Iran Updates

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, October 21, 2025 

Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. This competition for influence comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[i] Khamenei gave a speech on October 20 after a month of absence, when he did not attend three events that he usually attends.[ii] An unspecified senior regime diplomat said in September 2025 that some Iranian officials are concerned for his health after communication from his office slowed after the Israel-Iran War.[iii] Khamenei, who is 86 years old, also had a major health scare in September 2022.[iv] Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime.  Rouhani has attempted to publicly reemerge as a prominent political actor since the start of the war in June 2025 and has positioned himself as a leading advocate for reform. Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom during the war to urge them to persuade Khamenei to adjust the regime’s policy regarding the war.[v] Rouhani separately called on the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West on August 13.[vi]  An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) outlet accused Rouhani on October 20 of fueling division and serving as a cautionary example for political conduct amid Iran’s current conditions.[vii]

The resurgence of long-standing tensions between Rouhani and Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani may also be a reaction to Rouhani’s post-war criticism of the regime and Rouhani’s attempts to reassert himself. Shamkhani stated on October 12 that Rouhani knew ”from the first day” that Iran’s air defense shot down Ukraine Airlines Flight PS752 in January 2020 despite Rouhani’s public denial.[viii] The Iranian government initially denied any responsibility for the downing of the civilian plane.  The comments on Flight PS752 coincided with public backlash regarding Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding, which critics viewed as evidence of elite privilege amid economic hardship. Some Iranian social media users and outlets speculated that Rouhani’s faction initiated the leak of footage from Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding in response to Shamkhani’s statements about Rouhani and Flight PS752.[ix]

Long-standing tensions exist between Shamkhani and Rouhani. The Iranian Parliament passed the ”Strategic Action Law” in 2020 with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) support when Shamkhani was SNSC Secretary.[x] The law mandated faster enrichment and reduced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, likely to influence the West regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[xi] Shamkhani later accused Rouhani’s government of blocking the implementation of the law, which prompted Rouhani to say that he regretted appointing Shamkhani as the SNSC Secretary and that he blamed Shamkhani for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival.[xii]

Some factions may seek to sideline Rouhani’s renewed activism to prevent him from shaping the succession narrative or rallying support among disaffected elites. These factions could see this effort as particularly important now due to the increasing concerns among senior Iranian officials about Khamenei’s health following reduced communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[xiii] UK-based outlet “IranWire” previously reported on September 12 that an unspecified senior Iranian official stated that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber maintain the closest contact with Khamenei and are maneuvering to expand their influence ahead of a possible succession.[xiv]

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[xv] ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes.[xvi] Covering these structures with dirt is unlikely to stop a concerted effort to destroy the facility, depending on the munitions used. Israel struck Taleghan 2 in October 2024 and destroyed equipment needed to design and test nuclear devices.[xvii] Iran previously used the Taleghan 2 facility for this purpose prior to stopping its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[xviii] This is part of Iran’s effort to reconstitute its nuclear and missile programs in the wake of the Israel-Iran War.

Iran Update, October 20, 2025 

A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War.[i] Nour News interviewed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani on October 13 as part of its "Pathway" series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges. Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Khani stated that the regime is in a “permanent state of crisis” in which Iranian officials are only focused on the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States.  Khani argued that this mindset has paralyzed Iranian officials and made them unable to devise long-term defense, economic, and political strategies.[ii] The Iranian regime has adopted stop-gap interim solutions, such as purchasing MiG-29s from Russia, which would be useless against F-35s, and conducting mass arrests of Iranians in the hope of solving Iran’s counter-intelligence failures.[iii] Khani suggested that these reactive approaches do not solve more fundamental strategic issues that Iran faces in its competition with Israel and the United States.[iv] Khani asserted that the regime’s reactive decision-making drains decisionmaker bandwidth and prevents senior leaders from confronting major post-war problems, including reconstruction, economic growth, and, presumably, the failure of Iran’s strategic theories of deterrence and defense.

Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.[v] Khani stated that Iran must accept that war is always a possibility but emphasized that the Iranian regime cannot allocate all of its resources and capabilities to preparing for war. Khani proposed that Iran should adopt a “more balanced and hybrid” and “people-based” security strategy, while still prioritizing its development of military capabilities. Khani also warned that Iran could fall behind in the international order if the Iranian regime does not fundamentally change its economic and defense strategy.

Khani also made a series of operational- and tactical-level proposals focused on command decentralization and technical improvements for certain weapon systems in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the war.[vi] Khani proposed expanding former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari‘s 2005 “mosaic doctrine,” which decentralized the IRGC by establishing 32 IRGC provincial units across Iran.[vii] Khani argued that Iran should decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective.[viii] Khani probably believes that decentralizing Iranian decision-making would help Iranian leaders overcome the command and control challenges they faced when Israel killed senior Iranian commanders during the war. Israeli strikes against senior IRGC commanders inhibited Iran’s ability to immediately retaliate against Israel.[ix]

Khani also called on the regime to improve its missile guidance systems and implied that the regime should employ maneuverable reentry vehicles as part of an effort to advance its missile program.[x] Khani stated that Iran must improve its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[xi] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight. These proposals demonstrate that some Iranian officials acknowledge the relatively low accuracy rate of Iranian missiles.  The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on October 18 that it added an anti-electronic warfare system to the Ghadr ballistic missile and a precision-guided warhead to the Emad ballistic missile, which further highlights how the Iranian regime is trying to develop its ballistic missiles to perform more effectively in the event of a future conflict with Israel.[xii] Iran used the Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel, as well as during the Israel-Iran War.[xiii]  

IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency separately called on the Iranian regime to develop long-term solutions to mitigate the impact of sanctions. This article illustrates that at least some Iranian regime elements are beginning to focus more on long-term solutions instead of short-term stop-gap measures.[xiv] Tasnim’s emphasis on long-term solutions is consistent with Khani’s call for a long-term strategic rethink. Tasnim stated that the Iranian economy cannot rely on “informal mechanisms” to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, which may be a reference to barter agreements and other mechanisms that Iran uses to evade sanctions.[xv] Tasnim called for using regional and multilateral platforms to promote trade that does not rely on the Western financial system.[xvi] Iranian officials frequently emphasize the importance of cooperation with BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states to "de-dollarize” trade.[xvii] Iranian media reported on October 19 that two Russian banks agreed to accept letters of credit issued by Iranian banks to facilitate Russian agricultural exports to Iran and allow Iran to circumvent the SWIFT international banking and finance system.[xviii] Tasnim also highlighted the importance of the private sector and called for reducing Iran’s reliance on oil exports.[xix]   Tasnim also called on the Iranian regime to downsize the government, eliminate monopolies in the economy, and promote private sector competition.[xx]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria.[xxi] The advisers will reportedly work with personnel at al Tanf Garrison in southern Syria to support “counter-ISIS surveillance and coordination.”[xxii] Sudani told Iraqi media that recent “developments in Syria,” almost certainly referring to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, require the presence of US advisers at Ain al Asad.[xxiii] The Iraqi federal government has considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq after the fall of Assad due to concerns that ISIS could exploit the situation in Syria to threaten Iraq.[xxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxv] Sudani said that this agreement required all US forces to withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase by September 2025, but it is unclear whether this included non-combat US military advisers and support personnel.[xxvi] Sudani’s statements come after the US Department of Defense announced on September 30 that the United States has reduced its military presence in Iraq.[xxvii] A US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxviii] The official also said that the United States is in the process of transferring control of Ain al Asad Airbase to the Iraqi federal government.[xxix]

Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Lebanese and Israeli officials were reportedly expected to begin indirect negotiations after the new US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, assumes his position in the coming days.[xxx] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told Saudi media on October 19 that preliminary discussions between Israel and Lebanon to formally renew indirect negotiations reached a “dead end,” however.[xxxi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently called for renewed talks with Israel to discuss issues in the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, including an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, border demarcation, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and the issue of disputed territories.[xxxii] Salam claimed that the preliminary discussions stalled due to Israel’s refusal to cease its operations in southern Lebanon.[xxxiii] Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told Saudi media on October 20 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told the Lebanese government that Israel had rejected a US-proposed negotiations framework.[xxxiv] The US-proposed framework reportedly called for a two-month cessation of Israeli operations in Lebanon, an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and negotiations on other outstanding issues.[xxxv] Berri stated that Lebanon has abandoned “any negotiating process” with Israel outside of the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire monitoring committee.[xxxvi]

Neither Israel nor Lebanon has changed its position on key outstanding issues, including the timeline for disarming Hezbollah, which could further delay the full implementation of the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarmament plans. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated on October 17 that Lebanese officials will not participate in indirect negotiations with Israel until Israel ceases its operations and fully withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] Unspecified Lebanese sources told Saudi media on October 19 that Aoun believes that negotiations with Israel should occur simultaneously with the implementation of the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxviii] Lebanese officials and the LAF have repeatedly claimed that continued Israeli operations limit the LAF’s ability to fully deploy its forces to southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah.[xxxix] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed and previously refused to discuss the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xl]

Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpile, and bolster its domestic support base, which would likely increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Israeli media reported on October 18 that Hezbollah has restored its chain of command after the IDF killed a significant number of its top commanders during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xli] Israeli media also reported on October 18 that Hezbollah is rapidly rebuilding its military capabilities.[xlii] Hezbollah has reportedly adopted a new weapons strategy that requires fewer personnel, less money, and limited infrastructure, which could include prioritizing low-cost weapons such as drones.[xliii] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons.[xliv] Iran may focus on rebuilding its armed forces and nuclear and missile programs after the Israel-Iran War, which may further constrain Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xlv] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones belonging to Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xlvi] Israeli media also claimed that Hezbollah has continued to provide compensation to its supporters whose homes were destroyed in the conflict.[xlvii] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xlviii] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah claimed on October 20 that Hezbollah has completed around 80 percent of the first phase of its reconstruction plan, which stipulates that Hezbollah will allocate $1 billion to reconstruct Beirut’s southern suburbs and the surrounding villages.[xlix] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively trying to maintain its domestic support base and reconstitute as a military organization. Any delay in the implementation of the US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

These reports may be overstating the degree to which Hezbollah has reconstituted its capabilities and maintained its support base. Hezbollah has reportedly struggled to appoint new leaders to key political and military roles, according to a Saudi media report in September 2025.[l] Hezbollah units reconstituted from the Hezbollah cadres that survived the war will be less effective than their predecessor units given that Israel killed a significant number of Hezbollah’s experienced commanders and left Hezbollah with a much less experienced command cadre. Hezbollah’s new reported weapons strategy may allow the group to reconstitute some of its weapon capabilities, but the group still faces numerous setbacks to replenish its weapons arsenal.[li] The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the crackdown by the Lebanese government on weapons and money smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings make Iranian efforts to resupply Hezbollah relatively slow and inefficient.[lii] Hezbollah has also largely struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters and Shia support base following the conflict. Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan, temporarily froze compensation payments to fighters in February 2025 and later indefinitely suspended payments to fighters in June 2025.[liii] Al Qard al Hassan has not resumed these payments as of September 2025.[liv] Hezbollah’s financial struggles have reportedly caused unprecedented discontent among its Shia support base, which could grow over time if Hezbollah is unable to fulfill these commitments.[lv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War. Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Disarmament: Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to try to reconstitute its forces, bolster its domestic support base, and increase its weapons stockpile.

Iran Update, October 17, 2025 

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 16 that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes.[i] ISIS reported that satellite imagery of the tunnel entrances to the ENTC’s underground facilities showed that Iran cleared out all debris in front of the northern tunnel entrance and most of the debris in front of the middle tunnel entrance in late July and late September, respectively.[ii] ISIS reported that imagery from September 30 showed a backhoe piling rocks in front of the northern tunnel entrance, which ISIS said could be a sign that Iran is trying to reinforce the northern tunnel against possible future strikes.[iii] The ISIS report added that Iran is likely prioritizing ”slow and safe access” to the ENTC underground facilities because it may be dangerous to enter after the strikes.[iv] The United States struck the ENTC on June 22.[v] ISIS stated that the extent of damage to the three tunnels could not be assessed at this time.[vi]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts.[vii] This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[viii] Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The reimposition of UN sanctions restored an arms embargo and broad UN restrictions upon Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[ix] Larijani likely discussed ways that Russia can assist Iran in evading and mitigating the impact of sanctions. Iran and Russia have historically collaborated through networks of foreign-based front companies and shadow fleets transporting sanctioned goods, such as energy exports and arms sales.[x] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya stated on October 1 that Russia does not recognize the “snapback as coming into force,” suggesting that Russia will continue to assist Iran evade sanctions as it did before the imposition of snapback sanctions.[xi] Larijani and Putin also likely discussed Russian military assistance that Russia could provide to Iran. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov separately stated on October 13 that Russia would “develop military-technical cooperation with Iran” with “no restrictions.”[xii]  Larijani could also have discussed military support for Iran from Russia in addition to sanctions evasion and mitigation. Iran seeks to buy Russian military equipment, though procuring it has been difficult given Russia’s prioritization of the war in Ukraine. Russian assets like the S-300 have also proven incapable of stopping Israeli or US air attack, and Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-35 are unlikely to seriously challenge the US-made F-35.

Iranian media also reported that Larijani conveyed an unspecified message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin.[xiii] Kremlin newswire TASS previously reported on October 9 that Putin claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Russia that Israel is committed to a settlement and “is not interested in confrontation with Iran.”[xiv] Putin’s claim likely reflects Russia’s ongoing interest in serving as a political intermediary between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Russia has consistently attempted to position itself as a mediator between Iran and the United States during nuclear negotiations in early 2025.[xv][xvi]

Turkey is attempting to secure an agreement with the Syrian government that would allow Turkish forces to target Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters deep inside Syria and possibly set conditions for future military operations targeting the SDF. Unspecified Turkish officials told Bloomberg on October 17 that Turkey and Syria have discussed expanding the 1998 Adana Agreement so that it allows Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to 30 kilometers in Syrian territory.[xvii] The 1998 Adana Agreement, which the Turkish government signed with the Assad regime, currently allows Turkey the right to target Kurdish fighters it deems a threat up to five kilometers into Syrian territory.[xviii] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used this agreement to justify Turkey’s right to launch a military offensive targeting the SDF in 2019, citing the Assad regime’s lack of “measures” taken to rein in Kurdish fighters near the border.[xix] Turkey has recently threatened to take military action against the SDF—which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—by the end of 2025 if the SDF does not integrate into the Syrian state by that date.[xx] Turkey's ability to target the SDF deeper in Syrian territory would allow Turkey to set conditions for possible future military operations targeting the SDF, including by targeting key SDF tactical and operational commanders within the 30-kilometer operational zone. Turkey has previously struck SDF forces deep into Syria—much deeper than 30 kilometers—but an amendment to the 1998 Adana Agreement would enable ground pursuit and help alleviate any possible friction with the new Syrian government.

It is unclear if the Syrian government will permit an expansion of the Adana Agreement under these terms, given that doing so may risk ending recent Kurdish cooperation with the government. The Syrian government has negotiated with the SDF over its integration into the Syrian state while it has simultaneously attempted to prevent Turkey from conducting another destabilizing military offensive in northern Syria.[xxi] The Syrian government and SDF recently reached a limited breakthrough in negotiations and agreed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades after months of stalled negotiations. Many of the mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army still need to be finalized, according to SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi on October 16.[xxiii] Abdi said that the recent SDF-government progress gives Turkey “no excuse” to act in Syrian territory, however.[xxiv]

Turkey may leverage planned weapons shipments in order to secure this agreement with the Syrian government. Turkish officials told Bloomberg that Turkey plans to supply the Syrian Defense Ministry with armored vehicles, drones, artillery, missiles, and air defense systems in the coming weeks.[xxv] These shipments are likely part of the military training and ”consultation” agreement that Syrian officials signed with Turkey on August 13.[xxvi] This agreement and the weapons transfers that it entails could give Turkey additional leverage over the Syrian government because the Syrian Defense Ministry does not currently own many of these systems.[xxvii] Turkish officials said that this equipment will be deployed in northern Syria.[xxviii]

Iran Update, October 16, 2025 

Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters likely assassinated Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14 with an explosive device in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah district, Iraq.[i] The perpetrators remotely detonated an explosive device on Mashhadani’s car, killing Mashhadani and injuring four others.[ii] Both the Iraqi parliament speaker and the prime minister announced investigations into the assassination.[iii] Iraqi Security Media Cell head Lieutenant General Saad Maan said on October 15 that unspecified actors had previously tried to assassinate Safaa al Mashhadani.[iv] No group has claimed responsibility for either incident at the time of this writing, which suggests the involvement of Iranian-backed actors.

Iran Update, October 15, 2025 

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 indicates that the Syrian government will likely pursue a pragmatic and multi-faceted relationship with Russia.[i] This meeting was the first between the two leaders since Shara came to power in December 2024.  Shara told Putin that he is attempting to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship and that Russia will play a “significant role” in helping Syria advance its political goals.[ii] Putin stated that he is ”prepared to do everything possible” to implement new initiatives between the two countries in reference to discussions about Russian participation in the reconstruction of Syria’s energy sector. [iii] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, head of intelligence Hussein al Salama, and Maher al Shara, who is Shara’s brother and a Russian citizen, also attended the meeting.[iv]

The current Russia-Syria relationship consists of mutually beneficial arrangements and understandings that have developed since the fall of the regime. Russia, once a key Assad ally, has maintained a military presence at three military bases in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, including an airbase and a naval base in coastal Syria that are critical for Russia’s power projection in the Mediterranean Sea.[v] Russia has attempted to use economic incentives to secure its basing rights in Syria under Shara’s government. The continued Russian presence in Syria suggests that this effort has been somewhat successful.[vi] The Syrian government has proven to be increasingly willing to engage directly with Russia since Spring 2025 on economic, military, and political issues that are advantageous to Syria.[vii]

CTP-ISW assesses that the Syrian government likely aims to achieve the following domestic political, economic, and military objectives from a “redefined” relationship with Russia: 

• Military Cooperation: Syria likely aims to gain military and technical lessons from the Russian military as the Syrian Defense Ministry builds and professionalizes the new Syrian army. Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation in meetings since September 2025, including discussing the development of the Syrian army’s training, artillery, and armor capabilities and readiness.[viii] Russia is unlikely to provide Syria with Russian arms imports or direct Russian training given Russia's current need to prioritize materiel shortages in its war against Ukraine.[ix]
• Economic Aid: Syria likely seeks to continue to procure economic aid from Russia in order to address Syria’s critical resource shortages, particularly in the energy sector.[x] Russia has delivered crude and refined oil to Syria via sanctioned tankers since March 2025, when few states were willing to do so given remaining US and international sanctions on Syria.[xi] Shara told Putin during their meeting that Syria depends on Russia to operate its power plants and for food supplies.[xii] Russia has delivered wheat grown in Russian-occupied Ukraine to Syria since April 2025.[xiii] Shara and Putin discussed Russia’s future involvement in “oil projects” and in the restoration of energy and rail infrastructure damaged during the civil war, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.[xiv]
• Support for Assadists: Syrian officials likely intend to secure the Kremlin’s commitment to end its support for members of the Assad regime in order bolster the Syrian government’s domestic and international legitimacy. Russia is currently providing asylum to former Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his family.[xv] Shara declared in a recent interview that Syria will use ”all legal means possible” to demand that Assad be brought to justice and stand trial in Syria.[xvi] Russia also hosts several other former regime officials, some of whom were reportedly involved in instigating the pro-Assad coastal insurgency in March 2025.[xvii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Syrian officials sought guarantees from Putin that Russia will not help any regime remnants “rearm.”[xviii]
• Balancing Israel in Syria. Syria may seek to engage Russia and retain Russian forces in Syria in order to build a military and political counterweight to Israel. Israel maintains a presence in southern Syria and Israeli officials say that they want to institute a demilitarized zone in southern Syria. An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Shara may discuss the redeployment of Russian military police to southern Syria as a ”guarantor” against Israeli advances in the south.[xix] Russian forces formerly manned about 12 observation points along the Syria-Israel border prior to the fall of the regime.[xx] Turkey reportedly backs the effort to use Russia to ”balance” against Israel.[xxi]

Key Takeaways

• Russo-Syrian Cooperation: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 indicates that the Syrian government will likely pursue a pragmatic and multi-faceted relationship with Russia.
• Iranian Sanctions Subversion: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to receive Iranian oil exports at PRC port terminals despite five rounds of US sanctions that have targeted PRC port terminals and oil refineries for receiving illicit Iranian crude oil.
• US Sanctions in Iraq: Iraq's state-owned Rafidain Bank closed its office within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) directorate on October 15, likely in reaction to recent US sanctions.

Shara and his government are poised to strengthen relations with Russia in order to achieve the above objectives in the absence of international pressure to cut ties with Russia.  European Union parliamentarians called for Syria to end its ties with Russia in March 2025, but the effort has lost political momentum in more recent months.[xxii] Shara and his government may believe that Syria can forge a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia at this time and face few barriers to doing so.

 

Iran Update, October 14, 2025 

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively.[i] Abdi met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and US officials in Damascus on October 7 to agree to a ceasefire following an outbreak of violence between government forces and the SDF in Aleppo City.[ii] Abdi previously agreed to integrate all forces in northeastern Syria into state security forces in a framework agreement that he reached with Shara in March, but neither side has implemented most of the terms of the agreement.[iii] Abdi referred to the new agreement as a “preliminary agreement” and “oral agreement,” which suggests that the new agreement may represent a renewed commitment by the SDF to integrate its forces into the state and will probably necessitate further negotiations on specific implementation mechanisms.[iv] A prominent People’s Protection Units (YPG) commander led a delegation of SDF and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials to discuss “joint military and security cooperation” with Abu Qasra and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab in Damascus on October 13.[v] The Kurdish and Syrian government officials presumably discussed mechanisms to implement the new agreement.[vi]

Shara and Abdi appear to have reached at least a partial agreement about certain elements of the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian army. Abdi told AFP that the SDF will be “restructured through its integration” into the Defense Ministry but did not provide further details.[vii] Shara and Abdi have disagreed thus far over how the SDF would join the military. The SDF has consistently demanded that it integrate into the Syrian army as a “bloc” and retain its attributes, including its female units and commanders.[viii] It is unclear if Shara and Abdi have fully addressed this issue. An unspecified "informed” source told Syria TV on October 13 that Shara and Abdi agreed to establish three divisions and several brigades “from the SDF” as army units in Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces.[ix] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this claim, but such an agreement would be consistent with the SDF’s demand to remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[x] Abdi may also have been referring to a recent US proposal to form a joint SDF-government force to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[xi] Abdi said that the SDF accepted this proposal.[xii]

The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF's integration into the Syrian state. Abdi said that he and the Syrian government share an “understanding on the principle of decentralization" but that the SDF and government “have not agreed on it” and are “still discussing finding a common formula acceptable to all.”[xiii] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected decentralization and federalism and has accused the SDF of promoting "separatism.”[xiv] The two parties’ disagreement over decentralization has been one of the principal disagreements that has delayed the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.

Senior Syrian officials likely discussed the status of talks with the SDF and Turkish support for the Syrian army with Turkish officials in Ankara on October 12.[xv] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, intelligence head Hussein al Salama, and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed counterterrorism, border control, and joint training with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara.[xvi] The officials very likely discussed the progress of talks with the SDF given Turkey’s role in pressuring the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state in recent months. Abdi told AFP on October 11 that successful negotiations with the Syrian government would depend on whether Turkey plays a “supportive and contributing role.”[xvii] Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and “all affiliated groups...especially in Syria” to “surrender weapons immediately” in a statement on October 11 prior to the Syrian delegation’s visit.[xviii] Turkey often conflates the SDF with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. Abu Qasra separately thanked Guler on October 12 for Turkey's “concrete efforts” to build the Syrian army.[xix] Turkey and Syria signed a defense agreement in August 2025 that commits Turkey to assisting Syria with military training and equipment procurement.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• SDF Integration: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively. The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF's integration into the Syrian state.
• Iranian Oil Tanker Activity: Iran reportedly turned on the automatic identification systems (AIS) of most of its oil tankers on October 13, according to Tanker Trackers. This incident marks the first time that Iranian tankers have turned on their AIS signals since 2018.
• US Sanctions on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah criticized recent US sanctions targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-owned commercial entities, Iraqi bank executives, and Kataib Hezbollah officials. Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari called the US sanctions “ridiculous” and denied any connection between Kataib Hezbollah and the sanctioned individuals.

Iran Update, October 13, 2025 

Hamas and Israel have continued to implement the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange on October 9, and the Israeli government approved the agreement on October 10.[i] The agreement called for Hamas to release all remaining hostages and Israel to release Palestinian prisoners held in Israel.[ii] Hamas released all 20 living hostages and the bodies of four deceased hostages on October 13.[iii] It is unclear when Hamas will release the remaining 24 deceased hostages.[iv] Israel previously stated that an unspecified international organization would help locate the remaining deceased hostages if Hamas did not release them by October 13.[v] Israel released at least 1,700 Palestinian prisoners on October 13.[vi] The ceasefire agreement also calls for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the Gaza Strip.[vii] Egypt sent approximately 400 aid trucks to the Gaza Strip on October 12.[viii] The aid will be distributed after Israel inspects the trucks.[ix] Humanitarian organizations are expected to deliver approximately 600 trucks of aid per day to the Gaza Strip.[x]

US President Donald Trump traveled to Israel and Egypt to discuss the ceasefire with regional leaders. Trump addressed the Israeli Knesset on October 13 and told reporters that "the war is over.”[xi]  Trump departed Israel to attend a summit in Sharm al Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13 to discuss outstanding aspects of the US plan with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi and other Arab and regional leaders, including Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[xii]  Trump, Sisi, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a ceasefire plan during the summit.[xiii]  Trump said that the document, which the White House referred to as the “Gaza Peace Plan,” will “spell out rules and regulations” for the ceasefire.[xiv] The US plan calls for representatives from the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to coordinate the implementation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.[xv] Two hundred US military personnel will deploy to Israel to assist with the implementation of the ceasefire alongside forces from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.[xvi] The ceasefire agreement does not address key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and future governance in the Gaza Strip.[xvii] Hamas and Israel concluded talks on Trump’s peace plan after both parties agreed to the first phase of the plan and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[xviii]

Senior Iranian officials have continued to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to deter the United States and its allies from enforcing UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 and sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[xix] UNSC Resolution 1929 calls on UN member states to “inspect any [Iranian] vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[xx] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on October 10 that Iran would respond “in a reciprocal and appropriate manner” if UN member states use UNSC Resolution 1929 to seize Iranian vessels.[xxi] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani similarly warned Iranian adversaries on October 10 that Iran has not decided to close the Strait of Hormuz, but that Iran’s response to unspecified escalation in the strait would not be “limited.”[xxii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri separately stated on October 11 that Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz would depend on “the pressure on Iranian exports,” most likely referring to Iranian oil exports.[xxiii]  The United States recently sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas.[xxiv] The sanctions are part of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[xxv] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[xxvi] Iran responded to the maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[xxvii] Iranian officials’ concern about Iran’s ability to continue exporting Iranian oil comes after Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan in which the United States and its allies would halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[xxviii] Oil exports are Iran’s economic lifeline and are critical to keeping the Iranian economy afloat, particularly amid increased Western economic pressure on Iran in recent weeks. Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units stationed at Kharg Island, which is home to Iran’s main oil export terminal.[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas-Israel Ceasefire: Hamas and Israel have continued to implement the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas released all 20 living hostages and the bodies of four deceased hostages, and Israel released at least 1,700 Palestinian prisoners on October 13. The ceasefire agreement does not address key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and future governance in the strip.
• Iranian Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz: Senior Iranian officials have continued to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to deter the United States and its allies from enforcing UNSC Resolution 1929 and sanctions on Iranian oil exports. UNSC Resolution 1929 calls on UN member states to “inspect any [Iranian] vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”

Iran Update, October 9, 2025 

Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip.[i] The first phase will not be implemented until the Israeli cabinet approves it.[ii] The first phase stipulates that Israeli forces will immediately cease military operations in the Gaza Strip and withdraw to an agreed-upon line within 24 hours after the cabinet approves the plan.[iii] Israeli forces will retain control of approximately 53 percent of the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[iv] Hamas will release all 20 living hostages within 72 hours after Israel completes its withdrawal.[v] Hamas will also release all deceased hostages and Israel will release 2,000 Palestinian prisoners within an unspecified timeframe.  At least 400 truckloads of humanitarian aid will enter the Gaza Strip each day during the first phase.[vi] Both Israel and Hamas have reportedly begun initial preparations to implement the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has halted offensive operations in the Gaza Strip and begun preparing to withdraw its forces.[vii] Hamas has reportedly started to transfer hostages to locations where medical care is available in preparation for their release.[viii] The Israeli government has convened to vote on the agreement but has not made an official decision at the time of this writing. Israeli media reported that the Israeli cabinet is expected to approve the deal.[ix]

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel ended negotiations on Trump’s plan after both parties agreed to the first phase, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[x] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[xi] Western and Arab officials met in Paris on October 9 to discuss these issues.[xii] Hamas and Israeli officials did not participate in the talks in Paris.

It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xiii] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti stated on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas' weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas' theater of operations,” which suggests that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if Hamas is disarmed.[xiv] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire on October 3.[xv] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt such attacks if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire holds. The Houthis would retain the ability to resume attacks against Israel or international shipping at any time and for any reason in the future even if they suspended attacks due to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways

• Hamas-Israel Ceasefire: Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israeli officials have not yet discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament. It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel.

Iran Update, October 8, 2025 

Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. An Iranian parliamentarian warned on October 4 that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States or its allies prevent Iranian oil exports.[i] The head of the Iranian Armed Forces Judicial Organization similarly warned on October 5 that Iran would not allow a US presence in the Persian Gulf to threaten Iran’s economic or military security.[ii] US President Donald Trump reinstated his maximum pressure campaign against Iran in February 2025 to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and curb its influence abroad.[iii] Trump’s maximum pressure campaign seeks to drive Iranian oil exports “to zero.”[iv] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[v]  Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan for the United States and its allies to halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[vi] Iran previously attempted to close the strait in 2019 in response to the US maximum pressure campaign by sabotaging Emirati tankers, seizing British ships, and launching cruise missiles at Saudi oil facilities.[vii] Iranian officials’ threats to close the Strait of Hormuz come as Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units deployed at the Nazeat Islands.[viii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands in May 2025.[ix] Iranian state-controlled outlet Mehr News detailed Iran’s anti-ship missile capabilities on October 7 and highlighted Iran’s development of new cruise missiles that reportedly have fully automated guidance systems.[x] These capabilities could support a potential Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz.

 

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting.[xi] The PMF Intelligence and Information Department launched a campaign on October 2 to pursue Baath Party remnants.[xii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xiii] The 27th PMF Brigade, which the Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls, arrested a man in Karma District, Anbar Province, on October 2 for promoting Baath Party ideology.[xiv] PMF intelligence units separately arrested several alleged “senior” Baath Party members in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province, on October 8.[xv] Prominent Iraqi Shia politicians have commonly conflated Sunnism with membership in the Sunni-dominated Baathist government under Saddam Hussein and have abused de-Baathification measures to target Sunnis.[xvi]

 

It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.[xvii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iraqi Shia politicians are likely attempting to sideline Sunni political opposition ahead of the November 2025 elections by accusing their opponents of having Baathist ties.[xviii] Iraqi law prohibits Baath Party members from participating in political activities, including competing in elections.[xix] Iraqi Shia political parties have weaponized this law and other de-Baathification mechanisms to target Sunnis, particularly Sunni political opposition.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz: Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. Iranian officials have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Arrest Campaign: The Popular Mobilization Forces arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting. It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.

Iran Update, October 7, 2025 

Iran is pursuing alternative mechanisms, which may include barter systems, to mitigate the impact of snapback sanctions. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated on October 7 that the Iranian government aims to counter snapback sanctions by deepening ties with neighboring countries and international blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.[i] Mohajerani added that the Iranian government will also use barter mechanisms to sustain trade.[ii] An Iranian trade official similarly stated on October 7 that the Iranian government is preparing alternative ”mechanisms“ to reduce the impact of snapback sanctions on Iran’s trade agreements.[iii] The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, and the European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29.[iv]

 

These alternative mechanisms may include barter systems that bypass sanctions. US media previously reported on October 5 that Iran and China have used barter systems that bypass dollar transactions to evade US sanctions since at least 2018, including via the exchange of Iranian oil and metals for Chinese goods and infrastructure projects.[v] Unspecified officials told the Wall Street Journal on October 5 that China funded infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024 in exchange for 8.4 billion US dollars of Iranian oil.[vi]

 

Iran’s moves to mitigate sanctions are probably driven by concerns that sanctions on the Iranian economy will trigger an economic downturn. The World Bank forecasted in its October report that Iran will face an economic downturn over the next two years.[vii] The World Bank stated that the Iranian economy will shrink by 1.7 percent in 2025 and 2.8 percent in 2026, which is a change from the World Bank’s April 2025 forecast of 0.7 percent growth in 2026.[viii] The World Bank attributed this decline to reduced oil exports and non-oil economic activity due to the reimposition of UNSC sanctions and economic disruptions that followed the Israel-Iran War. The World Bank’s assessment comes amid the reimposition of sanctions on Iran and after several countries, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Turkey, stated that they would abide by UNSC measures.[ix]

 

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel continued to hold indirect negotiations on US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 7, which demonstrates that both sides view the plan as a starting point or framework for further negotiations rather than a comprehensive agreement to end the war.[x] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages during the ceasefire and expressed openness to negotiate on other elements of the US plan.[xi]  Hamas and Israeli officials first held talks on October 6 to discuss the roadmap for future negotiations and ceasefire mechanisms.[xii] The officials discussed an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a timetable for a hostage exchange during talks on October 7.[xiii] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed other key aspects of the US plan for peace in the Gaza Strip, such as governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[xiv] Israeli and Hamas officials are expected to continue negotiations for several days, with US officials joining the talks on October 8.[xv]

The United States facilitated a ceasefire between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on October 7 after fighting broke out between Syrian government and Kurdish forces in two Kurdish-dominated neighborhoods of Aleppo City.[xvi] Lingering tensions between the SDF and Syrian government over the partial integration of the into the Syrian state likely led to the outbreak of fighting. Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud are two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City that the SDF agreed to integrate into the .[xvii] The SDF’s Internal Security Forces, also known as the Asayish, do not appear to have integrated into local police forces under the Interior Ministry, as expected under the agreement.[xviii] Both the Syrian government and Kurdish forces have accused the other of exacerbating conflict in these neighborhoods in the months since the agreement went into effect.[xix] The most recent episode of fighting began shortly after the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) located an alleged SDF tunnel that extended from Kurdish areas into a nearby government-controlled neighborhood on October 6 and closed off all entrances or exits to Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud.[xx] Kurdish residents protested the closure of routes in and out of the neighborhoods, while Syrian government and Asayish forces exchanged fire for several hours.[xxi] Syrian state media reported that SDF mortar shells landed in nearby neighborhoods of Aleppo City.[xxii] The Syrian government accused the SDF of targeting GSS security checkpoints in Sheikh Maqsoud, which the SDF later denied.[xxiii] This round of fighting was the largest-scale conflict between Syrian government forces and Kurdish forces in Aleppo City since the SDF agreed to integrate into the Syrian state on March 10.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and two other Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials travelled to Damascus to meet with Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra on October 7.[xxiv] Abu Qasra later announced that he and Abdi agreed to an immediate “comprehensive ceasefire on all fronts” in northern and northeastern Syria, likely referring to the fighting both in Aleppo City and recent exchanges of fire near Deir Hafer, eastern Aleppo Province.[xxv] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack—who was also present for the meeting along with US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper—told Saudi media on October 7 that Shara and Abdi discussed both sides’ “recommitment” to the March 10 Agreement and that both sides were “heading in the right direction.”[xxvi]

 

US mediation temporarily halted the brief fighting in Aleppo City, but similar incidents will almost certainly erupt absent further progress from either side towards the SDF's integration into the Syrian state. Both the Syrian government and Turkey have maintained that the SDF must integrate by the end of the year.[xxvii] The continued lack of effort from both the government and the SDF to address minor issues—such as the Asayish’s integration into local police, for example—can contribute to further small-scale bouts of fighting as the deadline for the SDF’s integration approaches.

 

The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm and weaken Hezbollah. The Lebanese Council of Ministers held a cabinet session on October 6 to review the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s first monthly progress report on the implementation of its plan to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River in the next three months.[xxviii] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal reported that the LAF has prioritized monopolizing weapons south of the Litani River, containing weapons across Lebanon, and increasing control over Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.[xxix] The LAF has doubled the number of its missions in southern Lebanon and has made ”serious progress” in implementing its plan in the past month, according to Lebanese minister Kamal Shehadeh.[xxx]

Haykal said that Hezbollah is not cooperating with the LAF.[xxxi] Hezbollah previously threatened in September 2025 to halt its cooperation with the LAF by refusing to hand over its weapons south of the Litani River if the Lebanese government approved and implemented the LAF’s disarmament plan.[xxxii] Haykal noted that continued Israeli operations have created obstacles for the LAF's implementation of the plan.[xxxiii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[xxxiv]

The Lebanese Council of Ministers also agreed to suspend the license of a Hezbollah propaganda organization during the cabinet session on October 6.[xxxv] The Lebanese Association of Arts, commonly known as Rissalat, is a Hezbollah art and media organization that spreads Hezbollah propaganda.[xxxvi] Lebanese Interior Minister Ahmad al Hajjar requested that the government dissolve Rissalat, and Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar suggested that the government take judicial measures in response to Hezbollah’s Raouche Rock event.[xxxvii] Rissalat disregarded the Lebanese government’s instructions and illuminated the Raouche Rock in Beirut on September 25 during a rally event to commemorate the death of former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[xxxviii] Hezbollah officials previously warned the government against action that would target Rissalat during the cabinet session and threatened to organize all future Hezbollah events under Rissalat’s name.[xxxix] Rissalat stated that it will continue its activities in response to the government’s decision, which will force the government to take further legal or police action to shut down the organization.[xl]

Hezbollah’s inability to delay or veto the council’s decision to suspend Rissalat’s license and activities reflects Hezbollah’s relative loss of political leverage. Hezbollah held enough seats to have de facto veto power on the council between 2008 and 2019.[xli] Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, currently only hold five seats in the Council of Ministers, which is insufficient to veto a council decision.[xlii] Hezbollah’s weakened political leverage is also exemplified by the increasing confidence of the Lebanese government to take steps to directly weaken Hezbollah in recent months. The Lebanese Central Bank banned all licensed Lebanese banking institutions from working directly or indirectly with Hezbollah’s main financial arm, al Qard al Hassan, in July 2025.[xliii] The Lebanese government tasked the LAF with disarming Hezbollah and approved the US disarmament plan in August 2025.[xliv]

Iran Update, October 6, 2025

Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Trump proposed a 20-point plan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29 that laid out a broad vision for the end of the Israel-Hamas War and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[i] Trump warned that Hamas would face “all hell” if it did not agree to his peace plan by October 5.[ii] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages as part of the ceasefire and expressed openness to engaging in negotiations on other elements of Trump’s plan.[iii] Hamas endorsed one point of Trump’s plan that calls for a Palestinian body of independent technocrats to govern the Gaza Strip, but did not explicitly agree that an international transitional body chaired by Trump should have oversight and supervision over the Palestinian technocratic body.[iv] Hamas’ statement also did not acknowledge that Trump’s plan requires Hamas and other Palestinian factions to disarm.[v] US, Israeli, and Hamas negotiators held indirect negotiations on the ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 6.[vi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip, but halted its major offensive into Gaza City due to the ceasefire agreement.[vii] Hamas and other Palestinian factions have continued to target Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Hamas agreed to the proposal on October 3.[viii]

Elements of Trump's plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel last observed a ceasefire between January and March 2025. The ceasefire ended after Israel accused Hamas of delaying the release of hostages and failing to negotiate on next steps to end the war.[ix] Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a “permanent ceasefire,” but Trump’s plan only requires the IDF to fully withdraw after a set of undefined ”standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” are met in the opinion of the IDF, the United States, and additional guarantors.[x] Hamas previously demanded a “permanent” ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages due to skepticism that the IDF would resume hostilities once Israel received the hostages.[xi] Hamas has seemingly conceded on this demand by agreeing to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages before receiving a guarantee of a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas has also not yet addressed US and Israeli demands that it disarm and disband under Trump’s plan. Netanyahu remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through IDF military action if the plan fails.[xii] Hamas would receive some elements of its long-held demands, namely aid, reconstruction, and the release of prisoners held in Israel, under the proposal.[xiii]

It is unclear if an end to the war in the Gaza Strip would impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported Hamas’ agreement to the ceasefire and implicit rejection of the full US plan.[xiv] Iran and Hezbollah’s endorsement of Hamas’ objection to the later stages of Trump’s plan surrounding the political administration of the Gaza Strip suggests that both support Hamas continuing the war. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xv] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt these campaigns in response to a lasting Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire with Israel on October 3.[xvi] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti said on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas' weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas' theater of operations,” suggesting that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if the group is disarmed.[xvii] 

Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. At least 6,000 subcommittee members voted within regional electoral districts to elect at least 119 members of the legislature.[xviii] A committee appointed by Shara previously finalized the 6,000 subcommittee members in early September 2025.[xix] Shara will soon appoint the remaining one-third of the legislature, or 70 seats, in the coming days.[xx] The assembly’s members will serve 30-month terms, according to the Syrian transitional constitution.[xxi] The assembly will propose, approve, and repeal legislation, ratify international treaties, and approve the state’s budget, among other responsibilities.[xxii] The assembly will maintain legislative authority until Syria adopts a permanent constitution with new legislative elections.[xxiii]   

The newly elected assembly members appear to at least minimally represent the diversity of Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian communities, including Kurds, Alawites, Turkmen, and Ismailis, among others, according to Syrian and international observers.[xxiv] Many of the assembly members represent their region’s demographics. All three representatives for Afrin, a Kurdish stronghold in northern Aleppo Province, are Kurdish, for example.[xxv] The head of the committee that supervised the elections suggested on October 6 that Shara will use his appointment of 70 assembly members to address “gaps” in representation in the legislature, such as the small proportion of women and Christians.[xxvi] Candidates also appear to represent diverse political beliefs, ranging from moderates with a record of criticizing Shara and his new government to more conservative Islamists connected to the HTS-aligned Islamist coalition Ahrar al Sham.[xxvii] The election of many community representatives, activists, and dignitaries will probably present opportunities for them to engage more closely with Shara and his government, which is critical to build civil discourse and improve communication and trust between Syrian communities and the government. 

The assembly in its current form will likely not be able to meaningfully check the Syrian presidency. Shara has indirectly approved all of the elected candidates, given his oversight over their selection. Shara formed the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections in June 2025 to select at least 6,000 subcommittee members and approve 1,578 electoral candidates from among the subcommittee members.[xxviii] The newly elected assembly members may hold a diverse spectrum of political beliefs, but there is little transparency into the candidate selection process and whether or not Shara or his advisers had the authority to veto politically unfavorable candidates. The Supreme Committee faced criticism for rejecting numerous candidates on the basis of population demographics, cultural diversity, and “competence” without allowing appeals.[xxix] Syria’s transitional constitution also provides the assembly with very limited abilities to overrule Shara. A two-thirds majority of the assembly can overrule Shara’s veto of any legislation and require him to pass the legislation into law, but this check is somewhat offset by the fact that Shara will soon appoint one-third of the assembly members, which may limit the assembly’s ability to amass enough support to overturn Shara’s decisions.[xxx] The assembly lacks any other meaningful constitutionally provided powers through which it can push back against Shara’s decisions if needed.[xxxi] Diverse representation within the People’s Assembly is only valuable to the Syrian people if assembly members can meaningfully benefit or protect their communities.

The formation of political parties is one way through which assembly members can organize and build coalitions to advance the interests of the regions they represent and counter Shara’s policies. Syria’s transitional constitution protects the right to form political parties, though candidates ran independently in the October 5 election.[xxxii] Newly elected assembly members may organize into parties over time, and Shara’s tolerance for the creation of diverse parties or coalitions that may oppose him or push against his agenda will be an indicator of Shara’s commitment to forming a democratic society.

Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the October 5 elections. The Syrian government announced in late August 2025 that it would indefinitely suspend elections in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory and in Suwayda Province.[xxxiii]  The 21 seats allocated to these provinces will remain empty until these territories join the Syrian state, according to the government.[xxxiv] It is unlikely that these territories will integrate in the near term, however. Many Druze factions in Suwayda Province continue to organize under the banner of the “National Guard,” which is a force that is loyal to the newly formed Suwayda Autonomous Government.[xxxv] This parallel government structure is staunchly opposed to Shara’s Damascus-based government.[xxxvi]

Kurdish officials criticized the results of the October 5 elections as unreflective of the Syrian “national will.”[xxxvii] These criticisms come as neither the SDF nor the Syrian government has made meaningful, concessionary steps toward integrating the SDF into the Syrian army since March 2025. The Syrian army and SDF have continued to exchange artillery fire along frontlines near Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, since October 3.[xxxviii] The Syrian government reportedly conducted multiple drone strikes targeting SDF positions and fortifications in this region on October 5.[xxxix] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met with US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack and US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper in Hasakah on October 6.[xl] Abdi stated that they discussed “political integration” and counter-ISIS efforts, but it is unclear if any progress was made.[xli]

Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.[xlii] PRC companies began exporting motor vehicles to Iran in exchange for Iranian metals, including copper and zinc, around 2018 after US President Donald Trump launched his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, according to individuals with knowledge of the trade speaking to Bloomberg.[xliii] Hong Kong-registered PRC front companies have also recently paid PRC contractors to build infrastructure in Iran in exchange for Iranian crude oil exports to the PRC, according to current and former Western officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[xliv] Some of the officials stated that the PRC transmitted $8.4 billion in oil payments via this barter arrangement to finance PRC contracted infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024.[xlv] Iran and the PRC previously conducted negotiations in 2023 over a similar barter agreement in which Iran would provide the PRC with crude oil in exchange for the PRC’s assistance in constructing the Tehran-North freeway, which connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea.[xlvi] It is unclear whether Iran and the PRC signed the agreement in 2023. These transactions do not require Chinese or Iranian companies to trade on the international market using the US dollar and are not subject to US sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reports.[xlvii] The PRC does not acknowledge the United States’ unilateral sanctions and subsequent secondary sanctions on Iran, claiming that PRC-Iran trade complies with international law.[xlviii]

Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Iran allegedly agreed to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Russia with electronic warfare components and avionic enhancements, according to documents from Russian military conglomerate Rostec that were leaked by the Ukrainian hacker group “Black Mirror.”[xlix] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the authenticity of the leaked documents. Iran would allegedly receive the first shipment of Su-35s as early as 2026, although Iran has previously experienced difficulties acquiring Russian military systems given Russia’s constraints and preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.[l] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf advocated on September 24 for Iran to enhance its air power through the purchase of fighter jets.[li] The supposed Iran-Russia deal also comes amid reports that Iran may have acquired MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[lii]  Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Defa Press previously expressed support for the purchase of Chinese J-10 fighter jets in June 2025.[liii] Iran has sought advanced fighter jets from its partners because Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within the first few days of the Israel-Iran War, which helped Israel to achieve its objectives of degrading the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[liv]

Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian.[lv] The former parliamentarian’s statement that Sadr seeks to avoid “chaos and escalation” suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections. Sadr announced in March 2025 that his Shia National Movement would not participate in the elections and has repeatedly urged his supporters, who are primarily Shia, not to vote.[lvi] Sadr reaffirmed his call for Sadrists to boycott the elections during a meeting with former Sadrist parliamentarians in Najaf on October 3.[lvii] Iran and Iraqi politicians across the political spectrum have expressed support for Sadr’s involvement in the elections, likely due to concerns that Sadr could try to destabilize a future government that doesn’t include his movement.[lviii] Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[lix]

Iraqi politicians remain concerned about the potential of low voter turnout in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki all emphasized the importance of voter participation in the elections during speeches on October 4 and 5.[lx] These speeches follow reports that Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned that voter turnout in the upcoming elections will fall below 20 percent due to the Sadrist boycott.[lxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed in June 2025 that Shia Coordination Framework parties may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections.[lxii]

Key Takeaways

• Gaza Ceasefire Plan: Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Elements of Trump's plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement.
• Syrian Parliamentary Elections: Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the elections.
• Iran-PRC Trade: Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have reportedly used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian. The former parliamentarian’s statement suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections.

Iran Update, October 2, 2025 

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander   emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[i] Alaei claimed that Iran demonstrated the strength of its ballistic missiles and national unity during the war in an interview with Nour News on October 1.[ii] Alaei claimed that Iran‘s demonstration of these strengths caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire.[iii]  Alaei also claimed that Iranian missiles became more precise throughout the war and that no segment of the Iranian population chose to side with Israel in support of internal division.[iv] Alaei’s reflections almost certainly reflect only some segments of the regime’s national security community, and CTP-ISW cannot determine whether Alaei’s statements are reflective of a broader trend in Iranian strategic thought or if it is isolated to only a small number of thinkers.

Alaei’s statements regarding Iran‘s ballistic missiles and national unity suggest that some elements of the regime’s national security community believe that the regime has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes.[v] These reflections indicate that some Iranian officials believe that at least some elements of its previous efforts to deter and defend against Israeli strikes could be successful in the future, presumably with some modifications. Israel accomplished its campaign objectives—the degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—in the Israel-Iran War, but it needed to end the war rapidly and at a moment of its own choosing.[vi] Israel forced Iran to rapidly end the war by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime.[vii] Israel struck Iranian institutions and other assets used by the Iranian regime to ensure regime stability.[viii] A series of strikes against these institutions and assets that the Israelis design to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responds and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival would compel it to agree to a ceasefire. Alaei appears to be implying that the war illustrated that, in the future, Iranian missiles could be more successful if Israeli interceptor stockpiles are depleted. Alaei also suggests that national unity would have sustained a longer war, but it is unclear if expanded Israeli strikes would change Iranian calculations about regime stability.

Alaei’s assumptions that the ballistic missile attack campaign and national unity were part of Iran’s ”success” appear to disregard the reality that Israeli operations did not intend to collapse the regime or even seriously threaten it. Israel only aimed to demonstrate its military capability to destroy Iran’s ability to control its population. Israel retains that capability, and as noted above, could decide to expand or contract its military campaign against regime targets and threaten regime stability as it deems necessary to accomplish its objectives.

Alaei also emphasized that Iran can strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position in the Persian Gulf.[ix] Alaei described Iran’s location in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.” Alaei’s statement may be attempting to highlight the potential threat that Iran could pose to US forces and allied partners.[x] The IRGC Navy has historically harassed commercial and military vessels in the Persian Gulf to signal its ability to disrupt maritime traffic and pressure the United States and its partners.[xi]

It is notable that Nour News chose to interview Alaei as the first guest in its new “Pathway” series, given that Alaei has historically criticized the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Nour News is affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. Alaei served as the first IRGC Navy Commander from 1985 to 1990 and later as IRGC chief of staff from 1997 to 1999.[xii] Shamkhani similarly served as the IRGC Navy Commander from 1990  to 1997 and then as Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister from 1997 and 2005.[xiii] Shamkhani would have probably coordinated with Alaei in both of these roles. Alaei has repeatedly challenged the regime’s policies, including in his 2009 letter about the regime’s prison abuses, a 2011 editorial that indirectly criticized Khamenei, and his opposition to Iran’s support for former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[xiv] Alaei also publicly sympathized with anti-regime protesters in 2020 and suggested abolishing Iran’s morality patrol.[xv] Alaei’s criticism of the regime was underscored in his interview with Nour News. Alaei noted that both Iranian reformists and hardliners had managed the nuclear file but emphasized that all negotiations occurred under the Supreme Leader’s supervision, placing ultimate responsibility on Khamenei.[xvi] Alaei dismissed Iran’s foreign policy as no better than “acceptable” on the nuclear issue, which implicitly faulted Khamenei for the failure to achieve a resolution.[xvii]

Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.[xviii] It is unclear what type of short-range systems the Iranians have strengthened or whether these systems include electronic warfare systems. The outlet also claimed that Iran is attempting to acquire HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAMs) batteries to counter Israeli F-35 fighter jets. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Abolfazl Zohrevand previously claimed in September 2025 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would supply Iran with HQ-9 SAMs.[xix] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the PRC delivered these systems. It is unlikely that an HQ-9 SAM could shoot down an F-35 fighter jet, however.[xx] Israel destroyed the target engagement radars of four Russian S-300s, which bear technical similarities to Chinese HQ-9 SAMs, in Iran in April and October 2024.[xxi] The IRGC Ground Forces also conducted an air defense drill in its eastern air defense zone south of Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on October 2 to bolster its air defenses.[xxii] Iran conducted a similar exercise in northwestern Iran on September 24.[xxiii]

Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali al Naasan, Assistant Defense Minister for the Northern Region Brigadier General Fahim Issa, Air Force Commander Brigadier General Assem al Hawari, Navy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad al Saud, 52nd Division Commander Brigadier General Haitham al Ali, and other Syrian officials arrived in Moscow on October 2 to discuss “coordination mechanisms” with Russian defense officials.[xxiv] The inclusion of Fahim Issa, who is responsible for northern Syria, suggests that the two parties discussed the remaining Russian presence in Syria, particularly in Qamishli, Syria, which is surrounded by Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory. Fahim Issa is a Syrian Turkmen ethno-nationalist who is extremely hostile to Kurds and the SDF.[xxv] Issa is also close to Turkish ethno-nationalists aligned with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxvi] Turkey has threatened to attack the SDF if the SDF fails to integrate with the Syrian state before December 31, 2025.[xxvii]

The Syrian Defense Ministry's visit to Russia suggests that Syrian officials may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise. The Syrian delegation visited the Russian military’s Central National Military Park near Kubinka, Moscow Oblast, and viewed Russian air defense systems, reconnaissance and fixed-wing attack drones, anti-tank guided missiles, and armored vehicles.[xxviii] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over arms exports to Syria, despite previous Syrian interest in procuring Russian equipment.[xxix] Syrian officials may seek to increase cooperation with Russia to learn from the Russian military, however.

The Syrian defense officials’ visit to Moscow comes amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month.[xxx]  The topics discussed and officials present at other recent Syria-Russia meetings also suggest that Syria may be interested in establishing more direct military cooperation with Russia in the coming months. The Syrian Air Force Training Department head, Brigadier General Yahya Bitar, and representatives from the Defense Ministry’s training, artillery, and armor departments met with a Russian military delegation in Syria on October 2.[xxxi] The delegations discussed ways to “develop these specialties,” presumably referring to developing the Syrian army’s training, artillery, and armor capabilities and readiness.[xxxii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is expected to travel to Moscow on October 15 for the Arab-Russian summit, during which Syrian and Russian officials may continue to discuss the two countries‘ relations.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Strategic Re-Think: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander emphasized in an interview with Nour News the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Alaei’s statements suggest the regime believes that it has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes in the future.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.
• Syrian-Russian Defense Cooperation: Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian officials’ visit to Moscow on October 2 suggests that Syria may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise.

Iran Update, September 30, 2025 

Senior Iranian officials appear to be preparing for potential military conflict. Iranian officials continue to believe that the current ceasefire between Israel and Iran will collapse and fighting will resume at some point in the future. Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian stated on September 27 that the Supreme National Security Council (SCNC) had directed all Iranian military and civilian officials to designate several successors to ensure continuity of governance in the event of leadership disruption.[i] Pour Jamshidian added that the Interior Ministry adopted the same decision and designated several individuals, down to provincial governors, as successors within the Interior Ministry.[ii] The SNSC rejected Pour Jamshidian’s statement on September 27 and denied holding any meeting on this issue.[iii] The SNSC likely pursued succession planning as a part of the Iranian government’s attempts to amend issues it faced during the 12-day war, including those posed by the Israeli decapitation campaign that targeted senior Iranian officials. Israeli strikes destroyed the Islamic revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force command bunker on June 13 and killed senior IRGC commanders.[iv] The death of these commanders disrupted Iran’s command-and-control and made responding to Israeli attacks extremely difficult.[v] The SNSC’s succession planning also comes after Khamenei’s absence during the war, which prevented his principal subordinates from reaching him for rapid decisions.[vi] Khamenei also reportedly named three senior clerics as potential successors during the war and directed the Iranian Assembly of Experts to choose from those clerics to ensure an orderly wartime transition.[vii] The rare decision to take steps to ensure a smooth succession suggests that senior officials have already considered succession plans, even before the SNSC’s reported order.

Senior Iranian military commanders also continue to inspect military and air defense units across Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected the Dezful Air Defense Group on September 29 and assessed its combat readiness.[viii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected Artesh and IRGC naval, commando, and aviation units in Hormozgan Province on September 30.[ix] Mousavi assessed the capabilities of different units, met with commanders and personnel, and emphasized that both navies have achieved full readiness ”for a possible future conflict.”[x]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Succession Planning: Senior Iranian officials appear to be preparing for potential military conflict. Iranian officials continue to believe that the current ceasefire between Israel and Iran will collapse and fighting will resume at some point in the future. Senior Iranian military commanders also continue to inspect military and air defense units across Iran.
• Iranian Water and Energy Crisis: Iran’s worsening water and energy crisis could gradually increase the Iranian public’s frustrations with the regime and compound existing challenges to regime legitimacy. The Karaj Dam’s water reserves decreased from 111 million cubic meters to 28 million cubic meters between September 2024 and September 2025, making the dam incapable of generating electricity for Tehran.
• Iraqi Airspace Superiority: Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji said on September 30 that Iraq would take “all necessary measures” to prevent Israel from using Iraqi airspace to attack Iran, during a meeting with Iranian Armed Forces Intelligence head Brigadier General Sayyed Majid Mirahmadi in Baghdad. Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians and militia figures have long called on the Iraqi federal government to adopt policies that would restrict the United States and Israel’s ability to fly through Iraqi airspace.

 

Iran Update, September 29, 2025 

The European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The EU’s reimposition of sanctions comes after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[i] The EU froze the Iranian Central Bank and other major Iranian banks’ assets, banned the import of Iranian oil, and banned the export of technologies or materials that Iran could use for uranium enrichment, among other measures.[ii]  The EU reimposed sanctions on Iranian economic institutions, such as the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, that play an outsized role in the Iranian economy.[iii] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has built power plants, oil vessels, and transportation infrastructure on behalf of the IRGC. The EU also reimposed sanctions on Iranian banks, such as Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, that have supported Iran’s defense industry.[iv] Iranian banks reportedly held at least 1.9 billion euros in assets in Europe as of March 2024.[v] The reimposition of EU sanctions on Iran may further isolate Iran from international financial networks and reduce the volume of EU-Iran trade. The EU was Iran’s fifth largest trading partner in 2024.[vi] The full impact of the EU sanctions is currently unclear, however. The United States’ imposition of maximum pressure sanctions against Iran in 2018 has already significantly diminished the volume of EU-Iran trade in recent years.[vii] The EU’s reimposition of sanctions on September 29 follows the UNSC’s reimposition of snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, which are similarly designed to politically and economically isolate Iran due to its failure to fulfill its obligations in the JCPOA.

 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website framed snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” and called on the regime to expand ties with neighboring countries and pursue a “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of sanctions.[viii] A newspaper run by Khamenei’s website argued on September 28 that Iran must rely on its domestic strength and work with neighbors, “countries in the Global South,” and countries that are part of Iran’s “Look East” policy to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran’s “Look East” policy seeks to counter US pressure by building ties with countries such as China and Russia.[ix] This editorial is consistent with recent statements from Khamenei in May 2025 in which he framed Iran’s participation in multilateral institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as “opportunities” for Iran.[x] Iran joined BRICS in January 2024. Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran's participation in BRICS provides opportunities for Iran to reduce its reliance on the US dollar and develop alternative financial platforms.[xi] Iran has also deepened economic, political, and security ties with Russia in recent years and recently joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[xii] Iran likely seeks to use its membership in multilateral institutions to reduce the impact of Western sanctions and to secure alternative trade routes, energy partners, and financial channels.

 

Iranian officials are concerned that the reimposition of snapback sanctions may trigger economic unrest. Four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran’s economic isolation and fuel public anger.[xiii] An Iranian official said that the regime is increasingly concerned that discontent over economic difficulties may lead to mass protests. Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran, which likely reflects Iranian officials’ belief that Iran’s adversaries seek to increase public disillusionment by increasing economic pressure on Iran.[xiv] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei warned on September 29 that Iranian authorities will take legal action against individuals who undermine public morale or disrupt markets in ways that “serve enemy objectives.”[xv] Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, which makes it very unlikely that Iran will receive economic relief in the near term.[xvi] The regime’s concerns about potential internal unrest come as inflation has risen above 40 percent and the Iranian rial fell to a record low of 1,121,000 rials per one US dollar on September 29.[xvii]

The Turkish military's reported deployment of assets to Kuweires Airbase near Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in eastern Aleppo Province may indicate that Turkey and Syria are preparing for a joint military operation against the SDF.[xviii] An unspecified source from the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Syrian media that the Turkish military deployed Samur armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, unspecified air defense systems, and helicopters to the Kuweires Airbase on September 28.[xix] A separate local anti-SDF source circulated a video of a Turkish military convoy driving toward Kuweires Military Airbase on September 28.[xx] The MoD source did not specify why Turkey deployed military assets to Kuweires.[xxi] Kuweires Airbase is located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the province. Kuweires Airbase is positioned near an east-west highway that runs along the SDF’s salient south of Lake Assad. The MoD source added that several Syrian Army divisions also deployed to Kuweires Airbase to "secure” the base.[xxii] The Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Tal Abyad in Raqqa Province and Ras al Ain in Hasakah Province along the Syria-Turkey border, according to the same MoD source.[xxiii]

Iran Update, September 26, 2025 

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran on September 27 despite a last-ditch Iranian effort to delay the snapback mechanism. A UK-based media outlet reported on September 26 that Iran offered to immediately grant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to the Natanz Nuclear Facility. Iran, in return, called for the UNSC to adopt a Russian-Chinese resolution to extend the snapback mechanism’s deadline by six months.[i] The UNSC rejected the Russian-Chinese resolution in a vote on September 26, which means the UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on September 27.[ii] The E3 offered in July 2025 to extend the snapback mechanism’s deadline if Iran fully cooperated with the IAEA, resumed nuclear talks with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[iii] Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province, which was not damaged or targeted during the Israel–Iran War in June 2025.[iv] The Washington Post, citing satellite imagery, reported on September 26 that Iran has made key changes at the site since the war.[v]

• Security perimeter: Iran completed construction on roughly 4,000 feet of wall on the western edge and graded a parallel road, which brings the enclosure close to completion.
• Tunnel entrance: Iran reinforced one eastern entrance with dirt and rock to prevent damage or potential collapse in future airstrikes.
• Excavation spoil: The pile of rock and soil outside the eastern tunnels has modestly increased, indicating continued tunneling inside the mountain.

Unspecified analysts told the Washington Post that the facility’s underground halls may be 260 to 330 feet deep, which is deeper than the underground halls at Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[vi] The depth of the facility’s underground halls has fueled suspicions that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage for near-weapons-grade uranium.[vii] The Institute for Science and International Security reported in April 2025 that Iran had already begun building a security wall with new roads and space for fences, lights, and cameras at the facility.[viii] The institute’s report noted that the facility could house an advanced centrifuge assembly plant or potentially a small undeclared enrichment plant.[ix] The IAEA has never inspected the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility, which illustrates the limitations that the IAEA faces in obtaining a complete picture of Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran also barred IAEA inspectors from accessing the site’s tunnels in April 2025 and told the agency that “it is none of [their] business.”[x]

Iran Update, September 25, 2025 

Hezbollah is reportedly facing internal divisions among its members over its response to the Lebanese state’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Senior Hezbollah officials are divided over how to address the Lebanese government’s August 2025 decision to disarm the group, according to a Lebanese journalist speaking to Saudi media.[i] Some Hezbollah officials, such as Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem and Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc Head Mohammad Raad, have rejected the Lebanese government’s decision. Raad previously proclaimed “death over handing over” Hezbollah’s weapons, for example.[ii] Qassem has similarly directly threatened confrontation with the Lebanese government.[iii] Other Hezbollah officials have called for more flexibility and sought to avoid confrontation with the Lebanese Armed Forces.[iv] Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Head Mahmoud Qamati stated in August 2025 that Hezbollah will use all “peaceful means possible to oppose” the Lebanese government’s disarmament plan and affirmed that Hezbollah “will not use [its] weapons inside Lebanon” or “be dragged into internal strife with the [Lebanese Armed Forces].”[v]  It is unclear if the differences between Hezbollah officials will impair Hezbollah’s ability to form and execute a cohesive strategy to prevent the Lebanese state’s disarmament campaign.

Hezbollah is also reportedly facing challenges in appointing new leaders following the Israeli decapitation campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024. Unspecified sources familiar with Hezbollah’s internal affairs told Saudi media on September 25 that Hezbollah has been unable to appoint a deputy for Qassem.[vi] Hezbollah has similarly been unable to fill positions in its Coordination and Liaison Unit, which is Hezbollah’s main security apparatus.[vii] The unit is responsible for communicating with Lebanese security agencies and reports directly to Qassem.[viii] Hezbollah’s need to appoint senior leaders is a lingering effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) air campaign in late 2024, in which the IDF killed a significant number of top Hezbollah commanders and inflicted a 45 percent casualty rate on Hezbollah.[ix] Unspecified informed sources told Saudi media on September 25 that Hezbollah’s Shura Council is taking steps to replace Coordination and Liaison Unit Head Wafiq Safa due to “his failures and poor relations” with Lebanese state agencies.[x] Safa has led the unit for over a decade and survived a targeted Israeli airstrike in Beirut in October 2024.[xi] Safa is one of the few officials who was on former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s Shura Council to survive the war.[xii] Hezbollah reportedly seeks to replace Safa with a new unspecified figure close to Qassem.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emphasized on September 24 the strategic importance of maintaining an Iranian presence near Israel’s borders to defend against Israel.[xiii] Ghalibaf claimed that Israel’s recent campaign against Iran would "definitely not have occurred” and that Iran would have “confronted” Israel on its border with Syria if Iran still retained a presence in Syria.[xiv] Ghalibaf may have been arguing that Iran could have opened another front against Israel in Syria and thereby detracted Israel’s attention and diverted its resources away from Iran during the Israel-Iran War if Iran maintained its foothold in Syria. Iranian-backed groups in southern Syria, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias, often launched munitions targeting Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights in the months following October 7, 2023. Iran’s network in Syria remains extremely limited after the fall of Assad in December 2024, and Iranian-aligned militias in Syria did not participate in the Israel-Iran war.[xv] Ghalibaf also claimed that Israel would advance to Iran's border if Iran does not “stand against [Israel] in the Golan [Heights].”[xvi] Ghalibaf’s comments reflect Iran’s long-held objective to encircle Israel and to prevent conflicts with Israel from reaching Iran.

Ghalibaf also emphasized the need for Iran to strengthen its air power. Ghalibaf claimed that Iran’s Bavar-373, Khordad, Sayyad, and Majid air defense systems operated effectively during the Israel-Iran War, but called on the regime to prioritize purchasing fighter jets.[xvii] Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within a few days of the start of the Israel-Iran War.[xviii] Ghalibaf’s statements come amid reports that Iran may have acquired Russian MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[xix] Ghalibaf’s statements also come after Iranian armed forces-affiliated Defa Press expressed support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets in June.[xx]

The United States is continuing to pressure the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. Three unnamed Iraqi officials told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on September 24 that the United States asked the Iraqi federal government to reform the Iraqi judiciary and improve financial oversight as part of an effort to reduce Iranian influence over Iraqi state institutions.[xxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have coopted the Iraqi judicial system to issue rulings favorable to militia interests.[xxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[xxiii] The US demand for improved financial oversight comes after Iraq’s Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with a US-based financial consulting firm on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[xxiv] The Iraqi government previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[xxv]    

Iran Update, September 24, 2025 

Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[i] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Parchin and Shahroud military sites in October 2024 and during the Israel-Iran War.[ii] Satellite imagery of the Parchin missile site from August 28 and of the Shahroud missile site from September 5 showed that Iran has begun reconstructing buildings that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential to producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[iii] The Associated Press assessed that Iran still does not have mixers at Parchin or Shahroud to produce solid fuel, however.[iv] The IDF previously destroyed Iranian solid fuel mixers during its October 2024 attack on Iran. Israeli sources stated in October 2024 that Iran could not domestically produce solid fuel mixers and would need to purchase them from China, which could take at least a year.[v] China previously assisted Iran in rebuilding its ballistic missile program after the October 2024 Israeli attack on Iran by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a component of solid fuel.[vi] The Associated Press report comes after Iran tested an unspecified ballistic missile in Semnan Province on September 18.[vii] The report also comes after the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities,” which include Iranian missile capabilities.[viii]

An Iranian parliamentarian who is affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front and a member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran.[ix] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran’s acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict. Abolfazl Zohrevand claimed that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets have arrived in Shiraz, Iran, as part of Iran’s efforts to strengthen its air force.[x]  Russia has not confirmed this report. CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm whether Russia has delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran at the time of this writing. The MiG-29 is an antiquated system and would not be able to confront more advanced Israeli and US aircraft, such as F-35 fighter jets. Zohrevand also claimed that Russian Su-35 fighter jets are “gradually entering” Iran and that Russia will supply Iran with S-400 air defense systems.[xi] Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed that Russia will provide Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air defense systems in recent years, but Russia has not yet delivered any such systems to Iran.[xii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia is unable to divert critical systems like the Su-35 and S-400 away from its war effort to Ukraine. Zohrevand further claimed that China would supply Iran with HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).[xiii] Chinese HQ-9 SAMs bear similarities to Russian S-300s. Senior Iranian officials have expressed openness to expanding military cooperation with China, but it is unclear whether China is willing to provide Iran with the advanced systems that it seeks.[xiv]

Shia Coordination Framework parties that will compete against Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in the November 2025 parliamentary elections are continuing to try to detract voter support for Sudani’s coalition. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The spokesperson for former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition accused the Sudani administration of withholding government services, such as electricity, to pressure State of Law members to join Sudani’s coalition in an interview with Iraqi media on September 21.[xv] The spokesperson added that the State of Law Coalition opposes Sudani serving another term as prime minister. Unidentified Shia Coordination Framework members previously accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s prospects in the upcoming elections.[xvi]

Iraqi media separately reported on September 24 that unidentified Shia Coordination Framework parties have circulated rumors that Sudani is a Baathist.[xvii] An unidentified Shia Coordination Framework party previously accused Sudani of having ties to the Baath Party during discussions about Sudani becoming prime minister in 2022, according to an unidentified former Iraqi minister. It is unclear which Shia Coordination Framework parties are behind these accusations at the time of this writing. Maliki has frequently warned that Baathists could infiltrate the elections, however.[xviii] CTP-ISW assessed on August 20 that Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission, which bars candidates with Baathist ties from running in the elections, to sideline political opponents.[xix]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War.
• Russo-Iranian Defense Cooperation: An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran. CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran’s acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework parties that will compete against Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in the November 2025 parliamentary elections are continuing to try to detract voter support for Sudani’s coalition.

Iran Update, September 23, 2025 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in a speech on September 23.[i] Khamenei’s speech marks the first time that Khamenei has rejected all negotiations with the United States since the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Khamenei previously rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations in a speech in August 2025.[ii] Khamenei did not distinguish between direct or indirect negotiations in his September 23 speech, which indicates that he likely rejects any type of negotiation with the United States.[iii] Khamenei stated on September 23 that negotiations with the United States “do not serve [Iran’s] national interests” and cause serious and sometimes “irreparable damage.”[iv] Khamenei claimed that the United States approaches negotiations with a predetermined goal to end Iran’s nuclear activities and enrichment and stated that engaging in such negotiations means accepting coercion. Khamenei warned that negotiating under threat signals submission and would embolden the United States to demand more concessions from Iran, such as reducing Iran’s missile range. Khamenei also reiterated that Iran will not accept the United States’ demand for Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment, stating that enrichment is a national achievement that was developed through decades of effort.[v]

Khamenei separately claimed that national unity was decisive in undermining Iran’s adversaries during the 12-day war. Khamenei stated that Iranians’ cohesion prevented unrest despite “enemy effort[s]” to kill commanders, disrupt state functions, and “eradicate Islam in Iran.”[vi] Khamenei also highlighted the importance of swift leadership succession, the resilience of the Iranian armed forces, and effective state management during the war.[vii] Khamenei’s remarks about unity echo other regime officials’ comments since the 12-day war about national cohesion and solidarity. Moderate and pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, initiated calls for unity after the war.[viii] Rouhani emphasized in July the need for unity and to rebuild trust between the regime and the Iranian people, for example. Other senior officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have made similar statements about the importance of unity.[ix]

Iran is highly unlikely to prevent the reimposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by September 27 because Iran has failed to meet the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands for delaying the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with his E3 counterparts and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in New York on September 23 to try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[x] A European diplomat described the prospect of an agreement as “slim” because Iran has not fulfilled the E3’s conditions for delaying the snapback mechanism. These conditions include Iran granting inspectors full access to Iran’s nuclear sites, accounting for the location and amount of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, and resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States.[xi] A US journalist reported on September 23 that Araghchi did not make progress toward preventing the reimposition of UNSC sanctions in his meeting with Kallas and the E3 officials.[xii] Germany’s Foreign Office stated that the E3 and the European Union urged Iran to take “practical steps” in the coming hours and days to resume direct negotiations with the United States, among other steps.[xiii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, as noted above.

Iran is attempting to use the September 9 Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement to pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process. The Iran-IAEA agreement reportedly sets procedures for future inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities but does not provide a timeline for inspections.[xiv] Araghchi met with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 22.[xv] Grossi stated in an interview with PBS on September 22 that the IAEA has not received any “official communication” about Iran suspending the September 9 agreement.[xvi] Senior Iranian officials, including Araghchi, have maintained that the Iran-IAEA agreement will be voided if the E3 imposes snapback sanctions on Iran, however.[xvii] Iran may calculate that it can pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process by threatening to suspend cooperation with the IAEA given that the E3 has repeatedly called for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and allow IAEA inspectors to resume inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities.

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in a speech on September 23. Khamenei’s speech marks the first time that Khamenei has rejected all negotiations with the United States since the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.
• Snapback Sanctions: Iran is highly unlikely to prevent the reimposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by September 27 because Iran has failed to meet the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands for delaying the snapback mechanism. Iran is attempting to use the September 9 Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement to pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process.

Iran Update, September 22, 2025 

Some Iranian hardliners are renewing calls to revise Iran's nuclear doctrine as part of a broader effort to restore deterrence after the Israel-Iran War and two years of Israeli military actions that have collectively weakened Iran’s missile program and the Axis of Resistance, both of which were long pillars of Iran’s deterrence.[i] Seventy-one Iranian parliamentarians sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the heads of the three branches of government on September 22 and urged a revision of Iran’s defense doctrine.[ii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2003 that banned the production and use of nuclear weapons.[iii] The SNSC and the three branches of government cannot overturn Khamenei’s fatwa, but they can advise Khamenei to allow Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. The new letter follows a similar effort in October 2024, when thirty-nine parliamentarians wrote to the SNSC and called for the revision of Iran’s “defense doctrine” and to issue permission and provide facilities for the “production of nuclear weapons.”[iv] Paydari (Stability) Front parliamentarian Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri was the lead signatory of both the October 2024 and September 2025 letters. The near doubling of signatories over the past year indicates that calls to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program have become increasingly normalized in regime discourse. An Iranian expert close to the regime stated, without evidence, on September 21 that 90 percent of Iranians support acquiring a nuclear weapon.[v]

Calls to revise Iran’s defense doctrine come as Iran has lost key pillars that it has traditionally used to deter its adversaries, including its missile and drone stockpiles and the Axis of Resistance. Israel has significantly degraded the Axis of Resistance and limited their ability or willingness to support Iran since October 2023. Iran’s proxies did not provide Iran with any meaningful support during the Israel-Iran War.[vi] Only the Houthis attacked Israel at all, and the Houthis‘ actions did not change Israeli behavior. Israel intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s missiles during the 12-day war and destroyed 35 to 45 percent of Iran’s missile stockpile.[vii]

Iranian parliamentarian Mohsen Zanganeh stated in an interview on September 20 that Iran conducted a missile test on September 18 and said that Iran is “conducting a security test of an intercontinental [ballistic] missile.”[viii] Zanganeh’s phrasing is unclear and may suggest that Iran is taking some prerequisite steps to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile. CTP-ISW reported on September 19 that Iran tested an unidentified ballistic missile at the missile test range in the Semnan Space Center in Semnan Province on September 18, citing Iranian media.[ix] Zanganeh stated on September 20 that Iran had conducted a successful test of ”one of the country’s most advanced missiles” and added that ”even under these circumstances, we are conducting a security test of an intercontinental missile.“[x] It is unclear if Zanganeh is stating that Iran conducted an ICBM missile test on September 18 or plans to conduct one in the future. Zanganeh is a member of parliament’s Economic Commission and previously worked as a representative at the Iranian Central Bank.[xi] It is unclear if Zanganeh would be privy to the details of the missile test.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Some Iranian hardliners are renewing calls to revise Iran's nuclear doctrine as part of a broader effort to restore deterrence after the Israel-Iran War and two years of Israeli military actions that have collectively weakened Iran’s missile program and the Axis of Resistance, both of which were long pillars of Iran’s deterrence.
• Iranian Missile Test: Iranian parliamentarian Mohsen Zanganeh stated in an interview on September 20 that Iran conducted a missile test on September 18 and said that Iran is “conducting a security test of an intercontinental [ballistic] missile.” It is unclear if Zanganeh is stating that Iran conducted an ICBM missile test on September 18 or plans to conduct one in the future.

Iran Update, September 19, 2025 

Iran is attempting to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), but avoids any meaningful commitments regarding its nuclear program and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian and US officials have reportedly been in direct contact in recent days to discuss a new nuclear proposal.[i] Iran‘s new proposal stipulates that Iran would resume talks with the United States over an interim deal while the E3 simultaneously halts the snapback process and extends UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 for several months to allow time for negotiations. UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, prohibited Iran from engaging in “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons…until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.”[ii] Iran’s proposal said that the United States must also provide a guarantee that there will be no more strikes on Iran once an interim deal is reached. Iran would then begin retrieving its 60 percent highly enriched uranium stockpile. The proposal calls for the following three steps to be conducted after Iran’s retrieval and the United States provides a security guarantee:

• The UNSC will permanently terminate Resolution 2231.
• Iran will dilute its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to 20 percent for use in fuel plates at the Tehran Research Reactor.
• The United States will lift sanctions it agreed to in the interim deal, and both sides will begin talks for a “final agreement.”

An unspecified political source told Amwaj Media that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi submitted the Iranian proposal to US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead nuclear negotiator Steve Witkoff on September 16.[iii] Araghchi separately gave the same proposal to E3 foreign ministers and EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 17.[iv] The E3 responded to the proposal, calling it “insufficient in substance.”[v] An unspecified source familiar with the proposal stated that the Iranian proposal demands “far-reaching actions,” but includes “no concrete action” from Iran.[vi] The United States has not responded to the proposal at the time of writing.[vii] These Iranian steps are inconsistent with the stated US position on any nuclear agreement with Iran.

The UNSC rejected a draft resolution on September 19 to permanently lift sanctions on Iran.[viii] South Korea, which is the UNSC’s current president, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[ix] South Korea was required to hold the resolution for 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member held the resolution. The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[x] The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Snapback sanctions target Iran’s arms transfers and nuclear program more broadly, including its domestic enrichment activities.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran.[xi] The agreement is a mutual defense guarantee under which an attack on one party would trigger a response by both countries.[xii] Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif stated on September 18 that Pakistan's nuclear program "will be made available" to Saudi Arabia if necessary.[xiii] Asif added that Pakistan or Saudi Arabia has not specified a “country whose attack would automatically trigger a retaliatory response," which demonstrates that the agreement aims to address multiple security concerns rather than a single security threat.[xiv] Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar, that drew condemnation from Gulf states.[xv] Iranian outlets have also framed the agreement as a challenge to US influence in the region. An Iranian media outlet stated on September 19 that the agreement signals that "the era of unilateral dependence on America is over."[xvi] The outlet claimed that the agreement shows that Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the United States toward other "independent options."[xvii] Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been losing faith in US security guarantees for several years, at least since Iran targeted Saudi oil facilities with multiple missiles and drones in 2019, and a separate Iranian-backed attack struck Abu Dhabi, UAE, in 2022.[xviii] The timing of this agreement suggests that the recent Israeli strike in Doha factored in the Saudi decision to pursue and sign the agreement. But Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past, with much less precision and to a much greater effect than the Israeli strikes in Doha. The Iranian drone and missile attack in 2019 forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports.[xix] Iran has backed hundreds of Houthis and Iraqi militia attacks targeting the Gulf states since 2015 as well.[xx] Iran similarly conducted missile and drone strikes in Pakistan in January 2024, claiming to target members of the Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl.[xxi] Iran has also repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of fomenting internal unrest in Iran and backing anti-regime groups in southeastern Iran.[xxii] Saudi Arabia has historically supported US efforts to curb Iranian influence in the region, including by fighting Iran‘s regional proxies such as the Houthis in Yemen.[xxiii] CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran may be more concerned about this development than Iranian media coverage would suggest, given Iran’s repeated attacks or support for attacks in both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly suspended an agreement to import Turkmen gas due to US pressure. The deal would have enabled Iran to manage the gas flow and receive 23 percent of the gas daily.[xxiv] Such an arrangement would have given Tehran additional revenue and leverage over Baghdad, depending on the specific terms of the deal. Iraq would have imported over five billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas through Iran under the deal, which Iraq and Turkmenistan first proposed in 2023, according to four unidentified Iraqi officials and documents viewed by Reuters.[xxv] The Iranian state-owned National Iranian Gas Company would have reportedly managed the gas flow, and Iran would have received up to 23 percent of that gas daily. This arrangement would have benefited Iran and presumably enabled Iran to gain some revenue. It would also give Tehran leverage over Baghdad, assuming Iran could adjust the specific amount of flow from Turkmenistan if Iran desired. The United States rejected the Iraqi federal government’s previous attempts to justify the agreement, including an offer to employ a third-party international monitor to ensure that the agreement complied with US sanctions and anti-money laundering rules. An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on electricity issues implied that the United States would sanction Iraqi banks and financial institutions if the agreement moved forward. A source familiar with the matter told Reuters on September 19 that the United States refused to approve “arrangements that would benefit Iran.”[xxvi] The US opposition to this agreement comes as the United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq.[xxvii] This deal would have nominally decreased Iraq’s reliance on Iranian gas imports, but Iran’s ability to ”manage” gas flows and receive 23 percent of the gas flow would have benefited Iran.

Iraq continues to rely on Iran to meet its energy demands. An unidentified Iraqi power official told Reuters on September 19 that Iranian gas fulfills nearly a third of Iraq’s total power generation.[xxviii] The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity in March 2025, but Iraq has continued to import Iranian gas.[xxix] Iran’s ongoing, chronic energy shortages have complicated its ability to supply gas to Iraq, however. The office of Iraqi Electricity Minister Ziad Ali Fadel stated on August 1, ahead of Fadel’s meetings with Iranian officials in Tehran, that Fadel would discuss ways to ensure Iran’s commitment to its contracts regarding oil exports to Iraq.[xxx] Iraqi energy shortages run the continued risk of threatening Iraqi political stability by triggering power outages, though the destabilizing effects of power outages in Iraq are less pronounced after the summer. Summer power cuts have previously caused major anti-government demonstrations in Iraq, which would be especially concerning ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xxxi] Iraq has continued to pursue alternative pathways to fulfill its energy demands beyond relying on Iran, including via potential imports of Qatari and Omani gas and improvements to its existing energy infrastructure.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions on Iran: Iran is trying to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) but avoids any meaningful commitments on its nuclear program and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cooperation. These Iranian steps are inconsistent with the stated US position on any nuclear agreement with Iran.
• Saudi-Pakistan Defense Cooperation: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran. Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar. Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past and backed numerous militia attacks targeting the Gulf states.
• Iraq Energy Imports: The Iraqi federal government has reportedly suspended an agreement to import Turkmen gas due to US pressure. The deal would have enabled Iran to manage the gas flow and receive 23 percent of the gas daily. Such an arrangement would have given Tehran additional revenue and leverage over Baghdad, depending on the specific terms of the deal.

Iran Update, September 18, 2025

Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely in an effort to address energy shortages in Iran.[i] Paknejad and Tsivilyov reviewed the Iran-Russia April 2025 agreement for Russia to export 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Iran annually via Azerbaijan.[ii] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated in January 2025 that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year and could increase to 55 billion cubic meters annually.[iii] Iran, and especially northern Iran, faces recurring gas shortages during the winter because Iran has limited gas storage capacity, and energy production is concentrated in the South Pars gas field in southern Iran.[iv] Iranian media reported that Iran faces a potential steep decline in overall gas production over the next five to seven years.[v] Iranian officials may be concerned about potential unrest as a result of ongoing chronic energy shortages. Energy shortages have previously caused protests in northeastern Iran.[vi] Recent energy shortages have forced the Iranian government to temporarily shut down offices, banks, schools, and government buildings.[vii]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi also met with Tsivilyov and emphasized the importance of deepening bilateral defense cooperation amid Western sanctions.[viii] These meetings reflect Iranian efforts to deepen strategic cooperation with Russia under the framework of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.

French President Emmanuel Macron stated on September 18 that UN snapback sanctions on Iran are a “done deal” and will be reimposed at the end of September.[ix] Macron told Israeli media that Iran has failed to make serious commitments.[x] Iran reportedly presented the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) with a proposal earlier this week to extend the snapback deadline by several months in exchange for positive steps to curtail its nuclear program and an Iranian move to resume talks with the United States.[xi] The E3 reportedly viewed the proposal as “insufficient“, according to a source familiar with the proposal.[xii] The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[xiii] The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA.

Iran views Russia and China as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet Defa Press published an article on September 15 discussing how Iran will benefit from an upcoming BRICS naval exercise.[xiv] BRICS, which is an international economic coalition comprised of the PRC, Russia, and others, was scheduled to conduct a combined naval exercise with Iran and others in November 2025, though BRICS has delayed the exercise indefinitely. This would mark the first combined exercise with Iranian participation since the Israel-Iran war. The Iranian article asserted that the exercise would help Iran develop “modern tactics” across multiple domains, test domestically produced weapons, and share weapons technology and intelligence with other exercise participants.[xv] Indeed, combined exercises provide a controlled environment for militaries to test new tactics and equipment, enhance their interoperability, and learn from one another—all of which Tehran likely values heavily given its need to rebuild its military.

The Iranian discussion about the BRICS naval exercise came as Tehran has looked to the Adversary Entente for critical military and economic assistance. Iran has reportedly sought to buy advanced air defenses and fighter jets from the PRC and Russia in recent weeks.[xvi] Iran will need foreign help for the foreseeable future to reconstitute the damage that Israel inflicted upon Iranian air and air defense capabilities. Iranian officials and state media have separately emphasized in recent weeks the need to deepen economic cooperation with the PRC to withstand international sanctions.

The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of the Iranian military reconstitution effort. An Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet published an article on September 13 discussing efforts to strengthen Iranian air defense following the Israel-Iran war and focusing particularly on using Krasukha EW systems.[xvii] The Iranian military establishment has been very interested in improving its EW capabilities, particularly against the backdrop of the Russian war in Ukraine.[xviii] The Iranian leadership has more broadly emphasized the need to improve domestic defensive capabilities since the June 2025 Israel-Iran war.[xix] Russia developed the 1L269 Krasukha in 2010 as a ground-based EW system built to neutralize low earth orbit (LEO) spy satellites, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150-300 kilometers.[xx] Russia deployed the Krasukha-4 to Syria in 2015.[xxi] Commander of US Special Operations Command General Raymond Thomas reported in 2018 that Russian EW attacks in Syria had disrupted communications, EC-130s, and other equipment.[xxii] Satellite imagery captured in January 2024 showed that Iran had deployed a Krasukha-4 system to Bandar Abbas.[xxiii] Israel struck military targets at Bandar Abbas during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, though it is unclear whether the Krasukha systems were impacted.[xxiv] Israel used F-35s during its strikes into Iran, which are equipped with advanced counter-electronic warfare capabilities and can likely evade the Krasukha-4.[xxv] The Iranian military establishment may therefore be interested in new Krasukha-4 systems to defend against Israeli drone operations. Israel launched a wave of drones at the onset of its strike campaign in Iran to suppress air defenses and electronic countermeasures and damage missile launchers.[xxvi] Russia has used the Krasukha-4 EW system to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military assets in the Russian rear and also explicitly credited the Krasukha-4 for the Russian ability to defend against Ukrainian ground-based counteroffensive operations in June 2023.[xxvii] Iran is likely hoping to acquire the Krasukha-4 and integrate these operational lessons in future defensive operations against Israel.

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions on Iran: French President Emmanuel Macron stated on September 18 that UN snapback sanctions on Iran are a “done deal” and will be reimposed at the end of September. Macron told Israeli media that Iran has failed to make serious commitments. The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
• Iran-Russia Energy Cooperation: Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely in an effort to address energy shortages in Iran. Iranian officials may be concerned about potential unrest as a result of ongoing chronic energy shortages.
• Iranian Military Cooperation with US Adversaries: Iran views Russia and China as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled outlet Defa Press published an article on September 15 discussing how Iran will benefit from an upcoming BRICS naval exercise. The Iranian article asserted that the exercise would help Iran develop “modern tactics” across multiple domains, test domestically produced weapons, and share weapons technology and intelligence with other exercise participants.
• Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of the Iranian military reconstitution effort. Iran is likely hoping to acquire the Krasukha-4 and integrate these operational lessons in future defensive operations against Israel.

Iran Update, September 17, 2025

The E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) stated on September 17 that Iran has not taken any concrete steps required to delay the snapback mechanism.[i] The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[ii] The UN Security Council will reimpose sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 17 to discuss snapback sanctions.[iii] The E3 previously offered to extend the deadline by six months if Iran restored full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resumed negotiations with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[iv] Iran signed an agreement with the IAEA on September 9 that set procedures for inspections on all Iranian nuclear facilities, but only within parameters set by Iran.[v] The agreement also did not provide a timeline for inspections or clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium.[vi]  Araghchi stated on September 11 that the evaluation of enriched material buried under the rubble is still under review and will be submitted to the Supreme National Security Council, which will make the final decision based on Iran’s security concerns. European states remain unconvinced that Iran’s steps with the IAEA are serious.[vii] Kallas separately warned on September 17 that the “window for finding a diplomatic solution” on Iran’s nuclear issue is closing and added that Iran must take ”credible steps“ to meet E3 demands.[viii] Germany’s Foreign Ministry similarly stated that Iran has yet to take “reasonable and precise actions.”[ix] British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper also stated that Iran has not taken the necessary steps to avoid the reimposition of snapback sanctions and emphasized that the UK needs "concrete action.".[x]

 

The US State Department designated Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) on September 17.[xi] These four militias are part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xii] US federal law makes it a crime for any person in the United States or subject to US jurisdiction to knowingly provide “material support or resources,” including financial services, training, or weapons, to a designated FTO.[xiii] The United States Treasury Department previously designated these militias and their leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).[xiv] The US Treasury Department has the authority to block the assets of SDGTs and any individual or entity that provides them with support or services.[xv] US individuals or entities are also prohibited, with limited exemptions, from engaging in any transaction with a designated SDGT.[xvi] These designations come as the United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq and disarm Iran-backed militias by threatening sanctions.[xvii]

 

The Suwayda Autonomous Government rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap to resolve intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province. The rejection will complicate the transitional government’s effort to reconcile with the province and eventually integrate it into the state.  The United States, Syria, and Jordan announced a plan to “guarantee rights” and “promote societal reconciliation” in Suwayda Province on September 16.[xviii] The anti-government Suwaydawis were not included in the creation of the roadmap, which decreased the likelihood that the roadmap would succeed. The roadmap seeks to set up short and medium-term security and administrative arrangements to facilitate the province’s eventual integration into the Syrian state and commits the Syrian government to forming an independent commission for crimes committed in Suwayda.[xix] The autonomous Suwayda government’s judicial committee denounced the US-Syrian-Jordanian plan on September 16.[xx] The body criticized the roadmap's reliance on a “corrupt” Syrian judicial system and  on the Syrian government as a “neutral party.”[xxi] The committee—in tandem with its military wing, which is comprised of about 40 Druze militias—provides administrative services and security to communities in central, southern, and eastern Suwayda, while pro-government forces maintain control in Suwayda’s northern and western countrysides.[xxii] The committee argued in its denunciation of the roadmap that the violence committed in Suwayda in July 2025 justified the people of Suwayda’s right to ”self-determination.”[xxiii] The committee noted that self-determination may include either “self-administration” or “secession” from Syria.[xxiv] The Suwayda Autonomous Government’s denunciation of the roadmap contrasts with reactions from Syrian government allies and other regional powers. France, Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain all released statements welcoming the plan on September 16 and 17.[xxv]

The Druze leaders that the Syrian transitional government has partnered with for this roadmap likely do not hold the required influence in Suwayda to eclipse the popularity of the Suwayda Autonomous Government. The Syrian Interior Ministry appointed Druze militia leader Suleiman Abdul Baqi as Suwayda’s security director on September 15.[xxvi] Abdul Baqi formerly led the Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, which is a prominent Druze militia that has remained aligned with the government.[xxvii] Abdul Baqi, alongside Mudhafat al Karama leader Laith al Balous, has been one of the main Druze leaders to engage with the Syrian government since the fall of the regime. Both Abdul Baqi and Balous have reportedly lost significant local influence since the Suwayda violence in July 2025, and many Druze reportedly "publicly revile” them as traitors for their sympathy for the government.[xxviii] Pro-Hijri fighters burned down Abdul Baqi’s house and abducted his father in late August 2025, which demonstrated the degree of hostility between the two sides.[xxix] The pro-Hijri factions’ intimidation of Abdul Baqi suggests that he does not retain any favor with the factions that have joined the Suwayda parallel government’s administrative and military structures.

Reported Israeli support for anti-government Druze factions will also complicate the government’s efforts to reconcile with the Druze community. Two unspecified senior Druze commanders told Reuters on September 16 that Israel was helping to “unify” Druze factions in Suwayda and had delivered arms and ammunition to them since intercommunal violence erupted there in July 2025.[xxx] The two Druze sources and a Western intelligence source also said that Israel was paying salaries for “many of the roughly 3,000” anti-government Druze militia members.[xxxi] Hijri prominently called upon Israel and the international community for support during the violence in July 2025.[xxxii]

 

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) stated that Iran has not taken any concrete steps required to delay the snapback mechanism. EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas separately warned that the “window for finding a diplomatic solution” on Iran’s nuclear issue is closing and added that Iran must take ”credible steps“ to meet E3 demands.
• US Sanctions Designations: The US State Department designated Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya as Foreign Terrorist Organizations on September 17. These militias and their leaders were previously designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
• Syrian State Formation: The Suwayda Autonomous Government rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap to resolve intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province. The rejection will complicate the transitional government’s effort to reconcile with the province and eventually integrate it into the state.

Iran Update, September 16, 2025

Comments from sources involved in ongoing Syria-Israel security negotiations indicate that a security agreement between the two countries is currently very unlikely, despite US pressure. Reuters reported on September 16 that the United States is pressuring the Syrian transitional government to accelerate negotiations with Israel for a limited security pact ahead of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23.[i] This limited security pact would reportedly not include Israel-Syria normalization. US pressure has not resolved fundamental challenges to the current negotiations, however. The Syrian transitional government seeks to reinstate the 1974 demilitarized buffer zone between the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and Syria, curb Israeli incursions and airstrikes in Syria, and secure an Israeli withdrawal from recently seized territory in southern Syria, according to nine sources involved in the talks.[ii] Syrian sources said the proposal for a security pact will not address the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, which will be handled “in the future.”[iii] US sources said that “even a modest agreement would be a feat” due to Israel’s hardened stance in negotiations.[iv] The US sources added that the Syrian transitional government is in a weakened position after intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in July “inflamed calls for partition.”[v]  Unspecified sources said to Reuters that Israel would be reluctant to give up recently occupied Syrian territory, and an Israeli security source confirmed that “Israel is not offering much.”[vi] Israel’s negotiating position further narrows the prospect of a near-term security agreement due to the domestic political constraints that Shara faces. An Israeli source said Israel proposed to US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack that Israel would withdraw from southern Syria in exchange for Syria relinquishing its claim to the Golan Heights.[vii] Syrian sources said that President Ahmad al Shara has rejected this proposal since “any compromise on the Golan would mean the end of his rule.”[viii]

A Syrian military official separately told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on September 16 that Syrian government forces withdrew all “heavy weapons” from southern Syria, where Israel has repeatedly demanded a demilitarized zone.[ix] A southern Syrian journalist confirmed this claim.[x]  A Syrian diplomatic source added that the Syrian military has withdrawn heavy weapons northwards out of southwestern Syria to a line 10 kilometers south of Damascus.[xi] A Syrian diplomatic source told AFP that Israeli and Syrian officials will meet in Baku, Azerbaijan, on September 19, but the source did not specify attendees.[xii] Israel and Syria previously held bilateral negotiations in Paris on August 19, where the two sides discussed security arrangements in southern Syria and a previously rejected Israeli proposal for a humanitarian corridor that connects Israel to Suwayda Province.[xiii] 

Key Takeaways

• Syria-Israel Negotiations: Comments from sources involved in ongoing Syria-Israel security negotiations indicate that a security agreement between the two countries is currently very unlikely, despite US pressure. Reuters reported on September 16 that the United States is pressuring the Syrian transitional government to accelerate negotiations with Israel for a limited security pact ahead of the United Nations General Assembly on September 23.
• Iran and the Gulf: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with senior Saudi officials in Riyadh on September 16, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel following Israel's September 9 strike in Doha. Larijani met with Saudi officials, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, to discuss the "future of the region" and economic and defense cooperation.
• Chinese Imports of Iranian Oil: Iran is offering wider discounts on its oil exports to China to counter US sanctions and in reaction to demand drivers in the Chinese oil market.
• Israeli Strikes in Yemen: The Israel Defense Forces Air Force struck Houthi shipping infrastructure at Hudaydah Port on September 16, which the Houthis had repaired since the IDF’s last strikes on the port in July 2025. A Yemen analyst reported that Israel struck three recently repaired piers at the port.

Iran Update, September 15, 2025

A recent op-ed from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media offers insight into how some elements of the Iranian regime may be viewing the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Gulf in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha.[i] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim released an op-ed on September 14 in which it claimed that Israel has played an increasingly divisive role in the relationship between the United States and the Gulf states.[ii] Tasnim suggested that the Gulf states should make their continued economic cooperation with the United States contingent upon US efforts to “contain” Israel.[iii] The report also added that the Gulf countries can diversify their partnerships with other countries with US adversaries, particularly Russia and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC).[iv] It is unclear if Iranian officials are directly attempting to convince Gulf states to undertake any of these efforts in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes on Hamas leaders in Qatar.

Tasnim’s op-ed is consistent with how Iranian officials have been framing Israel’s September 9 strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers in an anti-United States, anti-Israel regional coalition.[v] Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami recently addressed the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia—all countries that have security partnerships with the United States—and warned that Israel would strike their country next if it was allowed to grow in power.[vi] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani similarly urged regional Islamic countries on September 13 to establish a ”joint operations room” against Israel to avoid their ”own annihilation.”[vii] Proposals like Larijani’s are unlikely to be taken seriously by the Gulf states because Iran has consistently conducted military attacks targeting the Gulf and could continue to do so in the future.

Qatar hosted an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha.[viii] No Gulf state, including Qatar, has made any tangible moves to punish Israel for the strikes. Numerous Gulf and Arab leaders attended the summit, including Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sabah Khaled al Hamad al Sabah, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[ix] The heads of state and other representatives condemned the Israeli strikes, reaffirmed solidarity with Qatar in its right to respond, and stressed the need for the international community to act urgently to ”deter Israel.”[x] The Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discussed the repercussions of the Israeli airstrikes and asserted that the strikes constitute a direct threat to the Gulf’s joint security.[xi] The GCC stated that Israel’s ongoing ”aggressive policies” undermine the future of ”existing understandings and agreements” with Israel, likely referring to the Abraham Accords and other economic agreements between GCC countries and Israel.[xii]

Iran does not appear to have made serious commitments in its new agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian effort to secure an agreement was likely an attempt to delay or prevent potential snapback sanctions. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed the Iran-IAEA agreement on September 9.[xiii] Grossi stated on September 10 that the agreement sets procedures for inspections and reporting on all Iranian facilities, including sites damaged during the 12-day War.[xiv] Araghchi stated on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA will solely take place under a “new framework” that is defined by parliamentary law and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[xv] The SNSC Secretariat confirmed in a statement on September 14 that all cooperation with the IAEA requires SNSC approval and that Iran will provide reports to the IAEA only after establishing its own internal security and safety conditions.[xvi] Iran has continued to refrain from cooperating with the IAEA in the days since the agreement and has not provided the IAEA with any timeline for resumed inspections or any clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium.[xvii] Iran’s newly defined limitations on its resumed cooperation with the IAEA follow a long pattern of Iran’s partial and conditional cooperation with the IAEA. Iran also restricted IAEA oversight after 2021 by removing monitoring equipment and expelling inspectors.[xviii] Iran has also historically restricted IAEA oversight by refusing access to certain facilities associated with its pre-2003 weapons program and by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[xix] The European Union (EU) warned at the 69th IAEA General Conference on September 15 that the IAEA has not been able to access most safeguarded facilities since June 2025.[xx]

Iran is simultaneously attempting to discourage the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from imposing snapback sanctions by threatening to suspend Iran’s agreed cooperation with the IAEA if sanctions are imposed. Araghchi claimed on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA is separate from its disputes with the Europeans over the snapback mechanism.[xxi] The SNSC specified on September 14 that any ”hostile” actions—including the imposition of snapback sanctions—would suspend Iran’s implementation of the Iran-IAEA agreement, which demonstrates that—contrary to Araghchi’s claim—Iran does view cooperation with the IAEA as connected with the snapback mechanism.[xxii] The E3 triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28 but offered to extend the deadline by six months if Iran restored full IAEA cooperation, resumed negotiations with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xxiii] Araghchi dismissed the E3 demands as “unrealistic, unreasonable, and contrary to Iran’s national interest.[xxiv] Iran has not complied with E3’s demands, which, combined with Araghchi’s comments, have left the E3 unconvinced that the Iran-IAEA agreement reflects any meaningful movement towards an Iranian effort to avoid snapback.[xxv]

The Syrian transitional government’s attempt to reconcile Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) violations in a Damascus suburb highlights the broader challenges that Damascus faces during Syria’s recovery from Assad’s rule and the civil war. Local sources told Reuters that General Security Services (GSS) personnel forcibly evicted about 22,000 Alawite residents from Damascus’s al Somaria neighborhood between August 27 and 29.[xxvi] An Interior Ministry commander named Hadi Askar (Abu Hudhayfah) reportedly led the operation.[xxvii] Al Somaria residents said GSS members demanded proof of home ownership and marked properties for eviction if residents failed to provide it.[xxviii] The GSS’s justification for the forced eviction was that the residents' homes were built on land illegally seized by the Assad regime in the 1970s, according to the Damascus governor.[xxix]  The Assad regime forcibly displaced Sunni residents in Damascus’s Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood to build the al Somaria neighborhood over it as military housing in the 1970s.[xxx] Syrian sources told Enab Baladi that over 200,000 former landowners from the original Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood and their heirs retain claims to return to their land in al Somaria.[xxxi] Syrian human rights experts alleged to Enab Baladi that the GSS evictions in al Somaria constituted forced evictions on a selective basis and that government forces failed to provide proper notice or housing alternatives.[xxxii] The human rights experts explained that successful transitional justice for HLP violations must respect the rights of original landowners and violators and cannot be decided by the Syrian government alone.[xxxiii]  

The evictions of the Alawite residents of al Somaria are emblematic of the country-wide challenges that Damascus faces as it attempts to rebuild Syria after decades under Assad rule and subsequent civil war. The Assad regime built multiple Damascus neighborhoods on top of others after displacing residents throughout its rule.[xxxiv] Turkey and its proxies have similarly displaced Kurds from their homes in northern Syria in acts of ethnic cleansing that seek to replace the Kurds with Sunni Arabs. The Syrian transitional government will need to contend with HLP reconciliation outside of Damascus, as well as internally displaced persons returning to their homes across the country. The transitional government will likely face continual challenges when addressing HLP violations, which can risk igniting long-held political or sectarian grievances.

Key Takeaways

• Iran and the Gulf: A recent op-ed from IRGC-affiliated media offers insight into how some elements of the Iranian regime may be viewing the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Gulf in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha. Iranian officials have framed Israel’s September 9 strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers in an anti-US, anti-Israel regional coalition.
• Regional Response to Doha Strikes: Qatar hosted an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha. No Gulf state, including Qatar, has made any tangible moves to punish Israel for the strikes.
• Iran’s Cooperation with the IAEA: Iran is attempting to discourage the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from imposing snapback sanctions by threatening to suspend Iran’s newly agreed-upon agreement with the IAEA if sanctions are imposed.
• Transitional Challenges in Syria: The Syrian transitional government’s attempt to reconcile Housing, Land, and Property violations in a Damascus suburb highlights the broader challenges that Damascus faces during Syria’s recovery from Assad’s rule and the civil war.

Iran Update, September 12, 2025

Iranian officials are using Israel’s September 9 strike in Doha, Qatar, to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region. Israel’s September 9 airstrike targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, caused the Gulf states to condemn Israeli actions.[i] Iran has exploited these frustrations among Gulf states by questioning the reliability of US partnerships. Iranian officials have made statements and held a series of meetings and phone calls with Gulf and Arab states since September 9, in which they condemned the Israeli airstrike as a “violation of international law.”[ii] Iranian officials have misrepresented the degree of US knowledge of the Israeli strikes and have suggested that the US-brokered agreements are incapable of defending Arab states from Israeli attacks.[iii] The United States did not have adequate foreknowledge of the Israeli strike to discourage the Israelis from conducting the strike. Iranian officials have painted the Israeli strike as a direct threat to the security of Gulf countries and called for the international community to hold Israel accountable for its “criminal act.”[iv] Iran, of course, has repeatedly targeted Gulf states with much less precision and to much greater effect. Iran fired missiles and drones at the Saudi oil terminal in Dhafran in 2019, for example, which forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports.[v] Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatani addressed the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia--all countries that have security partnerships with the United States--during Friday prayers on September 12 and warned that Israel would strike their country next if it was allowed to grow in power.[vi]

This Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel is extremely unlikely to succeed, but Iran has presumably designed a gradual coalition-breaking effort to undermine US-led efforts to forge an anti-Iran coalition in the Middle East. The US-led effort to forge this coalition has paid dividends for the United States in the Middle East already. Many Gulf and other Arab states contributed to Israel‘s defense against Iranian missile and drone attacks in April and October 2024, for example. This defense decreased the likelihood of further escalation between Iran and Israel by helping prevent any significant damage to Israel. One Iranian diplomatic push is extremely unlikely to undo the progress the United States has made towards forging an anti-Iran coalition, especially after the Iranian attack on al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in June 2025. The recent Iranian rhetoric degrading US diplomatic and security partnerships is part of a long-running line of effort in a long-standing Iranian campaign to weaken the United States and secure Iran’s role as a regional hegemon. This line of effort has had no success to date.

Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani called for an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 14 and 15.[vii]  An unspecified source cited by Lebanese media on September 12 claimed that the Qatari government is prepared to launch a ”comprehensive diplomatic campaign” against Israel through the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the United Nations Security Council, and “even within Washington itself and the halls of Congress.”[viii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will attend the emergency Arab-Islamic summit on September 14 and 15 in Doha, Qatar.[ix]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is similarly trying to sow doubt about the United States’ role in the region. These narratives, although not coordinated with Iran, support Iranian objectives to decrease regional support for the United States. The PRC’s Foreign Ministry stated on September 10 that the Israeli strikes were linked to the US bias towards Israel, implying that the United States ignored the Gulf states’ security concerns.[x] Chinese state-owned media widely covered the Israeli strike in Doha and accused the United States of foreknowledge of the strikes. Chinese state media Xinhua reported on September 10 that the Israeli airstrikes in Doha were “a clear escalation” involving a sovereign Arab country that has no direct military hostilities with Israel.[xi] State broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) reported on September 11 that it would have been “very difficult” for Israel to have launched its airstrikes on Doha without US approval.[xii] A Chinese scholar similarly told CCTV on September 11 that the United States did not attempt to stop the Israeli strikes after receiving advanced warning from Israel about the strikes.[xiii] The PRC has previously tried to exploit unpopular US policies among Arab states to undermine the US role as the primary regional partner.[xiv]

The PRC’s statements incorrectly characterize the United States’ role in Israel’s recent strikes in Doha and attempt to demonstrate that the United States is an unreliable security partner for Gulf states. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office indicated that Israel unilaterally conducted its airstrikes in Doha.[xv] US officials stated that Israel’s warning gave the United States no time to warn Qatar.[xvi]  The United States was only informed while Israeli jets were in the air, giving the United States only enough time to briefly inform Qatar and no time to force Israel to call off the strike.

Members of the Iranian regime are trying to prepare for supreme leader succession by taking steps to secure their influence within the regime after the eventual passing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. UK-based media outlet “IranWire” reported on September 12 that, according to a senior Iranian diplomat, Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber are the regime stalwarts most in contact with Khamenei and are positioning themselves for more influence in the regime in the event of a succession.[xvii] The report comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[xviii] The diplomat stated that Larijani is actively engaging with reformists, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders, and grand ayatollahs to prepare the country diplomatically, economically, and militarily for the transition period.[xix] Larijani has been a key figure within the Iranian policy space over the past two decades and supported major initiatives, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, also known as the 2015 nuclear deal).[xx] Larijani has taken on a prominent role in shaping Iranian foreign policy as a pragmatic hardliner since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. The diplomat added that Mokhber is actively trying to undermine Larijani’s efforts by exploiting his "controversial" history with Iran's media and security apparatus.[xxi] Mokhber previously served as the head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO)—a parastatal organization directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—between 2007 and 2021.[xxii]

This political maneuvering is occurring as Khamenei continues to be absent from important political decisions. The IranWire report stated that senior Iranian officials are growing increasingly concerned about the health of Khamenei following a reduction in communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[xxiii] The senior Iranian diplomat stated that Khamenei’s office did not brief Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi before this year’s UN General Assembly as it normally does, and that the Foreign Affairs Ministry is operating “almost independently.”[xxiv] Khamenei’s personal absence could be explained by increased security measures, though it is unclear why his office could not communicate with other elements of the Iranian government. Khamenei did not make any public appearances during the Israel-Iran War except for three pre-recorded televised speeches.[xxv] Khamenei gave 12 speeches in the 80-day period before the Israel-Iran War (March 24-June 12), while he has only given four speeches in the 80-day period after the war (June 24-September 12).[xxvi] Western media reported on June 22 that a group of Iranian businessmen, political and military figures, and relatives of high-ranking clerics had begun planning how to lead Iran without Khamenei.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Succession: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber are the regime stalwarts most in contact with Khamenei and are positioning themselves for more influence in the regime in the event of a succession, according to a senior Iranian diplomat cited by a UK-based news site.
• IDF Strikes in Doha: Iranian officials are using Israel’s September 9 strike in Doha, Qatar, to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region. This Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel is extremely unlikely to succeed, but Iran has presumably designed a gradual coalition-breaking effort to undermine US-led efforts to forge an anti-Iran coalition in the Middle East.
• IDF Strikes in Doha: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is similarly trying to sow doubt about the United States’ role in the region. These narratives, although not coordinated with Iran, support Iranian objectives to decrease regional support for the United States. The PRC’s statements incorrectly characterize the United States’ role in Israel’s recent strikes in Doha and attempt to demonstrate that the United States is an unreliable security partner for Gulf states.

Iran Update, September 11, 2025

Iranian media outlet Nour News highlighted the Defense Council as an important body in shaping Iran’s strategy after the Israel-Iran War. Nour News is affiliated with Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) established the Defense Council on August 3 to streamline wartime decision-making after the Israel-Iran War and justified its formation by citing fragmentation and lack of coordination among Iranian institutions.[i] Nour News published a video on September 9 in which it described the Israel-Iran War as a turning point that demonstrated how global security is no longer guaranteed by international law.[ii] It claimed that international institutions tasked with preserving peace “proved powerless,” and that law has effectively been replaced by power. Nour News described this as a global transition from “law-based security” to “weapon-based security.” The outlet stated that the formation of the Defense Council was a structural response to the shift to weapon-based security and that it is more than an administrative initiative. Nour News previously framed the Defense Council as responsible for executing a new Iranian defense doctrine against “hybrid threats.”[iii]

The United States and other foreign countries have taken steps to provide Lebanon with economic and military support. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on September 10 that it will send a $14.2 million military aid package to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[iv] The aid package will include a range of military equipment, including demolition charges, time blasting fuses, and blasting caps, to help the LAF dismantle unexploded ordnances and Hezbollah weapons caches.[v] The US DoD stated that the package will empower the LAF to ”degrade Hezbollah.”[vi] Lebanese officials met with French Presidential Envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian on September 11 to discuss providing the LAF with unspecified support to implement its disarmament plan.[vii] Drian reaffirmed that France would support the LAF, help with Lebanon’s reconstruction, and stimulate international investment in Lebanon.[viii] France will also continue its work to organize two international conferences aimed at acquiring support for the LAF and increasing economic investments in Lebanon.[ix]

Economic support for the Lebanese government would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by giving the government the ability to provide services that it has been unable to provide previously. Hezbollah previously led reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to access funds to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure following the conflict with Israel in late 2024.[x] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xi] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xii]

The Iraqi Independence Gathering in Najaf, which is a political advocacy group, launched a campaign to pressure the Iraqi government to prevent parties tied to armed factions from running in the November 2025 parliamentary elections. The Iraqi Independence Gathering submitted a complaint to the Department of Political Parties and Organizations under the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).[xiii] IHEC was established in 2019 as an “independent and impartial body” responsible for developing election rules and regulations, approving candidates running for elections, adjudicating electoral complaints and appeals, and approving election results.[xiv] The Iraqi Independence Gathering cited Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution in its complaints. Article 9 bars the formation of militias and excludes all Iraqi security forces from participating in or being affiliated with any political activity.[xv] The organization also claimed that parties violated Articles 8 and 47 of the 2015 Political Parties Law Number 36.[xvi] Articles 8 and 47 of the 2015 Political Parties Law prohibit political parties from having any ties to armed factions and states that violators will face a prison sentence.[xvii] The Iraqi Independence Gathering also filed a lawsuit with the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court against Parliament to challenge the current Elections Act.[xviii] The organization claimed that the Elections Act contained articles that contradicted the Iraqi constitution. The Iraqi Independence Gathering claimed the following political parties violated Iraqi federal and election laws:[xix]

• Muntasirun Bloc: led by Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada head Safaa Salem Hamid al Maliki;
• Islamic Movement of Iraq (Harakat al Iraq al Islamiyah): led by Imam Ali Brigades Secretary General Shibl Mohsen Ubaid al Zaidi;
• Services Alliance (Tahaluf Hadmat): led by Imam Ali Brigades Deputy Secretary General Ali Zaidan Hamid al Gharawi;
• Conservative Party: led by Popular Mobilization Forces member Wael Asim Hussein al Shammari;
• Jihad and Construction Party (Harakat al Jihad al Bina): led by Saraya al Jihad founder Jawad Rahim Qasim al Saadi;
• National Elite Alliance (Tahaluf al Safwat al Watani): led by Ansar Allah al Awfiya militia commander Haidar Mazhar Malak al Gharawi;
• National Plateau Alliance (Tahaluf al Hadba al Watani): led by Kataib Sayyida al Shudada Secretary General Hashim Fityan Rahm (Abu Alaa al Walai);
• Babylon Party: led by Raban Salem Sadiq al Kildani. The Babylon Party is the political wing of the 50th PMF Brigade (also known as the Babylon Brigade).
• Badr Organization: led by Hadi al Ameri. Ameri also leads the Badr Organization’s military wing.[xx]
• Sadiqoun Movement: led by Qais al Khazali. Khazali also leads the armed wing of the Sadiqoun Movement, Asaib Ahl al Haq.[xxi]

Iran Update, September 10, 2025

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 10 that the Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement is unlikely to persuade the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to stop pursuing the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran because the agreement does not include a timeline for inspections or a deadline for Iran to clarify the status of its enriched uranium stockpile.[i] The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28, which will automatically reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran or postpone the snapback mechanism’s expiration date.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[iii] The E3 stated in response to the agreement that “it is not enough for Iran to make promises for tomorrow.”[iv] UK Ambassador to the UN Corinne Kitsell stated on September 10 that the E3 “must be prepared to hold Iran to account” if Iran does not grant full access to its nuclear sites to the IAEA.[v] Grossi stated that the details of the agreement will not be made public due to its “technical and operational” nature and that the agreement “will open the way for the respective inspections and access.”[vi] Araghchi stated that the agreement will consider the agreement “void” if the UNSC reimposes sanctions on Iran.[vii] Araghchi also stated that Iran will not allow inspectors to access Iranian nuclear facilities besides the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant for fuel replacement.[viii]

The casualties from Israel’s strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9 remain unclear.[ix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders who were meeting to discuss ongoing ceasefire negotiations.[x] Saudi media reported that the Israeli strikes killed at least three Hamas leaders, including Hamas’ Gaza Strip leader Khalil al Hayya, West Bank leader Zaher Jabarin, and Leadership Council member Khaled Meshaal.[xi] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on September 9 that the Israeli security establishment felt “optimistic” about the strikes’ success and estimated that it would take several hours to confirm which Hamas officials were killed in the strikes.[xii] A senior Israeli official told the Guardian on September 10 that Israel’s optimism about the strikes’ success was “waning.”[xiii] Two Israeli defense and intelligence sources similarly told Israeli media that they felt pessimistic about whether the strikes killed "most or even all” of the intended targets.[xiv] Israel reportedly informed the United States that the likelihood of the strikes’ success has “decreased significantly.”[xv] Hamas has denied that the Israeli strikes killed any of its negotiating team, which includes Hayya, Jabarin, and Meshaal.[xvi] Hamas has consistently lied about the deaths of senior commanders and waited weeks or even months to confirm the deaths of commanders who were killed by Israel in the Gaza Strip, however. There have been no official Israeli statements about which Hamas officials were killed in the strikes at the time of this writing.

Qatar and several regional countries have strongly criticized Israel’s recent strikes in Doha.[xvii] Qatar condemned Israel’s violation of its sovereignty and stated that it reserves the right to respond to the strikes and will “act firmly” against any “reckless breach” that threatens Qatari security.[xviii] Qatar also announced that it formed a legal team to take action against Israel in response to the strikes.[xix]  Several Gulf and regional countries also strongly condemned the Israeli strikes and expressed support for Qatar on September 9.[xx] The UAE called the Israeli strikes a “reckless attack” and “flagrant violation” of international law, while Iran and Saudi Arabia characterized the strikes as a “criminal act.”[xxi]  The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the Israeli strikes indicate that Israel does not seek a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xxii]  Regional leaders are converging in Doha to meet with Qatari leaders and show support for Qatar following the strikes.[xxiii] UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed al Nahyan and Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah arrived in Qatar on September 10, and Saudi Crown Price Mohammad bin Salam is expected to arrive in Qatar on September 11.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions on Iran: The Wall Street Journal reported on September 10 that the Iran-IAEA agreement is unlikely to persuade the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to stop pursuing the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran because the agreement does not include a timeline for inspections or a deadline for Iran to clarify the status of its enriched uranium stockpile.
• IDF Strikes in Doha: The casualties from Israel’s strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9 remain unclear. Israel reportedly informed the United States that the likelihood of the strikes’ success has “decreased significantly.” Regional leaders are converging in Doha to meet with Qatari leaders and show support for Qatar following the strikes.

Iran Update, September 9, 2025

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[i] Several IAF fighter jets dropped at least 10 munitions on a residential building in northern Doha.[ii] Several Hamas Political Bureau members resided at the targeted building, according to the Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry.[iii] Senior Hamas officials and ceasefire negotiators, including Hamas Shura Council and Leadership Council head Mohammad Darwish and senior Hamas official and negotiator Nizar Awadallah, were reportedly meeting at the residence to review a recent US ceasefire proposal at the time of the strikes.[iv] The Israeli strikes reportedly killed several Hamas officials, including:

• Khalil al Hayya: Hayya was the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the leader of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team, and a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[v]
• Zaher Jabarin: Jabarin was the leader of Hamas in the West Bank, a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council, and a member of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team.[vi]
• Khaled Meshaal: Meshaal was a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[vii]

Hamas confirmed that the Israeli strikes killed five Hamas members, including the director of Hayya’s office, Jihad Labad (Abu Bilal), and Hayya’s son, Hammam al Hayya.[viii] Hamas claimed that its negotiating team survived the Israeli strikes but did not specify if any officials sustained injuries.[ix]

Three US officials told Axios that the US military detected Israeli fighter jets flying toward the Persian Gulf on September 9 and sought clarification from Israel.[x] The officials stated that “missiles were already in the air” by the time that Israel provided clarification to the United States. Axios reported that the Israeli strikes “infuriated” some of US President Donald Trump’s senior advisers because the US government was waiting for Hamas’ response to a recent US ceasefire proposal. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Israel’s strikes in Qatar, which is a major non-NATO ally of the United States, do “not advance Israel’s or America’s goals,” but added that eliminating Hamas is “a worthy goal.”[xi] Qatar condemned the strikes and stated that it will not tolerate “reckless Israeli behavior.”[xii] A Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson denied claims that the United States warned Qatar about the Israeli strikes in advance.[xiii] Qatar has reportedly suspended its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas following the strikes.[xiv]

Iran appears to be trying to fulfill the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28.[xv] The snapback process lasts 30 days, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran. South Korea, which is the current president of the UNSC, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[xvi] South Korea was required to table such a resolution 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member did so. Any permanent UNSC member (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto the South Korean resolution. The E3 previously outlined three conditions to extend the expiration date of the snapback mechanism, which is currently October 18, 2025. The three conditions are that Iran must account for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding inspections and verification of its nuclear sites, and resume negotiations with the United States. Iran rejected these conditions prior to August 28 but has since made progress toward fulfilling these conditions.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[xvii] Some reports have indicated that the Iran-IAEA agreement would involve Iran submitting a report on the status of its HEU to the IAEA in one month, after which the IAEA and Iran would negotiate how the IAEA could verify the Iranian report. Neither Iran nor the IAEA has confirmed the details of the agreement at the time of this writing, however.[xviii] Araghchi stated after the signing of the agreement that “any hostile action against Iran,” including the reimposition of UNSC sanctions, would make the Iran-IAEA agreement “null and void.”[xix] Araghchi similarly proposed an “interim deal” that would provide “more clarity” about the status of Iran’s HEU stockpile during a meeting with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in Qatar on September 5.[xx]

Iran has also indicated a greater willingness to negotiate with the United States on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran during negotiations.[xxi] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei reportedly asked Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to seek Qatar's help in mediating with the United States and the E3 to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[xxii] UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on September 8 that Oman is “re-engaging” with Iran about “possible renewed dialogue.”[xxiii] Araghchi held a phone call with his Omani counterpart on September 8.[xxiv] Oman mediated the five rounds of talks between the United States and Iran before the Israel-Iran War.[xxv]

US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on September 8 that Iran no longer has a clear path to produce weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched up to 90 percent) because US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran's gas centrifuge enrichment program.[xxvi] The Institute assessed that US and Israeli strikes destroyed or rendered inoperable all of Iran’s 20,000 centrifuges that it had installed across its three declared enrichment facilities.[xxvii] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently reported that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[xxviii] Iran would need to further enrich its 60 percent enriched uranium to be able to build a nuclear weapon. US and Israeli strikes also targeted Iran's centrifuge production and research and development facilities, which will almost certainly also hinder Iran's ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[xxix]

The Institute also published information about Iran’s fourth enrichment facility and reported that the facility does not appear to be operational after the war. Iran announced on June 12 that it would launch a newly built enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution that the IAEA Board of Governors had passed earlier that day.[xxx] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran would operationalize the facility by installing and activating centrifuges there.[xxxi] Israel launched its first airstrikes targeting Iran on June 12, which suggests that Iran never installed centrifuges at the site. The Institute assessed that the new facility, known as the Esfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, is located within the tunnel complex at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.[xxxii] The Institute reported that US strikes damaged the site and assessed that the site is not currently operational.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Israeli Strikes Targeting Hamas Leaders in Doha: The Israeli Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Israel’s strikes in Qatar do “not advance Israel’s or America’s goals,” but added that eliminating Hamas is “a worthy goal.” Qatar has reportedly suspended its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas following the strikes.
• Iranian Efforts to Avoid Snapback Sanctions: Iran appears to be trying to fulfill the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions. Iran previously rejected the E3’s demands prior to August 28 but has since made progress toward fulfilling these conditions.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on September 8 that Iran no longer has a clear path to produce weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched up to 90 percent) because US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran's gas centrifuge enrichment program.

Iran Update, September 8, 2025

Iranian officials are signaling openness to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiations with the United States, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran under the snapback mechanism during negotiations.[i] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback mechanism on August 28, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 unless the UNSC extends sanctions relief for Iran.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately published an op-ed in the Guardian on September 7 in which he stated that Iran is ready to accept limits on uranium enrichment and allow extensive international oversight of its nuclear facilities in exchange for sanctions relief.[iii] Araghchi specifically directed his op-ed to the E3.

Iranian leaders have recently expressed openness to resuming cooperation with the IAEA. Iran and the IAEA held their third round of talks in Vienna on September 6.[iv] Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated following the meeting that Iran and the IAEA are close to reaching a new cooperation agreement.[v] Grossi suggested that Iran and the IAEA have not, however, agreed on a timeline for the resumption of IAEA inspections and stated that it is also unclear what the IAEA would do when inspections resume.[vi] Iran may calculate that expressing willingness to cooperate with the IAEA and the United States will help Iran deter potential snapback sanctions. It is unclear if Iran is willing to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program in talks with the IAEA or the United States, however. Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months in exchange for Iran restoring full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[vii] Araghchi and Grossi will reportedly meet in Cairo this week to finalize a new cooperation agreement.[viii]

Iran is likely preparing for future conflicts with Israel and the United States by increasing funding for the Iranian armed forces and evaluating the combat readiness of armed forces units. The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a six-clause bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities.”[ix] The IDF destroyed Iranian air defense systems and achieved air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Israel-Iran War, and Iran likely seeks to bolster its defensive capabilities in preparation for potential future conflicts.[x] The bill includes the following clauses.

1. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry must pay the entirety of the funds allocated to strengthening the Iranian armed forces in the budget for the current Persian calendar year (March 2025-2026) and the previous Persian calendar year (March 2024- 2025).
2. The Planning and Budget Organization must fund the Supreme National Security Council’s defense allocations from public savings or the transfer of oil sales shares.
3. The Central Bank of Iran must provide the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) with up to two billion euros from blocked foreign assets or other overseas currency resources to implement emergency defense plans.
4. The Planning and Budget Organization, Central Bank of Iran, and Economy Ministry must provide the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry with two billion euros for “foreign purchases of major defense items.”
5. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry are authorized to allocate $1.5 billion in oil revenues to the Iranian armed forces.
6. Iran will allocate 30 percent of its revenue from air transit fees to Artesh air defense systems annually.[xi]

 

The clause to purchase “major defense items” is notable given that Iran has signaled interest in acquiring military equipment from foreign countries, such as China and Belarus, since the end of the Israel-Iran War.[xii] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for Iranian arms sales and purchases, traveled to China in late June 2025 in his first foreign visit after the 12-day war.[xiii] Iranian media expressed support for purchasing Chinese military equipment, such as J-10 aircraft, after the war.[xiv] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian recently traveled to Belarus, where he reportedly sought Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[xv]

 

Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami separately visited three Artesh Air Force bases in Esfahan, Tabriz, and Hamedan, respectively, on September 6 to evaluate the combat readiness of units stationed at these bases.[xvi] Hatami visited the Artesh Air Force 8th Tactical Airbase in Esfahan, 3rd Tactical Airbase in Hamedan, and 2nd Tactical Airbase in Tabriz. Israel struck all three bases during the Israel-Iran War.[xvii] Hatami stated that Iran is preparing for another round of confrontation with Israel.[xviii]

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on September 7 that Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War destroyed a key Iranian centrifuge research and development site, the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran.[xix] The Kalaye Electric Company is a subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and manufactures advanced centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. Centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. The United States sanctioned the Kalaye Electric Company in February 2007 for its involvement in Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program.[xx] The Institute reported that centrifuge design teams developed new centrifuge models and improved existing ones at the site.[xxi] Iran also reportedly previously tested advanced IR-8 centrifuges at the site.[xxii] There have been no repair efforts at the site following the war, according to the Institute.[xxiii] US and Israeli airstrikes during the war targeted Iran’s centrifuge production facilities as well as active centrifuges, which will likely hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[xxiv]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei outlined a series of economic recommendations on September 7, which highlights the regime’s concern about worsening economic conditions and their potential to undermine internal stability.[xxv] Khamenei delivered a speech during a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet on September 7 in which he called on the government to “discipline the market” and ensure Iranians’ access to essential goods.[xxvi] Khamenei’s directive to “discipline the market” comes as the Iranian rial traded above one million rials per one US dollar on August 28.[xxvii] Khamenei also ordered government officials to build up reserves of essential goods, break import monopolies by diversifying suppliers, and guard basic goods against sudden price hikes.[xxviii] The Iranian regime’s official data shows that Iranian household incomes have risen about 12.5 times since 2016, while the price of basic food items has increased more than 20 times.[xxix] Khamenei further emphasized that production is the key to economic progress and instructed officials not to cut electricity to factories except in emergencies.[xxx] Iranian media reported in late August that electricity shortages have forced about 50 percent of factories to go offline, which has created ripple effects across the economy.[xxxi]

Khamenei also instructed Iranian officials and media outlets to emphasize Iran’s strengths and avoid portraying Iran as weak.[xxxii] Khamenei’s directive comes after the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry restricted “provocative” media coverage of potential snapback sanctions.[xxxiii] Iranian authorities directed outlets to frame the E3‘s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) recent decision to trigger the snapback mechanism as proof of European dependence on the United States and to emphasize Iran’s resilience.[xxxiv] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi similarly directed Iranian media on September 7 to present potential snapback sanctions as a political setback but not as an economic catastrophe and warned that exaggerating the impacts of potential sanctions could inflame public anxiety.[xxxv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent further public frustration about deteriorating economic conditions and reduce the risk of economic-related unrest.

The Shia Coordination Framework (SCF), which is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, is trying to bypass the Iraqi parliament to strengthen the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxxvi]  The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is comprised of many militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xxxvii] Iraqi media reported on September 7 that the SCF may plan to have the Iraqi Prime Minister issue an executive order to restructure and expand the PMF’s authority after the SCF’s attempt to do so through the legislature stalled.[xxxviii] The SCF supported the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which would have likely increased Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key PMF structures.[xxxix] Sunni and Kurdish parties walked out of parliament on July 16 in protest against the contentious legislation.[xl]  Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad al Sudani withdrew the bill from the parliamentary agenda on August 27, reportedly due to threats from the United States to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill.[xli] The new SCF plan is reportedly modeled after former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s 2016 Executive Order, which formally established the PMF.[xlii]  The SCF plan would likely force Sudani to choose between two politically damaging options. He could issue an executive order to strengthen the PMF and risk the United States following through on its threats to sanction Iraq. He could, alternatively, refuse to issue the executive order and risk provoking a backlash from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors and militias. 

Hezbollah officials welcomed the Lebanese Council of Ministers’ approval of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to monopolize weapons, likely due to the plan’s implementation being contingent upon Israel withdrawing from Lebanon and ceasing its military operations in Lebanon.[xliii] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the LAF plan on September 5 under which the LAF will attempt to disarm Hezbollah and establish a state monopoly on all weapons.[xliv] Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Head Mahmoud Qamati told Reuters on September 6 that Hezbollah viewed the outcome of the September 5 cabinet session positively given that the government declared that the implementation of the LAF plan is dependent on Israel withdrawing from Lebanese territory and ceasing its operations in Lebanon.[xlv] Other Hezbollah officials have echoed Qamati’s statement, calling the cabinet session a “step” toward “correcting” the government’s previous cabinet decisions to disarm Hezbollah.[xlvi] Hezbollah has consistently rejected calls to disarm, often citing continued Israeli operations in Lebanon as justification for retaining its weapons.[xlvii] The LAF plan did not include an official timeframe for disarming Hezbollah due to the LAF’s resource constraints, which may also contribute to Hezbollah officials’ support for the plan.[xlviii] Hezbollah has consistently rejected any timetables for its disarmament.[xlix]

Hezbollah officials may calculate that Israel will not agree to the LAF plan and that Hezbollah can thereby delay or prevent the implementation of the disarmament plan. Lebanese officials, including Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, have stated that the Lebanese-approved US proposal will not become effective or be implemented until Israel agrees to it.[l] The LAF disarmament plan is part of the US proposal. The US proposal requires Israel to withdraw from its five positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the proposal's implementation. The proposal also stipulates that the LAF will completely disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[li] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[lii] An Israeli journalist reported on August 25 that the Israeli government will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it.[liii] Israeli officials later stated that Israel would conduct “reciprocal measures” if the LAF takes steps to disarm Hezbollah.[liv] Israel has rejected previous proposals that would require Israel to withdraw from Lebanon before the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[lv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shifted to a “forward defense” posture in August 2025 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[lvi] IDF Operations Chief Brigadier General Yisrael Shomer reiterated on September 7 that the IDF’s mission in southern Lebanon is not yet finished given that Israeli civilians have not fully returned to northern Israeli towns.[lvii] The November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement included an addendum that ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose to Israel.[lviii] The IDF has acted on this addendum and continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[lix]

Hezbollah could use any delay in the Lebanese state’s efforts to disarm it to reorganize and regenerate its forces, which would increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus likely make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah has undergone a review of its strategy in Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire to shape its reconstitution effort and reduce reliance on external support.[lx] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons and restructured its financial system in August 2025 to confront financial challenges.[lxi] Iranian officials and Axis of Resistance-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah has begun appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[lxii] Iran has reiterated that it will continue to support Hezbollah and has reportedly attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah in recent weeks.[lxiii] Hezbollah’s recent actions highlight how it is actively trying to refill its ranks, reconstitute its weapons, retain its Shia support base, and regenerate its smuggling networks. Any delay in the implementation of the LAF plan or US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

 

Key Takeaways

• Iran-IAEA Negotiations: Iranian officials are signaling openness to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiations with the United States, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: The Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) is trying to bypass the Iraqi parliament to strengthen the Popular Mobilization Forces. The SCF may plan to have the Iraqi Prime Minister issue an executive order to restructure and expand the PMF’s authority after the SCF’s attempt to do so through the legislature stalled.
• Iranian Military Readiness: Iran is likely preparing for future conflicts with Israel and the United States by increasing funding for the Iranian armed forces and evaluating the combat readiness of armed forces units. The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved a six-clause bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities.”
• Iranian Economy: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei outlined a series of economic recommendations in a speech, which highlights the regime’s concern about worsening economic conditions and their potential to undermine internal stability. Khamenei also instructed Iranian officials and media outlets to emphasize Iran’s strengths and avoid portraying Iran as weak.
• Iranian Centrifuge Capacity: Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War destroyed a key Iranian centrifuge research and development site, the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran, according to satellite imagery and the Institute for Science and International Security. US and Israeli airstrikes during the war targeted Iran’s centrifuge production facilities as well as active centrifuges, which will likely hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.

Iran Update, September 5, 2025

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E3 triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[i] The E3 previously told Iran that they would delay the reimposition of UN sanctions by up to six months if Iran met three key conditions, which include restoring the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear facilities, addressing concerns about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, and engaging in direct talks with the United States.[ii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 4 in Qatar to discuss Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the resumption of IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear sites.[iii] A Wall Street Journal reporter stated on September 4 that the talks produced no progress, and neither side shifted its stance during the talks.[iv] Iran and the IAEA are expected to meet in Vienna on September 5.[v] Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna Reza Najafi stated on September 5 that the discussions will define cooperation under Iran’s parliamentary law and establish the “new form of cooperation” with the agency.[vi] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA.[vii]  Iran recently allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to monitor fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but has barred them from accessing or inspecting damaged nuclear sites.[viii]

The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah.[ix] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to place all weapons under the state’s control during a cabinet session on September 5.[x] The Lebanese Council of Ministers ordered the LAF to create a plan on August 5 that will attempt to establish a state monopoly over arms in Lebanon.[xi] The Lebanese cabinet has decided to keep the details of the LAF’s plan and the cabinet’s deliberations confidential.[xii] The LAF plan will reportedly take 15 months to implement and will focus on clearing weapons in five geographical sectors, starting with Beirut, according to Lebanese media.[xiii] It is unclear what the other four geographical sectors are. Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos announced that the LAF will begin implementing its plan in accordance with its available resources and logistics, which suggests that the LAF faces certain resource and logistical constraints but does not specify the constraints.[xiv] Morcos noted that the LAF’s implementation process is contingent upon Israeli compliance with the US proposal.[xv] The US proposal stipulates an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement’s implementation, and the LAF completely disarming Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[xvi] The 15-month plan would not disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025, meaning that Israel could operate in Lebanon even under the US proposal as currently written and reported. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed, however.[xvii] Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government‘s approval of the LAF plan. Hezbollah and its Shia allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the LAF plan and have vehemently opposed the plan in public statements prior to the approval.[xviii]

Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament.  Senior Hezbollah officials have repeatedly argued that Hezbollah should not be subject to disarmament, given its “unique” status as defenders of Lebanon against Israel.[xix] Hezbollah has repeatedly initiated offensive wars against Israel on its own accord, which undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.[xx] These wars have frequently wrought significant destruction across Lebanon.[xxi] The group has already threatened to use force against the Lebanese government to coerce or compel it to cease its disarmament plans, which indicates that Hezbollah will attempt to subvert any disarmament efforts.[xxii]

A Hezbollah effort to delay or stop LAF efforts to disarm it would enable it to reorganize and regenerate its forces and possibly defeat a disarmament effort before disarmament can be successful. Hezbollah has undergone a review of its strategy in Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire to shape its reconstitution effort and reduce reliance on external support.[xxiii] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons and restructured its financial system in August 2025 to confront its financial challenges.[xxiv] Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[xxv] Iran has reiterated that it will support Hezbollah in its efforts to rebuild and has even reportedly attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah in recent weeks.[xxvi] Hezbollah will strengthen slowly as a result of these efforts unless it is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.

The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. US officials told the New York Times on September 4 that the Lebanese government would likely receive significant amounts of money for military equipment and LAF salaries if the Lebanese government implements a “serious disarmament plan.”[xxvii] Lebanese officials said on September 5 that unspecified foreign countries have pledged to provide Lebanon with aid, but that Lebanon will not receive any economic investments unless it restricts arms to the state.[xxviii] These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by providing services that the government fails to provide. The influx of aid would also increase support for the government should the government prove able to provide reconstruction funds and other social services historically provided by Hezbollah. Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to access funds to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure following the conflict with Israel in late 2024.[xxix] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xxx] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xxxi] This economic stimulus within communities from the Lebanese government would complement the LAF’s disarmament campaign by reinstating the Lebanese government as the primary service and security guarantor in Hezbollah strongholds.  

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament. Hezbollah will reconstitute slowly unless its reconstitution is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.
• Economic Support for Lebanon: The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by enabling the government to provide services that Hezbollah previously provided.

Iran Update, September 4, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare.[i] The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”[ii] The Tasnim report outlined the following three main areas that Iran must address to withstand hybrid warfare:

• Redefining Governance Structures and Processes: Tasnim called for re-engineering Iran’s governance system and warned that a centralized bureaucracy is too slow and brittle for hybrid war.[iii] Tasnim urged the regime to create mechanisms to monitor internal divisions, accelerate bureaucratic processes, and provide more authority to governors and local officials. It argued that decentralized power would make governance more flexible and resilient, which would speed up the regime’s responses to crises such as unrest, cyberattacks, or supply disruptions.
• Reforming the Relationship Between the Regime and People: Tasnim called for the regime to treat the Iranian people as Iran’s main strategic asset rather than dependents of the state.[iv] It stressed that victory in hybrid war requires citizens to actively participate in governance, including via neighborhood security, the economy, and cultural resistance. Tasnim highlighted that small, agile grassroots groups involved with technology, media, and culture would counter stronger adversaries and shape public opinion so that people accept hardships as part of a larger struggle for independence and survival.
• Developing Iran’s “resistance economy:” Tasnim called for the regime to turn the economy into a “defensive stronghold.”[v] It emphasized the need to end dependence on crude oil sales, cut reliance on food imports and gas consumption, and enforce tight control over foreign exchange and trade. Tasnim also called for building long-term cooperation with Axis of Resistance members, neighboring states, and emerging powers such as Russia and China to secure essential goods and bypass Western economic pressure.

Tasnim also warned that adversaries use media narratives to target the minds and will of the people, which the outlet referred to as “narrative warfare.”[vi] Tasnim’s call to prioritize narrative warfare is consistent with recent regime efforts to control domestic reporting on snapback sanctions.[vii] Iranian officials have recently directed outlets to downplay the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) activation of the snapback mechanism and avoid negative portrayals of Iran’s future.[viii]

Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats.[ix] Nour News is affiliated with Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. The Supreme National Security Council established the Defense Council following the Israel-Iran War to address emerging national security threats and streamline decision-making during wartime.[x] Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.[xi] Nour News stated that the Defense Council is responsible for setting and executing priorities for Iran’s armed forces to prepare Iran to confront such threats.[xii] Nour News identified the following recommendations for Iran to address these emerging threats: build multi-layered deterrence, conduct active diplomacy, and manage domestic public opinion.[xiii] Nour News’ emphasis on public opinion is consistent with previous calls by Iranian media and moderate and pragmatic regime officials to increase public trust and societal resilience, as well as resolve disputes between the regime and the Iranian people.

Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian proposal would allow Iran to determine how Iran’s nuclear activities would be investigated.[xiv] Iran also revoked the accreditations of two experienced IAEA inspectors in August for mistakenly taking documents from Fordow to Vienna that reportedly described the facility’s interior.[xv] The IAEA stated that the revocation was unjustified because the documents did not include any information that would compromise the facility’s security.[xvi] This comes after the Iranian parliament passed a law on June 25 suspending all cooperation with the IAEA.[xvii] IAEA Director General Grossi said on September 3 that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is unlikely that any agreement will be reached due to Iran’s opposition.[xviii]

Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s public statements about the SDF’s integration under the Syrian transitional government.[xix] A Washington, DC-based source implied to Emirati media on September 3 that the US State Department has softened its stance toward the SDF’s negotiating position in integration talks with the transitional government in response to the transitional government’s conduct in Suwayda Province.[xx] Syrian transitional government forces conducted atrocities against Druze fighters and civilians after they gained control of parts of Suwayda Province on July 15.[xxi]  The source said that State Department officials are “listening to them [the SDF] more than before.”[xxii] This report is consistent with US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack’s comments to the Washington Post on August 23 that the transitional government may “need to consider alternatives to a highly centralized state,” following the violence in Suwayda Province.[xxiii] Barrack had previously rejected SDF demands for federalism during previous rounds of integration negotiations prior to the start of intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province on July 13.[xxiv]

The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.[xxv] These concessions include requests for the SDF to relinquish control of Arab-majority areas within SDF territory and the SDF’s monopoly on oil production in northeastern Syria.[xxvi] US mediators now reportedly seek a compromise in which the SDF would partially integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but retain limited autonomy.[xxvii] The source told Emirati media that an SDF negotiation delegation will travel to Damascus “in the coming days” for a new round of talks with the transitional government.[xxviii] Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials announced on September 4 that they have not yet received an official date from the transitional government for the resumption of negotiations, however.[xxix]

The SDF is also unlikely to relinquish demands for security guarantees from the transitional government due to fear of ethnic cleansing by Turkey and Turkish-backed groups that have integrated into the Syrian MoD. Turkey and Turkish-backed groups previously conducted ethnic cleansing against Syrian Kurds through the creation of ”safe zones” in Turkish-controlled Syria, in which Turkey displaced Kurdish civilians and replaced them with Syrian refugees from Turkey.[xxx] These SDF fears are particularly relevant due to US pressure on the SDF to relinquish control of SDF areas east of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates River is a significant defensive terrain feature that would enable the SDF to defend against any Syrian transitional government incursion from the western bank with relative ease. There are no significant defensive terrain features east of the Euphrates until the Khabour River. The majority of Syrian Kurds east of the Euphrates live behind the Khabour River. Defensive positions on the Khabour or Euphrates could be turned by an attack from the north out of Turkish territory, however. An unspecified Western diplomat said to Emirati media on September 4 that Turkey’s hardline position against the SDF will complicate negotiations even if the SDF and transitional government come to an agreement with US mediation.[xxxi] The diplomat added that ”the problem is that even if [President Ahmed] al Shara accepts devolution, Turkey will not, and he [Shara] cannot go against Ankara.”[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare. The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”
• Iran: Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats. Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.
• Iran: Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War.
• Syria: Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s public statements about the SDF’s integration under the Syrian transitional government. The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.

Iran Update, September 3, 2025

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.[i] The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report.[ii] Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[iii] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms.[iv] This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17.[v] The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War.[vi] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13.[vii]  CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the "vast majority" of Iran’s enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be "extremely difficult" for Iran to extract the material.[viii] The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery.[ix] Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.[x]

Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[xi] The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.[xii] The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran’s ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran’s future negatively.[xiii] Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was “a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people’s morale through psychological warfare.”[xiv] Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act “intelligently” and "maintain national cohesion and unity.”[xv] Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain “national self-confidence" and avoid “simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric” regarding the E3’s snapback decision.[xvi]  The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran’s poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest. The regime’s efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.[xvii]

Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported on September 2 that likely Hezbollah officials discussed various tactics that Hezbollah could employ to bypass the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xviii] Hezbollah officials reportedly discussed compelling the Lebanese government to delay Hezbollah’s disarmament until Israel and Syria commit to the US disarmament proposal.[xix] The Lebanese media report did not specify how Hezbollah may attempt to compel the Lebanese government. The US proposal includes an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days and Hezbollah’s complete disarmament by the end of 2025.[xx] The Israeli government reportedly will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it.[xxi] Hezbollah officials also reportedly proposed that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could exempt Hezbollah from being disarmed due to the LAF’s “lack of readiness.”[xxii] Lebanese media noted that all options for “escalation” are on the table if Hezbollah cannot find a “suitable formula” to bypass the government’s decision.[xxiii] Hezbollah reportedly threatened on September 2 to halt its cooperation with the LAF by refusing to hand over its weapons south of the Litani River if the Lebanese government approves and implements the LAF’s disarmament plan.[xxiv] A Lebanese source previously told Saudi media on August 28 that the LAF has confiscated various types of weapons in southern Lebanon without any objection from Hezbollah.[xxv] The LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have continued to discover Hezbollah weapons depots that Hezbollah did not disclose to the LAF, however.[xxvi]

Hezbollah’s proposed tactics to delay and ultimately prevent its disarmament appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon, Israeli compliance with the US proposal, and the LAF’s capabilities. LAF and Lebanese officials have previously raised concerns about conflict breaking out between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xxvii] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened potential confrontation and anti-government protests if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah.[xxviii]  Lebanese, US, and UNIFIL officials have also expressed concerns about the LAF’s capability to disarm Hezbollah.[xxix] Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned media channels have amplified reports about Lebanese security forces’ alleged unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah.[xxx] Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri separately criticized recent US efforts to Saudi media on August 27, stating that the United States gave Lebanon “the opposite” of what it promised.[xxxi] Berri’s statement came amid Lebanese authorities’ concern that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon until Hezbollah is fully disarmed.[xxxii]

Some of Hezbollah’s tactics may have produced favorable results for Hezbollah. The Lebanese cabinet announced on September 3 that it would add four items to the agenda for its cabinet session on August 5 after Hezbollah threatened to boycott the session if the cabinet did not add items other than Hezbollah’s disarmament to the agenda.[xxxiii] Hezbollah has reportedly agreed to the updated agenda, which represents an example of the state acceding to Hezbollah’s demands.[xxxiv]  

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Enriched Uranium: Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however.
• Iranian Domestic Censorship: Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.
• Hezbollah’s Anti-Disarmament Campaign: Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Many of Hezbollah’s proposed tactics appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon and the LAF’s capability to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran Update, September 2, 2025

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[i] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[ii] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports.  Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program.[iv] The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[v] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[vi]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[vii] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[viii] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement..[ix] Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[x]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[xi] Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“[xii] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[xiii] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xiv] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[xv] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarrai as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarrai as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[xvi] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generates millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[xvii] Samarrai used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[xviii] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarrai’s tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6 for lacking proper documentation.[xix] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[xx]

These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[xxi] The United States sanctioned six entities and four vessels on July 3 that are involved in smuggling Iranian oil, including a network of companies run by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said.[xxii] The United States threatened in July 2025 to sanction the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization and block access to 350 million USD of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[xxiii]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds, formerly known as Ashab al Kahf, stated on August 29 that the US withdrawal to the Iraqi Kurdistan region is a “redeployment [within Iraq]” and reaffirmed the group’s commitment to the removal of US forces from Iraq.[xxiv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee similarly reiterated its demand for US forces to withdraw from Iraq in a statement on August 21.[xxv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvi] The United States is expected to complete the first phase of the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces to Iraqi Kurdistan by the end of September 2025.[xxvii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that the coalition forces remaining in federal Iraq after September 2025 would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxviii] The removal of US forces from Iraq is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxix] The effort by Iranian-backed militias to justify their continued existence comes amid US pressure for the Iraqi federal government to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq, especially via the dissolution of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Russia and North Korea have sent nuclear scientists and missile experts, respectively, to Iran since June 2024.
• Iran: Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions.
• Iraq: The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling.
• Iraq: Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq.

Iran Update, September 1, 2025

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as the SNSC deputy for international affairs on August 29. Larijani may have appointed Bagheri Kani due to his close ties to Paydari Front leader Saeed Jalili as part of an effort to reduce recent fissures between hardliners and more moderate elements of the regime.
• Iran: An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order.
• Iran: Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30. Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.
• Yemen: The Houthis confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai and 10 other senior Houthi political officials in an airstrike in Haddah District, southern Sanaa City, on August 28. These targeted killings are unlikely to disrupt Houthi military operations against Israel.

Previous Iran Updates

• August 2025
• July 2025
• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
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