Anti-American Protests in Nigeria; US Sanctions Rwanda; Ethiopia Deepens Involvement in Sudan: Africa File, March 5, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Iran. Read CTP’s latest special edition, “Iran War’s Impact on the Red Sea and Horn of Africa,” outlining the impacts the Iran war will have on security dynamics in Africa.
• Nigeria. The Iranian-backed Islamic Movement of Nigeria has staged several anti-American protests across Nigeria since the beginning of the Iran war. Iran and its Axis of Resistance have other ties in Nigeria that may be able to support attack plots against Israeli and US interests should Iran choose to expand its ongoing retaliation campaign.
• Rwanda. The United States imposed the most severe sanctions on Rwanda in over a decade and called for the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
• Sudan. Ethiopia is likely increasing its backing of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in eastern Sudan by allegedly allowing the RSF to launch attack drones from western Ethiopia and helping traffic weapons to RSF rear bases in western Ethiopia via Ethiopian Airlines. The RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) separately captured key positions along the main north–south highway going through el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan.
• Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia approved a new constitution extending the Somali president’s term against opposition objections. This decision may lead to political violence that could undermine counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab.

Figure 1. Africa File, March 5, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Nigeria

Authors: Liam Karr and Alexis Thomas

The Iranian-backed Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) has staged several anti-American protests across Nigeria since the beginning of the Iran war. Thousands of Nigerian Shi’ites protested across Nigeria—including in Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Sokoto, and Yobe states—after Israel and the United States killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[1] All protests have remained peaceful, with many demonstrators mourning Khamenei, although some have chanted slogans such as “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”[2] The US Mission in Nigeria warned on March 4 of protests in Abuja in the coming days due to the Iran war and canceled all visa appointments through March 8, recommending that US citizens in Abuja stay in their residences.[3]

The IMN has previously orchestrated numerous mass protests, which has led to several violent military crackdowns on its followers.[4] Nigerian authorities report that the IMN has about 60,000 registered members, while the group claims there are five to 10 million members—more than the estimated four million Shi’ites in Nigeria—who are mostly concentrated in northern Nigeria.[5] Nigerian security forces killed over 300 demonstrators in a single incident during mass IMN protests in 2015 following the arrest of the group’s leader, Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky.[6] Security forces have killed dozens of other IMN protestors in smaller-scale incidents in subsequent years, and the Nigerian government banned the group in 2019 for threatening the state.[7] IMN supporters have organized several pro-Palestinian protests in northern Nigeria since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, many of which have also led to security force violence against protestors.[8]

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) have direct financial, personal, political, and possible military ties to the IMN. Zakzaky founded the group in the early 1980s after being inspired by the Iranian Revolution and studying in Iran, and he met Khamanei for the first time in 1982.[9] The Middle East Institute reported in 2019 that LH was providing ideological and military training to IMN members in Lebanon.[10] This assistance has helped the IMN replicate some of LH’s media, recruitment, and social welfare models in Nigeria.[11] Zakzaky visited Lebanon in 2015 and did an interview with LH-owned and -operated al Manar TV during the trip.[12] A former US State Department official estimated in 2017 that the group received approximately $120,000 per year from Iran.[13] Zakzaky also has an office in Mashhad, Iran. He has done numerous TV interviews with Iranian regime-affiliated outlets, and he met with Khamenei in Tehran in mid-October 2023.[14]

Zakzaky has also espoused anti-American rhetoric in line with the Iranian regime’s framing. Zakzaky accused the United States in January of compelling other countries to support Israel and allow US military bases in Africa.[15] Zakzaky also echoed the Iranian regime’s praise of the coups and actions by the juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as anti-colonial uprisings against the West.[16] These statements continue a long-standing trend of Zakzaky parroting the Iranian regime’s framing of the US in regime-affiliated outlets.[17] Zakzaky voiced support for Palestinians and Hamas alongside Khamenei when visiting Tehran in October 2023.[18] Zakzaky also said that Palestinians are fighting for the liberation of “every Muslim” and symbolize the way in which the oppressed of the world need to resist during a January 2024 interview with the Iranian regime’s English language outlet Press TV.[19]

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have other ties in Nigeria that may be able to support attack plots against Israeli or US interests should Iran choose to expand its ongoing retaliation campaign. Lebanese diaspora populations and decades of soft-power proselytizing efforts have grown Nigeria’s Shi’ite minority, and LH exploits this population for its illicit activities.[20] LH’s Foreign Relations Department and Business Affairs Component had networks in Nigeria that the US Treasury sanctioned in 2015 for “scout[ing] recruits for Hezbollah’s military units, as well as . . . creat[ing] and support[ing] Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure for its operational units in Africa and globally.”[21] Iran also controls the Hausa-language Hausa TV radio and TV platform, which it has used to run information operations supporting its interests in Nigeria.[22]

Figure 2. Iranian-Backed Attack Plots in Africa

Iran has attempted to use its covert apparatus to attack US and allied personnel across Africa, including in Nigeria, as a form of horizontal escalation for US sanctions multiple times since 2013.[23] Nigerian officials caught suspected Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and LH operatives smuggling weapons into Nigeria in 2010 and 2013.[24] Iran surged attack plots in Africa between 2019 and 2022 in response to heightened US sanctions. Anonymous Western intelligence officials told The Telegraph in June 2019 that former IRGC-QF Major General Qassem Soleimani had organized attack cells in the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, and Sudan to attack Western targets in response to new US sanctions.[25] US intelligence exposed a potential Iranian plot to assassinate the US ambassador to South Africa in 2020 in retaliation for the US assassination of Soleimani.[26] Security forces also thwarted IRGC-QF-backed plots against Israeli tourists and Jewish centers in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania in 2021 and US targets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022.[27]

Rwanda

Author: Yale Ford

The United States imposed financial sanctions on the entire Rwandan army (RDF) and top RDF officials. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the RDF as an organization and four senior officials on March 2.[28] The four officials are the RDF’s chief of staff, the commander of the Fifth Infantry Division, the chief of defense staff, and the special operations force commander.[29] The sanctions mean that all assets and financial interests of the RDF and designated officials under US jurisdiction are frozen, and US civilians and entities could face civil and criminal penalties for any business transactions with the RDF or designated officials. The Treasury Department condemned Rwanda for “blatant violations” of the Washington Peace Accords and providing “direct operational support” to M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in a press release.[30] The US State Department said separately that Rwandan support has enabled M23’s “horrific human rights abuses.”[31]

The sanctions are the most drastic action the United States has taken against Rwanda and the RDF in over a decade. The US State Department suspended a small amount of foreign military financing for Rwanda—about $300,000—for its support for M23 in 2012.[32] The United States cut more military aid and added Rwanda to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) for the first time in 2013.[33] Rwanda then ended its support for M23 after European countries followed suit and suspended direct budgetary aid to Rwanda, letting the group collapse under pressure from UN and Congolese army troops.[34] The United States designated Rwanda under the CSPA again in 2014, 2016, and 2023–24, but successive US presidents waived most of the restrictions for US arms sales and military assistance.[35] OFAC sanctioned a senior adviser to Rwandan President Paul Kagame in February 2025.[36] The latest OFAC sanctions are more wide-reaching, however, and significantly restrict US-linked financial dealings and raise the risk of conducting business with the RDF, which is also an economic player in the Rwandan economy. The RDF is now the second national army in Africa facing current US sanctions, after Eritrea. Individuals and entities doing business with the RDF have until April 1, 2026, to end their transactions.[37]

Rwanda had backed a major M23 offensive in South Kivu that violated its peace commitments in late 2025, and conditions on the ground have changed little despite M23’s withdrawal from Uvira town. M23 and RDF troops had launched their largest offensive since early 2025 to capture Uvira in early December 2025. The RDF reportedly deployed thousands of troops, including special forces, and advanced military equipment to support the offensive on Uvira.[38] Rwanda violated its commitment to respect the DRC’s territorial integrity and to not “engage in, support, or condone any military incursions or other acts” in the DRC under the Washington Peace Accords, which Kagame had formalized at a signing ceremony with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, a few days after M23 and the RDF launched the operation.[39]

Strong US political pressure on Rwanda and M23 led to the group’s full withdrawal from Uvira in mid-January, but M23 did not pull back to its original, pre-offensive positions in South Kivu. CTP assessed in early February that M23 could use its residual territorial gains, particularly along the border with Burundi, to conduct another southward offensive in the medium-to-long term.[40] The Treasury Department called for the RDF’s “immediate withdrawal” from the eastern DRC and said that M23’s continued presence near the border with Burundi risks widening the conflict into a larger regional war.[41]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr with Elliot Nazar

Ethiopia is likely increasing its backing of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in eastern Sudan by allegedly allowing the RSF to launch attack drones from western Ethiopia and helping traffic weapons to RSF rear bases in western Ethiopia via Ethiopian Airlines. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation stated on March 2 that drones coming from Ethiopia have conducted strikes in SAF-controlled territory since February.^[42] A US State Department spokesperson acknowledged the accusation, stating that external involvement is prolonging Sudan’s civil war.^[43] Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia on March 3 to deny Sudan’s accusation and assert Ethiopia’s neutrality in the war.^[44] The RSF has conducted more drone strikes in Blue Nile state since February 14 than it did from April 2023—the start of the war—to January 2026, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[45] Pro-SAF source VistaMaps claimed that some of drones have originated from Asosa Airport in western Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, an airport where the Ethiopian military has constructed “drone support infrastructure” since August 2025.^[46]

Ethiopia has already helped set up an Emirati-backed RSF rear base in western Ethiopia. Reuters recently confirmed SAF allegations that Ethiopia is hosting an RSF camp, which anonymous Ethiopian officials said the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has financed, in Benishangul-Gumuz.^[47] Ethiopia has facilitated Emirati weapons shipments to this RSF rear base and other areas via Ethiopian territory since at least November 2025.^[48] An Emirati-linked flight transporting a suspected weapons shipment traveled from the UAE to Ethiopia on February 28 and possibly March 5, despite Iranian strikes on the UAE.^[49]

Open-source analyst Rich Tedd assessed that Ethiopian Airlines may have become directly involved in trafficking weapons to the RSF rear base in western Ethiopia since February 23.^[50] Tedd recorded two Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800 planes making at least eight separate flights from Addis Ababa to N’Djamena, the Chadian capital, before returning to Addis Ababa and leaving immediately for Asosa, the capital of Benishangul-Gumuz.^[51] The UAE has used Chad as a rear base and weapons trafficking hub for the RSF throughout Sudan’s civil war, with N’Djamena has serving as a transit point for mercenaries and weapons.^[52] The Ethiopian Airlines cargo planes always used the military apron of the N’Djamena airport, further indicating the cargo flights are military-related.^[53]

RSF rear basing in Ethiopia has enabled the RSF to open a second front against the SAF from the east. The RSF and allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu launched an offensive in Blue Nile in late January, concentrating on taking Kurmuk—a key border town linking Blue Nile to Benishangul-Gumuz.^[54] The SAF has alleged that the RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu are using Ethiopia and South Sudan as rear bases.^[55] Capturing Kurmuk would strengthen RSF supply lines to western Ethiopia, giving the RSF a launchpad to advance further into Blue Nile—the agricultural hub of Sudan—and open a potential axis of advance toward major cities Sennar, Wad Madani, and Khartoum, which are located approximately 150, 210, and 325 miles north of ad Damazin, the Blue Nile state capital, respectively.^[56]

Figure 3.  RSF Launches Offensive in Blue Nile State

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Ethiopian support for the RSF could cause the SAF and its allies to retaliate against Ethiopia. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation condemned Ethiopia’s alleged hosting of RSF drones, warning that Sudan has the right to “confront” the threat through “various means and methods.”^[57] The SAF has repeatedly conducted air and drone strikes on RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu positions on the Ethiopian border since their offensive in Blue Nile began.^[58] The SAF also has ties with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia, allowing the TPLF to use Sudanese territory as a safe haven, using TPLF fighters against the RSF, and previously sending weapons to the TPLF during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022.^[59] CTP has assessed that the Ethiopian federal government will likely launch an imminent offensive to neutralize the TPLF due to long-standing disputes, which would likely cause the SAF to increase support for the TPLF.^[60]

SAF allies and Ethiopian rivals Egypt and Eritrea could also help the SAF target RSF supply lines near Ethiopia. Egypt has coordinated drone strikes against RSF supply lines near the Egyptian border with Sudan from a drone base in Egyptian territory since late 2025.^[61] Egypt already has strained relations with Ethiopia due to Ethiopia’s unilateral operationalization of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River and desire for sea access, both of which Egypt views as serious threats.^[62] Egypt has previously threatened to take unilateral military action against the dam, which is near the Sudanese border in Benishangul-Gumuz, approximately 135 miles northeast of Kurmuk.^[63] Eritrea reportedly hosts SAF and SAF-aligned militia rear bases and has facilitated weapons shipments to SAF.^[64] Eritrea already has severely strained ties with Ethiopia due to Ethiopian threats to annex Eritrean territory to secure sea access, which has led Eritrea to support the TPLF and other armed opposition groups against the Ethiopian federal government.^[65]

The RSF and SAF separately captured key positions on the south and north axes, respectively, along the main north–south highway in central Sudan. The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu launched a multi-axis ground assault on Dilling—located 100 miles south of el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan—on March 1, which the SAF repelled.^[66] The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu claimed to have cut the road between Dilling and Habila, which was the only open supply line linking Dilling to el Obeid.^[67] Investigative outlet Sudan War Monitor verified the claim, but SAF sources have claimed that the SAF has retaken its positions on the road.^[68] The RSF additionally cut the road between Dilling and Kadugli—the South Kordofan state capital located approximately 85 miles south of Dilling—at Kega on March 2, placing Kadugli under siege again.^[69] The RSF also claimed to seize al Bardab—located approximately 20 miles north of Kadugli—on March 5.^[70]

The RSF’s seizure of Kega highlights the SAF’s continued difficulty consolidating battlefield gains, as it had reconnected Dilling and Kadugli on February 3.^[71] The SAF had also opened the supply line between Dilling and el Obeid on January 26.^[72]

The SAF recaptured Bara—located approximately 40 miles north of el Obeid—on March 5, however.^[73] The RSF and SAF have repeatedly clashed over Bara since late 2025, trading control of the town multiple times, due to the town’s implications for SAF supply lines.[74] Bara is located on the highway connecting el Obeid to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital located 255 miles northeast of el Obeid.

Figure 4.  Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Elliot Nazar.

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) approved a new permanent constitution that delays scheduled 2026 elections and extends the Somali president’s term, against opposition objections. The constitution extends Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term by a year and delays federal elections until 2027.^[75] The constitution institutes direct parliamentary elections, the winners of which will then choose the Somali president.^[76] The Somali parliament approved the amendments in a disputed vote on March 4.[77] The parliament may not have had the quorum required to approve the amendments.[78]

The Somali Future Council (SFC)—a political coalition consisting of the Jubbaland and Puntland states and Somali opposition figures that favors the current indirect, clan-based election system—denounced the vote. The SFC labeled the amendments as a corrupt and illegitimate Mohamud-driven process and reaffirmed its support for elections in 2026 and the interim constitution, which has been in place since 2012, barring a consensus constitutional amendment process.^[79] Talks between the FGS and SFC to reach a resolution had collapsed on February 23, and Somali officials reaffirmed the FGS’s intention to hold direct elections.^[80]

The FGS’s decision could lead to political violence and may cause the SFC to hold parallel political processes. Former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo) delayed federal presidential elections in 2021, citing his intent to implement direct elections.^[81] The opposition accused him of unilaterally extending his term, and Somali security forces aligned with the two opposing sides clashed in Mogadishu.^[82] The SFC has threatened to hold parallel elections if the FGS implements the direct election system.^[83] Disputes between Jubbaland and the FGS over Jubbaland holding elections that the FGS did not sanction already caused clashes in 2020, 2024, and 2025.^[84]

The political dispute could hamper ongoing counterterrorism efforts targeting al Shabaab. FGS and Ugandan African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) forces announced that they had launched an offensive on March 1 to clear al Shabaab from key areas and cut its supply routes in south-central Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region.^[85] Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) killed an al Shabaab commander near Awdheegle—a town located approximately 45 miles southwest of Mogadishu—on the same day.^[86] Somali outlet Caasimada reported that the commander had planned several high-profile attacks in Mogadishu, including a NISA prison break near the presidential palace in October 2025.^[87] FGS and AUSSOM forces then captured Daarusalaam and Mubaarak, which are located approximately 50 miles southwest of Mogadishu, on March 2.^[88]

FGS and AUSSOM forces have contested key positions linking al Shabaab–controlled areas of the Shabelle River valley to Afgoi—a district capital located on the outskirts of Mogadishu—since June 2025.^[89] Al Shabaab uses these positions as forward operating bases to pressure Mogadishu, including through vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks.^[90] FGS and AUSSOM forces have reportedly captured at least eight localities in the Shabelle River valley since June.^[91]

Figure 5.  Battle for the Mogadishu Outskirts

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Continued tensions and political violence would likely undermine the broader FGS and AUSSOM effort to disrupt al Shabaab supply lines to Mogadishu, opening security gaps for al Shabaab. Al Shabaab continues to maintain baseline attack capabilities around Mogadishu, having conducted a spate of major attacks on FGS facilities in December and frequently detonating improvised explosive devices.^[92] Al Shabaab has previously exploited political infighting related to election delays, increasing suicide bombings in Mogadishu in early 2022.[93] CTP has previously assessed that tensions over upcoming elections would likely obstruct counterterrorism operations in the event of factional political violence.^[94]

Africa File Data Cutoff: March 5, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.