Mali Negotiates Amid JNIM Blockade; M23 Numbers Swell: Africa File, October 9, 2025

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Key Takeaways:

• Mali. The Malian junta has supported select local negotiations with al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) to ease the ongoing fuel blockade, which has had widespread impacts on the Malian economy. The negotiations fit a growing pattern of junta-backed negotiations with JNIM, which give the group de facto control of affected areas, across the country throughout 2025.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 claimed to have added nearly 17,000 new fighters to its ranks since mid-September, effectively doubling its fighting force since early 2025 and making it the largest Rwandan-backed rebellion since the Second Congo War. M23’s force generation efforts will likely further complicate peace efforts with the Congolese government.
• Somalia—Counterterrorism. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) and African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) successfully cleared al Shabaab from multiple localities near Mogadishu. SFG and AUSSOM operations have failed to disrupt al Shabaab’s ability to target sensitive locations in the capital, however, as al Shabaab attempted a prison break in central Mogadishu.
• Somalia—Elections. Several Somali state governments are aligning against the SFG due to various political disputes. Continued tensions will hamper the SFG’s electoral reforms and increase the likelihood of violence between the SFG, states, and clans.
• Lake Chad. Boko Haram has escalated the scale of its attacks along the Nigeria-Cameroon border throughout 2025, capitalizing on deteriorating security pressure along the border.

Figure 1. Africa File, October 9, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Mali

Author: Miles Charles

The Malian junta has green-lighted local negotiations with JNIM to ease the ongoing fuel blockade, which has had widespread impacts on the Malian economy. Local leaders in central Mali have begun negotiating with JNIM under the supervision of Malian intelligence since at least early October.^[i] JNIM has reportedly demanded that the junta lift its ban on fuel sales in remote villages, which the junta imposed on western Mali on July 1.^[ii]

JNIM’s blockade has begun to cause widespread fuel shortages as it enters its second month. JNIM declared a blockade on Kayes and Nioro—key cities in western Mali—in July and began enforcing its fuel blockade in Mali more broadly on September 3.^[iii] The group has destroyed nearly 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali traveling from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal since the blockade started.^[iv] The blockade has caused fuel prices to more than double, closed gas stations across Mali, and left citizens waiting for hours in line at the stations still operable.^[v] Malian state media reported that the prime minister convened a disaster management committee on October 3, assuring that the government would take measures to ensure the country’s fuel supply.^[vi] A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7.^[vii]

Figure 2. JNIM Besieges Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The lack of fuel threatens to undermine the Malian mining sector in the medium term. Many mines in the mineral-rich western part of the country rely on fuel generators to operate. Malian forces have forced several fuel convoys planning to resupply mines to delay their trip by up to a week until security forces can escort the convoy.^[viii] The delays have caused temporary shutdowns, but many mines have enough reserves to weather temporary disruptions.^[ix] French investigative magazine Jeune Afrique quoted an anonymous source who said that local populations or the state could attempt to requisition the fuel reserves of mining companies in an emergency, however.^[x] The mining industry accounted for 82 percent of Malian exports, 21 percent of the state tax revenue, and more than 6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product in 2023.^[xi]

The negotiations fit a growing pattern of junta-backed negotiations with JNIM, which give the group de facto control of affected areas, across the country in 2025. Several local communities have engaged JNIM in government-supported negotiations to end JNIM sieges in 2025.[xii] JNIM has secured de facto control over several of these areas with agreements in which the group agrees to end its siege; the communities agree to pay taxes, adhere to JNIM-interpreted shari’a law, and cease cooperation with state security forces; and the military agrees to confine or reduce its presence in the area.^[xiii]

Figures 3 and 4. JNIM Local Agreements in Central and Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Somalia—Elections

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Several Somali states are increasingly aligning against the federal government over various political disputes and a broader push for greater autonomy. The Puntland and Somaliland state governments signed an agreement strengthening trade ties and security cooperation, focusing on counterterrorism and maritime operations during a meeting in Nairobi on October 5.[xiv] Puntland is a de facto autonomous state within the Somali federal system, while Somaliland is a de facto independent breakaway state. The two states control most of Somalia’s northern coastline. Puntland recognized Somaliland’s right to self-determination in the agreement, which is notable given their long-standing tensions.[xv] Puntland has historically refused to acknowledge Somaliland’s right to self-determination due to land disputes in the Cayn, Sanaag, and Sool regions in northern Somalia.[xvi]

Puntland has pivoted toward Somaliland amidst its ongoing opposition to constitutional reforms since March 2024. The reforms included giving the Somali president the power to remove the prime minister and requiring direct elections of the Somali president, which Puntland viewed as reducing its influence.[xvii] Puntland responded to the reforms by withdrawing its recognition of the SFG and recalling its parliamentary representatives.[xviii] This decision further weakened the Puntland government’s ties to the SFG, as it has always been semiautonomous due to its distance from Mogadishu.[xix] Puntland later opposed the SFG’s announcement of a transition to a one-person, one-vote election system in October 2024.[xx]

Puntland additionally opposed the SFG’s recognition of North Eastern state—a new state located in previously Somaliland-controlled territory, which Puntland and Somaliland both claim—in July 2025.[xxi] The SFG sided with clans who successfully rebelled against Somaliland forces and has since supported elections in the contested state under the federal framework.[xxii] Puntland has reportedly deployed forces to North Eastern state to prevent SFG voter registration efforts for one-person, one-vote elections.[xxiii] Somaliland’s defense minister claimed that Puntland and Somaliland agreed to oppose the formation of North Eastern state institutions during the recent talks, but Puntland’s interior minister denied that they discussed North Eastern state.[xxiv]

Figure 5. Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr.

The Jubbaland and Puntland state governments have also strengthened ties since issuing a joint statement opposing constitutional reforms in June 2025.[xxv] The Jubbaland and Puntland presidents reportedly met with Emirati officials in Abu Dhabi in mid-September.[xxvi] The state presidents met again in Nairobi in early October, announcing the formation of the Somali Future Council, a new political coalition.[xxvii] The Somali Future Council is composed of opposition factions who oppose the SFG’s constitutional and electoral reforms, including former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.[xxviii] The Somali Future Council pledged to hold a conference in Somalia to finalize the coalition.[xxix]

Jubbaland has been at odds with the SFG since the SFG announced its plans for a one-person, one-vote election system.[xxx] Jubbaland withdrew in protest from election negotiations in the National Consultative Council—a consensus-based political body composed of the Somali president, prime minister, and state presidents—and held state elections in November 2024.[xxxi] The SFG has not accepted the elections, in which Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam—also known as Madobe—won a third term, leading to intermittent fighting between SFG and Jubbaland state forces.[xxxii]

The SFG has decided to create a rival administration in Jubbaland.[xxxiii] Madobe and Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met in early October for the first time since late 2024 but failed to reach an agreement.[xxxiv] Madobe reportedly refused to support the one-person, one-vote election system, while Mohamud reportedly refused to recognize the Jubbaland election results.[xxxv] The National Intelligence and Security Agency’s commander in Gedo region announced on October 8 that the SFG will create a new administration in Garbaharey, Gedo region, reportedly with the support of Gedo region clan elders and security officials.[xxxvi] Gedo region has regularly been at odds with the Jubbaland state government based in Kismayo due to clan-based, local-central political tensions similar to those in the SFG-Jubbaland dispute.[xxxvii] SFG- and Jubbaland-backed forces already clashed in Gedo several times in July 2025.[xxxviii]

Continued tensions between the SFG and state governments could delay elections and cause violence in southern Somalia in the lead-up to the planned 2026 presidential election. Somalia has relied on a power-sharing system known as the “4.5 formula,” which reflects the country’s fragmented, clan-based society.[xxxix] State legislatures and clan leaders select parliamentary representatives to fill clan-based quotas. These representatives then select the president.[xl]

The shift to one-person, one-vote elections upends this fragile power-sharing system. The reforms would allow Somalis to directly elect local, state, and national representatives. This new system was supposed to first take effect in local elections in June 2025, but the SFG delayed the elections, partially due to state opposition.[xli] Such a major change to the political system would change the balance of power and elite bargaining that occurs in the 4.5 system, causing Jubbaland, Puntland, and affiliated clans to fear marginalization.[xlii]

The absence of an agreement between the SFG and Jubbaland could cause existing state and clan cleavages to turn violent as has happened during previous election disputes. SFG forces loyal to then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—also known as Farmaajo—and SFG forces who shared clan affiliations with opposition leaders fought in the streets of Mogadishu due to a delayed presidential election in April 2021.[xliii] SFG forces and Jubbaland state forces attacked each other over disputed Jubbaland elections in 2020, when Farmaajo weaponized the tensions between Gedo and the Jubbaland state government, and in 2024.[xliv] This rivalry has already led to fighting between Jubbaland state forces and SFG-backed forces in Gedo in 2025.[xlv]

Infighting would undermine counterterrorism efforts and create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit. Al Shabaab took advantage of the federal election dispute in 2021 to increase attacks in Mogadishu, particularly suicide bombings.[xlvi] The group continues to possess the capability and intent to attack high-value targets in Mogadishu, as evidenced by its attempted prison break near the presidential palace on October 4.[xlvii] Jubbaland accused the SFG of interfering with counterterrorism operations during the election dispute in 2024.[xlviii]

Figure 6. Somali Infighting Along the Ethiopia-Somalia Border

Source: Liam Karr.

Somalia—Counterterrorism

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Hannah Ochs

The SFG and AUSSOM recaptured a key town in southern Somalia, securing supply lines into Mogadishu. SFG and AUSSOM forces pushed al Shabaab out of Awdheegle and nearby villages Shangarre and Raqayle in Lower Shabelle region on October 4.[xlix] Awdheegle is a logistics hub located approximately 25 miles southwest of Afgoi, a district capital on the outskirts of Mogadishu. The Somali defense minister stated that al Shabaab used Awdheegle as a base to coordinate attacks in other parts of Somalia.[l]

SFG and AUSSOM forces have been waging an offensive since June to recapture several key towns that served as forward operating bases in Lower Shabelle.[li] Al Shabaab captured Awdheegle, Barire, and Sabiid in March 2025.[lii] These towns have key bridges over the Shabelle River that link the al Shabaab–controlled areas of southern Somalia to the main road leading to Afgoi and Mogadishu.[liii] SFG and AUSSOM forces retook Sabiid and Barire by August.[liv] Ugandan soldiers in AUSSOM have played a crucial role in the offensive, taking dozens of casualties during the battle to retake Barire.[lv] The Somali defense minister acknowledged the Ugandans’ role in recapturing Awdheegle during a speech on October 5.[lvi]

Figure 7. Battle for the Mogadishu Outskirts

Note: AU stands for African Union.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Al Shabaab’s recent attack on a prison near the presidential palace underscores the SFG’s continued inability to secure Mogadishu, however. Al Shabaab militants attempted a prison break at the National Intelligence and Security Agency’s (NISA’s) Jilicow facility—a primary base holding suspected al Shabaab members—on October 4.[lvii] The facility is located in a heavily guarded neighborhood adjacent to the presidential palace, which the militants reportedly attempted to access.[lviii] CCTV footage shows the militants driving through Mogadishu disguised as NISA personnel before they detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device to breach the prison grounds.[lix] The militants proceeded to occupy the prison for six hours before security forces killed them.[lx] The SFG claimed that no inmates escaped during the attack, but multiple local sources reported that several inmates escaped.[lxi] A local source reported that the militants traveled from Lower Shabelle to Mogadishu via Afgoi.[lxii]

Figure 8. Al Shabaab Attack on Mogadishu Prison

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

The prison attack in a sensitive location undermines the SFG’s message that it is degrading al Shabaab’s capabilities.[lxiii] Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre held an event on the streets of Mogadishu emphasizing the capital’s safety earlier on October 4.[lxiv] Barre announced that the SFG would reopen 52 roads in Mogadishu to allow for normal commercial activity and traffic flows.[lxv] Barre cited the improved security situation as the reason to open the roads, which the SFG had closed for 15 years.[lxvi] Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security has mandated that SFG forces inspect military vehicles moving through Mogadishu in the wake of the prison attack.[lxvii] Al Shabaab had not conducted a notable attack in central Mogadishu since it attempted to assassinate President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in March 2025, with no major attacks on military sites since October 2024.[lxviii]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford with Anping Zhu

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels claimed to have added nearly 17,000 new fighters to their ranks since mid-September. M23 commissioned 7,437 new fighters at its main military base in Rutshuru district in North Kivu on September 14.^[lxix] M23 claimed that many of the troops were former Congolese army (FARDC) soldiers, including former fighters from elite units, who surrendered to M23 in early 2025.^[lxx] M23 then commissioned what the group claimed was another 9,350 fighters who completed training on October 1.^[lxxi]

M23 has at least doubled its fighting force since early 2025 and may have quadrupled its number of active troops per the group’s claims. The UN estimated that M23 had at least 5,000 active troops in April 2025.^[lxxii] Reuters reported on September 18 that M23 has at least 14,000 troops deployed across North and South Kivu.^[lxxiii] The UN’s estimate, added to the group’s claims from September, means that M23 may have nearly 22,000 fighters.

M23’s force capacity is expanding at levels unseen for a Rwandan-backed rebellion since the Second Congo War. M23’s potential 22,000 troops far exceed its previous iteration in 2012–13, when it had between 1,200 and 6,000 fighters.^[lxxiv] The Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), M23’s predecessor, also had roughly 6,000 fighters when active from 2006–09.^[lxxv] The Rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma) had up to 40,000 troops in the late stages of the Second Congo War in the early 2000s.^[lxxvi]

Figure 9. Rwandan-Backed Rebellion Force Deployments in the Eastern DRC

Note: Estimate for M23 in 2025 is based on UN reporting and the group’s recent claims.

Source: Yale Ford; UN; Gérard Prunier.

M23’s force generation efforts will likely continue to further complicate peace efforts with the Congolese government. CTP assessed in September that M23’s force generation efforts may violate international humanitarian law.^[lxxvii] M23 has demobilized, trained, integrated, and redeployed thousands of FARDC troops and pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters through forcible means throughout 2025.^[lxxviii] The Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit nonstate armed actors from forcibly conscripting individuals into their ranks.^[lxxix] The Hague Conventions and subsequent Geneva Conventions also note that even warring states cannot “compel nationals of the hostile party to take part in operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before the war,” as M23 has with FARDC and militia fighters.^[lxxx]

Figure 10 . M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Note: AFC stands for M23’s political branch, Alliance Fleuve Congo.

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

M23’s force generation efforts will likely continue to complicate the issue of prisoner exchange in Qatari-mediated peace talks with the Congolese government. The prisoner swap issue has been one of the major obstacles to negotiating a long-term deal. The DRC has demanded the release of about 1,500 FARDC troops, which M23 sent to training camps in early 2025, as part of a prisoner exchange process led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).^[lxxxi] M23 already released some FARDC troops in an ICRC-led swap in late April but claims that any remaining soldiers have joined M23 voluntarily, including some of the recruits commissioned in August and September.^[lxxxii] The group has shown no sign that it would turn over these new fighters, especially as it pursues campaigns on multiple axes. The two sides will reportedly continue negotiating the prisoner swap issue and other disagreements that have blocked progress in a potential new round of talks soon.^[lxxxiii]

Lake Chad

Author: Miles Charles with Chris Dayton

Boko Haram has escalated the scale of its attacks along the Cameroon-Nigeria border throughout 2025. The group attacked the border town of Kirawa, displacing more than 5,000 residents, including a district head, on September 30.^[lxxxiv] Roughly 3,000 civilians fled across the border to Cameroon, while the remaining 2,000 took refuge in the nearby towns of Maiduguri and Pulka.^[lxxxv] Cameroonian and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) soldiers had abandoned Kirawa after Boko Haram last overran the town on August 7.^[lxxxvi]

The Kirawa attack follows a series of large-scale Boko Haram attacks along the Nigeria-Cameroon border in 2025. Several of these attacks were retaliatory, likely to coerce local populations into working with the group. Boko Haram massacred 100 civilians that it accused of spying for Islamic State—West Africa Province in northern Nigeria, along the border, in early 2025.^[lxxxvii] The group killed another 60 civilians that it accused of collaborating with the Nigerian military in Dar Jamal—a village 10 miles from Kirawa—in September.^[lxxxviii] Boko Haram has launched six large-scale attacks in 2025—defined as an attack inflicting 20 or more fatalities or displacing more than 100 civilians—compared to one in 2024.^[lxxxix]

Figure 11. Boko Haram Escalates Large-Scale Attacks in Northeastern Nigeria near the Cameroon Border

Source: Liam Karr.

These attacks underscore the broader deterioration of key military infrastructure and overall security along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Nigerian and Cameroonian troops have abandoned several border posts due to increased attacks, enabling Boko Haram to move more freely along the border.[xc] ISWAP’s “Burn the Camps” offensive has attacked 34 camps in 2025, forcing three border posts to permanently vacate and others to temporarily close, weakening border security.^[xci] Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 further degraded border security cooperation, allowing Boko Haram to strengthen its logistical corridors.^[xcii]

Insurgent activity may increase in the coming weeks with the onset of the drier spring season, which roughly runs from October to May. Insurgents' attacks fell by more than 35% during the rainy season.^[xciii] The drier conditions reduce flooding in support zones across the Lake Chad Basin and forests in northeastern Nigeria, allowing insurgents to reoccupy previously flooded areas and ultimately increase attacks.^[xciv]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 9, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.