Iran Updates

Follow CTP on Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebok.

Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, September 5, 2025

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E3 triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[i] The E3 previously told Iran that they would delay the reimposition of UN sanctions by up to six months if Iran met three key conditions, which include restoring the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear facilities, addressing concerns about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, and engaging in direct talks with the United States.[ii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 4 in Qatar to discuss Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the resumption of IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear sites.[iii] A Wall Street Journal reporter stated on September 4 that the talks produced no progress, and neither side shifted its stance during the talks.[iv] Iran and the IAEA are expected to meet in Vienna on September 5.[v] Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna Reza Najafi stated on September 5 that the discussions will define cooperation under Iran’s parliamentary law and establish the “new form of cooperation” with the agency.[vi] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA.[vii]  Iran recently allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to monitor fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but has barred them from accessing or inspecting damaged nuclear sites.[viii]

The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah.[ix] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to place all weapons under the state’s control during a cabinet session on September 5.[x] The Lebanese Council of Ministers ordered the LAF to create a plan on August 5 that will attempt to establish a state monopoly over arms in Lebanon.[xi] The Lebanese cabinet has decided to keep the details of the LAF’s plan and the cabinet’s deliberations confidential.[xii] The LAF plan will reportedly take 15 months to implement and will focus on clearing weapons in five geographical sectors, starting with Beirut, according to Lebanese media.[xiii] It is unclear what the other four geographical sectors are. Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos announced that the LAF will begin implementing its plan in accordance with its available resources and logistics, which suggests that the LAF faces certain resource and logistical constraints but does not specify the constraints.[xiv] Morcos noted that the LAF’s implementation process is contingent upon Israeli compliance with the US proposal.[xv] The US proposal stipulates an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement’s implementation, and the LAF completely disarming Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[xvi] The 15-month plan would not disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025, meaning that Israel could operate in Lebanon even under the US proposal as currently written and reported. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed, however.[xvii] Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government‘s approval of the LAF plan. Hezbollah and its Shia allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the LAF plan and have vehemently opposed the plan in public statements prior to the approval.[xviii]

Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament.  Senior Hezbollah officials have repeatedly argued that Hezbollah should not be subject to disarmament, given its “unique” status as defenders of Lebanon against Israel.[xix] Hezbollah has repeatedly initiated offensive wars against Israel on its own accord, which undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.[xx] These wars have frequently wrought significant destruction across Lebanon.[xxi] The group has already threatened to use force against the Lebanese government to coerce or compel it to cease its disarmament plans, which indicates that Hezbollah will attempt to subvert any disarmament efforts.[xxii]

A Hezbollah effort to delay or stop LAF efforts to disarm it would enable it to reorganize and regenerate its forces and possibly defeat a disarmament effort before disarmament can be successful. Hezbollah has undergone a review of its strategy in Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire to shape its reconstitution effort and reduce reliance on external support.[xxiii] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons and restructured its financial system in August 2025 to confront its financial challenges.[xxiv] Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[xxv] Iran has reiterated that it will support Hezbollah in its efforts to rebuild and has even reportedly attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah in recent weeks.[xxvi] Hezbollah will strengthen slowly as a result of these efforts unless it is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.

The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. US officials told the New York Times on September 4 that the Lebanese government would likely receive significant amounts of money for military equipment and LAF salaries if the Lebanese government implements a “serious disarmament plan.”[xxvii] Lebanese officials said on September 5 that unspecified foreign countries have pledged to provide Lebanon with aid, but that Lebanon will not receive any economic investments unless it restricts arms to the state.[xxviii] These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by providing services that the government fails to provide. The influx of aid would also increase support for the government should the government prove able to provide reconstruction funds and other social services historically provided by Hezbollah. Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to access funds to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure following the conflict with Israel in late 2024.[xxix] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xxx] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xxxi] This economic stimulus within communities from the Lebanese government would complement the LAF’s disarmament campaign by reinstating the Lebanese government as the primary service and security guarantor in Hezbollah strongholds.  

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament. Hezbollah will reconstitute slowly unless its reconstitution is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.
• Economic Support for Lebanon: The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by enabling the government to provide services that Hezbollah previously provided.

Iran Update, September 4, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare.[i] The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”[ii] The Tasnim report outlined the following three main areas that Iran must address to withstand hybrid warfare:

• Redefining Governance Structures and Processes: Tasnim called for re-engineering Iran’s governance system and warned that a centralized bureaucracy is too slow and brittle for hybrid war.[iii] Tasnim urged the regime to create mechanisms to monitor internal divisions, accelerate bureaucratic processes, and provide more authority to governors and local officials. It argued that decentralized power would make governance more flexible and resilient, which would speed up the regime’s responses to crises such as unrest, cyberattacks, or supply disruptions.
• Reforming the Relationship Between the Regime and People: Tasnim called for the regime to treat the Iranian people as Iran’s main strategic asset rather than dependents of the state.[iv] It stressed that victory in hybrid war requires citizens to actively participate in governance, including via neighborhood security, the economy, and cultural resistance. Tasnim highlighted that small, agile grassroots groups involved with technology, media, and culture would counter stronger adversaries and shape public opinion so that people accept hardships as part of a larger struggle for independence and survival.
• Developing Iran’s “resistance economy:” Tasnim called for the regime to turn the economy into a “defensive stronghold.”[v] It emphasized the need to end dependence on crude oil sales, cut reliance on food imports and gas consumption, and enforce tight control over foreign exchange and trade. Tasnim also called for building long-term cooperation with Axis of Resistance members, neighboring states, and emerging powers such as Russia and China to secure essential goods and bypass Western economic pressure.

Tasnim also warned that adversaries use media narratives to target the minds and will of the people, which the outlet referred to as “narrative warfare.”[vi] Tasnim’s call to prioritize narrative warfare is consistent with recent regime efforts to control domestic reporting on snapback sanctions.[vii] Iranian officials have recently directed outlets to downplay the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) activation of the snapback mechanism and avoid negative portrayals of Iran’s future.[viii]

Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats.[ix] Nour News is affiliated with Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. The Supreme National Security Council established the Defense Council following the Israel-Iran War to address emerging national security threats and streamline decision-making during wartime.[x] Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.[xi] Nour News stated that the Defense Council is responsible for setting and executing priorities for Iran’s armed forces to prepare Iran to confront such threats.[xii] Nour News identified the following recommendations for Iran to address these emerging threats: build multi-layered deterrence, conduct active diplomacy, and manage domestic public opinion.[xiii] Nour News’ emphasis on public opinion is consistent with previous calls by Iranian media and moderate and pragmatic regime officials to increase public trust and societal resilience, as well as resolve disputes between the regime and the Iranian people.

Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian proposal would allow Iran to determine how Iran’s nuclear activities would be investigated.[xiv] Iran also revoked the accreditations of two experienced IAEA inspectors in August for mistakenly taking documents from Fordow to Vienna that reportedly described the facility’s interior.[xv] The IAEA stated that the revocation was unjustified because the documents did not include any information that would compromise the facility’s security.[xvi] This comes after the Iranian parliament passed a law on June 25 suspending all cooperation with the IAEA.[xvii] IAEA Director General Grossi said on September 3 that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is unlikely that any agreement will be reached due to Iran’s opposition.[xviii]

Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s public statements about the SDF’s integration under the Syrian transitional government.[xix] A Washington, DC-based source implied to Emirati media on September 3 that the US State Department has softened its stance toward the SDF’s negotiating position in integration talks with the transitional government in response to the transitional government’s conduct in Suwayda Province.[xx] Syrian transitional government forces conducted atrocities against Druze fighters and civilians after they gained control of parts of Suwayda Province on July 15.[xxi]  The source said that State Department officials are “listening to them [the SDF] more than before.”[xxii] This report is consistent with US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack’s comments to the Washington Post on August 23 that the transitional government may “need to consider alternatives to a highly centralized state,” following the violence in Suwayda Province.[xxiii] Barrack had previously rejected SDF demands for federalism during previous rounds of integration negotiations prior to the start of intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province on July 13.[xxiv]

The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.[xxv] These concessions include requests for the SDF to relinquish control of Arab-majority areas within SDF territory and the SDF’s monopoly on oil production in northeastern Syria.[xxvi] US mediators now reportedly seek a compromise in which the SDF would partially integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but retain limited autonomy.[xxvii] The source told Emirati media that an SDF negotiation delegation will travel to Damascus “in the coming days” for a new round of talks with the transitional government.[xxviii] Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials announced on September 4 that they have not yet received an official date from the transitional government for the resumption of negotiations, however.[xxix]

The SDF is also unlikely to relinquish demands for security guarantees from the transitional government due to fear of ethnic cleansing by Turkey and Turkish-backed groups that have integrated into the Syrian MoD. Turkey and Turkish-backed groups previously conducted ethnic cleansing against Syrian Kurds through the creation of ”safe zones” in Turkish-controlled Syria, in which Turkey displaced Kurdish civilians and replaced them with Syrian refugees from Turkey.[xxx] These SDF fears are particularly relevant due to US pressure on the SDF to relinquish control of SDF areas east of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates River is a significant defensive terrain feature that would enable the SDF to defend against any Syrian transitional government incursion from the western bank with relative ease. There are no significant defensive terrain features east of the Euphrates until the Khabour River. The majority of Syrian Kurds east of the Euphrates live behind the Khabour River. Defensive positions on the Khabour or Euphrates could be turned by an attack from the north out of Turkish territory, however. An unspecified Western diplomat said to Emirati media on September 4 that Turkey’s hardline position against the SDF will complicate negotiations even if the SDF and transitional government come to an agreement with US mediation.[xxxi] The diplomat added that ”the problem is that even if [President Ahmed] al Shara accepts devolution, Turkey will not, and he [Shara] cannot go against Ankara.”[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare. The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”
• Iran: Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats. Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.
• Iran: Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War.
• Syria: Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s public statements about the SDF’s integration under the Syrian transitional government. The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.

Iran Update, September 3, 2025

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.[i] The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report.[ii] Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[iii] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms.[iv] This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17.[v] The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War.[vi] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13.[vii]  CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the "vast majority" of Iran’s enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be "extremely difficult" for Iran to extract the material.[viii] The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery.[ix] Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.[x]

Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[xi] The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.[xii] The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran’s ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran’s future negatively.[xiii] Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was “a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people’s morale through psychological warfare.”[xiv] Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act “intelligently” and "maintain national cohesion and unity.”[xv] Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain “national self-confidence" and avoid “simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric” regarding the E3’s snapback decision.[xvi]  The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran’s poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest. The regime’s efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.[xvii]

Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported on September 2 that likely Hezbollah officials discussed various tactics that Hezbollah could employ to bypass the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xviii] Hezbollah officials reportedly discussed compelling the Lebanese government to delay Hezbollah’s disarmament until Israel and Syria commit to the US disarmament proposal.[xix] The Lebanese media report did not specify how Hezbollah may attempt to compel the Lebanese government. The US proposal includes an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days and Hezbollah’s complete disarmament by the end of 2025.[xx] The Israeli government reportedly will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it.[xxi] Hezbollah officials also reportedly proposed that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could exempt Hezbollah from being disarmed due to the LAF’s “lack of readiness.”[xxii] Lebanese media noted that all options for “escalation” are on the table if Hezbollah cannot find a “suitable formula” to bypass the government’s decision.[xxiii] Hezbollah reportedly threatened on September 2 to halt its cooperation with the LAF by refusing to hand over its weapons south of the Litani River if the Lebanese government approves and implements the LAF’s disarmament plan.[xxiv] A Lebanese source previously told Saudi media on August 28 that the LAF has confiscated various types of weapons in southern Lebanon without any objection from Hezbollah.[xxv] The LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have continued to discover Hezbollah weapons depots that Hezbollah did not disclose to the LAF, however.[xxvi]

Hezbollah’s proposed tactics to delay and ultimately prevent its disarmament appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon, Israeli compliance with the US proposal, and the LAF’s capabilities. LAF and Lebanese officials have previously raised concerns about conflict breaking out between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xxvii] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened potential confrontation and anti-government protests if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah.[xxviii]  Lebanese, US, and UNIFIL officials have also expressed concerns about the LAF’s capability to disarm Hezbollah.[xxix] Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned media channels have amplified reports about Lebanese security forces’ alleged unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah.[xxx] Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri separately criticized recent US efforts to Saudi media on August 27, stating that the United States gave Lebanon “the opposite” of what it promised.[xxxi] Berri’s statement came amid Lebanese authorities’ concern that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon until Hezbollah is fully disarmed.[xxxii]

Some of Hezbollah’s tactics may have produced favorable results for Hezbollah. The Lebanese cabinet announced on September 3 that it would add four items to the agenda for its cabinet session on August 5 after Hezbollah threatened to boycott the session if the cabinet did not add items other than Hezbollah’s disarmament to the agenda.[xxxiii] Hezbollah has reportedly agreed to the updated agenda, which represents an example of the state acceding to Hezbollah’s demands.[xxxiv]  

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Enriched Uranium: Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however.
• Iranian Domestic Censorship: Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.
• Hezbollah’s Anti-Disarmament Campaign: Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Many of Hezbollah’s proposed tactics appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon and the LAF’s capability to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran Update, September 2, 2025

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[i] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[ii] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports.  Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program.[iv] The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[v] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[vi]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[vii] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[viii] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement..[ix] Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[x]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[xi] Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“[xii] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[xiii] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xiv] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[xv] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarrai as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarrai as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[xvi] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generates millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[xvii] Samarrai used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[xviii] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarrai’s tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6 for lacking proper documentation.[xix] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[xx]

These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[xxi] The United States sanctioned six entities and four vessels on July 3 that are involved in smuggling Iranian oil, including a network of companies run by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said.[xxii] The United States threatened in July 2025 to sanction the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization and block access to 350 million USD of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[xxiii]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds, formerly known as Ashab al Kahf, stated on August 29 that the US withdrawal to the Iraqi Kurdistan region is a “redeployment [within Iraq]” and reaffirmed the group’s commitment to the removal of US forces from Iraq.[xxiv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee similarly reiterated its demand for US forces to withdraw from Iraq in a statement on August 21.[xxv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvi] The United States is expected to complete the first phase of the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces to Iraqi Kurdistan by the end of September 2025.[xxvii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that the coalition forces remaining in federal Iraq after September 2025 would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxviii] The removal of US forces from Iraq is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxix] The effort by Iranian-backed militias to justify their continued existence comes amid US pressure for the Iraqi federal government to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq, especially via the dissolution of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Russia and North Korea have sent nuclear scientists and missile experts, respectively, to Iran since June 2024.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions.
• Iraq: The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling.
• Iraq: Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq.

Iran Update, September 1, 2025

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as the SNSC deputy for international affairs on August 29. Larijani may have appointed Bagheri Kani due to his close ties to Paydari Front leader Saeed Jalili as part of an effort to reduce recent fissures between hardliners and more moderate elements of the regime.
• Iran: An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order.
• Iran: Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30. Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.
• Yemen: The Houthis confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai and 10 other senior Houthi political officials in an airstrike in Haddah District, southern Sanaa City, on August 28. These targeted killings are unlikely to disrupt Houthi military operations against Israel.

Previous Iran Updates

• August 2025
• July 2025
• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023