one year, averting a potential flashpoint for the immediate resumption of war in Tigray. The extension does not address the impasse with the Pretoria peace agreement, which leaves an elevated risk of clashes between federal government and Tigrayan forces and could still lead to an Ethiopian military offensive to neutralize the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front by mid-2027.
• Ethiopia—Egypt. Ethiopia announced that it has commenced plans to build new dams on the Nile River, despite Egyptian warnings against doing so and US efforts to mediate between the two countries. New dams would increase tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, likely intensifying their regional proxy competition and potentially provoking a direct Egyptian military response against Ethiopia.
• Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is setting conditions to consolidate control of a regional government in southern Somalia’s Jubbaland state following the FGS’s takeover of the South West state government in late March. An FGS offensive in Jubbaland would likely strain relations with Ethiopia and Kenya and open security gaps for al Shabaab to exploit.
• Madagascar. Madagascar has continued strengthening military and political engagement with Russia since early 2026. Russia has little to offer beyond regime protection, however, which limits its leverage and leaves the door open for other partners, including France and the United States.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A new armed group with possible links to Rwandan-backed M23 rebels and other Congolese opposition figures has emerged in the economically vital Katanga region in the southern DRC since early March. M23 has incentives to aid the rebellion to bolster its claim that DRC President Félix Tshisekedi lacks broad legitimacy outside of his core constituency.
• West Africa. Infighting between al Qaeda’s and IS’s Sahel affiliates has spilled over into Niger and Nigeria for the first time. Clashes between the groups are gradually moving southward as they compete for legitimacy and dominance in West Africa, and this heightened competition could lead to more high-visibility attacks across West Africa.

Figure 1. Africa File, April 9, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Ethiopia—Tigray

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Ethiopian federal government extended the mandate of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) by one year on April 8, averting a potential flashpoint for the immediate resumption of war in Tigray. TIA head Tadesse Worede met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa—the Ethiopian capital—on April 7, presenting the TIA’s annual report and presumably discussing the TIA’s mandate, which was set to expire on April 8.^[1] The federal government’s revocation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF’s) legal standing as a political party in May 2025 had left Tigray without a clear alternative to the TIA, and the federal government was facing challenges in organizing regional elections in advance of the June 2026 deadline.^[2] The federal government cannot extend the TIA’s mandate again under the current law, as it had already extended the TIA’s mandate once and appointed Tadesse as the TIA head on April 8, 2025.^[3]

The extension signals that both sides have bought time to avoid an immediate return to war after being engaged in a major military standoff since February. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) began amassing forces, including heavy artillery and tanks, at multiple locations along the Tigray border in early February in response to Tigrayan offensives into disputed areas of Tigray.^[4] CTP assessed at the time that the scale of the buildup signaled that an imminent Ethiopian offensive to neutralize the TPLF was likely.^[5] The buildup required the ENDF to redeploy forces from other regions, including Amhara, where Amhara ethnonationalist Fano militias are waging an insurgency.^[6] TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael and Tadesse had warned that the ENDF is planning to launch operations in Tigray.^[7] The Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)—Tigray’s regional military force—responded by launching its own buildup near reported ENDF deployments.^[8] Eritrea, which has reportedly pledged to defend the TPLF against the Ethiopian federal government, deployed Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) units to its border with Tigray and reportedly embedded forces within Tigrayan units, according to European news outlets Deutsche Walle and The Africa Report.^[9]

Figure 2. Military Buildup in Northern Ethiopia

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Anahita Asudani; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The extension does not address the impasse with the Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the Tigray war in 2022, leaving an elevated risk of clashes between federal government and Tigrayan forces and the potential for an Ethiopian military offensive to neutralize the TPLF by mid-2027. The parties have been locked in an escalating political dispute since early 2025. Hardline factions aligned with Debretsion deposed then-TIA head Getachew Reda in March 2025 due to his perceived deference to the federal government, particularly on the implementation of the Pretoria agreement.^[10] Tadesse, who replaced Getachew, proceeded to align with Debretsion and has criticized the federal government for not enforcing the withdrawal of Amhara ethnonationalist militias from Tigray or facilitating the return of displaced Tigrayans, which are key tenets of the Pretoria agreement.^[11] The TPLF has used these grievances to justify not complying with the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration aspects of the Pretoria agreement.^[12] The federal government responded to the de facto coup in March by revoking the TPLF’s legal standing as a political party in May, leaving TPLF-controlled Tigray effectively outside of government control.^[13] The TPLF then reinstated military command over the TDF in June for the first time since the end of the Tigray war.^[14]

The political dispute led to the resumption of clashes in late 2025 and the military standoff in early 2026. The TDF attacked the Tigray Peace Forces—an anti-TPLF Tigrayan faction that the TPLF accuses the federal government of backing—in neighboring Afar region in November.^[15] The ENDF responded with its first drone strike on Tigrayan forces since the end of the Tigray war.^[16] The federal government then increased pressure on Tigray in December, halting funding to the TIA and imposing a fuel blockade on the region.^[17] The TDF proceeded to launch an offensive into the disputed areas of northwestern and southern Tigray in late January, capturing key positions from the ENDF and Amhara militias.^[18] Tigrayan officials withdrew forces from seized positions in northwestern Tigray soon after and tried to de-escalate, but the federal government reportedly refused to engage in African Union mediation efforts and launched its military buildup around Tigray.^[19]

Figure 3. Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) Offensives in Tigray

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

The fallout from the Iran war may have disrupted plans for an offensive in the short term. The Iran war has caused fuel shortages and price increases in Ethiopia since March.^[20] Abiy asked Ethiopians to limit their fuel use, and the federal government placed nonessential employees on leave to reduce their fuel use in late March.^[21] The Iran war may have also hindered support to the ENDF from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is a key backer of Ethiopia. Emirati-linked flights transporting suspected weapons shipments to Ethiopia stopped for a few days at the start of the war but have since resumed.^[22] An Emirati-backed Ethiopian offensive into Tigray or Eritrea would strain the UAE’s relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are more aligned with Eritrea, as the Gulf states and their regional partners are trying to rally in solidarity against Iran.

The underlying tensions between the federal government and Tigrayan officials remain, however. The federal government and Tigrayan officials have not engaged in high-level public dialogue outside of the recent Abiy-Tadesse meeting, and Tigrayan officials have continued to warn of a potential conflict despite the Iran war.^[23] The TPLF denounced a federal government–sponsored consultative body on Tigray, which is intended to address constitutional and governance issues in Tigray, in early April, citing the federal government’s alleged imposition on Tigray and continued threats to the region.^[24] The federal government is also planning to hold parliamentary elections in some disputed areas of Tigray in June over TPLF objections.^[25]

Ethiopia—Egypt

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

Ethiopia announced that it has commenced plans to build three new dams on the Nile River. Ethiopia said at a Ministry of Water and Energy conference in late March that it was already soliciting bids from international companies to complete the projects.^[26] The projects are expected to cost $10.5 billion and take seven years to complete.^[27] The dams are a key part of Ethiopia’s plan to become the preeminent energy power in East Africa, as they would increase Ethiopia’s power supply by approximately 25 percent.^[28] This effort builds on the operationalization of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in September 2025, which is projected to provide $1 billion annually in revenue from electricity exports.^[29]

Figure 4. Ethiopia Plans More Dams on the Nile

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

The announcement underscores the lack of progress in US efforts to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile access, which could result in a direct Egyptian military response against Ethiopia if Ethiopia builds the dams. The Nile serves key Egyptian energy and household purposes, as it provides approximately 97 percent of Egypt’s water.^[30] The Nile also sustains Egyptian agriculture, which is the one of the largest sectors of Egypt’s economy.^[31] Egypt vigorously opposed the operationalization of the GERD because the GERD gives Ethiopia leverage over Egypt’s water access.^[32] Ethiopia could halt water flows through the GERD during droughts, and it could initiate downstream flooding during the rainy periods.^[33] Egypt has accused Ethiopia of violating the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, which guarantees Egypt’s access to a large share of Nile waters.^[34] Egypt reportedly threatened to bomb the GERD in the absence of a Nile access agreement with Ethiopia.^[35]

The United States has attempted to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia, although US President Donald Trump has publicly aligned with Egypt. Trump predicted during his first term in 2020 that Egypt would “blow up that dam” because it “is not going to be able to live” with Ethiopian leverage over its water access.^[36] The United States and the World Bank mediated multiple rounds of negotiations for a Nile access agreement from 2019 to 2020, but Ethiopia eventually withdrew due to perceived US favoritism toward Egypt.^[37] Trump has complimented Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi’s governance and international role, particularly in Gaza, praise that he has not offered Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.^[38]

Dialogue has remained stalled amid the operationalization of the GERD and talks of additional Ethiopian dams.^[39] Egypt pledged a “firm and decisive response” to any future dams in December 2025.^[40] Trump sent a letter to Sisi in January 2026 offering to resume US mediation, stating that “no state in this region should unilaterally control the precious resources of the Nile, and disadvantage its neighbors in the process.”^[41] Sisi responded by publicly supporting US efforts.^[42] Ethiopia did not publicly comment on Trump’s letter, but Abiy denied Trump’s claim that the United States financed the GERD and that the dam “basically blocks the Nile” in early February.^[43] Egypt separately denied a report in late February that it is considering supporting Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea in exchange for more favorable Nile access terms.^[44]

New dams would increase overall tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia and likely intensify their proxy competition across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is vying for hegemony in the Horn of Africa, including in the Nile River Valley and the Red Sea. Abiy has predicated hegemony on energy preeminence and sea access, as Ethiopia’s rapidly growing economy and would benefit from access to greater resources and markets.^[45] Abiy has defined sea access for commercial and naval means as an existential matter, stating that landlocked Ethiopia cannot remain in a “geographic prison.”^[46] Egypt views Ethiopia’s aims as disruptive to a regional order in which it has the largest economy and military, with favorable resource access and positioning in the Red Sea.^[47]

Egypt could escalate in Sudan by increasing support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to repel an Ethiopian-backed Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive in southeastern Sudan near the border with western Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, where the GERD is based. Egypt has politically backed the SAF in US-led peace efforts and supported the SAF militarily through weapons shipments, drone strikes on RSF supply lines near the Egypt-Libya-Sudan border from a base in southern Egypt, and on-the-ground coordination with the SAF.^[48] Egypt backs the SAF’s leading role in Sudan’s governance, as the SAF has supported Egypt’s stance on the GERD and Ethiopian sea access and could help Egypt secure the Egypt-Sudan border.^[49]

Ethiopia began directly backing the RSF in 2025 as a hedge against Egypt and following years of tensions with the SAF due to SAF ties with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the disputed al Fashaga border area.^[50] Ethiopia has allowed the United Arab Emirates to move weapons to the RSF through Ethiopia and the RSF to establish a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, from which it has launched operations in southeastern Sudan’s Blue Nile state.^[51] The RSF is likely using Asosa Airport in Benishangul-Gumuz to conduct drone strikes in Blue Nile, with drone strikes surging since Ethiopia completed construction of “drone support infrastructure” in late 2025.^[52]

Figure 5. Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Launch Offensive in Sudan’s Blue Nile State

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Elliot Nazar.

Egypt has capitalized on federal tensions in Somalia, including the Somaliland independence movement, to dilute Ethiopian influence in the country and could increase efforts to further weaken Ethiopia in Somalia. Ethiopia-Somalia relations severely deteriorated after Ethiopia and Somaliland agreed that Ethiopia would obtain naval access on the Somaliland coast in exchange for recognizing Somaliland as an independent state in January 2024.^[53] Egypt had already been courting Somalia before 2024 and quickly signed strategic agreements with Somalia, which included the deployment of Egyptian forces in Somalia for counterterrorism purposes.^[54]

Ethiopia views strong Egypt-Somalia relations as raising the potential for Egyptian deployments near its border and a potential threat to its counterterrorism interests, as it has created a buffer zone inside Somalia along the Ethiopia-Somalia border.^[55] Multiple Somali sources reported in August 2025 that Somalia would station Egyptian forces in the Gedo and Hiiraan border regions, although Egypt and Somalia have since reportedly agreed to concentrate Egyptian forces closer to Mogadishu.^[56] The Federal Government of Somalia separately ousted the Ethiopia-aligned leader of Somalia’s South West state, which shares a border with Ethiopia, on March 30 to consolidate political control over the state.^[57]

Egypt could also support Tigrayan or Eritrean forces should a conflict break out in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia has massed forces on the Tigray regional border since mid-February as long-standing disputes with the TPLF escalate.^[58] Eritrea has opportunistically aligned with the TPLF to contain Ethiopia and use Tigray as a buffer so that Ethiopia is unable to carry out its threats to annex Eritrea’s port of Assab.^[59] Egypt has strengthened ties with Eritrea since late 2024, initiating a trilateral security dialogue including Somalia.^[60] The UAE-based newspaper The National reported in December 2025 that Egypt and Eritrea came to an agreement in December 2025 in which Egypt will invest in the port of Assab in exchange for naval access.^[61] Egypt’s SAF allies are a potential bridge for any military support to the TPLF or Eritrea, given SAF and SAF-affiliated militia links with both the TPLF and Eritrea.^[62]

Figure 6. Military Buildup in Northern Ethiopia

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Anahita Asudani; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is setting conditions to consolidate control over a regional government in Jubbaland state, building on its recent takeover of the South West state government in late March. Multiple Somali sources have reported that the FGS is considering launching an offensive to seize parts of Gedo region under Jubbaland state government control, including the Dolow district.^[63] The FGS-aligned Gedo police commander called on FGS forces to prepare for an operation against Jubbaland state President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe).^[64] Another FGS-aligned local official claimed that FGS forces are going to restore federal authority over noncompliant state authorities.^[65]

The FGS is building on its successful takeover of the South West state government in late March, as it looks to secure support for its election and constitutional reforms. The FGS is staging forces in Baidoa, the de facto capital of South West state that the FGS took control of on March 30.^[66] The forces are reportedly awaiting reinforcements from Mogadishu—the Somali capital—and include Turkish-trained Gorgor units, which helped the FGS take control of Baidoa.^[67] The FGS conducted the operation to depose the South West state president due to his opposition to the FGS’s early March approval of a new constitution, which mandates the implementation of direct elections.^[68] South West had then cut its ties with the FGS on March 17.^[69]

Figure 7. Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

Relations between the FGS and Jubbaland have deteriorated since late 2024 over the FGS’s plan to implement direct elections, with the two parties having already clashed over key areas in Jubbaland. Jubbaland withdrew from nationwide consultations in October 2024 due to the FGS’s insistence on holding direct elections and held an indirect state presidential election in November 2024.^[70] The FGS did not acknowledge Madobe’s election victory and deployed forces to Ras Kamboni, a town on the Kenyan border.^[71] The deployment led to clashes with Jubbaland state forces, with Jubbaland state forces defeating FGS forces and forcing the surrender of dozens of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers.^[72] The FGS forces redeployed forces to Gedo in late July 2025, however, and captured Beled Hawo, a town on the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders.^[73]

The political split between the FGS and Jubbaland has only deepened since the clashes. Jubbaland created the Somali Future Council (SFC) opposition coalition with Puntland state and other leading Somali opposition figures in October.^[74] The SFC opposes direct elections and has threatened to establish its own political processes if the FGS holds direct elections.^[75] The FGS responded by announcing that it would form a parallel Jubbaland government based in Gedo.^[76] The regional head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)—Somalia’s primary intelligence agency—has reportedly rallied support for the parallel government among local leaders.^[77] Jubbaland then amended its state constitution in December to remove references to itself as a “federal member state.”^[78] The FGS eventually acquiesced to SFC demands for dialogue in February, but the talks fell apart due to issue of direct elections and have not resumed.^[79]

An FGS offensive in Jubbaland would likely strain relations with Ethiopia and Kenya and potentially draw Ethiopian forces into the fighting. Ethiopia and Kenya have established buffer zones inside of Somalia along their shared borders with Jubbaland to defend against al Shabaab, whose headquarters are in the state. Ethiopia and Kenya have politically backed Madobe to maintain these favorable security arrangements, opposing FGS efforts to undermine the Jubbaland state government.^[80] Both countries have troops in Jubbaland as part of these buffer zones, with Ethiopia having a significant presence in border districts such as Dolow.^[81] These connections led Ethiopian forces to intervene in the 2024 and 2025 FGS-Jubbaland clashes, supporting Jubbaland’s military operations and even directly clashing with the SNA in some instances.^[82]

It is unclear if Ethiopian forces would again intervene in another round of clashes. Ethiopia reportedly refused a request from the FGS-aligned NISA head in Gedo for Ethiopia to support an FGS-backed parallel government in Gedo.^[83] However, Ethiopia did not intervene on behalf of the South West state president, who was an Ethiopia ally, in March despite its substantial troop presence in the state. Ethiopian officials instead reportedly mediated between the FGS and South West and helped the now deposed South West president flee Somalia.^[84]

Al Shabaab has already exploited the infighting in South West and will likely do the same in Jubbaland should the FGS launch an offensive. Al Shabaab has significantly increased its rate of attacks in South West since the FGS launched its offensive in mid-March.^[85] Al Shabaab has increased its presence around Baidoa and conducted multiple attacks in the city, which included firing mortars at the Baidoa airport as Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was on the airstrip.^[86] FGS forces have continued counterterrorism operations against al Shabaab in South West, but they have only partially consolidated control of the state.^[87] Forces loyal to the former South West state president have reportedly gathered in localities around Baidoa and refused to support the FGS-backed interim government, setting the stage for future clashes.^[88] The 2024 Jubbaland election dispute disrupted counterterrorism operations, as Jubbaland temporarily halted counterterrorism cooperation with the FGS.^[89]

Figure 8. Al Shabaab Exploits Infighting in South West

Note: Pro-Federal Government of Somalia forces began seizing local governments in South West state on March 14.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Madagascar

Author: Yale Ford with Alexis Thomas

Madagascar has continued strengthening military and political engagement with Russia since early 2026. Russia has expanded cooperation with Madagascar since the head of the Malagasy junta, Colonel Michaël Randrianirina, traveled to Moscow for his first official state visit outside of the country in mid-February.[90] Randrianirina had said that the visit marked a “new era of cooperation” between Russia and Madagascar.[91] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that the junta has been requisitioning fuel from French energy giant TotalEnergies to supply Russian aircraft transporting personnel and equipment to the airport in Antananarivo, the Malagasy capital, in recent weeks.[92] Randrianirina personally received a Russian delivery of two Mi-8 helicopters, military transport trucks, and humanitarian aid following a tropical cyclone in late February.[93] Russian military instructors completed the training of an initial class of about 200 Malagasy soldiers in early March.[94] Russia then delivered a shipment of weapons, ammunition, two tanks, and other military equipment to the junta on April 1.[95]

Russia is gaining political influence in Randrianirina’s circle. Russia had already been using its relationship with Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko, the president of the National Assembly and a longtime Russian ally who is close to Randrianirina, to grow ties with the junta. Africa Intelligence reported in March that Malagasy politicians and political networks with links to Russia have seen a “resurgence” in Antananarivo, as part of warming relations between the two countries.[96] A Malagasy politician with links to Russian networks in Madagascar launched a pro-Russian political party that advocates for closer relations with Russia and BRICS, an informal bloc of emerging economies aligned with Russia and China.[97] The junta has expressed interest in cooperating with BRICS in recent weeks.[98] The Malagasy National Radio outlet launched a program on Russian-Malagasy relations in collaboration with a press agency associated with Russian foreign intelligence in April.[99]

Russia has been courting the new junta since the junta took power via coup in late 2025. Randrianirina led a powerful faction within the Malagasy military, which mutinied and deposed the sitting president, Andry Rajoelina, in response to massive youth-led, anti-corruption protests in October. Randrianirina hosted an official Russian delegation led by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, the Russian deputy defense minister and de facto head of Africa Corps, in Antananarivo in late December.[100] Russia then began delivering a stream of weaponry—including one-way attack drones and anti-tank rocket launchers—and training Malagasy army units and Randrianirina’s presidential guard, before Randrianirina and Putin agreed to expand cooperation in mid-February.[101]

The Kremlin is likely seeking to trade regime protection primarily for sea access with the Malagasy regime to bolster its power projection in the Indian Ocean. Randrianirina reportedly discussed potential Russian access to the Antsiranana naval base—formerly known as Diego-Suarez—an abandoned former French facility in northern Madagascar with one of the best deepwater harbors in the western Indian Ocean, during his state visit in February.[102] CTP assessed after Randrianirina took power that Russia would seek to boost ties with Madagascar, given the Kremlin’s efforts to increase its naval power projection in key waterways surrounding the continent.[103] Antsiranana sits at the country’s northern tip, which lies along major shipping lanes between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, where almost a third of the global crude oil supply transits.[104]  CTP noted in October that a separate agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe that allowed Russian ships to refuel at São Toméan ports, thus allowing Russian ships to remain in the area for longer and improving Russian naval power projection, was a template for future agreements with other willing coastal countries, including a potential pro-Russian Malagasy government.[105]

Figure 9. Madagascar Moves Closer to Russia

Source: Yale Ford.

Russia has offered protection to Randrianirina’s fragile regime as part of the partnership. Randrianirina has said repeatedly that he fears a countercoup, which makes Russia’s regime security package attractive.[106] Malagasy intelligence services claimed in early November 2025 that they arrested two foreign nationals accused of planning to assassinate Randrianirina in an attempted coup.[107] Madagascar’s top prosecutor claimed on April 2 that security services thwarted a plot led by an army colonel to assassinate Randrianirina.[108] The French outlet Le Monde quoted an opposition figure or dissident to the new junta who said that Randrianasoloniaiko has convinced Randrianirina that “only the Russians are capable of guaranteeing his security.”[109]

Randrianirina could use Russian backing to stall a transition to civilian rule. Randrianirina announced in late February a roadmap for new elections to take place in 2027.[110] The purging of figures associated with the previous regime or disloyalty, the absence of an inclusive political dialogue, and the regime’s unilateral appointments to important government positions have all raised concerns about the return to civilian rule, however.[111] Some of the youth-led organizations have accused Randrianirina of turning his back on the revolution.[112] Russian-backed juntas that staged coups in West Africa also promised time-bound elections and a return to civilian rule but missed those deadlines or ran for office in rigged elections in recent years.[113]

Russia has little to offer beyond regime protection, however, which limits its leverage and leaves the door open for other partners, including France and the United States. The demands of the youth-led protests—and Madagascar’s greatest needs—are development-focused, not security-focused, and Russian companies have a limited presence in Madagascar. Randrianirina has discussed intelligence and security support to prevent a countercoup in multiple meetings with US officials and Erik Prince, an informal adviser to President Trump and private military contractor, since late 2025.[114] Three US officials visited Antananarivo in early January 2026 discussed with Randrianirina the possibility of establishing a military presence at the Antsiranana base.[115] Randrianirina has also held multiple rounds of investment discussions with US officials.[116] CTP assessed previously that that France has also engaged with the junta to secure its economic and security interests with the new authorities, despite the coup ousting its key ally in Rajoelina.[117] Randrianirina traveled to Paris to “renew” ties with French President Emmanuel Macron after his trip to Moscow in late February.[118]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

A new armed group has emerged in Katanga, the economically vital southern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), since early March. As many as 100 fighters from a group calling itself the Katanga Stand Up Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MDKC) attacked the headquarters of the Upemba National Park (UNP) in Lusinga in Haut-Katanga province on March 3.[119] The militants reportedly killed at least six people and then looted and burned down the Lusinga station in the attack, before the Congolese army (FARDC) deployed to the area and regained control.[120] MDKC militants then conducted two more attacks on the nearby town of Nkonga—about 25 miles north of the Mitwaba district capital in Haut-Katanga—on March 6 and 19, and they released a video proclaiming a new rebellion and listing their demands.[121] The FARDC commander of the region that covers the southern DRC deployed to the front line in late March to lead operations against the MDKC.[122]

Figure 10. New Armed Group Emerges in Former Katanga Province

Source: Yale Ford.

The MDKC could be members of a network of militias that have historically been active in Katanga. Local sources and the Congolese government suspected the militants to be members of the Bakata Katanga, which is a loose coalition of armed groups and political networks that support Katanga’s secession.[123] Various militia groups and independence movements have been active in the region since the 1960s, but the Bakata Katanga—a more radical wing of the independence movement—emerged in 2011 amid an upswing in secessionist sentiment and has since conducted a low-intensity insurgency, mainly in rural areas in north Katanga.[124] One military expert told French journalist Christophe Rigaud that the Bakata Katanga are heavily decentralized and that a direct link between the MDKC and the Bakata Katanga was not immediately clear, however.[125] French state media cited a security source in late March who noted that the MDKC were distinct from the Bakata Katanga because they appeared better organized and equipped.[126]

The grievances of the Bakata Katanga center on economic and political disparities between the northern and southern parts of Katanga. Haut-Lomami and Tanganyika provinces in the north rely on agriculture and suffer from poor infrastructure, whereas Lualaba and Haut-Katanga in the south have vast mineral wealth and are the political centers of gravity.[127] Former DRC President Joseph Kabila, who is from Katanga, exacerbated these long-standing tensions in 2015, when he divided the region into these four separate provinces.[128] Elites in northern and southern Katanga have both sought greater Katangan autonomy, but northern politicians have historically pushed a more militant agenda and co-opted armed actors to protect their interests, particularly since around 2011.[129]

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels—who operate over 500 miles away in the Kivu provinces in the eastern DRC—and actors affiliated with former Congolese president Joseph Kabila may have links, including possible military ties, to the MDKC. The UK-based outlet The Guardian reported that around 20 members of the group behind the March 3 Lusinga attack spoke Swahili with accents common to the eastern DRC, were “highly trained,” and had radios, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades.[130] The Guardian quoted a Belgian national working at the UNP who claimed that the militants had orders to kill anyone from the neighboring Kasaï region in the south-central DRC but “very precise instructions” not to kill foreigners.[131] The Congolese government claimed in mid-March that the MDKC militants were “likely linked” to M23 and arrested two people whom it claimed were FARDC officers recruiting for M23 in Katanga in late March.[132]

Katangan actors linked to Kabila may also be supporting the group. Various analysts and Congolese government sympathizers have circulated accusations that John Numbi, a former security official with ties to Kabila, is supporting the MDKC, which Kabila’s camp has denied.[133] CTP is unable to verify these accusations. Numbi is a close friend of Kabila from northern Katanga and was a high-ranking FARDC official and securocrat in Kabila’s inner circle. Numbi played a part in forming local militia groups to resist Rwandan-backed forces in the Second Congo War in the late 1990s and has long provided military and financial support to the Bakata Katanga.[134] Numbi fled to Zimbabwe in March 2021, after DRC President Félix Tshisekedi ousted him from the army and accused him of plotting a secessionist coup in Katanga, but he still reportedly maintains significant influence in the FARDC.[135] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported in late 2024 that the Congolese government was concerned about a “convergence of interests” between M23 and Numbi, after Congolese security services arrested “dozens” of Congolese nationals with links to Numbi plotting to destabilize Greater Katanga from Zambia.[136]

M23 and Kabila have separately forged coalitions with other armed groups and political heavyweights, including each other, to create new hotspots of tension outside of the eastern DRC. M23 joined as the main member of Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), an umbrella coalition of armed groups and political actors with the stated aim to overthrow the Tshisekedi regime, and began establishing ties with several armed groups in Ituri and South Kivu provinces in 2023.[137] The AFC enables M23 and Rwanda to extend their military reach and influence into areas that are beyond the front lines in the Kivu provinces.[138] The AFC has a national agenda and is led by numerous political heavyweights at odds with the current regime in the DRC, notably former Kabila party officials and Corneille Nangaa, who is the former head of Tshisekedi’s electoral commission. CTP assessed in mid-2025, when Kabila reemerged from a multiyear hiatus and informally aligned with M23, that he likely aimed to position himself as the leader of a broad opposition bloc to regain power.[139]

Rebellion in Katanga bolsters M23’s and Kabila’s claims that Tshisekedi’s regime lacks broad legitimacy and governs at the expense of those outside of his core constituency. Tshisekedi’s rise to power has reignited tensions between Katanga and the central government. Tshisekedi is an ethnic Luba from the diamond-rich Kasaï region in south-central DRC, whose community has feuded with native Katangans and felt marginalized for decades. Tshisekedi pushed Kabila and his coalition out of power after reneging on a power-sharing deal in 2021 and has since dismantled Kabila’s networks in Katanga and across the country.[140] The Brussels-based Egmont Institute assessed previously that Tshisekedi’s push to amend the Congolese constitution and prolong his time in office is tied to ambitions within the Kasaï community to consolidate power and retain national leadership for years to come.[141] The Kasaï region has not seen rapid development despite Tshisekedi’s rise to power, however, and many Kasaïns and Tshisekedi supporters, including youth league members, have migrated to Katanga en masse, taken jobs from locals, and established a parallel power structure in the region.[142]

Poor governance and state-led repression amid rising Kasaï-Katanga tensions have fueled further discontent in Katanga. Tshisekedi and his inner circle took control over the industrial mining sectors in Katanga, along over other lucrative government-run enterprises, and have instituted a de facto ethnic patronage system, appointing many people from Kasaï to key government positions in his regime.[143] International and national reporting indicates that the regime has been plagued by high levels of corruption.[144] Some members of Tshisekedi’s inner circle have been allegedly involved in a $2 billion per year scheme to illegally exploit copper and cobalt mines with Chinese and Lebanese cartels in south Katanga, according to Africa Intelligence.[145] Several nongovernmental organizations in Katanga and four former directors of the DRC’s state-owned mining company filed a lawsuit in a Belgian court in July 2025 accusing Tshisekedi and nine of his family members of looting mines in Lualaba and Haut-Katanga.[146] The Egmont Institute observed separately that many Katangans feel “dominated” by the Kasaï-centric regime and its supporters and would likely support an M23 advance to challenge Tshisekedi, though fear of government repression dissuades many people from speaking out openly.[147]

These grievances and MDKC’s emergence support the narratives of opposition factions like the AFC and Kabila, which claim to represent a countrywide movement pushing for better governance across the DRC. The MDKC has framed its grievances and demands in national terms and denounced Tshisekedi’s regime as tyrannical and guilty of “poor governance.”[148] The MDKC called on the Congolese population and Katangans to “rise up” against the regime and struggle for liberation.[149] The group also denounced Tshisekedi’s push to extend his tenure in power and the use of repression against Katangese leaders and those in opposition to the regime to silence dissent.[150] The MDKC’s claims predate the current M23 insurgency and are rooted in legitimate Katangese political grievances, but the UN had assessed as early as 2014 that secessionist sentiment pushed by the Bakata Katanga advances the interests of national and provincial elites, who can use it to generate instability as needed, despite its local aims.[151]

The MDKC is unlikely to pose a serious threat to the regime’s economic engine in mineral-rich Katanga, however. Presidential patronage networks have traditionally drawn their strength from the country’s main political and economic centers—Kinshasa, the Congolese capital; lucrative import-export corridors; and the copper belt in southern Katanga.[152] The MDKC could target mining sites roughly 90 miles to the north in Tanganyika province, but it would likely not threaten the regime’s economic interests, as more than 90 percent of the government’s revenue comes from export earnings, largely from copper and cobalt production in southern Katanga.[153] Bakata Katanga militants had conducted attacks and disrupted mining activity in Lubumbashi, the biggest city in Katanga and a major mining hub, in 2013.[154] The MDKC would have to conduct a large-scale offensive, likely with hundreds or thousands or fighters, and advance roughly 300 miles south to reach this area, however.

Figure 11. North and South Regions in Former Katanga Province

Source: Yale Ford.

West Africa

Authors: Liam Karr, Zoe Sommer, and Alexis Thomas

Infighting between Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has spilled over into Niger and Nigeria for the first time, as the two groups compete for legitimacy and dominance in West Africa. ISSP forces attacked JNIM bases in Petelkole village, Tillabéri region, western Niger, near the Burkina Faso border, on April 3.[155] ISSP claims to have killed 35 JNIM fighters and captured 38 weapons and 10 motorcycles during the fight.[156] ISSP framed the assault as retaliation for JNIM attacks against residents of ISSP-controlled villages in an official statement released on April 6.[157] JNIM fighters also attacked likely ISSP militants in Kebbi state, northwestern Nigeria, on April 4.[158] JNIM released a video after the attack in which militants claim to have fought a “rival organization,” killed one soldier, imprisoned another, and seized 10 million naira ($7 thousand) and three motorcycles.[159] ISSP’s Lakurawa faction is active in Kebbi, making it the likely target of the attack, although other non-jihadi militant groups also operate in the area. Infighting between JNIM and ISSP had previously only been documented in Burkina Faso and Mali.[160]

Infighting between the two groups has remained elevated in 2026 after the rate initially increased in late 2025. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data recorded six JNIM and ISSP clashes between July and September compared to 10 clashes from October through December. The fighting resulted in 49 fatalities in the first period compared to 85 fatalities in the second period.[161] The infighting has remained at an elevated rate, with 11 ISSP-JNIM clashes resulting in 73 casualties between January and March 2026.[162] ISSP has instigated most of these attacks, and the fighting has been concentrated in Burkina Faso’s northern Sahel region and Mali’s northern Gao and Tombouctou regions.

Recent defections from JNIM to ISSP highlight the importance of the rivalry for each group as they compete for legitimacy and fighters. A JNIM commander in eastern Burkina Faso, who is the brother of the JNIM subgroup leader in Niger, defected to ISSP in February 2026, citing alleged JNIM peace deals with the governments in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire as part of his reason for leaving.[163] JNIM has previously negotiated government-backed peace agreements with local communities in Mali to lift blockades, ease restrictions, and facilitate prisoner releases.[164] The intensity of JNIM-ISSP infighting surged in Burkina Faso around the defection in February 2026, with three clashes between the groups killing over 41 fighters, marking the deadliest month of infighting since November.[165] JNIM has launched offensives in eastern Burkina Faso and across the border in Benin since the defection, which CTP has previously assessed may be attempting to restore its legitimacy among local fighters to prevent further dissent.[166]

The infighting is gradually expanding further south in Burkina Faso and Niger, away from their border with Mali and toward their borders with Benin and Nigeria. CTP continues to assess that both groups’ expansion toward the border area between Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria could make the area a new theater for infighting.[167] The border area links JNIM-dominated territory in Burkina Faso, Benin, and southwestern Niger and is the main area of operations of the ISSP Lakurawa faction, which primarily operates along the Niger-Nigeria border and serves as a key logistic node between ISSP and Nigeria-based IS West Africa Province.

Figure 12. Sahelian Salafi-Jihadi Infighting Shifts South

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Both groups are attempting to consolidate control over areas they currently dominate and expand into new areas at the expense of each other. The former JNIM commander who defected in February accused the group of pursuing the peace deals with Benin and Côte d’Ivoire so that it could concentrate forces in northern Benin and prevent ISSP from expanding into Benin from Niger and Nigeria.[168] Journalist and researcher Wassim Nasr told French outlet France 24 that locals claimed that ISSP has been stockpiling weapons for a major battle with JNIM in southeastern Burkina Faso, where JNIM has historically been dominant and ISSP has been absent.[169] ISSP’s Lakurawa faction has been active in Kebbi for multiple years, whereas JNIM’s attack on Lakurawa was the group’s first claimed attack in the area.

Figure 13. Sahelian Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in Nigeria

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Group affiliation in northwestern Nigeria has previously been more fluid, but increased infighting could force Salafi-jihadi cells and other armed groups in the area to take sides. Militants linked with Nigeria-based Boko Haram, a Nigeria-based al Qaeda–linked group called Mahmuda, and JNIM have all been active in Nigeria’s Kainji Lake National Park area, which is over 150 miles south of the ISSP Lakurawa faction’s area of operations, in recent years. Salafi-jihadi militants in this area do not strongly adhere to group affiliations due to their small size and the competitive environment with bandits—an array of various criminal gangs that operate across northern Nigeria in a warlord-like system.[170] These challenging circumstances have even led to collaboration across groups based on human network connections and opportunistic cooperation between the Boko Haram–linked Sadiku faction and bandit groups.[171]

The heightened competition could lead to more high-visibility attacks across West Africa as the groups compete for attention and legitimacy. ISSP and JNIM have carried out high-visibility attacks in politically sensitive areas across the Sahel more frequently since competition between the two intensified in late 2025. JNIM launched an economic warfare campaign across southern and western Mali in September 2025, targeting fuel tankers and foreign work sites in dozens of attacks throughout late 2025. The campaign caused fuel shortages in major cities throughout politically and sensitive areas of southern Mali, including the capital Bamako. The ruling junta has pursued both military and diplomatic tools to counter the blockade, which has eased in early 2026, although fuel shortages and rolling blackouts have continued.[172] ISSP has launched an attack campaign targeting Nigerien airports in major cities in 2026, conducting complex attacks involving drones against the airports in Niamey and Tahoua in January and March, respectively. Both groups have also been increasingly active in claiming attacks in Nigeria since 2025, which has long carried symbolic value as the region’s largest state.

Africa File Data Cutoff: April 9, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.