Iran Updates

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.

    

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, December 19, 2025

The United States struck dozens of ISIS-affiliated targets in Syria on December 19 in direct response to the ISIS-affiliated killing of two US soldiers and a civilian interpreter in Palmyra on December 13.[i] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the US operation aims to eliminate ISIS fighters, infrastructure, and weapons sites.[ii] Unspecified US officials told Western media that US fighter jets, attack helicopters, and rocket artillery struck dozens of suspected ISIS sites across central Syria.[iii] Syrian media reported airstrikes and explosions in desert regions in Homs, eastern Raqqa, and western Deir ez Zor provinces.[iv] CTP-ISW will publish a complete analysis on US strikes in Syria in the December 22, 2025, Iran Update.

The Islamic State’s (IS) recognition of the December 13 attack on US forces in Palmyra may encourage Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated or -inspired fighters to attempt to conduct similar insider attacks on US or Syrian forces. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13.[v] IS did not explicitly claim involvement in the attack but praised the attack for targeting the “joint forces” of the United States and Syrian government.[vi] IS’s acknowledgement and praise of the Palmyra attack in a December 18 editorial suggests that IS encouraged and inspired the attack but probably did not have foreknowledge of the operative’s plans.[vii] The attack‘s perpetrator was a recent Syrian internal security forces recruit whom Syrian authorities had flagged before the attack for imminent dismissal over his “extremist” beliefs.[viii]  CTP-ISW assessed on December 15 that recent ISIS calls to monitor US forces and attack Syrian government forces “whenever and wherever possible” may have motivated the perpetrator.[ix]

IS supporters and followers will likely interpret IS’s praise of the Palmyra attack as encouragement to conduct similar “green-on-blue" or insider attacks targeting US or Syrian forces. Many IS supporters online have interpreted IS’s acknowledgement of the Palmyra attack as a claim of responsibility for the attack, according to a BBC Salafi-jihadi expert on December 19.[x] The interpretation that IS claimed the attack may encourage other attacks against US or Syrian forces, regardless of whether IS actually intended its acknowledgement as a claim. IS publishes weekly editorials in its publication, al Naba, to disseminate its ideology and propaganda to IS followers across the world. IS supporters often use these editorials to guide and shape their militant activities, including determining permissible targets and acceptable courses of action. A western Syria-based ISIS-aligned group, Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, interpreted IS’s praise for Palmyra attack as encouragement for individual fighters to conduct further attacks without deference to a “chain of command” as long as the fighters “follow [ISIS’s] methodology.”[xi]

IS’s veneration of the Palmyra attack may signal to IS followers that the organization has adapted its understanding of the permissibility of joining Syrian government forces with the intent to conduct insider attacks. The BBC expert noted that IS supporters have recently debated online if infiltrating Syrian government forces to carry out insider attacks is permissible, particularly given that IS has repeatedly called upon supporters to defect from the “apostate” Syrian government since the fall of the regime.[xii] IS’s approval of the recent insider attack may, however, encourage previously hesitant fighters or supporters to attempt to infiltrate Syrian security or military forces to conduct similar attacks.

Decentralized and isolated ISIS-inspired cells or individuals continue to present a serious threat to US and Syrian forces operating in Syria. That IS acknowledged but did not claim the Palmyra attack suggests that IS was not aware of the attack before it was conducted and that the group has not infiltrated Syrian government forces in any extensive way at this time. The editorial referred to the attackers as those “who have made up their minds,” which suggests that while ISIS believes that the attackers were committed supporters, it also knows that the attackers decided to attack US and Syrian forces independent of formal direction and were not formal members of ISIS.[xiii]  Individuals who are inspired by ISIS can still fulfill ISIS’s goals of driving a wedge between the Global Coalition and Syria by posing a major threat to US and Syrian forces operating in Syria. ISIS-inspired individuals operating individually or within decentralized, disconnected two to three-person cells are much more difficult for friendly forces to detect and dismantle because they are less likely to be connected to or in communication with other ISIS networks. US and Syrian forces have collaborated in recent months to dismantle ISIS cells and detain or kill ISIS leaders across Syria.[xiv]

Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam Ali leader Shibl al Zaidi called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and integrate into the Iraqi state in a statement published on X on December 18, which would constitute an initial step towards satisfying the first condition in the 2026 Nation Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).[xv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would need to demobilize their extralegal militias and reintegrate them into society, not merely place them under the PMF, to satisfy the first condition of the NDAA’s Iraq section. The NDAA lays out three conditions that the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) must meet for Iraq to receive 75% of funds under the Coalition Train and Equip Fund (CTEF): first, extralegal militias operating outside of the control of the Iraqi state must disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate; second, they must answer to the Iraqi prime minister; third, the Iraqi government must hold the militias accountable if the militias break the law. The PMF contains a number of Iranian-backed militias, but other militias operate outside even nominal government control, separate from the PMF.[xvi] Zaidi’s statement is also consistent with an earlier, reported Shia Coordination Framework plan to comply with the reported US demand that the Iraqi federal government disarm six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Imam Ali and Kataib Hezbollah. The framework is considering a plan to publicly disarm the six militias and integrate them into the PMF.[xvii]  All of the militias except Kataib Hezbollah reportedly agreed to the SCF’s plan, which suggests that Kataib Hezbollah is more ideological than the other militias.[xviii] The reported framework plan and Zaidi’s proposal for disarmament and integration integrates extralegal militias into the PMF but does not satisfy the first condition because it does not demobilize or reintegrate these militias into society.

Key Takeaways

• US Airstrikes in Syria: The United States struck dozens of ISIS-affiliated targets in Syria on December 19 in direct response to the ISIS-affiliated killing of two US soldiers and a civilian interpreter in Palmyra on December 13. CTP-ISW will publish a complete analysis on US strikes in Syria in the December 22, 2025, Iran Update.
• ISIS-aligned Attack in Syria: The Islamic State’s recognition of the December 13 attack on US forces in Palmyra may encourage Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated or -inspired fighters to attempt to conduct similar insider attacks on US or Syrian forces.
• Integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam Ali leader Shibl al Zaidi called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and integrate into the Popular Mobilization Forces in a statement published on X on December 18, which would constitute an initial step towards satisfying the first condition in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act’s Iraq funding. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would need to demobilize their extralegal militias and reintegrate them into society, not merely place them under the PMF, to satisfy the first condition of the NDAA’s Iraq section.

Iran Update, December 18, 2025

Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources speaking to Reuters expressed relative optimism about the progress on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government. A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent. One SDF source characterized the most recent proposal from the government to the SDF as “the closest” the two sides have been to a deal.[i] The Syrian transitional government reportedly recently sent a new integration proposal to the SDF ahead of the December 31 deadline for SDF integration.[ii] Unspecified Western, Syrian, and Kurdish officials told Reuters on November 18 that the proposal “expressed openness” to integrating the SDF as three main divisions, along with some smaller brigades, under the condition that the SDF ”cedes" some of its command structure and opens its territory to other Syrian army units.[iii] The Reuters report was unclear on what ”cedes” means in the context of a command structure, but it appears to imply some degree of subordination. The transitional government’s recent proposal resembles an October 2025 verbal, US-brokered agreement on SDF integration that included a stipulation for three divisions and other independent brigades.[iv]

Several sources said that the proposal is unlikely to produce a comprehensive breakthrough and that any agreement reached before the end of the year will fall short of fully integrating the SDF into the Ministry of Defense (MoD), however.[v] The reported contents of the transitional government’s recent proposal to the SDF still do not address core political disagreements between the transitional government and SDF, such as decentralization, Kurdish constitutional rights, and control of oil fields in northeast Syria, which have stalled integration talks since March 2025.[vi] Neither the Syrian transitional government nor the SDF has officially commented on the status of negotiations at the time of this writing. A separate Western source told Reuters that negotiators will extend the March 10 agreement’s year-end deadline to “save face.”[vii] A Kurdish official involved in the March 10 integration negotiations similarly indicated on December 15 that negotiators would extend the agreement’s deadline.[viii]

Turkish and Saudi media have corroborated and expanded on details discussed in the Reuters report. A Turkish analyst reported on December 17 that the Syrian government submitted a “final” 13-point proposal to integrate the SDF.[ix] The journalist stated that the proposal would reorganize the SDF into three Syrian army divisions, deploy additional government forces to northeastern Syria, and place the SDF under MoD authority.[x] SDF sources separately told Saudi media on December 18 that they received a Syrian government proposal calling for the integration of three SDF divisions into the MoD.[xi] Placing the three SDF divisions under the MoD would be consistent with the Reuters reporting that the latest government proposal required that the SDF "cedes“ some of its command structure to the MoD, assuming cedes implies subordination.  The SDF sources added that an SDF delegation will travel to Damascus “soon” to discuss several outstanding military integration items, including the future of female SDF units, specific SDF commanders in the MoD, and the SDF’s internal security forces.[xii] Saudi media also reported that the Syrian government and SDF agreed to complete negotiations on the military and security aspects of the March 10 agreement this year, but will postpone negotiations on unaddressed political questions, such as decentralization and the constitution, until next year.[xiii] A pro-government Syrian source suggested that these political questions were impeding ongoing negotiations, however.[xiv]   Reuters, Saudi, and Turkish media’s reports on the details of the Syrian government’s proposal to the SDF, however, contradict a December 17 claim by Syria in Transition (SIT) that the government’s proposal closely resembled the SDF’s ideal outcome for integration negotiations and would preserve SDF autonomy. [xv]  SIT’s reported terms of the Syrian government proposal violate several redlines articulated by the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the most recent proposal in recent days after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkey’s Syria policy. CTP-ISW has therefore adjusted its December 17 assessment that the Turkish government is the “main impediment” to an agreement at this time.[xvi] The Turkish government has repeatedly threatened military action against the SDF, and Fidan—as recently as December 6—demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian army as individuals, not as divisions.[xvii] Fidan’s rejection of the three-division integration, which had been originally suggested in October 2025, indicated that Turkey—not the SDF—was the main impediment to negotiations. Fidan met with Barrack on December 16 to discuss the SDF integration into the Syrian army, after which Fidan immediately changed his position.[xviii] Fidan said on December 17 that Turkey would not resort to military action against the SDF and that he is ”optimistic” about the integration negotiations.[xix] This change in official Syrian government position, combined with increased optimism from Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources about the negotiations, suggests that Turkey has dropped its opposition to the most recent proposal after the Barrack visit.

Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah military sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, which marks its most extensive wave of airstrikes in recent months.[xx] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on December 18 that it struck Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon that the group used to train its fighters, store weapons, and conduct military operations.[xxi] Israel reportedly struck the Qaalat Jabbour training complex near Medioun, Western Bekaa District, which is one of Hezbollah’s main training complexes that houses barracks, warfare simulation complexes, and shooting ranges.[xxii] Israel previously struck the complex in January 2024.[xxiii] The IDF also announced that it killed a Hezbollah fighter in Taybeh, southern Lebanon, on December 18.[xxiv]

These Israeli strikes focused on targets that the IDF has regularly struck and do not represent an inflection in target selection change at this time, despite the larger wave of strikes. The IDF has regularly conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters, weapons, and infrastructure since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in order to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution and remove any threat to northern Israeli towns.[xxv] Israel previously expanded its targets to include Hezbollah‘s communications network and senior leadership before it launched its large-scale ground and air operation in October 2024.[xxvi] An informed source told Saudi media on December 18 that Israel informed the United States that it does not have a deadline for launching an operation against Hezbollah and that the option of an expanded operation is ”on the table.”[xxvii] The United States is reportedly under the impression that Israel has removed the deadline to give Lebanese authorities ”room to maneuver” while keeping the ”threat of using military force in place,” according to a Saudi media report on December 18.[xxviii] The Saudi media report also stated that the Israeli government is urging northern Israeli citizens to return to their towns despite military activity in the region.[xxix] Israel previously evacuated northern Israeli communities along the Israel-Lebanon border in October 2023 as the likelihood of escalation and its cross-border engagements with Hezbollah intensified.[xxx] There has been no Israeli reservist call-up since early November 2025.[xxxi] The December 18 Israeli strikes occurred on the eve of the ceasefire monitoring committee meeting, during which Israeli and Lebanese officials will hold their second round of direct talks.[xxxii]

Iranian media have described the merger of Baluch militant groups in southeastern Iran under the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) as a “symbolic” rebranding of Jaish al Adl aimed at broadening their support base.[xxxiii] Four Baloch organizations in Sistan and Baluchistan in southeastern Iran announced on December 10 that they have unified under one coalition: the MPF.[xxxiv]  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media and hardliner outlets stated that the formation of this group is an attempt by Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, to “hide [its] record full of terror" and survive after incurring "heavy losses" in recent IRGC counterterrorism operations.[xxxv] IRGC-media stated that the new group was "a combination of the same old elements.” Jaish al Adl is almost certainly the most active group in MPF and appears to be the strongest member of the coalition.  

 

The following groups merged to form the MPF:   

 

• Jaish al Adl – The successor to former Sistan and Baluchistan-based Salafi Jihadi Sunni Baloch militant organization Jundallah, which disintegrated in 2012 after the Iranian regime executed its former leader Abdul Malik Rigi in 2010.[xxxvi] Jaish al Adl has historically stated that its objectives are to protect the rights of Sunni Muslims in Iran and establish an independent Baloch state.[xxxvii] Salahoddin Farooghi has commanded Jaish al Adl since its establishment in 2012.[xxxviii] Jaish al Adl operates in three districts across Sistan and Baluchistan Province. IRGC-affiliated media reported that Jaish al Adl has an intelligence branch focused on assassinating Sunni leaders within the Iranian regime.[xxxix] Jaish al Adl reportedly uses guerrilla tactics, ambush methods, and remotely controlled IEDs and land mines in their attacks.[xl] One UN member state told the United Nations that Jaish al Adl has tactical ties to Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP). The member state alleged that ISIS-KP previously provided suicide bombers to Jaish al Adl for its April 2024 attack on Iranian military sites in Rask and Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xli]
• Jaish al Nasr – A militant organization that splintered from Jundallah in 2010 after Abdul Malik Rigi’s execution following a dispute.[xlii] Jaish al Nasr reintegrated with Jaish al Adl in 2016 after the Iranian regime assassinated former Jaish al Nasr leader Abdul Rauf Rigi in Dalbandin, Pakistan, in 2014, according to Iranian and regional media.[xliii]
• Pada Baloch Movement – An anti-Iranian regime Baloch group established in 2017. CTP-ISW has not observed any recent recorded militant activity by this group.[xliv]
• Mohammad Rasul Allah Group – An anti-Iranian regime Baloch group established in the mid-70s.[xlv] CTP-ISW has not observed any recent recorded militant activity by this group.

 

Iranian media is likely framing the MPF as a “rebranding” of Jaish al Adl, at least partly in an effort to discourage Iranian Baloch public support for the group. Several Iranian media outlets have accused Jaish al Adl of killing Baloch and other Iranian civilians in its previous attacks.[xlvi] The MPF stated on December 10 in its new charter that it seeks “deep political change” in Iran. The MPF called on Baloch Muslims and all “freedom-seeking” Iranians to conduct “civil actions,” such as displaying MPF flags, sharing the MPF’s charter, and writing anti-regime slogans in public areas, to demonstrate their solidarity with the organization.[xlvii] The MPF has published footage of its new coalition flag in various locations across Sistan and Baluchistan and Shiraz provinces.

Key Takeaways

• Syrian Transitional Government Negotiations with the SDF: Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources speaking to Reuters expressed relative optimism about the progress on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government. A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent.
• Turkey’s Position on SDF Integration: Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the most recent proposal to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense in recent days after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkish Syria policy. CTP-ISW has therefore adjusted its December 17 assessment that the Turkish government is the “main impediment” to an agreement at this time.
• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah military sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, which marks its most extensive wave of airstrikes in recent months. These Israeli strikes focused on targets that the IDF has regularly struck and do not represent an inflection in target selection change at this time, despite the larger wave of strikes.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media has described the merger of Baluch militant groups in southeastern Iran under the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) as a “symbolic” rebranding of Jaish al Adl aimed at broadening their support base, likely at least partly in an effort to discourage Iranian Baloch public support for the group.

Iran Update, December 17, 2025

The Iranian regime announced new Artesh appointments on December 17 as part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leadership following the Israel-Iran War.[i] Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami appointed Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as his assistant for air defense affairs.[ii] Alireza Sabahi Fard most recently served as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander.[iii] Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[iv] Sabahi Fard’s new appointment may reflect Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of Iranian air defenses under Sabahi Fard’s command during the Israel-Iran War. Israel established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems during the first 24 hours of the conflict.[v]

Khamenei separately appointed Brigadier General Bahman Behmard as the new Artesh Air Force commander based on Hatami’s recommendation.[vi] Behmard replaced Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, who became Hatami‘s adviser for aviation affairs.[vii] Behmard previously served as the commander of the Artesh Air Force 1st Tactical Air Base in Tehran and 4th Tactical Air Base in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, and most recently served as the Deputy Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Operations Deputy.[viii]

These appointments are part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leaders after the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian regime has signaled that it urgently seeks to improve its air defense capabilities to better defend against potential future attacks on Iranian territory. Iran has expressed interest in acquiring advanced air defense systems and aircraft from Russia, such as the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jet, given that it currently lacks advanced air defense systems and fighter aircraft.[ix]

All sources for the above graphic are included in the endnote section at the end of this update.[x]

Ansar al Furqan recently conducted a tactically sophisticated attack targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. This attack is demonstrative of the growing threat that anti-regime Baloch groups in southeastern Iran have posed to the Iranian regime since late 2022. Ansar al Furqan, which is a Salafi-jihadi group, claimed that it killed at least 16 Iranian intelligence and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) personnel at a checkpoint in Fahraj, Kerman Province, on December 16.[xi] Iranian media reported that the group only killed three LEC personnel and one civilian at the checkpoint, however.[xii] Ansar al Furqan claimed that its fighters launched the attack on the checkpoint from three axes and initially killed the security forces at the checkpoint before ambushing reinforcements that arrived at the checkpoint following the initial attack.[xiii] Ansar al Furqan claimed that 43 of its fighters participated in the attack. The group also said that the attack marked the second phase of “Operation Sayf al Furqan.”[xiv] Ansar al Furqan stated that the first phase of “Operation Sayf al Furqan” took place in August 2025 when the group allegedly killed over 50 Iranian security personnel in Golkhani, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xv] Iranian media did not report any casualties among Iranian forces in the August 2025 attack. Ansar al Furqan did not specify a motive for the August 2025 attack, but the group’s spokesperson stated on December 16 that the recent attack on the Fahraj checkpoint was in response to Iranian officials insulting a companion of Prophet Mohammad.[xvi] Ansar al Furqan has reportedly not merged with the newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is notable given that Ansar al Furqan operates in southeastern Iran like the MPF.[xvii] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi organization, and several other Baloch groups established the MPF on December 10.[xviii] MPF fighters killed four Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base personnel from the Imam Hossein Battalions near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 10.[xix]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is reportedly “ready” to begin disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers as part of the second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan. This effort would mark an unprecedented step by the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River.[xx] Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said on December 17 that the LAF is “ready” to move to the second phase of its disarmament plan, which covers the area between the Litani and Awali rivers and does not have a specified timeline, according to Lebanese media.[xxi] The Awali River is located roughly 18 miles north of the Litani River.[xxii] Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said on December 11 that the LAF had completed 90 percent of its disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon, in reference to the LAF’s disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River under the first phase of its plan.[xxiii] Berri is Hezbollah’s highest-ranking ally within the Lebanese state and was heavily involved in negotiating the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah.[xxiv] The ceasefire agreement only mandated that the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River, but the Lebanese cabinet agreed in August 2025 to pursue Hezbollah’s complete disarmament.[xxv] LAF disarmament efforts north of the Litani River would be an unprecedented step toward disarming Hezbollah throughout Lebanon beyond what is mandated in the ceasefire. Mitri’s statement comes amid the LAF’s recent searches of Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon following Israeli pressure on the LAF to search private property and rural areas.[xxvi] The LAF searched a Hezbollah tunnel near Touline, southern Lebanon, on December 17 in response to an Israeli request through the ceasefire monitoring committee, according to videos published by Lebanese media.[xxvii] The LAF has previously reported searching Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon without sharing video or photo evidence.[xxviii] The LAF also searched a reported Hezbollah building for weapons in Yanouh, southern Lebanon, on December 13 after Israel threatened to strike the building.[xxix] The LAF reportedly found no Hezbollah weapons or ammunition at either location, however.[xxx] Israeli officials have repeatedly warned in recent weeks that Hezbollah is reconstituting faster than the LAF is disarming the group.[xxxi] Senior Israeli officials noted in late October 2025 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon.[xxxii] Syrian authorities have also interdicted multiple weapons shipments likely bound for Hezbollah in recent weeks.[xxxiii] Syrian authorities seized around 100 rocket-propelled grenades near Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on December 17, for example.[xxxiv]

Hezbollah will likely resist the LAF’s efforts to disarm it north of the Litani River more strongly than it has done in southern Lebanon. A Lebanese official and two unspecified security sources told Reuters in October 2025 that the LAF seeks to avoid inflaming tensions in Lebanon and buy time for Lebanese politicians to reach a consensus on what should happen to Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani River.[xxxv] The Lebanese government has historically approached the issue of Hezbollah weapons located north of the Litani River differently because Hezbollah is deeply entrenched in some northern Lebanese communities, such as the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs, where disarmament is a sensitive political issue that is widely opposed by Hezbollah’s Shia support base.[xxxvi] Hezbollah and its supporters largely view disarmament in southern Lebanon as part of implementing the 2006 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701, which designates areas south of the Litani River as a demilitarized zone.[xxxvii] Hezbollah and its supporters view disarmament north of the Litani River as an attempt to strip the organization of its right to “resistance” and an attack on Lebanese Shia communities, however.[xxxviii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has consistently noted that Hezbollah will retain its weapons north of the Litani River, insisting that agreements, such as UNSC 1701 and the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, only limit Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon.[xxxix] Qassem‘s statements indicate that Hezbollah will not be as willing to cooperate or hand over its weapons in areas north of the Litani as the group reportedly did in southern Lebanon.[xl] CTP-ISW has not observed Hezbollah cooperate with the LAF’s disarmament process thus far, but Hezbollah has claimed that it is cooperating with the Lebanese government to disarm in the south.[xli] Hezbollah is also reportedly concentrating most of its rearmament activity in areas north of the Litani River.[xlii] Hezbollah’s continued rejection of its complete disarmament and recent activity in northern Lebanon could complicate the LAF’s ability to implement the next phase of its disarmament plan.

Several Syrian and Kurdish sources have indicated that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government may imminently implement the March 10 agreement or extend the deadline for the implementation of the agreement. An unspecified Syrian government source told Syrian media on December 16 that the SDF and Syrian government have reached an agreement on the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which is the basis for the March 10 agreement.[xliii] The source added that the mechanism for integrating the SDF into the MoD “will be announced in the coming days.”[xliv] Hassan Mohammad Ali, who is a senior member of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), separately said in a December 15 interview with Emirati media that the March 10 agreement only stipulated that the SDF and Syrian government “would strive to implement” the agreement by the end of the year.[xlv] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing.[xlvi] The March 10 agreement stipulates that both sides “shall work toward implementing the agreement no later than the end of the current year,” but does not set a hard deadline.[xlvii] Ali added that the March 10 agreement will succeed, but that its implementation could face delays and would require “patience and political will from both sides.”[xlviii] Ali stated that the Syrian government submitted a military integration proposal and reached an initial agreement with the SDF to form three SDF divisions in northeastern Syria, but that the technical details of the SDF’s future relationship with the MoD are still under discussion.[xlix]

[l]These reports come as US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on December 16. Unspecified Turkish government sources told UK-based Saudi media that the meeting focused primarily on the implementation of the March 10 agreement.[li] Fidan is the main Turkish official in charge of Turkey’s Syria policy. Senior Kurdish officials directly involved in the integration negotiations with the Syrian government said on December 13 that they perceived a less hostile Turkish approach toward the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[lii]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely prefers to implement or extend the deadline of the March 10 agreement over conducting a joint Syrian-Turkish offensive against the SDF that would further destabilize Syria. The Syrian transitional government has reportedly asked Turkey to delay any military action against the SDF twice in 2025, first in January and again in September.[liii] Shara likely remains committed to negotiations with the SDF despite the lack of progress in implementing the March 10 agreement, as any offensive against the SDF would further destabilize Syria.[liv] Shara told Syrian state media in September 2025 that he had done “everything” to prevent a “battle or war” with the SDF, which was likely in reference to his efforts to prevent a Turkish offensive.[lv]

The Turkish government appears to be the main impediment to the implementation of the March 10 agreement and is the main party pushing for the end-of-year deadline. Fidan recently rejected the SDF’s proposal to integrate three SDF divisions into the MoD and suggested on December 6 that Turkey seeks to bar senior SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the MoD.[lvi] Turkey likely pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from US- and French-brokered integration negotiations with the SDF in Paris in August 2025.[lvii] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a December 12 speech that Turkey has called for “the implementation of the March 10 agreement, which risks escalating into a crisis if resisted.”[lviii] A pro-Erdogan newspaper interpreted Erdogan’s speech as Turkey’s “final warning” to the SDF on December 17.[lix] The same pro-Erdogan newspaper also said on December 17 that the SDF has until December 31 to integrate into the Syrian MoD.[lx]

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly appointed three Syrian National Liberation Front (NLF)-affiliated commanders to oversee military affairs in central, western, and southern Syria as “assistant defense ministers.”[lxi] The MoD probably appointed these commanders to improve the MoD’s capacity to supervise armed groups operating under the MoD across Syria. The NLF is a Turkish-backed coalition of civil war opposition factions that formed in 2018.[lxii] The Syrian MoD likely appointed these three NLF-affiliated commanders due to their loyalty to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and experience within the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Fateh al Mubin operations room that helped topple the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxiii]  HTS has supported and coordinated with the NLF since 2022 to weaken the NLF and draw it into HTS’s sphere of influence.[lxiv] The Syrian MoD, now led by former HTS commanders, has appointed numerous other NLF commanders to prominent positions within the MoD.[lxv]

The positions of these three new appointees will presumably mirror the role of Brigadier General Fahim Issa, who oversees the MoD’s affairs in northern Syria.[lxvi] Issa is a Turkish ethno-nationalist who formerly commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is a European Union-sanctioned civil war faction that fought within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.[lxvii] Issa has likely used his personal ties and experiences with Turkish-backed groups in northern Syria to facilitate their integration into the Syrian army, as seen through his meetings with militia leaders in Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, in May 2025.[lxviii] Issa also presumably supervises the Defense Ministry’s affairs in the northern region, given that he accompanied an MoD delegation to meet with Russian military officials in Moscow in October 2025.[lxix] Russia currently maintains forces in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[lxx] The three new commanders who will oversee MoD affairs in western, southern, and central Syria may increase the MoD’s institutional capacity and build the ministry's influence among local factions in these regions, which is an essential step in the professionalization process for the Syrian army.[lxxi] The new appointments are as follows:

• Assistant Defense Minister for the Central Region: Brigadier General Fadlallah al Hajji (Abu Yamen).[lxxii] Abu Yamen is a prominent pro-Turkish Syrian opposition figure who formerly led Faylaq al Sham. The Turkey-based Syrian Interim Government appointed Abu Yamen as Chief of Staff of its Defense Ministry, which oversaw the SNA, in 2017.[lxxiii] Abu Yamen assumed command over the NLF after its formation in 2018 and reportedly participated in the offensive that toppled the Assad regime alongside NLF forces in 2024.[lxxiv] He has served as the director of the MoD’s Higher Military Academy since February 2025.[lxxv] The “central region” presumably refers to parts of the Syrian central desert as well as Aleppo, Raqqa, and Rif Dimashq provinces.
• Assistant Defense Minister for the Southern Region: Brigadier General Ahmed Issa al Sheikh (also known as Abu Issa).[lxxvi] Abu Issa led the Suqour al Sham Brigades in the Idlib countryside during the early years of the Syrian Civil War before joining the Islamic Front and the NLF.[lxxvii] He maintained a close relationship with HTS and fought within the Fateh al Mubin operations room.[lxxviii] The “southern region” almost certainly refers to Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda provinces in addition to Damascus and parts of Rif Dimashq Province.
• Assistant Defense Minister for the Western Region: Brigadier General Mohammad Diaa Saleh Tahan (also known as Abu Saleh Tahan).[lxxix] Abu Saleh Tahan was a founding member of hardline Islamist group Ahrar al Sham and oversaw its military wing from 2014 to 2016.[lxxx] He defected from Ahrar al Sham in 2016 to join Jaysh al Ahrar, which briefly joined HTS when it formed in 2017 before splitting from the group.[lxxxi] Jaysh al Ahrar, under Abu Saleh Tahan’s leadership, joined the NLF and fought in the offensive that collapsed the Assad regime.[lxxxii] The “western region” presumably refers to coastal Syria, the Lebanese border areas, and parts of Homs and Hama provinces.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Military Appointments: The Iranian regime announced new Artesh appointments as part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leadership following the Israel-Iran War. Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami appointed Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as his assistant for air defense affairs. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei separately appointed Brigadier General Bahman Behmard as the new Artesh Air Force commander based on Hatami’s recommendation.
• Anti-Iranian Regime Baloch Groups: Ansar al Furqan recently conducted a tactically sophisticated attack targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. This attack is demonstrative of the growing threat that anti-regime Baloch groups in southeastern Iran have posed to the Iranian regime since late 2022.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is reportedly “ready” to begin disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers as part of the second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan. Hezbollah will likely resist the LAF’s efforts to disarm it north of the Litani River more strongly than it has done in southern Lebanon.
• Syrian March 10 Agreement: Several Syrian and Kurdish sources have indicated that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government may imminently implement the March 10 agreement or extend the deadline for the implementation of the agreement. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely prefers to implement or extend the deadline of the March 10 agreement over conducting a joint Syrian-Turkish offensive against the SDF that would further destabilize Syria.
• Syrian Ministry of Defense Appointments: The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly appointed three Syrian National Liberation Front-affiliated commanders to oversee military affairs in central, western, and southern Syria as “assistant defense ministers.” The MoD probably appointed these commanders to improve the MoD’s capacity to supervise armed groups operating under the MoD across Syria.

Iran Update, December 16, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Threat of Baloch Militant Groups to Iranian Regime Security: The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, released a video on December 11 in which it called on Iranians to engage in protest activities against the Iranian regime.
• ISIS Activity in Syria: Syrian security forces detained a cell of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighters in northern Idlib Province that has conducted at least three attacks targeting Syrian government forces along the M5 highway since November 28. This cell may have been operating in the southern Aleppo-northern Idlib countryside for some time, but its three most recent attacks are part of an increase in ISIS attacks targeting Syrian government forces since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assessed that Hezbollah has likely not reconstituted its military capabilities and weapons stockpiles to the point that the group could conduct a large-scale attack on Israel at this time. The IDF did not specify whether its assessment only evaluated Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a large-scale attack against Israel from southern Lebanon or from any part of Lebanon.

Iran Update, December 15, 2025

The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) likely seeks to conduct insider or “green-on-blue" attacks targeting US forces in Syria as part of an effort to reduce US forces’ trust in Syrian partner forces and disrupt the United States’ ability to effectively work with Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13.[i] Three US servicemembers and two Syrian fighters were also injured in the attack.[ii] Syrian forces killed the attacker at the scene.[iii] Palmyra is located in Syria’s central desert (also known as the Badia), which is a sparsely populated region that ISIS has used as a sanctuary to rest, refit, and train new fighters, particularly since its territorial defeat in 2019.[iv] The December 13 attack marked the first ISIS-affiliated attack on US forces in Syria since 2019.[v] Insider or “green-on-blue" attacks risk significantly reducing trust between the force that is attacked and its partner force, which can adversely impact the two forces’ ability to achieve joint tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Insider attacks cause the force that is attacked to take additional security precautions when operating alongside or meeting with the partner force, for example.

Recent Islamic State (IS) calls to monitor US forces and attack Syrian government forces may have motivated the recent attack. A BBC Salafi-jihadi expert noted on December 13 that high-profile IS supporters have encouraged ISIS sympathizers to conduct attacks against the Syrian transitional government “whenever and wherever possible” in the weeks since Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on November 10.[vi] The expert also stated that IS has encouraged its Syrian supporters to conduct what resembles pattern of life analysis on the movements of US forces and coalition partners in Syria.[vii] The expert added that prominent ISIS supporters launched a coordinated online campaign that urged sympathizers to kill foreigners, including US citizens.[viii] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated on December 13 that it had warned US officials about possible ISIS attacks on US forces.[ix]

The attacker and any accomplices were able to conduct this attack because the Syrian government has needed to rapidly expand local security forces to meet the state’s security needs after the fall of the Assad regime. Institutions like the MOI’s security forces have evolved from small organizations that operated in Hayat Tahrir al Sham-controlled Idlib Province into large organizations that oversee security in most of Syrian territory. This transformation has required local Syrian authorities to rapidly recruit personnel in order to address the sudden and significant increase in security tasks assigned to local forces. This approach appears to have enabled some individuals affiliated with ISIS or who hold ISIS-aligned views, such as the Palmyra attacker, to join units in the Syrian army or Syrian MoI. The Palmyra attacker joined the MoI’s Badia Security Directorate about two months ago as a base guard and was one of 5,000 recruits.[x] The MoI spokesperson explained in a December 13 statement that internal evaluations had flagged the attacker for “extremist” beliefs on December 10 and that the MoI planned to dismiss him on December 14.[xi] The perpetrator carried out the attack on December 13 while off duty.[xii] It remains unclear whether the attacker was an active member of ISIS or just held ISIS-aligned beliefs. Syrian security forces, in collaboration with US forces, arrested five suspects in Palmyra on December 13 and 14 in connection with the attack, which suggests that the attack was not a lone wolf attack.[xiii]

ISIS’s effort to sow divisions between the United States and Syria appears to be unsuccessful at this time because senior US officials have indicated that the recent attack “reinforces” the United States’ policy of supporting Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. The United States currently maintains about 1,000 personnel in Syria who provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other Syrian partners, such as the Syrian Free Army.[xiv] US intelligence sharing with Syrian MoI forces has led to numerous successful counter-ISIS raids across Syria in recent months.[xv] US forces also assist SDF units in managing and securing ISIS-affiliated detention camps in northern Syria.[xvi] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack stated on December 14 that the attack on US forces does not “invalidate,” but rather “reinforces,” the United States’ strategy of supporting Syrian partners to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.[xvii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani on December 14, and a Syrian state readout of the call noted that Rubio expressed the United States’ “continued support” for the Syrian government and joint counterterrorism efforts.[xviii] US President Donald Trump blamed the attack on ISIS and promised a “very serious [US] retaliation” on December 13.[xix] Trump gave no indication that the attack would change the United States’ policy toward or engagement with the Syrian government.

ISIS has increased the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10. ISIS fighters killed four MoI officers near Maarat al Numan, Idlib Province, on December 14.[xx] ISIS gunmen on motorcycles also engaged two Syrian 80th Division fighters near Ghanzawi, Aleppo Province, on December 15 and severely injured one fighter.[xxi] ISIS began publicly claiming attacks on Syrian government and former regime figures across Syria at a higher rate after November 28, following a long period in which ISIS rarely acknowledged attacks in government-held areas.[xxii]

The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations that seeks to facilitate “deep political change” in Iran, outlined its objectives in a charter on December 10.[xxiii] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, and several other Baloch groups established the Mobarizoun Popular Front on December 10.[xxiv] The other groups that comprise the Mobarizoun Popular Front include the Pada Baloch Movement, Nasr Movement of Baluchistan, and Mohammad Rasul Allah Group.[xxv] The Mobarizoun Popular Front stated in its charter on December 10 that it seeks to increase cohesion among anti-regime Baloch organizations, likely to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of attacks against the regime.[xxvi] The Mobarizoun Popular Front also stated that it seeks to use “up-to-date" insurgent tactics to confront the regime.[xxvii] The group added that it will conduct media and diplomatic activities in addition to “legitimate defense,” which suggests that the organization will use media engagement and public messaging to try to cultivate legitimacy in Iran.[xxviii] The organization lastly called for increasing coordination and cooperation with all anti-regime parties and groups across Iran. This call suggests that the Mobarizoun Popular Front may view itself as a vanguard for a popular uprising against the Iranian regime. Vanguardism is a method that some social movements, like Marxism-Leninism and Salafi-jihadism, employ that posits that a “small core of committed individuals [is] necessary to mobilize the masses” to remake society.[xxix] The Mobarizoun Popular Front's use of the word “mobarizoun” in its name also suggests that the group views itself as a vanguard. Mobarizoun were individuals in the 7th century Middle East who engaged in duels with opposing forces prior to a main battle between two armies.[xxx] The Mobarizoun Popular Front may therefore view itself as a vanguard that can initiate and incite “resistance” against the Iranian regime.[xxxi]

Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Second Class Abbas Malekizadeh as the new Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters commander on December 13, possibly in response to the recent establishment of the Mobarizoun Popular Front.[xxxii] The Artesh Ground Forces is responsible for defending Iran from foreign attacks, and the Southeast Regional Headquarters oversees Artesh Ground Forces units in Hormozgan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces, as well as in parts of Yazd Province.[xxxiii] Malekizadeh replaced Brigadier General Amir Gholam Alian, who had commanded the headquarters since August 2020.[xxxiv] Malekizadeh had previously served as the deputy commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters since at least July 2022.[xxxv] Malekizadeh served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade, which is based in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, prior to becoming the deputy commander of the Southeast Regional Headquarters.[xxxvi]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual-use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025.[xxxvii] A second unspecified US official familiar with the seizure stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran’s missile program.[xxxviii] US officials did not identify the vessel or its owner.[xxxix] The PRC has previously helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile program by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The PRC sent at least two shipments of sodium perchlorate to Iran before the Israel-Iran War, and European intelligence sources are tracking 10 to 12 shipments to Iran following the war, according to CNN.[xl] Iranian efforts to procure components and solid fuel ingredients for its missile program from the PRC are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[xli] An Israeli journalist recently reported on December 11 that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” ballistic missile stockpile to approximately 2,000 missiles.[xlii]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy possibly seized the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker Talara on November 14 in response to the US interdiction of the PRC-origin, Iran-bound vessel.[xliii] The United States interdicted the vessel on an unspecified date in November 2025. The IRGC circulated a Quranic verse on X after the Talara’s seizure that suggested Iran seized the Talara in retaliation for a previous incident.[xliv] Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that the United States and its allies could enforce United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which calls on United Nations member states to inspect any Iranian vessel within their territorial waters suspected of ”carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[xlv]

Iranian Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[xlvi] Sabahi Fard’s removal from these positions may reflect Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with Sabahi Fard’s performance during the Israel-Iran War. Elhami previously served as deputy commander of the Artesh Air Defense Force, commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Academy, and operations deputy of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters.[xlvii] Former Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander in February 2025.[xlviii] Sabahi Fard maintained his position as Artesh Air Defense Force commander, which he had held since June 2018, when he was appointed as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander.[xlix] The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[l] Sabahi Fard’s removal is notable given the poor performance of Iranian air defenses under his command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems in the first 24 hours of the war.[li] The regime has not appointed Sabahi Fard to a new position at the time of this writing.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi Arabia remain at odds over the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen. Saudi and Emirati defense ministry delegations met with STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi and STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami in Aden on December 12.[lii] Saudi media reported that the officials were expected to discuss the withdrawal of "any forces from outside the eastern governorates."[liii] Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors, including PLC President Rashid al Alimi, continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as the "only option for restoring normalcy” in the region.[liv] Zubaidi and Muharrami told the Saudi delegation in Aden that the STC will not withdraw from its newly seized territory, according to three STC sources speaking to a Yemen analyst.[lv]

The STC's refusal to withdraw from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates comes amid the STC’s continued efforts to legitimize its authority over these areas and frame its recent military action as necessary to fight the Houthis. Zubaidi formed the "Preparatory Committee for the Southern Fatwa Authority" on December 13, stating that the committee would "steadily pursue” the secession of southern Yemen.[lvi] The secession of southern Yemen is a long-standing STC aim. A Yemen analyst assessed that the creation of the committee reflects the STC's efforts to establish long-term governance and normalize the idea of an independent southern state.[lvii] STC leaders have also continued to meet with ROYG officials, including Parliament Speaker Sultan al Barakani, to discuss governance and joint efforts to fight the Houthis.[lviii] An STC spokesperson told Saudi media that the offensive aimed to address security threats from the east, such as Houthi smuggling from Oman, and claimed that ROYG’s failure to combat such threats forced the STC to intervene.[lix] The STC’s rhetoric is almost certainly part of a broader STC effort to justify its recent actions and frame itself as the most viable leader of Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement. 

Key Takeaways

• Attack on US Forces in Syria: ISIS likely seeks to conduct insider or “green-on-blue" attacks targeting US forces in Syria as part of an effort to reduce US forces’ trust in Syrian partner forces and disrupt the United States’ ability to effectively work with Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13. ISIS’s effort to sow divisions between the United States and Syria appears to be unsuccessful at this time because senior US officials have indicated that the recent attack “reinforces” the United States’ policy of supporting Syrian partners to defeat ISIS.
• Threat of Baloch Militant Groups to Iranian Regime Security: The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations that seeks to facilitate “deep political change” in Iran, outlined its objectives in a charter on December 10. The coalition stated in its charter that it seeks to increase coordination and cooperation with all anti-regime parties and groups across Iran. This call suggests that the Mobarizoun Popular Front may view itself as a vanguard for a popular uprising against the Iranian regime.
• PRC Military Support for Iran: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual-use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025. A second unspecified US official stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran’s missile program.
• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi Arabia remain at odds over the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen. The STC continues to take efforts to legitimize its authority over these areas and frame its recent military action as necessary to fight the Houthis, while Saudi-backed leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to claim that they are the rightful leaders of the Republic of Yemen Government.

Iran Update, December 12, 2025

The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)’s funding for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) significantly decreases the ability for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to successfully operate in pursuit of Iranian objectives unless the Iraqi government is both extremely pro-Iranian and willing to lose US security funding. The new NDAA requires that the Iraqi government make credible steps on three conditions, or the ISF will not receive more than 75 percent of the funds authorized under the NDAA. These conditions are:

• Condition 1. The Iraqi government must take credible steps to reduce the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are not integrated into the “Iraqi security forces” through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process” (DDR).[i]
• Condition 2. The Iraqi government must take credible steps “to strengthen the authority and operational control of the prime minister of Iraq as commander-in-chief.”[ii]
• Condition 3. The Iraqi government must take credible steps to “investigate and hold accountable members of Iran-aligned militia groups or members of the ISF operating outside of the formal chain of command” who attack US or Iraqi personnel or engage in “illegal or destabilizing” activities.[iii]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attempt to circumvent the 2026 NDAA’s conditions by establishing facade groups within the PMF and obfuscating their distortion of the official command and control structures within the PMF. These conditions considerably strengthen US leverage over the Iraqi government. Greater US leverage decreases the militias’ freedom of maneuver substantially. These militias have a long history of using facade groups and nominally unaffiliated military units to obfuscate their loyalty to Iran, their destabilizing activities, and their responsibility for attacks targeting US personnel, Israel, and energy infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan.[iv] The NDAA directly targets this practice by conditioning continued Defense Department funding in support of the ISF on the Iraqi government’s ability to reduce the capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The militias could slightly alter the use of facade militias and unaffiliated units tactic by establishing nominally unaffiliated PMF brigades that in fact answer to a militia chain of command that ultimately answers to the IRGC Quds Force. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could attempt to circumvent these conditions using the facade tactic in the following ways:

• Circumventing Condition 1. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could use the covert nature of their extralegal militias to create nominally new PMF brigades while claiming that their covert elements had been disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated. The NDAA calls for a “publicly verifiable” DDR process. The covert nature of extralegal Iranian-backed Iraqi militias means that these militias could withhold complete unit rosters—if such documents exist—to quietly insert covert Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commanders and fighters into new or existing PMF units, even if they executed a performative and public DDR process. These elements would still be constrained by the third NDAA condition, however.
• Circumventing Condition 2. The militias could obfuscate their distortion of the official chain-of-command by claiming that they follow the chain of command while receiving orders through extralegal channels. The 5th Iraqi Army Division, for example, was nominally unaffiliated in 2017 but in fact answered to the Badr Organization, not the army’s chain of command.[v] Such changes may be difficult to detect without a careful review of the behavior of individual units and the positions of individual commanders.
• Circumventing Condition 3. The militias could use their pervasive political and judicial influence to “arrest” commanders and fighters before quietly releasing them at a later date. Previous Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi arrested several commanders involved in illegal activities before powerful militia political interests intervened to get the commanders and fighters released.[vi] Many of these releases are widely reported, which indicates that the militias would need to further alter their tactics to successfully circumvent this condition.[vii]

 

These conditions may also require a resolutely pro-Iran government to overcome. The United States is currently attempting to prevent the formation of an extremely pro-Iran government. Five unspecified prominent Iraqi officials told regional media that the United States has conveyed that it will refuse to engage with any senior security official or prime minister affiliated with Iranian-backed militias.[viii] An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework member told regional media on December 12 that the framework may select a “consensus candidate“ as a result of US pressure.[ix]  The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose alliance of Iraqi Shia parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP will continue to assess Iraqi reactions to these conditions. The Iraqi federal government and Iraqi militias have so far failed to react.

 

An Israeli journalist reported that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” missile stockpile to around 2,000 missiles, which is consistent with other Israeli reports that Iran has prioritized rebuilding its missile program and stockpile after the Israel-Iran War.[x] “Heavy” ballistic missiles presumably refer to medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. This assumption would suggest that Iran reconstituted its stockpile from between 1,100 and 1,300 missiles to 2,000 missiles between June 2025 and December 2025, also assuming that post-war Israel Defense Forces (IDF) estimates about the missile stockpile were correct.[xi] CTP-ISW assessed on December 9 that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[xii] Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[xiii]

 

This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles. Israeli Military Intelligence head Major General Shlomi Bender told US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz on December 8 that Israeli damage to Iran’s ballistic missile industry was “less severe” than initially assessed, and that Iran has already restored its production capacity.[xiv] Iran could theoretically use a trough mixer, though planetary mixers are more efficient.[xv]

 

An unspecified Israeli official told the Israeli journalist that the rebuilt ballistic missile program is an unacceptable threat.[xvi] The official said that Israel “must coordinate with the [United States on] the red lines and actions [Israel] will take in the future, perhaps even in the near future.”[xvii]

 

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media proposed on December 12 that Iran establish a “joint operations room” with the Axis of Resistance to mitigate their weaknesses in the wake of conflict since October 7, 2023.[xviii] The concept of an Axis of Resistance joint operations room is not new, and Iran has historically relied on joint operations rooms to coordinate activity across the Axis of Resistance.[xix] Iran and the Axis of Resistance use these joint operations rooms to accomplish operational objectives in pursuit of their shared strategic objectives, but Hamas’ October 7 attack was poorly coordinated and resulted in a series of Israeli operations that badly degraded elements of the Axis.[xx] Operations rooms could be used for expansive objectives on the regional level — such as destroying Israel — as well as less expansive objectives on the country level, like expelling US forces from Iraq. This new proposal demonstrates how Iran is considering mechanisms to facilitate learning from unsuccessful Axis of Resistance campaigns in this period of reconstitution for the Axis of Resistance.[xxi]

 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) is emphasizing its intent to establish an independent state to Western diplomats as it consolidates control on the ground in eastern Yemen. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt, which successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[xxii] These eight governorates were previously part of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990.[xxiii] UK-based The Times reported on December 12 that an unspecified STC source told Western diplomats that Yemen will never be unified again as it ”prepares to declare an independent state.”[xxiv] The source added that the STC's declaration came at a meeting with members of the United Nations Security Council on December 9, during which the STC made it clear that ”the 1990 unity was over.”[xxv] These remarks align with the STC’s recent statements, which indicates that the group views its consolidation in eastern Yemen as a step toward formalizing independence.[xxvi] The STC has had long-standing secessionist aims, and many of its leaders led or fought for the South during the 1994 Civil War.[xxvii]

 

The STC is continuing to consolidate administrative control and establish new military units in eastern Yemen. STC-affiliated ministers issued new political and security appointments on December 12 that placed “sensitive positions” in al Mahra Governorate under STC influence, including control of the Shahn border crossing, which is the primary commercial crossing between Yemen and Oman.[xxviii] STC officials also appointed new heads for the Geological Survey and Mineral Resources Authority and al Ghaydah International Airport.[xxix] These new appointments would likely strengthen the STC’s leverage over border access, trade flows, and energy-related infrastructure in eastern Yemen.

 

The STC also dismissed the commander of the Yemeni Army’s 123rd Infantry Brigade and appointed Jalal Ali Mohammed al Jaari as the new brigade commander.[xxx] The 123rd Infantry Brigade is a Yemeni army unit in the 2nd Military Region and is stationed at al Hat Camp, al Mahra Governorate.[xxxi] Yemeni media reported on December 12 that the STC also deployed forces from southern governorates, including Dhaleh, Aden, and Abyan, to Mahra Governorate, and ordered officers and personnel originating from northern governorates to leave the governorate to consolidate STC control.[xxxii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the STC will likely backfill these positions because they are located in southern Yemen, where the STC seeks to establish an independent state.[xxxiii]

 

Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander General Metin Tokel met with Syrian defense officials in Damascus on November 12 amid indicators that Turkey may be preparing for potential offensive operations in northeastern Syria. Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Tokel discussed several “issues of mutual interest,” including strengthening Syrian-Turkish military cooperation, in Damascus on November 12.[xxxv] Tokel and Qasra almost certainly discussed efforts to enhance Syrian-Turkish defense cooperation under the military cooperation agreement that Turkey and Syria signed in August 2025.[xxxvi] The agreement stipulates that Turkey will provide the Syrian government with weapons, military equipment, training, and logistical support.[xxxvii] Syrian military commanders are currently training in Turkey under this agreement.[xxxviii]

The timing of Tokel’s visit to Syria is notable because the Turkish government continues to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson reiterated on December 12 that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian army on an ”individual basis” and not ”as units,” which is a demand that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan identified as a Turkish red line on December 6.[xxxix] Senior Turkish political and defense officials warned on December 12 that the SDF is failing to integrate into the Syrian government and noted that the SDF’s integration agreement with the Syrian government is set to expire at the end of 2025.[xl] Coordination between Syrian and Turkish ground forces would be a necessary part of possible preparations for a joint offensive or Turkish operations in Syrian territory.

The Turkish Defense Ministry denied on December 12 that recent footage of Turkish units deploying to Syrian positions suggested that the Turkish army was preparing for an operation.[xli] Turkish forces deployed reinforcements on December 7 to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province, according to Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish sources.[xlii] The ministry characterized the movement captured in the footage as “routine troop rotations.”[xliii] A spokesperson for an SDF faction similarly told Saudi media on December 11 that the SDF has not observed any Turkish “readiness for a major military operation” along the SDF-Syrian or SDF-Turkish frontlines.[xliv] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor indicators of a possible Turkish-Syrian operation in northeastern Syria.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Influence in the Iraqi Government: The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)’s funding for the Iraqi Security Forces significantly decreases the ability for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to successfully operate in pursuit of Iranian objectives unless the Iraqi government is both extremely pro-Iranian and willing to lose US security funding. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attempt to circumvent the 2026 NDAA’s conditions by establishing facade groups within the PMF and obfuscating their distortion of the official command and control structures within the PMF. The NDAA’s conditions may also require a resolutely pro-Iran government to circumvent, however. The United States is currently attempting to prevent the formation of an extremely pro-Iran government. 
• Iranian Ballistic Missile Production: An Israeli journalist reported that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” missile stockpile to around 2,000 missiles, which is consistent with other Israeli reports that Iran has prioritized rebuilding its missile program and stockpile after the Israel-Iran War. This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles.
• Iran’s Deterrence Strategy: Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media proposed on December 12 that Iran establish a “joint operations room” with the Axis of Resistance to mitigate their weaknesses in the wake of conflict since October 7, 2023.
• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) is emphasizing its intent to establish an independent state to Western diplomats as it consolidates control on the ground in eastern Yemen. The STC is continuing to consolidate administrative control and establish new military units in eastern Yemen.
• Turkish-Syrian Defense Cooperation: Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander General Metin Tokel met with Syrian defense officials in Damascus on November 12 amid indicators that Turkey may be preparing for potential offensive operations in northeastern Syria. The timing of Tokel’s visit to Syria is notable because the Turkish government continues to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Iran Update, December 11, 2025

Correction: CTP-ISW has updated its December 11, 2025, assessment about how Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will respond to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The previous version of this assessment mischaracterized the provisions of the NDAA.

CTP-ISW additionally removed a sentence from its December 12, 2025, update that incorrectly suggested that the United States Government provides funding to Iranian-backed and -affiliated groups and institutions in Iraq. We apologize for this error.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed National Resistance Front (NRF) Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who controls Yemeni government-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate near the Houthi frontlines, echoed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) rhetoric that frames the recent STC offensive as necessary to fight the Houthis.[i]  The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and confirmed on December 8 that it had successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[ii] Saleh declared his willingness to cooperate with the STC against the Houthis and other terrorist groups in a phone call with STC President Aidarous al Zubaidi on December 11.[iii] STC and NRF-affiliated media reported that Saleh echoed the STC’s justification for its recent seizures of key areas of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates as a “true starting point” to launch an offensive against the Houthis in northern Yemen during his call with Zubaidi.[iv] Saleh’s call with Zubaidi notably came after Saleh met with Saudi-supported Yemeni President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashid al Alimi as well as other unspecified Saudi officials in Riyadh on December 10.[v] Saleh is one of the seven vice presidents on the PLC.[vi] Saleh stated on the sidelines of his Riyadh meetings that “republican ranks,” likely referring to the anti-Houthi coalition, should focus on the battle against the Iranian-backed Houthis.[vii] Saleh is originally from northern Yemen and is the nephew of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Tariq Saleh previously served as a commander in the Presidential Guard until the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014.[viii] Saleh and the NRF have historically sought the unification of Yemen, which contrasts with the STC’s long-standing secessionist aims.[ix] The STC’s claim that its actions in Hadramawt and Mahra are meant to disrupt Houthi supply lines aligns with Saleh’s goal of removing the Houthis from northern Yemen, however.[x] The UAE has historically backed Saleh.[xi]

The STC continues to portray itself as a reliable military and political standard bearer for the anti-Houthi coalition.[xii] STC Vice President Major General Ahmed Saeed bin Brik described the STC as “an active and responsible partner in supporting regional and international security and stability” on December 11.[xiii] The UAE-backed Security Belt Forces (SBF) General Commander Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah al Wali similarly praised the STC’s offensive in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates and confirmed the SBF’s commitment to defending the STC‘s operation on December 11.[xiv] 26 southern Yemeni political groups separately published a joint statement on December 11 in which they confirmed their allegiance to the STC and Zubaidi as their leader.[xv] Most of the groups appear to have been aligned with the STC before the STC offensive.

Alimi and other non-UAE-backed Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) actors in Yemen continue to call for the complete withdrawal of STC forces from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates.[xvi] Alimi stressed the need for STC forces to hand back security authority to local leaders in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates in separate phone calls with Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi and Mahra Governor Muhammad Ali Yasser on December 11.[xvii] Other non-UAE-backed officials also published statements on December 10 condemning the STC’s “unilateral actions” and warning that “external networks” outside the 2019 PLC framework could influence decision-making.[xviii]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated on December 11 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by the United States’ December 31 deadline. It is possible that the LAF’s disarmament efforts will not meet Israel’s criteria for Hezbollah’s disarmament, however. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said on December 11 that the LAF has completed 90 percent of its disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon.[xix] Berri added that the LAF will complete its disarmament plan in southern Lebanon by the December 31 deadline set in the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xx] The LAF has, however, not met key Israeli demands regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament. The LAF has reportedly rejected Israeli demands to conduct “house-to-house searches” because the LAF seeks to avoid “civil strife.”[xxi] Hezbollah has historically used civilian homes to store weapons.[xxii] An Israeli military source told Israeli media on December 9 that the LAF cannot disarm Hezbollah because it does not search private property.[xxiii] Israel has repeatedly warned in recent weeks that the Israel Defense Forces may increase its operations in Lebanon, citing the LAF’s insufficient progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xxiv] US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus reportedly recently warned Lebanese officials that Israel will conduct “major and decisive strikes” in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley if Hezbollah does not hand over “drones and precision missiles,” presumably to the LAF, by January 1.[xxv] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports that the LAF has seized arms from Hezbollah fighters or raided any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present.

The United States Congress’s repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will reopen the Syrian economy to global investment. President Trump is expected to sign the NDAA into law on December 22.[xxvi]  The Caesar Act was the most stringent layer of US sanctions imposed on Syria and imposed secondary sanctions that targeted anyone who provided financial support to the Syrian government.[xxvii] Congress’s repeal requires President Trump to submit an unclassified report to Congress within 90 days of the NDAA’s passage that confirms that the Syrian transitional government is meeting eight key US security demands.[xxviii] The US President will be required to submit biannual reports to Congress for the next four years on the status of these demands.[xxix] The US demands include:

• Continuing to cooperate with US forces on counter-ISIS efforts[xxx]
• Removing foreign fighters from senior government and military positions[xxxi]
• Protecting Syrian religious and ethnic minorities[xxxii]
• Avoiding unprovoked attacks on nearby states, including Israel[xxxiii]
• Implementing the March 10 agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces[xxxiv]
• Combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and weapons and drug trafficking[xxxv]
• Prosecuting government security forces responsible for post-2024 atrocities[xxxvi]

The repeal of the Caesar Act removes a major obstacle to Syria’s economic recovery by reopening Syria’s access to foreign capital, imports, and reconstruction investment. The Syrian Economy Minister, Nidal al Shaar, praised Congress’s repeal of the Caesar Act and described the Caesar Act as the “biggest obstacle facing the Syrian economy.”[xxxvii] Shaar added that the repeal of the Caesar Act will inject foreign currency into Syria’s economy and allow Syria to import basic materials, machinery, and key technologies to revitalize stalled factories and support price stability in local markets.[xxxviii] The World Bank estimated in October 2025 that the Syrian Civil War left Syria with $216 billion in reconstruction costs, but the Caesar Act sanctioned anyone who supported the Syrian government or its key sectors.[xxxix] These sanctions blocked Gulf investment into Syria and obstructed Syria’s post-Assad economic recovery.[xl] The Congressional repeal of the Caesar Act does not include a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the act, but the US President can decide to impose new targeted sanctions on Syrian individuals, businesses, or government institutions if Syria fails to meet US demands for two consecutive reporting periods.[xli] Any future US sanctions on Syria would target Syrian citizens, businesses, or government institutions. Foreign banks may be more willing to lend money to investors for projects in Syria because they do not have to worry about the reimposition of Caesar sanctions, as they likely did with the six-month Caesar Act waivers that Trump issued prior to the full repeal. President Trump and Congress reportedly plan to lift more sanctions on Syria in 2026, according to a Washington-based Syria researcher.[xlii]

The 2026 NDAA seeks to weaken Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi Security Forces. The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and is “a part of the Iraqi armed forces,” according to the 2016 Popular Mobilization Commission Law.[xliii] The NDAA states that “Iraqi security forces” can only receive up to 75 percent of their allocated funds from the 2026 US Defense Department budget until the US Defense Secretary certifies to Congress that the Iraqi federal government has taken “credible steps” to weaken Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xliv] These steps include:

• Reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are not integrated into the “Iraqi security forces” through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process,”[xlv]
• Strengthening the Iraqi prime minister’s “authority and operational control” over the “Iraqi security forces”, and[xlvi]
• Investigating militia members who operate outside of the “Iraqi security forces’” chain of command to attack US personnel, among other activities.[xlvii]

The NDAA defines “Iraqi security forces” as the “military and other security forces of or associated with” the Iraqi government. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades as well as forces that operate outside of the PMF.[xlviii] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xlix] Iraq’s ruling Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered multiple options to meet US demands to disarm the militias, including integrating the militias into the PMF.[l] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on November 7 that integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would likely preserve their existing networks and political influence.[li] Any integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security apparatus must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[lii]

The US Defense Secretary can issue a six-month waiver if reduced US security funding to Iraq harms US national security interests. A previous version of the NDAA stipulated that the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, which equips and trains elements of the Iraqi security establishment, could only receive up to 50 percent of its allocated budget for 2026 until the US Defense Secretary certified to Congress that the Iraqi federal government had taken the above “credible steps” to weaken Iranian-backed militias.[liii] The NDAA clarifies that funds allocated to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan are not affected by the “credible steps” outlined above.[liv]

Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups established the “People’s Fighters Front” (JMM) on December 10, which highlights how anti-regime militant groups operating in southeastern Iran continue to pose a significant threat to Iranian security. Jaish al Adl, which frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran, previously announced on November 29 that it had merged with other Baloch groups.[lv] JMM stated that it seeks to “restore and protect the economic, political, cultural, and religious dignity” of Iranians and overthrow the “Velayat-e-Faqih regime,” which is a reference to the Iranian regime.[lvi] JMM claimed its first attack targeting Iranian security forces near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 10. JMM fighters killed four Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base personnel from the Imam Hossein Battalions near Zahedan on December 10.[lvii] The Imam Hossein Battalions is a highly trained unit in the Basij paramilitary organization.[lviii] It is notable that JMM decided to conduct its inaugural attack near Zahedan given that Zahedan has historically been a hotspot for anti-regime activity, which has been exacerbated by the Iranian regime’s poor treatment of Sunni Baloch communities.[lix] Iranian security forces violently suppressed Sunni Baloch protesters in Zahedan in September 2022 in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[lx] The formation of JMM reflects greater coordination between anti-regime Baloch organizations in southeastern Iran, which could increase the threat these groups pose to Iran’s internal security and regime stability. 

The United States seized an oil tanker, Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that has illicitly transported Iranian oil.[lxi] This seizure will likely increase Iran’s concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to block Iranian oil exports. Skipper’s beneficial owner and operator is Nigeria-based Thomarose Global Ventures Ltd., and its registered owner is Marshall Islands-based Triton Navigation Corp.[lxii] US Attorney General Pam Bondi stated that Skipper has transported sanctioned oil from Venezuela and Iran.[lxiii] Skipper has also conducted at least two ship-to-ship transfers to export illicit Iranian oil to China in 2025, according to two maritime analytics firms. [lxiv] The United States sanctioned the vessel in 2022 for its role in illicit Iranian oil shipments under the vessel’s former name Adisa.[lxv] Iran's embassy in Caracas condemned the seizure and claimed that it was a violation of international laws and norms.[lxvi] The recent seizure comes amid Iranian concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to prevent Iranian oil exports. Iran recently conducted a two-day naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman that likely sought to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare Iranian forces for potential future maritime escalation.[lxvii]

Key Takeaways

• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: United Arab Emirates-backed National Resistance Front Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who controls Yemeni government-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate near the Houthi frontlines, echoed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s rhetoric that frames the recent STC offensive as necessary to fight the Houthis.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated on December 11 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by the United States’ December 31 deadline. It is possible that the LAF’s disarmament efforts will not meet Israel’s criteria for Hezbollah’s disarmament, however.
• Congress’s Repeal of the Ceasar Act: The United States Congress’s repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will reopen the Syrian economy to global investment.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Influence in the Iraqi Government: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may use the 2026 NDAA’s broad definition of the term “Iraqi security forces” to try to retain their influence in Iraq by integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces.
• New Anti-Regime Militant Group in Iran: Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups established the “People’s Fighters Front” (JMM) on December 10, which highlights how anti-regime militant groups operating in southeastern Iran continue to pose a significant threat to Iranian security.
• Iranian Concerns About Potential US Seizures of Iranian Vessels: The United States seized an oil tanker, Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that has illicitly transported Iranian oil. This seizure will likely increase Iran’s concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to block Iranian oil exports.

Iran Update, December 10, 2025

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed elements of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) are each attempting to frame their respective coalitions as the most viable leaders for Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement.[i] The STC is attempting to present itself as the sole organized and effective force that can fight against the Houthis while it simultaneously attempts to undermine and diminish the strength of Saudi-backed groups. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi characterized the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as “a starting point for [a] serious battle” to eliminate Houthi control over northern areas of Yemen during a meeting with the ROYG’s Bayda governor in Aden on December 10.[ii] The Houthis still control the majority of territory within Bayda Governorate, but the ROYG retains its own ”governors-in-exile“ for northern Houthi-controlled governorates.[iii] Zubaidi’s efforts to approach officials like the Bayda governor may be part of an effort to consolidate his and the STC’s legitimacy and forge unity among anti-Houthi players within these strategic governorates. Zubaidi added that the anti-Houthi coalition cannot counter the Houthis with ”a vulnerable rear” in eastern Yemen due to Houthi smuggling routes in these areas.[iv] This statement about smuggling routes is both a justification for the STC seizure of eastern Yemen as well as an effort to delegitimize the ROYG forces previously controlling eastern Yemen by framing them as inept and unable to successfully prevent the Houthis from acquiring weapons and equipment. Smuggling across eastern Yemen is endemic, and the STC will have significant difficulty stopping smuggling if it tries to do so.[v] STC-affiliated media on December 10 called Zubaidi ”the right leader of this stage” and justified the STC‘s offensive in eastern Yemen as “necessary“ to save the people of eastern Yemen from ”further horrors.”[vi]

Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the ROYG and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates. Saudi-supported Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi called on PLC members to meet in Riyadh “soon” to discuss eastern Yemen, according to a senior PLC official on December 10.[vii]  The PLC official said that Alimi is also reportedly taking “all necessary measures to preserve unity” and to reject “unilateral actions” outside the agreed-upon PLC leadership framework.[viii]

Saudi Arabia almost certainly backs Alimi’s summons in order to re-impose unity on Yemen’s disparate anti-Houthi factions. Yemeni actors will presumably view it as a summons from Saudi Arabia, given their past experiences with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia frequently uses the legitimacy of its Yemeni partners to provide a Yemeni veneer to Saudi political maneuvers. Saudi Arabia similarly gathered Yemeni factions in Riyadh in 2022 before using their presence to orchestrate the ouster of former Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his replacement with Alimi.[ix] Saudi Arabia could use the summons to reprimand the STC and attempt to compel it to de-escalate with Alimi and northern Yemeni factions within the ROYG.

Saudi Arabia is simultaneously engaging its partners located in Yemen. A Saudi delegation travelled to Mukalla City, Hadramawt Governorate, and met with local officials and Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi on December 9.[x] Delegation lead Major General Mohammed al Qahtani called on the STC to withdraw and for the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces to assume responsibility for security in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates.[xi] Qahtani later told Yemeni media that the Saudi delegation‘s visit resulted in an agreement with all parties in Hadramawt, including the STC, on ”measures” to support de-escalation and stability.[xii]  Another PLC member who has criticized the STC’s recent actions, Marib Governor Sultan al Arada, held two meetings with senior ROYG security and administrative officials in Marib City on December 9 and 10.[xiii] Arada is a key Yemeni government loyalist and anti-Houthi military and political leader who has defended Marib against successive Houthi attacks by uniting the governorate‘s various communities against the Houthis.[xiv]

The STC is also attempting to consolidate local control in Hadramawt Governorate amid Saudi and Saudi-backed groups’ efforts to force STC forces to withdraw from the area. STC Barshid Brigade Commander Abdul Daim al Shuaibi, who is currently based in Wadi Hadramawt, stated on December 10 that STC forces will not withdraw from Hadramawt Governorate after Qahtani's remarks inspired speculation that the STC may withdraw.[xv] Shuaibi even claimed that STC forces will advance to ”Zamakh, Manwakh, al Dhuwaibi, and all border regions,” which border Saudi Arabia and the Houthi-controlled territory in northeastern Yemen, to ”fulfill their national duty.”[xvi] The newly appointed Hadramawt Tribal Alliance head, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed al Kathiri, who is also a member of the STC, separately asserted on December 10 that ”the people of Hadramawt” will now control the governorate’s security during a meeting with local tribal leaders.[xvii] The people of Hadramawt, coming from an STC official, is code for pro-South local leaders. Self-rule has been a long-held demand of some Hadrami tribal leaders, who have criticized both the Aden-based ROYG and Sanaa-based Houthis.[xviii] Other local Hadrami leaders have criticized the STC, and ROYG will almost certainly attempt to politically mobilize these leaders against the STC takeover. Kathiri proposed that all relevant Hadrami parties hold a dialogue to create a “roadmap” that guarantees consensus and unifies Hadrami actors.[xix] STC National Assembly head and STC Presidency member Ali Abdullah al Kathiri also called for the Hadrami elite to align with STC forces at the meeting.[xx] Khalid al Kathiri requested that the Saudi- and UAE-led contingents of the anti-Houthi coalition “adhere to the principles of local leadership.”[xxi] Another prominent STC leader, Fadi Hassan Baoum, separately discussed improving local services with Hadramawt Governorate’s representatives for the Yemen Gas Company and the tax office on December 10.[xxii] Baoum’s meetings indicate that the STC is attempting to assume control over administrative services within the governorate.

Key Takeaways

• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed elements of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) are each attempting to frame their respective coalitions as the most viable leaders for Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement. The STC characterized its recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen as “a starting point for [a] serious battle” to eliminate Houthi control over northern areas of Yemen.
• Saudi and Saudi-backed Efforts: Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the ROYG and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates. Saudi Arabia is almost certainly behind efforts by the Yemeni president to reimpose unity on Yemen’s disparate anti-Houthi factions.
• The STC in Hadramawt: The STC is also attempting to consolidate local control in Hadramawt Governorate amid Saudi and Saudi-backed groups’ efforts to force STC forces to withdraw from the area. The leader of a Hadrami tribal alliance proposed that locals control Hadramawt’s security moving forward. The ROYG will almost certainly attempt to politically mobilize Hadrami leaders critical of the STC against the STC takeover.

Iran Update, December 9, 2025

Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term. A senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told the Israeli Knesset on December 8 that Iran has resumed large-scale production of ballistic missiles.[i] Western diplomats also told Israeli media that Iran’s “top priority” is to restore the ballistic missile project, even if Iran does not appear to be advancing its nuclear program.[ii] The diplomats also told Israeli media on December 8 that Iran is using older manufacturing methods to continue producing ballistic missiles.[iii] Older manufacturing methods could refer to “trough-type mixers,” which are less efficient than the planetary mixers that Israel destroyed in October 2024, although CTP-ISW is unable to verify the type of mixers that Iran is currently using at the time of this writing.[iv] Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities, which Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War, since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[v] Iranian officials have long considered the ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.

The Iranian assumption that Israel will resume the Israel-Iran War in the short term is likely animating the decision to prioritize the Iranian missile program over other defense priorities. Iranian officials have repeatedly publicly stated that they expect the war between Iran and Israel to resume imminently since the war ended in June 2025.[vi] Iranian officials continue to say that they view ballistic missiles as a key deterrent to Israeli strikes, despite the ineffectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles in the Israel-Iran War. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[vii] Another former IRGC commander emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities played in its “success” during the war.[viii] Iranian officials are likely calculating that rapidly increasing their ballistic missile stockpile will deter the Israelis from resuming the war despite the missiles’ failures in June 2025. Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[ix]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, said that it intends to establish an independent state in southern Yemen in the near future.[x] The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and has had long-standing secessionist aims. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and confirmed on December 8 that it has successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[xi] These eight governorates previously comprised the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous Qassem al Zubaidi told STC leadership on December 9 that southern Yemen is currently at a critical transition period that the STC will manage.[xii] He added that the next phase will require building the institutions required for a future independent state in southern Yemen. Anti-Houthi media reported that Zubaidi is expected to declare the south an independent state.[xiii] Hundreds of individuals continued to participate in likely STC-orchestrated demonstrations in southern Yemen for a third day on December 9, calling for the secession of southern Yemen.[xiv]

Saudi forces have continued to withdraw from positions in southern Yemen, including some positions near Houthi frontlines. Unspecified military sources told a Yemeni media outlet on December 8 that the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) is preparing to withdraw from its positions in al Mudharabah and Ras al Arah districts in Lahij Governorate, which is near the Houthi frontlines.[xv]  A Yemen analyst reported that Saudi-backed forces withdrew from some positions in Aden and Lahij governorates to positions in Marib Governorate.[xvi] Marib is controlled by PLC Vice President and Marib Governor Sultan al Arada, who is a key Yemeni government loyalist and anti-Houthi military and political leader who has defended Marib against successive Houthi attacks by uniting the governorate‘s various communities against the Houthis.[xvii] The Yemen analyst added that Saudi forces have very likely also withdrawn from some positions in Mahra Governorate, including al Ghaydah Airport.[xviii] The STC will likely backfill these positions in Lahij, Aden, and Mahra governorates because they are located in southern Yemen, where the STC seeks to establish an independent state.

Saudi Arabia and several major Yemeni groups and organizations not backed by the UAE have criticized the STC offensive. Saudi Chairman of the Special Committee on Yemen Major General Mohammad Obeid bin Julaighm stated on December 9 that Saudi Arabia is calling for all STC forces to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates during a meeting with Hadrami officials.[xix] A Saudi delegation led by Julaighm has been in Hadramawt Governorate since December 3 to discuss the “eventual transfer of certain positions” to the NSF.[xx] Consultation and Reconciliation Authority Vice President Abdulmalik al Makhlafi stated on December 8 that the STC offensive is a "coup, not a secession" and "is still incomplete from a legal and political standpoint, which makes it easier to reverse it."[xxi] The Consultation and Reconciliation Authority was formed under former Yemeni President Mansour Hadi to support the PLC and unify the various actors within the anti-Houthi coalition.[xxii]

US and Western officials have reiterated their long-standing support for the unified Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) following meetings with Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi and Saudi officials. Western officials, including the British and French ambassadors to Yemen and officials from the US Embassy in Yemen, reiterated their support for the ROYG and the PLC following their meeting with Alimi.[xxiii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately held a phone call with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud on December 9 to discuss the situation in Yemen.[xxiv] The United States supports a unified Yemen under the ROYG, which is recognized by the UN.

The Houthis are using the STC offensive to continue to frame non-Houthi groups as proxies of foreign actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. This messaging is consistent with the group’s continuous efforts to weaken the anti-Houthi coalition. Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Farah claimed on December 5 that the STC, ROYG, and the Saudi-backed militias serve foreign patrons and do not serve Yemeni interests.[xxv] Senior Houthi media advisor Ahmed al Shami published a video on X on December 5 of alleged damage caused by the STC takeover and claimed that the STC has "starved and abused” the Yemeni people."[xxvi] Other Houthi officials and pro-Houthi journalists have criticized the STC and NSF for allowing Saudi Arabia and the UAE to use Hahdramawt and al Mahra governorates as a battleground for their objectives.[xxvii] This Houthi rhetoric is part of a long-standing Houthi information operation to frame non-Houthi groups as proxies of foreign actors and delegitimize the broader anti-Houthi coalition.

The Syrian government reportedly sent the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a “revised” and “detailed” integration proposal on December 6 that likely Kurdish sources equated to the SDF’s “complete subjugation” to the Syrian army on Turkish terms.[xxviii]  Unspecified but “well-placed” sources told Al Monitor on December 8 that they believe that Turkey dictated the proposal‘s terms.[xxix]  The sources did not provide specifics.[xxx] The unspecified sources are likely affiliated with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) or the SDF due to their knowledge of the proposal, their framing of its terms as “subjugation,” and their belief that Turkey is behind the proposal’s terms.[xxxi] The Syrian government has not commented on the details of the proposal at the time of this writing. The Syrian government and SDF have engaged in months-long negotiations about the terms of the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian state. The two sides reached a ”verbal” and ”preliminary” agreement in October 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) through several distinct formations, including at least three divisions and several independent brigades.[xxxii] Syrian sources also suggested in October that the SDF would retain de facto security control over Hasakah Province.[xxxiii] Kurdish commanders and politicians publicly expressed their support for the informal understanding and sent Damascus a list of 70 Kurdish commanders for leadership positions within the army, General Staff, and elsewhere in the MoD in late October.[xxxiv] The characterization of the new proposal by Al Monitor’s sources, however, suggests that the December 6 proposal omits several or all of these details included in the October agreement.[xxxv]

Turkey may have contributed to the reported changes within the Syrian government's revised proposal, given that Turkey has vehemently rejected key elements of the October agreement between the Syrian government and SDF. Turkish security sources indicated on December 7 that Turkey seeks to bar SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the Syrian army, which suggests that Turkey has probably rejected most—if not all—of the 70 commanders that the SDF requested take up leadership positions in the MoD.[xxxvi] Turkey’s calls for SDF fighters to integrate into the MoD as individuals and demand for “one command structure” also suggest that Turkey has rejected the integration of SDF divisions into the MoD as blocs and opposes allowing former SDF commanders to lead any unit formed from individually integrated SDF personnel.[xxxvii]

The SDF is unlikely to accept any proposal that requires Kurdish fighters to join the Syrian army as individuals, which decreases the likelihood that the SDF will integrate into the state by the end of the year under terms acceptable to the Syrian and Turkish governments. The SDF has firmly maintained that there must be Kurdish formations within the new army in order to "preserve” elements of Kurdish security and autonomy.[xxxviii] The SDF has sought to join the Syrian army as a ”bloc” in order to maintain weapons and networks that would allow Kurdish fighters to defend against possible attacks from Sunni groups within the army—such as former Syrian National Army factions—that have previously attacked Kurdish fighters.[xxxix] The Syrian and Turkish governments have given the SDF until the end of 2025 to complete its integration into the Syrian state.[xl] An SDF rejection of a new government proposal decreases the feasibility that the SDF will integrate into the state under terms acceptable to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. Any delay in SDF integration also raises the risk of renewed conflict in northeastern Syria. Recent reported Turkish deployments, high-level meetings between Syrian and Turkish defense officials, and statements from Turkish officials and security sources suggest that Turkey is preparing for potential joint offensive operations against the SDF if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian MoD by the end of the year.[xli] The Syrian government has not explicitly acknowledged interest or intent to participate in such an operation, but news outlets affiliated with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have continued to allege that the Syrian army is preparing to launch a “large-scale operation” alongside Turkey after the end-of-year deadline expires.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Production: Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term.
• The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, intends to establish an independent state in southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia and at least some Yemeni groups not backed by the UAE have criticized the STC offensive.
• SDF Integration into the Syrian State: The Syrian government reportedly sent the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a “revised” and “detailed” integration proposal on December 6 that likely Kurdish sources equated to the SDF’s “complete subjugation” to the Syrian army on Turkish terms. The SDF is unlikely to accept any proposal that requires Kurdish fighters to join the Syrian army as individuals, which decreases the likelihood that the SDF will integrate into the state by the end of the year under terms acceptable to the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Iran Update, December 8, 2025

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, has seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates in eastern Yemen since December 3.[i] The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and seeks to establish an independent state in southern Yemen.[ii] The STC launched an operation on December 3 to "restore stability to Wadi [Hadramawt], end the state of security breakdown, and halt the exploitation of the region by forces alien to [Wadi Hadramawt] and the governorate."[iii] Wadi Hadramawt is a relatively heavily populated region in Hadramawt and has historically been a stronghold for various Saudi-influenced military and political factions. An STC official told Emirati media on December 3 that the STC advanced into Hadramawt to confront a "rebellion" led by tribal forces that demanded greater control over local resources.[iv] STC-backed forces clashed with Yemeni government-affiliated First Military Region forces, which controlled the northern part of the governorate (including Wadi Hadramawt), on December 3 before STC forces took control of Seiyun, the largest city in Wadi Hadramawt.[v] STC forces also expanded their operation to seize key areas of Mahrah Governorate.[vi] Senior STC official Amr al Bidh told Reuters on December 8 that the STC has extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen. These eight governorates previously comprised the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to unification in 1990.[vii] The STC itself emerged from long-running divisions between northern Yemenis and southern Yemenis that have their roots in the conflict between north and south Yemen prior to unification. The STC operation forced some Saudi-backed forces to withdraw from some areas of southern Yemen.

Yemeni actors close to or openly allied with the STC and the UAE have supported or not explicitly condemned the STC’s operation to seize control of these governorates. Some actors have reiterated the STC’s secessionist aims. UAE-backed National Resistance Front (NRF) Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who is also one of the Yemeni government President Leadership Council’s (PLC) seven vice presidents, told NRF forces on December 7 that the STC's recent operation represents a "reorganization of the area of operations."[viii] STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami has similarly not condemned the STC offensive and has held several meetings with ROYG officials, including the Yemeni interior minister, in the office of Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi, since the STC's operation.[ix] Alimi traveled to Saudi Arabia on December 5 and the STC removed Alimi’s portrait and the ROYG flag from Alimi’s office after its fighters stormed the Presidential Palace on December 6.[x] A Yemen analyst suggested on December 8 that Muharrami presented himself as "an active state actor operating within the PLC framework" during his meetings with ROYG officials.[xi] Muharrami appears to be acting both as a representative of the STC and the PLC, but his presence in Alimi’s office without Alimi’s photograph or a Yemeni flag is notable because it implies Muharrami and the STC have sidelined Alimi. STC leaders in Hadramawt Governorate also called on December 8 for schools and government buildings to fly the former PDRY flag instead of the ROYG flag.[xii] The STC commonly uses the PDRY flag. Its demand that schools use the PDRY flag instead of the ROYG flag implies that the STC does not view the ROYG as legitimate in the south, however.

Hundreds of individuals participated in a likely STC-orchestrated demonstration in Khor Maksar, Aden Governate, on December 7, calling for the secession of southern Yemen.[xiii] An STC leader, Momen al Saqqaf, delivered a speech at the demonstration and emphasized that the recent events mark "the beginning of a new phase to impose a new reality."[xiv] STC member Raafat al Thaqali called on STC President and PLC Vice President Aidarous Qassem al Zubaidi to respond to popular demands for the establishment of a fully sovereign state in the south of Yemen.[xv]

There are several non-STC-aligned elements within the PLC that remain active in non-Houthi controlled areas of northern Yemen that border southern Yemen governorates, particularly around Taiz and Marib governorates. PLC Vice President and Marib Governor Sultan al Arada stated on December 8 that the recent developments threaten Yemeni and regional stability, and that "actions taken outside the national consensus" give the Houthis an opportunity to expand their influence in Yemen.[xvi] He emphasized the importance of greater support for President Alimi and the Yemeni government to prevent internal fragmentation. [xvii]

The STC offensive may increase tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while increasing Emirati influence in Yemen. Saudi forces have reportedly withdrawn from several parts of southern Yemen, including parts of Aden and Mahrah governorates and from Perim Island in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, since December 3.[xviii] Some social media users have circulated footage of Saudi forces reportedly mobilizing toward the al Wadiah border area near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.[xix] A Yemen analyst reported on December 7 that Saudi-backed forces are mobilizing near al Wadiah, citing unspecified sources.[xx] It remains unclear how Saudi Arabia will respond to the STC offensive. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have historically had conflicting objectives in Yemen. Alimi reportedly warned on December 7 that any actions outside the framework of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which forced the STC to recognize the legitimacy of ROYG and subordinate its structures to ROYG, will threaten Yemen’s stability.[xxi] Alimi told US, French, and British diplomats on December 7 that he rejects any "unilateral measures” that undermine the ROYG.[xxii]

Recent meetings between Saudi officials and their Hadrami contacts suggest that Saudi Arabia was not forewarned about the pending STC operation and that Riyadh is still determining how it should react. A Saudi delegation led by Chairman of the Special Committee on Yemen Major General Mohammad Obeid bin Julaighm has held meetings with various factions in Hadramawt Governorate since December 3 to discuss the “eventual transfer of certain positions” to the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces.[xxiii] A delegation of Hadramawt tribal leaders and forces also arrived in Saudi Arabia on December 6 to discuss recent developments in Hadramawt.[xxiv]

The Turkish government has continued to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) by December 31, 2025. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters on December 6 that the SDF has shown “no intention” of honoring the March 2025 agreement to integrate the SDF into the Syrian state and instead seeks to circumvent the agreement.[xxv] Fidan added that “there can only be one army, one command structure,” but caveated that “in local administration, [the SDF and Syrian government] can reach a different settlement and different understandings."[xxvi] Fidan separately said on December 6 that he wants the SDF to immediately expel its non-Syrian members, including those from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, according to Turkish media.[xxvii] Unspecified Turkish security sources told a pro-Erdogan Turkish newspaper on December 7 that Syria and Turkey will launch a joint military offensive against the SDF if the SDF does not comply with the March 2025 agreement.[xxviii]

Anonymous Turkish security sources separately told a Turkish journalist on December 7 that Turkey will “not accept the appointment” of senior Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) leaders to leadership positions “within the Syrian government,” which indicates that Turkey seeks to bar SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the Syrian army.[xxix] The YPG is the dominant faction within the SDF.[xxx] The Syrian transitional government previously agreed in October 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades.[xxxi] Turkey’s rejection of any appointment of senior YPG leaders to “leadership positions” effectively prevents senior SDF leaders from commanding the division- and brigade-level units proposed under the October 2025 agreement.[xxxii] The security sources also noted that Turkey insists on SDF members joining the Syrian MoD as individuals.[xxxiii] Turkey’s call for SDF fighters to integrate into the MoD as individuals and demand for a “one command structure” indicates that Turkey rejects the integration of SDF divisions into the MoD as blocs and opposes allowing former SDF commanders to lead any unit formed from individually integrated SDF personnel.[xxxiv] 

Corroborated reports of Turkish military deployments to northeastern Syria further suggest that Turkey may be preparing for potential joint offensive operations in the area.  Turkish forces deployed reinforcements on December 7 to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province, according to Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish sources.[xxxv] Kurdish media reported on December 7 that a Turkish convoy consisting of 20 heavy and medium vehicles entered Ras al Ain in Raqqa Province, which is located along the Turkish-occupied Peace Spring frontlines.[xxxvi] A local pro-Syrian government, anti-SDF source published a video of the reported Turkish military deployment on December 7 that shows three Turkish armored vehicles and three unspecified Turkish transport vehicles on an unspecified road in northern Syria.[xxxvii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the size or composition of these deployments, or whether they are specifically intended for offensive combat operations.[xxxviii] The Turkish military could launch offensive operations against the SDF from Turkish-occupied areas of Syria, including the Peace Spring region, given Turkey’s existing positions and air superiority over the SDF.[xxxix] The Turkish military reportedly maintains more than 60 active positions in the Peace Spring area, including at least two command bases and a renovated airstrip.[xl] The Turkish military previously deployed heavy military assets to Kuweires Airbase, Aleppo Province, near the MoD-SDF frontlines on September 28.[xli] The SDF also does not possess adequate air defense systems that it would need to counter Turkish close air support.[xlii]

Fidan’s statements and Turkey’s potential military preparations come amid senior Turkish and Syrian military officials’ discussions about enhancing military cooperation between the two countries. Turkish Chief of General Staff Selcuk Bayraktaroglu and Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra reportedly discussed ways to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries in Damascus on December 5.[xliii] Bayraktaroglu also reportedly inspected a joint Turkish-Syrian operations room on December 5.[xliv] Independent Turkish media described Bayraktaroglu’s visit as a Turkish attempt to “intimidate” the SDF, while pro-government Turkish media claimed that his visit was a “warning to the SDF.”[xlv] The Turkish and Syrian officials may have also discussed the August 2025 Turkish-Syrian military agreement.[xlvi] Turkish and Syrian defense officials formalized a military training and “consultation” deal in Ankara on August 13 following Syria’s July 23 request for Turkish assistance to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities.[xlvii] Unspecified regional sources told independent Turkish media on December 7 that Syrian forces have been training with Turkish military advisers, weapons, ammunition, and equipment “for some time” to prepare for “potential clashes.”[xlviii]

Israel and the United States began a week-long naval exercise off the coast of Israel on December 7 to prepare for “regional threats.”[xlix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on December 7 that the exercise, codenamed “Intrinsic Defender,” aims to improve naval coordination between the Israeli Navy and US 5th Fleet and prepare for “various regional threats.”[l] Iran and Iranian-backed groups have frequently posed maritime and aerial threats to Israel and international shipping, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel.[li] This exercise also comes after the IRGC Navy conducted a two-day naval exercise on December 4 and 5 in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Sea of Oman, which likely aimed to simultaneously deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare for potential future maritime escalation.[lii] The IRGC tested several missiles, drones, fast attack craft, and air defense systems during the exercise.[liii] The IRGC tested a ballistic missile named “303” but Iranian media did not provide any details about this missile. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated on December 6 that Iran tested a missile during the exercise that had a range of over 1,375 kilometers, possibly in reference to the “303” ballistic missile.[liv] Tangsiri also warned that the IRGC Navy is prepared for any conflict that could take place in the maritime domain.

The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the US Congress is expected to vote on in the coming days, demands that the Iraqi federal government take “credible steps” toward reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in order to receive US security funding in 2026.[lv] The NDAA allocates the Department of Defense’s 2026 budget.[lvi] The NDAA states that the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, which equips, trains, and supports elements of the Iraqi security establishment, can only receive up to 50 percent of its 2026 budget until the US Defense Secretary certifies to Congress that the Iraqi federal government has taken “credible steps” in three main areas regarding Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lvii] These areas include:

1. Reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias not under the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process,”[lviii]
2. Strengthening the Iraqi prime minister’s “authority and operational control” over the ISF, and
3. Investigating militia members who operate outside the ISF’s formal chain of command to attack US personnel, among other illegal activities.[lix]

The NDAA stipulates that the US Defense Secretary can issue a six-month waiver if the lack of US security funding harms US national security interests.[lx]

 

It is unclear if the NDAA’s use of the term “Iraqi Security Forces” refers to the Iraqi security apparatus as a whole or to the ISF specifically. Iranian-backed actors could try to use this ambiguity to retain their influence in Iraq. The Iraqi security establishment includes the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) while the ISF does not. The United States has consistently pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lxii] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades as well as forces that operate outside of the PMF.[lxiii] Iraq’s ruling Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered multiple options to meet US demands to disarm the militias, including integrating the militias into the PMF.[lxiv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors could exploit the NDAA’s lack of specificity to deem integrating the militias into the PMF as satisfactory to meet US demands, as the PMF is a part of the security apparatus but retains significant independence from the Iraqi state. CTP-ISW assessed on November 7 that integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would likely preserve their existing networks and political influence.[lxv] Any integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security apparatus must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[lxvi]

Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour gave speeches to students at the IRGC-controlled Command and Staff University and Imam Hossein University, respectively, on December 7.[lxvii] Both officials called on the Iranian armed forces to develop and utilize advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence.[lxviii] Mousavi emphasized the need for Iran to keep up with technological developments and strengthen the armed forces’ “preemptive capabilities.”[lxix] Iranian media noted that developing “preemptive capabilities” is consistent with Iran’s “active deterrence” strategy, which is an offensive strategy that Iran has employed since at least 2014.[lxx] “Active deterrence” emphasizes the need for Iran to intervene in situations abroad in order to expand Iranian influence and confront threats before they endanger Iran.[lxxi] Pakpour highlighted applications for artificial intelligence in surveillance and targeting and stated that “stealth technology” could improve Iranian missiles’ ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses.[lxxii] Pakpour emphasized that “more work should be done at Imam Hossein University in areas such as air defense and stealth technology.”[lxxiii] Mousavi and Pakpour’s emphasis on technological developments comes after Israel reportedly used artificial intelligence to identify Iranian targets during the war.[lxxiv]

 

Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels.[lxxv] The diplomats stated that Israel would likely attack Iran if Iran takes “serious steps” to enrich uranium and advance its ballistic missile capabilities, and if the United States and Iran do not reach a nuclear deal. The European diplomats did not provide any evidence for these assertions, however. Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that Israel and the United States damaged during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.[lxxvi] The Institute assessed on November 21 that Iran’s clean-up efforts at three nuclear weaponization sites “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”[lxxvii] There are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war. Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the war, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons.[lxxviii] A political analyst with ties to the Iranian regime assessed on December 7 that the probability of a “limited” and ”targeted” Israeli attack on Iran is high and that President Donald Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy aims to uphold “the status quo” by containing Iran rather than pursuing strategic reconciliation or full-scale war.[lxxix] The analyst claimed that the United States aims to keep Iran in a permanent state of “defense and effort to preserve survival” and prevent Iran from rebuilding its deterrence and influence.[lxxx] The analyst suggested that Iran can impose costs on Israel and Arab states to reduce their willingness to contain Iran in line with the US National Security Strategy.[lxxxi]

Key Takeaways

• The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s Advance in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, has seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates in eastern Yemen since December 3. Yemeni actors close to or openly allied with the STC and the UAE have supported or not explicitly condemned the STC’s operation to seize control of these governorates. Some actors have reiterated the STC’s secessionist aims. The STC offensive may increase tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while increasing Emirati influence in Yemen.
• Turkish Military Preparations in Syria: The Turkish government has continued to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense by December 31, 2025.
• Israeli and US Naval Exercise: Israel and the United States began a week-long naval exercise off the coast of Israel on December 7 to prepare for “regional threats.” Iran and Iranian-backed groups have frequently posed maritime and aerial threats to Israel and international shipping, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel.
• US Security Aid to Iraq: The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the US Congress is expected to vote on in the coming days, demands that the Iraqi federal government take “credible steps” toward reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in order to receive US security funding in 2026. It is unclear if the NDAA’s use of the term “Iraqi Security Forces” refers to the Iraqi security apparatus as a whole or to the ISF specifically.
• Iranian Efforts to Advance Military Technology: Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities.
• Potential Israeli Operation Against Iran: Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels. Iran has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, but there are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war.

Iran Update, December 5, 2025

Former senior Assad regime officials are likely funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Reuters reported on December 5 that former Military Intelligence Chief Major General Kamal Hassan and Bashar al Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, have formed rival Alawite militias in coastal Syria that seek to secede coastal Syria from transitional government control and restore Assad-era power structures, citing 48 informed anonymous sources.[i] Makhlouf and Hassan have reportedly spent over $6 million and $1.5 million, respectively, to recruit and pay the salaries of Alawite fighters in Syria and Lebanon.[ii] Unspecified Assadist and Syrian government sources told Reuters that Hassan and Makhlouf’s militias are also competing to gain access to 14 Assad-era command-and-control rooms scattered across coastal Syria and dozens of weapons caches.[iii] Tartous Province Governor Ahmed al Shami confirmed the existence of the Assad-era command rooms in the region but stated that the “centers have been significantly weakened” and that “there is no concern about their continued existence.”[iv] Reuters reported that Hassan also established a charity in Lebanon to build influence among Alawites who fled from Syria to Lebanon after the Assad regime fell in December 2024.[v] Thousands of Syrians tied to the Assad regime and Hezbollah fled coastal Syria to northern Lebanon after Assad was ousted, and Hassan may seek to recruit these Alawite refugees to participate in a potential future pro-Alawite insurgency.[vi]  The General Security Service (GSS) arrested a Makhlouf-funded insurgent cell in Latakia in October as well as a pro-Alawite insurgent commander in August who had ties to Makhlouf, which highlights Makhlouf’s efforts to actively support cells in coastal Syria that could participate in an Alawite insurgency.[vii]

Assadist officials’ claims that three prominent former Assad officials command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria are almost certainly an exaggeration. Reuters reported that internal documents from Makhlouf’s and Hassan’s factions claim that these officials control 54,000 and 12,000 fighters, respectively.[viii] The Assad regime officials have reportedly not yet mobilized the fighters because “the time is not yet right.”[ix] Reuters also reported that Bashar al Assad’s brother, Maher, commands 25,000 fighters in and outside of Syria that he could mobilize, citing former Assad commanders in Lebanon.[x] CTP-ISW has not observed a consistent level of violence or insurgent activity in coastal Syria that would be expected if the three former Assad regime officials actually commanded this number of fighters. Reuters reported that fighters on the coast are accepting money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, which suggests that many of the fighters are “ghost soldiers” who accept small payments but lack real loyalty or willingness to fight for either Makhlouf or Hassan.[xi] An anonymous local Alawite militia commander stated that the payments from Makhlouf and Hassan are insufficient but noted that “there is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years.”[xii]  Five other militia commanders echoed this commander's sentiment and said that Makhlouf attempted to buy their loyalty with “crumbs of money.”[xiii] The commanders' evident disdain for their patrons indicates that it is unlikely that Makhlouf or Hassan could launch a large-scale Alawite insurgency in coastal Syria because these commanders would be unlikely to risk their lives for their patrons. The GSS, with help from the Alawite community, dismantled an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-linked Assadist insurgent cell in Sheikh Badr, Tartous Province, on November 12, which suggests that an insurgency that seeks to restore Assadist power structures may lack broad Alawite support.[xiv] The pro-Assad Alawite insurgency has continued at a relatively low level since the height of the Alawite insurgency in March 2025, despite Makhlouf and Hassan’s efforts. Several Alawite insurgent groups remain active in coastal Syria but have conducted limited and largely ineffective attacks targeting the transitional government, and these groups currently lack the capabilities to force the transitional government to cede control of coastal Syria.[xv]

Many Alawites in Syria continue to hold grievances toward the Syrian transitional government that malicious actors may seek to exploit, but the vast majority of the Alawite community does not appear inclined to use violence to address these grievances. Alawites in Syria have repeatedly called for autonomy since the fall of the Assad regime because they are skeptical of the transitional government’s ability and willingness to protect their communities, particularly after some government forces participated in reprisal massacres against Alawites in coastal Syria in March 2025.[xvi] Some members of the Alawite community have also argued that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised under the new government.[xvii] Assadists like Makhlouf and Hassan may attempt to present themselves as defenders of the Alawite community and exploit the community’s grievances toward the government to recruit fighters. Prominent voices within the Alawite community have advocated against violence, however, and violence in coastal Syria has remained at low levels since March 2025.  Over 1,000 Alawite protestors participated in peaceful demonstrations on November 25 along the Syrian coast and western Hama Province following an incident of sectarian violence in Homs City.[xviii] These protests largely remained peaceful at the request of prominent Alawite leaders.[xix]

 

The Syrian government has additionally taken steps in recent months to build stronger relationships with some Alawite communities along the coast. The recent dismantlement of an IRGC-affiliated Assadist cell with the help of the Alawite community in rural Tartous on November 12 indicated that some GSS units are improving their counter-insurgency approach in rural minority areas by working with locals.[xx] Syrian security forces additionally worked to prevent counter-protesters from attacking Alawite protesters and de-escalated attempts to instigate violence on November 25.[xxi] High-ranking senior government officials have continued to engage with local Alawite leaders and dignitaries in order to build trust and improve community engagement, including through economic development.[xxii] Four Syrian aides stated that a former Assad-era military commander and current adviser to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Khaled al Ahmad, is financing jobs and other economic opportunities within the Alawite community to combat unemployment in the community.[xxiii] The governor of Tartous Province called Khaled al Ahmad a “crucial” individual in building trust between Alawites and the government.[xxiv]  Improved trust and more robust partnerships between the Syrian government and the Alawite community can reduce opportunities for Assadists and Alawite insurgents to recruit fighters.

Key Takeaways

• Assadist Insurgency Efforts: Former senior Assad regime officials are likely funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Assadist officials’ claims that three prominent former Assad officials command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria are almost certainly an exaggeration.
• Alawite-Syrian Government Relations: Many Alawites in Syria continue to hold grievances toward the Syrian transitional government that malicious actors may seek to exploit, but the vast majority of the Alawite community does not appear inclined to use violence to address these grievances. The Syrian government has additionally taken steps in recent months to build stronger relationships with some Alawite communities along the coast.

Iran Update, December 4, 2025

Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supports his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes Maliki, is currently considering multiple candidates for prime minister, including Maliki.[ii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised primarily of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the prime minister.[iv] Maliki likely claimed that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while in office because he believes it could garner him US support for another term.

 

Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the PMF, into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister. This effort would harm Iraqi stability because Maliki pursued authoritarian and sectarian policies when he previously served as prime minister that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Maliki has continuously defended the PMF throughout the United States’ efforts to dissolve it in 2025.[v] He did, however, state in February 2025 that the PMF should be “reconsidered and rehabilitated” to have an “exclusive” connection to the prime minister.[vi] Maliki’s proposed modification of the PMF bears resemblance to the extra-constitutional Office of the Commander and Chief, which Maliki used to bypass the chain of command and directly influence Iraqi security affairs.[vii] Maliki centralized power, weakened multiple Iraqi institutions, and exacerbated Sunni grievances toward the Shia-dominated Iraqi federal government while in office.[viii] His mismanagement of the Iraqi security forces played a pivotal role in the speed of ISIS’s seizure of almost a third of Iraqi territory in 2014.[ix] Maliki then used the threat of ISIS to accelerate his pre-existing effort to form a popular army, which he proceeded to staff with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and place under the purview of the Office of the Commander and Chief. Maliki used this force to coerce his political enemies and increase his power.[x] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa, which called for Iraqis to mobilize against ISIS and is often credited with creating the force that would become the PMF, further propelled Maliki’s mobilization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xi] The United States ultimately delayed support for Iraq in 2014 until Maliki was removed from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[xii]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.[xiii] Iraqi state media reported on December 4 that the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Funds had designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations and froze the groups’ assets in mid-November 2025.[xiv] The committee later announced that it would remove the Houthis and Hezbollah from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[xv] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered an investigation of the incident on December 4.[xvi] Two Iraqi officials told the Associated Press on December 4 that the Iraqi federal government reversed its terrorist designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[xvii] The militias reportedly accused the government of targeting regional allies and risking conflict with Iran. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors condemned the Iraqi federal government's designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah on December 4.[xviii] This incident comes as the United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.[xix]

The Iraqi federal government accused “outlaws” on December 3 of committing the November 26 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xx] The Iraqi federal government often uses the term “outlaws” to accuse Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of conducting attacks without explicitly implicating the militias. The November 26 drone attack targeting the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province caused material damage and sparked a fire but did not cause any casualties.[xxi] A committee formed by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to investigate the attack announced the results of its investigation on December 3.[xxii] The committee said that "outlaws” launched two drones at the gas field, one of which hit the gas field and the second landed outside the field.[xxiii] The Iraqi federal government has previously used the term “outlaws” and similar phrases to obfuscate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ culpability in attacks to avoid political blowback.[xxiv] The Iraqi federal government blamed a November 2020 rocket attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad on “outlaws,” even though Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds (formerly called Ashab al Kahf) claimed responsibility for the attack.[xxv] CTP-ISW assessed on November 28 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack on Khor Mor to try to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed political parties in the government formation process.[xxvi] The Shia Coordination Framework, which has controlled the federal government since 2022 and is poised to control the next government following the recent elections, includes the political wings of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvii] The committee did not specify if the perpetrators of the November 26 Khor Mor attack also attempted to conduct a drone attack targeting Khor Mor on November 23.[xxviii] Kurdish security forces intercepted the drone on November 23.[xxix]

It remains unclear which Iranian-backed Iraqi militia conducted the November 26 attack on Khor Mor. The committee said that the perpetrators launched the November 26 attack from eastern Tuz Kharmatu District, Salah al Din Province, and that the attack was the eleventh attack against the gas field.[xxx] Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-controlled PMF brigades under the now defunct PMF Northern Axis, which operated in the Tuz Kharmatu District, have notably previously conducted multiple attacks targeting the Khor Mor Gas Field.[xxxi] Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh ordered the integration of the Northern Axis into the Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command in August 2024.[xxxii] The Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command is led by a Badr Organization-affiliated commander.[xxxiii] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba led a drone strike campaign targeting oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan following the 2021 parliamentary elections to deter the Kurdistan Democratic Party from allying with Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xxxiv] No Iranian-backed Iraqi militia has claimed the November 26 attack at the time of this writing and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, denied that it was involved in the November 26 attack.[xxxv] Lower-ranking fighters could have independently conducted the attack, or militia leadership could have allowed fighters to conduct the attack without publicly sanctioning it, however.

A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party suggested that Turkey will no longer consider the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be a “terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its integration into the Syrian state. Turkey has long considered the SDF to be a terrorist organization due to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) historic ties to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the dominant faction within the SDF.[xxxvi] Justice and Development Party (AKP) Spokesperson Omer Celik told Turkish media on December 2 that the SDF would “cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over airports, border crossings, and oil fields that it controls to the Syrian government and integrates into the Syrian state per the March 10 agreement.[xxxvii] The SDF-approved March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF will transfer its control over border crossings, oil and gas fields, and Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria to the transitional government.[xxxviii] Turkey probably views the SDF’s transfer of key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as a mechanism through which to reduce the SDF’s perceived threat to Turkey because it would limit the SDF’s access to the Turkish border and the SDF’s revenue from oil fields. The SDF has not yet transferred control of any of these resources or infrastructure to the Syrian transitional government, however.[xxxix]

Celik’s reference to a possible change in Turkey’s threat perception suggests that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s compliance with the March 10 agreement, which possibly indicates positive momentum in the integration process as the end-of-year integration deadline approaches. Both Turkey and the Syrian government have maintained that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian state by the end of the year.[xl] Turkey has consistently called for the SDF’s military and administrative integration into the Syrian state since March 10.[xli] Turkey has also argued in recent months that the SDF is not complying with the March 10 agreement and has likely pushed the Syrian government to coerce the SDF to implement the agreement.[xlii] Celik’s remarks about a possible change in Turkey’s perception of the SDF suggest that the SDF’s integration may be proceeding along the lines agreed to by the Syrian government and SDF. The Syrian government and SDF reached a limited breakthrough in October 2025 and agreed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Army in three divisions and several independent brigades after months of stalled negotiations.[xliii] There have been few updates on the progress or development of these units, but a Syrian Democratic Council official noted on December 4 that dialogue is “currently underway” between the SDF and Syrian government after US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack met with senior Syrian officials in Damascus on December 1.[xliv]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.[xlv] The exercise took place in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC Navy claimed on December 4 that it alerted US vessels in the region about the exercise.[xlvi] The Iranian regime’s primary English language news outlet stated on December 4 that this exercise sends a “dual message” of peace toward Iran’s regional partners and a warning to Iran’s adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[xlvii] The IRGC Navy previously used this annual exercise to signal Iran’s commitment to “sustainable security” in the region but did not issue a warning to the United States and its allies.[xlviii] The IRGC Navy also named this year’s exercise after deceased IRGC Navy commander Mohammad Nazeri, who was reportedly involved in the seizure of two US patrol boats and 10 US personnel in the Persian Gulf in January 2016.[xlix] Senior Iranian military officials have consistently threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States blocks Iranian oil exports since the Israel-Iran War.[l] 

Key Takeaways

• Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Political Efforts: Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supports his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3. Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the PMF, into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister.
• Iranian Influence in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.
• Militia Activity in Iraq: The Iraqi federal government accused “outlaws” on December 3 of committing the November 26 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi federal government often uses the term “outlaws” to accuse Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of conducting attacks without explicitly implicating the militias.
• Turkey’s View of the Syrian Democratic Forces: A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party suggested that Turkey will no longer consider the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be a “terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its integration into the Syrian state. The spokesperson’s statement suggests that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s compliance with the March 10 agreement, which possibly indicates positive momentum in the integration process as the end-of-year integration deadline approaches. 
• Iranian Military Posture: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.

Iran Update, December 3, 2025 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.”[i] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an action would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts, however. Kaabi threatened that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would “shove a rock down [Savaya’s] mouth” if the United States does not stop his "interference.“[ii] Kaabi also suggested that the Iraqi federal government has adopted “timid and silent stances” toward Savaya.[iii] Iraqi media reported on December 2 that Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are the political wings of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. CTP-ISW assessed on December 2 that the exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions would be unlikely to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government because Iraqi political parties often appoint loyalists to act as proxies for them in key government institutions.[v] Savaya has also made several comments in recent weeks that may have upset Kaabi, including Savaya’s statement that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the drone attack that targeted the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province on November 26.[vi] CTP-ISW similarly continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack to try to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed Iraqi parties in the government formation process.[vii]

An attack by Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba or other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Savaya would likely harm militia interests regarding the ongoing Iraqi government formation process. Government formation is important for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests in the country.[viii] An Iraqi militia attack against Savaya could cause some Iraqi parties to decide not to align with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a conflict with the United States, for example. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.[ix]

The Shia Coordination Framework’s internal divisions over the selection of the next prime minister are likely due, in part, to US pressure on the framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership. Framework sources told Iraqi media on December 3 that the framework did not reach an agreement on the next prime minister during a framework meeting on December 2.[x] Internal divisions and disputes reportedly caused tension among framework parties during the meeting. Iraqi media has noted that the framework is considering a variety of individuals for the premiership, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, and Iraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri.[xi] Iraqi media reported on December 1 that the framework is seeking a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who does not face objections from framework parties or any “regional or international forces influential in Iraqi politics,” which suggests that the framework is trying to balance pressure from Iran and the United States regarding government formation.[xii] Iran and the United States have historically exerted major influence in Iraqi government formation, particularly in the selection of prime ministers.[xiii] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iranian-backed parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xiv]

US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq has previously divided the framework. Iraqi media reported in August 2025 that framework members are divided into two “camps” regarding US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi state security service primarily composed of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xv] The first camp supports challenging US objections to the PMF, while the second camp is concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq.[xvi] The United States has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders if the Iraqi federal government does not dissolve the PMF.[xvii] CTP-ISW assessed in August that framework members with armed groups in the PMF likely support strengthening the institution.[xviii] Iraqi media also reported in October 2025 that unspecified framework parties were in a “political rush” to receive US support prior to the November 2025 elections, which highlights how framework parties vary in their degree of willingness to work with the United States.[xix]

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on December 2 that Iran likely sought Russian assistance in 2024 to develop laser-based conventional military systems rather than laser technology for nuclear weapons testing.[xx] The Institute’s assessment comes after the Financial Times reported on November 19 that a group of Iranian scientists traveled to Russia in November 2024 to visit a Russian military laser technology company.[xxi] A former CIA analyst told the Financial Times that Iran may have been seeking “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test.”[xxii] The Institute stated that Iran already has the equipment and expertise necessary to conduct such a validation test without using laser-based diagnostic systems.[xxiii] The Institute assessed that the Iranian delegation was, instead, likely seeking Russian assistance to advance Iran’s anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems.[xxiv]

Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years. Israel has conducted a series of drone attacks on Iran in recent years, including a drone strike on a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Karaj, Alborz Province, in 2021, a strike that destroyed a drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah Province in 2022, and a drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan in 2023.[xxv] These attacks may have driven Iran to seek to develop laser-based anti-drone systems, which cost significantly less than traditional air defense systems.[xxvi] Israel also used small drones in June 2025 to kill Iranian nuclear scientists and destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which may further drive Iran to develop its anti-drone capabilities.[xxvii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on December 3 that it has launched a one-way attack drone force in the Middle East, which highlights how drones will continue to play a large role in future conflicts in the region.[xxviii] Russia may be able to share knowledge about laser-based anti-drone systems with Iran given that Russia has developed such systems to counter Ukrainian drone strikes.[xxix] Russia unveiled a truck-mounted anti-drone laser system in October 2025, for example, that can detect, track, and destroy small drones by damaging onboard sensors, wiring, and batteries and causing the drone to crash.[xxx] Iran would likely prioritize laser-based anti-drone systems over laser-based anti-ballistic missile systems in the near future given that the latter requires much more energy than the former.[xxxi] Most existing laser-based air defense systems, such as the Israeli Iron Beam, can shoot down small drones, rockets, and other systems, but currently do not have the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles.[xxxii]

Iraqi Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi announced on November 26 that all forces under the US-led International Coalition in Iraq are now in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as part of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Muhammadawi caveated that four or five individuals remain in Baghdad to manage unspecified diplomatic and logistical tasks.[xxxiii] The US forces in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region do not appear to include the 250 to 350 “military advisors and support personnel” who remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria.[xxxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxxv] A US official told Reuters in September 2025 that the United States planned to reduce its military presence from 2,500 personnel to less than 2,000 and redeploy the majority of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxxvi] Muhammadawi added that a joint committee will negotiate with the United States between January and June 2026 to draft a memorandum of understanding that addresses the future US presence in Iraq and future US-Iraq security cooperation.[xxxvii] The committee will include Muhammadawi, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Abdul Amir Yarallah, Peshmerga Affairs Ministry Secretary General Bakhtiar Mohammad, and several other unspecified individuals.[xxxviii]  

Israel and Lebanon sent diplomatic representatives to hold direct talks at a ceasefire monitoring committee meeting on December 3 amid warnings that Israel may soon launch a new operation targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon.[xxxix] Former Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Simon Karam and Israeli National Security Council Senior Director for Foreign Policy Uri Rasnick led the Lebanese and Israeli delegations, respectively, during the committee meeting in Naqoura.[xl] The November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon established the committee, which includes representatives from the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon, and the United Nations, to monitor Israel and Hezbollah’s compliance with the ceasefire.[xli] Western sources told Lebanese media that the Israeli and Lebanese representatives discussed Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israeli strikes in Lebanon, and the potential for economic cooperation in southern Lebanon to build trust between Israel and Lebanon during the committee meeting.[xlii] The Israeli-Lebanese talks mark a positive step for dialogue between the two countries—which have not directly engaged in talks since 1983—particularly amid recent Israeli warnings that Israel is preparing to potentially increase its operations in Lebanon due to frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xliii] An unspecified source told Lebanese media that Lebanese officials left the meeting with the impression that Israel will allow the LAF “a chance to do its job,” in reference to Hezbollah disarmament.[xliv] Neither Lebanon nor Israel has changed its position on key outstanding issues, however. An informed source told Lebanese media that the December 3 ceasefire monitoring committee meeting did not address the issue of the LAF searching private property, which Israel has demanded that the LAF do.[xlv] An Israeli Channel 13 journalist reported on November 28 that the LAF has until US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus leaves Beirut on December 6 to demonstrate to Israel that it has made unspecified progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xlvi] Israeli state broadcaster Kan described on December 2 a “significant [Israeli] escalation” in Lebanon as “inevitable.”[xlvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Militia Threatens US Envoy: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.” Iraqi media reported on December 2 that Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an action would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts, particularly the ongoing Iraqi government formation process.
• Iranian Anti-Drone Capabilities: The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on December 2 that Iran likely sought Russian assistance in 2024 to develop laser-based conventional military systems rather than laser technology for nuclear weapons testing. The Institute assessed that the Iranian delegation was likely seeking Russian assistance to advance Iran’s anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems. Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: Iraqi Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi announced on November 26 that all forces under the US-led International Coalition in Iraq are now in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as part of the US withdrawal from Iraq. 250 to 350 “military advisors and support personnel” remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria.
• Israel-Lebanon Relations: Israel and Lebanon sent diplomatic representatives to hold direct talks at a ceasefire monitoring committee meeting on December 3. The Israeli-Lebanese talks mark a positive step for dialogue between the two countries—which have not directly engaged in talks since 1983—particularly amid recent Israeli warnings that Israel is preparing to potentially increase its operations in Lebanon due to frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.

Iran Update, December 2, 2025

Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran.  Iran is holding the “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in East Azerbaijan Province from December 1 to 5.[i] Iran faces security threats along its northwestern border near East Azerbaijan Province from Kurdish groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).[ii] All ten members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, Belarus, and China, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[iii] The SCO has historically emphasized counterterrorism as a key goal of the institution.[iv] Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Oman, and Iraq also attended as observers.[v] IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first-person view (FPV) drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.[vi] These drones, when employed at scale, can ”perform a wide array of functions but have been particularly transformative in creating a nearly-transparent battlefield.”[vii] This transparency has applications outside of conventional warfare, as seen in Ukraine. Drones could be employed in Iran to assist counter-insurgency operations in border regions or to help suppress protests, for example.

Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[viii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Unspecified Iraqi political sources told Iraqi media on December 2 that the framework may change its government formation strategy in response to US pressure.[ix] A framework member confirmed that the framework discussed its response to Savaya on December 1.[x] The framework is reportedly trying to find a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who is acceptable to the framework and any “regional or international forces influential in Iraqi politics,” which suggests that it is trying to balance Iranian and US pressures regarding government formation.[xi] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence within the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iran-aligned parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xii]

The exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions is unlikely to curb Iran’s influence within Iraqi government institutions, however. Many Iraqi political parties appoint loyalists to senior civil service positions, known as “special grades,” within key ministries to act as a proxy for the party.[xiii] These “special grades” include director-general and deputy minister and enable the Iranian-backed parties to divert state resources for their benefit.[xiv]  Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties could use the ”special grades” system to retain control of key ministerial roles even if their publicly affiliated candidates were barred from senior ministry roles. These parties could also promote long-time ”special grade” officials loyal to them while still claiming that the appointments are ”technocratic.” Either method would be difficult to detect without an in-depth, detailed understanding of the internal workings of Iraqi ministries. 

 

The Suwayda National Guard conducted several politically motivated arrests and killings of prominent Druze individuals in Suwayda Province on November 28, likely as part of an effort by the Suwayda Autonomous Government to discourage dissent and to consolidate political control. The Suwayda National Guard arrested ten individuals on November 28 and accused them of participating in a “conspiracy” in coordination with the Syrian transitional government to conduct attacks in Suwayda Province.[xv] A media figure close to Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri reinforced the accusations on November 28 by claiming that the individuals planned to kidnap Suwayda Autonomous Government leaders, use car bombs, and attack public areas with improvised explosive devices.[xvi] The Suwayda National Guard arrested Sheikh Raed al Matni, Sheikh Maher al Falout, prominent Druze businessman Assem Abu Fakhr, Gandhi Abu Fakhr, and three relatives of transitional government-allied Laith al Balous, among others.[xvii] Suwayda National Guard members recorded themselves torturing Sheikh Matni on November 29 and forcibly shaving his moustache and beard, which hold religious significance for the Druze.[xviii]  The Suwayda National Guard reportedly delivered Matni’s body, which showed visible signs of torture, to the entrance of the Suwayda City hospital on December 2.[xix] Sheikh Matni helped form the Suwayda Military Council in February 2025, which was a Druze militia that fought transitional government forces during the intercommunal violence in Suwayda in July 2025.[xx] Some Syrian and Turkish media reports claim that Matni had a close relationship with Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri, but that the relationship deteriorated after Matni opposed Hijri’s formation of the Suwayda National Guard in August 2025.[xxi] A separate pro-government Syrian source claimed the Suwayda National Guard arrested Matni for proposing a negotiated settlement with the Syrian transitional government.[xxii] The Suwayda National Guard also tortured and killed Sheikh Falout and businessman Assem Abu Fakhr.[xxiii] The National Guard’s arrest, torture, and reported killing of prominent locals who may have challenged the Suwayda Autonomous Government likely aims to deter dissent by increasing the perceived cost of opposition to its rule. The autonomous government may weaponize the allegations of a Damascus-sponsored coup against the Suwayda government to justify additional repressive measures in the name of community security.

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan presented a plan for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that aligns with the SDF leadership’s federalized vision for Syria as the March 10 agreement’s December 31 deadline approaches. Imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan presented a detailed plan to Turkish parliament members involved in the PKK disarmament process on November 24 that calls for the SDF to join the Syrian military but maintain its own internal security structures.[xxiv] This statement marks the first time that Ocalan has explicitly called for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian military but retain its internal security forces. Ocalan stated in February 2025 that ”all [PKK] groups must lay [down] their arms,” which Turkish officials took to mean that the SDF would be pressured into disarming and integrating into the Syrian transitional government under the MoD.[xxv] This belief is based on the Turkish government’s conflation between the PKK, the SDF, and the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF in February 2025 but rejected Ocalan’s call to disarm and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.”[xxvi]  Ocalan’s newly articulated vision more closely aligns with Abdi’s demand for a decentralized Syrian state and for the SDF to retain local security control in northeastern Syria.[xxvii] Abdi said on November 24 that the SDF seeks a ”decentralized Syria” that allows local populations in northeastern Syria to elect their own military, administrative, and security representatives.[xxviii]

Both the SDF and the Syrian government have refused to concede their fundamental negotiating positions, which would require them to change their views on the centralization of state power as the year-end March agreement deadline approaches. The Syrian transitional government insists that a central authority should rule Syria through appointed governors and views SDF decentralization as a path toward secession.[xxix] The SDF views decentralization as a way to secure local authority over regional affairs and sees the government’s push to concentrate power in Damascus as an attempt to impose autocratic rule.[xxx] The Syrian government and the SDF hold opposing, zero-sum positions on centralization, and their dispute risks renewed conflict in Syria if neither side compromises.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Military Cooperation with US Adversaries: Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran. IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first-person view drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions. The exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions is unlikely to curb Iran’s influence within Iraqi government institutions, however.
• Suwayda Political Consolidation: The anti-Syrian government Suwayda National Guard conducted several politically motivated arrests and killings of prominent Druze individuals in Suwayda Province on November 28, likely as part of an effort by the anti-Syrian government Suwayda Autonomous Government to discourage dissent and to consolidate political control.
• Syrian Democratic Forces’ Integration: Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan presented a plan for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense that aligns with the SDF leadership’s federalized vision for Syria as the March 10 agreement’s December 31 deadline approaches. Both the SDF and the Syrian government have refused to concede their fundamental negotiating positions, which would require them to change their views on the centralization of state power. The lack of compromise increases the risk for renewed conflict in the short term.

Iran Update, December 1, 2025

Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario. An Israeli security source told Israeli media on November 30 that Iran is attempting to rearm its regional partners, including the Houthis, Hezbollah, and unspecified groups in the West Bank and Syria, for potential action against Israel.[i] The source added that Iran is in “an arms race” because Iran understands that Israel will launch an operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government fails to meet the United States’ December 31 deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[ii] A political council member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Iranian media on December 1 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have worked to develop an “advanced security plan” to improve organizational structure, enhance drone and missile capabilities, and fortify militia headquarters in preparation for “any upcoming military operation“ against Israel.[iii] Israeli and Arab media reported on December 1 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that Israel intends to carry out an operation against Hezbollah soon, ”that will continue until [the group] is disarmed.”[iv] Barrack reportedly warned Sudani that Israel would strike Iraq if any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias intervene in a potential Israeli operation against Hezbollah and urged Sudani to stop any militia activities to ”support Hezbollah... financially or militarily.”[v] US officials have previously warned Iraqi officials that they must deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militia from targeting Israel or the United States. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi on November 4 that the United States would act against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria.[vi]

Iran’s reported preparations for a potential Israel-Hezbollah conflict suggest that Iran could push its Axis of Resistance partners to proactively fight Israel, despite the major defeats that multiple Axis partners and Iran have sustained in the past two years.  Iran largely restrained itself and the rest of the Axis from fully engaging Israel and the United States at various points throughout the Israel-Hamas War. Iran only partially activated its Axis partners following the Hamas October 7 attack. Iran did not activate pre-existing plans for Hezbollah to launch ground attacks into northern Israel after the October 7 attacks, for example. Some Iranian officials have recently called for Iranian partners to remove this ”restraint,” which may suggest that Iran views its previous approach against Israel as a mistake. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei, for example, urged Hezbollah on November 25 to abandon its ”restraint” and strike Israel for its killing of Hezbollah’s ”de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai on November 23.[vii]

Iran is facing several internal issues and is in the process of rebuilding its diminished military capabilities, which may make the regime hesitant to become directly involved in a renewed Israel-Hezbollah conflict, however. Iran is reportedly facing increased “turmoil” and infighting within the regime due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[viii] Iran has also undertaken efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program and its weapons stockpiles and reshuffle senior military leadership after Israel destroyed key weaponry and killed a significant number of senior Iranian military officials during the Israel-Iran War.[ix] Iran’s need to rebuild and re-focus domestically will limit Iran’s ability to meaningfully rebuild some of its partner forces on a short timeline, however.

Some of Iran's other partners, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, may also be hesitant to conduct kinetic operations against Israel in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may hesitate to get involved in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions for their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is significant for the Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[x] Iraqi militias could face political repercussions for engaging in a conflict. Some Iraqi parties could decide against aligning with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a war with Israel, for example. Iran’s partners in Iraq conducted attacks targeting Israel and US military positions in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not claim the attacks to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and causing negative political repercussions ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xi] The militias’ inaction during the war highlights that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may not be willing to engage in activities that could disrupt their political efforts. External militia operations that trigger US or Israeli action in Iraq are generally unpopular in Iraq.

Hezbollah is also likely hesitant to pursue any direct action against Israel that could trigger a full-scale conflict and disrupt the group’s reconstitution efforts. An Israeli media outlet reported on December 1 that Hezbollah is pursuing the “dual objective” of indirectly retaliating for Tabatabai’s death while ensuring that its retaliation will not warrant an Israeli response that could lead to a “full-scale war” in Lebanon.[xii] The Israeli outlet added that Hezbollah may request that the Houthis launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel on Hezbollah’s behalf.[xiii] The Houthis may be willing to act on Hezbollah’s behalf in this specific situation due to Tabatabai’s role in training Houthi fighters.[xiv] The Houthis may not be willing to engage in a broader escalation, however. The Houthis did not support Hezbollah kinetically during or after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024, despite Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stating that there is “complete solidarity” between the Houthis and Hezbollah.[xv] The Houthis instead have linked their campaign against Israel to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xvi] Hezbollah’s continued hesitancy to act directly against Israel, nonetheless, suggests that the group fears escalation because of its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control. Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack directly targeting Israel or Israeli forces would presumably prompt a large Israeli response, because Israel has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force.[xvii] Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks by targeting Hezbollah fighters, military infrastructure, and supply lines.[xviii]

Jaish al Adl announced on November 29 that the group has merged with other Baloch militia groups and will continue its activities in Iran.[xix] Jaish al Adl has posed one of the largest internal security threats to the Iranian regime, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[xx] The group‘s attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province have demonstrated sophisticated operational and organizational capabilities. Likely Jaish al Adl fighters killed an IRGC Ground Forces officer along the Bampur-Delgan road and separately killed two Basij members along the Khash-Zahedan road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 1, though Jaish al Adl has not claimed either attack or any others since October 2025.[xxi] Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have recently visited Pakistan to discuss bilateral economic, border security, and counterterrorism cooperation.[xxii] Larijani traveled to Pakistan on November 24 and met with multiple Pakistani officials, including Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Pakistani PM Shahbaz Sharif.[xxiii] Larijani called for enhanced Iran-Pakistan intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation.[xxiv]

The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort.[xxv] The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[xxvi] The Sahand capsized in Bandar Abbas Port on the Persian Gulf in July 2024.[xxvii] The Kurdistan reportedly carries eight Ghadr and Ghadir anti-ship missiles with a 200-kilometer to 300-kilometer range, vertical-launch Navab air-defense missiles with a 25-kilometer range for low-altitude threats, and Kian one-way attack drones with a roughly 2,000-kilometer range.[xxviii] Iran has constructed several forward base ships and other offensive vessels since 2021 to execute expeditionary and out-of-area operations.[xxix] Iran has sometimes built these vessels by converting old commercial tankers. The Iranian Artesh has also developed a variety of forward-base and long-range surface ships, including the Makran, which was the first Artesh Navy’s forward base ship.[xxx] The Makran carries drones, helicopters, and anti-ship missiles, which enable months-long deployments for out-of-area missions.[xxxi]

These Iranian ships are not likely to survive conventional naval engagements with the United States, but they can support attacks on international commercial traffic. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.[xxxii] Iran would have to deploy naval mines and fast attack crafts to close the Strait. Iran also sees its naval capabilities as another form of deterrence. Senior Iranian military commanders claim that Iran did not use its naval capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because Iran deliberately held those capabilities in reserve and saw no reason to expand the conflict.[xxxiii] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani also announced on November 29 that the Artesh Navy will name its next "floating base" Khuzestan, which indicates that the Iranian Artesh is institutionalizing this class of long-endurance support ships as a core element of its future naval force.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Plans for a Potential Israel-Hezbollah Conflict: Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario, but Iran and many of its key partners have strong incentives not to threaten Israel at this time if it can be avoided.
• Jaish al Adl Militancy: Jaish al Adl announced on November 29 that the group has merged with other Baloch militia groups and will continue its activities in Iran. Jaish al Adl has posed one of the largest internal security threats to the Iranian regime, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests.
• Iranian Navy Modernization: The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort. The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.

Previous Iran Updates

• November 2025
• October 2025
• September 2025
• August 2025
• July 2025
• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023