Iran Updates

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Strike Update, July 6, 2025

Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. British media reported on July 6 that armed Iranian “intelligence agents” have conducted dozens of coordinated raids across Iran targeting Bahai religious minority members.[i] Iranian authorities reportedly seized electronic devices, personal belongings, and religious material that is being treated as contraband.[ii] Bahai members have frequently been accused of espionage and anti-regime activities.[iii] Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests. The death of Mahsa Amini in police custody acted as the proximate cause for protests in Tehran that rapidly expanded to Kurdish areas of Iran in Fall 2022. The regime has long oppressed Iranian Kurds, but Mahsa Amini’s death acted as a salient event that caused unexpected unrest.[iv]

Iran has arrested over 700 individuals on espionage accusations since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[v] The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as ”Mossad spies.”[vi]   Regime authorities, for example, arrested someone they called a Mossad ”associate” on July 6 for collecting information on military sites and attempting to send the information to ”hostile intelligence services.”[vii] First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli ”spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.[viii] CTP-ISW assessed on June 27 that Iran’s concern about Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran may be used as justification for broader crackdowns on society.[ix]

Key Takeaways

• Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since moving to a secure location on June 12 at the start of the Iran-Israel War.
• Likely Houthi fighters attacked a Liberian-flagged ship off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 6.

Iran Strike Update, July 5, 2025

An unspecified high-ranking Iranian official cited by Amwaj Media on July 4 reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran.[i] Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities. The unspecified Iranian official told Amwaj that Iran is seeking a guarantee in negotiations that the United States will not conduct any additional strikes on Iran.”[ii] The official added that “a lack of confidence and ...  mistrust” with the US following the Israel-Iran Twelve Day War are core obstacles to future negotiations.[iii] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi stated on July 3 that the United States will have to “convince“ Iran that it will not use force before Iran agrees to engage in talks.[iv] US President Donald Trump has previously suggested that the United States could strike Iran if Iran attempted to rebuild its nuclear program, but he said on July 4 that Iran wished to resume negotiations.[v] Trump noted that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[vi] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands for zero enrichment and recently ended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Trump has warned that the United States would not allow Iran to restart its nuclear program in a new location in Iran.

European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections.[vii] These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization.  Three unspecified European officials cited by The Washington Post assessed that US strikes on Iran have likely strengthened hardline Iranian leaders’ belief that Iran must develop a nuclear weapon to deter future foreign intervention.[viii] A former European diplomat suggested that Iran would attempt to develop a nuclear weapon “as secretly as possible.”[ix]  The IAEA did not have access to all Iranian facilities before the strikes, including multiple facilities associated with the pre-2003 Iranian nuclear weapons program.[x] Israeli intelligence has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran’s nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly).[xi] For example, Israeli intelligence--not the IAEA--revealed that Iran was using computer modelling for research at Parchin Military Complex, a site that is linked to the nuclear program and that the IAEA has had difficulty accessing in the past.[xii] Computer modelling can be used to model different nuclear weapon designs before producing an arsenal. Israeli intelligence, not IAEA inspections, drove Israeli concerns about Iranian weaponization and the Israeli decision to strike. The loss of IAEA inspections in Iran will certainly decrease the availability of open-source information on Iran’s nuclear program, but it is far from clear that the loss of these inspections would make it possible for Iran to build a weapon in secret.

Iran also faces challenges if it tries to weaponize because Iran will need large-scale production facilities to build a nuclear arsenal. Iran, if it chooses to weaponize, will almost certainly pursue a nuclear arsenal instead of a single nuclear weapon, as CTP-ISW has long assessed.[xiii] The development of a nuclear arsenal would require extensive rebuilding of Iranian facilities amid a major counterintelligence campaign that will undoubtedly create friction within the nuclear program. The scale of the facilities and time required for their development would make it very difficult for Iran to weaponize in secret.  There are also additional challenges associated with miniaturizing a weapon so that it can be used on a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, rather than deploying the weapon as a bomb. Any Iranian progress to weaponize will presumably be slowed by major Iranian counterintelligence investigations within the program, which could make it more difficult for surviving Iranian nuclear scientists to do their work.

Key Takeaways

• An unspecified Iranian official reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran. Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities.
• European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections. These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization.
• Iranian officials emphasized the importance of Azerbaijani airspace to successful Israeli operations in northern Iran and near Tehran. This discussion within the Iranian information space is indicative of Iran's long-standing concerns about perceived Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation and the threat it poses to Iranian security.
• Sources familiar with deliberations claimed that Hezbollah is conducting a review of its strategy in Lebanon. This rethink is probably driven by Hezbollah‘s losses in the October 7 War and regional changes since October 7 and does not represent a fundamental change in Hezbollah’s strategic aims.

Iran Strike Update, July 4, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Senior Iranian leaders have continued to underscore that they will not stop uranium enrichment and that the United States will need to “convince” Iran that the United States will not resort to force with Iran again. It is unclear what will be required to “convince” Iran.
• Israel struck an Iranian facility on June 16 that is tied to Iran’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs. The Israeli strikes probably destroyed areas used for plastic explosives production.
• Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched one drone, probably targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Iraq. No militia has claimed the attack.

Iran Strike Update, July 3, 2025

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have likely degraded Iran's ability to develop a nuclear arsenal. A nuclear analyst at a Washington, D.C.-based think tank reported on July 2 that US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s uranium metal conversion facilities at the ENTC did not significantly delay Iran’s nuclear timeline. The analyst stated that Iran could still produce enough uranium metal for a nuclear weapon (25 kilograms) in “weeks, perhaps even days” without these facilities. CTP-ISW previously assessed that, if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it would likely pursue a nuclear arsenal rather than a single nuclear weapon. A nuclear arsenal would require more than 25 kilograms of uranium metal and significant amounts of highly enriched uranium.
• Israel is reportedly drafting a mechanism to prevent Iran from being able to rebuild its nuclear program following the conclusion of the Israel-Iran War, according to Israeli media. The mechanism is reportedly similar to the US-approved Israeli monitoring mechanism for the ceasefire in Lebanon that allows Israel to conduct preemptive operations against Hezbollah if Hezbollah violates the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.
• Anti-regime media claimed on July 2 that former President Hassan Rouhani supports Hassan Khomeini as the next supreme leader and is attempting to play a role in succession. Anti-regime media added that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, along with other actors, support senior cleric Javad Alavi Boroujerdi, who has previously criticized Vilayat-e Faqih, while hardliners favor Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, who is a staunch anti-Western figure.
• Basij forces shot and killed two men in a vehicle in Hamedan Province, Iran, on July 1. IRGC-affiliated media claimed that security forces suspected the men of conducting drone activities. Mourners at a funeral for the men on July 3 chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Death to the oppressor” and “The real enemy is right here, they’re lying when they say it’s America.” This incident comes amid the regime’s efforts to tighten internal control, including by passing a new law on June 29 that regulates the use of drones.

Iran Strike Update, July 2, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Former President Hassan Rouhani is likely attempting to reenter Iran’s political scene by presenting the post-war crisis as a chance to reform governance, restore public trust, and recalibrate the regime’s trajectory. Rouhani’s efforts appear to have triggered concern among his longstanding hardline rivals. Rouhani may seek to work with members of the regime who have larger power bases than himself to reassert his political influence.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander. Ali Abadi has held leadership roles in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and several internal security positions throughout his career. Ali Abadi had most recently served as the Armed Forces General Staff coordination deputy since 2016. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a capacity similar to a chief of staff in the US military.
• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi cast doubt on the possibility of European involvement in future nuclear negotiations. European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas and Araghchi held a phone call on July 1 to discuss future nuclear negotiations. Araghchi posted on X following his call with Kallas that the European Union and the United Kingdom’s participation in any future negotiations is “irrelevant and therefore meaningless.”

Iran Strike Update, July 1, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Iran is continuing to try to assess damage at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). CTP-ISW previously reported that imagery from June 28 and 29 showed an excavator and crane near the northern impact points and an excavator near the southern impact points at Fordow. A US weapons expert assessed on June 30 that Iran may be preparing to send cameras or personnel into the craters to conduct a downhole damage assessment.
• Satellite imagery captured on July 1 indicates that Iran has at least partially filled the three southern impact points and covered one of the northern impact points with a temporary cover. A US weapons expert suggested that Iran may seek to prevent materials and personnel from falling into the craters while Iran conducts battle damage assessments around the site. Satellite imagery captured on July 1 also shows that Iran has cleared the surroundings of a tunnel entrance near the southern impact points to enable vehicle access to the tunnel.
• The Iranian Parliament approved an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) law on June 29 that aims to close the “critical legal and operational gaps” that enabled Israel to conduct drone operations at the beginning of the Israel-Iran War. Mossad established a secret drone base in Iranian territory prior to the war that Israel used to target Iranian air defenses and missile launchers at the start of the war. The Iranian Parliament also introduced a nine-article law on June 29 that labels any intelligence, espionage, or operational cooperation with Israel, the United States, or other “hostile” actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a crime punishable by death. These security measures are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that the Iranian regime is prioritizing regime stability following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran Strike Update, June 30, 2025

US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes.[i] Four unspecified US officials familiar with US intelligence said that the intercepted communication included Iranian officials speculating as to why the US airstrikes were not as destructive and extensive as they anticipated.[ii] The Western media report did not clarify what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement. It is also unclear when the US intelligence community collected this intelligence, but separate Israeli intelligence suggested that Iranian military officials have been giving false situation reports and downplaying the extent of damage to Iran’s political leadership, however.[iii] Signals intelligence collected within a day or two of the strike would presumably be less reliable than intelligence collected a week or more after the strike. It is unlikely that any Iranian officials could have executed a complete battle damage assessment within 48 hours because doing so would require seeing the inside of the facility, and all the known access points had collapsed. The Institute for Science and International Security also previously assessed that twelve 30,000lb bombs penetrated Fordow and generated a blast wave that would have destroyed the centrifuges enriching uranium at Fordow.[iv] Even small vibrations can destroy centrifuges.

Key Takeaways

• A top Iranian official cast doubt on the likelihood of US-Iran talks soon. The official, who was previously involved in negotiations, said Iran “insist[s]” on enriching uranium.
• US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes. It is also unclear what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement.
• A prominent Iranian cleric issued a religious ruling that states individuals who threaten Iranian leadership and religious authority are punishable by death. This cleric previously met with a reformist former Iranian president, who attempted to sideline the supreme leader at least temporarily, and the ruling may be intended to demonstrate loyalty to the supreme leader.

Iran Strike Update, June 29, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Iran has likely begun to assess damage and conduct repair operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 28 and 29 shows Iranian heavy equipment near two clusters of three impact points on ventilation shafts at Fordow that were caused by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. A US weapons expert assessed that Iran may be filling the craters and conducting engineering damage assessments and radiological sampling.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said on June 27 that Iran could resume uranium enrichment within “a matter of months.” Grossi stated that Iran could have at most “a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium” within months. US and Israeli strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges. The destruction of so many centrifuges will likely hamper Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.
• Former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani argued that Iran must restore deterrence and rebuild public trust with the Iranian people as part of a revitalized national strategy. Rouhani’s call for restoring trust with the Iranian people follows a similar call by Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani on June 28. Rouhani’s statement is also notable given recent reports that Rouhani may be attempting to use Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence to try to play a larger and more meaningful role in regime decision-making.
• Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an article on June 29 expressing support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets. Defa Press argued that the Iranian Artesh Air Force “needs to employ up-to-date fighter jets" so that the Artesh Air Force can defend Iranian airspace and confront Iran's adversaries "more effectively." The Israeli Air Force established air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Iran-Israel War, as CTP-ISW previously noted. Defa Press argued that Chinese fighter jets, particularly the Chengdu J-10, can play an” important role” in helping Iran defend its airspace and confront foreign adversaries.

Iran Strike Update, June 28, 2025

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.
• Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site.
• Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s command and control structure. Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi Nemati. Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding” in an interview on June 28. Shamkhani claimed that nuclear negotiations with the United States are a “deceptive plan” that seeks to “provoke unrest” and “prepare the atmosphere inside Iran” for protests. Shamkhani’s statements come as the Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24.

Iran Strike Update, June 27, 2025

US and Israeli strikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat. The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow directly targeted points above the centrifuge cascade hall and likely destroyed all six IR-1 and seven IR-6 cascades that produced nearly 90 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium as of the last IAEA reporting period.[i] IAEA Director Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 26 that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that small vibrations can destroy them.[ii]  The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that the twelve 30,000lb GBU-57s—over 180 tons of bombs—detonated inside the facility after traveling through the Fordow ventilation shafts.[iii] These bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.

Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles could pose a threat if Iran attempts to rebuild its nuclear program over the following years. Iranian officials have maintained Iran’s stated right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil despite the US and Israeli air campaign. Two unspecified officials told the Financial Times on June 26 that Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile “remains largely intact” following the US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, citing “preliminary intelligence assessments provided to European governments.”[iv] The Institute for Science and International Security also noted that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, which Iran would need to enrich further to weapons-grade (90% enrichment).[v]  Uranium enrichment is logarithmic, meaning that ”the higher [the concentration of Uranium], the easier it gets” to enrich to higher levels.[vi] The destruction of so many centrifuges between June 12 and June 24 will still make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material. Conventional explosives cannot destroy enriched uranium. Iran may have moved some enriched uranium from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of Israeli strikes, according to some reports.[vii] The White House has rejected reports that suggest Iran relocated enriched material ahead of US airstrikes on June 21.[viii]

The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though Iran could enrich to weapons-grade if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility.[ix] Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the US atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type weapon would need at least 25kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. Iran would only be able to deliver such a weapon using an aircraft or other, more rudimentary delivery weapon, however. Iran would also still require the know-how and facilities to build such a weapon. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.[x] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,” such as a nuclear bomb.[xi]

IRGC-affiliated media confirmed on June 27 that the IDF killed another Iranian nuclear scientist, Soleiman Soleimani, in a recent targeted attack.[xii] Soleimani was a chemical engineering graduate from the Iranian University of Science and Technology (IUST).[xiii] The IUST is a Tehran-based technical university closely linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[xiv] IUST has conducted research relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles, missile propulsion, and satellite technology, and has collaborated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) on continuous mixer technologies with potential missile propellant applications.[xv] Israel’s targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear scientists degrade Iran’s nuclear program by limiting the institutional knowledge available to rebuild the nuclear program following US and Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli airstrikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program. The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though it could do so if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility or retains surviving centrifuges at another facility. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.
• A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israel seeks to retain its air superiority over Iranian airspace, prevent reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and inhibit Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened to conduct retaliatory attacks against a potential Israeli strike.
• The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime’s paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli “spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.

Iran Strike Update, June 26, 2025

Key Takeaways

• The United States and Iran will reportedly resume nuclear negotiations in the near future. Iran will likely reject any US nuclear proposal that requires Iran to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil given that Iran has maintained its position on uranium enrichment from before the Israel-Iran War.
• Moderate elements within the Iranian regime may be using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s isolation during the Israel-Iran War to try to exert greater political influence in the regime. Four unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, are part of a faction that supports a pragmatic and diplomatic approach to the conflict with the United States and Israel. The New York Times report about pragmatic and hardline factions vying for decision-making authority follows earlier indications of internal fissures in the regime.
• International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi stated on June 26 that centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) are "no longer working" due to the US and Israeli strikes on the site. Grossi stated that centrifuges are very "delicate" and that "even small vibrations can destroy them.
• Israeli airstrikes killed several IRGC Aerospace Force commanders, including commanders who would have coordinated Iran’s retaliation against Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked a group of IRGC Aerospace Force commanders on June 12 who were meeting to discuss Iran’s retaliation against Israel’s initial airstrikes. The strike killed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh and at least seven other commanders.

Previous Iran Updates

• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023