Red Sea Showdown Brewing in Northern Somalia; New Fronts in Sudan: Africa File, January 29, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) inaugurated a new federal member state in northern Somalia amid political disputes with the anti-FGS Puntland and Somaliland regions and those regions’ Emirati and Israeli partners. The FGS’s regional allies—Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—supported the inauguration and likely view a position in northern Somalia as an opportunity to further their regional ambitions while limiting Emirati influence, which could set the stage for a broader conflict.
• Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) partially broke the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) siege of a key town south of el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan. The SAF’s advance sets conditions for it to relieve pressure on el Obeid and potentially advance west, although the RSF may have launched an offensive in eastern Sudan to divert SAF resources from central Sudan.

Figure 1. Africa File, January 29, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Somalia

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) inaugurated North East state in northern Somalia as a federal member state (FMS) amid political disputes with the neighboring autonomous Puntland state, de facto independent Somaliland, and the two regions’ Emirati and Israeli partners. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud attended the inauguration in Las Anod—the North East state capital—on January 17, the first time a president had visited Las Anod since 1984.^[1] North East state is disputed territory among the FGS, Puntland, and Somaliland.^[2] Somaliland controlled the territory until 2023, when local clans successfully revolted and declared their intention to join the FGS.^[3] North East state officials established a state government in August 2025.^[4] Mohamud pledged that the FGS would facilitate “reconstruction and development” and provide security in North East state.^[5]

Puntland and Somaliland have separately rejected any new state or FGS presence in the area. Somaliland denounced North East state’s split and pledged to take back the territory.^[6] Puntland’s minister of information accused the FGS of provoking conflict with Somaliland and planning to establish military bases in territory that Puntland claims.^[7] Puntland claims parts of North East state’s territory due to shared clan ties and has opposed the FGS’s involvement in the territory since 2023.^[8]

The FGS’s planned implementation of direct elections in North East state and across the country in upcoming 2026 federal elections has furthered its years-long divide with Puntland over constitutional and electoral reforms. Puntland believes that the new system threatens its place in the current power-sharing arrangement in the clan- and quota-based indirect election system.^[9] Puntland withdrew its recognition of the FGS in March 2024 and has since joined the Somali Future Council, an anti-FGS political coalition including the Jubbaland state government and Somali opposition.^[10] The FGS and Somali Future Council are scheduled to hold talks on February 1 regarding planned federal presidential elections in 2026 and a roadmap to a permanent constitution after the council imposed a deadline on dialogue with the FGS.^[11]

The inauguration of North East state is also linked to the ongoing diplomatic standoff pitting the FGS against Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is result of the latter two’s growing ties with Puntland and Somaliland. Israel became the first state to recognize Somaliland statehood in late December.^[12] The FGS canceled bilateral agreements with the UAE, including for ports in Puntland and Somaliland, in mid-January for “hostile and destabilizing actions undermining national sovereignty.”^[13] Israeli officials claimed that the UAE had helped facilitate Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, and the UAE had evacuated a Saudi-wanted Yemeni official through Somaliland days prior to the cancellation.^[14] Saudi Arabia had also reportedly increased pressure on the FGS to halt Emirati weapons shipments to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, as the shipments transited through an Emirati base in Puntland.^[15] Mohamud and Somali officials characterized North East state’s inauguration as a rejection of Somaliland statehood and a “message” to Israel.^[16]

Figure 2.  Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.

North East state serves as a key node for the FGS’s regional allies—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar—to further their influence in northern Somalia and the Gulf of Aden as they look to contain Israel and the UAE, which could cause an armed regional standoff. The four allies have been the staunchest supporters of the FGS since Israel recognized Somaliland, with each expressing individual and joint support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.^[17] The Egyptian, Saudi, and Turkish ambassadors to Somalia attended North East state’s inauguration.^[18] Qatar and Somalia signed a defense cooperation agreement on January 19, bolstering Qatari efforts to supply and train Somali forces.^[19] Qatar has reportedly stepped in to fund the salaries of approximately 3,500 Somali soldiers around Mogadishu, which the UAE had provided until the FGS annulled defense cooperation.^[20] The investigative outlet Middle East Eye reported that Somalia and Turkey are discussing the establishment of a Turkish naval base at Las Qoray on North East state’s coast.^[21] Mohamud is separately planning to travel to Saudi Arabia in the coming weeks to finalize a trilateral military pact among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia, according to Bloomberg.^[22]

Figure 3.  Turkish and Emirati Presence on Northern Somali Coast

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

The heightened interest in northern Somalia is part of a broader competition pitting these FGS partners against Israel and the UAE across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Emirati-backed proxies across the Bab el Mandeb Strait in Yemen took key positions from Saudi-backed forces in a major offensive earlier in December.[23] These developments threatened to give Israel and the UAE control over the Bab el Mandeb, and thus the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia conducted direct strikes on Emirati targets in late December and supported the Saudi-backed Yemeni government in retaking positions from Emirati-backed forces in early January.[24] Saudi Arabia, alongside Egypt and Turkey, has taken a similarly more assertive stance against the UAE since late 2025 in the Sudanese civil war. The UAE is the RSF’s primary backer, supplying the group with drones, air defense systems, and other equipment.^[25] Saudi Arabia is reportedly on the verge of a deal with Pakistan to supply the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with drones, air defense systems, and potentially fighter jets.^[26] Turkey provides drones to the SAF, and both Egyptian and Turkish personnel have coordinated operations with the SAF throughout the war and began coordinating joint operations directly against the RSF in late 2025.^[27]

Figure 4. Emerging Blocs in the Red Sea Arena

Source: Liam Karr.

A military buildup in North East could cause another regional standoff in northern Somalia, pitting Israel, Puntland, Somaliland, and the UAE against Egypt, the FGS, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Puntland rejected the Somalia’s cancellation of bilateral agreements with the UAE, although the UAE has reportedly drawn down its presence at its Bossaso base in Puntland since the cancellation.^[28] The FGS has little ability to force a withdrawal from the UAE’s bases in Bossaso and Berbera in Somaliland, however, and Emirati-based port operator DP World stated that it would not stop operations at the port of Berbera.^[29] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar visited Somaliland on January 6 despite FGS objections, and open-source analyst Rich Tedd identified a plane reportedly linked to Israeli intelligence traveling from Israel to Somaliland on January 18.^[30] Somalia and Turkey signed a defense agreement shortly after Ethiopia considered recognizing Somaliland in 2024 that authorizes Turkey to deploy warships to Somalia to protect Somalia’s territorial waters and remove “any external violations or threats.”^[31] The proposed language in the potential Egypt–Saudi Arabia–Somalia military pact is unclear, but Somalia already has a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Egypt, which allows for the deployment of thousands of Egyptian troops to Somalia.^[32] Qatar and Somalia’s recent defense cooperation agreement includes the “development of defense capabilities,” which could involve the provision of advanced weapons systems.^[33]

Another regionally fueled, large-scale civil war is unlikely due to regional efforts to manage current tensions. Somali forces would need a higher degree of direct external support to operate similar advanced weapons systems, as they are less trained and equipped than Sudanese forces. More direct involvement of foreign partners would mark an escalation and risk elevating current competition from proxy conflicts to direct conflict between foreign trainers operating in the theater. The ties between external actors increase incentives for them to manage tensions and avoid another major proxy conflict like Sudan or a direct conflict in Somalia, however. Saudi Arabia has shown a willingness to de-escalate tensions with the UAE since their proxy battle in Yemen, while the UAE remains a vital economic partner for Egypt and Turkey.^[34] Qatar has maintained relations with all actors. Israel is additionally pursuing recognition from Saudi Arabia as part of the Abraham Accords.

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) partially broke the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) siege of Dilling—a key town 100 miles south of el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan. The SAF and allied Joint Forces first captured Habila and then advanced 25 miles further west to enter Dilling on January 26.[35] The SAF bypassed the main north–south road in Kordofan region, which the RSF and allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu faction largely control except for Dilling, el Obeid, and Kadugli, which is the South Kordofan state capital located approximately 85 miles south of Dilling.[36] The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu still surround Dilling from the north, south, and west. The RSF also retains a presence around Habila. The RSF reportedly launched a counterattack to retake Habila on January 27, but the SAF repelled the attempt.[37]

Figure 5.  Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.

The SAF’s advance to Dilling sets conditions for it to reconnect Dilling, el Obeid, and Kadugli, which would relieve pressure on el Obeid and create a potential second axis of advance toward the RSF’s center of gravity in western Sudan. The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu cut the road between Dilling and Kadugli in mid-December at Kega, which is located 35 miles north of Kadugli, imposing full sieges of the SAF-controlled towns.[38] The RSF gradually tightened the sieges and increased artillery and drone strikes in Dilling and Kadugli to weaken SAF defenses into 2026, which CTP assessed was likely in preparation for a ground offensive.[39]

The SAF could also attempt to directly link Dilling and el Obeid. The SAF’s capture of Habila only opened an indirect supply link via al Rahad, which is located approximately 50 miles southeast of el Obeid and 85 miles northeast of Dilling. The SAF has attempted to directly reconnect Dilling and el Obeid by advancing south on the main highway from Kazgil, which is located 30 miles south of el Obeid. The SAF advanced roughly 20 miles south toward al Hamadi on December 31 before the RSF pushed the SAF back to Kazgil.[40]

The SAF seeks to clear multiple potential lines of advance through Kordofan region to the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur region, which necessitates the RSF’s sieges in South Kordofan.^[41] Dilling indirectly connects to an Nahud, the RSF-controlled West Kordofan state capital located 125 miles northwest of Dilling. An Nahud is on Sudan’s primary east–west highway going from el Obeid to el Fasher, the RSF-controlled North Darfur state capital. Dilling is also indirectly connected to a secondary road leading to Nyala, the South Darfur state capital and RSF’s de facto capital.^[42] The SAF unsuccessfully tried to open a line of advance from al Dabibat—located approximately 65 miles southwest of el Obeid—in May 2025, but the RSF recaptured the town.^[43]

SPLM-N al Hilu launched a separate assault in southeastern Sudan near the Ethiopian and South Sudanese border, which could be the initial attack in a broader offensive that would intend to open a second front and divert SAF resources from central Sudan. SPLM-N al Hilu attacked SAF positions in Malkan and al Silak—located approximately 85 miles southwest of ad Damazin, the Blue Nile state capital—on January 25 and 26.[44] The SAF ultimately repelled both attacks despite SPLM-N al Hilu briefly seizing al Salk on January 26.[45] Blue Nile state is the agricultural hub of Sudan and location of the biggest dams in the country due to the state’s vital location in the Nile River Valley. Ad Damazin also has road links to other major cities up the Nile River Valley, including Sennar, Wad Madani, and Khartoum, which are located approximately 150, 210, and 325 miles to the north, respectively.

Figure 6.  RSF Launches Offensive in Blue Nile State

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.

The SAF has prepared for an RSF cross-border offensive from the east since early December. SAF officials have accused Ethiopia of hosting an RSF training camp near the border with Blue Nile and facilitating UAE weapons shipments to the RSF.[46] Emirati-linked flights to Ethiopia carrying likely weapons shipments have significantly increased since November 2025.^[47] SAF officials warned in mid-January that an offensive from the east was imminent and sent reinforcements to Blue Nile.[48] The SAF conducted airstrikes against an RSF-aligned supply convoy near the Ethiopian border on January 11.^[49] Middle East Eye reported an SAF official’s claim that RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu fighters moved from Ethiopia and South Sudan to launch their recent attacks in Blue Nile.[50]