Uvira Returned, but South Kivu Still at Risk: Congo War Security Review Special Edition

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Key Takeaway: The Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels reconvened for Qatari-mediated peace talks, following M23’s full withdrawal from Uvira town in South Kivu province. The return of government control to Uvira without a formal ceasefire leaves the same underlying security conditions in South Kivu that gave M23 pretext to capture Uvira in the first place, however. M23 is already setting conditions for a future military campaign in South Kivu and would be in an even stronger position if it were to launch a new southward offensive in the coming months.

Assessment:

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels reconvened for Qatari-mediated peace talks to secure a formal ceasefire. Qatar has reportedly hosted delegations from both sides for new talks in Doha, the Qatari capital, since February 1.[1] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on January 28 that the scope of Qatar’s effort in restarting the talks is limited, mainly focusing on resuming dialogue and implementing a prior ceasefire verification agreement.[2]

The Doha process has been at an impasse since late 2025. The Congolese government and M23 signed a nonbinding peace framework agreement that contains eight pillars or separate negotiating tracks to address specific key issues of the conflict on November 15.[3] The two sides missed a two-week deadline to reconvene talks on negotiating the first unresolved pillar, and the process has since been at a standstill, including with the implementation of the first two pillars—key ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreements that the two sides had already negotiated prior to the November agreement. Jeune Afrique reported that Qatar has no immediate plans to facilitate negotiations on the six additional pillars.[4]

Figure 1. Peace Processes Multiply in the African Great Lakes Region

Source: Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

The slow restart of peace talks comes after M23 withdrew fully from Uvira town in South Kivu province and the group and its Rwandan backers publicly acknowledged their partnership in mid-to-late January amid heavy US diplomatic pressure. M23 withdrew the last of its units from Uvira on January 17, after it had initially announced a withdrawal in mid-December but kept de facto control of the city.[5] The Congolese government retook control of the city on January 17 and said that it would seek to re-establish the provincial administration if security conditions permits in the coming weeks.[6] M23 and Rwandan army (RDF) troops had launched their largest offensive since early 2025 to capture Uvira in early December 2025. M23 and the RDF launched the operation on December 1 and advanced about 50 miles to take control of the town by December 9.[7] M23 and M23-aligned militia groups had been waging smaller offensives to expand their territorial control in violation of ceasefire efforts, particularly in Mwenga and Shabunda districts in South Kivu between mid-November to early December, before capturing Uvira.[8]

Strong US political pressure on Rwanda and M23 led to the group’s withdrawal. Rwanda violated its commitment to respect the DRC’s territorial integrity and to not “engage in, support, or condone any military incursions or other acts” in the DRC under the US-brokered peace agreement from late June.[9] The RDF reportedly deployed thousands of troops, including special forces, and advanced military equipment to support the offensive on Uvira.[10] Senior US officials, including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have openly criticized Rwanda and warned of consequences to high-ranking Rwandan officials for violating the Washington Accords, including possible sanctions.[11] Corneille Nangaa, the head of M23’s political wing, said the group withdrew at the direct request of the United States.[12]

Rwanda and M23 acknowledged their ties publicly for the first time in late January, possibly to help further manage US diplomatic pressure. The Rwandan ambassador to the US, Mathilde Mukantabana, said for the purpose of “transparency” that Rwanda engages in “security coordination” with M23 in a statement to the US House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 22.[13] The Rwandan government had consistently denied claims that it backs M23 or operates in the DRC but committed to withdraw its troops in the June peace agreement. Nangaa acknowledged for the first time that M23 “collaborates” with Rwanda on security issues in an interview with Rwandan media on January 27.[14] Mukantabana and Nangaa both invoked self-defense and existential security threats in the eastern DRC to justify their cooperation while leaving the extent of Rwanda’s military involvement with M23 ambiguous.

The return of Congolese government control to Uvira without a working ceasefire leaves the same underlying security conditions in South Kivu in place that gave M23 and Rwanda pretext to capture the town in December. M23 targeted Uvira because it is the last and most important node in South Kivu for the Congolese government and the government’s Burundian and Congolese militia allies. Uvira had been a Wazalendo stronghold with more than 80 distinct militia groups claiming the town as its base.[15] The Congolese army (FARDC) had used Uvira as a logistic hub and the Bujumbura airport, 16 miles to the east in Burundi, as a rear base for joint ground and air operations with the Burundian army (FDNB) against M23 for months. Burundi is the FARDC’s most important and capable ally against M23 and M23-aligned rebel militias in South Kivu. The FDNB had reduced its force deployment in South Kivu after deconflicting with Rwanda in early 2025, but it reportedly began redeploying heavy and light weaponry and thousands of additional troops—18,000 in total by December, according to a security source cited by the French outlet Le Monde—in August.[16] CTP assessed that M23 and Rwanda launched the Uvira offensive to knock the FDNB out of the war after relations with Burundi collapsed and to break a FDNB-Wazalendo siege on ethnic Banyamulenge civilians in the South Kivu highlands.[17]

M23 received no concessions for its withdrawal. Nangaa framed the group’s withdrawal in its initial announcement in December as a “good faith” move that would be contingent on concessions and security guarantees from the Congolese government and international community.[18] This included the suspension of FARDC air attacks, the deployment of a “neutral” peacekeeping force to protect civilians and keep the FARDC and Wazalendos from retaking Uvira, and the establishment of a buffer zone on the front line.[19] CTP assessed that an external peacekeeping force was unlikely to form quickly due to political constraints, however, and the DRC presumably rejected M23’s demands, as US pressure grew on the group and Rwanda to pull out.[20] The Congolese government criticized Nangaa’s announcement as a “diversion” tactic, indicating that it viewed the withdrawal as a move mainly to reduce international pressure on M23 and Rwanda, rather than a genuine gesture to advance the peace process.[21]

The remilitarization of Uvira gives M23 incentives to relaunch a military campaign in South Kivu. CTP assessed when the city fell that M23’s advance was a strategic setback for the Congolese government that severely constrained if not completely cut Burundian support and would have further eroded the FARDC’s military strategy in the eastern DRC.[22] Burundi had initiated the repatriation of thousands of its troops from the eastern DRC.[23] The FARDC’s recapture of Uvira and the border with Burundi reopened a major supply corridor for troops and military equipment in the region, however. The FDNB began redeploying forces to the mountainous areas above Uvira in late December and to Uvira and the Ruzizi Plain after M23’s full withdrawal.[24] The FARDC has conducted numerous bombing runs on M23 and M23-aligned positions in South Kivu, some reportedly launched from Bujumbura, since mid-December—including a drone strike that reportedly killed several senior M23 officials in Uvira on January 14.[25] Human Rights Watch said on January 20 that it was concerned about human rights abuses after Wazalendo fighters looted Uvira and targeted Banyamulenge and their property.[26]

M23 is already setting conditions to justify future offensive military maneuvers in South Kivu as the security situation returns to the status quo ante. M23 officials have accused the Congolese government of violating the ceasefire with new air and ground attacks and boycotting ceasefire evaluation meetings.[27] Senior M23 officials have criticized the Congolese government for taking advantage of its withdrawal to foment chaos and target civilians, cut off internet access in Uvira to mask human rights abuses, and reinstitute the humanitarian blockade in the highlands.[28] Nangaa said that M23 had the capability to retake Uvira and would do so if the security situation deteriorated further in late January.[29]

M23 could use its control of key terrain in South Kivu and residual territorial gains from December to launch a new southward offensive in the coming months. The front line on the RN5 in the Ruzizi Plain had been frozen between M23-controlled Kamanyola and government-held Katagota towns between March and December 2025. The RN5 is the main route from Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital, to Uvira on the Ruzizi Plain. M23 withdrew to about 20 miles north of Uvira to Sange village—only halfway northward on the Ruzizi Plain to its previous frontline position on the RN5.[30] M23 still controls transit networks and supply corridors south of Bukavu and several key areas in southern Walungu district and the Mwenga district highlands west of the RN5, notably the Kaziba and Luhwindja chiefdoms. The Kaziba and Luhwindja chiefdoms are important transit hubs that M23 has used to support a ground assault on pro-Congolese government forces in the Ruzizi Plain from Kamanyola in early December, launch offensives in the Mwenga highlands and the adjacent Shabunda district, and link with M23-aligned militia fighters in the midlands and highlands around Uvira.[31]

Figure 2. Key Terrain in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford.

M23’s increased foothold in the Ruzizi Plain gives it a strong position and favorable territorial conditions to conduct another southward offensive. Kamanyola sits on the border of Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda, serving as the key entry point for Rwandan troop deployments and logistics for its supply lines in South Kivu. Katagota is the northern entry point to the Ruzizi Plain and controls access to the midland and highlands to the west of the RN5. M23 can use Nyangezi, a logistic hub about 16 miles south of Bukavu, to rapidly deploy forces to elevated areas west of the RN5 and directly to the Ruzizi Plain from Bukavu, its military headquarters in South Kivu, via Katagota. M23’s control of this east–west network between the high ground and its gains in the Ruzizi Plain means that it can more easily move troops and military equipment between the two corridors, giving it the capacity to conduct another multipronged assault on enemy defensive positions in the Ruzizi Plain.

Figure 3. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Claire Schreder; Anping Zhu.

Data Cutoff: February 2, 2026, at 10 a.m. ET

The Critical Threats Project’s Congo War Security Review is an in-depth review of activity related to the war in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.