Africa File, June 5, 2025: JNIM Offensive Across the Sahel; IS Somalia Down but Not Out; IS Central Africa Targets Uganda; IS Mozambique Threatens US and Western LNG Projects

Data Cutoff: June 5, 2025, at 10 a.m.

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The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Sahel. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate—Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)—has intensified its attacks across the Sahel, leading to one of the deadliest-ever 30-day periods for Sahelian security forces and allied militias. This insecurity increases the risk of coups and local leaders negotiating with JNIM to secure their communities.
• Somalia. The autonomous Puntland government has conducted an offensive with United States and Emirati backing against IS Somalia Province (ISS) in northern Somalia and degraded the group. ISS will likely reconstitute without sustained pressure on its support zones and financial networks, however.
• Uganda. IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) attempted its first suicide bombing in Uganda since December 2023, indicating that the group has reconstituted some of its attack capabilities there. ISCAP is likely responding to the increased pressure that it is facing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
• Mozambique. IS Mozambique Province intensified its attacks targeting Mozambican and Rwandan security forces in Cabo Delgado Province in the deadliest month for security forces in Mozambique in years. These attacks could complicate efforts to resume US-backed natural gas projects and, in turn, risk exacerbating the lack of socio-economic opportunity in the area, which fuels the insurgency.

Assessments

Sahel

Author: Liam Karr.

Jamaat Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has intensified the rate and scale of attacks against government-controlled population centers across the Sahel, particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali, since the beginning of May. JNIM has conducted 10 “large-scale” attacks against Sahelian security forces or allied militias that killed at least 20 civilians, militia fighters, or soldiers since May 11.[1] The offensive initially focused on Burkina Faso but shifted to Mali in June. Four of the five attacks in Burkina Faso occurred in May, and three of the four attacks in Mali occurred since June 1. Over half of these attacks have killed at least 50 people, and two attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali each killed over 100.[2] The offensive has produced one of the deadliest-ever 30-day periods in the Sahel and made May the deadliest month in the Sahel since August 2024.

Figure 1. JNIM Escalates Large-Scale Attacks Across the Sahel

Source: Liam Karr.

Figures 2 and 3. Number of Fatalities Caused by Large-Scale JNIM Attacks Against Security Forces and Militias in the Sahel

Note: June data as of June 5. Included attacks are JNIM-initiated engagements against state security forces or allied militias that resulted in at least 20 soldier, militia, and civilian deaths.

Source: Liam Karr; Critical Threats Project; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data

JNIM has targeted administrative and population centers, particularly in Burkina Faso, continuing a trend that has emerged throughout 2025. JNIM spokesperson and high-ranking Katiba Macina leader Mahmoud Barry threatened in November 2024 that JNIM would “get you in the big cities.”[3] JNIM has since increased its rate of attacks on commune centers across Burkina Faso in 2025 by nearly 33 percent compared to 2024, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).[4] Over half of the large-scale JNIM attacks since May 11 have targeted commune centers, compared with just 30 percent of attacks in its previous surge in the summer 2024 offensive.[5] All five of JNIM’s large-scale attacks against Burkinabe forces in the current offensive targeted commune heads.

Figure 4. JNIM Increases Pressure on Administrative Centers in Burkina Faso

Note: Fatalities include civilian, militant, and soldier fatalities from JNIM-initiated engagements (attacks). Included attacks targeted commune capitals (the most basic unit of local governance in Burkina Faso, provincial capitals, and regional capitals.

Source: Liam Karr; Critical Threats Project; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

These attacks have become much larger and more lethal. JNIM attacks on commune centers in Burkina Faso are on pace to result in nearly as many fatalities in 2025 as in 2023 and 2024 combined, per ACLED figures.[6] In particular, attacks on provincial capitals in 2025 are on pace to more than double the number of fatalities from 2023 and 2024 combined.[7] Fatality figures highlight the growing scale of JNIM’s attacks, even if these figures are approximate and include militant casualties. The shifting focus to commune and provincial centers indicates an effort to increase pressure on these politically sensitive and “harder” targets.

The attacks have highlighted security gaps between Burkina Faso and Mali along their shared border. JNIM has concentrated most of these deadly attacks near the Burkina Faso-Mali border. Multiple JNIM subgroups have allegedly cooperated in these attacks, which would likely involve JNIM militants moving across the border.[8] Parts of the border lie near the area of operations overlap between Ansaroul Islam and Katiba Macina. The former operates in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, while Katiba Macina operates in northern and western Burkina Faso and central, southern, and western Mali.[9] Tuareg fighters allegedly participated in some attacks near the border, likely indicating the involvement of fighters from JNIM subgroup Ansar al Din, which is based in northern Mali.[10]

Government-backed ceasefires in central Mali may have freed JNIM subgroups in the area to reallocate resources to support the offensive in Burkina Faso. Multiple sources claimed that the Malian government encouraged a series of ceasefires between local leaders and Katiba Macina in central Mali earlier in 2025, which led the group to lift blockades of Malian towns and freed resources to direct across the border into Burkina Faso.[11] These developments have likely contributed to a decrease in JNIM attacks and Malian counterterrorism activity on the Malian side of the border in the Mopti region, while attacks and counterterrorism activity have increased in Burkina Faso.[12] 

The offensive has exposed the limits of the Sahelian juntas’ air support, as capacity limits and JNIM tactical adaptations enabled JNIM militants to remain in seized towns for several hours without facing air or drone strikes.[13] JNIM published video footage from the May 11 attack on Djibo that showed militants used stolen 14.5-mm anti-aircraft guns to force Burkinabe air support to retreat from the area.[14] France 24 journalist Wassim Nasr reported that the Malian junta faces a missile shortage that has created additional air gaps due to financial issues.[15]

The offensive will likely increase the risk of coups and local negotiations with JNIM by further undermining the legitimacy of the juntas among the local populations and militaries. An increase in attacks on more politically sensitive population centers highlights that the state cannot protect the population, which leads local leaders to negotiate with JNIM to protect their communities. JNIM has besieged population centers across the Sahel to attain these local agreements over the last several years.[16] The siege campaign similarly aims to highlight the government’s inability to provide security outside of the town and protect the local economy in order to delegitimize the government. The campaign has led communities to accept agreements with JNIM that range from noncooperation with state personnel to shadow governance and forms of shari’a law, without JNIM having to capture or administer the towns directly.[17] The increase in major attacks on administrative and population centers, many of which are already under siege, indicates that JNIM is increasing pressure on areas still holding out.

Figure 5. Salafi-Jihadi Sieges Across the Sahel

Source: Liam Karr; Amnesty International; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The high casualties suffered in these attacks degrade the morale of the armies and have spurred coups in the past. High-casualty and heavily publicized JNIM attacks in November 2021, September 2022, and June 2024 directly contributed to coup attempts in Burkina Faso in the subsequent weeks and months.[18] The Burkinabe junta already claimed to thwart a coup attempt in April.[19] Mali’s junta has been much more stable, and the latest offensive has not hit Mali as hard, but high-casualty attacks still undermine the junta’s narrative that it has improved security as promised since it took power in 2021.

The JNIM offensive will likely exacerbate an escalating cycle of ethnically based retaliatory violence against civilians that involves both JNIM and state security forces. Violence against civilians has grown exponentially in recent years, with the rise of the Sahelian military juntas and their new Russian partners enforcing brutal counterterrorism strategies premised on indiscriminate violence and collective punishment that eliminates any potential resistance. Insurgent attacks across the Sahel have led state forces and pro-government militias to regularly conduct large-scale retaliatory, collective punishment massacres of civilians suspected of working with insurgents, which is a war crime.[20] These massacres have predominantly targeted marginalized ethnic groups with links to insurgent groups, such as the Fulani (Peul) ethnic group in Burkina Faso and Mali and Tuareg communities in northern Mali.[21] These tactics have been ineffective because the massacres allow JNIM to pose as avengers and protectors for targeted communities and fuel JNIM recruitment.[22]

Figures 6 and 7. Burkinabe and Malian State Forces Attacks on Civilians 2022–25

Note: Attacks include all events with Burkinabe and Malian security forces as the primary or auxiliary actors.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Burkina Faso and Mali have responded to the deteriorating security situation by partnering with civilian militias and Russian auxiliaries, all of which have further inflamed ethnically based violence against civilians. Malian forces have worked with ethnic self-defense militias since before the junta took power, but the junta brought thousands of Russian soldiers—formerly under Wagner Group, now under the Russian Ministry of Defense Africa Corps—to augment its forces.[23] The Burkinabe junta has mobilized tens-of-thousands of militia fighters from pre-existing self-defense militias under a formal auxiliary group called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP).[24] Russian soldiers have conducted numerous massacres and war crimes against civilians—often based on ethnic profiling—in line with Russia’s brutal counterinsurgency doctrine.[25] Sahelian militias have demonstrated a consistent pattern of ethnically motivated violence, and in Burkina Faso, the VDP are increasingly participating in violence against civilians.[26]

Figure 8. VDP Attacks on Civilians, 2022–25

Note: Attacks include all events with VDP as the primary or auxiliary actor.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

JNIM has retaliated with its own large-scale massacres against communities believed to be collaborating with government forces and forming pro-government militias, perpetuating this escalatory cycle. JNIM killed at least 133 people in a Burkinabe village in August 2024 after security forces forced the civilians to dig a trench around the town.[27] JNIM labeled all the killed as members of the “Burkinabe military and affiliated militias.” JNIM massacred 100 civilians in a rural commune in western Burkina Faso in April after residents signed up as VDP fighters.[28]

Somalia

Author: Kathryn Tyson.

Officials in Puntland—an autonomous region in northern Somalia—said on May 31 that the Islamic State Somalia (ISS) is “collapsing” in Puntland. The Puntland Defence Forces (PDF) said that it captured the last ISS camp in the Cal Miskaad Mountains, where ISS has its primary support zones.[29] Somali state media reported that the “final phase” of the PDF operations “ended in a decisive victory, signaling the collapse of [ISS] in northeastern Somalia.”[30] The president of Puntland previously announced in late April 2025 that the offensive was near the end of its final phase.[31]

The Puntland government initiated the counter-ISS offensive in December 2024 with support from the United Arab Emirates and the United States after warnings from US officials that ISS posed a growing transnational threat.[32] ISS directly supports external IS attack plots due to its role as an administrative, foreign fighter, and leadership hub. Unspecified US officials said in 2024 that ISS leader Abdulqadir Mumin serves as the Islamic State’s "global leader.”[33] ISS hosts the regional East Africa IS office, al Karrar.[34] Al Karrar disperses funds and trainers around the world from Somalia, including IS affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Yemen.[35]

Figure 9. The Islamic State Somalia Province’s Global Financing Network

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The Puntland government and its international partners have degraded ISS support zones and leadership networks in the Cal Miskaad mountains. The PDF has cleared swaths of territory from ISS and destroyed numerous ISS training areas, weapons manufacturing facilities, and a court to adjudicate internal issues since December.[36] The PDF has seized ISS weapons, including armed commercial quadcopter drones, and destroyed wells and food supplies.[37] US Africa Command has conducted at least 19 airstrikes targeting ISS since February 2025 that have killed dozens of ISS fighters, including a high-ranking leader involved in ISS recruitment, financing, and external operations plotting against the United States and Europe.[38]

The Puntland government has worked to disrupt ISS’s financial and recruiting networks. Puntland media reported in February that the Puntland government seized money in dozens of ISS-linked accounts and shut down the accounts.[39] ISS generates hundreds of thousands of US dollars per month for regional IS financing efforts through racketeering networks in Bossaso, Puntland’s port capital.[40]

Figure 10. Islamic State Somalia Area of Operations in Northern Somalia: January–June 2025

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

ISS likely remains intact, albeit significantly degraded. ISS has leveraged the ungoverned and difficult terrain of the Cal Miskaad mountains to retreat and regroup across the mountain chain. Puntland security forces regularly document ISS fighters retreating into the mountains before counterterrorism forces arrive.[41] The PDF also documented ISS fighters wearing civilian clothes to blend in with nomadic communities.[42] ISS maintains the ability to conduct attacks despite the offensive degrading the group’s capacity—ISS carried out 20 attacks in January and February, compared with eight attacks in March and April.[43] ISS still continued to attack PDF and contest PDF gains in May. An ISS suicide bomber detonated an unspecified explosive before ISS fighters engaged the PDF in an armed clash in Dasaan, Cal Miskaad Mountains, on May 2.[44]

ISS will likely be able to reconstitute without sustained pressure on the group’s financial networks and support zones. The Puntland government “banned” the illegal entry of foreigners in January 2025, presumably to counter the influx of foreign fighters to the group.[45] Puntland security forces launched a crackdown on undocumented immigrants in Bossaso to curb ISS recruitment.[46] Puntland has set some conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s support zones in the mountains through cooperation with local civilians against the group.[47]

Puntland forces do not have the capacity to secure its porous coastline and rugged mountain terrain, however. Somali pirates have posed a varying threat to maritime security in the region for decades, and there are well-established transnational human and weapons smuggling routes that pass from the Puntland coast through the mountains to southern Somalia.[48] Yemeni Houthis have used these routes to transfer small arms to Somalia.[49] The Puntland government has not publicly provided a plan to keep troops in the Cal Miskaad mountains once the offensive is complete.

Figure 11. Somalia-Yemen Arms Smuggling Network in the Gulf of Aden

Source: Liam Karr; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Uganda

Author: Yale Ford

IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) attempted its first suicide bombing attack in Uganda since December 2023, indicating that the group has reconstituted attack capabilities inside Uganda. Two suspected ISCAP militants attempted to target a religious site in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, in a suicide bombing on June 3.^[50] Ugandan army intelligence claimed to have foiled the unclaimed attack.^[51] Ugandan authorities previously arrested one of the bombers for alleged ties to ISCAP on several occasions since late 2021.^[52]

The attack in Kampala signals that ISCAP has reconstituted attack capabilities inside Uganda. ISCAP, which is locally known by its pre-IS name—the Allied Democratic Forces—has been able to perpetrate previous suicide attacks in Uganda by using an established network of operational cells inside Uganda.^[53] Ugandan authorities have targeted these networks in recent years and sought to degrade ISCAP’s ability to support cells in Uganda from the eastern DRC.^[54]

ISCAP may be remobilizing its attack networks in Uganda in response to heightened counterinsurgency pressure from Congolese and Ugandan forces in the eastern DRC. ISCAP has conducted attacks in Uganda following successful joint DRC-Uganda counterinsurgency operations against the group in the eastern DRC. The UN reported in December 2024 that security forces intensified operations against ISCAP in the eastern DRC and successfully weakened ISCAP, pushed the group out of its strongholds, and killed several senior ISCAP commanders in the eastern DRC.[55] Security forces launched a bombing campaign on ISCAP positions more recently in Lubero district in North Kivu province in the eastern DRC in late May.^[56]

The UN and Uganda have previously assessed that ISCAP bombing attacks in Uganda are meant to show resilience to both its fighters and Uganda in the face of counterterrorism pressure. The UN previously assessed that attacks in Uganda aim to show that ISCAP still has the capability to conduct sophisticated and lethal operations in Uganda.^[57] The UN assessed that ISCAP likely conducted attacks in Uganda in late 2022 and 2023 to “avenge” casualties from counterinsurgency operations in the eastern DRC and to “embarrass” the Ugandan government who regularly touts its success in degrading ISCAP.^[58] The Ugandan president claimed in October 2023 that ISCAP likely plotted a failed bombing attack in Kampala after security forces conducted airstrikes that killed a significant number of ISCAP militants in the eastern DRC.^[59]

Mozambique

Author: Yale Ford.

IS Mozambique Province (ISMP) increased the rate and severity of attacks on Mozambican and Rwandan forces in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in May. ISMP insurgents attacked security forces six times in northern Mozambique in May, making May its most active month targeting security forces in northern Mozambique in 2025.[60] ISMP claimed that it killed 31 military personnel in May—over double the 15 total casualties ISMP claimed from January through April 2025 and the deadliest month for security forces since at least 2022.[61] ISMP released credible evidence on May 3 that it killed Rwandan troops for the first time since Rwandan forces deployed to Mozambique in mid-2021 and conducted its most lethal attack in 2025 against Mozambican forces on May 9.[62]

Figures 12 and 13. ISMP Attacks on Security Forces in Mozambique

Note: Fatalities include civilian, militant, and soldier fatalities from ISMP-initiated engagements (attacks).

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

ISMP concentrated its attacks on security forces in May along the N380 road. The N380 is a major roadway that connects several districts in Cabo Delgado and allows for the movement of goods and people.[63] The roughly 87-mile section of the N380 between Macomia town and Mocímboa da Praia district towns is heavily militarized with at least eight Rwanda and Mozambican army outposts.[64] ISMP launched attacks on three of these outposts and three attacks against civilians along the N380 in May.[65]

Figure 14. ISMP Activity on the N380 in Cabo Delgado

Source: Yale Ford.

ISMP has likely taken advantage of Rwandan forces’ inaction to increase its activity in Cabo Delgado and launch attacks on security forces on the N380. Rwandan forces have significantly degraded ISMP and helped to stabilize the conflict since 2021.[66] Rwandan forces have decreased engagement with ISMP militants since December 2024, however, despite their strong military presence on the N380.[67] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) recorded only four clashes involving Rwandan forces with ISMP insurgents from December 2024 to May 2025, compared to 21 clashes from August 2024 to November 2024.[68] This decrease is partially explained by the January-March rainy season, when three cyclones hit Cabo Delgado, but Rwandan forces have still not increased their activity since March. ACLED assessed in late April that unfettered ISMP activity near the N380 allows ISMP insurgents to move more freely, attack civilians, and loot villages to replenish basic goods and equipment.[69]

Increased ISMP activity near the N380 contributes to insecurity in Cabo Delgado and could complicate efforts to resume US-backed natural gas projects. The current uptick in violence risks undermining US-supported plans to restart liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects that American and Western investors suspended due to the insurgency. The US-based ExxonMobil and French hydrocarbon company TotalEnergies are both financing LNG projects on the Afungi peninsula in the Rovuma deepwater basin. The ISMP insurgency previously forced Total to declare force majeure on its $20 billion project in April 2021 and shelve plans to restart the project in early 2024.[70] ExxonMobil revised the final investment decision on its site in Afungi—the larger of the two projects by roughly 40 percent in total output per year—in late 2024 from 2025 to 2026 due to the security situation in Cabo Delgado.[71]

The uptick in ISMP activity in May has corresponded loosely with the renewed push to resume construction of the two major LNG sites in Afungi. The US Export-Import Bank unfroze $4.7 billion in loans to fund Total’s project in March 2025.[72] The Total project is expected to support thousands of domestic jobs in the United States.[73] The Total CEO announced in late April that construction for the natural gas project could restart by mid-2025.[74] Total asked the Mozambican government to lift the force majeure freeze in late May to restart construction.[75] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that ExxonMobil redeployed employees to the LNG site for the first time in May and has made “steady progress” on its project in 2025.[76]

Increased construction activity around the natural gas projects in Afungi has likely given ISMP more incentive to increase attacks in Cabo Delgado and attract international attention.[77] The N380 is a vital supply and logistics corridor for both projects as the primary paved route in Cabo Delgado, and security forces’ ability to secure the N380 is crucial to the success of the projects.[78] The ISMP uptick aligns with the end of the rainy season and monsoon weather in March, however, which could also signal that the offensive is tied to seasonal conditions.

Further delays to the natural gas projects risk exacerbating the lack of socioeconomic opportunity in Cabo Delgado. Natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado will bring important economic benefits to the local economy as Mozambique seeks to address the underlying socioeconomic drivers of conflict. Cabo Delgado remains one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique—a driving factor in the initial ISMP insurgency—despite the discovery of an abundance of natural resources.[79] The International Monetary Fund forecasted in 2024 that the Total project could boost the growth of Mozambique’s gross domestic product to 10 percent in 2028.[80] The Mozambican state owns a 15 percent stake in the Total project and a 10 percent stake in the ExxonMobil project.[81] Total estimates that its project would employ 15,000 people and provide job creation programs that would foster substantial local economic growth.[82] Further delays to the projects would reduce the project’s profitability due to other major LNG projects in the United States and in Qatar that are expected to come online by 2030.[83] A slower rollout could compound Mozambique’s public debt crisis and hinder Mozambique’s ability to address the underlying socioeconomic drivers of conflict in Cabo Delgado.[84]