DRC Ceasefire Collapse; Turkish Troops to Niger; El Fasher on the Brink: Africa File, September 25, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwandan-backed M23 rebels are conducting at least two separate offensives in North and South Kivu, which likely violates the Qatari-brokered ceasefire between M23 and the DRC and could further complicate already-struggling peace talks. M23 is likely attempting to set conditions to attack two strategic towns—Uvira in South Kivu and Pinga in North Kivu—by targeting key positions along several axes toward both targets.
• Turkey. Turkey reportedly plans to send soldiers to Niger to train and advise Nigerien forces, increasing Niger’s role as a strategic partner and hub for Turkish engagement in West Africa. Turkey’s growing position in Niger is part of its increasingly prominent role in West Africa, which supports Turkey’s strategic effort across Africa to position itself as an alternative partner to China, Russia, and the West and create opportunities to consolidate power domestically.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advanced on key positions in el Fasher, the besieged capital of North Darfur state. The RSF’s capture of el Fasher would consolidate its control over nearly the entirety of western Sudan’s Darfur region and likely lead to mass RSF crimes against humanity, including acts of ethnic violence that may constitute genocide.
• Burkina Faso. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has escalated the rate of its attacks in eastern Burkina Faso throughout 2025, as it seeks to strengthen and expand its support zones and isolate urban centers. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen may use strengthened support zones in eastern Burkina Faso along its southern border to better support its activity in the littorals.

Figure 1. DRC Ceasefire Collapse; Turkish Troops to Niger; El Fasher on the Brink: Africa File, September 25, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford with Liam Karr

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured a key town near the Walungu district capital in South Kivu from the Congolese army (FARDC). M23 captured Nzibira from the FARDC and pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters who undertook a “strategic retreat” on September 21.[i] Nzibira is an important tin and gold mining town and FARDC logistics hub with an airfield about 20 miles southwest of Walungu town in South Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).[ii] M23 had launched an offensive near Walungu town in early August and captured several villages before advancing southward and westward toward Nzibira on two axes despite resistance from pro-Congolese government militias in late August and early September.[iii]

M23’s recent force generation efforts may have aided the group’s capture of Nzibira. M23 has at least 9,000 newly trained recruits, including at least over 7,400 who recently entered service, some of whom reportedly arrived in Bukavu—M23’s South Kivu command center—in mid-September.[iv] M23 has also likely freed more capacity to devote to the frontlines with the recent deployment of hundreds of new police officers in late August, including surrendered Congolese national police officers.[v] The group used military forces to carry out law enforcement functions in the provincial capitals, Bukavu and Goma, in early 2025, but M23 officials said that the new police deployment would allow the group to focus on the front lines and leave urban security to the police.[vi] CTP assessed in mid-August that M23’s use of advanced weaponry and equipment from its early 2025 capture of Goma has likely aided the group’s Walungu offensive, and Congolese media reported that M23 used armored vehicles in Nzibira.[vii]

Figure 2. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Nzibira gives M23 access to several potential lines of advance to the interior of the DRC and could serve as a staging area for offensives toward the south-central DRC in the medium term. Kindu in Maniema province lies roughly 160 miles west of Nzibira via Shabunda district in South Kivu. Kindu is an important FARDC command center that houses the FARDC’s 31st Rapid Intervention Brigade.[viii] The politically important Kasai provinces in south-central DRC are nearly 600 miles southwest from Nzibira via Mwenga district in South Kivu on the RN2. Congolese media cited sources in Walungu who considered the loss of Nzibira as a “major operational setback” because of its critical position with respect to Shabunda and Mwenga.[ix]

M23 could alternatively use Nzibira to move troops to a mountainous area in central South Kivu for an attack on Uvira in the short term. M23 is likely seeking alternative routes to Uvira that bypass the heavily fortified Ruzizi Plain on the RN5 and would enable the group to use the less-defended high ground above Uvira to flank and then encircle the town and cut off its supply lines. M23 used this operational maneuver during its offensive on Goma in early 2025. Uvira town is situated on a lakeside plain between the highlands and Lake Tanganyika, making it particularly vulnerable to encirclement, with the only viable escape route through Burundi.

M23’s control of Nzibira and southern Walungu strengthens its control of supply lines to the advantageous mid-level highlands around Uvira.[x] M23 and M23-aligned fighters reportedly captured at least five remote villages in the mid-level highlands, about 25 miles south of the Kaziba chiefdom and 50 miles west of Uvira, after bypassing enemy positions in northern Mwenga district in late August.[xi] These captures and M23’s increasing proximity to Uvira led the Congolese government to assure locals that Uvira’s fall was not imminent.[xii] M23 has also sent small contingents to some mid-level areas around Uvira to link with an M23-aligned militia, Twirwaneho, who already controls most of the high plateaus further southwest of Uvira.[xiii] An FARDC official told Reuters that M23 would be “impossible to dislodge” if it consolidates control over the high ground around Uvira.[xiv] These remote, mid-level highlands are exposed to air attacks and have poor roads, however, which would make it difficult to move troops and long-range artillery for a large-scale attack on Uvira, although incremental movements would be more feasible.

Figure 3. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

M23 launched a separate offensive in north-central Masisi district in North Kivu. M23 has captured several villages in the Bashali chiefdom in north-central Masisi, roughly 15 miles southeast of Pinga since early September.[xv] Wazalendo fighters and hundreds of civilians in Bashali have fled toward Pinga from Lukweti village, which sits on a local road 25 miles south of Pinga and 10 miles north of Nyabiondo.[xvi]

The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters launched counteroffensives east and southeast of Pinga in northern Masisi district. The FARDC has conducted several bombing runs on M23 positions in Bashali chiefdom since September 19, and Wazalendo fighters recaptured at least one village north of Nyabiondo.[xvii] Pro-Congolese fighters recaptured two villages on the RP1030, including Katobi, on September 15, before repelling at least two M23 attempts to retake Katobi on September 20 and 22.[xviii] Katobi is the last significant village east of Pinga on the RP1030, which is the primary supply and transit corridor in northern Masisi. The FARDC has reportedly used artillery and airstrikes to target M23 positions near Katobi and Mpeti—an M23 forward operating base about one mile east from Katobi—to thwart M23’s counterattacks.[xix]

Figure 4. M23 Advances Westward Toward DRC Interior

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The FARDC may be seeking to prevent M23 from encircling Pinga, which is an operationally significant town and gateway to the DRC interior. M23 is setting conditions to attack Pinga on three potential axes. The group’s offensive in the Bashali chiefdom and potential capture of Lukweti threatens to open a line of advance to move troops from Nyabiondo and Masisi town to attack Pinga from the south. M23 has reinforced its positions east of Pinga on the RP1030 using its supply points in Kalembe and Kitchanga, although the FARDC’s counteroffensive is a significant obstacle. M23 has also opened another potential axis north of Pinga by moving troops north of the RP1030 to the Ikobo group in Walikale, which is connected to Pinga by a forested route, on multiple occasions in September.[xx]

Pinga is a key town due to its vital infrastructure and location as a potential launching pad for future M23 offensives into the DRC interior. Pinga hosts an airstrip, an army base, and a hospital.[xxi] This infrastructure makes the town a favorable staging ground for M23 expansion deeper into mineral-rich Walikale territory or Maniema and Tshopo provinces. Holding Pinga would mark a notable expansion in M23’s areas of control given the town’s history as a contested stronghold.[xxii]

The uptick in hostilities effectively ends the fragile ceasefire between the DRC and M23 and risks derailing already-stalled DRC and M23 peace talks. M23’s offensive actions violate the Qatari-brokered ceasefire, which the Congolese government and M23 signed as part of a preliminary peace agreement in July.[xxiii] The ceasefire provision prohibited new attacks or attempts to conquer new territory and committed both sides to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict” in the eastern DRC.[xxiv] Both sides meanwhile have continued to reinforce their positions in North and South Kivu, going against the spirit of the late July peace agreement.[xxv] The Congolese government has also failed to uphold its commitments under the separate DRC-Rwanda agreement to control and cease support for the aligned Wazalendo militias, which CTP has assessed repeatedly threatens the peace process due to continued fighting between and M23 and the militias.[xxvi]

The breakout in fighting between M23 and Congolese troops—the most intense in months—signals the breakdown of the ceasefire. Both sides have accused each other of violating the ceasefire on multiple occasions in recent weeks and voiced their determination to resume hostilities in response.[xxvii] M23 declared itself as in a position of “self-defense” and said it would “eliminate any threat at its source” after an FARDC bombing run on Bashali on September 19.[xxviii] A high-level Congolese official told Reuters that the FARDC is compelled to take action to counter M23, given M23’s frequently stated aims to overthrow the government.[xxix] The FARDC accused M23 of violating the ceasefire repeatedly and killing civilians in several attacks in Walikale district, among others across the Kivus, on September 19.[xxx] The FARDC said it would report these violations to the US- and-Qatari-led processes, called on captured FARDC soldiers to take up arms against M23, and reiterated its position that it would “reserve the right to respond” to M23 with force.[xxxi]

Heightened tensions on the battlefield would almost certainly complicate peace talks. Prisoner exchange between the Congolese government and M23, the main obstacle advancing talks toward a full peace agreement, has reportedly made slow progress, despite the signing of technical—and still yet to be implemented—agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross.[xxxii] The Congolese government has continued to refuse a blanket release of M23’s more than 700 requested prisoners, and the Congolese justice minister said in mid-September that the DRC would refuse to release M23 prisoners accused of “serious crimes.”[xxxiii] Delegations from both sides reportedly left Doha, the Qatari capital, after a fifth round of talks without a breakthrough last week.[xxxiv]

Turkey

Author: Liam Karr

Turkey reportedly plans to send soldiers to Niger to train and advise Nigerien forces. The United Kingdom–based, pro-Turkish outlet Middle East Eye reported that “at least four battalions will provide training and advisory support in Niger” in the counterterrorism fight, although they would not participate in direct combat.[xxxv] A Turkish source told Middle East Eye that most of the soldiers would be veterans of Turkish deployments to Iraq and Syria, where a détente with the Kurdish factions in both countries has freed bandwidth for Turkey to redeploy some of its forces.

Turkey views Niger as a strategic partner and likely aims to make Niger its hub for engagement in West Africa. Turkey has labeled Niger as a “strategic investment” and “strategic partner,” which is reflected in the depth and breadth of its engagement in the country.[xxxvi] Turkey sent six TB-2 Bayraktar drones, two Hürkuş-C close air support training aircraft, and armored vehicles to Niger between 2021 and 2022.[xxxvii] The UK-based human rights watchdog Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) claimed in May 2024 that the Sadat International Defense Consultancy had deployed over 1,000 Turkish-recruited, Turkish-trained, salaried Syrian mercenaries to Niger.[xxxviii] CTP cannot verify this claim. Turkish and Nigerien officials discussed greater military training and energy and mining cooperation during multiple high-level meetings in 2024.[xxxix] Turkey and Niger then signed a military financial cooperation agreement in July 2025, which will help Niger acquire Turkish drones and other weapons and enables the deployment of Turkish forces for training and technical support.[xl]

The deployment of Turkish regular forces to Niger is a first for Turkey in the region and further solidifies Niger as a focal point of Turkish engagement in the region, much like Somalia in East Africa. Turkish defense engagement in Somalia has significantly grown over the past decade despite not initially being a major focus, much like Niger and the wider Sahel. Turkey established its first overseas military base in Somalia in 2017, which currently hosts roughly 800 Turkish trainers supporting Somali forces in their fight against al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[xli] Turkey has used its defense ties in Somalia to strengthen cooperation in other sectors, including infrastructure and energy.[xlii]

Turkey’s growing position in Niger is part of its increasingly prominent role in West Africa, as French influence wanes and African countries seek to diversify their partners. Turkey has been active in West Africa for decades and has sought to strengthen its position since the 2010s.[xliii] Turkey pursued various avenues of influence across Africa as part of this effort, including greater trade ties and significant investments into infrastructure, mining, and textiles.[xliv] Turkish officials have also framed Turkey’s shared Muslim identity and historical links with Africa dating back to the Ottoman era as a shared foundation upon which to strengthen Turkish influence. A Turkish intelligence report specifically highlighted Niger as important to revitalizing the Ottoman Empire’s historical influence in the Sahel.[xlv] Several Turkish investments projects have focused on religious sites, and Turkey has also pursued other soft power efforts within a religious framing, such as education and humanitarian work.[xlvi]

Turkey has capitalized on the erosion of French influence in West Africa to strengthen its partnerships in recent years. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials regularly accused France of pursuing neocolonial policies in Africa and positioned Turkey as an alternative partner and supporter of African-led multilateral initiatives throughout the 2010s.[xlvii] Anti-French backlash has caused France to withdraw its military forces and weakened French economic influence across the region since 2022. Turkey has capitalized on this position to fill the void that France has left, particularly in defense and mining.[xlviii]

Turkey has particularly strengthened defense ties in francophone West Africa to fill the void left by France. Turkish advisers and trainers are now present across several West African countries. Numerous reports in early February reported that Chad planned to host Turkish drones and Turkish technicians at an air base in north-central Chad, which French forces had withdrawn from after Chad annulled its defense agreements with France in late 2024. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has killed Turkish trainers in northern Togo, where the trainers instruct Togolese forces, help clear mines, and pilot helicopters to improve border security.[xlix] Turkey sought to expand preexisting training efforts in Mali and Niger in 2024 that had been in place for several years.[l]

Turkey is a leading provider of drones in West Africa. Turkish drone diplomacy has built on preexisting defense ties in places such as Nigeria and created defense ties that Turkey has expanded on in francophone West Africa.[li] Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Togo all use various Turkish drones in their counterterrorism operations.[lii] Turkish drones have an optimal price-to-performance ratio for many African countries, as they are more affordable than similar Western models but perform better than cheaper Chinese or Iranian drones.[liii]

Turkey reportedly sent more than a thousand Syrian mercenaries to Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024.[liv] SOHR reported in January 2024 that an initial batch of 300 Turkish-recruited, Turkish-trained, salaried Syrian mercenaries from the Sadat International Defense Consultancy deployed in Burkina Faso and Niger in December 2023.[lv] The BBC and France 24 confirmed the existence of these Syrian recruits and interviewed some anonymously in early 2024.[lvi] The mercenaries are reportedly primarily responsible for protecting crucial economic sites where the Turkish government has a shared stake, such as mines.[lvii] Sadat is a Turkish private military company run by a former intelligence officer with close ties to Erdoğan.[lviii]

Turkey uses its defense partnerships in Africa to support its broader strategic goal of strengthening Turkey’s position as an alternative partner to the West, China, and Russia. Turkey has situated itself to help address the West’s concerns with migration, terrorism, and Russian influence in the Sahel, which Europe and the wider NATO coalition view as part of its southern flank.[lix] Turkey has similarly positioned itself as a critical counterterrorism partner in Somalia and is poised to play a greater role in Red Sea maritime security with its strong ties with the Somali and Sudanese governments.[lx] Turkey’s role as a major player in these theaters elevate its global perception and usefulness as a partner and gives it greater leverage with China, Russia, and the West.

Turkey’s partnerships in Africa have also helped Erdoğan consolidate power domestically. Erdoğan has used his partnerships in Africa to crack down on domestic opposition abroad. Erdoğan blamed exiled Turkish Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen for the failed 2016 coup attempt.[lxi] Erdoğan has since pressured African partners to shut down Gülenist schools or replace them with schools run by a Turkish government–approved organization.[lxii]

Erdoğan has used trade ties with Africa to bolster the Turkish economy and create patronage opportunities for loyal businesses and allies. Turkey has exponentially increased its trade with West Africa over the last decade, bolstering the Turkish economy, which is dependent on foreign trade.[lxiii] The Turkish government has facilitated investment in Africa through tax exemptions, credit, and other incentives, with preferential treatment given to businesses loyal to Erdoğan’s party.[lxiv] Turkish defense sales and mercenary deployments also directly support close Erdoğan allies, including his son-in-law, who runs the Bakar Defense drone company, and another close associate who runs Sadat.[lxv]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The RSF advanced in el Fasher from the north and south on September 18, contesting Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-aligned forces’ control of key infrastructure and neighborhoods. The RSF captured part of the SAF-aligned Joint Forces headquarters, which is housed at the former United Nations—African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), advancing from the north.[lxvi] SAF-aligned forces launched a counterattack to push them out of the base, but the RSF is likely still present in the immediate vicinity of the base, although CTP cannot verify current RSF positions.[lxvii] Capturing the base would give the RSF control over northwest el Fasher, as Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab reported that the RSF likely controls Abu Shouk refugee camp based on satellite imagery showing RSF vehicles stationed in the camp.[lxviii] The UNAMID base is located less than two miles north of el Fasher Airport and three miles west of the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division headquarters, which are the main remaining pro-SAF bases in the city.

The RSF also captured the al Qiyada Girl’s School in central el Fasher, advancing from the south.[lxix] The school is in the neighborhood immediately east of el Fasher Airport and a mile southwest of the 6th Infantry headquarters. The RSF has reportedly engaged SAF-aligned units on a main road further north since taking the school.[lxx] Control of the road would enable the RSF to advance toward both the airport and headquarters, which are connected to the main road via side access roads.

Figure 5. RSF Offensive on El Fasher

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps, Suriyak, Thomas Van Linge.

CTP has previously assessed that the RSF aims to capture el Fasher imminently to strengthen its position in Sudan-related discussions at the now-ongoing UN General Assembly and US-backed peace talks in late September.[lxxi] The RSF has tried to do so by conducting frequent and indiscriminate artillery and drone strikes to weaken SAF-aligned forces’ positions.[lxxii] The group then carries out ground operations to break SAF defensive lines. The RSF is deploying electronic jamming and other antiaircraft tools to counter SAF air capabilities.[lxxiii] This process has allowed the RSF to gradually advance from the east, north, and south to tighten the siege. The city’s Coordination of Resistance Committees—a coalition of civil society groups—stated on September 21 that the RSF will overwhelm defenses without an “immediate” operation from SAF-aligned forces to break the siege.[lxxiv]

The RSF’s campaign has indiscriminately targeted civilians. The RSF reportedly displaced residents of a village north of el Fasher to establish a logistic outpost on September 15.[lxxv] The RSF has killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure, particularly in the Abu Shouk area. The RSF reportedly razed the camp’s only functional market on September 16.[lxxvi] The RSF conducted a drone strike on a mosque in the adjacent al Daraja Awla neighborhood on September 20, killing at least 70 civilians.[lxxvii] The group conducted another drone strike in the neighborhood on September 21, killing the secretary general of the local government.[lxxviii] The RSF also reportedly struck the Saudi hospital and a market on September 23, killing and injuring several civilians.[lxxix]

The continued destruction of infrastructure and displacement of civilians is worsening the city’s already dire humanitarian situation. The UN’s top humanitarian official in Sudan recently said that the RSF is refusing to allow humanitarian aid into el Fasher.[lxxx] The RSF has prevented adequate aid from entering as part of its siege, which has led to famine conditions since August 2024 due to extreme shortages of food and clean water.[lxxxi] UNICEF reports that half of the estimated 260,000 civilians left trapped in el Fasher are children.[lxxxii] 6,000 children are facing severe acute malnutrition, and over 200 children died from malnutrition from January to June 2025.[lxxxiii] Moreover, 40 percent of children under five are suffering from acute malnutrition.[lxxxiv]

The RSF’s capture of el Fasher would give the group control over all population centers in Darfur region, consolidating a de facto partition in Sudan. The RSF established the Government of Peace and Unity in April 2025, swearing in RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) as the head in Nyala—the capital of South Darfur state—in August.[lxxxv] The parallel government has appointed a prime minister and cabinet officials to govern RSF territory.[lxxxvi] Reports indicate that the parallel government is assuming responsibilities such as establishing a bank, which is a priority due to an ongoing liquidity crisis.[lxxxvii] RSF governance over almost all of the Darfur region would strengthen the group’s position in potential peace talks and complicate any efforts to unify Sudan.

Figure 6. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps.

The RSF will likely commit further crimes against humanity, including ethnic violence that may constitute genocide, if it takes el Fasher. International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes against civilians that violate human dignity, including murder, extermination, forcible deportation, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, disappearance, and apartheid.[lxxxviii] The International Criminal Court (ICC) deputy prosecutor said on July 10 that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been and are continuing to be committed in Darfur.”[lxxxix] Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, but the UN Security Council previously referred investigations into the Darfur genocide committed by the Janjaweed—the Darfur-based rebel groups that became the RSF—to the ICC.[xc]

The RSF has repeatedly violated international humanitarian law during the siege of el Fasher and other offensives in Darfur region, including through likely acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide. A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”[xci] Acts of ethnic cleansing may amount to constituent acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”[xcii]

The RSF’s campaign against the non-Arab Massalit ethnic group in al Geneina, West Darfur state from April to November 2023 likely included acts of ethnic cleansing, which may amount to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide.[xciii] The campaign against the Massalit killed thousands, with upper estimates by the UN reaching 15,000 killed.[xciv] The United States declared in January 2025 that the RSF had committed genocide against the Massalit.[xcv]

The RSF has targeted non-Arab communities around el Fasher using summary executions and gender-based sexual violence, according to a recent UN Human Rights Council report.[xcvi] The Guardian published a report detailing RSF targeting of Zaghawa and other non-Arab civilians during the group’s assault on Zamzam refugee camp—located about 10 miles south of el Fasher—in April 2025.[xcvii] The RSF reportedly killed over 1,500 civilians, including women and children, and committed widespread crimes such as rape and destruction of medical facilities.[xcviii]

Figure 7. RSF Atrocities in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr.

The UN and other international observers have warned repeatedly that the RSF could perpetrate a genocide if it captures el Fasher.[xcix] The RSF has demonstrated a pattern of genocidal violence throughout its history stretching back to the Janjaweed’s Darfur genocide in the 2000s up to al Geneina in 2023.[c] CTP continues to assess that this pattern serves as a template for what will likely happen if the RSF captures el Fasher.[ci]

Burkina Faso

Author: Miles Charles

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has escalated the rate of its attacks in eastern Burkina Faso throughout 2025. The group has attacked security forces in eastern Burkina Faso at more than double the rate in 2025 compared to 2024 and has already set an all-time high in attacks across the Est and Centre-Est regions.[cii] JNIM has notably increased its activity in the Gourma and Koulpelgo provinces, attacking nearly twice as many times through the third quarter of 2025 than in the entirety of 2024.[ciii]

Figure 8. JNIM Escalates Attacks on Security Forces in Eastern Burkina Faso, 2024–25

Source: Miles Charles; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

JNIM likely seeks to strengthen and expand its support zones by restricting military and economic activity along the major roads in the region. All of JNIM’s attacks in the Gourma and Koulpelgo provinces have occurred within 12 miles of the N4, N16, N17, and N18 highways. The group is on pace to double the number of attacks against forward operating bases and patrol forces along these roads in 2025 compared to 2024.[civ] These attacks restrict the freedom of movement of security forces along these key roads and increase the cost of contesting JNIM, enabling it to strengthen and expand its support zones.

Figure 9. JNIM Escalates Attacks Across Eastern Burkina Faso

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The four roadways are key trade and smuggling arteries connecting the littoral countries—Togo and Benin—and the landlocked Sahel countries—Burkina Faso and Niger.[cv] The roads anchor the Cotonou–Fada N’Gourma–Niamey and Lomé–Ouagadougou–Niamey corridors, responsible for 40 and nearly 20 percent of Burkina Faso’s and Niger’s import volume, respectively. The highways are also part of the Trans-Sahelian Highway, which connects the capitals of Senegal, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger.[cvi] The importance of these corridors grew following the closure of the Niger–Benin trade corridor, which handled half of Niger’s trade.[cvii]

JNIM also exploits smuggling networks along these roadways. JNIM has taxed independent smugglers along these roads since 2021 and simultaneously used them to smuggle stolen gold and livestock to Burkina Faso, Benin, and Togo.[cviii] JNIM reportedly makes $42,000 to $50,500 a month from cattle rustling in northeastern Burkina Faso, although there are no concrete figures for areas near the Benin and Togo border.[cix]

Control of these key corridors supports JNIM’s efforts to isolate and coerce urban centers in eastern Burkina Faso, replicating the siege strategy it uses across the Sahel. The group has targeted Fada N’Gourma, the largest town and a key counterterrorism hub in eastern Burkina Faso, at record levels in 2025. JNIM laid the conditions to besiege Fada N’Gourma in 2024 and has since targeted the regional capital in over half of its in Gourma province in 2025.[cx] JNIM has employed various siege tactics, such as destroying surrounding critical infrastructure and targeting supply trucks in the surrounding area.[cxi] Cutting off Fada N’Gourma would inflict a symbolic blow to the junta and weaken counterterrorism efforts in eastern Burkina Faso, further isolating the region. The group’s broader siege campaign threatens to degrade popular support for the junta and its legitimacy in targeted areas as more frequent attacks affect citizens’ livelihoods. Sieges elsewhere have led to food shortages and rampant inflation.[cxii]

Figure 10. JNIM Increasingly Targets Fada N’Gourma, 2023–25

Source: Miles Charles; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

JNIM may use strengthened support zones in eastern Burkina Faso along its southern border to better support its activity in the littorals. JNIM has used eastern Burkina Faso as a staging ground to expand into Benin since 2021.[cxiii] The United Nations reported in July 2024 that JNIM cells in Burkina Faso conduct most of the group’s attacks in Benin and aim to establish support zones over resource and logistic corridors that are essential for expansion.[cxiv] JNIM has increasingly integrated itself into the local economy and illicit networks in northern Benin as it expands, strengthening its support zones.[cxv] CTP similarly assessed in 2024 that JNIM militants had used support zones in Burkina Faso to strengthen cross-border activity in Togo, although the group’s activity in Togo has remained at a lower level than in Benin.[cxvi]

JNIM could operationalize these cross-border rear support zones to push further south into Benin and Togo. The United Nations reported that JNIM appointed its first littoral emir to Benin in 2024, and the group is since on pace to set an all-time high in attacks and fatalities in 2025.[cxvii] CTP assessed in 2025 that JNIM had likely operationalized rear support zones in northwestern Nigeria to open a second front in Benin.[cxviii] JNIM activity in Togo has remained on a lower level but strengthened support zones could enable JNIM to conduct more frequent and severe attacks. JNIM already used these support zones to increase its activity in Benin and Togo in response to heightened counterinsurgency activity in 2022.[cxix]

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