Iran Updates

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                                                                                                                          Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, July 24, 2025

A delay in the snapback deadline is unlikely to shift Iran’s position on domestic uranium enrichment, though additional leverage applied after a delay could cause Iran to shift its position.[viii] Iran and the E3 will meet on July 25 in Istanbul to discuss Iran’s nuclear program and snapback-related sanctions.[ix] Iran may calculate that reaching a deal with the E3 and the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran’s willingness to resolve the nuclear issue. The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps—such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran‘s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile—before the snapback deadline takes effect.[x]

Araghchi emphasized Iran’s commitment to domestic uranium enrichment ahead of the upcoming July 25 E3 meeting.[xi] Araghchi added that the upcoming Iran and E3 meeting is important for European officials to understand that Iran’s position remains “unchanged,” and that enrichment will continue as a “non-negotiable right.[xii] Gharibabadi warned  that continued E3 pressure to reimpose snapback sanctions could push Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[xiii] Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 triggers the snapback sanction mechanism.[xiv]

Gharibabadi announced on July 23 that an IAEA technical team will visit Iran in the coming weeks to discuss a “future engagement framework.”[xv] Gharibabadi stated that the technical team will not be allowed access to damaged nuclear sites.[xvi] Iranian personnel have been unable to access the nuclear sites due to damage caused by the strikes, which makes the question of a technical visit to the sites mostly irrelevant at this time because the IAEA cannot access centrifuge halls or other enrichment facilities that are underground.[xvii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian claimed during his interview with Tucker Carlson on July 7 that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities destroyed much of the equipment and infrastructure, and Iranian personnel cannot easily access the sites.[xviii] Pezeshkian added that Iran must wait to determine whether it can regain access.[xix] IAEA announced on July 4 that it withdrew all inspectors from Iran.[xx] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei previously stated on June 30 that Iran would allow inspectors to remain in-country but could not guarantee their safety following recent strikes on nuclear infrastructure.  The Iranian Parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA,  mandating the suspension of inspections until the IAEA recognizes Iran’s right to enrich uranium.[xxii]

The Syrian transitional government’s continued demand that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) disarm is a double standard that the government has not applied equally to all factions. SDF spokesman Farhad Shahdi told Syrian media on July 23 that the SDF refuses to disarm because it fears attacks from forces affiliated with the government.[xxiii] Shahdi emphasized that the SDF must be integrated as a military bloc, rather than as individuals, which has been a recurring point of contention between both sides.  This would allow the SDF to maintain a Kurdish force to defend Kurds in northeastern Syria, which have come under threat from forces that are now affiliated with the government throughout the civil war.

The SDF’s statement about disarmament and the linkage of disarmament with the recent violence in Suwayda reflects a deeply held fear developed throughout the civil war among Syrian Kurds about the threat they face from forces now affiliated with the government, rather than a recent fear spurred by the recent violence. An unspecified Syrian government official stated in a response to Syrian media on July 24 that the transitional government will not respond to SDF preconditions that contradict state unity, rejected the SDF’s refusal to disarm, and condemned the SDF’s use of violence in Suwayda Province as a justification for refusing to integrate into the Syrian state.[xxv] The implication that the SDF is using the violence in Suwayda as a political tool to retain their weapons, combined with the rejection of SDF concerns, ignores legitimate SDF and Kurdish fears that the government will be unable to control elements in the Syrian security forces that seek to suppress the Kurds.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to continued negotiations, but the Syrian government has continued to emphasize disarmament of the SDF. The emphasis on disarmament is a double standard that the government has not applied to every Syrian faction equally.[xxvi] The SDF and Syrian transitional government signed a framework agreement on March 10 oulining broad principles for the integration of the SDF’s military and civil organizations into the Syrian government and the handover of SDF-controlled sites in northeastern Syria to the government.[xxvii] The Syrian transitional government has repeatedly demanded that the SDF disarm and dissolve its forces prior to integrating into the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD).[xxviii] These demands differ from the transitional government’s willingness to allow certain Syrian armed groups, like elements of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Druze forces led by Laith al Balous, which were re-flagged and integrated as blocs.[xxix]  Some Turkish-backed militias in the SNA are made up of Turkish ethno-nationalists who have committed atrocities against Kurds in northern Syria.[xxx] The government, by its own admission, cannot control all the bad actors within its security forces, some of whom would pose a potentially existential threat to Kurdish forces who disarm.[xxxi]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi actors continue to use sectarian events in Syria to justify the existence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leader Hammam Hamoudi said in an interview with the Australian Ambassador to Iraq on July 24 that the events in Suwayda Province have convinced Iraqis that they must “hold on” to the PMF, referring to the abuses Syrian security forces committed against Druze in southwestern Syria.[xxxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari said on July 23 that Iraqis from the Sunni-majority “western regions” who left to fight in support of the Syrian government must be monitored, presumably by the PMF.[xxxiii]  These statements follow the leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq and an Iranian-affiliated Iraqi politician separately suggesting on July 21 that the violence in Suwayda Province justifies the PMF‘s continued existence.[xxxiv] The PMF was established in 2014 by "institutionalizing” pre-existing and predominantly Shia militias that were engaged in the fight against ISIS, including various Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq.[xxxv] These Shia sectarian actors have remained intensely distrustful of the Syrian transitional government under Ahmed al Shara due to his historic ties to al Qaeda in Iraq, which was the predecessor to ISIS.[xxxvi] Ongoing discussions surrounding the dissolution of the PMF are probably driving some of these Iraqi militia efforts to justify their existence.[xxxvii] 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-US Nuclear Talks: Some Iranian officials are continuing to signal openness to resume nuclear talks with the United States, but Iranian officials have not altered their previous set of conditions.
• SDF-Syrian Government Negotiations: The Syrian transitional government’s continued demand that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) disarm is a double standard that the government has not applied to every Syrian faction equally. The SDF’s recent statement about disarmament and the linkage of disarmament with the recent violence in Suwayda reflects a deeply held fear that Kurds developed during the civil war about the threat they face from forces now affiliated with the government, rather than a recent fear spurred by the recent violence.
• Iraqi Discussions on the PMF: Some Iranian-backed Iraqi actors continue to use sectarian events in Syria to justify the existence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Ongoing discussions surrounding the dissolution of the PMF are probably driving some of these Iraqi militia efforts to justify their existence.

Iran Update, July 23, 2025

Iran Update, July 22, 2025

Iran Update, July 21, 2025

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[i] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come as the E3 has threatened to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it may trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and make “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[ii] The E3 would have to initiate the snapback mechanism by September 3 to complete the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasized on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the United States and stated that Iran has “no plans” to negotiate with the United States.[iv]

Baghaei also announced that Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[v] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia and China would likely not be able to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[vi] Any JCPOA signatory can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[vii] China and Russia could therefore try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the United States, the United Kingdom, or France could veto such a resolution.

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed "expanding military cooperation.”[viii] Iranian media also reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[ix] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[x] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[xi] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future, which underscores the limits of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[xii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may expand strategic relations with other partners, such as China, due to Russia’s limited support for Iran during and after the war.[xiii] 

Pro-government Bedouin groups and Druze militias continued to adhere to the US-brokered ceasefire in Suwayda Province on July 21 as Syrian transitional government forces evacuated over 1,500 Bedouin civilians who were targeted in intercommunal violence since July 13.[xiv] Druze militias have obstructed the implementation of some ceasefire terms, but fighting has not resumed on a large scale.[xv] Suwayda Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Ahmed al Dalati announced on July 21 that Druze militias agreed to allow Suwaydawi civilians to evacuate the province with assistance from the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) until “their safe return to their homes is secured.”[xvi] Dalati also announced that the transitional government established a security cordon around Suwayda Province to stop fighting between Druze and Bedouin militias and maintain the ceasefire agreement.[xvii] The evacuation of civilians from Suwayda is part of the second phase of the July 18 ceasefire agreement, which also mandates the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of basic services to civilians in Suwayda Province.[xviii] Druze militias prevented the delivery of humanitarian aid by the transitional government into Suwayda Province on July 20, however.[xix] The Syrian Communications Ministry also said that Druze militias prevented it from entering Suwayda City to assess the city’s fuel needs and address electricity and communications outages.[xx] The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned Druze militias on July 20 for preventing Syrian Red Crescent aid convoys led by three Syrian ministers from entering Suwayda.[xxi] The Syrian Foreign Ministry said that Druze militias only permitted a small number of Red Crescent vehicles to enter the province.[xxii] Druze militias reportedly did not participate in a prisoner exchange on July 20 in the town of Umm al Zaytoun, which was stipulated in the second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[xxiii]

The transitional government faces major obstacles in restoring rule of law, regaining trust, and healing inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even as the ceasefire holds. The third phase of the ceasefire mandates that internal security personnel will deploy to Suwayda Province and that state institutions in the province will reopen.[xxiv] This phase will be difficult for the government to effectively implement due to the displacement of 93,000 people from Suwayda Province since fighting began, the ongoing documentation of atrocities by all actors, and Bedouin-Druze and intra-Druze conflict.[xxv] Distrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities remains high as more accounts of reciprocal atrocities surface. This inter-communal mistrust is compounded by the Druze community’s distrust of the transitional government after government forces committed abuses against Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16.[xxvi] This distrust challenges the government’s ability to maintain order and restore the rule of law in Suwayda. The Syrian government remains responsible for holding all perpetrators of atrocities accountable, including government forces. The Syrian National Inquiry Commission, which investigated the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast in March, presented its findings to President Ahmed al Shara on July 13.[xxvii] While the details of the Inquiry Commission’s conclusions have yet to be published, whether or how the transitional government holds its forces accountable for abuses committed during the March coastal violence will likely inform future peace processes in Suwayda Province. The Syrian government’s response to the coastal atrocity report could further build or degrade minority trust in Suwayda, depending on how the government responds to the report’s findings. Holding perpetrators of atrocities accountable requires the government to not only investigate the atrocities, but to act on its findings and charge, sentence, and punish perpetrators.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-E3 Talks: The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.
• Syria Ceasefire: The Syrian transitional government faces major obstacles in restoring rule of law, regaining trust, and healing inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even as the ceasefire holds. Distrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities remains high as more accounts of reciprocal atrocities surface. This inter-communal mistrust is compounded by the Druze community’s distrust of the transitional government after government forces committed abuses against Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16. This distrust challenges the government’s ability to maintain order and restore the rule of law in Suwayda.

Iran Update, July 20, 2025

Key Takeaways:

•  Iran-E3 Talks: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media confirmed that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats agreed to discuss Iran’s nuclear program “next week.” The E3 has warned that it may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.

• Iranian Air Defenses: A senior Iranian military commander claimed on July 20 that Iran has replaced air defense systems that Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems, so Iran has likely replaced damaged air defense systems with domestically produced
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Senior Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani discussed the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 20. Larijani’s visit to Russia is notable given reports in January 2025 that Larijani had made frequent visits to Moscow to seek Russian assistance with the Iranian nuclear program and air defense capabilities

Iran Update, July 18, 2025

Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. An unspecified Israeli official reported on July 18 that Israel will “allow” a limited number of Syrian transitional government forces to enter Suwayda for the next 48 hours to restore stability.[i] Syrian transitional government forces withdrew from Suwayda Province on July 17 after Israeli airstrikes conducted "to protect” the Druze inflicted heavy losses on transitional government forces.[ii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 16 that Israel would continue to enforce its demand for a demilitarized Syria south of Damascus.[iii] Bedouin clans across Syria exploited the security vacuum created in the withdrawal of government forces and deployed to Suwayda to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins.[iv] These killings by Druze militias are retaliation for the atrocities committed against the Druze in Suwayda by predominantly Sunni militias over the last week. Fighting between factions and attacks on civilians have intensified across Suwayda Province since the government forces withdrew on July 17.

Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province.[v] It is unclear if Syrian government forces have entered Suwayda at this time. Syrian media reported on July 17 that Syrian government forces are present near Soura al Kabira on the Damascus-Suwayda Highway and have reportedly allowed non-government fighters to pass through government checkpoints to enter Suwayda.[vi] Syrian media reported on July 18 that Syrian General Security Service (GSS) convoys reached the northern countryside of Suwayda but have not advanced beyond the city of Liwa, northeast of Suwayda Province.[vii]  An unspecified security source told Reuters on July 18 that Syrian government forces ”were awaiting a final green light to enter Suwayda.”[viii] Suwaydawi media reported on July 18 that some Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) fighters have removed their uniforms and begun supporting Bedouin fighters.[ix] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these claims. The existence of these claims in the information space, combined with atrocities committed by government forces against the Druze over the last week, will have extremely deleterious effects on the government’s ability to present itself as a neutral security guarantor and restore order in Suwayda Province.

It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window. Government forces initially deployed to Suwayda on June 14 to quell intercommunal violence between Druze and Bedouin communities.[x] Unsanctioned violence and abuses committed by government forces between June 14 and June 16 deepened existing distrust between the government and the Druze.[xi] Violence in Suwayda Province has intensified as Sunni Bedouin fighters have flooded Suwayda in the wake of the government forces’ withdrawal. These tribal fighters have seized large swaths of Suwayda’s territory.  Government forces returning to Suwayda to quell the violence will need to successfully position themselves so that they can adequately protect both Druze and Sunni Bedouin populations in Suwayda before setting up lasting security mechanisms to suppress violence over the long term. This would likely require a ceasefire among the many armed groups involved in the violence, along with a well-disciplined stay-behind force that could protect both the Druze and Sunni Bedouins equally without resorting to the abuses that government forces have been involved in over the last week. A plan that relies on undisciplined government forces or local, communal-based militias is likely to drive additional violence because these forces would continue to conduct retaliatory killings, contribute to a cycle of violence, and fail to protect the local populations.

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy.[xii] The E3 foreign ministers held a teleconference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on July 17 to urge Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid snapback sanctions.[xiii] An unspecified French diplomatic source stated the E3 seeks a “verifiable and lasting” deal and reiterated their readiness to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran fails to produce results by the end of August.[xiv] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the 45–65-day process before the measure expires in October 2025.[xv] A Wall Street Journal reporter noted that the E3 foreign ministers and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas also suggested extending the snapback deadline during the call.[xvi] He added that such an extension would reportedly require agreement from Iran and its UN Security Council allies, Russia and China, to amend the timeline.[xvii] There is no provision in the JCPOA to extend the snapback clause, however.[xviii] It is unclear how the UN Security Council could amend the snapback timeline, given that the JCPOA is a political agreement among its participants and not a legally binding UN treaty.[xix]

Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations. Iran has repeatedly reiterated its unwillingness to concede on its right to enrich, though there is an ongoing debate in Iran over resuming negotiations, and this policy could change. Iranian officials have maintained their position on retaining uranium enrichment capabilities despite pressure from the US and European countries. The delay of snapback sanctions is unlikely to change Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment because a delay does not incentivize Iran to change its position. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran would not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the US guarantees Iran’s right to enrichment.[xx] The recognition of this right is itself a precondition, however. US officials repeatedly rejected the demand and insisted on “zero enrichment.”[xxi] Senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani separately stated on July 17 that “no talks are underway” and argued that Iran should not rush into negotiations, leaving it to Khamenei to decide when to proceed.[xxii]

Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected Iran’s air defense headquarters on July 18 to assess postwar readiness.[xxiii] Mousavi highlighted the need for updated air defense systems, creative tactics, and operational agility to counter “future threats.”[xxiv] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard also presented a report during Mousavi’s visit on recent efforts to strengthen Iran’s air defense capabilities.[xxv] The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using domestically produced systems.[xxvi] Iranian officials may seek to acquire advanced systems from partners like China after domestically produced systems failed.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The E3 urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy. Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations.
• Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using a domestically produced system.
• Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province. It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window.

Iran Update, July 17, 2025

A US media outlet reported on July 17 that US strikes in Iran on June 21 caused significant damage to only one of the three Iranian nuclear facilities that the United States struck.[i] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the strikes caused significant damage to all three facilities and will likely set back Iran's nuclear program.[ii] US airstrikes targeted the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz Enrichment Complex, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).[iii] NBC News reported on July 17 that the US strikes set back uranium enrichment at Fordow by up to two years but stated that "nuclear enrichment [at Natanz and the ENTC] could resume in the next several months," citing former and current US officials familiar with a recent US damage assessment.[iv] A US weapons expert stated on July 17 that Iran does not conduct uranium enrichment at the ENTC.[v]

The strikes destroyed key infrastructure at all three facilities. US strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[vi] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly said in a closed-door briefing that it would take "years to rebuild" this facility, according to a US official authorized to discuss the briefing.[vii] The strikes also struck and sealed tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.[viii] Ratcliffe said that the strikes buried the "vast majority" of enriched uranium at the ENTC and Fordow and that it would be "extremely difficult" for Iran to extract the material.[ix] CTP-ISW previously reported that Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the ENTC or Natanz.[x] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[xi] The IAEA previously reported that US and Israeli strikes also rendered most, if not all, of the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow inoperable.[xii] Three sources told NBC News that US officials knew that some facilities at Natanz were “beyond the reach” of GBU-57 bunker buster bombs.[xiii] The destruction of centrifuges and facilities does not necessarily require bombs to "reach" all infrastructure, however. Grossi previously stated that centrifuges are “delicate” and that even small vibrations can destroy them.[xiv] The United States used two massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs on Natanz, which would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.[xv]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority Law from Parliament on July 17 following US concern over the legislation.[xvi] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law would integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the PMF before the PMF integrates into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[xvii] Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani implied that the United States had contacted several unidentified Iraqi leaders about the Popular Mobilization Authority Law in an interview with Iraqi media on July 14.[xviii] Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi directed the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee to complete all amendments to the law and submit the final version of the law to Mashhadani for a vote during the July 16 parliament session.[xix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.  Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians left the parliament session on July 16 in protest because they claimed that the reading of the law occurred without prior “political consensus” or discussion in relevant committees.[xx]

The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun political bloc implied to Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media on July 17 that US and Israeli pressure caused Sudani to withdraw the legislation.[xxi] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders in recent months.[xxii] Sudani withdrew the law after its first reading in Parliament in March 2025, likely to prevent political deadlock and the removal of Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[xxiii] A previous version of the law would have required around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire. The amended version of the law allows PMF leaders who entered their posts before the law’s passage to maintain their positions.[xxiv]

The Popular Mobilization Authority Law includes several provisions that would likely further Iranian influence in the Iraqi security and political apparatus. The law stipulates that Fayyadh would receive a ministerial rank.[xxv] The United States sanctioned Fayyadh in 2021 for suppressing protests in Iraq in late 2019 with the support of the IRGC Quds Force.[xxvi]  The law would require PMF brigades to only carry out orders from the Iraqi prime minister, as already required under Iraqi law, and refrain from attacking US forces and interests and other unspecified targets outside of Iraq.[xxvii] It remains unclear if PMF units that would merge into the ISF would be reflagged or distributed among existing ISF units. Reflagging units would enable them to largely retain their current command and control structures. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East.[xxviii] The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.

Syrian transitional government forces withdrew from Suwayda Province on July 16 after Israeli airstrikes conducted in support of the Druze inflicted heavy losses on transitional government forces.[xxix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ceased conducting airstrikes targeting Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) members after MoD forces withdrew from Suwayda Province. The IDF conducted over 160 airstrikes across southern Syria between July 15 and 16, including a strike on the Syrian Presidential Palace and multiple strikes on the MoD headquarters in Damascus.[xxx] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 17 that Israel would continue to enforce its demand for a demilitarized Syria south of Damascus. Netanyahu first articulated this demand in February 2025.[xxxi] Israel has enforced this demand inconsistently, such as by permitting MoD and General Security Service (GSS) forces to deploy in Daraa Province in southern Syria on multiple occasions since February 2025.[xxxii]

The withdrawal of government forces has not brought peace to Suwayda Province and has contributed to a security vacuum that risks generating further violence. Government forces initially deployed to Suwayda to quell intercommunal violence between Druze and Bedouin communities that included targeted killings and kidnappings of civilians.[xxxiii] The recent outbreak of violence has deepened the mistrust and poor intercommunal relations that characterize the relationship between the Druze community, Sunni Bedouins, and the government. Likely anti-Damascus Druze factions began to torture and execute Bedouin civilians in several areas of Suwayda on July 17 after government forces withdrew.[xxxiv] Hundreds of Bedouins have fled Suwayda to neighboring Daraa Province.[xxxv]

Bedouin clans across Syria, including in Deir ez Zor, Idlib, and Daraa provinces, began mobilizing to deploy to Suwayda to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins after the transitional government withdrew from the province.[xxxvi] It is unclear at the time of writing how many groups, if any, have successfully deployed to Suwayda. The arrival of Bedouin clans from across Syria would likely increase intercommunal violence in Suwayda, given the absence of a neutral force to prevent intercommunal violence. Attacks targeting the Druze between July 14 and 16 largely stemmed from a lack of control over undisciplined MoD units and not official orders from the transitional government.[xxxvii] While these official units have now withdrawn due to Israeli airstrikes, informal and even less disciplined fighters have threatened to mobilize to protect Bedouin communities.

Bedouin fighters from Daraa and Suwayda provinces have continued to fight in western Suwayda Province amid the reprisal killings.[xxxviii]  Bedouin fighters seized several towns in Suwayda Province near the Suwayda-Daraa border from Druze militias on July 17.[xxxix] Prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, who has led much of the fighting against the transitional government, called on Druze fighters to avoid harming “the peaceful Bedouin tribes” and to treat prisoners well.[xl] A Bedouin military commander told Reuters on July 17 that the withdrawal and truce only apply to government forces and that his fighters seek to free Bedouins detained by Druze armed groups.[xli] Sunni residents of Sasa in Rif Dimashq Province targeted Druze in a neighboring town in response to Druze militia attacks on Bedouins in Suwayda, demonstrating that intercommunal violence has the potential of expanding geographically.[xlii]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara portrayed his government’s failed campaign to impose control over Suwayda Province as the result of Israeli attempts to fracture Syria and to start a war in a July 17 speech.[xliii] Shara claimed that his “efforts to restore stability and expel outlawed factions succeeded, despite Israeli interventions.”[xliv] Violence has continued in Suwayda, however. Shara accused Israel of seeking to “dismantle” Syrian unity and to weaken Syrian reconstruction and advancement by drawing Syria into another war.[xlv] He said that Syria can overcome all Israeli attempts to tear Syria apart.[xlvi] Shara said that “building a new Syria requires” all Syrians to “place the nation's interests above all individual or limited interests.” Shara attempted to reassure the Druze community that the transitional government will prioritize Druze rights and freedoms and announced that he assigned “some local factions and religious elders the responsibility of maintaining security in Suwayda” upon the government’s withdrawal. [xlvii] The local factions that Shara assigned to maintain security in Suwayda have not established control over the province, however.[xlviii] Anti-Damascus Druze militias have returned to positions in Suwayda and have taken advantage of the security vacuum to settle scores with pro-Damascus Druze factions by desecrating gravesites of former pro-Damascus Druze faction leaders and looting the factions' weapons stockpiles.[xlix] Violence will likely continue absent a strong security guarantor. The Druze factions that Shara put in charge of security in Suwayda have not demonstrated that they are capable of establishing security thus far.

Key Takeaways:

• US Strike Damage: A US media outlet reported on July 17 that US strikes in Iran on June 21 caused significant damage to only one of the three Iranian nuclear facilities that the United States struck. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the strikes caused significant damage to all three facilities and will likely set back Iran's nuclear program.
• Iraqi PMF Legislation: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority Law from Parliament on July 17 following US concern over the legislation. The Popular Mobilization Authority Law includes several provisions that would likely further Iranian influence in the Iraqi security and political apparatus.
• Southern Syria: Syrian transitional government forces withdrew from Suwayda Province on July 16 after Israeli airstrikes conducted in support of the Druze factions inflicted heavy losses on transitional government forces. The withdrawal of government forces has not brought peace to Suwayda Province and has contributed to a security vacuum that risks generating further violence.

Iran Update, July 16, 2025

Israeli airstrikes in Syria are unlikely to achieve Israel’s stated aim of protecting the Druze in Syria because the strikes do not address the root cause of attacks committed by some members of the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) against the Druze. These attacks largely stem from a lack of control over undisciplined MoD units.[i] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 16 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is working to “save” the Druze and “eliminate” the “regime’s gangs,” referring to Syrian government forces that have conducted attacks against Druze.[ii] The IDF has conducted over 160 airstrikes across southern Syria since July 15, including a strike on the Syrian Presidential Palace and multiple strikes on the MoD headquarters in Damascus.[iii] The IDF also struck MoD personnel, tanks, vehicles, and military bases in Rif Dimashq, Daraa, and Suwayda provinces.[iv] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on July 16 that the IDF will continue to "impose the demilitarization policy” until Syrian MoD units withdraw from Suwayda Province.[v] 

It is highly unlikely that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara ordered or encouraged the abuses that some MoD forces have committed in Suwayda. The abuses likely stem from a lack of control over undisciplined units. The transitional government has repeatedly called on MoD members to cease violations and has implemented some measures, such as the deployment of military police, to arrest perpetrators. MoD forces’ violations disrupt Damascus’s ability to secure Druze support for a settlement to the crisis.[vi]

Israel conducted these strikes after the United States demanded that Israel cease all airstrikes in southern Syria on July 15. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on July 16 that the United States is very concerned about Israeli strikes and "want[s] the fighting to stop.”[vii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF is preparing to transfer two divisions to the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and Syrian border area, including the 98th Reserve Paratrooper Division and another unspecified reserve division.[viii] The 98th Division is currently deployed in the Gaza Strip, where it has operated since May 2025.[ix] The IDF also diverted additional aircraft to Syria.[x]

A lone Druze faction is undermining the Syrian transitional government’s diplomatic efforts with pro-government Suwaydawi leaders. Prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly rejected a ceasefire agreed upon by the transitional government and pro-government Druze leaders on July 16. This marks the third time that Hijri has rejected a government-Suwaydawi ceasefire since the fighting began on July 13.[xi] Druze militias loyal to Hijri resumed attacks on government forces after the ceasefire was announced on July 16.[xii] These militias include the Suwayda Military Council, which retains ties to Assad-era generals.[xiii] Hijri only represents a fraction of the Syrian Druze community, however. Several prominent Druze leaders, such as Sheikh Yousef Jarbou, have committed to working with the Shara government and continue to do so even after government forces entered Suwayda and committed abuses against residents.[xiv] Pro-government Druze leaders like Jarbou and Hamoud al Hanawi have a fractious history of political rivalry with Hijri, and Hijri was often at odds with Men of Dignity founder and father of Laith al Balous, Wahid al Balous.[xv] Balous and other leaders have rejected Hijri’s call for international intervention to protect the Druze in Suwayda Province.[xvi] Hijri called for the “unconditional liberation” of Suwayda Province from government forces, which suggests that he is unwilling to negotiate with the transitional government without a complete withdrawal of government forces from Suwayda.[xvii] The ceasefire agreement that Hijri broke on July 16 was nearly identical to a May 2025 agreement between Suwaydawi leaders, the transitional government, and Hijri himself.[xviii] Both the broken ceasefire agreement and the May 2025 agreement appear designed to minimize abuses against civilians by allowing Suwaydawis to man local police and General Security Service (GSS) forces. The agreement also created a fact-finding commission to investigate abuses committed during the recent conflict.

The Syrian government remains responsible for holding the perpetrators of abuses against Druze accountable, even if the government does not order or support these abuses. Suwayda-based media reported on July 16 that MoD forces have executed Druze men in their homes and in city streets.[xix] The outlet, citing unspecified local sources, also accused military forces of raiding homes, looting, and threatening residents at gunpoint.[xx] The pro-government Men of Dignity condemned government forces’ “excessive use of violence” against civilians and criticized government forces’ lack of discipline and violation of agreements.[xxi] Shara issued a statement that “strongly” condemned attacks against Suwaydawi residents and promised that the attacks will not go “unpunished.”[xxii] The Syrian government must hold undisciplined units, individuals, and commanders responsible for their crimes. Not all MoD units that have deployed to Suwayda in recent days are responsive to the chain of command, as evidenced by these violations. The Syrian transitional government’s ability and willingness to hold security forces accountable for crimes committed against civilians will be one factor that influences its ability to establish security and stability in southern Syria. A complete breakdown of trust between the government and the Druze community would make it very difficult for the government to build lasting stability in southern Syria. These attacks also risk significantly eroding other Syrian minority communities’ trust of the Syrian government and its motives, regardless of whether or how the government holds perpetrators accountable. Other minority communities that fear that the government will not protect them, such as the Kurds, may view these attacks as confirmation of their fears.

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) have reportedly set an end-of-August deadline for Iran to agree to a nuclear deal before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism.[xxiii] Axios reported on July 16 that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with the E3 foreign ministers on July 14 and set this deadline, citing three sources familiar with the call.[xxiv] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xxv] The snapback mechanism under the JCPOA expires on October 18, 2025. The process to impose snapback sanctions takes between 45 and 65 days from when the initial non-compliance complaint is issued, which means that the E3 would have to initiate the process no later than September 3.[xxvi] The E3 reportedly seeks to engage Iran and push for verifiable commitments, such as renewed cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the removal of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, ahead of the deadline to avoid triggering the snapback mechanism.[xxvii]

Iran has maintained its position on its right to enrich uranium in Iran, which makes it very unlikely that Iran would accept a nuclear agreement by the end of August that required Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi reiterated the Iranian regime’s official position on July 16that Iran will never accept zero enrichment.[xxviii] The Iranian Parliament separately rejected renewed talks with the United States on July 16 unless certain preconditions are met.[xxix] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated that the preconditions include guarantees against future US or Israeli strikes and compensation for recent damage.[xxx] Ghalibaf’s statement does not reflect the regime’s official position and aligns with the position of an anti-negotiation camp within Iran, which is largely comprised of hardliners. This camp has continued to advocate for stringent preconditions that effectively amount to rejecting renewed negotiations.[xxxi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that these preconditions are likely non-starters for the United States and Israel.[xxxii]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei underscored the need for national unity to stabilize the regime amid fissures between regime factions on July 16.[xxxiii] Khamenei praised the Iranian people’s response to the recent war during a meeting with senior judiciary officials and emphasized that “it is everyone’s duty to preserve this national unity.”[xxxiv] Khamenei emphasized that individuals with different religious beliefs and opposing political views must unite to “defend Iran and the regime.”[xxxv] Khamenei cautioned Iranian officials against raising “unnecessary criticisms” and disputing minor issues, noting that such behavior undermines state unity.[xxxvi] Khamenei’s remarks come as moderate elements in the regime appear to be trying to use the Israel-Iran War and its aftermath to increase their political influence in the regime. Former reformist President Hassan Rouhani reportedly lobbied senior clerics in Qom to encourage Khamenei to accept a ceasefire during the war and has issued public statements urging de-escalation and renewed engagement with the United States.[xxxvii] Former Iranian Prime Minister and 2009 Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi separately called on July 11 for a referendum to establish a constitutional assembly. Mousavi warned that public solidarity during the Israel-Iran War should not be mistaken for “approval of the government” and that the war was “the bitter result of a series of grave errors.”[xxxviii]

Khamenei’s remarks also come amid divisions within the region over how Iran should engage the United States following the Israel-Iran War.  Khamenei asserted that individuals who oppose Iranian officials on “diplomatic or military issues” must express their opposition in line with regime policy.[xxxix] Khamenei may have been referring to efforts by the anti-negotiation camp in the regime to resist efforts to resume nuclear talks with the United States.[xl] This camp has presented preconditions for negotiations that effectively amount to rejecting renewed negotiations, as noted above. Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati stated on July 14 that Iran would accept negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States respects Iranian red lines, which include the right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[xli] Velayati may have been referring to the preconditions that have been presented by the anti-negotiation camp. The Washington Post reported on July 13 that there is a “consensus” among Iran’s political class to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States.[xlii]

Iran is likely concerned that Syrian cooperation with Azerbaijan could increase Turkish influence in the South Caucasus. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara visited Baku, Azerbaijan, on July 12.[xliii] Shara signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan’s state oil company to export Azerbaijani gas to Syria via Turkey during his visit to Baku.[xliv] Iranian state media criticized Shara’s visit to Baku and claimed that his trip was part of an effort to diminish Iranian influence in the South Caucasus.[xlv] A Syrian source close to Shara told Israeli media that Shara met with Israeli officials in Baku on July 12.[xlvi] Iran opposes Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel and has historically accused Israel of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct operations in Iran, including during the Israel-Iran War.[xlvii]

Iranian media separately described the Zangezur Corridor as a Turkish attempt to extend Turkish influence into Eurasia.[xlviii] The Zangezur Corridor is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transportation route that would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The Zangezur Corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[xlix] Iranian media stated on July 16 that the Zangezur Corridor would also prevent Iran from being able to militarily support Armenia against Azerbaijan.[l] Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growth of Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus in recent years, particularly since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iran is concerned that Russia’s focus on the war in Ukraine has left a power vacuum for other regional actors, such as Turkey and Israel, to exploit.

Iran continues to send advanced weapons to the Houthis, including cruise and anti-ship missiles, which the Houthis regularly use to attack Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea.[li] The Yemeni National Resistance Front (NRF) announced on July 16 that the NRF coast guard intercepted over 750 tons of munitions and hardware with instruction manuals written in Farsi from an unnamed US-sanctioned company affiliated with the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[lii] The NRF is an anti-Houthi paramilitary group led by former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew, Brigadier General Tariq Saleh.[liii] The shipment included hundreds of advanced cruise missiles, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, warheads, and other missile components, as well as hundreds of drone engines, air defense equipment, radar systems, and communications equipment. The NRF’s interdiction of the Iranian weapons shipment comes amid continued Houthi missile and drone attacks targeting Israel and renewed Houthi attacks on international shipping. The Houthis recently attacked and sank two commercial bulk carriers off the coast of Hudaydah, western Yemen, on July 6 and 7.[liv]

Some Iraqi parliamentarians, including Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, may have threatened to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani to pressure Mashhadani to place the Popular Mobilization Authority Law on the parliamentary agenda. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Parliament Speaker and their two deputies are responsible for “jointly” determining the agenda.[lv] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law would integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the PMF before the PMF integrates into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[lvi] A parliamentarian with an unknown affiliation told Iraqi media on July 14 that 80 parliamentarians signed a petition to remove Mashhadani due to Mashhadani’s “monopoly” on decision-making that “reflects a new sectarian trend.”[lvii] The parliamentarian may have been accusing Mashhadani of helping pass the General Amnesty Law in January 2025 while not helping pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[lviii] The General Amnesty Law is largely supported by Sunni parties.  Iraqi media separately reported that a “verbal altercation” between Mashhadani and several Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarians, including Mandalawi, during a parliament session on July 14 led to the session’s postponement.[lix] A parliamentary source told Iraqi media on July 15 that Mashhadani and Mandalawi reconciled and agreed to resume the parliamentary session.[lx]

 The Popular Mobilization Authority Law was raised during the July 16 parliament session even though it was not formally placed on the July 16 parliamentary agenda.[lxi] It is notable that the law was raised in parliament after Mashhadani and Mandalawi reconciled. Iraqi media reported that Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians left the July 16 session in protest to the reading of the law because the law was raised without prior “political consensus” or discussion in relevant committees.[lxii] Mandalawi reportedly chaired the parliament session on July 14 and directed the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee to complete all suggested amendments to the Popular Mobilization Authority Law and submit the final version of the law to Mashhadani for a vote.[lxiii]

The Popular Mobilization Authority Law includes provisions that require PMF brigades to only carry out orders from the prime minister, as already required under Iraqi law, and refrain from attacking US forces, interests, and other unspecified targets outside of Iraq.[lxiv] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders in recent months.[lxv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East.[lxvi] The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.

Key Takeaways:

• Southern Syria: Israeli airstrikes in Syria are unlikely to achieve Israel’s stated aim of protecting the Druze in Syria because the strikes do not address the root cause of attacks committed by some members of the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) against the Druze. These attacks largely stem from a lack of control over undisciplined MoD units.
• Iran Nuclear Talks: The United States and the E3 have reportedly set an end-of-August deadline for Iran to agree to a nuclear deal before the E3 triggers the JCPOA snapback mechanism. Iran has maintained its position on its right to enrich uranium in Iran, which makes it very unlikely that Iran would accept a nuclear agreement by the end of August that required Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment.
• Iran After the War: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei underscored the need for national unity to stabilize the regime amid fissures between regime factions. Khamenei’s remarks come as moderate elements in the regime appear to be trying to use the Israel-Iran War and its aftermath to increase their political influence in the regime.
• Iran-Houthi Coordination: Iran continues to send advanced weapons to the Houthis, including cruise and anti-ship missiles, which the Houthis regularly use to attack Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea.

Iran Update, July 15, 2025

Iran may be prioritizing deeper strategic ties with China over its current partnership with Russia, though the extent of China’s willingness to support Iran remains unclear. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan reported on July 15 that Iran is frustrated over Russia’s “cautious stance” during the 12-Day War.[i] The outlet stated that Iranian officials believe that Russia misinterpreted the war as a localized conflict between Iran and Israel rather than a “broader NATO confrontation.”[ii] Farhikhtegan reported that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Moscow on June 23 pushed Russia to more strongly condemn Israeli strikes, including at UN Security Council meetings.[iii] Iranian experts told Farhikhtegan that Iran will likely maintain ties with Russia but must “rethink parts of the relationship and expand cooperation with other partners,” especially in “sensitive military and strategic areas.”[iv] Reuters previously reported on June 23 that Iran was unsatisfied with Russia’s support for Iran during the Israel-Iran War, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[v]

Iran appears to be trying to strengthen military and defense cooperation with China following the Israel-Iran War.[vi] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with his Chinese counterpart on June 26 during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Beijing, reportedly to discuss potential military purchases, including J-10 fighter jets and advanced AWACS systems.[vii] Arab media claimed on July 9 that China sent surface-to-air missile systems to Iran in late June to replenish its degraded air defenses after Israeli strikes, although Chinese and Iranian officials denied the report.[viii] These developments reflect Iran's efforts to diversify its defense partnerships after dissatisfaction with Russia’s limited wartime support and delays in delivering S-400 systems and Su-35 aircraft.[ix]

Araghchi held a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 15 on the sidelines of an SCO ministerial meeting in Beijing.[x] Xi also met with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the SCO meeting.[xi] Araghchi delivered a speech at the summit and proposed initiatives to strengthen regional cooperation, including creating a permanent security mechanism, a center to counter sanctions, and a regional security forum to address shared threats.[xii] The proposal to create a permanent security mechanism likely reflects Iran's dissatisfaction with Russia’s support for Iran during the war. The Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation agreement lacks a mutual defense guarantee, unlike the cooperation agreement between Russia and North Korea.[xiii]

Iran has lastly signaled that China could play a more significant role in future nuclear negotiations. Farhikhtegan reported on July 14 that Iran would consider Norway or China as mediators to replace Oman in future nuclear talks with the United States.[xiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei separately highlighted China’s potential “significant and constructive” role in nuclear diplomacy and in rebuilding Iran’s economy under the 25-year partnership agreement, which Iran and China signed in 2020.[xv]

Iran is threatening to expand its nuclear program, likely in an attempt to deter snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xvi] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media published an article on July 15 outlining potential Iranian responses to snapback sanctions.[xvii] The responses included increasing uranium enrichment levels from 60 percent to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, deploying more advanced centrifuges, expanding nuclear research and development, and developing uranium metal production chains. These threats come after E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials have resurfaced threats to trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran fails to make verifiable commitments related to its nuclear program.[xviii] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told reporters on July 15 that the E3 will trigger the snapback mechanism "by end of August at the latest" if Iran fails to make a "firm, tangible, and verifiable commitment."[xix] The snapback mechanism under the JCPOA expires on October 18, 2025. The process to impose snapback sanctions takes between 45 and 65 days from when the initial non-compliance complaint is issued, which means that the E3 would have to initiate the process no later than September 3.[xx] The graphic below outlines the processes by which the E3 could impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The quickest process would take a minimum of 45 days while the lengthiest process would take 65 days.

Each step in the snapback process provides Iran with an opportunity to comply with its JCPOA commitments. The process for imposing snapback sanctions continues so long as Iran continues to fail to comply with its commitments.

US and Israeli airstrikes have likely hindered Iran's ability to carry out these threats to expand its nuclear program, at least in the short term. The Institute for Science and Security assessed that US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment program and that it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels.[xxi] The strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges.[xxii] Israeli airstrikes also destroyed some of Iran's uranium metal production facilities, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[xxiii] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. Israeli airstrikes also targeted Iranian nuclear scientists, which will likely temporarily disrupt Iran's ability to conduct nuclear research.[xxiv] Iran will likely try to take some of the steps outlined in IRGC-affiliated media, regardless of whether the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, as part of its effort to rebuild its nuclear program following the Israel-Iran War.

The Institute for Science and International Security (the Institute) assessed that Israel's decapitation campaign targeting Iranian nuclear scientists “weakened Iran’s base for building nuclear weapons."[xxv]  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 14 nuclear scientists during the Israel-Iran War.[xxvi] The Institute reported on July 15 that it "may be far more difficult and take far longer" for Iran to recover from the loss of these scientists given the scope of the decapitation campaign compared to previous Israeli killings of Iranian nuclear scientists.[xxvii] The Institute stated that 11 of the scientists were affiliated with or senior managers at the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[xxviii] The Institute reported that among the 11 scientists, six had expertise in explosives, at least three were nuclear coding and simulation experts, four were experts in nuclear weapons testing, two were linked to foreign procurement networks for Iran's nuclear weapons program, three had experience in ballistic missiles, two worked on nuclear propulsion for submarines, and two conducted theoretical work on gas centrifuges.[xxix] Axios reported in June 2024 that Iran had begun running computer simulations that could support the research and development of a nuclear weapon, citing US and Israeli intelligence agencies.[xxx] The loss of these nuclear scientists may temporarily hinder Iran’s ability to conduct nuclear research and develop its nuclear program.

Abuses committed by all actors during the ongoing insurgency in Suwayda Province will likely degrade trust between communities and the Syrian transitional government, which risks undermining the transitional government's ability to establish long-term stability in Syria. These abuses, while not all inherently sectarian in nature, will be perceived as such by Syrian minority groups and will have protracted impacts on Syria’s stability and security. Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra announced a ceasefire between the Syrian transitional government and local Suwadawi leadership on July 15 and instructed Ministry of Defense (MoD) units that had entered Suwayda City to only fire when fired upon, pursue outlaw groups, protect the local population, respect property, and maintain peace.[xxxi] Security forces deployed to Suwayda City on July 15 and established checkpoints to monitor activity.[xxxii] Security forces engaged in numerous abuses, however, including the summary executions of civilians and Druze militiamen, arson attacks on shops, acts of pillage, and the forcible shaving of Druze men's moustaches, which have religious significance for the Druze.[xxxiii] Druze militia members have also engaged in abuses during the insurgency, such as the summary execution of security forces on July 14. These abuses further complicate the security situation and increase tensions between the MoD and Druze militias.[xxxiv]

The Syrian transitional government’s ability and willingness to hold security forces members accountable for crimes committed against civilians will be one factor that influences its ability to establish security and stability in southern Syria. Defense Minister Qasra announced on July 14 and 15 that the government will hold troops who commit abuses in Suwayda responsible for their actions.[xxxv] These abuses violate the MoD’s code of conduct, which applies to all military personnel.[xxxvi] The Syrian transitional government has not publicly held Syrian soldiers accountable for the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast in March, despite investigative reports from humanitarian groups documenting and identifying perpetrators.[xxxvii] This inaction has fueled distrust of the transitional government among the Alawite community.[xxxviii] Failing to hold security forces accountable for crimes committed in Suwayda would similarly likely increase distrust between the Druze community and the Syrian transitional government.  

Some Druze factions that oppose the Syrian transitional government rejected the ceasefire between the government and Suwaydawi leadership. Suwaydawi religious and civil leaders announced a ceasefire agreement on July 15 that allowed MoD forces to enter Suwayda City.[xxxix] Faction leaders, such as the leader of the Men of Dignity’s Sheikh al Karama militia, Layth al Balous, coordinated with the MoD during the recent insurgency and supported the previous security agreement in May.[xl]  The Suwayda Military Council (SMC), which retains ties to Assad-era generals and is loyal to prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, rejected the ceasefire and attacked MoD units entering the city.[xli] Hijri initially accepted the ceasefire agreement in two published statements but then released a third statement on July 15 in which he claimed that his earlier statements were made under duress.[xlii] Hijri added that the Druze face a “war of extermination” and that they must confront the “barbaric campaign with all available means.”[xliii]  Ahmed al Shara’s government could build relationships with militias that agreed to the ceasefire and oppose Hijri, such as Liwa al Jibal, the Men of Dignity, and Sheikh al Karama, to isolate and ultimately defeat Hijri and the SMC.[xliv] Shara has employed similar tactics previously, such as when he successfully disbanded and integrated the Eighth Brigade into the Syrian government in April.[xlv] Druze factions have divergent political views and are not a monolith, but most have rejected the imposition of security forces from outside the province.[xlvi] This is due to legitimate concerns about the Syrian transitional government’s treatment of minorities, amplified by the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast in March and previous mistreatment of Druze in Rif Dimashq Province in May.[xlvii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) accepted a US demand to cease all airstrikes in southern Syria on July 15 following a series of airstrikes on Syrian transitional government military targets in southwestern Syria.[xlviii] The IDF conducted several airstrikes in Suwayda Province on July 15 that targeted the Syrian MoD and General Security Service (GSS).[xlix] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz released a statement on July 15 that Israel conducted the strikes to protect the Druze minority in Syria.[l] The IDF struck MoD vehicles, tanks, and the police station in Suwayda City before and after the ceasefire between Druze notables and the Syrian transitional government was announced.[li] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned the strikes, calling them a blatant violation of Syria’s sovereignty and a breach of international law and the UN Charter.[lii] The ministry called on the UN Security Council to condemn the strikes.[liii]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, which is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS, threatened on July 15 to expand its sectarian attacks to include the Druze community in Suwayda.[liv] The group has threatened the Druze and killed Druze civilians since it was established in December 2024.[lv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has not claimed any attacks in Suwayda since it was established. The group’s threat may be intended to instill fear and distrust within the Druze community of transitional government forces.[lvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s stated objective is to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Shia.[lvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran may be prioritizing deeper strategic ties with China over its current partnership with Russia, though the extent of China’s willingness to support Iran remains unclear. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan reported on July 15 that Iran is frustrated over Russia’s “cautious stance” during the 12-Day War.
• Iran is threatening to expand its nuclear program, likely in an attempt to deter snapback sanctions. US and Israeli airstrikes have likely hindered Iran's ability to carry out these threats to expand its nuclear program, at least in the short term.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reappointed senior clerics Ahmad Khatami, Alireza Arafi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani as Guardian Council members on July 15. All three clerics are Assembly of Experts members and belong to the hardline Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom. The Guardian Council plays a key role in Iranian elections and vets candidates and legislation, which gives these clerics significant influence over Iran’s political landscape until at least 2031.

Iran Update, July 14, 2025

The Iranian regime is pursuing a relatively unchanged nuclear negotiating position even as hardliners continue to advocate preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations with the United States. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran does not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States respects Iranian red lines, which include an assurance that Iran can retain its right to enrich uranium.[i]  Velayati, as the supreme leader’s adviser, is presumably stating the position of the supreme leader. This policy is the policy that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi advocated for and are attempting to execute.[ii] The current negotiation policy is relatively unchanged from before the Israeli strikes, when the regime insisted that it must be allowed to enrich uranium. This is consistent with the July 13 Washington Post report that noted the “consensus” among Iran’s political class that Iran needs to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States. US President Donald Trump stated on July 4 that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[iii]

Hardliners have continued to advocate for much more stringent preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations, but the supreme leader does not appear to be heeding their advice. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media and a current parliamentarian and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) member have supported very stringent preconditions for talks since July 10, including recognition of “Israeli aggression,” investigation of US involvement, payment of war reparations, and binding security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[iv]  An Iranian expert close to the regime reinforced the hardliner position and told the Washington Post on July 13 that there is “basically no chance“ that Iran will negotiate under threat of US or Israeli attack and that Iran requires guarantees against future Israeli attacks.[v] These preconditions would be non-starters and amount to a rejection of negotiations. The hardliner’s preconditions are not supported by the supreme leader and therefore do not reflect official Iranian policy.

The recent fighting between Druze and Sunni Bedouin militias in Suwayda Province, Syria, is emblematic of the lack of trust and tension between different Syrian communities. The government’s present makeup and the history of its key members will contribute to the distrust and make it more difficult for the government to maintain security and stability along certain demographic fault lines in Syria. The fighting in Suwayda reportedly began after Bedouin militias beat and robbed a Suwaydawi Druze man in Masmiyah, Daraa Province, on July 11.[vi] The initial engagements began near al Tirah village, Suwayda Province, and al Maqous neighborhood, Suwayda City, on July 13.[vii] Both sides kidnapped dozens of civilians as hostages in these early engagements.[viii] The fighting rapidly expanded on July 13 and spread throughout Suwayda Province.[ix] Thirty people died and 80 more were injured during the fighting on July 13.[x] The Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed forces to Suwayda on July 14.[xi] These forces have cleared Druze militia positions west of Suwayda City and are now on the city outskirts, where MoD forces have paused as the Syrian transitional government begins negotiations to stop the violence.[xii]

This most recent outbreak of violence will deepen the mistrust and poor intercommunal relations that characterize the relationship between the Druze community, Sunni Bedouins, and the government. The Druze previously signed an agreement with the government on May 1 that would allow for joint Druze-government deployments across Suwayda Province to improve trust without requiring Druze militias to disarm.[xiii] The Druze likely sought to retain their weapons because they are skeptical of the government’s motives.[xiv] The Druze are skeptical because President Ahmed al Shara’s Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) persecuted the Druze in northwestern Syria. The current violence will not decrease this Druze perception. Both Druze factions and MoD forces have engaged in serious abuses since the fighting began. Druze forces have beaten MoD captives, and MoD forces have looted Druze villages and forcibly shaved Druze fighters’ moustaches, which have religious significance for the Druze.[xv] The MoD has also reportedly coordinated with Sunni Bedouin militias.[xvi] The MoD has since ordered MoD personnel to cease “pillaging and violations,” but this is highly unlikely to assuage Druze concerns.[xvii] The Druze behavior towards the MoD will also cause the MoD to increasingly view the Druze as enemies to be defeated. The lack of trust will make it very difficult for the Syrian government to create lasting stability in Suwayda under the current conditions.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted multiple airstrikes on Syrian MoD forces in Suwayda Province after Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri called for “international protection” for the Druze community on July 14.[xviii] The IDF Air Force repeatedly flew shows of force over Syrian MoD forces amassed in Daraa Province on July 14.[xix] The IDF Air Force also conducted a demonstration in which it dropped unknown ordnance on a MoD tank in the village of Sami on the outskirts of Suwayda City on July 14.[xx] The demonstration reportedly caused no casualties and such limited damage that the tank was repaired in under an hour and redeployed.[xxi] The IDF then conducted multiple airstrikes in the town of Mazraa on the outskirts of Suwayda City after MoD forces advanced to the town on July 14.[xxii] The IDF conducted several more airstrikes targeting unspecified sites on the outskirts of Suwayda City.[xxiii] IDF airstrikes killed one MoD member in western Suwayda Province on July 14.[xxiv] The IDF said that it conducted the airstrikes to prevent the buildup of armed forces in southern Syria but did not reiterate its previous pledge to protect the Druze community.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is pursuing a relatively unchanged nuclear negotiating position even as hardliners continue to advocate preconditions that would amount to a rejection of renewed negotiations with the United States. An adviser to the supreme leader said that Iran does not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States respects Iranian red lines, which include an assurance that Iran can retain its right to enrich uranium.
• The recent fighting between Druze and Sunni Bedouin militias in Suwayda Province, Syria, is emblematic of the lack of trust and tension between different Syrian communities. The government’s present makeup and the history of its key members will contribute to the distrust and make it more difficult for the government to maintain security and stability along certain demographic fault lines in Syria.

Iran Update, July 13, 2025

We will publish an abbreviated Iran Update on July 12 and 13. The abbreviated update will cover updates to nuclear negotiations and information about the status of Iran’s nuclear program, military, and political scene after the Israel-Iran War. We will resume our full coverage of the entire region on July 14.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has built new access roads and flattened earth near impact points at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), likely as part of Iran’s efforts to assess the damage at the facility.
• Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian moderates who support nuclear negotiations with the United States appear to be prevailing over Iranian hardliners who have rejected negotiations in recent days. Iran’s requirements in negotiations do not appear to be consistent with US demands, however. The Iranian regime also defines enriching uranium as a right, which stalled negotiations prior to the Israeli strikes that began on June 12.
• Iranian Nuclear Inspections: Iran will cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) despite recent restrictions imposed by the Iranian parliament, but is unlikely to allow inspections of bombed nuclear sites, citing safety and security concerns.

Iran Update, July 12, 2025

We will publish an abbreviated Iran Update on July 12 and 13. The abbreviated update will cover updates to nuclear negotiations and information about the status of Iran’s nuclear program, military, and political scene after the Israel-Iran War. We will resume our full coverage of the entire region on July 14.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the underground areas of the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Natanz Enrichment Complex as of July 9. The process to repair the ENTC’s facilities is “lengthy and complicated” due to the collapsed tunnel entrances and the need to check ENTC’s aboveground facilities for radiation hazards, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Axios reported on July 12 that Russia has encouraged Iran to accept zero uranium enrichment demands while offering to provide Iran with 3.67 percent uranium for nuclear power and small quantities of 20 percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor and the production of nuclear isotopes. Iran is unlikely to accept a proposal that requires Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment.

Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) or Natanz Enrichment Complex, according to satellite imagery originally published on July 9. The lack of access means that Iranian officials cannot assess the extent of the damage to the underground facilities at ENTC and Natanz with accuracy. Iranian personnel have not made visible efforts to rebuild or remove rubble from destroyed aboveground facilities at ENTC.[i] The Institute for Science and International Security (the Institute) reported that it will take Iran time to begin rebuilding the ENTC‘s aboveground facilities, which house the destroyed uranium conversion facility and uranium metal production plant, because the bombing dispersed radiological and chemical material. The dispersion of this material will require Iran to deploy hazardous material (HAZMAT) teams first. Then Iran will need to remove rubble before any large-scale reconstruction could take place. The combination of the HAZMAT requirements and the removal of debris is a “lengthy and complicated“ process that will take Iran “some time“ to complete, according to the Institute.  

It will also take time for Iran to access ENTC’s underground facilities because it has not delivered any excavation equipment or heavy machinery to the site.[ii] The Institute reported that Iran would need to use machinery to remove approximately 20 meters of rubble and backfill from tunnel entrances to access the underground facilities located at the complex.[iii]

The Institute reported that satellite imagery captured through July 8 showed that Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the underground portions of the Natanz nuclear facility.[iv] CTP-ISW previously reported that commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 showed that Iran has filled in a crater above the enrichment hall caused by the June 21 US strike.[v] Satellite imagery captured on June 8 showed that Iran has placed a cover on the point.[vi]

Russia has reportedly encouraged Iran to accept zero uranium enrichment demands while offering to provide Iran with 3.67 percent uranium for nuclear power and small quantities of 20 percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor and the production of nuclear isotopes.[vii] Iran is unlikely to accept a proposal that requires Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment.[viii] Three European officials and one Israeli official told Axios on July 12 that Russia has encouraged Iran to agree to “zero enrichment” and conveyed its support for such a demand several times in the last few weeks.[ix] Senior Russian officials have previously stated that Iran has the right to possess the "full nuclear fuel cycle," including uranium enrichment capabilities.[x] Russia has recently offered to support a civilian nuclear program in Iran.[xi] Iran reportedly told Putin that it will not consider zero uranium enrichment demands.[xii] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands for Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment. Iran previously rejected a US proposal to establish a regional consortium outside of Iran that would provide Iran with uranium for civilian nuclear purposes but would not allow enrichment on Iranian soil.[xiii] Iranian officials stated that Iran was open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium’s enrichment facility was in Iran.[xiv]

Iran Update, July 11, 2025

The operator of the Liberian-flagged Eternity C told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that the British Navy and the European Union (EU) naval task force did not have ships near the Eternity C to protect it from a Houthi attack on July 7.[i] The Houthis have conducted two complex attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea in recent days, sinking both ships. The Houthis attacked the Magic Seas and Eternity C on July 6 and 7, respectively, using small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and unmanned surface vessels.[ii] The Houthis reportedly also used anti-ship missiles to attack the Eternity C.[iii] The Houthis launched the small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and unmanned surface vessels from small attack craft. Ocean swells can hide small attack craft on radars, making them difficult to detect. The large geographic area of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden that the British Navy and the EU naval task force patrol imposes constraints on the navies’ ability to respond to crises. A senior US official told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that international efforts to protect shipping in the Red Sea have become “less robust” as fewer navies conducting patrols in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have the capabilities to counter Houthi attacks.[iv]

Former Iranian Prime Minister and a key leader of the 2009 Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi, called on July 11 for a referendum to establish a constitutional assembly in Iran.[v] Mousavi framed a referendum as the only way to “save” Iran and warned that public solidarity during the Israel-Iran War should not be mistaken for “approval of the government.”[vi] Mousavi described the war as “the bitter result of a series of grave errors” and said that the current governance system does not represent all Iranians, echoing his February 2023 demand for a referendum and new constitution.[vii] Mousavi called for a referendum in February 2023 on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic and proposed drafting a new constitution.[viii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected calls for a referendum in April 2023, likely in response to Mousavi and other reformist officials’ calls for a referendum.[ix] Khamenei warned that such calls risked “polarization and instability.”[x]

Key Takeaways

1. The British Navy and the European Union (EU) naval task force were unable to protect two merchant vessels from recent Houthi attacks. Ocean swells can hide small attack craft on radars, making them difficult to detect. The large geographic area of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden that the British Navy and the EU naval task force patrol imposes constraints on the navies’ ability to respond to crises.
2. Iran has reportedly asked the United States for support to develop a peaceful nuclear program, which is likely part of a continued Iranian effort to maintain domestic uranium enrichment. Iran reportedly seeks to secure sanctions relief and US assistance with a civilian nuclear program. In exchange, the United States is demanding that Iran remove remaining enriched nuclear material and enrichment equipment, limit its missile program, and halt support for the Axis of Resistance.
3. The Israel-Iran War has exacerbated pre-existing fissures between reformists and hardliners in the Iranian regime over how to engage the West. A group of 180 Iranian reformists signed a letter urging President Masoud Pezeshkian to pursue negotiations with the United States and Europe to prevent renewed conflict. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Fars News rejected the statement on July 11 as “politically naive” and a “repetition of failed strategies.”

Iran Update, July 10, 2025

A senior Israeli official told Western media on July 10 that Iran did not move its enriched uranium stockpile from the Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan nuclear sites ahead of the US and Israeli strikes on the sites.[i] The official told Reuters that Iran has not moved the material since the strikes either.[ii] Israeli sources stated on June 25 that US and Israeli strikes buried Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile under rubble.[iii] Israeli strikes on June 13 damaged the Fuel Plate Manufacturing Plant (FPFP) at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which stored approximately 85 percent of Iran’s 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile and 83 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile as of August 2023.[iv] It is unclear how much, if any, of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile was at FPFP at the time of US and Israeli strikes. Reuters reported that Iran could gain access to the Esfahan site, but that it will be difficult to remove any of the material stored at the site, according to the senior Israeli official.[v] The New York Times similarly reported on July 10 that the storage facility at the Esfahan site was too deep to be effectively destroyed, but US and Israeli strikes made it significantly harder to access the material by targeting tunnel entrances, according to a senior Israeli official.[vi] Uranium is an element, which means that you cannot destroy it with conventional weapons, only scatter it or pulverize it into dust. The Israeli official said that Israel believes Iran stored additional stockpiles at Fordow and Natanz but that these will be too difficult to recover following US and Israeli strikes.[vii] The US and Israeli strikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground to limit access to it. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran cannot access certain key nuclear facilities to accurately assess the damage.[viii] Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is effectively inaccessible, assuming that Iran did not move the material and cannot access the facilities it is stored. Senior Israeli intelligence officials said that any Iranian attempts to recover the material would "almost certainly" be detected.[ix]

Iranian reformists and hardliners are in disagreement over Iran’s policy on nuclear negotiations and US-Iran relations following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Reformist newspaper Ham Mihan published an editorial on July 9 and warned that public threats against foreign leaders, including US President Donald Trump, risk provoking US retaliation.[x] The outlet explicitly addressed Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei and criticized judicial “double standards” for prosecuting “minor dissent” while ignoring calls to assassinate Trump.[xi] The outlet also cited Trump’s 2023 assassination attempt and warned that similar incidents could justify US retaliation “regardless of Iranian denials.”[xii]

These reformists' comments come after senior Iranian clerics issued a fatwa on June 30 that declared Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “mohareb” (enemies of God) and called for their killing.[xiii] Some clerics and organizations even offered monetary rewards and solicited public donations for the assassinations.[xiv] Assembly of Experts member Mohsen Araki defended the fatwa and stated that threats to Khamenei amount to “war against the Islamic world” and similarly labeled US and Israeli leaders as “mohareb.”[xv] Twenty-four Iranian parliamentarians, including ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front members, criticized President Masoud Pezeshkian’s interview with Tucker Carlson on July 6 and accused him of undermining national unity in a July 10 letter.[xvi] They also criticized Pezeshkian for failing to endorse recent clerical fatwas against Trump and Netanyahu.[xvii]

The post-war environment has demonstrated Iran’s internal divisions as hardliners and media linked to the military rejected nuclear talks while moderates pushed for de-escalation with the United States. The Iranian parliamentarians criticized Pezeshkian’s call for renewed talks with the United States and resuming cooperation with the IAEA as “disappointing.”[xviii] They warned that expressing willingness to negotiate sends a “message of weakness” to the United States, which could ”embolden the US to impose more sanctions or launch another military strike.”[xix] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media separately outlined preconditions on July 10 that amount to a rejection of renewed US-Iran talks.[xx] The preconditions include recognition of Israeli aggression, investigation of US involvement, payment of war reparations, and binding security guarantees to prevent future attacks.[xxi] The outlet warned that talks without these demands would ”legitimize past attacks“ and encourage future ones.[xxii] Hardliners are effectively rejecting negotiations unless they occur on a maximalist basis that addresses Iranian demands in full. The United States has shown absolutely no inclination towards addressing any maximalist Iranian demands, especially these preconditions that go far beyond previous negotiation frameworks. Hardliner demands contrast with efforts by moderate figures, including former President Hassan Rouhani, to push for de-escalation.[xxiii] Rouhani has lobbied senior clerics in Qom to pressure Khamenei into accepting a ceasefire and halting uranium enrichment, framing these moves as necessary to “save the Islamic system from collapse.”[xxiv]

Israeli airstrikes targeting Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several berths at the port inoperable. Satellite imagery also demonstrates that the Houthis have only a limited ability to repair the damage that the berths have sustained. Israeli airstrikes since May 2025 have badly damaged six of Hudaydah port’s seven main berths. Berth seven has not been regularly used since before the strikes began on May 5, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence, indicating that Israeli airstrikes destroyed it.[xxv] Satellite imagery shows that the most recent strike on July 6 was the most destructive, causing significant damage to berths two, three, and four, as well as additional damage between berths six and seven. The July 6 damage to berths two, three, and four appears to be more significant than the damage that berth seven suffered in early May.  

The Houthis repaired some earlier damage to the port facilities in June during a lull in Israeli strikes, but did not repair the more significant damage to berths one, five, and seven. The Houthis were unable to repair some of the more significant damage within the two months between May and July 2025. The Houthis would presumably repair these facilities if they could do so rapidly. The Houthi inability to repair the berths between May and July does not, on its own, indicate that the berths are permanently destroyed.

The combination of Israeli operations against Iranian military leadership and an Israeli strike targeting a senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commander on the Iraq-Iran border may have created shock among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that disrupted their plans to attack US forces in Iraq. An Israeli airstrike killed a senior member of Iranian-backed Iraq militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) on the Iran-Iraq border on June 21.[xxvi] The senior militiaman was on the border while KSS had already planned to transfer weapons, including drones, from Iran to Iraq to attack US forces.[xxvii] A Kurdish journalist close to the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) said on June 28 that the strike caused militia commanders to “panic” and cancel pre-planned attacks on US forces.[xxviii] This “panic“ suggests that the methodical Israeli campaign that killed many top Iranian military commanders, combined with the death of the senior KSS member on a presumably confidential mission, created shock within the militia ranks and caused them to cancel the attacks.

KSS leader Abu Alaa al Walai had previously threatened on June 11 to attack US forces if the United States participated in the Israeli air campaign.[xxix] Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including KSS, announced on June 17 that they had developed a “joint plan” to target US forces if the United States joined the Israeli air campaign against Iran.[xxx]

The plans to attack US forces, which would presumably have been previously communicated to militia attack cells, probably contributed to unclaimed but likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces in Iraq since June 12. Militia commanders would have needed to communicate basic attack plans to their cells throughout Iraq and provide them with weapons to conduct the attacks. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted multiple one-way drone attacks targeting US positions across Iraq between June 12 and 24.[xxxi] The militias may have suffered from a lack of discipline among the rank-and-file fighters who attempted to independently launch drone attacks targeting US forces in Iraq. Mid-level militia leadership may have also allowed fighters to conduct attacks without publicly sanctioning them.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Program: A senior Israeli official told Western media on July 10 that Iran did not move its enriched uranium stockpile from the Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan nuclear sites ahead of the US and Israeli strikes on the sites. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is effectively inaccessible, assuming that Iran did not move the material and cannot access the facilities it is stored.
• Iranian Domestic Politics: The post-war environment in Iran has demonstrated Iran’s internal divisions as hardliners and media linked to the military rejected nuclear talks while moderates pushed for de-escalation with the United States.
• Yemen: Israeli airstrikes targeting Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several berths at the port inoperable. Satellite imagery also demonstrates that the Houthis have only a limited ability to repair the damage that the berths have sustained.
• Iraq: The combination of Israeli operations against Iranian military leadership and an Israeli strike targeting a senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commander on the Iraq-Iran border may have created shock among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that disrupted their plans to attack US forces in Iraq.

Iran Update, July 9, 2025

Russia offered to help replenish Iran’s depleted uranium stockpile to support a peaceful nuclear program.[i] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.[ii] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on July 8 that Russia can receive and downblend Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and return it to supply Iranian nuclear power plants. [iii]Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium. Russia previously accepted 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran in December 2024 in exchange for natural uranium as part of the JCPOA.[iv] Russia also has previously offered to accept Iran's enriched uranium to "provide assistance" to the United States and Iran during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations before the Israel-Iran war.[v] Neither the United States nor Iran accepted Russia's offer to mediate. Russia has repeatedly opposed the stated US demands in the negotiations by supporting Iran's right to enrich uranium and has consistently supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel.[vi]

French Director General of External Security Nicolas Lerner told French media on July 8 that Iran’s nuclear program is very seriously damaged and its weaponization timeline is extremely delayed, which is consistent with previous reports.[vii] Lerner did note that Iran still retains a significant portion of its enriched uranium stockpile. Lerner stated that the US and Israeli strikes have "very seriously affected, very seriously damaged...and extremely delayed" all aspects of Iran's nuclear program.[viii] Lerner said that the strikes "destroyed" a small part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile but claimed that Iran still retains most of its stockpile.[ix] He added that France has "indications" of the stockpile’s location but cannot confirm the details until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resumes its verification activities at Iranian nuclear facilities.[x] The IAEA did not have access to all of the possible facilities Iran could use to store enriched uranium, so it is unclear how the IAEA is critical to confirming these details.  Israeli intelligence, for example, has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran's nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly). The enrichment level of the enriched material that Iran reportedly retains is unclear.

British Foreign Secretary David Lammy warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program.[xi] Lammy emphasized that Iran needs to "step back" from its "nuclear ambitions," including by resuming IAEA inspections, to avoid snapback sanctions.[xii] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xiii] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[xiv] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, after which the UN sanctions cannot be reinstated. The process of triggering the snapback mechanism and completing the UN Security Council can take up to 30 days, which means the E3 would need to start the process well in advance of the deadline. The sanctions, if imposed, would remain in place even after the deadline. These sanctions would increase economic pressure on Iran as it seeks to rebuild its military and economic infrastructure following the Israel-Iran war.

The Houthis killed at least four crew members and took up to 21 crew members hostage, probably as part of an effort to deter shipping companies from sailing to Israeli ports.[xv] The Houthis confirmed on July 9 that they conducted a July 7 attack that sank the Liberian-flagged, Greek-operated Eternity C. The Houthis deployed multiple small craft carrying armed personnel, who fired at least five rocket-propelled grenades targeting Eternity C before boarding.[xvi] The damage from the explosions sank the vessel. The Houthis killed four out of 22 to 25 crew members (21 Filipinos and one Russian) aboard the Eternity C and took roughly 12 crew members hostage. European vessels operating under the EU mission to protect shipping in the Red Sea rescued six other crew members.

The Houthis appear to have adopted hostage-taking to discourage international shipping companies from shipping goods to Israel. The effort to discourage shipping companies from shipping to Israel is part of a long Houthi campaign to “blockade” Israel and impose economic costs for Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have not taken any hostages from ship crews since November 2023, when they initially took 20 crew members from the Galaxy Leader.[xvii] The Houthis have targeted two vessels (the Magic Seas on July 6 and the Eternity C on July 7) in recent days and have either tried to take or have taken hostages from the vessels.[xviii] Both ships sailed on behalf of companies that also send ships to Israeli ports, though neither ship was itself bound for an Israeli port.[xix] The Houthis said that they targeted the Eternity C because some ships owned by its parent company docked at Israeli ports.[xx] This suggests that the Houthis are attempting to discourage shipping companies from traveling to Israeli ports by attacking their vessels regardless of destination. This tactic will have the added effect of driving up shipping costs in the Red Sea for all shippers, regardless of port of destination. Shipping prices have still not fallen to their pre-October 7 rates, and this hostage-taking will only exacerbate the issue.[xxi]

Key Takeaways

• Nuclear Negotiations: Russia offered to help replenish Iran’s depleted uranium stockpile to support a peaceful nuclear program. Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.
• Iran’s Nuclear Program: French intelligence assesses that Iran’s nuclear program is very seriously damaged and its weaponization timeline is extremely delayed, which is consistent with previous reports.
• Snapback Sanctions: British Foreign Secretary David Lammy warned on July 8 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not cooperate on its nuclear program. Lammy emphasized that Iran needs to "step back" from its "nuclear ambitions," including by resuming IAEA inspections, to avoid snapback sanctions.
• Red Sea: The Houthis killed at least four crew members and took up to 21 crew members hostage, probably as part of an effort to deter shipping companies from sailing to Israeli ports. The Houthis appear to have adopted hostage-taking to discourage international shipping companies from shipping goods to Israel. The effort to discourage shipping companies from shipping to Israel is part of a long Houthi campaign to “blockade” Israel and impose economic costs for Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip.

Iran Update, July 8, 2025

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei denied on July 8 US President Donald Trump’s July 7 claim that Iran requested nuclear talks.[i]  Western and regional officials told Reuters on July 8 that Iran may “drag out” the talks to avoid either renewed airstrikes if negotiations fail or “humiliation at home” if Iran accepts the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.[ii] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will meet with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oslo in the coming days for nuclear talks, according to an Axios report on July 3.[iii] A Tehran-based Western news correspondent later confirmed on July 4 that preparations are underway for “indirect” negotiations between Witkoff and Araghchi but noted that the meeting has not been finalized.[iv]  The Iranian official position against halting uranium enrichment and missile and drone production has not changed, however. It is therefore unlikely that nuclear negotiations would have a successful outcome in the aftermath of the Israel-Iran war if the current positions remain the same.

Top Iranian officials have continued to argue that US-Iranian nuclear negotiations were “gaining momentum” prior to Israeli airstrikes, which is false. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi incorrectly claimed that US-Iran negotiations had “gained momentum” prior to the Israeli air campaign.[v] US President Donald Trump publicly threatened force against Iran on April 12 if Iran did not agree to a nuclear deal within 60 days of the start of talks.[vi] Israel began its airstrikes on June 12-13, one day after Trump’s 60-day deadline. The United States had not altered its demand that Iran seek no uranium enrichment, and Iran had not altered its demand that it be allowed to continue enrichment. It is misleading to frame these talks as having meaningfully advanced when fundamental disagreements over nuclear enrichment continued to persist.  Araghchi’s statements and tone echoed those of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during his July 7 interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson, suggesting that the Iranian government is orchestrating an information campaign targeting Western audiences.[vii]  [viii] Iran even expanded its nuclear program during the negotiating period, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s recent reports.[ix] The amount of enriched uranium and the level to which it was enriched had no civilian use.

Iran cannot access certain key nuclear facilities, according to the Iranian president. This suggests that leaked Iranian signals intercepts about limited damage at the nuclear facilities were inaccurate. [x]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Tucker Carlson that US airstrikes on June 22 damaged Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan nuclear sites, but Iran cannot access the facilities to accurately assess the damage in an interview aired on July 7.[xi] Pezeshkian did not draw differences in levels of access between the different facilities. Pezeshkian’s statement demonstrates that it would have been almost impossible for Iranian officials to have accurate knowledge within days of the strikes about the extent of damage that the facilities suffered. The statement also suggests that Iran’s understanding of the exact damage within the facilities remains limited.

Israeli officials suggested that the United States would support further Israeli airstrikes against Iran if Iran attempts to either rebuild its nuclear program or move highly enriched uranium from previously targeted nuclear sites.[xii] Unspecified US officials reportedly left Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer with the ”impression” that the United States would support further Israeli airstrikes on Iran under certain conditions after Dermer’s meetings in Washington last week. These conditions include Iranian efforts to rebuild its nuclear program or to move highly enriched uranium from Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan, according to two sources familiar with the matter speaking to Axios on July 7.[xiii]  US airstrikes on these facilities on June 22 “sealed off” the enriched uranium inside the three damaged nuclear sites but did not destroy all the nuclear material or infrastructure, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios on July 7.[xiv] The enrichment level of the nuclear material at these sites and whether Iran moved some of the enriched material prior to the strikes is unclear.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) harassed a German aircraft supporting the EU mission to defend international shipping in the Red Sea, which could decrease the ability of US partners to defend the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against the Houthis. The German Foreign Affairs Ministry said on July 8 that a People’s Republic of China (PRC) PLAN ship used a laser to harass a German surveillance aircraft operating in the Red Sea in early July.[xv] The German Foreign Affairs Ministry said that the PLAN ship lasered the civilian-contracted German aircraft “without any reason” or prior contact while the aircraft had been operating under the European Union (EU)’s mission to protect merchant vessels from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[xvi] The Ministry added that the aircraft and its crew, which included German army personnel, had resumed operations since the incident. The German aircraft is based in Djibouti, where the PLA has a military base.[xvii] The PLAN has previously used lasers to harass US aircraft operating from Djibouti, as well.[xviii] The United States and Australia have previously accused the PLAN of using lasers against US and Australian aircraft in the Pacific Ocean.[xix] The PRC does not actively support the Houthis in the Red Sea, but PRC harassment of vessels and assets supporting the defense of international shipping can pull these assets off station and make them unable to fulfill their mission. This result, in turn, would mean that the net effect of PRC behavior supports Houthi operations even if the PRC does not intend to do so.

Likely Houthi militants conducted a complex attack targeting the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier Eternity C off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 7.[xx] Likely Houthi fighters on several small vessels attacked Eternity C with at least five rocket-propelled grenades and several one-way attack naval surface drones.[xxi] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that the vessel sustained significant damage and lost all propulsion.[xxii] The attack killed at least two crew members.[xxiii] UKMTO previously reported that the vessel was under continuous attack as of 3:34 AM ET on July 8.[xxiv] The Houthis previously conducted a similar complex attack targeting the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier Magic Seas off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 6.[xxv] Both vessels were traveling near the Zubair Islands at the time of the attacks, which suggests that a Houthi cell is likely operating from the Zubair Islands.[xxvi] The Houthis previously used these islands during the October 7 War to attack vessels and appear to be doing so again.[xxvii] It is also possible that the Houthis launched the vessels from Hudaydah and used the Zubair Islands as a way station. The Houthis have not claimed the attack at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways

• Top Iranian officials have continued to argue that US-Iranian nuclear negotiations were “gaining momentum” prior to Israeli airstrikes, which is false. It is misleading to frame these talks as having meaningfully advanced when fundamental disagreements over nuclear enrichment continued to persist.
• Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei disputed on July 8 US President Donald Trump’s July 7 claim that Iran requested nuclear talks. A Tehran-based Western news correspondent later confirmed on July 4 that preparations are underway for “indirect” negotiations between Witkoff and Araghchi but noted that the meeting has not been finalized.
• Iran cannot access certain key nuclear facilities, according to the Iranian president. This suggests that leaked Iranian signals intercepts about limited damage at the nuclear facilities were inaccurate.
• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) navy harassed a German aircraft supporting the EU mission to defend international shipping against Houthi attacks. The PRC does not actively support the Houthis, but the harassment could cause allied aircraft to be unable to support efforts to defend against the Houthis.
• Likely Houthi militants conducted a complex attack targeting the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier Eternity C and killed two crew members off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 7.

Iran Update, July 7, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian took advantage of an interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson on July 7 to platform Iran's demands and misrepresent Iran’s destabilizing activities and role in the Middle East. Pezeshkian leveraged the interview to falsely present Iran as a peaceful force in the Middle East to a Western audience.
• Senior Iranian officials have claimed that Iran retains a significant missile stockpile that it can use to attack Israel. Israeli airstrikes on Iran between June 12 and 24 likely degraded Iran’s missile program, however.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck several Houthi targets in Hudaydah Governorate, Yemen. The Israeli strikes follow a Houthi ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on July 5.
• The Houthis claimed responsibility for a July 6 complex attack targeting the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier Magic Seas off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen. The Houthis had not attacked a merchant vessel in the Red Sea since November 2024. This attack highlights that the Houthis remain capable of resuming attacks on ships whenever they want and for reasons they choose.

Iran Update, July 6, 2025

Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. British media reported on July 6 that armed Iranian “intelligence agents” have conducted dozens of coordinated raids across Iran targeting Bahai religious minority members.[i] Iranian authorities reportedly seized electronic devices, personal belongings, and religious material that is being treated as contraband.[ii] Bahai members have frequently been accused of espionage and anti-regime activities.[iii] Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests. The death of Mahsa Amini in police custody acted as the proximate cause for protests in Tehran that rapidly expanded to Kurdish areas of Iran in Fall 2022. The regime has long oppressed Iranian Kurds, but Mahsa Amini’s death acted as a salient event that caused unexpected unrest.[iv]

Iran has arrested over 700 individuals on espionage accusations since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[v] The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as ”Mossad spies.”[vi]   Regime authorities, for example, arrested someone they called a Mossad ”associate” on July 6 for collecting information on military sites and attempting to send the information to ”hostile intelligence services.”[vii] First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli ”spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.[viii] CTP-ISW assessed on June 27 that Iran’s concern about Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran may be used as justification for broader crackdowns on society.[ix]

Key Takeaways

• Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since moving to a secure location on June 12 at the start of the Iran-Israel War.
• Likely Houthi fighters attacked a Liberian-flagged ship off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 6.

Iran Update, July 5, 2025

An unspecified high-ranking Iranian official cited by Amwaj Media on July 4 reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran.[i] Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities. The unspecified Iranian official told Amwaj that Iran is seeking a guarantee in negotiations that the United States will not conduct any additional strikes on Iran.”[ii] The official added that “a lack of confidence and ...  mistrust” with the US following the Israel-Iran Twelve Day War are core obstacles to future negotiations.[iii] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi stated on July 3 that the United States will have to “convince“ Iran that it will not use force before Iran agrees to engage in talks.[iv] US President Donald Trump has previously suggested that the United States could strike Iran if Iran attempted to rebuild its nuclear program, but he said on July 4 that Iran wished to resume negotiations.[v] Trump noted that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[vi] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands for zero enrichment and recently ended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Trump has warned that the United States would not allow Iran to restart its nuclear program in a new location in Iran.

European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections.[vii] These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization.  Three unspecified European officials cited by The Washington Post assessed that US strikes on Iran have likely strengthened hardline Iranian leaders’ belief that Iran must develop a nuclear weapon to deter future foreign intervention.[viii] A former European diplomat suggested that Iran would attempt to develop a nuclear weapon “as secretly as possible.”[ix]  The IAEA did not have access to all Iranian facilities before the strikes, including multiple facilities associated with the pre-2003 Iranian nuclear weapons program.[x] Israeli intelligence has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran’s nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly).[xi] For example, Israeli intelligence--not the IAEA--revealed that Iran was using computer modelling for research at Parchin Military Complex, a site that is linked to the nuclear program and that the IAEA has had difficulty accessing in the past.[xii] Computer modelling can be used to model different nuclear weapon designs before producing an arsenal. Israeli intelligence, not IAEA inspections, drove Israeli concerns about Iranian weaponization and the Israeli decision to strike. The loss of IAEA inspections in Iran will certainly decrease the availability of open-source information on Iran’s nuclear program, but it is far from clear that the loss of these inspections would make it possible for Iran to build a weapon in secret.

Iran also faces challenges if it tries to weaponize because Iran will need large-scale production facilities to build a nuclear arsenal. Iran, if it chooses to weaponize, will almost certainly pursue a nuclear arsenal instead of a single nuclear weapon, as CTP-ISW has long assessed.[xiii] The development of a nuclear arsenal would require extensive rebuilding of Iranian facilities amid a major counterintelligence campaign that will undoubtedly create friction within the nuclear program. The scale of the facilities and time required for their development would make it very difficult for Iran to weaponize in secret.  There are also additional challenges associated with miniaturizing a weapon so that it can be used on a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, rather than deploying the weapon as a bomb. Any Iranian progress to weaponize will presumably be slowed by major Iranian counterintelligence investigations within the program, which could make it more difficult for surviving Iranian nuclear scientists to do their work.

Key Takeaways

• An unspecified Iranian official reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran. Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities.
• European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections. These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization.
• Iranian officials emphasized the importance of Azerbaijani airspace to successful Israeli operations in northern Iran and near Tehran. This discussion within the Iranian information space is indicative of Iran's long-standing concerns about perceived Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation and the threat it poses to Iranian security.
• Sources familiar with deliberations claimed that Hezbollah is conducting a review of its strategy in Lebanon. This rethink is probably driven by Hezbollah‘s losses in the October 7 War and regional changes since October 7 and does not represent a fundamental change in Hezbollah’s strategic aims.

Iran Update, July 4, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Senior Iranian leaders have continued to underscore that they will not stop uranium enrichment and that the United States will need to “convince” Iran that the United States will not resort to force with Iran again. It is unclear what will be required to “convince” Iran.
• Israel struck an Iranian facility on June 16 that is tied to Iran’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs. The Israeli strikes probably destroyed areas used for plastic explosives production.
• Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched one drone, probably targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Iraq. No militia has claimed the attack.

Iran Update, July 3, 2025

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have likely degraded Iran's ability to develop a nuclear arsenal. A nuclear analyst at a Washington, D.C.-based think tank reported on July 2 that US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s uranium metal conversion facilities at the ENTC did not significantly delay Iran’s nuclear timeline. The analyst stated that Iran could still produce enough uranium metal for a nuclear weapon (25 kilograms) in “weeks, perhaps even days” without these facilities. CTP-ISW previously assessed that, if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it would likely pursue a nuclear arsenal rather than a single nuclear weapon. A nuclear arsenal would require more than 25 kilograms of uranium metal and significant amounts of highly enriched uranium.
• Israel is reportedly drafting a mechanism to prevent Iran from being able to rebuild its nuclear program following the conclusion of the Israel-Iran War, according to Israeli media. The mechanism is reportedly similar to the US-approved Israeli monitoring mechanism for the ceasefire in Lebanon that allows Israel to conduct preemptive operations against Hezbollah if Hezbollah violates the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.
• Anti-regime media claimed on July 2 that former President Hassan Rouhani supports Hassan Khomeini as the next supreme leader and is attempting to play a role in succession. Anti-regime media added that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, along with other actors, support senior cleric Javad Alavi Boroujerdi, who has previously criticized Vilayat-e Faqih, while hardliners favor Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, who is a staunch anti-Western figure.
• Basij forces shot and killed two men in a vehicle in Hamedan Province, Iran, on July 1. IRGC-affiliated media claimed that security forces suspected the men of conducting drone activities. Mourners at a funeral for the men on July 3 chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Death to the oppressor” and “The real enemy is right here, they’re lying when they say it’s America.” This incident comes amid the regime’s efforts to tighten internal control, including by passing a new law on June 29 that regulates the use of drones.

Iran Update, July 2, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Former President Hassan Rouhani is likely attempting to reenter Iran’s political scene by presenting the post-war crisis as a chance to reform governance, restore public trust, and recalibrate the regime’s trajectory. Rouhani’s efforts appear to have triggered concern among his longstanding hardline rivals. Rouhani may seek to work with members of the regime who have larger power bases than himself to reassert his political influence.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander. Ali Abadi has held leadership roles in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and several internal security positions throughout his career. Ali Abadi had most recently served as the Armed Forces General Staff coordination deputy since 2016. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a capacity similar to a chief of staff in the US military.
• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi cast doubt on the possibility of European involvement in future nuclear negotiations. European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas and Araghchi held a phone call on July 1 to discuss future nuclear negotiations. Araghchi posted on X following his call with Kallas that the European Union and the United Kingdom’s participation in any future negotiations is “irrelevant and therefore meaningless.”

Iran Update, July 1, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Iran is continuing to try to assess damage at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). CTP-ISW previously reported that imagery from June 28 and 29 showed an excavator and crane near the northern impact points and an excavator near the southern impact points at Fordow. A US weapons expert assessed on June 30 that Iran may be preparing to send cameras or personnel into the craters to conduct a downhole damage assessment.
• Satellite imagery captured on July 1 indicates that Iran has at least partially filled the three southern impact points and covered one of the northern impact points with a temporary cover. A US weapons expert suggested that Iran may seek to prevent materials and personnel from falling into the craters while Iran conducts battle damage assessments around the site. Satellite imagery captured on July 1 also shows that Iran has cleared the surroundings of a tunnel entrance near the southern impact points to enable vehicle access to the tunnel.
• The Iranian Parliament approved an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) law on June 29 that aims to close the “critical legal and operational gaps” that enabled Israel to conduct drone operations at the beginning of the Israel-Iran War. Mossad established a secret drone base in Iranian territory prior to the war that Israel used to target Iranian air defenses and missile launchers at the start of the war. The Iranian Parliament also introduced a nine-article law on June 29 that labels any intelligence, espionage, or operational cooperation with Israel, the United States, or other “hostile” actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a crime punishable by death. These security measures are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that the Iranian regime is prioritizing regime stability following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran Update, June 30, 2025

US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes.[i] Four unspecified US officials familiar with US intelligence said that the intercepted communication included Iranian officials speculating as to why the US airstrikes were not as destructive and extensive as they anticipated.[ii] The Western media report did not clarify what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement. It is also unclear when the US intelligence community collected this intelligence, but separate Israeli intelligence suggested that Iranian military officials have been giving false situation reports and downplaying the extent of damage to Iran’s political leadership, however.[iii] Signals intelligence collected within a day or two of the strike would presumably be less reliable than intelligence collected a week or more after the strike. It is unlikely that any Iranian officials could have executed a complete battle damage assessment within 48 hours because doing so would require seeing the inside of the facility, and all the known access points had collapsed. The Institute for Science and International Security also previously assessed that twelve 30,000lb bombs penetrated Fordow and generated a blast wave that would have destroyed the centrifuges enriching uranium at Fordow.[iv] Even small vibrations can destroy centrifuges.

Key Takeaways

• A top Iranian official cast doubt on the likelihood of US-Iran talks soon. The official, who was previously involved in negotiations, said Iran “insist[s]” on enriching uranium.
• US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes. It is also unclear what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement.
• A prominent Iranian cleric issued a religious ruling that states individuals who threaten Iranian leadership and religious authority are punishable by death. This cleric previously met with a reformist former Iranian president, who attempted to sideline the supreme leader at least temporarily, and the ruling may be intended to demonstrate loyalty to the supreme leader.

Iran Update, June 29, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Iran has likely begun to assess damage and conduct repair operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 28 and 29 shows Iranian heavy equipment near two clusters of three impact points on ventilation shafts at Fordow that were caused by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. A US weapons expert assessed that Iran may be filling the craters and conducting engineering damage assessments and radiological sampling.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said on June 27 that Iran could resume uranium enrichment within “a matter of months.” Grossi stated that Iran could have at most “a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium” within months. US and Israeli strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges. The destruction of so many centrifuges will likely hamper Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.
• Former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani argued that Iran must restore deterrence and rebuild public trust with the Iranian people as part of a revitalized national strategy. Rouhani’s call for restoring trust with the Iranian people follows a similar call by Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani on June 28. Rouhani’s statement is also notable given recent reports that Rouhani may be attempting to use Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence to try to play a larger and more meaningful role in regime decision-making.
• Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an article on June 29 expressing support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets. Defa Press argued that the Iranian Artesh Air Force “needs to employ up-to-date fighter jets" so that the Artesh Air Force can defend Iranian airspace and confront Iran's adversaries "more effectively." The Israeli Air Force established air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Iran-Israel War, as CTP-ISW previously noted. Defa Press argued that Chinese fighter jets, particularly the Chengdu J-10, can play an” important role” in helping Iran defend its airspace and confront foreign adversaries.

Iran Update, June 28, 2025

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.
• Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site.
• Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s command and control structure. Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi Nemati. Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding” in an interview on June 28. Shamkhani claimed that nuclear negotiations with the United States are a “deceptive plan” that seeks to “provoke unrest” and “prepare the atmosphere inside Iran” for protests. Shamkhani’s statements come as the Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24.

Iran Update, June 27, 2025

US and Israeli strikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat. The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow directly targeted points above the centrifuge cascade hall and likely destroyed all six IR-1 and seven IR-6 cascades that produced nearly 90 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium as of the last IAEA reporting period.[i] IAEA Director Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 26 that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that small vibrations can destroy them.[ii]  The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that the twelve 30,000lb GBU-57s—over 180 tons of bombs—detonated inside the facility after traveling through the Fordow ventilation shafts.[iii] These bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.

Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles could pose a threat if Iran attempts to rebuild its nuclear program over the following years. Iranian officials have maintained Iran’s stated right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil despite the US and Israeli air campaign. Two unspecified officials told the Financial Times on June 26 that Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile “remains largely intact” following the US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, citing “preliminary intelligence assessments provided to European governments.”[iv] The Institute for Science and International Security also noted that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, which Iran would need to enrich further to weapons-grade (90% enrichment).[v]  Uranium enrichment is logarithmic, meaning that ”the higher [the concentration of Uranium], the easier it gets” to enrich to higher levels.[vi] The destruction of so many centrifuges between June 12 and June 24 will still make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material. Conventional explosives cannot destroy enriched uranium. Iran may have moved some enriched uranium from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of Israeli strikes, according to some reports.[vii] The White House has rejected reports that suggest Iran relocated enriched material ahead of US airstrikes on June 21.[viii]

The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though Iran could enrich to weapons-grade if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility.[ix] Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the US atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type weapon would need at least 25kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. Iran would only be able to deliver such a weapon using an aircraft or other, more rudimentary delivery weapon, however. Iran would also still require the know-how and facilities to build such a weapon. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.[x] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,” such as a nuclear bomb.[xi]

IRGC-affiliated media confirmed on June 27 that the IDF killed another Iranian nuclear scientist, Soleiman Soleimani, in a recent targeted attack.[xii] Soleimani was a chemical engineering graduate from the Iranian University of Science and Technology (IUST).[xiii] The IUST is a Tehran-based technical university closely linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[xiv] IUST has conducted research relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles, missile propulsion, and satellite technology, and has collaborated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) on continuous mixer technologies with potential missile propellant applications.[xv] Israel’s targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear scientists degrade Iran’s nuclear program by limiting the institutional knowledge available to rebuild the nuclear program following US and Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli airstrikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program. The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though it could do so if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility or retains surviving centrifuges at another facility. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.
• A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israel seeks to retain its air superiority over Iranian airspace, prevent reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and inhibit Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened to conduct retaliatory attacks against a potential Israeli strike.
• The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime’s paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli “spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.

Iran Update, June 26, 2025

Key Takeaways

• The United States and Iran will reportedly resume nuclear negotiations in the near future. Iran will likely reject any US nuclear proposal that requires Iran to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil given that Iran has maintained its position on uranium enrichment from before the Israel-Iran War.
• Moderate elements within the Iranian regime may be using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s isolation during the Israel-Iran War to try to exert greater political influence in the regime. Four unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, are part of a faction that supports a pragmatic and diplomatic approach to the conflict with the United States and Israel. The New York Times report about pragmatic and hardline factions vying for decision-making authority follows earlier indications of internal fissures in the regime.
• International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi stated on June 26 that centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) are "no longer working" due to the US and Israeli strikes on the site. Grossi stated that centrifuges are very "delicate" and that "even small vibrations can destroy them.
• Israeli airstrikes killed several IRGC Aerospace Force commanders, including commanders who would have coordinated Iran’s retaliation against Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked a group of IRGC Aerospace Force commanders on June 12 who were meeting to discuss Iran’s retaliation against Israel’s initial airstrikes. The strike killed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh and at least seven other commanders.

Previous Iran Updates

• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023