Iran Updates

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provide these updates daily Monday-Friday. See our most recent maps and updates below. 

Iran Update, September 14, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s apparent challenges in consolidating control over the Strait of Hormuz are likely driving the regional campaign that Iran is currently waging against the United States and its allies in the region. Iran’s proposal for the management of the strait, which attempts to formalize Iranian control in the strait, has generated significant resistance from other Persian Gulf littoral states. Iran is also attempting to overcome current operational constraints on its ability to control shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iranian regime media notably acknowledged that Iran’s control over the strait may be waning on September 14, which suggests that some factions within the regime recognize how Iran’s current constraints are impacting its ability to achieve its positive objectives.
• Yemeni government-aligned forces appear to have halted Houthi advances south along Yemen’s Red Sea coastal plain since September 11. Sustained Houthi control of Dhubab, Mokha, and the Hanish Islands preserves the Houthi’s ability to threaten international shipping in the Red Sea.
• The Iraqi federal government has taken some recent steps to show that it is taking the threat posed by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to other countries seriously, including closing border crossings with Iran. These actions are unlikely to stem the flow of Iranian arms to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that the militias are using to conduct attacks on US regional assets and US allies as a part of Iran’s broader campaign in the US-Iran conflict.
• Iran is also reportedly prioritizing newly-formed, IRGC-directed Iraqi militia cells over Iran's historic Iraqi partners to conduct operations against the United States and its allies in the region. Iran may be prioritizing support for these new militia cells due to command-and-control issues that Iran has reportedly faced with some of its historic Iraqi partners. Some Iraqi militias appear dissatisfied with Iran's development of new networks in Iraq, however.

Iran Update, September 11, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis are setting conditions to establish the Bab al Mandeb Strait as an Axis of Resistance-controlled body of water as part of the Axis of Resistance’s effort to assert control over regional oil exports. Allowing the Houthis to consolidate control over the Bab al Mandeb would be unacceptable for US national security and economic interests.
• Houthi officials and organizations have emphasized that the Houthis intend to maintain “safe” shipping in the Bab al Mandeb, but the Houthis’ recent advances set conditions for the Houthis to be able to threaten shipping more easily if they decide it is in their interest to do so. Public Houthi statements may not necessarily reflect the Houthis’ true intentions regarding the strait.
• The Houthis' seizure of Yemen's Red Sea coast and Perim Island in the Bab al Mandeb Strait enables the Houthis to use a broader range of weapons systems to threaten shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. The Houthis could also use their new positions to deploy anti-shipping methods that the group deployed further away from shipping lanes in northern Yemen during the 2023-2025 Houthi campaign against international shipping.
• The Houthis are conducting a coordinated effort with other Axis of Resistance members to coerce Saudi Arabia to meet Houthi demands by attacking Saudi energy infrastructure. The Saudi Foreign Ministry announced that an unspecified actor launched several drones from Iraq that struck the East-West Pipeline and nearby pumping stations south of Medina, Medina Province, on September 10.
• The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes some Iranian-backed parties, is reportedly divided and considering several proposals to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias amid US pressure and the nearing September 30 disarmament deadline. These options appear designed to enable the militias to maintain access to their weapons.

Iran Update: September 10, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthi offensive to capture territory near the Bab al Mandeb advances Iranian objectives under the current regional campaign that Iran is waging against the United States and its allies. Iran has recently pursued the following lines of effort under this regional campaign: Targeting US naval forces; Attacking US forces across the region; Disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
• The Houthis and Iran may share common objectives at this current moment for the Houthis to establish control over the Red Sea coastline, but the relationship between Iran and the Houthis means that the Houthis alone will determine their level of involvement in supporting other Iranian objectives.
• The Houthis' capture of Mokha Port and reported landings on islands near the Bab al Mandeb may set conditions for potential Houthi efforts to establish themselves as a legitimate authority and guarantor of passage through the strait, as Iran has attempted to do in the Strait of Hormuz.
• The Houthis exploited military developments in southwestern Yemen in recent days to conduct an offensive against ROYG-aligned forces along the Red Sea coastal plain and capture Mokha. The Houthis have also reportedly attempted to seize ROYG-controlled islands in the Red Sea from which Houthi fighters could launch attacks on international shipping.
• The Houthis' coastal plain offensive accomplished significant Houthi operational and strategic objectives that weaken the ROYG's ability to disrupt Houthi operations and exert both short-term leverage over Saudi Arabia and possible long-term leverage over the international community. The Houthis could attempt to capture remaining territory on the coastal plain south of Mokha in order to secure lines of communication with Perim Island and exert full control over Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

Iran Update, September 9, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has launched a concerted effort in recent days to more aggressively target US naval forces, likely to degrade the United States’ willingness and ability to continue enforcing the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.
• US officials warned that Iran may be using “more sophisticated weapons” to target US vessels in recent days.
• Iran may be relying upon targeting assistance from Russia or the People’s Republic of China to support Iranian attacks on US warships and vessels. US officials raised their concerns to the Wall Street Journal that Russian or PRC targeting assistance enabled Iran’s recent attacks against US vessels.
• Iran appears to be targeting anchored and docked commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, likely to deter the United States from conducting further strikes on Iranian oil tankers.
• Iranian targeting constraints may be contributing to Iran’s decision to target stationary vessels. CTP-ISW recently assessed on September 4 that Iran is struggling to fix moving commercial-vessel targets, given that Iran has not increased attacks on moving civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz despite the reported increase in the flow of traffic through the waterway.
• The Iranian regime is framing its retaliation against vessels that do not comply with Iranian policies in the Strait of Hormuz as its own Iranian enforcement of a “sanctions regime” in order to legitimize illegal Iranian activities against commercial vessels.
• Iran used cluster munition ballistic missiles in an attack on US forces in Jordan on September 9, which indicates that Iran sought to inflict greater damage or casualties to impose further human and political costs on the United States.

Iran Update: September 08, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis have shifted their tactics toward increasingly targeting Saudi oil facilities, likely after recognizing that their naval blockade of Saudi vessels in the Red Sea has failed to compel Saudi Arabia to meet Houthi demands in Yemen.
• The National Resistance Forces (NRF), which is a component of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), conducted a counteroffensive in southern Hudaydah Governorate on September 5, possibly to relieve Houthi pressure on NRF forces near Taiz City. The principal challenge for the NRF will be exploiting any tactical offensive successes, however. One intermediate NRF and ROYG objective is to capture al Jarrahi, a crossroads town that lies astride a major Houthi supply line between Hudaydah City and Taiz City and its environs.
• Hudaydah could be the ultimate objective of the offensive, but NRF and ROYG-aligned forces will need to seize intermediate objectives long before Hudaydah. Hudaydah is critical to both Houthi civilian and military goods, and its loss would be a significant setback for the Houthis.

Iran Update, September 7, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attempted to attack US naval forces on September 5, likely to try to degrade the United States’ resolve to continue enforcing its naval blockade on Iranian ports. The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on September 5 that it targeted a US aircraft carrier and destroyer because the vessels were enforcing the US naval blockade. US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that Iran launched ballistic missiles at two US Navy warships but noted that the missiles did not hit the warships or cause any casualties.
• The IRGC may have also conducted the attack to deter US forces from facilitating the transit of commercial vessels through the strait amid indications that Iran may be facing constraints in its maritime surveillance, targeting, and mine-laying capabilities.
• Iran’s planned restricted maritime zone appears to be a separate effort to deter commercial vessels from bypassing Iranian control of the strait and coerce the shipping industry to pressure the United States to lift its blockade.
• Iran’s recent efforts to coerce the United States to lift its blockade may reflect growing regime concerns about the blockade’s impact on the Iranian economy. Iran has a growing incentive to find alternative ways to force the United States to end its blockade, including by raising the military costs of enforcement for the United States and increasing commercial costs for vessels that bypass Iranian control.

Iran Update, September 4, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Recent Iranian attacks on US regional assets indicate that Iranian decision-makers—particularly the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faction that appears to be controlling decision-making—are dissatisfied with the current status of the war because Iran has not yet achieved its key objectives in the conflict, namely securing recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz. These decision-makers appear intent on trying to change the trajectory of the conflict through the use of military force.
• Iran is facing several constraints that are limiting its ability to achieve its political objectives in the war. The operational constraints imposed by US strikes are temporary and Iran will likely try to reconstitute its degraded capabilities and develop new capabilities to adapt to the constraints on its military campaign.
• Iran’s ongoing cash flow crisis will likely limit Iran’s ability to overcome these constraints in the near term. Iran is facing a shortage of foreign currency reserves and access to US dollars, which has been exacerbated by intensifying US economic pressure.
• Iran is constrained by its relationships with the Gulf states because it seeks to increase political and economic costs on the United States while, at least at this time, avoiding actions that could push the Gulf states to support a resumption of large-scale US operations against Iran. Iran has also faced consistent opposition from the Gulf states toward its efforts to control shipping in the strait.

Iran Update, September 3, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian Artesh conducted a missile and drone attack targeting US bases in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates on September 3, likely as part of the regime's efforts to raise the costs of the US campaign against Iran. The latest Iranian strikes bear some similarity to a recent Iranian attack on Jordan that some Iranian military officials have claimed is reflective of a new Iranian targeting doctrine that reportedly includes preemptive strikes against US military assets in the region.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on September 3 that it cleared a major Hezbollah underground facility beneath the Ali al Taher Ridge in Nabatieh District after a months-long siege. Ali al Taher occupies advantageous terrain overlooking the Litani River and the neighboring Houla Valley that enabled Hezbollah to target Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and civilian settlements in northern Israel.
• ISW-CTP is considering three possible Iranian courses of action against Israel in response to the assault on Ali al Taher: a large-scale missile and drone attack, a limited and “symbolic” attack, and no military response. Iranian officials reportedly warned the United States in mid-August 2026 that Iran would respond to any offensive to seize the Ali al Taher facility with a “large-scale attack” on Israel, according to unspecified regional sources speaking to Reuters. All of the courses of action rely upon the assumption that the reporting about the Iranian warning is accurate.

Iran Update, September 2, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US efforts to restore freedom of navigation appear to be having some success in challenging Iran's ability to enforce control over the Strait of Hormuz. Increased commercial vessel transit levels indicate that Iran is having difficulty in preventing some commercial vessels from using the southern route. Iran may seek alternative ways to demonstrate or restore control over the strait as the United States challenges Iran’s ability to threaten vessels.
• The roughly 50 percent reported failure rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Jordan on September 1 may reflect the degradation of Iran’s longer-range missile capabilities.
• The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 1 that Russia has been covertly helping Iran develop advanced cruise missile technology since around November 2023. Iran’s development and operationalization of this technology would likely improve its ability to threaten US land and naval assets in the region. The development of supersonic cruise missile technology takes a substantial amount of time, and it is currently unclear how far along Iran is in developing this technology.
• Iran is likely pursuing two separate but related lines of effort to advance Iranian objectives in Iraq amid Iraqi government efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iran reportedly pushed unspecified Iraqi government actors and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to reach a settlement in which the militias would “discreetly” keep their weapons by storing them either in Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-controlled depots or in the militias’ own depots under the condition that they would not use them without PMF approval. Iran is also reportedly pursuing a plan to build a new cadre of smaller, more ideological militias over which Iran would have strong control.

Iran Update, September 1, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran struck US and allied bases and assets in the region on September 1 in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian military targets, including radars, on the same day. The CENTCOM strikes appeared to focus on assets that Iran uses to sense ships to strike.
• US strikes on radars will likely impose operational constraints on Iranian forces attempting to disrupt shipping in the strait. CTP-ISW previously assessed on August 31 that Iran was facing operational constraints on its ability to disrupt shipping in the strait.
• The Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 indicate that Iran has some capacity to disrupt shipping through the southern route to exit the Strait of Hormuz. The three Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 do not necessarily imply that Iran faces no constraints, only that it overcame them in those three instances. CTP-ISW will continue to monitor the rate of strikes and the tactical choices involved in each strike to evaluate whether Iran is facing tactical constraints as it attempts to disrupt shipping.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian may have sought military and economic aid for Iran during meetings with world leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31 and September 1.

Iran Update, August 31, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is attempting to re-assert its control over the Strait of Hormuz by deploying mines and re-cultivating international perceptions of the threat to vessels in the strait after US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had cleared mines in the strait. CENTCOM announced that US forces struck two Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island after observing the IRGC prepare to launch mines into the strait.
• Iranian forces’ suboptimal methods to intimidate ships in the strait — including missile launchers instead of fast attack craft (FAC) to lay mines and FAC for detecting vessels — suggest that Iranian forces are adapting under military constraints that are limiting Iran’s ongoing ability to threaten vessels.
• The Iranian regime is demonstrating increasing concern that worsening economic conditions could trigger renewed anti-regime protests and is expanding preventive measures to deter and suppress possible unrest.
• Iran’s deteriorating economy is generating potential triggers for renewed unrest, but the regime has limited ability to address these problems, especially under the US economic campaign to isolate Iran.
• Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are conditioning their disarmament on several conditions that the militias likely recognize the Iraqi federal government will not be able to implement, which underscores the militias’ intentions to resist disarmament.
• Iran likely pressured these militias to condition their disarmament on the Iraqi federal government expelling Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to further incentivize the Iraqi government to crack down on these groups. The Iranian regime perceives Iraqi Kurdistan as a base for Israel and Kurdish opposition groups to cooperate and launch attacks against Iran.

Iran Update, August 28, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s official Telegram account implicitly instructed Iranian officials on August 28 to avoid making statements that highlight Iran’s worsening economic conditions, likely to prevent such statements from fueling public frustration against the regime. Mojtaba’s Telegram account acknowledged that Iran faces inflation, unemployment, high prices, and other economic problems but emphasized that domestic production, “resistance economy” policies, and better economic management are the solutions to such problems.
• Pezeshkian reiterated the severity of Iran's economic situation in an address to the Iranian public on August 28 that was broadcast shortly after Mojtaba’s account warned officials against discussing Iran’s poor economic conditions. Pezeshkian linked Iran's deteriorating economic conditions to the war, US sanctions, and the naval blockade.
• The regime appears increasingly focused on preventing worsening economic grievances from producing renewed unrest, including by targeting alleged networks that helped drive the Winter 2025-2026 protests and reinforcing ties with traditionally pro-regime elements of Iranian society. The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on August 28 that it arrested 30 alleged leaders and participants of the December-January protests.
• The United States reportedly rejected a proposal by five Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to pause their military operations for two years instead of fully disarming. Multiple Iraqi sources told Iraqi Kurdish media on August 28 that the United States labeled the proposal a “trick.”

Iran Update: August 27, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian officials currently dominating regime decision-making appear to retain their anti-concessions stance vis-à-vis the United States despite compounding US economic pressure and a worsening domestic fuel crisis. Western media has recently reported long lines at gas stations and gas station closures as a result of fuel shortages across Iran.
• Key decision-makers in Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s inner circle continue to threaten to respond to US economic pressure and do not appear to have softened their position on core regime demands. These decision-makers' insistence on maintaining maximalist demands despite immense economic pressure highlights their willingness to incur economic costs and the risk of potential domestic unrest.
• Some senior Pezeshkian administration officials are trying to downplay the situation and reassure the public, likely to try to mitigate the risk of social unrest during this economic crisis.
• The Iranian regime appears to be considering several courses of action to address the fuel crisis, including potentially raising gasoline prices. Raising fuel prices has previously caused widespread protests in Iran.
• Some peripheral elements of the Iranian regime are more openly advocating for the development of nuclear weapons. These individuals do not have decision-making authority over Iran’s nuclear policy, but their recent comments are nevertheless notable given that they reflect a growing normalization of discussions about nuclear weapons in Iranian political discourse.
• These parliamentarians and commentators’ support for nuclear weapons development reflects a public debate over how Iran should restore deterrence after the recent US-Israel-Iran War, similar to debates that followed the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.
• The recent public discussions about nuclear weapons among peripheral elements of the regime may reflect decreased control over the information space by the Supreme Leader, as opposed to an actual increase in discussions about nuclear weapons.

Iran Update, August 26, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• A senior Iranian military official outlined the main principles of Iran’s new targeting logic, which is intended, in part, to reestablish deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and Israel as the Iranian regime prepares for potential future conflict. These principles include “rapid response[s]” to US and Israeli attacks, responding to individual strikes on Iranian territory with multiple strikes on various targets, preemptive strikes against US assets, and expanding the geographic scope of Iranian conflicts with the United States and Israel.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is attempting to carry out a fundamental reform of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that is designed to consolidate his individual power as prime minister. Zaydi’s efforts to professionalize the PMF could fulfill US objectives regarding militia disarmament. The success of these reforms would depend on Zaydi’s ability to enforce them and appoint professional personnel to undertake institutional changes throughout the PMF.
• The Iraqi Parliament is unlikely to approve this draft PMF Law, however. The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee is unlikely to approve the amended draft PMF Law, given that the committee includes parliamentarians from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia political wings that also control PMF brigades.
• Iranian opposition to any Iraqi federal government attempts to weaken the Iraqi militias could undermine Zaydi’s efforts to subordinate the PMF under himself, even if this draft law were to pass through the Iraqi Parliament.

Iran Update, August 25, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has not changed its negotiating position and continues to seek formal control over transit through the Strait of Hormuz as Pakistan tries to revive US-Iran negotiations. Iran has continued talks with Oman over transit arrangements that would formalize an Iranian role in controlling commercial traffic through the strait, which also demonstrates the lack of progress in talks.
• Iranian officials appear to be debating potential responses, including a more proactive military response, to sustained US economic pressure. Iran may target regional energy infrastructure as part of an effort to threaten the regional and global economy to impose political costs on the United States and its partners after the imposition of the US economic campaign. The regime is likely debating whether it should target regional energy infrastructure, however.
• Iran is implementing short-term economic measures to contain the effects of US pressure and reduce the risk of domestic instability, but these measures are unlikely to resolve Iran’s underlying economic problems.

Iran Update: August 24, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States is targeting Iran's sanctions-evasion networks to deepen Iran's economic isolation and strengthen international sanctions enforcement. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced Operation Economic Outcast on August 24 aimed to “foreclose every other [financial] option available to the Iranian regime.” Bessent added that US officials are engaging with their international counterparts to emphasize that every country has a defined timeline to shut down problematic activities with Iran that the US Treasury has identified. These economic steps come as the Iranian economy continues to deteriorate.
• The Iranian regime is attempting to find routes to alleviate economic pain while simultaneously trying to deter and prepare for potential social unrest in response to compounding economic pressure.
• Regime officials and outlets are issuing threats against foreign states, likely to deter them from complying with the US economic campaign against Iran.
• The Iraqi federal government and some Iranian-backed militias are likely attempting to reach an agreement to integrate militia elements operating outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into recognized PMF units.
• The Houthis struck a Saudi oil tanker roughly 950 kilometers north of Yemen in the northern Red Sea on August 24. The strike demonstrates the Houthi ability to launch anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) further than 500km, assuming the Houthi claim is accurate. CTP-ISW has not observed any open-source reporting that confirms that the Houthis possess an ASBM with a range exceeding 500 kilometers.

Iran Update: August 21, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• There is no indication that economic pressure on the regime has changed the anti-concessions position of some top Iranian officials, even while a group of Iranian officials responsible for managing the economy (“realists”) are increasingly warning that worsening economic pressure could threaten regime stability. These officials also appear to openly advocate ending the war to reduce the economic cost to the regime.
• The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Vahidi and other anti-concession officials.
• Regime decisionmaking may therefore take a long time to react, even as the economy gets much worse. Vahidi and other anti-concession officials appear to have a higher tolerance for domestic unrest because they may calculate that the regime can contain and suppress renewed protests without changing course.
• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is resisting US efforts to economically isolate Iran, but Chinese economic engagement cannot offset the blockade if Iran cannot physically supply its largest oil customer.

Iran Update, August 20, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that the United States will intensify its maximum pressure campaign against Iran in the coming days. Bessent announced on August 20 that the United States will announce further economic measures against Iran and entities with commercial ties to Iran on August 24.
• The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is preparing to implement phased trade and financial restrictions in parallel with upcoming US economic measures. The UAE reportedly plans to phase its reduction of trade and financial engagement with Iran adopting initial measures to restrict cargo and trade flows.
• Iranian officials are acknowledging the mounting economic pressures that Iran faces and are pursuing alternative trade, banking, and financial arrangements designed to reduce the impact of these pressures. Iran is seeking to invest in alternative routes and destinations for its oil exports to alleviate this economic pressure.

Key Takeaways:

• The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intensifying economic pressure on Iran to discourage Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran. The announcement comes after the UAE accused Iran of launching missiles from Iranian territory toward the UAE on August 18.
• The UAE has previously supported US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait, which suggests that the UAE’s decision is part of a broader effort to raise the costs of Iran’s attempts to control or disrupt maritime traffic.
• The UAE’s decision will further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions. Roughly one-third of Iran’s imports have come from the UAE, and the largest proportion of Iranian imports in the last five years come from the UAE have made the UAE.
• Iran will likely respond to the UAE’s decision with greater military and economic pressure against the UAE rather than abandon its efforts to secure greater control over the Strait of Hormuz. CTP-ISW previously also assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major Ahmad Vahidi’s faction—whom CTP-ISW continues to assess is driving regime decision-making—may be willing to accept some economic costs and the risk of renewed war if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives, including Iranian control over the strait.
• Increasing Emirati alignment with the United States will also drive longer-term hostility between the UAE and Iran. It is not clear the extent to which the Iranian regime decisionmakers have internalized the ramifications of long-term hostility with the UAE, given the economic relationship between the two states.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is under pressure from both the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors over Iraqi militia disarmament but appears to be responding primarily to militia pressure at this time. Zaydi reportedly planned to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism unit near Jurf al Sakhar, south of Baghdad, to monitor the movement of people and vehicles, and would not lead to a raid or a military incursion into the militia’s key site.
• Iran has also dispatched senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to Baghdad in recent days to discourage conflict between the Iraqi federal government and the militias. These officials are also discouraging disarmament.

Iran Update Special Report, August 18, 2026

Iran Update Evening Special Report, August 14, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Several Iraqi sources have described in recent days Iraqi planning for a possible operation to retake one of Kataib Hezbollah’s strongholds as part of a broader crackdown on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi reportedly ordered a study of the security and logistical conditions in Kataib Hezbollah’s stronghold of Jurf al Sakhr in Babil Province, according to unspecified Iraqi political sources on August 14.
• Iraqi sources’ discussions of plans for an operation against the militias may intend to encourage Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to acquiesce to the federal government and voluntarily disarm by September 30. Zaydi’s reported preparations for such an operation suggest that Iraqi security forces are preparing to enact such a plan if the militias do not oblige, however.
• Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) customs authorities seized two caches of electronic components that could be used for first-person view (FPV) drones at Yemeni ports and land crossings on August 13. ROYG authorities seized 23 fiber-optic cable spools at the Wadiah crossing in Hadramawt Governorate, on the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, according to Yemeni media.

Key Takeaways:

• There are additional indicators that the Iraqi federal government is considering using force to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if they fail to disarm by September 30. Iraqi sources told Saudi media on August 12 that the Iraqi federal government has a plan to deploy Iraqi Army, Counter Terrorism Service, and other “elite” units around Iraqi militia operation centers to restrict the militias’ freedom of movement and supplies after the September 30 disarmament deadline.
• Iran and some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned about Zaydi’s preparations to use force against the militias in order to directly disarm them or compel them to disarm. An Iraqi security source told Iraqi media on August 13 that the Iraqi federal government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are engaging in intensive talks about the disarmament process.
• Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media interpreted Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment decree of Basij Commander Hossein Taeb as an indicator that the regime plans to strengthen its ability to monitor and repress the Iranian population. Mojtaba appointed Taeb as Basij commander on August 10 and tasked Taeb with making “every Iranian a Basiji,” using the people to “confront enemy threats,” and protecting the Islamic Revolution.
• The Houthis deployed fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to attack Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces in Yemen for the first time on August 11. Two Yemen analysts published footage on August 12 that showed a Houthi fiber-optic FPV drone that ROYG forces captured in Marib Governorate on August 11.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, August 12, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is adapting its tactics based on lessons from recent conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine War. Iran deployed a swarm of drones into an area that US fighter jets had entered before downing the US F-15E with MANPADS in April 2026. The drones reportedly transmitted the jet’s GPS location, speed, and direction to Iranian commanders, which helped them successfully target the aircraft.
• Houthis are attempting to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military campaign against the Houthis by threatening to attack Saudi oil infrastructure unless Saudi Arabia negotiates a settlement. The Houthis also seek to coerce Saudi Arabia into accepting negotiations, likely because the group sees diplomatic engagement as a means to halt Saudi kinetic activity in Yemen and codify a Saudi surrender to Houthi demands.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: August 11, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Some observed indicators suggest that the Iraqi federal government is considering a major crackdown on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including by entering and retaking militia-controlled strongholds. Such an effort would require major mobilization, and the militias would likely be aware of any pending crackdown.
• Previous Iraqi administrations, particularly under former Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi, have conducted limited crackdowns on militia activity, but the combination of the Iranian infiltration of Iraqi government institutions and the strength of the Iraqi militias limited the scale of such efforts.
• The US’ pressure on Zaydi to disarm the militias could compel him to act against the militias despite these limitations. US efforts to compel Baghdad to disarm the groups have only increased due to militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region in March and April, as well as in recent months.
• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned Iraqi militia leaders against armed confrontation with the Iraqi government and to reach a settlement to avoid handing over militia weapons to the state during an August 10 visit to Baghdad, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media. Ghaani likely discussed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' recent attacks on Gulf states, namely Saudi Arabia, during his visit to Baghdad.
• Iranian leaders, including Ghaani, are likely attempting to draw the Iraqi government away from developing alternative oil export corridors to the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian leaders also almost certainly intend to preserve Iran’s leverage over regional states, the United States, and the global economy by promoting an arrangement that would offer Iraq short-term economic relief and reduce Iraq’s incentive to develop alternative oil export corridors to the Strait.
• A sustained US naval blockade could increase economic and political pressure on Iran and may eventually compel at least some regime officials to accept greater concessions in negotiations. The Iranian regime’s recent appointments suggest that the officials who currently dominate decision-making may be less responsive to that pressure and more inclined to maintain maximalist positions, however.

Iran Update Special Report, August 10, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian armed forces are undergoing an extensive reorganization that reflects lessons that the regime learned from the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei instructed Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi on August 10 to “complete the process” of merging the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.
• The regime likely calculates that merging the AFGS and KOACH will help streamline coordination between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), reduce institutional redundancies, and enable military leaders to make wartime decisions more quickly and effectively.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed several Iranian officials to senior military positions on August 10. These appointments largely formalize the structure of the armed forces that has existed for several months and consolidate both Mojtaba and his inner circle’s authority.
• Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces and the Houthis exchanged fire across multiple Yemeni governorates between August 7 and 10. Houthi and ROYG forces have fought at low levels since 2023, but the recent fighting follows reports that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a naval and possible land offensive to end the Houthi “chokehold” on Saudi Red Sea oil exports.
• The Iraqi federal government appears to be taking limited steps to prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Saudi Arabia and other regional states in order to avoid further strikes on Iraq. Iraqi officials who met with a Saudi intelligence delegation on August 8 pledged to prevent the use of Iraqi territory for attacks against Saudi Arabia and asked for information to help prevent future attacks.
• A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 9 that Iraqi militias will hand over their weapons to the PMF before the Iraqi federal government’s September 30 disarmament deadline, which corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraq. The PMF contains many Iraqi militias that answer to Iran and is led by Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. Transferring militia weapons to the PMF would thus harm US interests by transferring weapons to an organization that Iran has heavily infiltrated.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted a drone strike that destroyed shells for US-provided Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles at Camp Taji, north of Baghdad, on August 2, according to security and intelligence sources speaking to Saudi media on August 10. An unspecified official stated that the attack indicates that some militias opposed to disarmament are attempting to strip the Iraqi military of military assets that it could use against the militias.
• US-funded Arabic-language media reported on August 8 additional details of the IRGC’s role in directing Iraqi militia attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan and neighboring countries. The IRGC reportedly operates small cells of between five and ten Iraqi fighters from the main Iraqi militias who maintain a “lower profile” and “bypass” Iraqi militia leadership, according to unspecified sources.

Iran Update Special Report, August 4, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US officials and Iranian negotiators continue to present competing interpretations of the emerging arrangement on the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians’ inconsistent messaging in these negotiations is likely a product of the competing Iranian regime factions’ approaches to control over the strait and negotiations with the United States writ large.
• Iran’s broader military establishment, which appears to currently be dominating regime decision-making, maintains its position against significant concessions over the Strait of Hormuz because they assess that Iran can outlast the United States in the war.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and other pro-negotiations officials continue to advocate for diplomacy to settle the conflict and prioritize Iran’s economic challenges, while facing mounting pressure from the other regime factions that oppose compromise and seek more maximalist regional objectives. This intra-regime divide will likely impede Iran’s ability to concretely come to an arrangement over the strait.
• Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be downplaying these intra-regime divisions in an attempt to portray a unified front against the United States, however. The Supreme Leader's Public Relations Office on August 4 rejected reports claiming to describe Mojtaba's reaction to a letter from President Masoud Pezeshkian.
• The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that a Houthi drone struck a “sensitive target” at Najran Regional Airport, southern Saudi Arabia, on August 4. An informed regional source told AFP on August 4 that the Houthis struck the Najran Regional Airport’s main radar installation, which has affected airport operations.
• The Houthis likely sunk an Indian-flagged cargo vessel with a one-way naval attack drone near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Indian Minister of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal announced on August 4 that an unspecified projectile struck and sunk the Indian-flagged MSV FAIZE NOORE OLIYA “near Yemeni waters.”

Iran Update Special Report, August 3, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei may be trying to reduce President Masoud Pezeshkian and other “pragmatist” officials’ ability to influence the regime’s approach toward the United States in the current conflict. Senior cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, who has familial ties to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, claimed on August 3 that Mojtaba formally warned Pezeshkian that he would accept Pezeshkian’s resignation if Pezeshkian tried to resign again. Mojtaba may have made this warning to prevent Pezeshkian from using the threat of his resignation to influence regime policies.
• Kharrazi’s comments come as a contingent of “pragmatist” regime officials has directly and indirectly questioned how much effort the regime should exert to control the Strait of Hormuz. Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who played a central role in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations, warned on August 3 that a prolonged closure or “short-term exploitation” of the Strait of Hormuz could generate an international consensus against Iran, including from the People’s Republic of China.
• The IRGC faction that currently appears to be dominating regime decision-making has likely not diverged from its maximalist positions and will likely maintain these positions in reported upcoming talks with the United States, however. Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Mohsen Rezaei, whom CTP-ISW assesses is part of the IRGC faction controlling regime decision-making, stated on August 3 that Iran will not allow the use of a second corridor in the strait “under any circumstances.”
• The IRGC continued to use force to assert Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz on August 2, which reflects the IRGC’s unwillingness to compromise on its control over the waterway. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 2 that an explosion occurred near a civilian vessel off the coast of Oman.
• Mojtaba may be trying to increase his influence over key regime institutions, including the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Kharrazi claimed that Mojtaba wants to replace Vahidi-appointed SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr with one of his military advisers, former IRGC Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei. Iranian outlet Tabnak, which is affiliated with Rezaei, notably recirculated Kharrazi’s claim.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States conducted a wave of strikes in Iran on July 29 in response to Iranian attacks on US forces on July 28. The majority of recorded US airstrikes targeted Iranian military sites in southern Iran, including targets along the Persian Gulf coastline.
• Iran is attempting to weaken US resolve to continue its war against Iran by increasing the economic and political costs of ongoing US military operations. Iran possibly conducted or directed the drone attack on a US gas tanker at Damietta Port in northeastern Egypt on July 29. Iran almost certainly recognizes that the northern Red Sea and Suez Canal corridor provides a viable alternative route for international shipping and energy markets to circumvent Iran’s disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iran is attempting to increase domestic pressure on the US government by inflicting casualties on US forces and material damage to regional bases.
• Iran also seeks to coerce US partner states into revoking US basing access in the region. The IRGC is asserting that US forces and air defense systems cannot protect US troops or bases, almost certainly as part of a broader information operation that portrays US military presence as a source of insecurity for regional states.
• Saudi Arabia is assembling a multinational “maritime defense coalition” to protect Red Sea shipping from Houthi and Iranian threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Houthis and Iran will likely view this coalition’s formation as a direct threat to their current regional objectives.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are discussing how to respond to recent US-Saudi airstrikes on militia positions in Iraq. The militias could target US and Saudi interests, including US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan or Baghdad.
• The Houthis could participate in the Iraqi militias' response to the US-Saudi strikes. Saudi Arabia and unspecified regional partners reportedly assess that the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia on July 27 from Iraqi territory in coordination with the Iraqi militias and under IRGC supervision. The Houthis’ ability to launch attacks in the region from Iraqi territory expands the group’s options to obfuscate responsibility for the attacks that it is conducting.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: July 29, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime likely launched a “surprise attack” on US forces in Jordan on July 28 to erode the United States’ willingness to undermine the regime’s efforts to achieve its war aims, including securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The regime likely calculated that it could degrade the United States’ willingness to continue the conflict by inflicting damage or US casualties during the current “pause” in strikes.
• The IRGC Aerospace Force conducted the attack in Jordan, but it is unclear if there was consensus among various regime factions to conduct the attack. IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom CTP-ISW continues to assess is playing an outsized role in decision-making, almost certainly supported the decision to launch the recent attack on Jordan. Those within the regime’s pro-negotiations camp may have also backed the strikes as they also seek to secure Iranian control over the strait, an end to the US military presence in the region, and other regime objectives.
• The Iranian regime also likely sought for its attack on Jordan to signal the regime’s willingness to incur the risk of full-scale conflict with the United States in order to secure control over the strait.
• The United States and Saudi Arabia conducted strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia weapons and logistics supply sites across Iraq on July 28 in retaliation for Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.
• The United States and Saudi Arabia also conducted several strikes on July 28 along the Iran-Iraq border targeting sites used for the Arbaeen pilgrimages. Iran intended to use the Arbaeen pilgrimage to move weapons and advisers into Iraq, according to Israeli media.
• The US and Saudi strikes on July 28 reportedly killed at least four IRGC Quds Force officers in Diyala Province, which underscores the IRGC’s role in overseeing Iraqi militia attacks on the Gulf states and US interests in Iraq.
• Iran is attempting to bolster its air defense capabilities with assistance from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and improve its drone capabilities.
• The Houthis are threatening to expand their attacks on Saudi targets, likely in order to coerce Saudi Arabia to terminate its blockade against Houthi ports and airports. Unspecified regional sources also told Reuters on July 29 that the Houthis may start to impose fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait.
• An unspecified actor conducted a drone attack targeting a US-owned tanker at a Mediterranean port in Damietta, Egypt, on July 29.

Iran Update Special Report, July 28, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• There are three competing groups within the regime that are attempting to influence negotiations policy. The group currently arguing for negotiations and total control over the strait is likely guiding policy at this time. This group is likely led by elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), including IRGC commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi.
• The “IRGC-Vahidi" group is under pressure from a pro-negotiations and pro-compromise group that likely includes but is not limited to President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. This group primarily disagrees with the IRGC-Vahidi group over means, not ends. This group also seeks “control” of the strait, though its definition of control may be less expansive.
• The third group is an ultra-hardline faction, the Paydari Front, which opposes all negotiations with the United States. This group is a small minority, but its proximity to power through regime insiders like Saeed Jalili, who is currently a Supreme Leader representative on Iran’s top national security decision-making body — the Supreme National Security Council — and previously chaired the council, would likely require Vahidi and other policymakers to take note of its views.
• Concerns from pro-negotiation corners in Iran over continued US sanctions, the US blockade, and economic damage from the war underscore the risk Iran faces in continuing the war indefinitely. Economic challenges caused by the US blockade were one of the reasons Pezeshkian argued the MoU’s case to the supreme leader in June, according to the New York Times, which indicates that at least some regime actors believe the present situation is untenable for Iran.
• Iran continues to reject compromises to Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz because hardline decisionmakers perceive control of the waterway as the regime’s most reliable means of preserving future leverage. Iran is refusing to give up control of the strait in talks with Omani mediators as the mediators have proposed a formal 10-day truce, according to a US official and mediators speaking to Western media on July 27.
• The Houthis claimed to have struck a Saudi vessel on July 28, marking their third claimed attack on Saudi shipping since July 22. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea announced on July 28 that the Houthis fired several ballistic missiles targeting the Saudi-flagged oil and chemical tanker NCC Ghazal for "violating" the Houthi blockade.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) reportedly asked the Houthis to facilitate safe passage for Chinese-owned oil tankers through the Red Sea, according to six informed sources speaking to Reuters on July 28. Reuters, citing commercial ship tracking data, reported on July 28 that at least four tankers transporting Saudi oil to China transited the Bab al Mandeb since the Houthis announced their blockade on July 20.

Iran Update Special Report, July 27, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Recent attacks on regional states by Iran’s proxies and partners enable Iran to maintain plausible deniability while continuing to advance its objective of coercing the United States to end the war in terms favorable to Iran, which include accepting Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia and Jordan reported hostile drone attacks on July 27. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably conducted the attack on Jordan and at least some attacks on Saudi Arabia.
• The recent strikes on Saudi Arabia also support Iran’s objective of coercing the Gulf states to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz by disrupting efforts to bypass the strait. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea announced on July 27 that the Houthis launched drones targeting Saudi infrastructure vital to transporting oil from Saudi oilfields in eastern Saudi Arabia to export hubs on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on the East-West pipeline and Yanbu on the Red Sea coast to export oil to circumvent Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
• Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia support the Houthis’ objective of coercing Saudi Arabia to lift its blockade on Houthi ports and airports. Houthi officials have emphasized that the Houthis will continue to act against Saudi Arabia until Saudi Arabia terminates its blockade on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and ceases strikes on Houthi infrastructure.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 23, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis struck at least one Saudi vessel to enforce their naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on July 22. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations confirmed on July 23 that the Houthis attacked an unspecified Saudi-flagged tanker with an “unknown projectile.”
• Iran continues to support the Houthis and their efforts to disrupt maritime traffic in and around the Red Sea. The expansion of the maritime shipping crisis to the Red Sea supports Iranian efforts to degrade the United States’ willingness and ability to continue its strike campaign against Iran and coerce the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
• Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted a drone attack on Kuwait's Abdali border crossing with Iraq on July 23, marking Iran and the Axis of Resistance's first attack on a regional border crossing since July 11. Iranian media separately reported on July 23 explosions on Kuwait's Bubiyan Island.
• The IRGC is highlighting the alleged presence of naval mines in the southern corridor to deter commercial vessels from using this corridor and consolidate Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC claimed on July 22 that an oil tanker attempting to use the southern route struck a naval mine that disabled the vessel. CTP-ISW has not observed reports of any commercial vessels hitting mines in the southern route at the time of this writing.
• Russia may be helping Iran increase the accuracy of its targeting of US military sites in the region. Four people familiar with US intelligence told Reuters on July 22 that Russia may be providing Iran with targeting intelligence on US sites and equipment in the region. Russia’s provision of targeting intelligence to Iran would likely improve the accuracy and effectiveness of Iran’s drone and missile attacks.
• US President Donald Trump told Axios on July 23 that he may decide to expand US strikes against Iran. Trump said that the United States is prepared to launch a “massive attack” against Iran if he orders such an operation.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: July 22, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• CTP-ISW is tracking initial reports that the Houthis attacked two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea on July 22. Sources close to the Houthis previously stated that the Houthis had finished deploying missiles and drones near the Bab al Mandeb Strait to attack civilian shipping, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center on July 21. At least seven vessels have changed course to avoid transiting through the Bab al Mandeb Strait in light of the Houthi blockade on Saudi ports.
• The United States has increasingly struck Iranian targets outside of southern Iran, including western and northwestern Iran. The United States also struck unspecified targets in the Parchin Military Complex near Tehran, which the Iranian regime uses to produce advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.
• Hezbollah is likely alleging that Lebanese Shia are being discriminated against at the Beirut airport as part of an effort to remobilize support for the group and protect Hezbollah’s military organization.
• Iran fired at US military installations in the region as part of its ongoing efforts to degrade US capabilities and willingness to continue the war, end the war in a way that maintains Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, and break the coalition between the United States and regional Arab states.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 20, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis' announced naval blockade against Saudi Arabia could result in an expansion of the shipping crisis in the Middle East, as it will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping through the Red Sea by discouraging ships from transiting through the Red Sea. CTP-ISW has not recorded any Houthi attacks on shipping since July 7, 2025, at the time of this writing, but the Houthis ordered Saudi-bound vessels to turn back from Saudi Arabia over radio on July 20.
• Iran is trying to expand the geographical scope of its conflict with the United States to the Red Sea to cause further disruption to international markets and impose additional costs on the United States.
• The Houthis may have announced the blockade to deter Saudi Arabia from striking Houthi targets in Yemen to discourage further Saudi attacks, separate from but partially satisfying Iranian efforts to impose costs on the United States.
• Some senior Iranian officials appear concerned that the renewed conflict will deepen Iran’s economic problems and threaten Iran’s internal security. Senior Iranian officials have previously appeared concerned that the conflict will deepen Iran’s economic problems, but these concerns do not appear to have meaningfully impacted the calculus of the IRGC.
• US forces expanded strikes to possible missile launch sites in northwestern and central Iran.
• Iran continues to coerce vessels by force to transit through Iranian territorial waters to prevent them from using routes through the strait that Tehran does not approve. Iran has attacked at least two vessels in the strait since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff.
• The IRGC released a statement on July 19 thanking the Jordanian people for providing Iran with information that has aided Iran’s recent attacks on Jordan, possibly to counter continuing reports that Russia and the People’s Republic of China have helped Iran target US assets in the region during the US-Israel-Iran War. The statement could also be part of recent broader Iranian efforts to mobilize the local populations in Arab countries against US forces.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 18, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is adapting to US defenses by firing high-speed, maneuverable missiles at US bases in the region, which highlights the threat that the advancement of Iran’s ballistic missile program poses to US national security interests. Iranian leaders have expressed interest since at least the Iranian strikes on Israel in April and October 2024 in employing maneuverable reentry vehicles in order to improve the relatively low accuracy of Iranian missiles.
• An Iranian missile attack on a base in Jordan killed two US service members on July 17. Unspecified US officials told Western media that the attack took place at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are likely supporting Iranian efforts to target US bases in the region. US officials told the Wall Street Journal on July 18 that they are concerned that the PRC and Russia are supporting recent Iranian targeting of US assets.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials, including members of the negotiating delegation, have publicly declared that the US–Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) is no longer in effect.
• Iran and the United States interpreted the MoU's fifth clause about the Strait of Hormuz in fundamentally different ways, which contributed to the MoU's collapse.
• Iran struck a Kuwaiti power and desalination plant on July 18, likely in response to an alleged US strike on an Iranian desalination plant near Jask, Hormozgan Province, on July 17.
• Iran launched a ballistic missile at a US base in Saudi Arabia, marking the first Iranian attack on Saudi territory in nearly three months. Iran also targeted US facilities in Bahrain and Jordan on July 17 and 18.
• The United States has struck additional bridges and roads around Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on July 17.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: July 17, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States has struck several bridges and railroads in southern Iran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff in order to disrupt supply routes to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to a senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal. Bandar Abbas is a port city that hosts the IRGC Navy First Naval District and numerous other naval facilities.
• Iran struck critical infrastructure in Kuwait on July 17, possibly in response to recent US strikes on bridges in Iran and to deter the United States from conducting strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. The Kuwaiti Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy Ministry announced that an attack, which it attributed to “Iranian aggression,” damaged several power generation units at an unspecified power and water desalination plant on July 17.
• Iran attacked US targets in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 16 and 17 as part of Iran’s ongoing effort to impose costs on US allies and partners in the region and discourage them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait. Iran targeted US assets in Oman that support US operations in the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to degrade the United States’ capability to operate around the strait.
• Iran also attacked a former US base in Syria on July 17, likely to deter the Syrian government from undertaking any serious operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The IRGC said that it targeted a US special operations command center at al Tanf Garrison in the Syrian Badia in retaliation for the killing of Iranian soldiers in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
• Iran is continuing to use force and the threat of further attacks to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran targeted a Thai-flagged vessel in the strait on July 17.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: July 16, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is trying to deter expanded US strikes by signaling that it could escalate against international shipping around the Bab al Mandeb, using the Houthis. It is unclear whether the Houthis would act on the Iranian threats, though the risk is very high.
• The United States has continued its effort to degrade the Iranian ability to attack commercial traffic around the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has also conducted strikes further inland, the purpose of which is unclear.
• The IRGC is trying to send FPV, fiber-optic drones to Lebanese Hezbollah. Such drones have posed a significant threat to Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. The drone hardware derives from Russia and China.

Iran Update, July 15, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States has continued to strike Iranian military targets, including some targets further inland. Iranian regime media reported on July 15 that US forces struck the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade barracks in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. This strike is notable given that the 388th Brigade is located around 200 kilometers from the Iranian coast, while most US airstrikes in July have been concentrated around Iran’s southern coast. The Artesh has conducted operations throughout the war and most recently claimed on July 15 that it conducted drone strikes targeting US forces at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan.
• Iraqi media reported on July 15 that an unknown actor launched six drones targeting Erbil International Airport and the US Consulate in Erbil, Erbil Province. It is unclear whether Iran or Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted this attack.
• Iran is attacking vessels that have adopted alternative mechanisms to bypass Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked three vessels in the strait on July 13, two of which were doing “shuttle runs,” or repeated short trips to ports outside the strait in order to transport oil through the strait while avoiding Iranian territorial waters.
• Iran’s attacks on shipping are having some success in deterring shipping companies from using routes outside Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme, which advances Iran’s objective of securing control over the strait. Seven maritime security and shipping industry sources told Reuters on July 15 that shipping companies are avoiding using the southern route despite US military escorts, highlighting how shipping companies’ willingness to use alternative routes in the strait is dependent on their risk calculations.

Iran Update Special Report, July 14, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has attacked at least three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in the past 24 hours, which indicates that Iran retains the ability and willingness to attack commercial shipping despite recent US strikes on Iran. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on July 13 that it conducted another wave of strikes against Iranian military targets that Iran used to threaten shipping in the strait. Iran responded to the US strikes by attacking US military bases across Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan on July 14.
• Hezbollah appears to be conducting an information campaign to delay the Lebanese government’s disarmament efforts by attempting to convince the Lebanese government that the group will cooperate with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and that the Lebanese government must prioritize securing a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon before disarmament efforts can begin.
• Two US officials stated on July 14 that the United States backed Saudi Arabia’s July 13 airstrikes on Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport in Yemen. The Houthis also warned commercial airlines on July 14 against using Saudi airspace.

Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The present fighting is relatively less widespread in geographic scope and smaller in terms of total strikes compared to March and April 2026, but the increase in strikes and reimposition of the blockade nonetheless mark the end of the ceasefire.
• The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the MoU. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, reportedly fearful of the US blockade and the deteriorating economic situation in Iran, implored Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to accept the June 18 MoU despite the supreme leader’s concerns and desire to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz. Pezeshkian’s efforts to secure the MoU do not imply that other elements of the Iranian regime were seriously affected by the blockade, however.
• The recent MoU breakdown and the reimposition of the US naval blockade can cause negative political effects within Iran that are not immediately related to a breakdown in the regime’s willingness to continue the fight. The regime’s decision to continue firing into the Strait of Hormuz ultimately reignited the war, and the regime will need to argue the case to its own people and among itself as to why continuing the conflict is necessary. This situation will likely revive the intra-regime debate over how to handle the strait, economy, and negotiations with the United States.
• The United States and Iran are in a new phase in the war, and both sides have had time to internalize lessons and reconstitute after the initial round of conflict.

Iran Update Special Report, July 12, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is refusing any arrangement that undermines Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and is using force to maintain its control. Iran views control over the Strait of Hormuz as a major strategic objective, and its leaders believe that if Iran ends the war without control of the strait, it would be a serious strategic defeat.
• Recent US strikes have attempted to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping, but it remains unclear when Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping will be degraded sufficiently to prevent individual attacks that disrupt shipping.
• Iran is likely attacking Persian Gulf littoral states to deter them from supporting US- or Gulf-led efforts to limit Iranian control over the strait. Iran fired missiles and drones at US facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 12 in retaliation for the US strikes in Iran on July 11.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: July 8, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is willing to return to a large-scale conflict with the United States if necessary to secure its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s behavior after the latest US strikes indicates that the Iranian regime values control over the strait more than avoiding renewed escalation with the United States.
• The present pattern of US strikes does not appear to be changing Iran’s calculus on controlling the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 7 that it struck over 80 targets in Iran in response to repeated Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the strait.
• Iran is attempting to coerce Gulf states and others to acquiesce to Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz after Iran failed to secure recognition of its control over the strait through diplomacy.
• Iran is attempting to unilaterally impose a vision for the strait’s ”arrangements,” which are supposed to be created in dialogue with the Gulf states, not through coercing the Gulf states. Iranian coercion of the Gulf states is an effort to circumvent the intent of Clause 5, which administration officials noted was designed so that Gulf states would moderate Iranian positions about controlling the strait.
• Iran is using the ceasefire to reconstitute its military capabilities, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.
• The Lebanese government announced on July 8 that it will participate in negotiations with the US and Israel in Rome, Italy, on July 15 and 16. The Lebanese government earlier claimed that its participation in negotiations would be contingent on an Israeli withdrawal from “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 7, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is attempting to stop Western and Gulf efforts that could weaken Iran's ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as a source of leverage in current and future disputes. Gulf states and the United States are attempting to undermine Iran’s ability to use the strait as leverage by entering and exiting the strait along the Omani coast and by proposing alternative, non-Iranian-controlled transit mechanisms.
• Several Iranian media outlets reported on July 7 that the UAE proposed a plan to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to manage the strait, which Iran rejected and eight other unspecified UAE “allies” supported, because it lacked “legal basis” and “exceeds the IMO Council’s technical mandate and authority.”
• Iran is also taking military steps to stop Western and Gulf efforts to weaken Iran’s ability to control traffic in the strait. Iran launched two missile attacks on tankers in the strait on July 6 because both vessels failed to use Iranian-approved transit mechanisms. Iran also launched another drone at an unspecified tanker on July 7.
• Iran’s military and diplomatic efforts come as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member Foreign Ministers are set to discuss how to handle the strait issue with Bahraini, Kuwaiti, Qatari, and Emirati foreign ministers on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara.
• Hezbollah is preparing to use Iranian funds to resume financial payments to displaced Lebanese families in Hezbollah’s political strongholds as part of an effort to rebuild support among the Lebanese public.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 6, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Lebanese government appears to be implementing the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement and other diplomatic initiatives in a way that advances the government’s primary objective of ensuring stability in Lebanon. The Lebanese government may hesitate to implement parts of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement that it assesses risk igniting widespread conflict in Lebanon.
• The Lebanese government may also be postponing or preventing the Iran-Lebanon-United States “deconfliction cell” from commencing operations because the mechanism contradicts other Lebanese government objectives, especially expelling Iranian influence from Lebanon. Lebanese media reported on July 6 that Iranian regime officials have expressed frustration regarding the Lebanese government’s refusal to appoint representatives to the cell. Lebanese media also reported that the Lebanese government has largely ignored the deconfliction cell since Israel, Lebanon, and the United States signed the framework agreement on June 26.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reappointed Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei as judiciary chief on July 5. Ejei’s appointment is Mojtaba’s third appointment since becoming supreme leader in March 2026. Ejei has historically taken a harsh stance against regime dissidents, such as when he publicly defended executing protesters during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022 and described protesters as “terrorists” in 2026.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 4, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran continues to use threats and force to compel commercial vessels to transit through its illegal traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz. Alternative transit routes such as the route along Oman’s coast undermine Iran’s efforts to establish complete control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that threats and continued attacks on vessels will deter countries and international organizations from facilitating such alternative transit routes.
• Senior Iranian officials continue to portray the strait as Iran's primary source of leverage against the United States. Long-term Iranian control over the strait would enable Iran to close the waterway at any time and for any reason in order to make its adversaries meet Iranian demands and deter its adversaries from taking action against Iran.
• Senior Iranian regime officials appear to be trying to contain growing factional disputes over Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s position on the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Supreme Leader Representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Abdollah Haji Sadeghi told IRGC and Basij commanders and members in a letter on July 4 that Mojtaba’s recent message on the MoU is the regime’s final basis for action.
• The Iranian regime appears to be reshuffling some senior military positions after the US-Israel-Iran war. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-run media Defa Press reported that Rear Admiral Ali Ozmaei replaced Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri as the IRGC Navy commander.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 3, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran continues to insist on imposing an illegal toll scheme in the Strait of Hormuz despite Omani opposition to mandatory fees. The US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to engage with Oman to determine the “future administration” of the strait, but recent reports indicate that Iran and Oman have different visions for the future management of the waterway.
• Iranian officials appear to be trying to rally support for Iranian management of the strait by touting the alleged economic and security benefits of such management for regional countries. Iranian management of the strait would be detrimental to global commercial interests by enabling Iran to disrupt global trade and energy flows at will, however.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei did not make a public appearance at the opening ceremony for the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran on July 3, despite the attendance of most of Iran’s senior leadership and many foreign dignitaries.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, July 2, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has signaled that it will continue to use force to compel vessels to exclusively use the Iranian traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz as part of the broader Iranian effort to assert its claimed control of the strait. Iran has repeatedly attacked vessels in the strait to coerce them to use the illegal Iranian traffic separation scheme and thus implicitly recognize Iranian control over the waterway.
• Iranian forces may have launched an effort against Kurdish militancy around the Iran-Iraq border. The exact military objectives are unclear at this time.

Iran Update Special Report, July 1, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is pushing the United States to unfreeze a significant amount of Iranian financial assets and acknowledge Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz as part of the United States-Iran MoU. Doing so would leave Iran in a significantly stronger strategic position and could support its military reconstitution efforts.
• Ghalibaf’s June 30 interview appears to be part of an effort to build intra-regime support for the MoU amid domestic backlash from the anti-negotiation camp. Ghalibaf argued how Iran will continue to collect fees from vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, implicitly arguing that the MoU supports Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait.
• Iranian officials are openly discussing expanding their missile ranges beyond the long-held 2,000-kilometer limit. A senior political adviser to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Brigadier General Rasoul Sanaei Rad, said on July 1 that Ali Khamenei had previously issued “phased” guidance to increase missile range and then improve missile accuracy.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: June 30, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian officials are simultaneously employing diplomatic outreach and military coercion to pressure regional states to support a new "regional security mechanism," likely to advance Iran's long-standing objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East. Iran is likely using this proposed regional security mechanism to encourage Gulf states to distance themselves from the United States in exchange for cooperation with Iran. Iran may be offering economic cooperation, guarantees against Iranian attacks, and access to the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Gulf support for key Iranian demands.
• Iranian officials continue to signal that Iran intends to maintain long-term control over the Strait of Hormuz despite apparent resistance from Gulf states.
• Iran and Oman appear to have at least some disagreements over the strait’s management, but any arrangement, regardless of fees, that recognizes Iranian control over the strait would be extremely problematic to US and Gulf interests as well as global commerce. An Iranian official and an unspecified regional diplomat told the New York Times on June 30 that Oman recently presented the United States with a proposal under which shipping companies would pay service fees to transit through the strait. The regional diplomat stated that the fees would be voluntary, but the Iranian official claimed they would be mandatory, which suggests that Iran and Oman disagree on this issue.
• Iran announced that it will send a delegation to Doha, Qatar, on July 1 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran MoU, but Iran continues to reject direct talks with the US delegation in Qatar and any discussion of its nuclear program.
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) will reportedly deploy ground forces to Israel and Lebanon to monitor compliance with the Trilateral Framework Agreement. CENTCOM’s on-the-ground presence would likely enable the United States to more quickly identify and address potential Israeli or Hezbollah ceasefire violations and thereby limit Iran’s potential advantage in the recently established “deconfliction cell.”

Iran Update Evening Special Report: June 29, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran and the United States will reportedly hold talks in Doha, Qatar, on June 30 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) despite the recent exchange of fire between the United States and Iran. Iran will likely use these talks to try to secure the implementation of provisions in the MoU that help advance Iranian objectives, including the provision about the release of Iranian frozen assets.
• Clerics within Iran’s Assembly of Experts, including within the body’s leadership, appear divided over how the regime should implement the US-Iran MoU and how much latitude Iranian negotiators should have in talks with the United States. The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member clerical body that is responsible for appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader, according to the Iranian constitution.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately appears to be trying to build support for the MoU among senior clerics and defend the Iranian negotiating team. Pezeshkian met with several senior Shia clerics in Qom Province on June 28, likely to rally clerical support for the agreement, present the MoU as a source of economic relief, and insulate negotiators from criticism by hardline clerics.
• Iranian officials and media are signaling that Iran will not allow Oman to constrain Iran’s effort to establish control over the Strait of Hormuz. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency argued in an op-ed on June 29 that tying the future management of the strait to Omani consent would harm Iranian interests.
• An international media correspondent released on June 29 the reported text of the June 26 Israel-Lebanon-United States trilateral framework agreement's security annex, which stipulates the process by which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon. The annex includes a four-stage mechanism for the LAF and IDF to dismantle non-state armed groups in designated “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah officials and media are attempting to delegitimize the trilateral framework agreement by accusing the Lebanese government of violating Lebanese law and public interests. Hezbollah-affiliated media argued on June 29 that the agreement is invalid because it allegedly violates Lebanese sovereignty, popular consent, and the Lebanese constitution due to the agreement being signed under Israeli military “duress.”

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 28, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has continued to attack US forces in the region to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian drone struck the Panama-flagged M/T Kiku on June 27. US military aircraft targeted Iranian military surveillance infrastructure, communications systems, air defense sites, drone storage facilities, and mine-laying capabilities in response. The IRGC launched drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting the US Fifth Fleet Naval Base in Bahrain and the Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait on June 28.
• Iran’s strikes may reflect an Iranian effort to dissuade the Gulf states from resisting Iranian control over the strait. Iran may have intended for its strikes to signal to Gulf states that Iran will respond with force to any Gulf opposition to its control of the strait, amid recent Gulf resistance to this Iranian effort. Iranian media and officials have adopted a harsher tone toward Gulf countries in recent days, likely in response to these countries’ opposition to Iranian management of the strait.
• Iran is threatening to suspend negotiations as part of its efforts to deter the United States from challenging Iranian sovereignty over the strait. The IRGC Navy stated on June 27 that US strikes on Iran violated the ceasefire and “will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes.”
• The Israeli government confirmed the locations of two "pilot zones" where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon as part of the June 26 trilateral framework agreement. Both of the announced pilot zones lie beyond the IDF’s “anti-tank line,” which would likely reduce the risk of Hezbollah launching attacks on Israeli territory from those zones following the IDF’s withdrawal.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 27, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has continued to use force to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian forces then conducted a drone attack against US positions in Bahrain on June 27. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) subsequently reported on June 27 that an unspecified projectile struck a tanker off the coast of Oman.
• Iran’s strikes against Bahrain may be part of an ongoing Iranian effort to coerce the Gulf states to accept Iran’s control of the strait and deter them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iran’s control. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the US retaliatory strikes against Iran on June 26 by warning Gulf states not to allow the United States to attack Iran from bases within their territory.
• The Israel-Lebanon-United States Trilateral Framework challenges Iranian and Hezbollah efforts to facilitate an Israeli capitulation in Lebanon and threatens Hezbollah’s existence as an armed group. The agreement seeks to disarm all non-state armed groups in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah is conducting an information operation that is intended to weaken the Lebanese government’s resolve to disarm Hezbollah by threatening renewed civil war in Lebanon if the government attempts to implement the framework agreement. Hezbollah has long leveraged the threat of renewed civil war to deter the Lebanese government from attempting to disarm the group.
• The Iranian regime likely views the framework agreement as contravening the Lebanon-related clause of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) and may attempt to use the agreement as a pretext to further delay nuclear negotiations with the United States. CTP-ISW has repeatedly assessed that Iran has attempted to condition US-Iran nuclear negotiations on the United States compelling Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory as part of its efforts to preserve Hezbollah and delay nuclear negotiations.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: June 26. 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is using force in an attempt to maintain its control over the Strait of Hormuz in the immediate future. Iran is likely attempting to prevent vessels from using non-Iranian shipping channels with force in the immediate term as it continues negotiations with the Gulf Arab states to secure long-term recognition of its control.
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck an unspecified number of Iranian missile and drone storage sites and coastal radar sites on June 26 in response to Iran’s drone attack on the M/V Ever Lovely.
• Iran is also using diplomacy and threats to secure long-term diplomatic recognition of its control of the Strait of Hormuz because continued Iranian strikes in the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult to maintain.
• Iranian officials and state media are reacting to their faltering diplomatic efforts with a significantly more hostile tone towards the Gulf states.
• Israel and Lebanon signed a US-brokered “framework agreement” on June 26 that describes a path towards eventual full Israeli withdrawal. The agreement stipulates that the Lebanese Armed Forces will backfill the Israel Defense Forces at two positions in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 25, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is attacking and threatening vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to advance its objective of establishing control over the waterway. The recent attack and ongoing threats also likely seek to undermine international efforts to guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iran is using military threats and economic incentives to try to convince Gulf states to support its efforts to control the strait, but the Gulf states appear to be resisting Iranian pressure at present.
• The United States and GCC foreign ministers issued a joint statement on June 25 that emphasized the importance of “free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation” and rejected “any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait. The statement explicitly opposes any payment requirement for transit through the strait and implicitly opposes any Iranian attempts to manage maritime traffic through measures such as its traffic separation scheme or requirements that vessels coordinate with the IRGC Navy.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 24, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is likely using discussions called for by the US-Iran memorandum of understanding to reach arrangements with the Gulf states that would allow for sustained Iranian influence around the strait during the post-war period. The fifth clause of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other littoral Persian Gulf states. The Iranian regime may also be attempting to segue discussions with the Gulf states on the status of the Strait of Hormuz into broader conversations about limiting US or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf.
• Recent remarks from Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani suggested that some Gulf countries may be amenable to cooperating with the Iranians on a “broader economic framework.” Thani told the Financial Times on June 24 that Qatar was open to discussing Iran's plans to administer the strait alongside Oman about the future management of the strait with Oman and other Gulf countries.
• Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials discussed proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill the IDF in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon during talks in Washington, DC, on June 23 and 24. Israeli officials told Reuters and Israeli media on June 24 that Israeli and Lebanese negotiators discussed a US-backed plan to deploy US-trained and vetted LAF personnel to backfill Israeli positions.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 23, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is taking steps to establish a joint mechanism with Oman to try to exercise long-term authority over the Strait of Hormuz. Such a mechanism would enable Iran to regulate transit through the strait and decide to restrict passage at its discretion. Recent increased vessel traffic through the strait does not eliminate the threats that Iranian control over the strait pose to US interests and global commerce.
• Iranian regime officials have continued to deny that the United States could control how the regime spends any funds it obtains from the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Any economic relief that the regime obtains could support Iranian efforts to reconstitute its military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s Telegram channel reiterated the primary objectives that Iran seeks to achieve in the current conflict. These objectives include ending US military operations against Iran, making the United States lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports, consolidating Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, receiving US compensation for Iranian reconstruction, the lifting of all sanctions, “the resolution of nuclear issues,” and Iranian access to frozen assets.
• Recent Iranian reporting suggests that Major General Ali Abadi Abdollahi may now serve as the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander simultaneously. Iranian media reports identifying Abdollahi as the AFGS deputy chief follow unconfirmed reports from December 2025 that Iranian leaders were considering merging the AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.
• United States Central Command’s (CENTCOM) proposed deconfliction initiative in Lebanon would operate at a disadvantage compared to Iran because the IRGC’s on-the-ground presence in Lebanon likely enables Iran to identify and report alleged ceasefire violations to the newly established “deconfliction cell” faster than the United States. Israeli political leaders have expressed concern over the “deconfliction cell” due to Iran’s role in the cell and Israel’s exclusion from the mechanism.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: June 16, 2026

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 14, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Iran reached an agreement on June 14 that apparently calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, Iran to “open” the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States to lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports. The United States and Iran will sign the agreement in Geneva on June 19.
• The exact terms of the MoU are not publicly available as of this writing, which makes it difficult to assess how Iran views the agreement in terms of achieving Iranian objectives. Iranian officials have not yet commented on whether Iran would re-open the strait without tolls. It is not clear if a “toll-free" and “open” strait means that Iran retains any of its management functions over the strait. Iran has repeatedly emphasized that the strait is under Iranian control and that the strait is part of Iran‘s broader deterrence strategy.
• An Israeli attack in southern Beirut prompted a flurry of diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement amid Iranian threats that it would respond by attacking Israel. Several Iranian military and security officials warned on June 14 that Iran would respond to the Israeli attack. Three Iranian officials said that Iran called off a planned attack on Israel after Trump urged restraint.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 13, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian statements regarding the contents of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) indicate that some terms of the agreement are at odds with stated US positions on the Strait of Hormuz in recent months. The agreement has two parts: a first stage that deals with an “end to the war” on all fronts, a resumption of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and economic benefits for Iran, including reconstruction funds, sanctions relief, release of frozen funds, and an end to the US blockade. The second stage would deal with the nuclear issue and “one or two other [unspecified] issues.”
• Iran is likely attempting to structure the MoU and the phasing of a final agreement to reduce US leverage before later negotiations over the nuclear program. Iran is attempting to access at least some of its frozen assets early in the MoU process, for example, which would give it some economic relief before nuclear talks begin.
• Iranian media appears to be portraying a possible MoU as a tactical pause in the war rather than a final settlement. The Ghalibaf-affiliated Khorasan outlet argued on June 13 that the emerging agreement only aims to end the current war and does not resolve the underlying issues between Iran and the United States.
• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s readout of the MoU is largely consistent with IRGC-affiliated media’s readout of the latest possible agreement, which may indicate a growing consensus among Iranian regime leaders on Iran’s red lines for negotiations. That Araghchi’s June 12 readout and IRGC media’s account of the latest US-Iran MoU are very similar suggests that Vahidi or elements close to him may have successfully driven consensus on their preferred policy outcomes.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 12, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Persistent internal disagreements remain among Iranian regime leaders over the concessions that the regime should accept in negotiations with the United States. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle appear to continue to seek an agreement that meets Iranian maximalist demands and would be tantamount to a US surrender. Other Iranian officials appear to have disputed a draft memorandum leaked by IRGC-linked and state media.
• Conflicting US and Iranian accounts of the MoU suggest that the United States and Iran remain far apart on several core issues, however. It remains unclear whether these public statements accurately reflect each side's negotiating position or the contents of the agreement, given competition between the IRGC and the formal negotiating team.
• Iranian statements and Iran’s continued use of force and coercion in the Strait of Hormuz indicate that the regime remains unwilling to relinquish its claims to control over the waterway. Any US-Iran agreement must require Iran to abandon efforts to establish long-term authority over the strait. Iranian forces continue to employ coercive measures to force vessels to transit through Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with its protection racket.
• Hezbollah’s efforts to decentralize its military structure may be enabling the group to conduct more effective defenses of specific areas in southern Lebanon than it was able to muster in Fall 2024. The IRGC reportedly reorganized Hezbollah’s C2 system starting in late 2024, and the shift towards unit independence and mobility would theoretically enable Hezbollah fighters to execute more effective defenses against Israeli advances in several sectors across southern Lebanon.
• “IRGC-linked” figures acting on Iran’s behalf reportedly warned unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders to resist surrendering militia weapons to the Iraqi state in the days after Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s successful formation of a new government in May 2026. Iran’s reported opposition to Iraqi militia disarmament at this time conflicts with several other reports that Iran has encouraged some Iraqi militias to end their kinetic operations in exchange for solidifying Iranian-backed Iraqi control over the Iraqi state, however.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 11, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is using information operations to magnify the informational effect of its strikes as part of an effort to compel the United States to accept an agreement that is relatively advantageous to Iran.
• Iran does not view the current phase in the conflict as negotiations in pursuit of a deal; it believes it is at war and that war will end with a deal.
• The Iranian regime likely assesses that the United States does not seek a return to the conflict. Iran’s campaign seeks to leverage US fears about a return to conflict. The regime has almost certainly observed and reacted to US statements in the Western press.
• Iran is attempting to reinforce what it appears to believe is a US reticence to resume the war by claiming that it is unwilling to yield to US military pressure.
• Iran’s strikes on US bases and assets are also designed to have primarily informational and economic effects, rather than military effects. Iran continues to demonstrate that it is unwilling to yield to US military pressure and come to an agreement. Iran also knows that not conceding and amplifying its denial imposes political and economic cost on the United States as well.
• Iran’s announcement that it has “closed” the Strait of Hormuz is an extension of Iran’s information operation to heighten political and economic pressure on the United States by amplifying its military operations in the region. It remains unclear whether Iran’s statement will translate into changes to its existing coercive maritime behavior.
• The United States attempted to degrade Iran's ability to sense, target, and strike vessels moving through the Strait of Hormuz and US air assets protecting their transit in its second round of airstrikes in two days on June 10.
• The United States continued to enforce its blockade on Iranian ports as part of its economic pressure campaign on Iran. US forces disabled the Guinea-Bissau-flagged oil tanker M/V Jalveer on June 10 after the vessel attempted to violate the US blockade and transport Iranian oil outside of Iran.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 10, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is using force, combined with the threat to suspend US-Iran negotiations, to try to deter the United States from conducting further attacks on Iran that would likely make it more difficult for Iran to achieve its strategic objectives, which include solidifying control over the Strait of Hormuz and preserving the Axis of Resistance. US forces struck around 20 targets in southern Iran, including air defenses, ground control stations, and surveillance radar sites, on June 9 in response to Iran's drone attack that downed a US Apache helicopter off the coast of Oman on June 8.
• Iran has repeatedly used calibrated force as part of a series of campaigns to try to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 to pressure US President Donald Trump to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These attacks were part of a broader Iranian effort to preserve Hezbollah, which it views as a key pillar of its deterrence strategy vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.
• CTP-ISW is monitoring reports of additional US strikes in Iran as of 5:36 PM ET on June 10. CTP-ISW will provide more details on the US strikes in its June 11 morning thread and evening update.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 9, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is attempting to use calibrated force in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States without triggering a full-scale US response. Iran has likely designed this new approach based on an assessment that the United States does not want to return to war.
• Iran is using force against US forces near the Strait of Hormuz, likely in an effort to deter US forces from operating in the Strait of Hormuz for any reason. An Iranian drone downed a US Army AH-64 Apache gunship near the coast of Oman on June 8. This use of force is designed to achieve the Iranian war aim of asserting its control over the strait.
• US President Donald Trump emphasized that the United States must respond to the Iranian attack. CTP-ISW is monitoring reports of a ”proportional” US response as of 5:50 PM ET on June 9. CTP-ISW will provide more details on the US response in its June 10 morning thread and evening update.
• The Houthis continue to threaten to restrict commercial shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, but they have not yet conducted attacks to realize these threats.
• Hezbollah and Iran appear not to have effectively deterred Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: June 8, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is attempting to use force and the threat of force to establish a strategic reality in which any Israeli or US attack on an Iranian proxy or partner would result in a large-scale conflict that would seek to impose significant economic and political costs on Israel and the United States. The recent exchange of fire comes as the Iranian regime appears to be placing renewed emphasis on the importance of the Axis of Resistance, and particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, as a central pillar of Iranian deterrence.
• The Iranian regime likely seeks to pressure the United States to limit Israel’s operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon by threatening to conduct large-scale attacks against Israel. Hezbollah likely seeks to benefit from Iranian deterrence because Iran's threat to respond to any Israeli attack against Hezbollah injects uncertainty into Israel’s decision-making process for military operations against Hezbollah.
• The recent Iranian strikes on Israel and Iran’s renewed emphasis on the Axis of Resistance reflect how the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) likely continues to dominate regime decision-making. The regime’s renewed emphasis on Hezbollah and the broader Axis of Resistance, coupled with its lower threshold for direct military conflict, likely reflects Vahidi’s efforts to preserve and reinforce what he likely views as one of Iran’s most valuable forms of deterrence.
• The IDF responded to the Iranian strikes on northern Israel by attacking Iranian air defense and ballistic missile sites in central and western Iran. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts on X and anti-regime media reported strikes against other Iranian military facilities, including drone storage and production facilities in Tehran and Esfahan provinces, respectively.
• The Houthis announced on June 8 that they will target Israeli vessels in the Red Sea but have not yet acted on this threat at the time of this writing. Any Houthi attack on Israeli vessels in the Red Sea would likely seek to impose costs on Israel while remaining below the threshold that would trigger a US response. Houthi attacks on Israeli vessels in the Red Sea would complement Iran’s broader effort to pressure international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and increase costs on regional and global commerce.
• The Houthis launched at least two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel on June 8, which is consistent with the group’s “limited” involvement in the current war. The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile salvo at Tel Aviv and other unspecified areas of central Israel on June 8. The IDF stated that it intercepted one missile while a second missile landed near the Yemeni–Saudi border, according to the Saudi Defense Ministry.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 7, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• A Hezbollah rocket attack on northern Israel on June 7 is threatening to completely collapse the ceasefire in the Middle East. Israel responded to the Hezbollah attack by conducting an airstrike in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Iran responded with a missile attack designed to deter future Israeli attacks against Hezbollah while avoiding escalation into a resumption of full-scale war.
• Iran will likely seek to use the threat of a resumption of full-scale war to deter additional Israeli attacks. Iran is already attempting to present itself as a reasonable actor in the most recent escalation, even though its ally, Hezbollah, started the escalation on June 7.
• Iran has continued its efforts to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy warned other states against disrupting its unrecognized and illegal transit rules, which presumably refers to US efforts to support the movement of commercial vessels through the strait.
• Bloomberg reported on June 6 that US officials are considering using frozen Iranian funds to help Gulf allies repair damage caused by Iranian aggression, citing a Trump Administration official. The official added that the US Treasury Department “will use all tools available” to obtain estimates of the damage that Iran caused to the United States’ Gulf allies and allow them to use Iranian assets for rebuilding.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 6, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian officials and media continue to demand US guarantees and concessions ahead of any US-Iran deal, likely to reduce US leverage before any substantive negotiations over points of key disagreement between the United States and Iran, such as Iran’s nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. The regime is seeking immediate economic relief as one of these preconditions.
• Iran is continuing to leverage its support for Lebanon in order to delay substantive negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program and the strait. Iran has suspended negotiations until a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is reached.
• Iran and the United States exchanged limited fire over the past 24 hours after the IRGC attempted to stop tankers from crossing the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Public Relations Office claimed on June 5 that four oil tankers attempted to violate Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme under US military “guidance.”

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 5, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah and Iran’s maximalist demands seek to undermine US and Lebanese government efforts to end the conflict with Israel and restrict weapons to the Lebanese state.
• Iran and Hezbollah continue to link Israeli capitulation in Lebanon to US-Iran negotiations to try to delay discussions about key points of disagreement between the United States and Iran, particularly Iran's nuclear program and its efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iranian officials and media are highlighting the growing ties between the UAE and Israel, likely to try to exploit anti-Israel sentiment among Gulf states to drive a wedge between the UAE and its Gulf neighbors.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: June 4, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah and Iran’s insistence on this demand is part of an effort to defer negotiations about key points of disagreement between Iran and the United States, particularly Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz, and strengthen Iran’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States.
• Hezbollah and Iranian leaders are unified in viewing Israeli capitulation in Lebanon as inextricable from Iranian negotiations with the United States. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem acknowledged Iran’s role in pushing for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and noted that Iran’s push for a complete ceasefire is an “integral part” of Iran’s own efforts against the United States.
• Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the Lebanon issue in order to try to deflect focus away from key points of disagreement in the US-Iran negotiations, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program, which the regime seeks to avoid making concessions on. A newspaper linked to the Supreme Leader’s office argued on June 2 that the status of the Strait of Hormuz will not return to its pre-war status. This comment reflects how the Iranian regime does not solely seek to survive this war and return to the pre-war status quo; the regime has positive objectives that it seeks to achieve, including securing Iranian sovereignty over the strait.
• The Iraqi federal government has begun to try to restrict arms to the state through the disarmament and integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment, including the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
• Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is also reportedly pursuing a plan, approved by unidentified framework leaders, in which disarmed militia members would integrate into other Iraqi security institutions, such as the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). Any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, June 2, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is likely trying to transform negotiations about ending the war with Iran into negotiations about ending the war in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah seek to end in Israel’s capitulation. The Iranian regime is likely also using the time it is buying through this negotiation tactic to try to legitimize its illegal traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz and solidify its de facto control over the strait.
• The United States mediated a partial agreement between Israel and Hezbollah to halt Israeli strikes against Beirut and Hezbollah strikes against northern Israel. The ceasefire appears to be largely holding but is very fragile. A partial ceasefire likely does not meet Iran and Hezbollah’s maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah view as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.
• Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation that is likely intended to pressure the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iranian officials have threatened attacks against both Israel and shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon, likely because they calculate that the threat of an expanded conflict will drive the United States to pressure Israel to stop its operations against Hezbollah.
• Iran is also using the time it is gaining by deflecting attention from the US-Iran negotiations to advance other objectives, such as securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy announced on June 2 that it permitted 24 vessels to pass through the strait in the past 24 hours.
• The Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework announced its support on June 1 for restricting arms to the state and separating the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from all “political, partisan, and social frameworks.” The framework’s announcement is probably a response to intensified US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias, rather than an indicator that the framework intends to disarm the militias.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on June 2 that it has formed an internal committee to begin “disengaging” from the PMF. This announcement comes amid Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali’s public support for disarmament and shift toward political activity in recent years.

Iran Update Special Report, June 1, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW continues to assess is dominated by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, suspended US-Iran negotiations on June 1. Vahidi and his inner circle likely calculate that the status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions to the United States in a diplomatic agreement nor is engaged in a full-scale conflict with the United States, is a favorable situation that advances their objectives. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency announced on June 1 that the regime has suspended negotiations, ostensibly in response to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
• The Iranian regime's decision to suspend negotiations and emphasize the Lebanon issue is almost certainly a response to US President Donald Trump's recent amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU).
• The Iranian regime has likely focused on the Lebanon issue, as opposed to another key sticking point in negotiations, to try to curb Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as part of the regime’s broader objective to preserve Hezbollah. The regime also likely seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel by falsely blaming Israel and its operations in Lebanon for the collapse of the US-Iran talks. Vahidi and his inner circle also likely calculate that the status quo will help them advance several other objectives, such as solidifying Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining the Iranian nuclear program.
• The suspension of negotiations further indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle are driving Iranian decision-making and have likely gained the upper hand over proponents of a deal, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
• Iran and the United States have exchanged limited fire over the past 48 hours. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media announced on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US MQ-1 Predator drone over “Iranian territorial waters.” US Central Command (CENTCOM) responded by launching defensive strikes against Iranian targets on Qeshm Island and in Goruk, Hormozgan Province. The IRGC retaliated against the US strikes by launching two missiles at US forces in Kuwait on May 31.
• Iranian forces also likely attacked a civilian cargo vessel located off the coast of Iraq on June 1. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on June 1 that an unspecified projectile struck a cargo vessel transiting the northern Persian Gulf approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of the Umm Qasr Port in Iraq.

Iran Update Evening Report, May 31, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump has requested several amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the United States and Iran remain at odds over key issues. Officials said that Trump specifically requested amendments to the draft’s text about how and when the United States would secure Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU). A second informed source told Axios that Trump also requested changes to the draft MoU’s text on the Strait of Hormuz. Three US officials separately told the New York Times on May 30 that Trump is concerned about parts of the draft MoU that would involve the United States unfreezing Iranian funds. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media argued that it would be better to not reach an agreement than for Iran to accept a “bad deal” that failed to secure Iranian interests.
• Anti-regime media, citing an unspecified informed source, claimed on May 31 that President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media denied this report and no Iranian officials have confirmed this claim at the time of this writing.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 30, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran continues to try to frame Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “management” of transit through the Strait of Hormuz as the new status quo. The United States and international community must continue to reject Iranian efforts to try to establish this new status quo, as it is detrimental to international commercial interests and sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of navigation in international waterways.
• Neither the United States nor Iran has indicated that the two sides have narrowed gaps on key issues in the US-Iran negotiations, such as economic relief for Iran. Iran likely seeks unrestricted access to its frozen assets to reduce the effect of US sanctions and the naval blockade and support its military reconstitution.
• The hardline faction within the Iranian regime is not a monolith but contains a spectrum of actors with varying priorities, opinions, and political positions. CTP-ISW continues to assess that hardline IRGC officials, particularly IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, are unwilling to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States.
• Iran may have used a Chinese-made man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to target US aircraft during the war, according to three individuals familiar with the matter speaking to Western media.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 29, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump called for the Strait of Hormuz to “immediately open” without tolls and with the removal of mines. Iran has, in recent days, used force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s demands for “control” of the Strait of Hormuz directly contradict Trump’s position. These Iranian demands would be a fundamental change to long-held international maritime law and are at odds with the free flow of commerce.
• US Central Command has continued to respond to Iranian efforts to use force to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, most recently by issuing a notice to mariners and airmen on May 29 that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iranian officials continue to indicate that Iran will not accept or make concessions on US President Donald Trump’s most recent demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program that including not producing a nuclear weapon and agree to “destroy” or move its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.
• The US Treasury Department has sanctioned five front companies supporting the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company on May 28, for facilitating Iranian oil shipments, including exports to the People's Republic of China.
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) denied Iranian claims that Iranian air defense systems downed US aircraft near Bushehr Province in southern Iran on May 28.
• Saudi officials complained to the United States in early April that the UAE’s involvement in US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran increased the risk that Iran would target regional energy facilities, according to the Wall Street Journal. It is unclear on which day the UAE strikes began, based on this reporting, but Iran first struck Gulf energy infrastructure on March 1, when it hit a structure at Jabel Ali Port‘s oil terminal in Dubai, UAE, and Ras Tanura Refinery in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
• Hezbollah has adapted to increasing IDF night operations by fielding thermal camera-equipped first-person view (FPV) drones that enable nighttime attacks, after the IDF began nighttime operations to make it harder for Hezbollah to launch FPV drone attacks at them. Hezbollah, subsequently, appears to be dictating the pace of adaptation to the IDF at this time by quickly overcoming relatively rudimentary Israeli countermeasures.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 28, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Western media reported on May 28 that US and Iranian negotiators have reached a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MoU), but the US and Iranian leaders who must approve the agreement—US President Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, respectively—have not approved the “agreement” at this time. The details of the reported “agreement” are also unclear based on the wording and sourcing of the leaks of the agreement.
• Even if Iranian negotiators did offer some concessions, it is far from clear that senior decision-makers in Tehran, including Mojtaba and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, are willing to make such concessions. Mojtaba’s recent public statements indicate that he is not willing to give up Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
• The IRGC is using force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) recent military strikes against Iran are part of an effort to deny Iran the ability to create that reality.
• The United States is taking steps to prevent Iranian efforts to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz. The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) on May 27 and warned that any actor that cooperates with the PGSA could face sanctions.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 27, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Senior Iranian officials continue to frame Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic necessity and core element of Iranian deterrence against the United States and Israel.
• Iranian officials continue to insist that Iran will “reopen" the strait to civilian shipping under “Iranian arrangements.” Any arrangement in which maritime traffic can only pass through Iran’s traffic separation scheme with Iranian approval contradicts the US demand for freedom of navigation, and such an arrangement would significantly undermine US interests and establish a dangerous precedent for the freedom of navigation in international waterways.
• Conflicting reports about the draft US-Iran agreement, as well as public statements from both sides, highlight continued disagreements on other key issues between the United States and Iran. Iran’s proposed sequencing of concessions would require the United States to surrender key sources of leverage before negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program begin, which would significantly reduce US leverage in any future nuclear negotiations.
• Iranian media outlet Nour News published an op-ed that emphasized the need for Iran to convert its recent “military victory” into broader political success, which reflects a belief within the regime that Iran emerged from the recent conflict in a position of strength. Iran’s maximalist and uncompromising negotiating positions reflect the Iranian regime’s effort to translate its perceived success in the war into long-term strategic and political gains.
• An Israeli open-source intelligence analyst posted satellite imagery that shows Iranian reconstitution efforts at the Yazd Missile Base in Yazd Province since the start of the US-Iran ceasefire in April 2026. These reconstitution efforts corroborate CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran is exploiting the ceasefire period to reconstitute its military capabilities at the tactical and operational levels.

Iran Update Evening Report, May 26, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran and the United States have not bridged key differences on all the major demands in the US-Iran talks. Iranian officials said that they are unwilling to discuss their nuclear program on May 25, and Iranian regime media on May 25 insisted that the United States observe Iran’s right to enrich uranium on Iranian territory.
• Granting Iran economic relief by unfreezing funds or removing sanctions would likely decrease Iranian military reconstitution timelines. Iran reportedly demanded that the US immediately release the first half of frozen Iranian assets upon signing the agreement and the second half of the assets within 60 days, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) media on May 26.
• Iran is also refusing to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and using force to ensure the recognized traffic separation scheme remains closed. Iran used force again on May 25 to maintain its illegitimate traffic separation scheme when it attempted to deploy mines in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei released a statement on May 26 reaffirming the regime’s commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution and his father’s grand strategy – namely, a commitment to the destruction of Israel, the expulsion of US forces from the region, and the formation of a “new Islamic civilization” united against the United States. Khamenei emphasized that “Death to America [and Israel]” will again be the slogan of Iran and the Islamic world.

Iran Update Evening Report, May 25, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Iran continue to hold fundamentally different positions on most major issues within the US-Iran “agreement.” Iran has not publicly committed to removing its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles or to halting uranium enrichment in Iran, reinforcing broader uncertainty around the negotiations. US President Donald Trump said on May 25 that any deal with Iran must be “great and meaningful,“ and explicitly rejected “anything like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).”
• Iran has continued to claim that it and Oman control the Strait of Hormuz as territorial waters. Iranian officials are attempting to reframe transit tolls as “protection fees” to give Iran’s protection racket the veneer of legality. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under international law. Iran is claiming that the strait is territorial waters and under the administration of “coastal” states. It is notable in this context that Iran does not define the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a coastal state, even though the UAE borders the strait.
• US President Donald Trump urged on May 25 the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords.
• Hezbollah drone operators have likely developed a rudimentary tactical approach to coordinate multiple small first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in a short period of time. The “swarm” attacks appear to employ three or more drones operating in a staggered but near-simultaneous manner. This system is extremely rudimentary and would either require a single commander to coordinate the attack or a preset, prioritized list of strikes that cannot be dynamically changed. Hezbollah will likely attempt to overcome the shortcomings of this tactical approach.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 24, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Conflicting US, Iranian, and regional reporting indicates that the contours of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) remain unresolved and may not yet represent a final agreement.
• Iranian officials, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlets, and Iranian sources speaking to Western and regional media are presenting the possible MOU as conditional on US concessions and continued Iranian leverage.
• IRGC-affiliated reporting has identified frozen assets, sanctions relief, the naval blockade, Lebanon, and the Strait of Hormuz as the main unresolved issues. This is every issue in the first stage of the agreement, prior to talks on the nuclear program.
• Mediators appear to be trying to preserve momentum toward a US-Iran MOU by sequencing unresolved issues and developing technical arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz, but Iranian reporting suggests that Iran has rejected efforts to defer its core demands.
• Iran appears to believe that it is negotiating from a stronger position than the United States and is accordingly attempting to remake the regional order in a way that benefits Iran.
• Iran has not publicly accepted meaningful nuclear concessions in the possible MOU, and Iran believes that the draft defers nuclear talks until after Iran secures relief from military and economic pressure.
• Iranian officials have stated that the US-Iran MOU must end the war “on all fronts,” including in Lebanon. The United States supports continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah, however, to prevent threats to Israel.
• Israeli officials have reportedly called on the United States to allow the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to continue its operations in Lebanon, in accordance with the current temporary ceasefire in Lebanon, and President Trump agreed with this position.
• Hezbollah officials have continuously reiterated that the group will continue to engage the IDF in southern Lebanon and launch attacks against northern Israel until the IDF completely halts its activity in Lebanon and withdraws from southern Lebanese territory.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 23, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s latest counterproposal frontloads all of Iran’s key demands on the withdrawal of “a US threat to Iran,” financial relief, and Iran’s “right” to manage the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to delay discussion of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s proposal corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment that the regime believes it is winning the war and is negotiating from a position of strength.
• Iran’s latest proposal demanded an end to the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of US forces from the ”warzone.” Withdrawing US “threats to Iran” would constitute a withdrawal from the region, presumably, which both removes US military leverage and accomplishes a key Iranian objective: expelling US forces from the region.
• Iran emphasized in its latest proposal that the Strait of Hormuz will remain under some form of Iranian control and that Iran will not continue negotiations if the United States does not end its blockade of Iranian ports and ships. Iranian officials continue to emphasize Iranian management of the strait as a key sticking point in negotiations.
• US President Donald Trump stated on May 23 that he would decide by May 24 whether to resume strikes on Iran. Trump said he would only accept a deal that addresses key issues, including Iran's uranium enrichment and its HEU stockpile.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 22, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The US-Iran negotiations have reportedly made “slight progress,” but Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz remain the two key sticking points in negotiations. It is unclear from public reporting where specifically “progress” was made.
• Iran has launched an information operation to frame its protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz as a legitimate maritime security service. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy claimed on May 22 that 35 vessels transited the strait in the past 24 hours after obtaining Iranian ”permission” and ”security.” This “security“ is effectively protection from attacks by Iranian forces, which is the only force that has threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz since February 2026.
• The war cannot end in a way that secures US and allied interests until Iran abandons its effort to control the strait. Recognition or compliance with Iranian transit rules would allow the regime to achieve de facto control over the strait.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 21, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has not submitted a response to the latest US proposal as multiple mediators continue efforts to narrow gaps between the United States and Iran. Both US and Iranian officials said on May 21 that nuclear weapons and the Strait of Hormuz remain the two “sticking points” on negotiations. Iranian officials appear divided over potential nuclear concessions, especially whether Iran should send its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile abroad. The reporting does not clarify the seniority of the Iranian leakers or clarify their motives, but the contents of the leaks about the alleged directive from Mojtaba and subsequent denials suggest disagreement within the Iranian regime over nuclear concessions. 
• Iranian officials have coalesced around demands to formalize Iranian control over Strait of Hormuz transit, in contrast to their apparent division over the nuclear file. Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that Iranian officials believe they won the war because formalizing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz is a territorial claim on the sovereign territory of another country.
• Iran continues to attempt to build support for its protection racket in the Persian Gulf, in which vessels must pay, coordinate with, or receive permission from Iran’s preferred mechanism to transit the Strait of Hormuz in order to avoid attacks from Iranian forces.
• Iran is continuing to use the ceasefire period to reconstitute its drone and missile program. Iran’s drone program is far more difficult to degrade for long periods of time compared to the ballistic missile program. The drone program relies on less complex and more easily-produced systems compared to the ballistic missile program, which requires huge facilities with extremely specialized equipment (like planetary mixers for solid fuel, for example).
• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are helping Iran reconstitute its drone and missile program. The PRC has sent missile components, according to US officials familiar with intelligence assessments, speaking to CNN. There is no evidence that these missile components reached Iran.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 20, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is likely using the ceasefire period to normalize Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz by compelling oil-importing countries to establish a bilateral transit agreement with Iran while charging fees from vessels that are not part of the bilateral deals.  These fees are framed as “security” fees, but the fees are in reality part of a mafia-esque protection racket in which the vessels pay Iran so that the Iranian navy can “secure” the vessels against an attack by the Iranian navy or Iranian shore-based missiles and drones.  
• Iran’s normalization scheme could not be disrupted by a post-war “security” deployment by European states, as some countries have suggested. Iran would likely attempt to stop, perhaps with force, any post-war “security force” if the war ends with an official or de facto recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait.
• A successful Iranian effort to normalize this structure would gradually increase the number of vessels moving through the strait to near pre-war levels. This reduces the visible economic costs of restricted access and therefore weakens the primary argument for mobilizing US allies to help reopen the strait. It is not a given that this effort will be successful, however.
• Three US officials told the Wall Street Journal that US forces seized a US-sanctioned, Iranian-linked oil tanker, the M/T Skywave (IMO: 9328716), between May 19 and 20 after it transited the Strait of Malacca on May 14. US Marines separately boarded the Iranian-flagged oil tanker M/T Celestial Sea (IMO: 9397030) on May 20 on suspicion of attempting to reach an Iranian port.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) threatened on May 20 to expand the war "far beyond the region" if US-Israeli strikes on Iran resume. This threat almost certainly seeks to deter renewed US-Israeli strikes but could also reflect IRGC planning for a potential future conflict. Iran does possess several capabilities with which it could operationalize these threats, including by conducting terror attacks abroad, disrupting shipping in other chokepoints, or firing ballistic missiles at longer range.
• Pakistan is attempting to secure its own political and security interests by fulfilling its end of the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defense agreement and helping mediate between the United States and Iran.
• Hezbollah defended against an IDF assault into Haddatha, Bint Jbeil District, on May 19 and 20. The protracted Hezbollah defense is the first prolonged engagement between the IDF and Hezbollah since the ceasefire began.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 19, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States continues to pressure Iran economically through its naval blockade and sanctions, which impose costs on Iran’s economy.
• Concerns from Iranian officials or citizens about economic damage do not, on their own, imply that Iranian leaders will drop negotiating demands. Other factors, such as (but not limited to) a proven threat to regime stability, could trigger a rethink among Iranian leaders about their negotiating positions. Iranian leaders have proven that they care little for the economic well-being of the Iranian people beyond the impact the economic well-being of the people has on regime stability.
• Some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries reportedly support a plan to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz beginning in early July if Iran continues to impose its blockade, according to a senior NATO official speaking to Bloomberg on May 19. One NATO diplomat stated that several NATO countries support the idea, but that there is not the required unanimous support to enact it.
• Iran reportedly analyzed US military aircraft flight patterns to try to improve its ability to intercept and target US and allied aircraft during the war. The New York Times, citing a US military official, reported that Iranian military commanders studied the flight patterns of US fighter jets and bombers, likely ahead of and throughout the recent war. That the US official appears aware of the risk of predictable flight patterns means that the US military is aware of and could diagnose the issue of predictability during the ceasefire.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 18, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s latest counterproposal does not appear to meet US demands. A senior US official and source briefed on the matter told Axios on May 18 that Iran’s counterproposal does not contain a commitment “about suspending uranium enrichment or handing over its existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU).” US demands have been and continue to be that Iran must give its HEU to the United States.
• US President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social on May 18 that he canceled a scheduled US military strike against Iran that was planned for May 19. Trump’s announcement comes after Qatari, Emirati, and Saudi leaders asked Trump to suspend the strike “for two or three days” due to ongoing negotiations and concerns over Iranian retaliation. Trump, however, noted that he instructed the US military to remain prepared to launch a “full, large-scale assault” against Iran on short notice if negotiations fail.
• Iran continues to formalize and institutionalize its claimed control over transit through the Strait of Hormuz in contravention of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Iran has incorrectly asserted that this is ”legal” under the UNCLOS because the Strait of Hormuz is within Iran’s territorial waters.
• IRGC-affiliated outlets continue to threaten commercial and digital activity linked to the Strait of Hormuz as part of broader regime efforts to institutionalize Iranian authority over the waterway.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 17, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Iran continue to pursue fundamentally incompatible negotiating positions. Unspecified sources familiar with the US response to the latest Iranian counterproposal told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency on May 17 that the United States laid out its five main conditions in response to the latest Iranian proposal.
• Likely Iranian or Iranian-backed forces launched three drones targeting the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on May 17. Radiation levels at the plant remain normal. The drones approached the target from the west. Iran has previously used drones to approach a target from an unexpected direction to obscure its responsibility and create challenges for air defenses. IRGC-affiliated media used the attack to attempt to drive a wedge between the UAE and other Gulf States by blaming Saudi Arabia for the attack.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 16, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Iranian regime is introducing a formalized toll system under the guise of maritime insurance policies and continuing to deploy incentives and threats to vessels in the Persian Gulf as part of their efforts to normalize and solidify Iranian control over the strait. This system appears designed to be more palatable than an outright “toll” by framing it as a “maritime insurance policy.” The insurance presumably insures the vessel against an Iranian attack.
• Iran is trying to circumvent the US naval blockade by expanding alternative overland and rail trade routes through the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Pakistan, and Iraq. These alternative trade routes are unlikely to replace the scale and efficiency of maritime trade through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, however.
• Israel and Lebanon have agreed to continue dialogue and extend the ceasefire but appear to remain at odds over key issues surrounding Hezbollah and its status. Israeli and Lebanese officials have long disagreed on the implementation mechanism, timing, and other political details related to Hezbollah’s disarmament and Israel’s military presence in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update, May 15, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Senior Iranian officials continue to demand guarantees against future US-Israeli attacks as a precondition for negotiations, and the Iranian regime likely views recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz as one such guarantee.
• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not appear to have made a clear commitment to support US efforts to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s assertion of control over the strait is inconsistent with the long-stated PRC position, however.
• Iran may have decided to deprioritize certain restrictive measures in the Strait of Hormuz, such as toll collection, in order to encourage states such as the PRC to cooperate with Iran and implicitly recognize its control over the strait.
• The Iranian regime is attempting to ease economic pressures that the US naval blockade on Iranian ports is imposing upon the Iranian economy by taking measures to preserve necessary economic resources, while attempting to keep the Iranian public calm ahead of expected shortages.
• The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced on May 15 that it will accelerate efforts to double the export capacity in Fujairah to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reduce the UAE’s strategic vulnerability. This reflects a broader strategy that Gulf states are adopting to safeguard energy exports from future disruption through chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz.
• Unspecified Western diplomats told Western media on May 14 that Saudi Arabia is discussing pursuing a potential non-aggression pact with Iran after the war, but it is unclear how much meaningful progress there has been towards such a pact. Iran could theoretically attack Gulf states under the guise of targeting US assets in each country, even under such a pact.
• The recent war has showcased the UAE’s adoption of a more assertive posture against Iran amid its deepening security ties with Israel.
• The US State Department announced on May 15 that Israel and Lebanon have agreed to extend the temporary ceasefire for an additional 45 days.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders and political figures are threatening to withdraw their support for new Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi’s government amid US pressure to deny Iranian-backed figures positions of influence in the Iraqi government.
• US authorities charged senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah commander Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawoud al Saadi with planning attacks targeting civilians in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 14, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran may be prioritizing upholding the “legitimacy” of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz over toll collection at this time. This prioritization helps Iran encourage states to implicitly recognize its control over the strait while avoiding international concerns over paying the Iranians and incurring sanctions risk. Legitimizing any aspect of Iranian control over the strait, with or without tolls, is unacceptable due to the precedent it sets.
• Iran is likely prioritizing the implementation of the protocol over the tolls at this time in order to present itself as a reasonable actor that is willing to “open” the strait to “free” travel without tolls. Recognizing Iran’s protocol—which bars certain countries from accessing the strait and not others based on their behavior—is unacceptable because it implies that the Strait of Hormuz is sovereign Iranian territory. The PRC only explicitly opposes the toll system and Iranian “blockade,” but has not explicitly opposed Iranian claims to sovereignty, for example.
• PRC companies have been reportedly discussing arms sales routed via third-party countries with Iranian officials, but currently it is unclear to what extent PRC officials have decided to approve these sales and subsequent weapons shipments, according to New York Times reporting on May 13 that cited US officials.

 Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 13, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its military capabilities during the ceasefire period are consistent with the behavior of any military organization when given time and space to reconstitute itself after combat. These tactical and operational reconstitution efforts, however, do not necessarily offset the strategic effects achieved during the war against ballistic missile production facilities.
• Iran’s growing emphasis on the Strait of Hormuz reflects a broader, emerging consensus around the idea that the Strait of Hormuz must be central to Iranian strategy and deterrence in the future. Iranian strategy before October 7 and the events thereafter, including the Spring 2026 war, revolved primarily around ballistic missiles, drones, and its proxy and partner network as deterrents and force projection tools. Naval assets around the Strait of Hormuz featured only secondarily and as part of this wider three-pillar system.
• Some regime officials and outlets have floated new ideas about how the regime could use the Strait of Hormuz to discourage behavior that the regime believes is contrary to its interests. Many of these proposals, if accepted and operationalized, would also provide Iran with new revenues that would enable it to reconstitute its military forces.
• Some regional states appear to be complying with Iranian-imposed transit procedures in the Strait of Hormuz, which normalizes Iran’s claim that vessels need Iranian permission to transit the waterway. Five unspecified sources told Reuters on May 12 that Iraq and Pakistan reached agreements with Iran to move crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the strait.

 Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 12, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s consistent pursuit of international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz reinforces CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Iran views control of the waterway as its most important tool of deterrence against future US or allied military action, because such recognition would allow it to restrict activity in the strait whenever it wills. Iranian sovereignty and control over the strait would have severe consequences for global shipping for all countries dependent on maritime trade, but especially the Gulf States.
• Iran is likely preparing for a resumption of hostilities. The Kuwaiti government stated on May 12 that six Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers attempted to infiltrate Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island on May 1, though their exact objective was unclear. Bubiyan Island offers a host of opportunities for the IRGC to stage operations, conduct intelligence, sabotage nearby facilities, or some combination of all three. The Iranian military will reportedly also conduct drills at Mahshahr Port on May 12, which is approximately 100 kilometers away from Bubiyan Island. The IRGC Navy could use these drills to prepare for new operations if the ceasefire collapses or to disperse vessels ahead of resumed strikes.
• Iran may also be trying to protect some of its military assets by repositioning them in countries it calculates that the United States would not attack. CBS reported on May 12 that Iran repositioned military and civilian aircraft in Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively, shortly after the ceasefire on April 8.
• The Iranian regime appears to view preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel as inseparable from preparations to secure the regime internally and conduct operations against potential domestic unrest. The Tehran Province IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Unit conducted an exercise in Tehran Province on May 12. The unit is one of the regime’s most important internal security formations and serves as the primary IRGC command responsible for security in Tehran Province.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 11, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian leaders are trying to dictate the terms for ending the war, which illustrates that the Iranian regime perceives that it has the upper hand in the conflict at this time. Iran’s proposed terms would require the United States to give up its leverage over Iran before any negotiations could take place, which would likely make it more challenging to extract nuclear concessions from Iran. Iran has not provided any guarantees that it would engage in nuclear negotiations, let alone make nuclear concessions, even if the United States accepted its terms.
• Commercially available maritime data appears to indicate that some vessels may be complying with Iran’s new transit regulations in the Strait of Hormuz. Recognition of Iran’s “sovereignty” over the strait would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests.
• Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media claimed that the Iranian regime has deployed 10,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the Artesh Ground Forces since the 12-Day War in June 2025. Iranian forces would likely use these drones to try to defend against potential ground operations in Iranian territory.
• Iran is likely providing Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with FPV drone technology. Hezbollah and Iraqi militias have consistently conducted attacks targeting Israeli and US forces and assets using FPV drones during the current conflict.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 10, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump stated on May 10 that Iran's latest counterproposal is “totally unacceptable.” Individuals familiar with Iran’s counterproposal told the Wall Street Journal on May 10 that Iran’s counterproposal calls for an end to the war, the “gradual opening of the Strait of Hormuz,” and the lifting of the United States’ naval blockade on Iranian ports.
• Iran likely conducted attacks against a commercial vessel and some Gulf countries on May 10. These attacks may be intended to sustain high oil prices and thereby impose economic pressure on the United States in order to compel the United States to make concessions in negotiations.
• Iran is attempting to coerce countries into lifting economic pressure on Iran in order to be able to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is also attempting to generate revenue by imposing a toll scheme in the strait.
• Iranian media has publicized meetings between Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and senior Iranian officials in recent days, likely to portray Mojtaba as an active decision-maker in the regime amid reports that Mojtaba has been marginalized.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 9, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is supporting Iranian efforts to rebuild Iran’s military capabilities during the ceasefire period. Russia is reportedly sending drone components to Iran via the Caspian Sea to help Iran rebuild its offensive capabilities following the war, according to US officials. Russian shipments of drone components to Iran support Iran's broader effort to restore its missile and drone capabilities ahead of a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel.
• Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also supported Iranian attacks on US bases during the war. Russia and the PRC both provided Iran with satellite imagery of US and allied bases during the war.
• Iran has not yet responded to the latest US proposal and will likely use any delay in negotiations to continue to rebuild its military capabilities. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 9 that Iran is still reviewing the US proposal and will "pay no attention to...deadlines."

Iran Update Special Report, May 8, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian officials continue to frame control over the Strait of Hormuz as a key strategic interest and a critical component of long-term Iranian deterrence. Iran likely views control over the strait as essential to restoring deterrence against the United States and Israel following the degradation of its other forms of deterrence.
• The United States and Iran remain divided over key issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, the status of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, and Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.
• The United States has continued efforts to maintain an effective naval blockade against Iran as Iran continues to assert long-term sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iran has continued to escalate rhetorically and militarily against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) amid Iranian attempts to portray the UAE as a hostile state supporting US and Israeli operations against Iran. Iran likely also seeks to demonstrate that continued US military actions against Iran will generate direct security and economic costs for Gulf states cooperating with the United States.
• Confidential Russian documents, seen by The Economist, revealed a Russian proposal to offer Iran several thousand drones and training for Iranian drone operators, which raises concerns about the proliferation of fiber-optic drone technology to Iran and its regional proxies. Some of these proxies have already demonstrated the ability to employ these systems against US and allied targets.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 7, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 7 that US forces “eliminated inbound threats” and struck Iranian military facilities responsible for attacks on US forces after Iran targeted US naval assets in and around the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM stated that the United States “does not seek escalation.”
• The United States and Iran remain divided over key issues, particularly issues related to Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile and enrichment activities are some of the main obstacles to a deal.
• Iran is increasingly attempting to formalize recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz in a way that would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests.
• Iranian regime media highlighted a meeting between Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, likely to display unity amid reports of divisions within the regime. Pezeshkian reportedly sought an emergency meeting with Mojtaba to ask him to stop the IRGC's attacks on the UAE and to prevent their reoccurrence. The fact that Iranian media and Mojtaba’s office have not provided details about what Mojtaba and Pezeshkian discussed suggests that Pezeshkian did not convince Mojtaba to alter the regime’s current policies.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 6, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran seeks to achieve positive strategic objectives beyond the negative objective of surviving the war. Iran’s principal positive strategic objective at this time is to secure recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests.
• Long-term control of the Strait would require Iran to secure US recognition of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz through a negotiated agreement so that Iran could order ships to comply with its rules legitimately and then intercept those ships that fail to comply. Iranian negotiators increasingly prioritized securing its control over the Strait in negotiations, likely because it believes Iranian control over the Strait would act as a safeguard against future wars between Iran and Israel and the United States.
• Iran is also seeking economic relief as a positive objective from the war, which could enable Iran to accelerate its efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile program. US sanctions on Iranian oil have contributed to severely weakening Iran’s ability to raise revenue that the regime has used to fund the development of its ballistic missile program.
• The introduction of these positive strategic objectives does not mean that Iran has abandoned its “negative” strategic objectives, which include limiting discussions on its nuclear program and avoiding an economic collapse that could trigger severe domestic unrest leading to the collapse of the regime.
• The Iranian regime is preparing for economic instability that could cause domestic unrest. This effort supports the “negative” strategic objective of preventing regime collapse caused by protests that result from serious economic instability. Iranian officials’ public emphasis on economic management suggests that the regime recognizes that economic pressure could create internal stability risks and is preparing mechanisms to manage those risks. These statements, concerns, and preparations do not on their own indicate that the Iranian regime is prepared to surrender as a result of economic pressure.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: May 5, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran has conducted a series of attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past 48 hours that are likely intended, in part, to isolate the UAE from other Gulf states. Iran’s decision to solely attack the UAE, as opposed to multiple Gulf states, indicates that Iran is likely trying to isolate the UAE and exploit fractures between the Gulf states to sow further divisions between the UAE and other countries in the Gulf.
• Iran’s attacks against the UAE also likely seek to drive a wedge between the UAE and the United States and Israel in response to the UAE taking steps to strengthen its partnership with the United States and Israel. Iranian state-controlled media has suggested that Iran’s attacks against the UAE were driven by the UAE’s increasing alignment with the United States and Israel.
• Iran’s recent attacks against the UAE are also a response to US efforts to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked an Emirati-linked vessel and UAE territory after US President Donald Trump announced Project Freedom on May 3.
• Iran’s escalation against the UAE also likely reflects internal Iranian regime dynamics and IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi’s efforts to constrain diplomacy. Vahidi continues to dictate the regime’s approach toward the Strait of Hormuz, which has reportedly angered Iranian “pragmatist” actors.
• Iran is expanding its efforts to establish bureaucratic frameworks to assert its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, reported on May 5 that Iran has designed and implemented “a new mechanism for exercising sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.”
• US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated that Iranian attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and against the UAE on May 4 were not violations of the US-Iran ceasefire in a Pentagon press briefing on May 5. US officials have not commented on Iran’s May 5 attack on the UAE at the time of this writing.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 30, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei declared on April 30 that Iran will retain control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and maintain its nuclear and missile capabilities, which supports CTP‑ISW's assessment that the Iranian regime is unlikely to make meaningful concessions in its next proposal to the United States.
• Some Iranian officials who have advocated for a “pragmatist” approach toward negotiations may be aligning themselves behind Vahidi’s redlines, which Mojtaba publicly endorsed in his April 30 statement. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been acting in “full coordination” with Vahidi and following Vahidi’s “instructions” over the past two weeks, according to two informed sources speaking to anti-regime media on April 30. This report suggests that Araghchi may have aligned himself with Vahidi’s position on negotiations.
• Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian are reportedly dissatisfied with Araghchi's close cooperation with Vahidi and approach toward negotiations, even though they have publicly signaled their acquiescence to Vahidi's hardline approach.
• Iran is trying to sow divisions between the Gulf states and the United States as part of a longstanding Iranian effort to push the Gulf countries to expel US forces from their territory.

Iran Update Special Report, April 29, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is unlikely to make meaningful concessions in its next proposal to the United States, which is expected in the next several days. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whose hardline position on negotiations the regime has adopted, appears unwilling to concede on Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program.
• Mainstream Iranian politicians are consolidating around the decision to avoid discussing the nuclear issue before the United States lifts the naval blockade on Iranian ports, which was Vahidi’s preferred policy outcome. Other Iranian regime factions do not appear to materially constrain Vahidi’s uncompromising position.
• The Iranian regime is likely attempting to modify and legitimize its plan to exert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz by including Oman in a scheme to collect tolls on shipping through the Strait. This would enable Iran to present a “new proposal” to the United States without compromising on any Iranian red lines. Oman rejected Iran’s proposal, however.
• Iranian leaders are preparing for a variety of contingencies and risks that could result from a hardline negotiating position that fails to end the war, including an economic collapse that triggers economic unrest, a long-term blockade, or a resumption of the US-Israeli air campaign.
• Iran has responded to growing pressure on the economy caused by the war, sanctions, and the blockade by shoring up internal unity, presumably as an initial step in a more comprehensive internal security plan.
• Iran is reportedly exploring alternative methods to circumvent the US blockade of its ports, which is a suboptimal way to alleviate some of the economic pressure, including seizing US commercial vessels or Israeli-linked vessels, relying on trade with Russia and other countries bordering the Caspian Sea, or even the Houthis attacking vessels through the Bab el Mandeb Strait.
• Iran has almost certainly used the ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its missile and drone forces, which were badly degraded on the operational level prior to the ceasefire.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 28, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s latest proposal in negotiations offers no concessions and represents an Iranian effort to end the war on Tehran’s terms. The proposal illustrates that Iran’s current decisionmaker, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, believes Iran is winning despite the serious damage Iran has suffered. The United States remains opposed to the most recent April 26 proposal because it failed to address both Iran’s nuclear program and enabled Iran to assert “control” over the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iran’s growing challenges in storing and exporting its oil could be one mechanism by which Iranian calculations change in negotiations. Iran also faces significant pressure on other parts of its economy. It is unclear, however, whether this pressure on Iran’s economy will cause Vahidi and his inner circle to make concessions to the United States.
• Iran’s highest national security decision-making body is preparing for a potential protest wave as economic deterioration and social pressure intensify. Iran’s prolonged internet shutdown is also posing severe economic damage and accelerating unemployment, which likely increases pressure on regime stability.
• Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be trying to retain political support and remain a key actor in negotiations despite prior signs of opposition from Vahidi and his inner circle.
• Infighting among hardline factions has escalated into a public media confrontation amid intra-regime competition over negotiations. Intra-regime power struggle between pragmatic hardliners and ultrahardliners indicates the absence of a decisive central arbiter, which has allowed factional disputes to unfold publicly.
• Iran continues to cooperate with key US adversaries, such as Russia and China, as it prepares for a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran appears to be attempting to exploit its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz to end the war in a way that removes the US blockade of Iranian ports without Iran having to make nuclear concessions. Iran presented a new proposal to the United States in which it reportedly offered to “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, while postponing US-Iran nuclear negotiations to a later date. The Iranian proposal would not force Iran to make concessions regarding its highly enriched uranium or ability to enrich uranium up front but would rather grant Iran more time to engage in talks about these nuclear issues. It is unclear if Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle support this new proposal.
• Iran’s rapidly depleting oil storage capacity likely explains, at least in part, why Iran is pushing for a peace agreement that would lift the US naval blockade. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 27 that the US blockade on Iranian ports has forced Iran to store oil in “disused oil tanks in poor condition” and in “containers” in the cities of Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, according to unspecified current and former Iranian officials.
• An Iranian delegation led by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russo-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27. Russia has facilitated Iranian strikes in the Middle East throughout the war, such as by providing Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East.
• Hezbollah has increasingly used first-person view (FPV) drones to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon since the ceasefire came into effect on April 16. Hezbollah has claimed that it used FPV drones in 12 of its 18 claimed attacks on Israeli ground forces in Lebanon since April 16. Israeli media reported that Hezbollah has begun using fiber-optic FPV drones as its main strike platform for attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 26, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Prospects for meaningful US-Iran negotiations remain low due to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) domination of decision-making and opposition to compromise. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi travelled to Muscat, Oman, on April 26 to discuss security in the Strait of Hormuz with Omani Sultan Haitham al Tariq.
• Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) personnel to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which demonstrates the deepening of Israeli and Emirati security ties as a result of the war. Two Israeli officials and one US official told Western media on April 26 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to send an Iron Dome battery and “several dozen” IDF personnel to operate it after a phone call with Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 25, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Prospects for meaningful US-Iran negotiations remain low as Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle continue to dominate Iran’s decision-making and oppose compromise. CTP-ISW assessed that in recent days, the IRGC has sidelined civilian officials and that Iran’s negotiating team lacks the authority to make independent decisions, which helps explain continued inflexibility and the absence of tangible progress.
• US President Donald Trump canceled US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s planned trip to Islamabad, Pakistan, for talks with Iran, due to Iran’s unchanged negotiating positions.
• Hezbollah may be conducting smaller-scale attacks targeting uninhabited areas of northern Israel and Israeli forces in southern Lebanon to demonstrate that it has the ability to threaten Israeli security and will respond to Israeli operations in Lebanon. This strategy accepts the risk of a return to war, but is still attempting to keep the attacks below a threshold that would trigger major Israeli attacks.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 24, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle have repeatedly blocked attempts by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and other “pragmatist” officials to push the regime toward a more flexible negotiating position. Vahidi appears to have prevailed in this internal power struggle and will likely shape the regime’s approach toward negotiations and the war with a maximalist and uncompromising stance. Ghalibaf likely lacks the leverage to alter this trajectory in a meaningful way at this time.
• Recent reports that Ghalibaf may resign from being a member of the negotiating team are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Vahidi has emerged as the winner of the intra-regime rivalry. Sources told Western media that Ghalibaf has grown frustrated with internal divisions and has considered resigning from the negotiating delegation, while some outlets have claimed that Ghalibaf has already resigned from the negotiating team due to disagreements over nuclear concessions.
• “Pragmatist” officials may continue to advocate for a more flexible approach, but their efforts are unlikely to meaningfully shape regime decision-making in the near term.
• Vahidi’s apparent victory will likely have significant implications for potential future US-Iran negotiations. Vahidi has also shown greater willingness than "pragmatist” officials to accept the risk of renewed conflict with the United States.
• Iran and the United States are both sending delegations to meet with Pakistani mediators in Islamabad this weekend, but it remains unclear whether the delegations will engage in a second round of negotiations at the time of this writing. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Islamabad on April 24, and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will travel to Islamabad on April 25. Sources told Axios that a trilateral meeting between Araghchi, Witkoff, and Kushner could take place following separate bilateral discussions between Witkoff, Kushner, and Pakistani mediators.
• Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted two fiber-optic drone attacks on Kuwaiti border posts on April 24. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not claimed these attacks at the time of this writing. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have demonstrated their ability to use fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones during the war, however.
• The US naval blockade appears to be constraining Iran’s oil storage capacity. Tanker Trackers reported on April 23 that Iran has recommissioned the retired very large crude carrier (VLCC) Nasha into service, likely to expand Iran’s floating storage capacity near Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf as Iran’s onshore storage capacity decreases.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 23, 2026

Key Takeaways:

Toplines

• US President Donald Trump’s messages have appeared to elicit a choreographed response by the Iranian regime that is directed both to regime factions and to the United States. The heads of Iran’s three branches of government issued a series of statements likely aimed at defending themselves from accusations of “moderation” in the Islamic Revolutionary context. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei acknowledged Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Aragchi’s obeisance several hours later in a choreographed manner that likely seeks to demonstrate unity and signal an end to the internal competition between pragmatic and hardliner officials.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is likely unable to seriously impact Iranian decision-making due to injuries sustained during the war. The New York Times reported on April 23 that Mojtaba is under frequent medical attention and heavily reliant on the advice and guidance of senior IRGC commanders led by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, citing a number of former IRGC and current regime officials.
• Vahidi continues to support Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and efforts to retain the nuclear program, because he views negotiations with the United States as having no present value, according to IRGC sources and anti-Iranian regime media. Vahidi is part of the first generation of revolutionaries, and he prioritizes ideological purity and hard power over the economy and well-being of Iranian citizens.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 22, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked and likely redirected two vessels towards Iran on April 22, likely to enforce Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait in order to disrupt global shipping and extract US concessions. The IRGC also may have redirected the two vessels in response to the recent US Navy seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska in the Gulf of Oman.
• The IRGC’s attacks on shipping and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s apparent willingness to scrap US-Iran talks indicate that Vahidi is prepared to resume the war if needed. Vahidi appears willing to risk incurring a potential US military response in order to assert Iranian ”control” over the strait.
• Iranian decision-making remains fragmented and in disarray, which explains Iran’s inability to formulate and communicate a coherent negotiating position. Iranian officials have not reached a unified decision on whether to return to negotiations in recent days, and competing regime power centers appear to be blocking consensus on core issues. The regime’s formal decision-making and coordinating mechanisms are also not functioning effectively.
• US officials have recently leaked quantitative estimates of the number of different Iranian assets remaining after the ceasefire. It is extremely difficult to deduce the degree of degradation to Iranian forces based on these estimates because the number of remaining systems is only one of many data points required to form a complete evaluation of military strength.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 21, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.
• The US negotiating delegation demanded a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, and unfettered freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz during the negotiations in Pakistan. Iran countered the 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a “single-digit” number of years and offered to downblend its HEU instead of handing over its HEU stockpile. It is unclear whether the three US demands and Iranian counterproposal represent the full scope of each side’s demands.
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) is simultaneously imposing a blockade on Iranian ports and vessels while taking steps to open the official transit route through the Strait of Hormuz for vessels transiting to or from non-Iranian ports. CENTCOM implemented its blockade on Iranian ports and vessels at 10:00 AM ET on April 13.
• Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels continued to use the Iranian-approved transit route to cross the Strait of Hormuz before the blockade went into effect on April 13, but more vessels transited outside this route near the Omani coast than on April 12. At least two oil tankers destined for China via the Iranian-approved transit route turned around after CENTCOM began blockading Iranian and Iranian-approved shipping.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 20, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious intra-regime debate with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior regime officials opposed to negotiations with the United States.
• Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. Vahidi is reportedly the only Iranian official with direct access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, according to Israeli media on April 19.
• US and Iranian delegations will reportedly meet in Islamabad, Pakistan, for a second round of talks in the coming days. US and Iranian demands appear to have largely stayed the same, however.
• The US Navy continued to enforce its blockade of Iranian ports, directing 27 vessels to change course since the start of the blockade. US forces likely forced two Iranian-linked vessels attempting to violate the Navy’s blockade to turn around.
• The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters claimed that the April 19 seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska by the US Navy violated the US-Iran ceasefire. Unspecified security sources told Reuters that the Touska was likely transporting dual-use items from China to Iran.
• The Iranian Parliament is attempting to formalize Iranian “control” over the Strait of Hormuz by drafting a bill that would ban Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, require vessels from “hostile countries” to obtain approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to transit the strait, and bar states that “caused damage” to Iran from transiting the strait until they paid reparations to Iran.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 19, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
• Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait.  
• US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19.
• US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. CTP-ISW has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however.
• Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose.
• A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 18, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi's announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands.
• Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran’s negotiations after the Islamabad talks.
• The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated.
• The IRGC attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran’s negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver. The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran’s negotiations policy.
• The US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports remains in place as of April 18. US CENTCOM said that it forced two ships to turn around and return to Iran between April 17 and 18. The US Navy has forced 23 ships to turn back since the United States began the blockade. No Iranian vessels have attempted to approach or test the blockade line as of this writing.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 17, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is the Iranian entity that has disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the war, outlined specific conditions on April 17 for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait. These conditions include: 1) only commercial vessels not “related to belligerent countries” may transit the strait, 2) vessels must transit the strait via Iran’s approved transit route through Iranian territorial waters, and 3) vessels must coordinate their passage through the strait with Iranian forces. These conditions indicate that the IRGC seeks to retain operational control over transit through the strait, likely to continue to use the strait as a point of leverage to try to extract concessions from the United States.
• The IRGC harshly criticized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi after Araghchi announced on X that the Strait of Hormuz is “completely open.” The IRGC’s criticism of Araghchi is reflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW has consistently reported on in recent weeks.
• Commercially available maritime data shows that no Iranian-linked vessels approached the US blockade line on April 17, and US officials have stated that US forces will engage Iranian-linked vessels beyond this line. CENTCOM announced on April 17 that 19 vessels have complied with US direction to turn around and that zero vessels have successfully breached the blockade. Commercially available maritime data shows that some non-Iranian-linked vessels have approached the US blockade line to exit the strait. These ships do not fall under the US blockade and are able to freely transit in and out of the strait.
• There continue to be significant gaps between the US and Iranian negotiating positions, and the status of the negotiations remains unclear. The two sides disagree on several core issues, according to US, Iranian, and other officials and sources on April 16 and 17.
• Some Iranian regime officials seek a preliminary agreement to extend the ceasefire to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement. CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile force, and Iran would almost certainly continue to do so if the United States and Iran agreed to a preliminary agreement and extended the ceasefire.

Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 16, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• The main sticking point in current US-Iran negotiations is reportedly Iran's enrichment of uranium and its highly enriched uranium stockpile. The IRGC appears to be playing an outsized role in Iranian decision-making in these negotiations, traditionally meant for civilian leadership.
• Iran appears to have not compromised on its stance over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, despite Iranian sources attempting to illustrate that Iran has compromised and the two sides have made progress in negotiations, however. Iran is leveraging its position over the Strait of Hormuz to extract concessions while maintaining its claim to control access to the waterway.
• US President Donald Trump stated on April 16 that the United States is “very close” to reaching a deal with Iran. Trump stated that Iran “has agreed to almost everything” and added that Iran has agreed to hand over its enriched uranium stockpile. Iran has not publicly confirmed Trump’s remarks at the time of this writing.
• The United States is targeting materiel support to Iran’s armed forces and military capabilities through the blockade. The blockade also continues to impose economic costs on Iran.
• The Iranian missile force is exploiting the current ceasefire to reconstitute its tactical and operational-level units, but rebuilding the industrial facilities and other components that sustain the missile force at the strategic level will be extremely challenging.
• US President Donald Trump announced that Lebanon and Israel have agreed to a 10-day ceasefire beginning at 5:00 PM ET on April 16. Netanyahu stated that Lebanon must disarm Hezbollah and establish a ”lasting peace agreement” with Israel.

Iran Update Evening Special Report: April 13, 2026

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.
• The US negotiating delegation demanded a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, and unfettered freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz during the negotiations in Pakistan. Iran countered the 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a “single-digit” number of years and offered to downblend its HEU instead of handing over its HEU stockpile. It is unclear whether the three US demands and Iranian counterproposal represent the full scope of each side’s demands.
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) is simultaneously imposing a blockade on Iranian ports and vessels while taking steps to open the official transit route through the Strait of Hormuz for vessels transiting to or from non-Iranian ports. CENTCOM implemented its blockade on Iranian ports and vessels at 10:00 AM ET on April 13.
• Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels continued to use the Iranian-approved transit route to cross the Strait of Hormuz before the blockade went into effect on April 13, but more vessels transited outside this route near the Omani coast than on April 12. At least two oil tankers destined for China via the Iranian-approved transit route turned around after CENTCOM began blockading Iranian and Iranian-approved shipping.