Iran Updates

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.

                      

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, January 13, 2026

The Iranian regime is using an unprecedented level of brutality to suppress protests. The actual death toll is likely significantly higher relative to the 1,500 people killed during the 2019 protests, though CTP-ISW cannot independently determine the number of protester deaths. Western media outlets have reported death toll estimates in Iran ranging from 2,000 to 20,000, and anecdotal information is consistent with the regime killing thousands in its crackdown.[i] The regime killed approximately 1500 people in the span of two weeks during the 2019 economic protests.[ii] Regime security forces have fired on crowds indiscriminately—in some cases with machine guns—and killed scores of citizens across numerous locations.[iii] Some Iranians who have bypassed the internet shutdown have reported very high volumes of dead protesters on the streets and in hospitals and morgues.[iv] Some reports alleged the presence of 700-1,000 dead protesters at just one morgue in Tehran, not accounting for other locations around the capital or the country overall.[v] Other Iranians have claimed that the regime's crackdown is much greater than the one it conducted in November 2019, during which security forces killed around 1,500 protesters.[vi] This anecdotal information is most consistent with the regime killing many thousands in its crackdown.

This level of brutality may be discouraging protesters and decreasing the rate of protest activity. A protester from Shiraz told TIME on January 11 that the police attacks have been particularly violent compared to previous protests and that the protest turnout in Shiraz on January 9 ”was inhibited by aggressive security forces.”[vii] CTP-ISW assessed on January 12 that the rate of protest activity across Iran may have decreased due to the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests. 

Reports of protest activity across Iran continued at a relatively low level on January 13. We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 7 protests across 6 provinces on January 13, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[viii] CTP-ISW continued to record protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Esfahan, and Tabriz. The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas. It would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.

The regime has continued to take steps to severely restrict the flow of information out of Iran. The regime has maintained a nationwide internet blackout, designed to prevent Iranians from sharing videos of protests and the regime’s crackdown, since January 8. Iranian security forces reportedly launched a massive operation on January 12 to search homes in several cities across Iran, including Tehran, and seize satellite dishes, according to Norway-based human rights group Hengaw.[ix] The collection of satellite dishes would allow the regime to disrupt the use of Starlink and other satellite connectivity by Iranians who seek to share videos of protests with foreign media.[x]

Russia is likely helping the Iranian regime suppress protests and maintain control in the face of both protests and insurgent attacks. Politico reported on January 13 that Russia supplied Iran with Russian-made Spartak armored vehicles and attack helicopters in recent weeks.[xi]  Iran received these systems before the protests began, but Iran likely acquired these systems for use in internal disturbances, including protests. Iran is very unlikely to use such equipment in any conventional modern conflict. Israel and the United States, Iran’s key adversaries, use long-range missiles and aircraft that could destroy attack helicopters long before the helicopter could engage the aircraft. Attack helicopters are more capable at fighting insurgencies or addressing internal conflicts due to the lack of serious enemy air defenses that could inhibit helicopter operations.[xii] Iran is facing both large-scale protests and small insurgent attacks along its borders. Armored vehicles can be used to bolster the regime’s efforts to suppress the protests and broader counter-insurgency efforts. Russia previously sent Iran Spartak armored vehicles in 2023, and Iranian border guards began operating them in November 2025.[xiii] These border guards could help support counterinsurgent operations against Balochi or Kurdish militias that operate in border areas and are conducting attacks amid the protests (see below). Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu held a phone call with SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani on January 13, almost certainly to discuss ongoing protests in Iran.[xiv] Iran previously sought Russia’s help to quell protests in 2022.[xv]       

The overlap of protest activity and reported militancy in border areas is placing additional strain on the regime’s security apparatus and risks allowing each to intensify the threat posed by the other. Recent regime responses to the protests, including the deployment of the IRGC Ground Forces to some cities, indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces. Reports indicate that the Iranian security forces arrested at least 550 Baloch protesters in Zahedan, Chabahar, and Iranshahr, over the past five days.[xvi] Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid escalated his criticism of the regime’s response to the protests in a January 13 post on X. Hamid stated that the killing of protesters constituted a “horrific and unprecedented catastrophe” that plunged the Iranian nation into grief and rage.[xvii] Abdol Hamid warned that those responsible would be held accountable both "in this world and the hereafter."[xviii] Abdol Hamid’s statement marks an intensification from his January 9 sermon, in which he urged peaceful change and called on security forces to avoid confronting protesters.[xix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamid may be reemerging as a catalyst for protests in southeastern Iran, which would compound the bandwidth constraints that Iranian security forces are reportedly facing. Abdol Hamid was a catalyst for protests in Zahedan during and after the Mahsa Amini movement.  A medium-sized anti-regime protest, which CTP-ISW defines as a protest with 100-1,000 participants, broke out in Zahedan after Abdol Hamid’s January 9 sermon.

A recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran may exacerbate the regime's bandwidth constraints by creating additional security challenges for the regime in southeastern Iran. Anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran will only further strain security force capacity as the protests continue. Iranian media reported on January 13 that Iranian security forces arrested several “terrorist teams” operating und n Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xx] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on January 13 that those groups entered Iran from the east and established seven safe houses in Zahedan.[xxi] The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Sistan and Baluchistan border guards separately arrested a group of “smugglers” and seized several weapons in border areas on January 13.[xxii] The Mubarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch organizations,  separately claimed responsibility for two attacks targeting LEC personnel in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 7 and 10.[xxiii] The MPF stated on January 1 that it is monitoring the regime’s response to the protests and emphasized that it will respond to any instances of regime violence, which suggests a potential willingness to escalate if conditions deteriorate.[xxiv]

There also continue to be unconfirmed reports of Kurdish militant activity in northwestern Iran. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), which is an Iranian Kurdish militant group, issued a statement on January 13, claiming responsibility for attacks against IRGC positions in Kermanshah Province on January 12.[xxv] The group claimed that multiple teams conducted a coordinated attack and killed IRGC personnel.[xxvi] The group stated that the operation was retaliation for the death of PAK fighters.[xxvii] IRGC Ground Forces Nabi Akram Unit members have been involved in the suppression of protests in Kermanshah.[xxviii]  The Kurdistan National Guard separately announced on January 9 that its “Zagros Tornado units” attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.

Militant groups operating in Iran’s border regions do not represent the ongoing protest movement, however. The recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran suggests that these groups may exploit the current unrest and the bandwidth issues facing regime security forces to advance their objectives. These groups are likely not solely focused on overthrowing the regime but are also positioning themselves for a potential post-regime environment in which they could pursue greater ambitions, including autonomy in Kurdish and Baloch areas.[xxix] Militant activity challenges the regime by diverting security forces and stretching resources across multiple regions, which may allow these groups to operate more freely. It is possible that regime collapse could create conditions for these groups’ separatist aims, which would have consequences beyond Iran into the broader Middle East and South Asia. The regime could use gains by these groups to support its framing that the protests are driven by ”terrorists,” just as Syrian President Bashar al Assad falsely claimed that all Syrian protesters were jihadists during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War.

US President Donald Trump is continuing to consider various options to intervene in the ongoing protests in Iran.  Some US officials believe that Iran may be trying to delay a US attack on Iran rather than aiming to engage in sincere diplomacy, according to two officials speaking to the New York Times.[xxx] The Pentagon presented Trump on January 13 with a range of strike options and targets in Iran, including Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile sites, according to a US official.[xxxi] The official stated that a cyberattack on Iran's domestic security apparatus is more likely, however.[xxxii] The official added that any attack is ”at least several days away.”  President Trump also wrote on Truth Social on January 13 that he has canceled all meetings with Iranian officials until the regime stops killing protesters and emphasized that “help is on the way.”[xxxiii] He later added that US citizens in Iran should leave Iran.[xxxiv]  Trump separately announced on January 12 that any country conducting business with Iran will face a 25 percent tariff on its bilateral trade with the United States.[xxxv]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on January 12 to take unspecified kinetic action against the United States if it attacks Iran.[xxxvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, notably did not follow through with their threats to conduct major attacks targeting the United States after the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi released a statement on January 12 that emphasized the “legitimate and moral duty” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to support Iran amid US preparations to attack Iran.[xxxvii] Hamidawi warned the “American enemy” that it would “pay a double price” if the United States attacked Iran.[xxxviii]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be taking inspiration from recent Iranian threats to target US forces and following the intent of Iranian officials. Hamidawi’s threat comes after Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on January 11 that Iran could target US or Israeli military bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[xxxix] A likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facade group also threatened on January 10 to attack the US Embassy in Baghdad and US interests in the Middle East in response to US support for the ongoing protests in Iran.[xl] Iran’s partners in Iraq conducted a few unclaimed attacks on US military bases in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not pursue greater kinetic action after the US struck Iranian nuclear sites.[xli] The militias’ show of restraint in June 2025 was probably partially a response to a concern that attacking the United States would have negative political ramifications for the militias’ political wings in the November 2025 elections.[xlii] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors continue to vie to maintain their control of the Iraqi state during the ongoing Iraqi government formation process following the elections, however. The militias could reassess attacks on the United States at any time, however, including if the US strikes in Iran seriously threatened regime stability. There have been several unconfirmed reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, are helping the Iranian regime suppress protests.[xliii]

Current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew from the premiership race on January 12, probably in an effort to sabotage State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s chances of obtaining the position.[xliv] Sudani also leads the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, which is a large Shia coalition in parliament. The Reconstruction and Development Coalition spokesperson announced on January 12 that Sudani has withdrawn from the premiership race to break the “deadlock” within the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a coalition of Shia parties including some that Iran backs.[xlv] The framework, as the largest bloc in parliament, has debated for weeks who to select for the next prime minister.[xlvi] Unspecified framework members told Iraqi media on January 12 that Sudani withdrew himself from consideration in order to “expose” Maliki to an “expected barrage of political and religious vetoes” to his candidacy that could weaken Maliki’s position during the government formation process.[xlvii] Sudani reportedly said that he would withdraw from the race if all framework leaders, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Shia nationalist cleric Moqtada al Sadr, and unspecified Kurdish and Sunni political parties approved Maliki as prime minister, according to information that unspecified actors leaked to Kurdish media.[xlviii] The leaked information also suggested that if Maliki failed to meet these conditions, Sudani would receive the premiership with the backing of the framework.[xlix]

Sudani may be wagering that Maliki will fail to meet the five reported conditions. Iraqi media reported on January 12 that framework leader and National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim does not support Maliki, although Maliki’s senior adviser denied that Hakim opposed Maliki on January 13.[l] Sistani, Iraq’s highest religious authority, reportedly refused to intervene in the selection of the next prime minister when Hakim asked for Sistani’s thoughts on Maliki, which suggests that Sistani is unlikely to weigh in positively or negatively about Maliki.[li] Sistani only intervenes in Iraqi politics in dire situations, such as when he refused to support Maliki’s bid for a third term in 2014 as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) ravaged the country.[lii] Maliki is also unlikely to gain support from Sadr due to the longstanding enmity between Sadr and Maliki.[liii]

Maliki may be attempting to meet these conditions. The State of Law Coalition has recently expressed support for Parliament Secretary-General Hamid al Ghazi, who is close to Sadr, which may indicate that Maliki’s coalition is attempting to induce Sadr’s support for Maliki’s prime minister bid.[liv] Maliki‘s adviser also stated that unidentified Sunni political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party support Maliki’s bid for the premiership, but none of these parties have publicly declared or implicitly signaled that they support Maliki.[lv] Maliki has a long history of sectarian behavior, but Sunni parties may still support Maliki if he can offer them enough inducements to encourage their cooperation.[lvi]

It is unclear if the framework would allow Sudani to serve another term even if Maliki failed to meet Sudani’s reported five conditions, however. Multiple framework leaders, including Maliki, have opposed Sudani serving a second term in office due, in part, to some actions that Sudani has taken against Iranian-backed interests in Iraq while in office.[lvii] These actions have eroded some framework parties’ confidence that they can control and co-opt Sudani, and Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors have historically sought prime ministers who are perceived as malleable and susceptible to framework influence.[lviii]

A Maliki premiership would be severely detrimental to US interests in Iraq, even if it supports efforts to “disarm” Iraqi militias. The United States reportedly told the Shia Coordination Framework and the Iraqi federal government that the United States will not engage with any prime minister or appointee to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Counterterrorism Service, National Intelligence Service, or Iraqi Army Chief of Staff who has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, according to five Iraqi officials speaking to al Araby al Jadeed on December 11.[lix] Maliki may have less overt ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias than other Iraqi figures that the United States wants excluded from government formation, but he would still likely pursue problematic policies regarding the militias. Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supported his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3.[lx] The State of Law Coalition denied on December 6 that Maliki contacted the United States about militia disarmament.[lxi]

These soft commitments by Maliki, if true, do not outweigh the risks he poses to US interests and stability in Iraq. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the partially Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister. This effort would harm Iraqi stability because Maliki would probably pursue authoritarian, sectarian, and extralegal policies that are similar to the policies he pursued when he previously served as prime minister, which led to the rise of ISIS.[lxii]  The United States delayed its military support for Iraq against ISIS in 2014 until Maliki was removed from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[lxiii]

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began a limited offensive operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in a salient east of Aleppo City and west of the Euphrates River.[lxiv] The MoD may have launched the operation to defeat and remove SDF fighters who are responsive to PKK control from the Aleppo area. A number of Asayish fighters in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh ignored a US-mediated ceasefire over the city on January 9 and continued to attack government forces, despite SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi's presumed agreement to the ceasefire.[lxv] The MoD said that the operation was necessary due to the presence of PKK fighters and Assad regime remnants in Deir Hafer, which is consistent with Turkish reports that SDF forces in Aleppo may be more responsive to the PKK than to SDF control.[lxvi] The Syrian government also alleged that Deir Hafer-based SDF forces fired a series of drones at Aleppo City during the fighting on January 10 that struck some civilian infrastructure, including a government building where the governor and other ministers were attending a conference.^[lxvii] Deir Hafer is the westernmost city that the SDF still holds in Aleppo Province and the salient where MoD and SDF engagements have previously occurred most frequently. Turkish officials believe that the PKK interfered with SDF efforts to end the fighting in Aleppo by encouraging SDF forces in Aleppo to stand and fight despite SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and AANES official Ilham Ahmed’s efforts to end the fighting.[lxviii] These comments indicate that Turkey is beginning to distinguish between the SDF and PKK in Syria, which is a significant policy change. The MoD achieved complete control over the Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo and forced the last SDF-affiliated fighters to withdraw to Deir Hafer on January 11.[lxix] These forces were supposed to withdraw to northeastern Syria, according to Abdi, but it is unclear if and how many of the Aleppo-based fighters actually left Deir Hafer.[lxx]

The stated objective of the MoD’s operation is to advance and secure the majority of the Deir Hafer salient, including the towns of Deir Hafer, Babiri, and Maskana, in order to prevent further mobilization of SDF reinforcements there and to deny the SDF’s ability to launch drone attacks on government territory such as the SDF’s January 10 drone attacks on Aleppo City.[lxxi] The MoD’s capture of the Deir Hafer salient would limit the SDF’s ability to threaten the MoD's rear and flanks if the MoD launched a larger offensive across the Euphrates River, where MoD forces are currently confined to the vulnerable Qara Qozok Bridge and Tishreen Dam crossings. MoD seizure of the Deir Hafer salient would further consolidate SDF defense on the east bank of the Euphrates, however.

The MoD and SDF have undertaken the following lines of effort to achieve their respective objectives. The SDF reportedly destroyed three bridges near Umm Tina, Tell Maaz, and Rasm al Harmel villages to disrupt MoD advances along the northern and western flanks of the salient on January 13.[lxxii] The 20-meter-wide al Jer canal divides most of the northern and western flanks of the Deir Hafer salient—and therefore the SDF–MoD frontlines—acting as a barrier that forces must cross to reach the opposite side.[lxxiii] Local pro-government sources claimed the SDF deployed landmines near Babiri village on January 13, likely to create a defensive barrier because Babiri and the nearby water plant are the only areas of Deir Hafer salient not bisected by the canal.[lxxiv] The SDF also reportedly deployed sniper units to Deir Hafer itself and nearby villages to halt MoD advances on January 13.[lxxv] The SDF separately conducted a drone strike in MoD-controlled Humaymah, to which the MoD responded by conducting counter-battery artillery strikes on Deir Hafer on January 13.[lxxvi] The MoD conducted multiple drone and artillery strikes on SDF positions within the Deir Hafer salient, including strikes on Deir Hafer, Umm al Mara, and Rasm al Krum on January 13.[lxxvii] MoD drone strikes also targeted the SDF-controlled Jirah Airbase, likely to disrupt SDF efforts to reinforce its frontlines in the salient on January 13.[lxxviii]  MoD reportedly prevented the SDF from destroying the bridge that connects MoD-controlled Rasm al Imam to SDF-controlled Rasm al Krum which could allow for MoD forces to cross the al Jer canal and begin advances on Deir Hafer, as the road is the most direct northern route to Deir Hafer.[lxxix] The MoD and SDF both deployed reinforcements to the Deir Hafer salient on January 13, with the MoD reinforcements reportedly including drone units and recently produced multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).^[lxxx]

The Syrian operation in Deir Hafer does not appear at this time to be part of a larger-scale nationwide military campaign that the Syrian government is launching against the SDF. The MoD launched the Deir Hafer operation after accusing the SDF of mobilizing alongside “terrorist PKK militias” and of launching drone strikes from the area that struck civilian areas.[lxxxi] The MoD’s specific reference to the presence of the possibly PKK-linked fighters and the drone attacks that struck Aleppo suggests that this operation is an effort to protect a major Syrian city rather than a nationwide operation to destroy the SDF.[lxxxii] The Syrian government has not yet explicitly connected this objective to its strategic aims regarding the Kurds’ integration into the Syrian state, nor articulated any objectives in other regions of northern or eastern Syria.

CTP-ISW has not observed strong indicators to suggest that the Syrian government is actively preparing for an expanded campaign that might stretch into other regions or northern and eastern Syria. Turkish media have described such an operation as a large-scale, multi-pronged offensive on northeastern Syria.[lxxxiii] Such an operation would probably require the involvement of Raqqa and Deir ez Zor province-based Syrian army units, including former Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters that have been based in the SNA-controlled Peace Spring enclave since 2019.[lxxxiv] CTP-ISW has not observed the significant deployment of forces or equipment to SDF-government frontlines in Raqqa or Deir ez Zor provinces as of this writing, though the Syrian army reportedly deployed some reinforcements to the Euphrates River line in Deir ez Zor Province in early December 2025.[lxxxv]  Assistant Minister of Defense Fahim Issa additionally visited Syrian army units in the Peace Spring area on December 23 to discuss ”military readiness” and deployments in the area.[lxxxvi]

The Syrian government’s operations against the SDF in Aleppo may not necessarily remain “limited,” however. The MoD's goal to reduce the SDF’s salient in Deir Hafer is a logical first step in any larger military campaign designed to compel the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state. Senior Syrian officials have long referred to Syrian or Turkish military action against the SDF as an undesirable but possibly inevitable outcome; however, they may still decide to pursue a larger military campaign in the coming weeks or months.[lxxxvii]

Turkey’s involvement in the MoD’s Aleppo operations, if it occurred, would be an indicator that the MoD may seek to expand the fighting beyond Deir Hafer, western bank of the Euphrates River, but CTP-ISW has not observed any Turkish involvement in Deir Hafer at this time. Turkey has long considered the SDF to be a terrorist organization due to its ties to the PKK and has conducted multiple offensives targeting the SDF's dominant faction, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), along the Syrian-Turkish border.[lxxxviii] Turkey  is reportedly not participating in Syrian operations in Aleppo at this time, but the Turkish Defense Ministry said on January 8 that the Turkish army is “ready to provide the necessary support” to the Syrian government in a conflict with the SDF, despite Turkey’s current restraint.[lxxxix] AANES official Ilham Ahmed warned on January 13 that the current events in Aleppo increase the risk of ”external interference,” likely referring to Turkey.[xc]

Key Takeaways

• Protests in Iran: Reports of protest activity across Iran continued at a relatively low level on January 13. CTP-ISW recorded 7 protests across 6 provinces on January 13, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8. We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran.
• Iranian Regime Crackdown on Protests: The Iranian regime is currently engaged in an unprecedented level of brutality to suppress protests. The actual death toll is likely higher relative to the 1,500 people killed during the 2019 protests, though CTP-ISW cannot independently determine the number of protester deaths.
• Anti-regime Militancy in Iran: A recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran may exacerbate the regime's bandwidth constraints by creating additional security challenges for the regime in southeastern Iran.
• SDF-Government Conflict in Aleppo: The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began a limited offensive operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in a salient east of Aleppo City and west of the Euphrates River. The MoD may have launched the operation to defeat and remove SDF fighters who are responsive to PKK control from the Aleppo area. The Syrian operation in Deir Hafer does not appear at this time to be part of a larger-scale nationwide military campaign that the Syrian government is launching against the SDF. The Syrian government’s operations against the SDF in Aleppo may not necessarily remain “limited,” however.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew from the premiership race on January 12, probably in an effort to sabotage State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s chances of obtaining the position. A Maliki premiership would be severely detrimental to US interests in Iraq, even if it supports efforts to “disarm” Iraqi militias.

Iran Update, January 12, 2026

CTP-ISW has recorded significantly less protest activity across Iran since January 8.[i] We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 14 protests across six provinces on January 12, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[ii] CTP-ISW recorded protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Mashhad, and Karaj, on January 12.[iii] The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas and it would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.[iv] Iranians are also likely able to access tools like Starlink satellites more readily in urban areas and use these tools to share videos of protests with foreign media.[v] The regime’s internet shutdown therefore likely explains, at least partially, the decrease in recorded protest activity since January 8.[vi]

 

There are several indications that protests continue to take place in areas where we did not record protests on January 12. Fox News’s chief foreign correspondent reported on January 12 that he was able to contact a source in Esfahan who confirmed that protests continue to take place in the city.[vii] CTP-ISW has not recorded protests in Esfahan since January 9, which suggests that protesters in Esfahan have been unable to share videos of protests due to the internet shutdown. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency separately updated its security personnel death count on January 12 from 114 to 121.[viii] Tasnim recorded seven additional security personnel deaths in Fars Province on January 12, which suggests that protests, or at least the regime’s crackdown on anti-regime dissidents, have continued to take place in this province. CTP-ISW last reported a protest in Fars Province on January 10.[ix] Tasnim’s death count likely does not account for the full scale of security personnel deaths, given that CTP-ISW has recorded three security personnel deaths in Tehran Province, while Tasnim has not reported any deaths in this province.[x]

 

It is possible that the rate of protest activity across Iran has decreased due to the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests. A Norway-based human rights group reported on January 11 that the regime has killed at least 544 people and arrested more than 10,681 people since the beginning of the protests on December 28.[xi] Some estimates suggest that the protester death count is in the thousands. CTP-ISW has recorded 83 incidents across 24 provinces of security forces shooting live ammunition at protesters since December 28.[xii] Hospitals and medical centers in Iran have also reported being overwhelmed by the number of wounded protesters. The regime’s brutality could discourage some individuals from participating in the protests and thereby reduce the rate of protests.[xiii]

 

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media threatened on January 12 to deploy more IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress protests.[xiv] The threat indicates that the regime continues to perceive protests as a significant threat to its stability, which is consistent with our assessment that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded. AFGS-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised the ability of the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade to “confront terrorists in any situation,” suggesting that the IRGC could deploy these units to suppress protests.[xv] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly described protesters as “terrorists.” The Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces, is considered the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[xvi] Brigadier General Amanollah Goshtasbi has commanded this base since March 2025.[xvii] The United States sanctioned Goshtasbi for his role in suppressing and killing Baloch citizens during the Mahsa Amini movement while serving as the IRGC Ground Forces Salman Corps commander in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xviii] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought in Syria to defend the Assad regime in 2015 and suppressed protests in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement.[xix] Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Feizollahi has commanded the Saberin Special Forces Brigade since June 2023.[xx] Feizollahi previously commanded the IRGC Ground Forces Ansar-e Rasoul Special Forces unit and reportedly ordered forces to shoot directly at protesters in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province, in November 2022.[xxi]

IRGC Ground Forces units have already deployed to several locations in western Iran, which suggests that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij may be struggling to contain protests in these provinces. The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division deployed to suppress protests in Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province, on January 8.[xxii] The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division operates under the IRGC Ground Forces Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Hamedan provinces.[xxiii] IRGC Ground Forces Command Brigadier General Mohammad Karami recently appointed Brigadier General Mohsen Najaf Karimi as the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base commander in November 2025.[xxiv] The United Kingdom and European Union sanctioned Karimi for perpetrating serious human rights violations in his role as commander of the IRGC Ruhollah Corps in Markazi Province during the regime’s crackdown on the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests.[xxv] A Kurdish human rights organization separately reported a “large deployment” of IRGC forces to Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 10.[xxvi] It is possible that the IRGC forces in Bukan operate under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base given that this base is headquartered in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province.[xxvii] A BBC Persian journalist additionally circulated unverified reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam Province on January 8.[xxviii] IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 12 that protesters killed IRGC Colonel Mehdi Rahimi in Ilam City, Ilam Province, which could corroborate the recent reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam.[xxix]

 

 

The Iranian regime is likely encouraging pro-regime demonstrations as a counter-protest tactic to broadcast public support for the regime, discredit the protest movement, and possibly even directly confront protesters in the streets. The regime called on the Iranian people on January 12 to participate in pro-regime protests.[xxx] IRGC-affiliated media reported that pro-regime protesters demonstrated in at least 13 cities, including Tehran.[xxxi] Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian attended a pro-regime rally in Tehran on January 12.[xxxii] The call for regime supporters to take to the streets inherently creates a risk that anti-regime protesters will encounter pro-regime supporters, many of whom are likely members of Iranian security institutions, such as the Basij.[xxxiii] The regime is almost certainly aware of this risk and may seek to frame any engagements between pro- and anti-regime protesters as an attack by protesters on civilians and perpetuate its narrative that anti-regime protesters are “terrorists” and “rioters.” The presence of additional security members in public areas could also help the regime quickly quell protests and prevent them from becoming large-scale demonstrations. The regime lastly likely seeks to use the pro-regime rallies to demonstrate that it maintains public support and to retain its legitimacy.

 

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration has expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States amid Iranian concerns about potential US strikes on Iran. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has softened its red lines for negotiations with the United States. Two sources “with knowledge” told Axios on January 12 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently contacted US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in an effort to “de-escalate” tensions with the United States or “buy more time” before potential US military action against Iran.[xxxiv] Araghchi and Witkoff discussed the possibility of meeting “in the coming days,” according to the sources.[xxxv] Trump confirmed on January 11 that Iran reached out to the United States to propose negotiations for a nuclear deal.[xxxvi] The Axios report comes after Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Araghchi in Tehran on January 10.[xxxvii] Political insiders in Tehran told UK-based Amwaj Media on January 12 that Albusaidi may have relayed a message from the Trump administration during his visit.[xxxviii] Oman has historically served as a mediator between Iran and the United States. The Pezeshkian administration’s efforts to de-escalate tensions with the United States come as Trump has warned that the United States could intervene in the ongoing protests. Trump stated on January 11 that the United States is “looking at” options to support Iranian protesters.[xxxix] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 12 that Trump is weighing diplomacy against military strikes but currently “favors” using military action against Iran.[xl] Iran has refused to negotiate its ability to enrich uranium, support the Axis of Resistance, and develop its ballistic missile program in negotiations with the United States.[xli] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran is willing to make concessions on these issues.

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached a ceasefire on January 10 after government forces captured Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City. Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces, including armored units, advanced into Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo City on January 9 and secured the neighborhood on January 10 after engaging SDF-affiliated internal security forces, known as the Asayish.[xlii] The SDF then conducted five drone attacks targeting civilian infrastructure, including a government building, in Aleppo City on January 10 after the MoD captured Sheikh Maqsoud.[xliii] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF agreed to an internationally-mediated ceasefire on January 10 that requires Asayish forces to withdraw from Aleppo City to SDF-controlled territory in northeastern Syria.[xliv] Local Syrian sources reported that the last Asayish fighters withdrew from Sheikh Maqsoud to SDF-controlled Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, on January 10.[xlv] The fighting between Syrian government forces and the SDF began on January 6, and Sheikh Maqsoud was the last Kurdish neighborhood under Asayish control after the MoD captured the majority of the Ashrafiyeh and Bani Zaid neighborhoods on January 8.[xlvi]  

Syrian government forces’ capture of Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City and the Asayish’s withdrawal from the city will prevent the implementation of certain parts of the April 1 agreement. The April 1 agreement is a 14-point agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF that stipulates the integration of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud into Aleppo City’s municipality, as well as the integration of the Asayish into local police forces.[xlvii] The agreement was never fully implemented and significant episodes of fighting have broken out between government forces and the Asayish since April 2025.[xlviii] The agreement would have allowed the Asayish to effectively continue to police its own communities, but the Asayish will no longer be able to do so given its forced withdrawal from Aleppo City. The Asayish’s possession of heavy weapons violated the April 1 agreement, which required the SDF to remove such weapons from Aleppo City.[xlix]

The ongoing risk of new bouts of conflict between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF along eastern Aleppo frontlines underscores the need for the Syrian government and SDF to implement previous agreements. Syrian media reported that the MoD and SDF sent reinforcements to their respective positions along frontlines near Deir Hafer and Tishreen Dam on January 11 following the Asayish’s withdrawal from Aleppo City on January 10.[l] The MoD claimed that it observed the SDF moving fighters and heavy equipment toward frontlines in Deir Hafer.[li] The SDF denied the MoD’s claim, and a local source observed SDF convoys transferring civilians to Deir Hafer on the same day, likely after evacuating Aleppo City.[lii] A military source told Syrian state media that the MoD deployed additional reinforcements, including armored units and heavy artillery, to SDF-MoD frontlines near Deir Hafer on January 12.[liii] The SDF and MoD separately engaged each other with drones near Tishreen Dam on January 11.[liv] Sporadic bouts of fighting have erupted between the Syrian government and SDF near Tishreen Dam and Deir Hafer in recent months, though these frontlines have remained relatively unchanged. Tensions along these frontlines are unlikely to ease until both the Syrian government and SDF take meaningful steps to fully integrate the SDF into the Syrian state and security apparatus.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Protests: CTP-ISW has recorded significantly less protest activity across Iran since January 8. We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. The regime’s internet shutdown likely explains, at least partially, the decrease in recorded protest activity since January 8. It is possible that the rate of protest activity across Iran has also decreased due to the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests.
• Regime Crackdown: Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media threatened on January 12 to deploy more IRGC Ground Forces units and specialized forces to suppress protests. The threat indicates that the regime continues to perceive protests as a significant threat to its stability, which is consistent with our assessment that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded. IRGC Ground Forces units have already deployed to several locations in western Iran, which suggests that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij may be struggling to contain protests in these provinces.
• US-Iran Negotiations: The Masoud Pezeshkian administration has expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States amid Iranian concerns about potential US strikes on Iran. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has softened its red lines for negotiations with the United States.
• SDF-Government Conflict in Aleppo: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached a ceasefire on January 10 after government forces captured Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City. Syrian government forces’ capture of Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City and the Asayish’s withdrawal from the city will prevent the implementation of certain parts of the April 1 agreement.

Iran Update, January 11, 2026

Note: CTP-ISW has resumed publishing daily Iran Updates to cover the ongoing protests in Iran. CTP-ISW's weekend updates will only include analysis on the protests, while our weekday updates will also include analysis on Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Regime Rhetoric about the Protests: Some Iranian regime officials have framed the ongoing protests as the next phase of the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian security establishment has repeatedly stressed since June 2025 that it believes that the Israel-Iran War is ongoing, despite the fact that the 12-day military conflict ended in June.
• Iranian Threat to Attack US Forces: Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned the United States against “miscalculations” on January 11 and threatened that Iran could target US military bases in the region or Israel if the United States attacks Iran. Ghalibaf’s threat is likely a response to recent Western media reports that US President Donald Trump is considering various options to intervene in the ongoing protests.
• Security Force Crackdown: The regime may be labeling Iranian protesters as “terrorists” and connecting the ongoing protests to the United States and Israel as a tactic to motivate hesitant security officers to forcefully crack down on the protests.
• Iranian Security Personnel Deaths: More Iranian security officers have died during the current protests than in any other protest wave in Iran. IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 11 that at least 114 regime security personnel from the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC have been killed since the start of the protests on December 28. The actual death count for Iranian security personnel is likely higher than the number that IRGC-affiliated media reported given that CTP-ISW has observed reports of security personnel casualties in areas, such as Tehran Province, that IRGC-affiliated media did not include in its death count.
• Protest Rate and Information Availability: CTP-ISW recorded a lower rate of protest activity across Iran on January 11 compared to recent days. The lower rate of protests that CTP-ISW recorded is likely due to the regime’s nationwide internet shutdown and crackdown on the use of Starlink satellites.

Some Iranian regime officials have framed the ongoing protests as the next phase of the Israel-Iran War. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attributed the ongoing protests to Israel and the United States on January 11, arguing that the "riots" have killed hundreds of people and are an "extension of the 12-day war" with the United States and Israel.[i] The IRGC claimed that the United States and Israel have equipped and armed "terrorists" to cause chaos in Iran.[ii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian similarly claimed on January 11 that the United States and Israel aim to incite internal unrest in Iran under the pretext of economic issues.[iii] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared on January 11 that Iran is at war with the United States and Israel on four fronts: cognitive, economic, military, and terrorism.[iv] The “military” front likely refers to the 12-day kinetic conflict in June, while “terrorism” likely refers to the regime’s view of the ongoing protests. Ghalibaf warned the United States against “miscalculations” and threatened that Iran could target US military bases in the region or Israel if the United States attacks Iran.[v] He noted that Iran will not limit itself to being reactive and will respond based on its threat perception.[vi]

The regime may be labeling Iranian protesters as “terrorists” and connecting the ongoing protests to the United States and Israel as a tactic to motivate hesitant security officers to forcefully crack down on the protests. The IRGC Intelligence Organization released a statement on January 10 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment.”[vii] This statement suggests that some Iranian security forces may have already defected or that the regime is very concerned about this possibility.  A Kurdish human rights organization previously reported on January 8 that the regime had arrested “dozens” of security officers in Kermanshah City who refused to fire on protesters.[viii] The regime may be framing protesters as “terrorists” and linking them to the United States and Israel to increase security forces’ willingness to use lethal force against protesters and reduce the risk of defections. The regime’s framing of protesters as “terrorists” and characterization of the protests as a continuation of the Israel-Iran War further indicate that the regime is approaching the ongoing protests as a military issue rather than a law enforcement one.

Ghalibaf’s threat to attack US bases or Israel is likely a response to recent Western media reports that US President Donald Trump is considering various options to intervene in the ongoing protests. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 11 that Trump and senior officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Dan Caine, will receive a briefing on January 13 about response options to Iran’s protests, though the officials are not expected to make a final decision during that meeting.[ix] The New York Times separately reported on January 10 that Trump is “seriously considering” military strikes against Iran in response to the Iranian regime’s violent crackdown on the protests, but “has not made a final decision.”[x] Unspecified US officials said that advisers presented Trump with a range of potential strike targets, including unspecified non-military sites in Tehran and facilities linked to Iranian security services involved in suppressing protests.[xi]  Axios similarly reported on January 11 that Trump has considered military strikes, a carrier strike group deployment to the Middle East, and cyber or information operations to support protests in Iran but has not yet made a decision, according to US officials.[xii]

 

CTP-ISW recorded a lower rate of protest activity across Iran on January 11 compared to recent days. The lower rate of protests that CTP-ISW recorded is likely due to the regime’s nationwide internet shutdown and crackdown on the use of Starlink satellites. CTP-ISW has recorded 22 protests across nine provinces since 0000 local time on January 11, 11 of which were medium-sized (100-1,000 participants) and six of which were large (>1000 participants).[xiii] The decrease in recorded protest activity is at least partly due to the regime’s nationwide internet shutdown that has been in effect for over three days.[xiv] The Iranian regime has also begun jamming Starlink signals to prevent Iranians from being able to use Starlink satellites.[xv]  About half of the protests that CTP-ISW has recorded since its last data cutoff took place in Tehran, which may be explained by Iranians’ ability to access tools like Starlink more readily in larger cities than in less urban areas.[xvi] Reports of arrests, deaths, and violence from regime and anti-regime outlets in Lorestan, Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchistan, South Khorasan, and Golestan provinces suggest that protests are taking place across Iran but that protesters in these areas have been unable to share footage of protests with foreign media.[xvii] State media reported that the Mashhad anti-narcotics police head was killed in protests in Mashhad on January 11, demonstrating the intensity of protests there despite limited footage of the demonstrations.[xviii] CTP-ISW has not recorded protests in Kermanshah Province since January 9, despite the province experiencing intense and violent protest activity before that date.[xix]

More Iranian security officers have died during the current protests than in any other protest wave in Iran. IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 11 that at least 114 regime security personnel from the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC have been killed since the start of the protests on December 28.[xx] The LEC is the regime’s main internal security service and is responsible for conducting ordinary policing activities and maintaining social control.[xxi] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that largely focuses on disseminating regime propaganda, suppressing domestic dissent, and conducting civil defense activities.[xxii] The regime has also deployed the IRGC Ground Forces in some areas during the current wave of protests, although it is unclear whether all of the IRGC deaths reported by IRGC-affiliated media are deaths of IRGC Ground Forces members. Iranian media reported that Esfahan Province has the highest number of LEC and IRGC deaths at 30, followed by 9 Basij and IRGC deaths in Ghazvin Province.[xxiii] The data indicates that the IRGC has mainly been active in western Iran, which is consistent with recent reports of IRGC Ground Forces deployments in Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan provinces.[xxiv] The actual death count for Iranian security personnel is likely higher than the number that IRGC-affiliated media reported given that CTP-ISW has observed reports of security personnel casualties in areas, such as Tehran Province, that IRGC-affiliated media did not include in its death count.[xxv] Over 70 regime security personnel died in the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement, which was the deadliest wave of protests until this wave.[xxvi]

Recent Baloch anti-regime activity and reported Iranian efforts to use Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suppress the protests indicate that the regime may be facing significant security bandwidth constraints. Baloch anti-regime coalition Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) fighters killed one Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer and injured another in an attack on an LEC patrol vehicle in Dashtiari County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 11.[xxvii] The MPF announced that it conducted the attack in response to Iranian security forces’ continued suppression of protests across Iran.[xxviii] The MPF conducted a similar attack and killed an LEC commander in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 7 in response to ”the killing and suppression of protesters in various parts” of Iran.[xxix] CTP-ISW has observed protests in Zabol, Iranshahr, Zahedan, and Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since the start of the protests on December 28.[xxx] Regime forces used live fire, tear gas, and rubber bullets to disperse a medium-sized protest in Zahedan on January 9.[xxxi] That the MPF continues to be able to conduct attacks targeting Iranian security personnel in southeastern Iran suggests that security forces may not have the bandwidth to confront this group while it faces widespread protests across the country.

Iran has reportedly asked Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, for assistance in suppressing the protests, according to a Fox News correspondent citing unspecified sources on January 11.[xxxii] Anti-regime media and social media users previously claimed on January 6 that around 800 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters have deployed to Iran since January 2 through border crossings in Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces.[xxxiii] The Iraqi fighters are reportedly members of Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and the Badr Organization, among other militias.[xxxiv] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with unspecified Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad between January 6 and 8, according to informed Iraqi sources speaking to regional media on January 8.[xxxv] Iran likely seeks to use Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to bolster the number of forces it has to suppress the current unrest. Iran’s use of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suppress the protests suggests that Iranian security forces may face bandwidth constraints and difficulties in suppressing the protests on their own.

Iran Update, January 10, 2026

Key Takeaways

• Intensification of the Iranian Regime’s Crackdown on Protests: The Iranian regime has shifted from labeling protesters as “rioters” to describing them as “terrorists,” which signals that the regime has taken an uncompromising stance toward the ongoing protests. The regime will likely use its characterization of protesters as “terrorists” to justify further cracking down on the protests. The regime has killed hundreds of protesters and injured hundreds more in its violent crackdown on the protests.
• Protests in Iran: Protest activity has continued to take place across Iran amid the Iranian regime’s continued nationwide internet shutdown. CTP-ISW has recorded 60 protests across 15 provinces since 0000 local time on January 10, 25 of which were medium-sized and eight of which were large.
• US Policy in Iran: US officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 10 that US officials have held “preliminary discussions” about taking military action against the Iranian regime. The officials stated that there is no sign of an imminent attack on Iran, however.

 

The Iranian regime has shifted from labeling protesters as “rioters” to describing them as “terrorists,” which signals that the regime has taken an uncompromising stance toward the ongoing protests.[i] The regime will likely use its characterization of protesters as “terrorists” to justify further cracking down on the protests. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani distinguished on January 9 between protesters with legitimate economic demands and “urban semi-terrorist[s]” who conduct armed attacks. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media has repeatedly described protesters as “terrorists” and compared them to Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighters.[ii] The “terrorist” label portrays protesters as an existential security threat that warrants a forceful and violent response.

The regime has also explicitly signaled its willingness to use lethal force to suppress protests. Ammar Headquarters Central Council member Hossein Yetka, who is close to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his son, Mojtaba Khamanei, called on Basij members and regime supporters to mobilize and warned Iranians not to complain if “shots are fired or if something happens to someone."[iii] Yekta served in the IRGC Ground Forces Habib Ibn Mazaher Battalion during the Iran-Iraq War.[iv] Many former members of that battalion, such as Hossein Taeb, Mehdi Taeb, Alireza Panahian, and Hassan Mohaghegh, have held or currently hold influential positions in the regime, especially related to internal security.[v] An anti-regime outlet reported in November 2022 that Yekta is linked to a network of individuals within the regime who finance the regime’s repression apparatus.[vi]

The regime is increasingly approaching the protests as a military issue rather than a law enforcement or crowd control issue. The Artesh, which is Iran’s conventional military, issued a statement on January 10 in which it vowed to protect national interests, strategic infrastructure, and public property. The statement, similar to senior regime officials and state media, framed the protests as a plot by Iran’s adversaries, namely the United States and Israel, to disrupt public security.[vii] The Artesh statement comes amid an unverified report of the deployment of Artesh forces in Karaj, Alborz Province, on January 10.[viii] It is notable that the Artesh has indicated that it could get involved in the protests given that it has historically played a limited role in suppressing domestic unrest. It is unclear what role the Artesh would play in the regime’s crackdown on the protests and whether Artesh personnel would demonstrate the same willingness to repress protesters as more ideological security institutions, such as the IRGC and Basij. The regime has also reportedly continued to deploy IRGC forces to suppress the unrest.[ix] A citizen in Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, told a Kurdish human rights organization on January 10 that IRGC forces had deployed to this city.[x] IRGC Ground Forces Nabi Akram Unit members have also been involved in the suppression of protests in Kermanshah.[xi] An unspecified eyewitness in western Iran told Reuters on January 10 that IRGC forces were deployed to western Iran and opened fire on protesters.[xii] CTP-ISW assessed on January 8 that the regime has taken the rare step of using the IRGC Ground Forces to suppress protests because it has likely determined that these protests represent a dire security threat to the regime.[xiii]

There are further indications that the ongoing protests are challenging the ability and willingness of Iranian security forces to crack down on the protests. The IRGC Intelligence Organization released a statement on January 10 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment.”[xiv] This statement suggests that some Iranian security forces may have already defected or that the regime is very concerned about this possibility. A Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer from an unspecified Kurdish-majority city in northwestern Iran told TIME on January 7 that Iranian security forces disagree over whether a “massive” regime crackdown on protests will contain the protests or incite further unrest.[xv] The officer said that all of the officers at his station believe the regime is collapsing.[xvi] The officer added that he works in the LEC for money, “not to kill people.”[xvii] A Kurdish human rights organization previously reported on January 8 that the regime had arrested “dozens“ of security force members in Kermanshah City who refused to fire on protesters.[xviii] The regime may have started to frame protesters as “terrorists” to increase security forces’ willingness to use lethal force against protesters and reduce the risk of defections. The regime’s potential deployment of the Artesh would further indicate that the protests are challenging security forces’ ability and willingness to repress the unrest. The Artesh is generally less ideological and more representative of the Iranian population than the IRGC, which increases the risk that Artesh members could defect.[xix] The deployment of the Artesh, which is not trained to control civil unrest, would also indicate that Iranian security forces may face bandwidth constraints given that the regime would likely not deploy the Artesh unless it absolutely had to.[xx]

Protest activity has continued to take place across Iran amid the Iranian regime’s continued nationwide internet shutdown. CTP-ISW has recorded 60 protests across 15 provinces since 0000 local time on January 10, 25 of which were medium-sized and eight of which were large.[xxi] CTP-ISW defines medium protests as protests with between 100 and 1,000 participants and large protests as protests with more than 1,000 participants. CTP-ISW recorded a decrease in the rate of protests on January 10 compared to the 116 protests across 22 provinces that it recorded on January 9.[xxii] The decrease in recorded protest activity is at least partly due to the Iranian regime's nationwide internet shutdown that has been in effect for over 48 hours.[xxiii] CTP-ISW’s protest data since its last data cutoff likely reflects only part of the protest activity that has taken place in Iran since that time given that the internet shutdown restricts protesters’ ability to publish and share videos of the protests. Protesters have continued to reportedly use Starlink, which is a satellite-based internet service, to send reports of protests to foreign media.[xxiv] 

The regime has killed hundreds of protesters and injured hundreds more in its violent crackdown on the protests. A Tehran-based doctor told TIME on January 9 that six hospitals in Tehran have recorded at least 217 protester deaths since January 8.[xxv] Local Iranian sources in Tehran told anti-regime media on January 10 that "a large number” of protesters have been shot and killed by Iranian security forces in Tehran since January 8.[xxvi] Several Iranian medical professionals told Western media on January 9 and 10 that Iranian hospitals are overwhelmed with casualties from the protests.[xxvii] A doctor similarly told the BBC on January 9 that Farabi Hospital in Tehran is in “crisis mode” due to the number of wounded protesters.[xxviii] A doctor told Reuters on January 10 that “large numbers” of injured protesters have been brought to hospitals in northwestern Iran since January 9 with head injuries, broken limbs, deep cuts, and gunshot wounds.[xxix]  Unspecified sources told anti-regime media on January 8 that Iranian security agencies have threatened doctors and instructed them not to treat injured protesters in an effort to prevent information about protest-related injuries from leaving hospitals, citing unspecified sources.[xxx] Iranian security agencies told doctors to report any injured protesters who sought treatment to the security agencies immediately.[xxxi] Unspecified observers reported that Iranian security forces have begun to forcibly remove protesters from medical facilities.[xxxii] Iranian security forces previously raided a hospital in Ilam Province where injured protesters were being treated on January 5.[xxxiii]

 

There are unconfirmed reports of Kurdish militant activity in northwestern Iran. The Kurdistan National Guard announced on January 9 that its “Zagros Tornado units” attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.[xxxiv] CTP-ISW cannot verify this attack at the time of this writing. It is unclear if the Kurdistan National Guard has ties to other Kurdish anti-regime groups that operate in northwestern Iran, such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Iranian state media outlet Mehr News separately reported on January 10 that Iranian authorities killed a group of PJAK fighters who were attempting to enter Iran from Iraq in rural areas of Ilam and Kermanshah provinces.[xxxv] Iranian leaders have historically accused Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan of operating in Iranian border provinces and inciting social unrest. Those concerns grew particularly acute during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests, which were partly concentrated among Kurdish communities in northwestern Iran.[xxxvi] These Kurdish anti-regime groups do not represent the ongoing protest movement and its grievances.

 

US officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 10 that US officials have held “preliminary discussions” about taking military action against the Iranian regime. The officials stated that there is no sign of an imminent attack on Iran, however.[xxxvii] US President Donald Trump warned Iranian leadership on January 9 that the United States would get involved if the regime fires at protesters.[xxxviii] Trump issued a similar social media statement on January 10 stating that the United States is ready to help Iranian protesters achieve freedom.[xxxix] A US official told the Wall Street Journal on January 10 that the Trump administration has discussed launching airstrikes targeting unspecified Iranian military sites to follow through on Trump’s repeated warnings to the regime.[xl] Another US official stated that there is no consensus on what military action to take.[xli] The US officials added that the United States has not moved any equipment or personnel to prepare for military action and that there is no “sign of an imminent attack on Iran.”[xlii]

Iran Update, January 9, 2026

The Iranian regime has sustained its nationwide internet shutdown, likely to disrupt protest coordination and obscure the scale of its crackdown.[i]  Reports indicate that Iran’s internet connectivity has remained at approximately one percent of normal levels since 3:00 PM ET on January 8.[ii] The Iranian regime has historically imposed internet blackouts during periods of major unrest, including during the 2019 protests, when the regime killed around 1,500 protesters in less than two weeks.[iii] The internet shutdown reflects the regime’s concerns about the momentum of the protests and international scrutiny on its repression. The regime likely shut down the internet to disrupt protesters’ ability to communicate with one another and organize protests. The regime has also expanded its use of lethal force to crack down on protests beyond western and central Iran, and the internet shutdown is likely meant to hide the extent and brutality of the regime’s crackdown across Iran.[iv] A Norway-based Iranian human rights organization reported on January 9 that Iranian security forces have killed at least 51 protesters, including nine minors, and wounded hundreds of others since December 28.[v] Anti-regime media reported on January 9 that Iranian security forces killed at least 10 protesters during demonstrations in Fardis, Alborz Province.[vi]

Widespread protest activity has continued to take place across Iran amid the internet shutdown. CTP-ISW has recorded 116 protests across 22 provinces since 3:30 PM ET on January 8.[vii] Twenty of these protests were large protests, which CTP-ISW defines as protests with more than 1,000 participants.[viii] CTP-ISW's protest data since its last data cutoff likely reflects only part of the protest activity that has taken place in Iran since that time given that the internet shutdown restricts protesters’ ability to publish and share videos of the protests. Some protesters have reportedly used Starlink, which is a satellite-based internet service, to send reports of protests to foreign media.[ix]

The protests in Iran may have expanded to such an extent that they are challenging Iranian security forces’ ability to suppress them. Regime security forces in Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, retreated during intense clashes with protesters and were unable to receive reinforcements due to a shortage of security forces, according to a Kurdish human rights organization.[x] This report suggests that some Iranian security forces may be facing bandwidth constraints. CTP-ISW has not observed reports of security forces redeploying to other provinces, which could indicate that there is not a surplus of forces to reinforce areas with significant protest activity. The current scale of the protests and their distribution across wide swaths of Iran further complicate the regime’s efforts to contain the protests. The New York Times reported on January 8 that security forces fled a protest in Bushehr City in southern Iran due to the large size of the protest, which highlights the challenge that large-scale protests pose to the regime’s ability to impose control.[xi] 

The Iranian regime may increasingly rely on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to suppress the protests as local Law Enforcement Command (LEC) forces reportedly face bandwidth constraints. An unspecified senior Iranian government official told the New York Times on January 8 that the Iranian regime is struggling to find a way to contain the “avalanche” of protests.[xii] The official added that the IRGC would likely take over suppression efforts.[xiii] Anti-regime media reported on January 9 that clashes between protesters and security forces in Kermanshah Province killed at least 10 IRGC Ground Forces Nabi Akram Unit members.[xiv] The Nabi Akram Unit is headquartered in Kermanshah City and is subordinate to the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Kermanshah, Hamedan, and Ilam provinces.[xv] The deaths of IRGC soldiers are notable because these individuals are from a military force, not the police, and should be more capable in violent situations. Social media users have also reported that the regime has deployed the IRGC in Ilam Province, although the regime has not confirmed this deployment at the time of this writing.[xvi]

Protesters damaged regime institutions in multiple cities across Iran on January 8 and 9.[xvii] Anti-regime media reported that protesters set fire to an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) building in Esfahan on January 8.[xviii] Anti-regime media has also circulated videos of protesters burning the Iranian flag and images of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[xix] Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani acknowledged damage to economic and public infrastructure on January 9.[xx] Iranian officials have historically used protesters’ destruction of regime property to crack down on protests and frame protesters as rioters.[xxi]

Anti-regime media reported on January 9 that Iranians are unable to withdraw cash from Iran’s largest bank. This banking disruption, if true, could exacerbate the current unrest in Iran. Anti-regime media reported that Iran’s largest bank, Bank Melli, experienced a bank run and has suspended cash withdrawals.[xxii] Bank Melli’s suspension of cash withdrawals could exacerbate the current protests, which began on December 28 in response to Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.

Senior Iranian regime officials reaffirmed their hardline stance on the protests and willingness to sustain the regime’s violent crackdown on the protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on January 9 that the regime will “not back down" against “saboteurs.”[xxiii] Khamenei noticeably used more aggressive rhetoric in his January 9 speech compared to his January 4 speech, where he distinguished between acceptable economic protests and “useless” anti-regime demonstrations.[xxiv] Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, released a statement on January 9 echoing Khamenei's comments. The council warned that “security forces and the judiciary will not make any concessions to the saboteurs.”[xxv] The IRGC Intelligence Organization similarly justified the suppression of protests as a way to halt “the spread of insecurity” in a statement on January 9.[xxvi] A Tehran prosecutor announced on January 9 that the Iranian judiciary will not be lenient toward “armed terrorists" and will charge protesters who use firearms or bladed weapons with moharebeh (enmity against God), which is a charge that is punishable by death.[xxvii] The Iranian regime previously used the charge of moharebeh to sentence individuals who participated in the Mahsa Amini protest movement to death.[xxviii]

Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid may be reemerging as a catalyst for protests in southeastern Iran, which would compound the bandwidth constraints that Iranian security forces are reportedly facing. Abdol Hamid stated during his Friday sermon that Iranians believe that Iran is at an “impasse” and are seeking major, peaceful changes to ensure capable and inclusive governance and build positive relations with the world.[xxix] Abdol Hamid also urged security forces not to confront protesters, to avoid escalating tensions, and respect citizens’ right to peaceful protest.[xxx] A medium-sized anti-regime protest, which CTP-ISW defines as a protest with 100-1,000 participants, broke out in Zahedan after Abdol Hamid’s January 9 sermon.[xxxi] Security forces used live fire, plastic pellets, and tear gas to try to disperse the protesters.[xxxii] Smaller protests separately took place in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, for the first time on January 9.[xxxiii] Abdol Hamid was a catalyst for protests in Zahedan during and after the Mahsa Amini movement. Zahedan residents began holding weekly protests after Friday prayers in late September 2022, after security forces violently suppressed protesters in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday."[xxxiv] Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly Friday protests even after the Mahsa Amini protest movement culminated in other parts of the country.[xxxv] The resumption of protest activity in southeastern Iran during the current wave of protests could further constrain Iranian security forces as security forces also contend with unrest in other parts of the country.

Israel’s January 9 airstrikes may indicate that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had moderate success in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons production sites, weapons depots, artillery launch sites and launchers, and other military sites across Lebanon on January 9.[xxxvi] These strikes mark the third wave of Israeli strikes in recent weeks, following strikes on at least 14 Hezbollah targets on December 18 and 17 targets on January 2.[xxxvii] Israel’s January 2 and 9 strikes focused on Hezbollah targets north of the Litani River, in contrast to the December 18 strikes that primarily focused on targets along the Litani River. Israel’s January 9 strikes notably came a day after the LAF announced that it had mostly disarmed Hezbollah south of the Litani River and will begin preparations for the next disarmament phase.[xxxviii] The recent shift in the location of large waves of Israeli airstrikes from south of the Litani to north of the Litani suggests that Israel perceives a reduced threat south of the Litani. Israel’s January 2 and 9 airstrikes targeted areas between the Litani and Awali rivers, which is where the LAF’s next disarmament phase is expected to take place.[xxxix]  The shift in the IDF’s targeting pattern suggests that the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah and reducing the threat the group poses to Israel influences Israel’s military activities in Lebanon. The IDF occasionally conducts one-off airstrikes targeting Hezbollah reconstitution activities in southern Lebanon when it identifies threats.[xl]

The concentration of Israeli strikes north of the Litani River is consistent with Hezbollah’s reported weapons movements. Lebanese security and military sources told Emirati media in December 2025 that Hezbollah is deploying its full combat capabilities to north of the Litani River.[xli] Israeli security sources similarly noted that Hezbollah has pushed the bulk of its “power” north of the Litani River and that Hezbollah maintains a significant number of underground sites in mountainous areas north of the Litani River.[xlii] Lebanese security sources told Emirati media on January 6 that Hezbollah has moved fighters and weapons to mountainous areas north of the Litani River, including the Iqlim al Tuffah region, al Rihan, and Jezzine District.[xliii] Israel’s January 9 airstrikes targeted Hezbollah sites in all three of these mountainous areas.[xliv]

Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters resumed fighting in Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 9 after some SDF-affiliated fighters and a local Kurdish council rejected the January 8 US-mediated ceasefire. Syrian government forces and SDF-affiliated internal security forces, known as the Asayish, began fighting in the historically Kurdish Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 6.[xlv] Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces reportedly advanced and secured the majority of Ashrafiyeh and Bani Zaid neighborhoods on the evening of January 8.[xlvi] The MoD announced a US-mediated ceasefire with the SDF on January 8, which took effect on the morning of January 9.[xlvii] The ceasefire required SDF-affiliated Asayish forces to withdraw from Aleppo City to northeast Syria between 3:00 and 9:00 AM local time.[xlviii] MoI forces arranged the Asayish forces’ evacuation via buses and cleared roadblocks near Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood to allow the Asayish withdrawal on January 9 but were reportedly attacked by a group of Asayish forces that reportedly rejected the ceasefire.[xlix] A separate group of Asayish forces, as well as the Kurdish Neighborhood Council of Aleppo, also rejected the ceasefire and vowed to continue fighting on January 9.[l] The MoD then designated Sheikh Maqsoud a military zone and opened a humanitarian corridor for civilians in the al Wared area on January 9.[li] The MoD issued evacuation orders for at least five locations that it identified as Asayish positions in Sheikh Maqsoud that it intended to strike.[lii] A Syrian source said the MoD launched ground operations to advance and secure Sheikh Maqsoud on January 9.[liii] SDF-MoD fighting since January 6 has killed at least nine civilians, according to Reuters.[liv] The Kurdish Neighborhood Council’s rejection of the ceasefire agreement will likely negatively impact future relations between the council and the Aleppo government.

Key Takeaways

• Internet Shutdown in Iran: The Iranian regime has sustained its nationwide internet shutdown, likely to disrupt protest coordination and obscure the scale of its repression. Widespread protest activity has continued to take place across Iran amid the internet shutdown.
• Protests in Iran: The protests in Iran may have expanded to such an extent that they are challenging Iranian security forces’ ability to suppress them. Protesters damaged regime institutions in multiple cities across Iran on January 8 and 9. The Iranian regime may increasingly rely on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to suppress the protests as local Law Enforcement Command forces reportedly face bandwidth constraints.
• Iranian Regime’s Crackdown on Protests: Senior Iranian regime officials reaffirmed their hardline stance on the protests and willingness to sustain the regime’s violent crackdown on the protests. The regime has expanded its use of lethal force to crack down on protests beyond western and central Iran.
• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: Israel’s January 9 airstrikes may indicate that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had moderate success in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River. The pattern of Israel’s major strike waves suggests that Israel conducts airstrikes only where it perceives a threat and refrains from large-scale strikes in locations where it deems the LAF has effectively reduced Hezbollah’s threat to Israel.
• Syrian Government-SDF Fighting in Aleppo City: Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters resumed fighting in Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 9 after some SDF-affiliated fighters and a local Kurdish council rejected the January 8 US-mediated ceasefire.

Iran Update, January 8, 2026

Protest activity in Iran has expanded dramatically in both rate and magnitude since January 7, including in major cities like Tehran and in northwestern Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least 156 instances across 27 provinces on January 8, which almost doubles the number of protests recorded on January 7.[i] The individual protests are also much larger than those prior to January 8 and include 60 medium-sized protests (over 100 participants) throughout the country.[ii]

 

 

Protests and strikes have expanded to the Kurdish-populated Kurdistan Province in northwestern Iran. CTP-ISW has recorded six protests in Kurdistan Province.[iii] The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), among others, called for a nationwide “general strike” on January 8 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces.[iv] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News denounced the Kurdish groups’ call for a general strike, accusing them of attempting to incite riots.[v] The regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement.[vi]

 

Iranian leaders have long-standing concerns about Kurdish separatism and militancy in the western and northwestern provinces.[vii] Iranian leaders have historically accused Kurdish militias in Iraq of operating in the border provinces and inciting social unrest. Those concerns grew particularly acute during the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini protests, which were partly concentrated among Kurdish communities that the regime worried the Kurdish militias could try to co-opt.[viii] The regime appeared especially prepared to use extreme force to suppress protests in the western and northwestern provinces during the Mahsa Amini protests, at one point deploying the IRGC Ground Forces to conduct what the regime described as clearing operations across several towns and villages.[ix] The expansion of the ongoing protests to northwestern Iran will reignite regime anxieties about Kurdish separatism and militancy there. That could in turn drive the regime to adopt an especially brutal crackdown in those areas, which may already happening in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces.

 

 

The regime has likely determined that these protests represent an extremely dire security threat and has intensified its crackdown accordingly, including by taking the rare step of using the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least one province.[x] The regime used the IRGC Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least Kermanshah Province and possibly other provinces on January 8.[xi] This is a rare step; the regime only deployed the IRGC Ground Forces once during the Mahsa Amini protests, but it did so in Kurdish-populated areas. Kermanshah Province, where there are reports of IRGC Ground Forces activity, has a large Kurdish population.[xii] The regime tends to rely most heavily on the LEC and paramilitary Basij to manage social unrest and suppress protests.[xiii] The regime maintains elite Basij units that specialize in crowd control and repression and activates them when protests escalate meaningfully. The regime relies on the IRGC Ground Forces in the most extreme circumstances, during which the regime tends to approach protests as an insurgency rather than gatherings of aggrieved citizens. The IRGC Ground Forces is the final regime defense against civil upheaval and thus uses extreme levels of force to quell demonstrations.[xiv]

The use of the IRGC Ground Forces in Kermanshah and the reports of casualties there suggest that the regime is approaching the protests there as an insurgency rather than riots or protests. Norway-based human rights organization Hengaw claimed that two IRGC Ground Forces members were killed during the protests in Kermanshah City on January 8, citing Iranian state media outlets.[xv] The deaths of the IRGC soldiers are notable because these individuals are from a military force, not the police, and should be more capable of protecting themselves. It is unclear what caused their deaths, though the deaths of two soldiers during protests indicate that the clashes between protesters and security forces have become particularly intense in Kermanshah City. Hengaw also claimed that forces from the Nabi Akram Operational Division fired live rounds at protesters in Kermanshah City, where the unit is based, on January 8.[xvi]

The use of the IRGC Ground Forces could indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces in addition to a shift in how the regime perceives the protests, however. The rapid expansion of the protests in space and magnitude may have outstripped the ability of the LEC and Basij to cover every protest. The lack of LEC and Basij manpower would require the regime to use the IRGC Ground Forces to continue to suppress ongoing protests.[xvii]

The regime arrested several security forces members on January 8 who reportedly refused orders to fire at protesters, according to a Norway-based human rights organization.[xviii] This is the only instance CTP-ISW has observed of security forces refusing orders at this time. Should this trend expand, however, it could cause major bandwidth constraints that would further limit the regime’s ability to suppress protests.

IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 8 that a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) member died of a stabbing injury he sustained on duty while attempting to contain protesters in Malard.[xix] Protesters killed two LEC officers during protests in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Provinces, as well as an unspecified security force member in Malekshahi, Ilam Province.[xx] The Iranian regime could use the deaths of security personnel as justification to intensify its suppression of Iranian protesters and contribute to the regime’s perception that it is suppressing insurgents rather than protesters or rioters.

The regime has also responded with sweeping internet shutdowns.[xxi] The regime has spent years developing its ability to impose localized internet shutdowns.[xxii] The regime has elected for a countrywide shutdown is dramatic and reflects how dire Iranian leaders perceive the situation. Countrywide internet shutdowns precede bloody crackdowns, as was the case during the Aban protests in November 2019. Reuters reported that the regime killed around 1,500 protesters during this period.[xxiii]

 

The internet shutdown across Iran could severely limit the open-source information available to CTP-ISW. Our updates during the shutdown will likely reflect only some of the protest activity on a given day. Nevertheless, the continuation of the internet shutdown is an indicator in itself that a meaningful amount of protest activity is still occurring.

 

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly urged unity among unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders on the issue of disarmament during a visit to Baghdad between January 6 and 8. Ghaani’s visit and his urgings demonstrate the continued divisions among Iraqi militias over disarmament.[xxiv] “Informed” Iraqi sources told Asharq al Awsat that Ghaani emphasized the prevention of “internal differences or escalation” regarding disarmament during a meeting with unspecified Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad.[xxv] Multiple prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members have expressed varying positions on disarmament in recent weeks, even as the militias’ official coordinating body has attempted to maintain a unified face.[xxvi] Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad follows a statement by the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee on January 4 that rejected calls for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm due to the continued presence of US and Turkish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxvii] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxviii] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Asaib Ahl al Haq signed the statement.[xxix] CTP-ISW previously noted the inconsistencies between the committee’s statement and the positions that some of the militias that signed it have expressed about disarmament.[xxx] There may also be splits within as well as among the militias. A senior member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s rejection of the statement on January 5 indicates that there may even be splinters within Asaib Ahl al Haq on the topic.[xxxi] The United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including throughout 2025.[xxxii]

 

Ghaani may have attempted to increase militia support for disarmament in line with Iran’s reported efforts to push its larger partner militias in Iraq into politics. Iraqi political insiders told UK-based Amwaj media in November 2025 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to focus on political engagement instead of armed resistance, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[xxxiii] Some prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have refused to disarm.[xxxiv] Other militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, have attempted to obfuscate the relationship between the militias and the Iraqi state.[xxxv] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi claimed on December 20 that weapons are already restricted to the Iraqi state, and the militias therefore do not need to disarm.[xxxvi] Fartousi’s comments ignore the reality that many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, possess weapons and are neither integrated into the Iraqi security forces nor answer to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxvii]

 

Ghaani probably also discussed anti-regime Kurdish groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan with Iraqi officials during his reported visit to Baghdad. Ghaani has reportedly discussed anti-regime Kurdish group activity with Iraqi officials during previous protest waves in Iran.[xxxviii] Unidentified Iraqi and Kurdish officials told AP in November 2022 that Ghaani threatened that Iran would conduct a ground operation into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iraq did not secure the Iran-Iraq border against anti-regime Kurdish groups.[xxxix] Iran has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations in Iran.[xl]  Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can foment instability against the regime.[xli] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news called on officials in Iraqi Kurdistan to prevent anti-regime groups from threatening Iranian national security after seven Kurdish groups, including anti-regime groups, called for a general strike across Iran on January 8.[xlii] Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji also discussed border security with Iranian Military Attache to Iraq Majid Gholipour in Baghdad on January 7.[xliii]

 

The Syrian government secured areas of Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on January 8 as fighting between the Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters continued for a third day. Initial fighting between the Syrian government and SDF-affiliated internal security forces, known as the Asayish, began on the city’s western outskirts on January 6 and spread to Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh.[xliv] Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud are two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City that the SDF agreed to integrate into the Aleppo City municipality and under Syrian state control on April 1. The Asayish has maintained de facto security control over these neighborhoods since April 1, however.[xlv] The fighting ceased for two or three hours in the morning of January 8 to allow for the government and the SDF to attempt to negotiate—with Turkish and US mediation—a permanent end to the fighting.[xlvi] Syrian sources reported that the talks did not produce any results, however, and the Syrian army announced the launch of a “limited military operation” in the area.[xlvii] Three divisions, including an armored division, deployed to the area under the “Aleppo Operations Authority,” a command room supervised by Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali al Nassan.[xlviii] The 60th and 72nd divisions—which consist of a mix of Hayat Tahrir al Sham fighters, Syrian National Army fighters, and new recruits—have both been involved in fighting the SDF along frontlines in eastern Aleppo Province.[xlix]

Syrian forces attempted to suppress Asayish mortars and snipers in Aleppo City before advancing into and securing parts of the Ashrafiyeh neighborhood.[l] SDF mortar shelling and gunfire have continued to target government positions and impact civilian sites across Aleppo City since January 6.[li] The Syrian Ministry of Defense issued evacuation orders for at least nine specific buildings or blocks that it claimed were Asayish positions in Sheikh Maqsoud and Bani Zaid, a neighborhood that lies between government-controlled territory and the two historically Kurdish neighborhoods.[lii] The Syrian army reportedly struck several Asayish positions with drones and artillery a few hours later, according to Syrian and SDF media.[liii] Syrian army armor then advanced into southern Ashrafiyeh and engaged Asayish fighters, who either surrendered or withdrew to Sheikh Maqsoud.[liv] Syrian state-owned media claimed that residents and notables of Ashrafiyeh and Bani Zaid requested that Syrian government forces enter the neighborhood and facilitated their entry.[lv] Interior Ministry forces deployed to Ashrafiyeh to secure the area.[lvi]

The recent fighting in Aleppo indicates that the previous SDF-government agreement has been largely insufficient in its current form to integrate Kurdish forces into the Syrian state and prevent new rounds of conflict. The April 1 agreement is a 14-point agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF that stipulates the integration of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud into the city's municipality, as well as the integration of the Asayish into local police forces.[lvii] The agreement has never been fully implemented, and several significant episodes of fighting have broken out between government forces and the Asayish since April 2025.[lviii] The Syrian government, SDF, and the United States will need to update previous agreements and possibly develop new frameworks to integrate SDF-affiliated forces into the state. The government has now seized parts of Ashrafiyeh and may advance into Sheikh Maqsoud in the coming hours or days, which would complete the reduction of the SDF exclave.[lix] Any new agreement would need to specify the role that now-detained Asayish fighters would play in a new Syrian state, for example. The government demanded the “withdrawal of militia groups” and an end to the fighting, but affirmed that Kurds are the government’s ”integral” and ”full partners.”[lx] The demand that militia groups withdraw suggests that the Syrian government will force the Asayish fighters to leave Aleppo rather than allow them to join local forces, as per the old agreement. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and senior US military leaders have continued to work with the Syrian government and the SDF to de-escalate fighting, according to Western and Syrian media on January 8.[lxi]

The Lebanese cabinet reviewed on January 8 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s progress in disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and tasked the LAF to develop a plan to disarm the group north of the Litani River.[lxii] The LAF told the Lebanese cabinet on January 8 that it has entered an “advanced stage” of its Hezbollah disarmament plan and is now focused on expanding and securing its presence in southern Lebanon.[lxiii] The LAF noted that it is still working to address unexploded ordnance and Hezbollah tunnels in the area.[lxiv] The Lebanese cabinet emphasized that the LAF needs to implement all of the plan’s phases and develop a plan to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River, which the LAF is to present to the cabinet in February 2026.[lxv] The timeline is unclear for both the implementation and completion of the next phase of the LAF’s plan. Hezbollah officials rejected the cabinet‘s request and emphasized that Israel must halt its operations and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[lxvi] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment on January 8, noting that the first goal of his ongoing visit to Beirut is to discuss Israel’s presence in Lebanon with senior Lebanese officials.[lxvii]

 

Israeli officials are calling into question the LAF’s ability to disarm Hezbollah faster than Hezbollah can rearm itself, irrespective of the LAF’s ongoing efforts. The Israeli Foreign Ministry stated on January 8 that the LAF’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah have been “limited” and added that Hezbollah is rearming faster than it is being disarmed.[lxviii] Israeli officials and sources similarly stated that the LAF’s progress statement contradicts the “reality” on the ground as Hezbollah has not been disarmed and is still present in southern Lebanon.[lxix] Israeli media reported on January 8 that Israel views the LAF’s statement as a signal for Israel to step in to disarm Hezbollah.[lxx] Several Israeli media outlets have indicated that an Israeli operation in Lebanon is not a question of if but rather a question of when, noting that Israel will be required to launch a major operation in Lebanon.[lxxi] These Israeli outlets reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s operational plans are ready and that the decision now lies with the Israeli political echelon.[lxxii]

 

Lebanese security and military sources’ recent leaks to Emirati media about Hezbollah’s military readiness suggest that these sources may be attempting to discourage Israel from launching an operation in Lebanon by portraying Hezbollah as capable of withstanding an Israeli operation and imposing costs on Israel. Lebanese security sources told Emirati media on January 6 that Hezbollah has begun secretly repositioning combat units and “strategic” weapons north of the Litani River to “absorb” Israeli strikes and maintain its ability to respond.[lxxiii] ”Informed” Lebanese security sources told Emirati media on January 7 that Hezbollah is replacing its overt military and security leaders with ”unknown” officials and adopting a stricter communications policy to make it harder for Israel to target its leadership.[lxxiv] The sources stated that Israel would confront unfamiliar Hezbollah leaders in a new conflict and noted that Hezbollah’s preemptive steps would help the group minimize the effects of an Israeli operation.[lxxv] Lebanese security and military sources told Emirati media on January 8 that Hezbollah is in the advanced stage of ”maximum readiness” as the group has raised its missile readiness, minimized its footprint to avoid detection, and moved fighters to non-fixed positions.[lxxvi] These leaks coincided with reported internal Israeli deliberations over the timing of a potential Israeli operation in Lebanon. Israeli media reported on January 6 that Israeli officials are increasingly hesitant about executing the IDF’s attack plan in Lebanon at this time and are weighing several external factors into a decision regarding conflict with Hezbollah.[lxxvii] These external factors are presumably related to international politics and not Hezbollah’s preparations, however. Hezbollah may be taking some steps to prepare for an Israeli operation, but these leaks nevertheless support Hezbollah’s objective by attempting to insert uncertainty into the calculus of the Israeli government.

 

Key Takeaways

• Protests in Iran: Protest activity in Iran has expanded dramatically in both rate and magnitude since January 7, including in major cities like Tehran and in northwestern Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least 156 instances across 27 provinces on January 8, which almost doubles the number of protests recorded on January 7.
• Protests in Kurdish-Populated Provinces: Protests and strikes have expanded to the Kurdish-populated province of Kurdistan in northwestern Iran. CTP-ISW has recorded six protests in Kurdistan Province.
• Iranian Regime Security Perceptions: The regime has likely determined that these protests represent an extremely dire security threat and has intensified its crackdown accordingly, including by taking the rare step of using the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least one province. The use of the IRGC Ground Forces could indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces in addition to a shift in how the regime perceives the protests, however.
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Visit to Iraq: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly urged unity among unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders on the issue of disarmament during a visit to Baghdad between January 6 and 8. Ghaani’s visit and his urgings demonstrate the continued divisions among Iraqi militias over disarmament.
• Syrian Government-SDF Fighting in Aleppo City: The Syrian government secured areas of Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on January 8 as fighting between the Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters continued for a third day. The recent fighting in Aleppo indicates that the previous SDF-government agreement has been largely insufficient in its current form to integrate Kurdish forces into the Syrian state and prevent new rounds of conflict.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese cabinet reviewed on January 8 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s progress in disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and tasked the LAF to develop a plan to disarm the group north of the Litani River. Israeli officials are calling into question the LAF’s ability to disarm Hezbollah faster than Hezbollah can rearm itself, irrespective of the LAF’s ongoing efforts.

Iran Update, January 7, 2026

CTP-ISW has recorded 89 protests across 21 provinces in Iran since its last data cutoff on January 6. CTP has adjusted its data cutoff for protests in Iran to 3:30 PM ET to correspond with 12 AM Tehran time.[i] CTP-ISW recorded eight protests across seven provinces in Iran between 2:00 and 3:30 PM ET on January 6.[ii] Protests have continued to primarily take place in western Iran and in smaller, less-populated areas. CTP-ISW has recorded 19 protests in Tehran City since its last data cutoff, however.[iii] CTP-ISW has also recorded 14 medium-sized protests since its last data cutoff, which CTP-ISW defines as protests with more than 100 participants.[iv]

 

The regime continues to use violence and lethal force to suppress the protests. CTP-ISW has recorded 15 instances of security forces firing at protesters across eight provinces since its last data cutoff, most of which were concentrated in Tehran, Fars, Kermanshah, and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari provinces.[v] The regime reportedly disrupted internet access in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province, and Malekshahi and Abdanan cities, Ilam Province, where security forces have clashed with protesters, according to an internet access researcher on January 7.[vi] The regime has arrested at least 2,078 citizens and killed at least 24 protesters since December 28, according to a US-based human rights organization focused on Iran on January 6.[vii]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on January 7 that protesters killed two Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers during protests in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province, as well as an unspecified security force member in Malekshahi, Ilam Province.[viii] These reports mark the first time that the regime has publicly announced the death of security forces members since the start of the protests on December 28. The regime previously claimed on January 1 that protesters had killed a member of the Basij, but this claim turned out to be false.[ix] The Iranian regime could use the deaths of security personnel as justification to intensify its suppression of Iranian protesters.

An Iranian media outlet affiliated with one of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representatives to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, implicitly criticized security forces’ recent raid on a hospital in Ilam Province.[x] Security forces raided a hospital in Malekshahi County, Ilam Province, on January 5, where injured protesters were being treated.[xi] The outlet argued that the incident represents “a serious test of how the government engages society during crises” and that “issuing conciliatory statements, declaring responsibility, and accepting the possibility of error” do not diminish the regime’s authority but rather strengthen it.[xii] The outlet’s implicit criticism of the raid is notable given that other parts of the regime have justified the raid.[xiii]

A group of seven Kurdish organizations, including anti-regime groups, called for a general strike across Iran on January 8.[xiv] The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), among others, called for a nationwide “general strike” on January 8 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces.[xv] CTP-ISW has recorded 67 protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces since December 28.[xvi] The organizations’ call for a general strike is notable given that the regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement.[xvii] The IRGC previously struck anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan in October 2022.[xviii] Significant protest activity took place in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, which have large Kurdish populations, during the Mahsa Amini movement.[xix] CTP-ISW has not observed any protests in Kurdistan Province nor significant protest activity in West Azerbaijan Province thus far in the current wave of protests, however.

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, killed an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 7 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters across Iran.[xx] The MPF claimed that it killed the Shahr-e Deraz LEC commander in response to “the killing and suppression of protesters in various parts of our country.”[xxi] The MPF claimed that the commander previously served as the Iranshahr LEC Information Protection Organization commander and had killed “Baloch fuel workers” in recent months.[xxii] The MPF previously warned on January 1 that it would respond to “every bullet” fired by Iranian security forces at protesters.[xxiii] CTP-ISW has not recorded any protests in Iranshahr at the time of this writing. The MPF’s January 7 attack marks the first time that the MPF has conducted an attack in Iranshahr. The MPF previously conducted its first attack in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in early December 2025.[xxiv]

Anti-regime media and some social media users claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran to support the Iranian regime’s crackdown on protests.[xxv] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these reports, and anti-regime media has circulated similar reports during previous waves of protests. Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that around 800 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters have deployed to Iran since January 2 through border crossings in Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces, citing unsourced “information.”[xxvi] The Iraqi fighters are reportedly members of Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and the Badr Organization, among other militias.[xxvii] Iran International added that unspecified Iraqi government officials are aware of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[xxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently use their control of many Iran-Iraq border crossings to smuggle items, such as weapons, in and out of Iraq.[xxix] Several social media users have also claimed in recent days that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[xxx] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that tend to report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxi]  The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime’s efforts to contain the protests. Iraqi militias may also be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters given that they lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that are protesting. Anti-regime media often circulates reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest. Iran International, citing Israeli media, reported in 2022 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias under the PMF deployed to Iran during the Masha Amini protest movement to help the Iranian regime contain the protests, for example.[xxxii] The former head of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court, Musa Ghazanfarabadi, also implied in 2019 to Iranian religious students in Qom that Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, could support the regime’s suppression of future protest movements in Iran.[xxxiii] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[xxxiv]

Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashad al Alimi altered the composition of the PLC by pressuring Southern Transitional Council (STC) members to sideline STC President and former PLC Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi and other hardline secessionists. Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors have been trying to reunify Yemen’s anti-Houthi factions, de-escalate the conflict between the ROYG and the STC, and reassert the ROYG’s control over southern Yemen. The PLC convened an emergency meeting in Riyadh on January 7 and announced that it expelled Zubaidi from the council and referred him to the attorney general for prosecution on charges including "high treason.”[xxxv] Zubaidi, who recently announced the STC’s intent to form an independent state in southern Yemen, did not board a Riyadh-bound flight in Aden on January 6 after Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors, including Alimi, pressured him to travel to Riyadh to meet with the PLC.[xxxvi] The Saudi-led military coalition claimed that Zubaidi fled Aden after refusing to travel to Riyadh.[xxxvii] The coalition struck weapons and equipment depots in Dhaleh Governorate after it received intelligence that Zubaidi had moved a “large military force” to Dhaleh.[xxxviii] Zubaidi is from Dhaleh Governorate.[xxxix]

Several STC-aligned actors appear to be cooperating with Saudi Arabia and Alimi’s efforts to sideline Zubaidi and other hardline secessionists, though the STC continues to publicly support Zubaidi.[xl]  Two of Zubaidi’s partners, PLC Vice President Tariq Saleh and STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami, were present during the meeting in which the PLC decided to expel Zubaidi.[xli] Only Zubaidi and STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Farah al Bahsani—who had aligned with Zubaidi, Saleh, and Muharrami in supporting the STC’s takeover of eastern Yemeni territory in early December 2025—did not attend the PLC meeting.[xlii] President Alimi summoned these STC leaders to Riyadh on January 4.[xliii] CTP-ISW previously noted that Saudi Arabia could use the summons to reprimand the STC and attempt to compel it to de-escalate with Alimi and northern Yemeni factions within the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG).”[xliv]  Saleh and Muharrami’s activity in Riyadh since their arrival, including meetings with Saudi and Saudi-backed PLC members, suggests that both men have succumbed to pressure from Alimi and Saudi Arabia to end cooperation with Zubaidi and other secessionists. Muharrami’s Southern Giant Forces have assumed control over several positions across Aden on January 6 and 7 at the Saudi-led coalition’s request, according to local media and the coalition’s spokesperson.[xlv]  A Yemen analyst reported on January 7 that other STC forces are cooperating with the Southern Giant Forces in Aden.[xlvi]

The PLC also dismissed two ministers and several Hadrami military commanders on January 7, possibly as part of an effort to purge supporters of Zubaidi or secession from ROYG political and security institutions.[xlvii] PLC President Alimi fired the ROYG’s transport and planning and international cooperation ministers on January 7 and placed both ministers under investigation as part of “urgent measures to control the security situation and strengthen state sovereignty.”[xlviii] Alimi and his ally, Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi, also dismissed commanders in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates on January 7 and referred them to courts-martial, which Saudi-backed Yemeni forces recently seized from the STC during a counteroffensive.[xlix] Neither Alimi nor Khanbashi attributed these individuals’ dismissals to support for the STC’s takeover, but the PLC notably took action against these individuals on the same day that the PLC expelled Zubaidi from the PLC and accused him of treason.

Several former Assad regime officers are reportedly attempting to organize insurgent activity against the Syrian government from Lebanese territory.[l] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) does not appear to have taken actions to meaningfully disrupt these officers’ efforts to organize and support insurgent activity. Numerous Assad regime members fled to Lebanon in December 2024 after the fall of the Assad regime, including prominent Assad regime figures such as Assad’s senior adviser, Bassam al Hassan, and Fourth Division General Ghiath Dalla.[li] Dalla, who reportedly lives "just over” the Syrian border in Lebanon, has continued to organize Assadist insurgent activity from Lebanon, according to recent Western and Arab media investigations.[lii] Former Tiger Forces Commander Suhail al Hassan, who has attempted to recruit and equip Assadist insurgents, has met with collaborators in Lebanon over the past year and reportedly purchased a large office along the Lebanon-Syria border to use as a “headquarters” for future operations in Syria.[liii]   Hassan claimed, according to documents obtained by the New York Times and Al Jazeera, that at least 20 former Assad regime pilots are living in Lebanon and intend to join Assadist insurgent groups.[liv] A Syrian transitional government delegation reportedly submitted a list of names of Assad regime officers living in Lebanon to the Lebanese government on December 22 and demanded that Lebanon transfer them to Syria.[lv] The Syrian government has long demanded that Lebanon extradite former Syrian regime officials accused of war crimes, which the Lebanese government has not yet done.[lvi]

Recent investigations into former Assad regime officials operating from Lebanon reportedly prompted Lebanese authorities to carry out raids and arrests nationwide. Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Matri stated on January 2 that the investigations were “cause for concern” and publicly called on Lebanese security forces to investigate and "take appropriate measures.”[lvii]  Lebanese media reported that the LAF raided an Alawite-majority neighborhood in Tripoli in search of Assad regime remnants on January 3.[lviii] The LAF announced that it arrested 35 Syrians in northern and eastern Lebanon districts on smuggling and weapons charges on January 4.[lix] Several Syrian and international media outlets claimed that the LAF arrested Assad regime remnants during this arrest campaign.[lx]

There are several indications that Alawite insurgent groups currently active in Syria may have ties to former regime networks in Lebanon. The Syrian government has alleged that Suhail al Hassan has ties to the Alawite insurgent group known as the Men of Light, for example.[lxi] Another Syrian insurgent group, Fawj Azra’il al Jabal, praised Lebanon for allegedly refusing the Syrian government’s December 22 request to extradite regime officers living in Lebanon, which suggests that Fawj Azra’il al Jabal may have connections to some of the officers in Lebanon.[lxii] The LAF’s recent arrest campaign in northern Lebanon that resulted in the arrest of 35 Syrians also prompted an aggressive reaction on social media from the Coastal Shield Brigade, another Alawite insurgent group currently active along the Syrian coast.[lxiii] The Coastal Shield Brigade’s reaction to the arrests suggests that the group possibly has ties to the insurgent or smuggling networks that were targeted in the arrests.[lxiv]

The Lebanese army can play a meaningful role in disrupting former regime networks in Lebanon that are attempting to destabilize the new Syrian government as part of the Lebanese government’s improved relationship with Syria since December 2024. CTP-ISW recently assessed that the current scale, performance, and organizational structure of Assadist insurgents suggest that the threat of these insurgents to Syrian government forces remains low at this time.[lxv] These networks may expand if allowed time and space to recruit and organize in both Syria and Lebanon, however. 

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Protests: CTP-ISW has recorded 89 protests across 21 provinces in Iran since its last data cutoff on January 6, including 19 protests in Tehran City. The protests have continued to primarily take place in western Iran and in smaller, less-populated areas. The regime continues to use violence and lethal force to suppress the protests. The regime reportedly disrupted internet access in parts of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari and Ilam provinces.
• Iranian Protests: A group of seven Kurdish organizations, including anti-regime groups, called for a general strike across Iran on January 8. The organizations’ call for a general strike is notable given that the regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement.
• Baloch Insurgency: The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, killed an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 7 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters across Iran. The MPF previously warned on January 1 that it would respond to “every bullet” fired by Iranian security forces at protesters.
• Rumored Iraqi Militia Deployments: Anti-regime media and some social media users claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran to support the Iranian regime’s crackdown on protests. The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime’s efforts to contain the protests. CTP-ISW is unable to verify these reports, and anti-regime media has circulated similar reports during previous waves of protests.
• Changes Within Yemen’s PLC: Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashad al Alimi altered the composition of the PLC by pressuring Southern Transitional Council (STC) members to sideline STC President and former PLC Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi and other hardline secessionists.
• Assadist Insurgent Networks in Lebanon: Several former Assad regime officers are reportedly attempting to organize insurgent activity against the Syrian government from Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) does not appear to have taken actions to meaningfully disrupt these officers’ efforts to organize and support insurgent activity, despite recent arrests that are rumored to have targeted Assad regime networks.

Iran Update, January 6, 2026

The rate of protests across Iran declined slightly on January 5 and 6 compared to the rate of protests between January 2 and 4. CTP-ISW recorded at least 43 protests across Iran between January 5 at 2 pm EST and January 6 at 2 pm ET, and 37 protests between January 4 at 2 pm ET and January 5 at 2 pm ET.[i] The day-by-day breakdown of protests since January 1 illustrates that the protest rate has declined since January 4 at 2 pm ET:[ii]

• 81 protests occurred across 23 provinces between January 3 at 2 pm ET and January 4 at 2 pm ET.
• 62 protests occurred across 18 provinces between January 2 at 2 pm ET and January 3 at 2 pm ET.
• 70 protests occurred across 22 provinces between January 1 at 2 pm ET and January 2 at 2 pm ET.

The Iranian weekend—which is on Friday and Saturday—may have driven the higher rate of protests from Friday, January 2, to Sunday, January 4. CTP-ISW observed an increase in protests across Tehran on January 5 and 6, however, in contrast to the declining national rate on January 5 and January 6. Nineteen protests took place in Tehran between January 5 and 6, while only eight protests occurred in Tehran between January 4 and 5.[iii] A medium-sized protest occurred in Abadan, Ilam Province, during which Iranian Law Enforcement Command personnel waved at protesters from the rooftop of a nearby police building.[iv] Iranian authorities have arrested nearly 1,000 people and killed at least 25 people, including four minors, since the protests started on December 28, according to a Norway-based Kurdish Iranian rights group.[v] CTP-ISW has not observed a demographic or geographic change in protests since its last data cutoff at 2 pm on January 5.

The Iranian regime warned on January 6 that it would take unspecified preemptive measures to counter any US and/or Israeli attempts to exploit the ongoing protests across Iran that threaten Iranian regime security, almost certainly to deter US and Israeli activity against Iran.[vi] The Defense Council condemned Iran’s adversaries’ “intensifying threatening language and interventionist threats” on January 6 in the council’s first official statement since its establishment in August 2025.[vii] The council is presumably referring to US President Donald Trump's January 2 warnings that the United States could intervene if Iranian security forces shoot or kill Iranian protesters.[viii] Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, established the Defense Council to restructure Iran‘s defense strategy and restore deterrence through “hard power” following the Israel-Iran War.[ix] The Defense Council warned on January 6 that “Iran does not consider itself limited to reacting after the action and considers objective signs of threat as part of the security equation,” which implies the possibility of Iranian preemptive action.[x] A preemptive action is taken to prevent an imminent attack or threat from an adversary, whereas a preventive action is taken to avert a future, non-imminent threat.[xi] A political analyst close to the Iranian regime, Mostafa Najafi, stated on January 6 that the Defense Council issued the January 6 statement after receiving ”multiple signals regarding the urgency of potential threats.”[xii] Najafi assessed that Iran is “highly unlikely” to launch a preemptive strike, however, and that the only way for Iran alter the current position that Iran, the US, and Israel are in is through the “restoration of deterrence.”[xiii] An unspecified Iranian official separately told Reuters on January 5 that these external pressures have narrowed the regime’s room to maneuver between protests and hardening US demands, leaving Iranian leaders with the perception that there are “few viable options and high risks on every path.”[xiv] Mahdi Mohammadi, an advisor to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, similarly stated on X on January 5 that the “boundary" between the current state of the unknown and war, as well as "psychological operations and physical operations, and preemption and response, has become extremely faint” and even “intertwined.”[xv]

 The Iranian regime is likely trying to appease protesters by approving economic reforms, such as subsidies for basic goods. The Iranian Parliament approved the revised second edition of the 2026-2027 budget bill on January 5.[xvi] The bill mandates that the Iranian government will increase public sector salary raises from 20 percent up to 43 percent, keep the value-added tax (VAT) rate at ten percent, and provide $8.8 billion in subsidized credits for the purchase of basic goods like eggs, oil, and red meat.[xvii] It is noteworthy that the first edition of the budget bill only increased public sector salaries by 20 percent, which some Iranian officials criticized as being insufficient to keep up with the current 42.2 percent inflation rate in Iran.[xviii] The updated subsidy will reportedly provide about 80 million Iranians approximately seven dollars a month per person for four months, which is still extremely low.[xix]  The average Iranian monthly wage is around $200.[xx] It is unclear if the approved budget will appease protesters demanding economic reform, as some Iranian social media users mocked the subsidy amount as wholly insufficient.[xxi]  

 The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee published a statement on January 4 that rejects calls for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm due to the ongoing presence of US and Turkish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxii] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxiii] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Asaib Ahl al Haq signed the January 4 statement.[xxiv] The Karbala Brigades, which the United States has sanctioned as a Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada offshoot, also signed the statement.[xxv] This statement comes amid continued US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvi]

 The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s statement is inconsistent with the expressed positions of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Asaib Ahl al Haq on disarmament. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi claimed on December 20 that weapons are already restricted to the Iraqi state and the militias and thus do not need to disarm.[xxvii] Fartousi’s comments ignore the reality that many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, possess weapons and are neither integrated into the Iraqi security forces nor answer to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxviii]  Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali appeared to support disarmament in a December 19 speech to his supporters.[xxix] Asaib Ahl al Haq then reiterated on January 6 its “clear and declared position since 2017” that weapons should exclusively belong to the Iraqi state.[xxx] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s military spokesperson denied on December 22, however, that the group intends to surrender its weapons.[xxxi] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s January 4 statement is consistent with other militias’ positions on disarmament. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, for example, each issued statements on December 20 that rejected calls to disarm and restrict weapons to the state due to the ongoing presence of foreign forces in Iraq.[xxxii] Harakat Ansar al Awfiya leader Haider al Ghrawi issued a contrasting statement on December 19 that called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[xxxiii]

 

Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors continue to pressure the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and to reassert the internationally-recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)’s control over southern Yemen. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi likely traveled to Riyadh on January 6 under Saudi-led political pressure to participate in a Saudi-hosted southern Yemeni dialogue conference alongside other UAE-backed STC leaders.[xxxiv] The Riyadh-based, Saudi-supported Yemeni President and PLC President, Rashad al Alimi, summoned STC leaders to Riyadh on January 4 for “discussions” and to prepare for the Saudi-hosted conference during which southern Yemeni factions will discuss "solutions to the southern cause.”[xxxv] Saudi Arabia almost certainly backs Alimi’s summons in order to reunify Yemen’s anti-Houthi factions and de-escalate the conflict between the ROYG and the STC. Saudi Arabia frequently uses the legitimacy of its Yemeni partners to provide a Yemeni veneer to Saudi political maneuvers.

Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors have likely, over the past day, increased political pressure on Zubaidi, who did not attend the January 4 meeting, to travel to Riyadh to meet with Alimi and Saudi officials.[xxxvi] The Southern Giant Brigades' commander, STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zahraa Muharrami, travelled to Riyadh after Alimi‘s initial summons and met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman on January 3 and 4 to discuss Saudi-Yemeni coordination to stabilize Yemen.[xxxvii] The STC’s Southern Giant Brigades then assumed security control of Aden’s Maashiq Palace, where Zubaidi lives, on January 6.[xxxviii] The Southern Giant Brigades presumably assumed control over Maashiq Palace with Saudi approval, given Muharrami’s public willingness to cooperate with the Saudis and his meetings that preceded the deployment.[xxxix] A Yemeni journalist stated that the Giant Brigades are expected to transfer control of the palace to Saudi-backed Yemeni forces upon their eventual arrival in Aden.[xl] Al Jazeera’s Yemen affairs editor reported that Zubaidi ”was given a brief deadline” to depart from Aden before unspecified ”further measures” took place.[xli]

The Saudi-backed National Shield Forces’ (NSF) consolidation of territorial gains from a recent counteroffensive and westward advance also contributes to the Saudi-led pressure effort to compel the Emirati-backed STC to cooperate with the ROYG. The NSF, supported by Saudi airstrikes, forced the STC to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates between January 3 and 5.[xlii] Local authorities in Mahra governorate confirmed on January 6 that the NSF took full control over the governorate’s public facilities.[xliii] Several indicators suggest that the NSF will continue to advance westward and consolidate NSF control over STC-controlled territory. The NSF deployed to key positions within the STC-controlled Shabwa Governorate on January 6 after coordinating with local authorities in Ataq on January 5.[xliv] Shabwa Governorate's UAE-backed governor has reiterated his support for the ROYG and Saudi-led Yemeni dialogue in recent days.[xlv] Several Yemeni sources suggested that the NSF was expected to arrive in Aden, which the STC controls, in the near future.[xlvi]

US officials met with Saudi and Yemeni actors in Riyadh to discuss Yemeni stability on January 6 amid Saudi efforts to reassert the ROYG’s control over Yemen. Alimi and PLC Vice President and STC Vice President Tariq Saleh separately met with US Ambassador to Yemen Stephen Fagin and US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos.[xlvii]  The United States supports a unified Yemen under the ROYG, which is recognized by the UN, and US and other Western officials have reiterated their long-standing support for the ROYG in recent statements and calls with Yemeni and Saudi officials.[xlviii]

Key Takeaways

• Protests in Iran: The rate of protests across Iran declined slightly on January 5 and 6 compared to the rate of protests between January 2 and 4. CTP-ISW recorded at least 43 protests across Iran between January 5 at 2 pm EST and January 6 at 2 pm ET, and 37 protests between January 4 at 2 pm ET and January 5 at 2 pm ET.
• Iranian Preemptive Action Threats: The Iranian regime warned on January 6 that it would take unspecified preemptive measures to counter any US and/or Israeli attempts to exploit the ongoing protests across Iran that threaten Iranian regime security, almost certainly to deter US and Israeli activity against Iran. The Defense Council condemned Iran’s adversaries’ “intensifying threatening language and interventionist threats” on January 6 in the council’s first official statement since its establishment in August 2025.
• Iranian Economic Reform: The Iranian regime is likely trying to appease protesters by approving economic reforms, such as subsidies for basic goods. The Iranian Parliament approved the revised second edition of the 2026-2027 budget bill on January 5.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Disarmament: The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee published a statement on January 4 that rejects calls for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm due to the ongoing presence of US and Turkish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Asaib Ahl al Haq signed the January 4 statement.
• Saudi Pressure Campaign in Yemen: Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors continue to pressure the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and to reassert the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)’s control over southern Yemen. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi likely traveled to Riyadh on January 6 under Saudi-led political pressure to participate in a Saudi-hosted southern Yemeni dialogue conference alongside other UAE-backed STC leaders.

Iran Update, January 5, 2026

CTP-ISW recorded a total of at least 179 protests in 24 provinces across Iran since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on January 2 at 2 pm ET.[i] The following number of protests have occurred since January 2:

• 62 protests occurred across 18 provinces between January 2 at 2 pm ET and January 3 at 2 pm ET.[ii]
• 81 protests occurred across 23 provinces between January 3 at 2 pm ET and January 4 at 2 pm ET.[iii]
• 37 protests occurred across 15 provinces between January 4 at 2 pm ET and January 5 at 2 pm ET.[iv]

CTP-ISW has recorded a total of 369 protests in 28 of the 31 provinces across Iran since the protests began on December 28.[v]

 CTP-ISW recorded 17 medium-sized protests, which CTP-ISW defines as more than 100 participants, across Iran since January 2.[vi] The Governor of Qom Province told Iranian state media on January 4 that around 150 to 200 people participated in the protests in Qom Province on the night of January 2 and 400 to 450 people on January 3, most of whom were between the ages of 14 and 28.[vii] CTP-ISW cannot confirm the number of protestors in Qom on these dates.

Some protesters have continued to clash with Iranian security forces since January 2 in response to the regime’s protest suppression efforts. An individual brandished a rifle and shot into the air while chanting “Death to Khamenei,” allegedly in a protest in Sarableh, Ilam Province, on January 4.[viii] CTP-ISW cannot confirm if this incident happened at a protest or if the video was new. Iranian protesters also threw Molotov cocktails at Iranian security forces in Shazand, Markazi Province, and Lahijan, Gilan Province, on January 4 and 5, respectively.[ix]

The Iranian regime appears to have shifted toward a harsher and more coercive crackdown after top Iranian officials began differentiating between “rioters” and “protesters” and calling for crackdowns on “rioters.” Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a speech on January 4, stating that while protesting is acceptable, it differs “from rioting.”[x] Khamenei added that speaking with “rioters” is useless and noted that “rioters should be put in their place.”[xi] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei similarly called for the judiciary to act decisively against rioters and said that ”this time [the regime] will show no mercy to the rioters.”[xii] Mohseni Ejei also stated on X on January 5 that “this time, we [the regime] will show no mercy to the rioters.”[xiii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi stated during a meeting with Law Enforcement Command (LEC) commanders on January 4 that the LEC will “put the rioters in their place” with public support.[xiv]

These aggressive statements by top officials come amid growing reports of arrests and casualties linked to the protests. Iranian authorities have arrested nearly 1,000 people, including minors, and killed at least 16 people since the protests started on December 28.[xv] Several media outlets reported that Iranian security forces raided a hospital in Ilam City, Ilam Province, to arrest wounded protesters.[xvi] Security forces also fired tear gas into the hospital compound and entered the wards and rooms to search for injured protesters.[xvii] Malekshahi, Ilam Province, in western Iran, has been a main focal point of protest activity and regime repression in recent days.[xviii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency claimed on January 3 that some unrest in western provinces has taken the form of “organized cells” and ”semi-militant attacks.”[xix] The IRGC Hazrat-e Abolfazl Unit in Lorestan Province, western Iran, also issued a statement on January 5 and warned that the “appeasement period” toward “elements of unrest” has ended, citing recent remarks by the Supreme Leader.[xx]

Iranian officials appear to have considered a less violent approach to contain the protests, but have since shifted toward a harder and more coercive crackdown after Khamenei’s January 4 speech. Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times on January 4 that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) held an emergency meeting on January 2 to discuss containing the protests with “less violence” in order to avoid  .[xxi] The SNSC convened on January 2, before Khamenei’s speech on January 4. Both Mousavi and Mohseni Ejei are also SNSC  .[xxii] Mousavi’s and Mohseni Ejei’s statements suggest that the regime has shifted toward a harsher approach to suppress ongoing protests, however.

Iranian officials believe that recent US threats have limited their ability to respond effectively to protests. Unspecified Iranian officials told Reuters on January 5 that US President Donald Trump's threat to intervene in Iranian protests has complicated Iran's efforts to quell recent anti-government protests.[xxiii]  Trump told reporters on January 4 that the United States will “hit [Iran] hard” if the Iranian regime continues to violently target protesters as it has done in the past.[xxiv] One Iranian official noted that some Iranian officials fear that the United States may target Iran after the January 3 US strikes in Venezuela.[xxv] Another unspecified Iranian official noted that these external pressures have narrowed the regime’s room to maneuver between public anger and protests, and hardening US demands, leaving Iranian leaders with the perception that there are "few viable options and high risks on every path."[xxvi]

The IRGC reportedly conducted a missile and air defense exercise on January 4 in multiple cities, including Tehran and Shiraz, which suggests that Iran is increasingly concerned about a renewed conflict with Israel after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington.[xxvii] IRGC-affiliated media previously reported on December 22 that the IRGC Aerospace Force launched missiles as part of a missile exercise in unspecified locations in five provinces.[xxviii] Iran reportedly conducted a missile launch in an unspecified location in Ilam Province, near Iran’s western border with Iraq, on December 30.[xxix] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports. Iran’s reported missile exercises highlight the regime’s concerns about a renewed Iran-Israeli conflict as Iran tries to prepare its air defense systems and missile capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems in the first 24 hours of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War.[xxx]

The Riyadh-based, Saudi-supported Yemeni President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President, Rashad al Alimi, summoned Southern Transitional Council (STC) leaders to Riyadh on January 4 for “discussions,” likely as part of a Saudi effort to pressure the STC to end its hostilities against the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF).[xxxi] Emirati-backed STC forces seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates in eastern Yemen in early December 2025, which triggered an NSF counteroffensive on January 2.[xxxii] A Yemen analyst reported that Alimi summoned senior STC leadership, including STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami, for a PLC meeting in Riyadh on January 4.[xxxiii] Alimi summoned the STC officials to discuss recent events in southern Yemen and to prepare for a Saudi-hosted conference for all southern Yemeni factions ”to discuss just solutions to the southern cause,” which Alimi requested on January 2.[xxxiv] STC President and PLC Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi reportedly did not attend the January 4 PLC meeting, however.[xxxv] STC leadership, including Muharrami and STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Tariq Saleh, also met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh on January 3 and 4 to discuss Saudi-Yemeni coordination to stabilize Yemen.[xxxvi]

Saudi Arabia almost certainly backs Alimi’s summons in order to reunify Yemen’s anti-Houthi factions and de-escalate the conflict between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and STC. Yemeni actors will presumably view Alimi’s summons as a summons from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia frequently uses the legitimacy of its Yemeni partners to provide a Yemeni veneer to Saudi political maneuvers. Saudi Arabia similarly gathered Yemeni factions in Riyadh in 2022 before orchestrating the ouster of former Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his replacement with Alimi.[xxxvii] Saudi Arabia could use the summons to reprimand the STC and attempt to compel it to de-escalate with Alimi and northern Yemeni factions within the ROYG.

STC officials’ support for the Saudi dialogue conference suggests that the STC may be willing to ease tensions and increase dialogue with the Yemeni government.[xxxviii] STC-affiliated media reported on January 5 that Zubaidi and STC leadership held a cabinet meeting in Aden, during which STC members praised Saudi Arabia’s efforts to hold the southern Yemeni dialogue conference and affirmed their readiness to “actively participate in ensuring the conference’s success.”[xxxix]

The Saudi-backed NSF, supported by Saudi airstrikes, forced the Emirati-backed STC to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates between January 3 and 5. It is unclear to what degree the STC withdrew under pressure, but there were relatively few ground engagements reported in Yemeni media.[xl] The NSF, with significant Saudi air support, advanced from Khashaa, Hadramawt Governorate, through Wadi Hadramawt to seize al Qatn and Seiyun, Hadramawt Governorate, on January 2 and 3, according to local Yemeni media.[xli] NSF commander and ROYG Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi called on STC forces to withdraw from both areas.[xlii] Saudi Arabia supported Khanbashi’s call and conducted airstrikes targeting the STC units that did not comply.[xliii] Yemeni media reported that NSF forces then seized al Adwas, Hadramawt Governorate, on January 3, and allowed STC forces to withdraw to Aden Governorate after surrendering heavy weaponry and armored vehicles.[xliv] Yemeni and the Associated Press reported that NSF units seized Mukalla, Hadramawt Governorate, and al Ghaydah, Mahra Governorate, on January 4, and have since begun to establish ”security and stability duties” in Mahra Governorate.[xlv] Military sources told Yemeni media on January 4 that the STC has begun to reinforce positions in Shabwa Governorate with STC units that withdrew from Hadramawt Governorate alongside reinforcements from Aden, Lahij, and Dahle governorates.[xlvi] Yemeni media reported that NSF forces began to advance toward Shabwa Governorate on January 5.[xlvii]

Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leadership met in Damascus on January 4 to negotiate the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state after the initial integration deadline passed on December 31, 2025.[xlviii] The SDF’s media office announced on January 4 that the parties did not finalize an integration agreement, but that periodic meetings will continue.[xlix] The SDF delegation consisted of SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and General Command members Sozdar Derik and Sipan Hemo.[l] SDF sources reported that Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Brigadier General Kevin Lambert also attended the meeting.[li]

This meeting indicated that the Syrian transitional government and Turkey have chosen—at least in the near term—to pursue diplomacy rather than using military force to integrate northeastern Syria and the SDF into the state, even as the agreement term ”expired.”[lii] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to attack the SDF if it failed to integrate into the Syrian state by the end of 2025 and has expressed concerns about the future security situation in northeastern Syria if the SDF retains its current influence there.[liii] Turkey slightly reversed this position throughout December 2025, and on December 31, the Turkish government said that it supports the Syrian government’s efforts to extend negotiations.[liv]

The SDF and Syrian government still disagree over fundamental issues for the future of Syria, however. SDF officials reiterated their fundamental negotiating positions before the meeting, including the centralization of state power, which indicates that the Syrian government and the SDF still disagree on their vision for a Syrian state.[lv] The Syrian transitional government insists that a central authority should rule Syria through appointed governors and views SDF decentralization as a path toward secession.[lvi] The SDF views decentralization as a way to secure local authority over regional affairs and sees the government’s push to concentrate power in Damascus as an attempt to impose autocratic rule.[lvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Protests: CTP-ISW recorded a total of at least 179 protests in 24 provinces across Iran since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on January 2 at 2 pm ET. Some protesters have continued to clash with Iranian security forces since January 2 in response to the regime’s protest suppression efforts.
• Iranian Regime Response to Protests: The Iranian regime appears to have shifted toward a harsher and more coercive crackdown after top Iranian officials began differentiating between “rioters” and “protesters” and calling for crackdowns on “rioters.” Iranian officials believe that recent US threats have limited their ability to respond effectively to protests.
• Iran’s Defense Strategy: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reportedly conducted a missile and air defense exercise on January 4 in multiple cities, including Tehran and Shiraz, which suggests that Iran is increasingly concerned about a renewed conflict with Israel after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington.
• Saudi-Backed Efforts in Yemen: The Riyadh-based, Saudi-supported Yemeni President and Presidential Leadership Council President, Rashad al Alimi, summoned Southern Transitional Council (STC) leaders to Riyadh on January 4 for “discussions,” likely as part of a Saudi effort to pressure the STC to end its hostilities against the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF). STC officials’ support for the Saudi dialogue conference suggests that the STC may be willing to ease tensions and increase dialogue with the Yemeni government. The Saudi-backed NSF, supported by Saudi airstrikes, forced the Emirati-backed STC to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates between January 3 and 5.
• SDF Integration: Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leadership met in Damascus on January 4 to negotiate the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state after the initial integration deadline passed on December 31, 2025. The SDF and Syrian government still disagree over fundamental issues for the future of Syria, however.

Iran Update, January 2, 2026

The rate and geographic scope of protests in Iran increased on January 1 and 2. CTP-ISW recorded 56 protests on January 1 and 70 protests on January 2, compared to 31 protests on December 31.[i] Protests took place in 17 out of Iran’s 31 provinces between December 28 and 31 and have since spread to five additional provinces, including Ghazvin, Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad, Mazandaran, North Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces.[ii] Protests have also spread to a greater number of cities within individual provinces. CTP-ISW recorded one protest in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province on December 31 and three protests in three cities in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province on January 1, for example.[iii] Protests have primarily taken place in medium-sized and small towns instead of in major cities. CTP-ISW has not observed significant protest activity in provinces with large Kurdish populations, such as Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan Province. The lack of protest activity in these provinces thus far is notable given that a significant portion of protests during the Mahsa Amini movement took place in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces.[iv]

The protests in Iran have become more violent since January 1, primarily in less populated and more rural areas. Iranian security forces have killed protesters in at least the following locations: Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, Fuladshahr, Esfahan Province, Marvdasht, Fars Province, Azna, Lorestan Province, and Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province.[v] Security forces previously fired live ammunition at crowds of protesters in Fasa, Fars Province, and Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, on December 31.[vi] The concentration of the use of lethal force in more rural areas reflects Iranian security forces’ reduced capacity to suppress unrest and impose control in these areas. 

The Iranian regime claimed that a protester whom security forces killed during protests in Kuhdasht was a member of the Basij, likely in an effort to obfuscate the regime’s use of violence and lethal force against protesters.[vii] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that largely focuses on producing and disseminating propaganda, suppressing domestic dissent, and conducting civil defense activities.[viii] A Kurdish human rights organization reported that the regime refused to hand over the protester’s body to his family or allow his family to hold a funeral until they publicly stated that their family member was a member of the regime.[ix] The protester’s father confirmed that his son was not a member of the Basij, however.[x]

Several funerals for killed protesters transformed into anti-regime protests on January 2. Funerals for killed protesters transformed into anti-regime protests in Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, and Marvdasht, Fars Province, with protesters chanting slogans such as “I will kill, I will kill whoever killed my brother.”[xi]  Attendees at the funeral in Kuhdasht threw stones at and pushed back security forces.[xii] The Iranian regime has historically sought to prevent Iranians from holding funeral and commemoration ceremonies for killed protesters given that these ceremonies can often turn into protests against the regime.[xiii]

Protesters have in some instances responded violently to security forces’ use of violence and force. Social media users circulated a video of protesters throwing a Molotov cocktail at security forces in Arak, Markazi Province on December 31.[xiv] Protesters have also reportedly set fire to regime property in multiple cities, including a security vehicle in Lorestan Province, a Basij building in Hamedan Province, and a seminary building in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province.[xv] Iranian media claimed that 13 Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij members were injured by stones thrown by protesters in Kuhdasht.[xvi] The regime previously claimed that three security forces members were injured in Fasa, Fars Province, on December 31.[xvii] The Lorestan LEC Deputy for Cultural and Social Affairs claimed that LEC officers arrested a protester who had a “pistol” on January 1, although there is no evidence that the protester used or intended to use the weapon against security forces.[xviii]

Iranian officials have threatened that Iran could attack US interests in the Middle East if the United States intervenes in the ongoing protests. US President Donald Trump stated on January 2 that “If Iran [shoots] and violently kills peaceful protesters...the United States of America will come to [protesters’] rescue.”[xix] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf responded to Trump’s statement, warning that US “adventurism” would make US bases and forces in the Middle East “legitimate target[s].”[xx] Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately stated that any “hostile action” would “destroy” Israel, US bases, and regional stability.[xxi] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani similarly warned that US interference in the protests would destabilize the Middle East and destroy US interests, adding that the United States should “be mindful of [its] soldiers’ safety.”[xxii]

Anti-regime protests spread to Sistan and Baluchistan Province in southeastern Iran on January 2.[xxiii] Protesters gathered after Friday prayers in Zahedan, which is the largest city in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid addressed the ongoing anti-regime protests in his sermon on January 2, stating that peaceful protests constitute a legal and legitimate right.[xxiv] Abdol Hamid criticized how Iranian officials handle the economy and stated that “Iranians’ lives have reached a dead end.”[xxv] Abdol Hamid urged protesters to keep protests peaceful and urged security forces not to use violence against protesters. Zahedan residents began holding weekly protests after Friday prayers in late September 2022, after security forces violently suppressed protesters in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday." Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly Friday protests even after the Mahsa Amini protest movement culminated in other parts of the country.[xxvi]

The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, issued a statement on January 2 in which it declared support for the ongoing protests as a legitimate response to severe “livelihood pressures and structural discrimination."[xxvii] The MPF stated that it will not directly intervene in the protests "so as not to provide an excuse for abuse, distortion of facts, and organized repression" by the regime.[xxviii] Sistan and Baluchistan Province has long posed an internal security challenge for the Iranian regime due to recurring anti-regime activity in the province. Jaish al Adl, which is part of the MPF, and other Baloch groups frequently conduct attacks targeting Iranian regime security forces and institutions in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxix]

A senior Shia cleric acknowledged public grievances and the regime’s shortcomings and mismanagement on January 1. Prominent Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani blamed government mismanagement for the current protests during a meeting with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) head Peyman Jebelli on January 1.[xxx] Nouri Hamedani stated that Iranians are “fed up with high prices” and livelihood hardships and that the declining value of the national currency has left people “confused” and feeling economic pressure.[xxxi] Nouri Hamedani also stated that the “lack of leadership and proper management are the cause of these [economic] problems” and that the problems must be solved to satisfy the people.[xxxii] Nouri Hamedani previously called on Iranian officials during the Mahsa Amini movement in 2022 to listen to protesters’ demands and resolve their grievances.[xxxiii]

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is taking initial steps toward declaring an independent “State of South Arabia” and seceding from the Republic of Yemen, which could risk increasing fighting between Emirati-backed and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces in and outside of Hadramawt Governorate and exacerbating tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and has long had secessionist aims. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi declared the beginning of a two-year transitional period for a future independent state on January 2.[xxxiv] The STC also released a constitutional declaration for the independent and sovereign "State of South Arabia,” the borders of which will correspond with those of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990.[xxxv] The STC has indicated that it seeks to establish an independent state in southern Yemen since it launched an offensive in early December 2025 and seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates.[xxxvi] The 30-article constitutional declaration outlines the structure of the “State of South Arabia” following the two-year transition period and will, according to Zubaidi, go into effect on January 2, 2028.[xxxvii] The declaration states that the STC will use the two-year transition period to hold a popular referendum and build state institutions, including a democratic political system with separation of powers and a free-market economy.[xxxviii] Zubaidi called for the Central Bank in Aden to organize a mechanism to collect revenue.[xxxix] The publication of a constitutional declaration and Zubaidi’s comments mark the most tangible steps that the STC has taken since its offensive toward the establishment of an independent southern Yemeni state.

Zubaidi said that the STC seeks to establish dialogue with “all concerned parties in the South and North,” presumably referring to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG).[xl] Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors, including PLC President Rashid al Alimi, maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the ROYG and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as the "only option for restoring normalcy” in the region.[xli]  Zubaidi said that the STC’s declaration will achieve southern Yemen’s aspirations in a “gradual and safe manner” and provide the ROYG with a “stable and responsible” partner during the transition.[xlii] Zubaidi called on the international community to promote dialogue between the STC and ROYG.[xliii] Zubaidi also emphasized the STC’s commitment to participating in the anti-Houthi coalition during the transition.[xliv]

Saudi-backed Yemeni forces’ new operation to recapture areas of Hadramawt Governorate risks increasing fighting between UAE- and Saudi-backed Yemeni group amid the STC’s initial steps toward establishing an independent southern state. Alimi appointed Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi on January 2 to command the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) in Hadramawt Governorate.[xlv] Khanbashi immediately announced a new military operation to retake military positions from the STC in Hadramawt Governorate.[xlvi] Khanbashi’s announcement follows reports that around 20,000 NSF fighters had gathered in al Wadiah and al Abr districts in Hadramawt Governorate near the Saudi-Yemeni border on December 17.[xlvii]  The NSF seized the 37th Strategic Brigade military base in Khashaa, which is located along a key route that connects Wadi Hadramawt to other parts of southern Yemen. Pro-ROYG Hadrami tribal forces also seized the 1st Military Region Command Headquarters in Seiyun, according to Khanbashi.[xlviii] Local Yemeni media reported on January 2 that Saudi-backed forces advanced east toward al Qatn and Seiyun.[xlix] The Saudi Air Force struck at least seven STC positions in Hadramawt, including Khashaa and Seiyun.[l]

The STC is reportedly redeploying forces from its fronts with the Houthis in western Yemen to reinforce STC positions in Hadramawt Governorate in response to the NSF’s operation.  Military sources told Yemeni media on January 1 that six brigades from the STC’s Southern Giant Forces redeployed from positions along the western frontlines with the Houthis to reinforce STC positions in Hadramawt Governorate.[li] The sources said that UAE-backed National Resistance Forces backfilled the Southern Giant Forces’s positions.[lii] The Southern Giant Forces, which is commanded by STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami, is primarily based in southwestern Yemen and has played a significant role in fighting the Houthis in Shabwa and Marib governorates in central Yemen.[liii] The STC may not be able to continue to backfill positions along Houthi frontlines if the fighting between Saudi-backed forces and the STC increases in eastern Yemen and requires further STC reinforcements to protect the territory that would comprise the State of South Arabia. The Houthis could exploit the conflict between UAE- and Saudi-backed forces for their own territorial gains if the STC continues to redeploy forces from the front lines in western Yemen to Hadramawt and other eastern Yemeni Governorates.

Israel conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on January 2.[liv] These strikes marked Israel’s most extensive wave of airstrikes in Lebanon in recent months. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly struck Hezbollah targets in several areas of Jezzine, Nabatieh, Sidon, Bint Jbeil, and Western Bekaa districts in southwestern Lebanon.[lv] The IDF stated on January 2 that it struck a Hezbollah Radwan Force training compound and several other Hezbollah buildings that Hezbollah used to store combat equipment.[lvi] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s elite special operations unit that conducts cross-border infiltrations and attacks on Israeli positions.[lvii] The IDF has regularly conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters, weapons, and infrastructure since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in order to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution and remove any threat to northern Israeli towns.[lviii] Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, for example.[lix]  

The IDF is reportedly continuing to prepare to launch an operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Lebanese, Israeli, and Emirati media. Unspecified Western sources told Emirati media on January 1 that recent intelligence reports that circulated among Western diplomats showed that Israel is mobilizing special rapid intervention units along the Israel-Lebanon border in order to “preemptively intervene” in the event of any development on Israel’s northern front.[lx] Western sources told the Emirati outlet that the deployment indicates Israel’s readiness to conduct a “preemptive” operation in Lebanese territory.[lxi] The Israeli defense establishment is also reportedly working to raise the IDF’s readiness to launch an operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon “to the extent necessary.”[lxii] Lebanese and Israeli media reported on January 2 that the IDF is preparing options for action against Hezbollah and will present these options to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in “the near future.”[lxiii] Netanyahu will reportedly hold a security cabinet meeting to make “exceptional” decisions about Lebanon soon.[lxiv] CTP-ISW is unable to verify the Emirati media report that Israel has deployed units along the Israel-Lebanon border.

US President Donald Trump reportedly asked Netanyahu to not launch an operation against Hezbollah at this time in order to allow for dialogue with Lebanon during their December 29 meeting.[lxv] Netanyahu warned Trump about Hezbollah’s reconstitution during their meeting.[lxvi] US sources told Lebanese media on December 31 that Israel’s military plan to “deter” Hezbollah “exists and is ready.”[lxvii] Two unspecified sources familiar with the matter told Israeli media on January 2 that the Trump administration does not rule out the possibility of an Israeli operation in Lebanon.[lxviii] Israeli and Lebanese officials will reportedly hold their third direct talks on January 7, 2026.[lxix]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Protests: The rate and geographic scope of protests in Iran increased on January 1 and 2. The protests in Iran have become more violent since January 1, primarily in less populated and more rural areas. Protesters have in some instances responded violently to security forces’ use of violence and force.
• Iranian Protests: Anti-regime protests spread to Sistan and Baluchistan Province in southeastern Iran on January 2. Sistan and Baluchistan Province has long posed an internal security challenge for the Iranian regime due to recurring anti-regime activity in the province. The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, issued a statement on January 2 in which it declared support for the ongoing protests.
• STC Efforts to Establish an Independent Southern Yemeni State: The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is taking initial steps toward declaring an independent state in southern Yemen and seceding from the Republic of Yemen, which could risk increasing fighting between Emirati-backed and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces in and outside of Hadramawt Governorate and exacerbating Saudi-Emirati tensions. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi declared the beginning of a two-year transitional period for a future independent state and a new constitutional declaration for the “State of South Arabia.” Saudi-backed Yemeni forces’ new operation to recapture areas of Hadramawt Governorate risks increasing fighting between UAE- and Saudi-backed Yemeni groups.
• Israeli Efforts to Prevent Hezbollah’s Reconstitution: The IDF is reportedly continuing to prepare to launch an operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Lebanese, Israeli, and Emirati media. US President Donald Trump reportedly asked Netanyahu to not launch an operation against Hezbollah at this time in order to allow for dialogue with Lebanon. Israel conducted its most extensive wave of airstrikes in Lebanon in recent months targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.

Iran Update, December 31, 2025

Protests continued to expand geographically across Iran on December 31. Small protests broke out in Tehran on December 28 and have since spread to 17 out of Iran’s 31 provinces.[i] Protests spread to Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Ilam, Khuzestan, Khorasan Razavi, and Lorestan provinces on December 31.[ii] CTP-ISW recorded a total of 31 protests in Iran on December 31, compared to 24 protests on December 30. The protests took place across 12 provinces, including the five mentioned above.[iii]

Iranian security forces shot live fire to disperse protesters in at least two instances on December 31, as protests continued across Iran for the fourth consecutive day. Security forces fired live ammunition at crowds of protesters in Fasa, Fars Province, and Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, on December 31.[iv] The regime appears to be using live fire to suppress protests in less populated areas of Iran. The regime has historically struggled to impose control in more rural areas.

The regime also deployed water cannons in an attempt to suppress protests on December 31.[v] Security forces used a water cannon against protesters in Hamedan. The weather in Hamedan is currently two degrees below zero degrees Celsius.[vi] Security forces also reportedly used a water cannon against protesters in Arak, Markazi Province.[vii] The regime’s use of water cannons against protesters comes amid Iran’s unprecedented water shortage crisis.[viii] The regime’s deployment of water as a tool to suppress protests amid Iran’s water crisis highlights the regime’s prioritization of its security and survival.

The regime also continued to arrest protesters on December 31.[ix] Security forces arrested four Kurdish individuals in Asadabad, Hamedan Province, four individuals in Fasa City, Fars Province, and four individuals in Behbahan, Khuzestan Province.[x] The Intelligence Ministry separately arrested seven individuals who allegedly have ties to Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[xi] The ministry claimed that the individuals had smuggled 100 Colt revolvers into Iran.[xii] An informed source told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency that these individuals intended to incite violence at protest gatherings in Iran.[xiii]

The Iranian regime is taking steps to prevent further protests at universities. The regime likely views university students as a serious threat to regime stability given that students played a significant role in the Masha Amini protests. The regime directed some universities on December 31 to do remote learning until the end of the semester, citing “cold weather.”[xiv] The decision is very likely meant to prevent students from organizing and participating in protests, however.  Students from at least 10 universities across Iran participated in protests on December 30, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[xv] Iranian authorities separately released five Tehran University and Sharif University of Technology students whom security forces arrested on December 30 for participating in protests.[xvi] The Science, Research, and Technology Ministry additionally dismissed the “security managers” of several universities in Tehran on December 31 following the security forces’ “mistreatment of students,” possibly in an effort to appease university students and prevent further student protests.[xvii] An Iranian human rights organization reported on December 31 that security forces violently arrested a student protesting at Sharif University of Technology.[xviii] The regime likely regards university protests as a more serious threat to its stability than demonstrations organized by other segments of the population given that university students were a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement between September 2022 and January 2023.[xix]

 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC deputy commander on December 27 only two months after appointing him as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[xx]  Vahidi replaced Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, who had served as the IRGC deputy commander since May 2019.[xxi] Khamenei neglected to promote Fadavi as IRGC commander after the killing of former IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami in June 2025.[xxii] Khamenei instead appointed former IRGC Ground Forces Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour as IRGC commander.[xxiii] Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member who previously served as the IRGC Quds Force commander, defense minister, interior minister, and AFGS deputy chief.[xxiv] Khamenei emphasized in Vahidi’s appointment decree that Vahidi should prioritize improving the readiness of the Iranian armed forces and addressing IRGC personnel’s livelihood concerns in coordination with the AFGS.[xxv] Iranian media has not reported who will replace Vahidi as AFGS deputy chief at the time of this writing. Iranian media reported Vahidi’s appointment on December 31, but Khamenei issued the appointment decree on December 27 based on a recommendation from Pakpour.[xxvi]

Vahidi’s appointment as IRGC deputy commander reflects the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to reconstitute Iran’s military leadership following the war. Unofficial reports allege that Vahidi was removed from the AFGS deputy chief position due to internal disputes between Vahidi and Artesh leadership over post-war air defense priorities, including Vahidi’s opposition to the acquisition of airborne early warning and control systems.[xxvii] This internal debate highlights the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to cohere and unite Iran’s new generation of military commanders. Israel killed numerous commanders during the Israel-Iran War, many of whom were part of the IRGC Command Network. The IRGC Command Network was one of the most influential networks in Iran for decades. Khamenei must now fill this void with a new cadre of military leaders, which presents challenges as Khamenei appoints individuals with different personalities and factional ties to senior positions.[xxviii]

The regime’s decision to remove Vahidi from the AFGS deputy chief position and elevate him within the IRGC reflects his status within the security elite and may reflect the regime’s confidence in his ability to manage internal security challenges. The timing of Vahidi’s appointment is notable given the expanding protests in Iran and his prior role in suppressing demonstrations.[xxix] The United States and European Union sanctioned Vahidi in 2022 for his role in directing the Law Enforcement Command during the Mahsa Amini protests.[xxx]

Khamenei is also reportedly considering restructuring the relationship between the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, according to unspecified social media reports.[xxxi] The AFGS is responsible for crafting strategic guidance and military policy and does not have operational responsibility.[xxxii] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is a parallel organization to the AFGS and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xxxiii] Unverified reports have suggested that Khamenei could merge the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters. The AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters previously operated as a single institution, but Khamanei separated the institutions in 2016.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Protests in Iran: Iranian security forces shot live fire to disperse protesters in at least two instances on December 31, as protests continued across Iran for the fourth consecutive day. The Iranian regime is taking steps to prevent further protests at universities. The regime likely views university students as a serious threat to regime stability given that students played a significant role in the Masha Amini protests.
• Iranian Military Appointments: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC deputy commander on December 27 only two months after appointing him as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief. Vahidi’s appointment as IRGC deputy commander reflects the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to reconstitute Iran’s military leadership following the war.

Iran Update, December 30, 2025

Protests in Iran have expanded geographically and demographically since December 28. Small protests broke out in Tehran on December 28 in response to worsening economic conditions. These protests were primarily concentrated near markets and shopping centers in Tehran.[i] The protests have since spread to other locations across Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least nine provinces on December 30, including in Tehran, Alborz, Kermanshah, Markazi, Hamedan, and Esfahan provinces.[ii] Students also participated in protests on December 30 at multiple universities across Iran, including at universities in Tehran, Yazd, and Zanjan.[iii] Merchants went on strike in Shiraz, Fars Province, Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and Tehran Province.[iv] The Iranian Truck Drivers Union declared support for striking shopkeepers and protesters on December 29.[v] Iranian truck drivers previously went on strike in May 2025.[vi] CTP-ISW has recorded a total of 24 protests across Iran, including 13 protests in Tehran Province, since its last data cutoff on December 29. 

Many of the recent protests adopted an explicitly anti-regime tone. Protesters and students chanted anti-regime slogans, such as "Death to the dictator" and "No Gaza, No Lebanon, I will sacrifice my life for Iran," as well as slogans that praised the Pahlavi dynasty.[vii] The anti-regime tone of many of the protests comes as the regime is trying to frame the protests as driven solely by economic grievances. Economic-related protests and strikes have the potential to transform into explicitly anti-regime protests. Demonstrations against an increase in gasoline prices morphed into anti-regime protests in Iran in 2019, for example.[viii]

Iranian government officials and some Iranian media outlets have likely adopted a relatively soft tone toward the protests thus far to prevent the protests from expanding and becoming more overtly anti-regime in nature. Iranian government officials have acknowledged Iranians’ economic hardships and emphasized the need for dialogue with protesters during the first three days of the protests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on December 29 that the livelihoods of Iranians are his daily concern and that his administration will pursue monetary and banking reforms to preserve purchasing power.[ix] Pezeshkian added that he tasked Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni to “hear protesters’ legitimate demands” through dialogue with the protesters’ representatives.[x] It is unclear what representatives Pezeshkian was referring to. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani separately stated on December 30 that the government recognizes public protests, supports peaceful gatherings, and listens to “harsh and critical voices."[xi] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on December 30 that officials must respond fully and responsibly to public concerns over livelihood problems and that executive authorities must prioritize dialogue, especially with representatives of merchants.[xii] Government officials’ relatively soft tone toward the protests is not completely unusual, given that the Iranian regime has historically been slightly more tolerant of economic-driven protests as compared to protests driven by sociocultural grievances, such as the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement.  

There are several other factors that could also explain the Iranian government’s relatively soft tone toward the protests thus far. The Pezeshkian administration includes more moderate figures than the administration of Pezeshkian’s hardline predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, who was serving as president during the Mahsa Amini movement. The Iranian regime is also concerned about a potential new conflict with Israel and may seek to avoid worsening its internal security situation so that it does not have to confront external and internal threats simultaneously. An adviser to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed on December 29 that Israel could exploit Iran's weakened position to attack Iran. The adviser called on the Iranian regime to address external perceptions of internal unrest in Iran.[xiii]

Some elements of the Iranian security apparatus have adopted a more hardline tone toward the protests, however. The Armed Forces General Staff published a statement on December 29 in which it called on the government to address economic problems but also warned that Iran’s adversaries “will receive blows that are much stronger, more crushing, and more damaging” if they “make another mistake.”[xiv]

Iranian security forces have responded in a relatively restrained manner to the protests thus far. CTP-ISW has observed limited reports of engagements between security forces and protesters thus far. Social media users circulated a video from December 29 that showed security forces firing tear gas at a small crowd in Hamedan Province.[xv] Security forces also arrested protesters in Tehran Province on December 30.[xvi] The Amir Kabir University newsletter reported clashes between security forces and student protesters at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran on December 30.[xvii]

Iran will likely continue to rebuild its ballistic missile program despite rising Israeli concerns about Iranian reconstitution. Iranian officials emphasized that Iran will not make any concessions regarding its ballistic missile program after US President Donald Trump suggested after his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on December 29 that the United States could support an Israeli strike on Iran's ballistic missile program.[xviii] Israeli officials have become increasingly concerned about recent Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile production facilities.[xix] One of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representatives to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, stated on December 29 that Iran’s missile capabilities are not “permission-based” and warned that Iran would respond to any threats before they materialize.[xx] An Iranian analyst close to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately claimed that any path to negotiations with the United States would be based on Iran strengthening its “hard power, military capability, and...deterrence levers."[xxi] Missiles, in addition to Iran’s Axis of Resistance, have long acted as the central pillar of Iran’s regional defense strategy, and Iranian officials have long considered the regime’s ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.[xxii]

UK-based Amwaj Media reported on December 29 that Iran and Israel have recently exchanged secret messages through Russia to deescalate tensions, citing informed regional and political sources.[xxiii] One unspecified regional source claimed that Netanyahu asked Russia to convey to Iran that Israel does not seek further confrontation with Iran.[xxiv] A separate unspecified source in Tehran claimed that Iran and Israel told a Russian intermediary—believed to be President Vladimir Putin—on an unspecified date that they do not intend to conduct new strikes on the other country.[xxv] The source reported that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani engaged with the unspecified Russian intermediary, rather than the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry.[xxvi] This report contrasts recent reports that Netanyahu was planning to brief Trump on options for the United States to “join or assist” an Israeli military operation against Iran’s ballistic missile program during his December 29 meeting with Trump.[xxvii]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) recent offensive in Yemen has caused a growing rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia as well as between UAE-backed and Saudi-backed groups in Yemen that risks fracturing the anti-Houthi coalition. The STC seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates in eastern Yemen in early December.[xxviii] The UAE and Saudi Arabia have cooperated since 2015 to fight the Iranian-backed Houthi movement as part of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition but competing Saudi and Emirati interests in southern Yemen are causing a growing rift between the two countries.[xxix] Saudi Arabia, which opposes the STC‘s recent offensive, struck Emirati targets in Yemen on December 29, including an Emirati shipment of armored vehicles and weapons intended for STC forces at Mukalla Port, after the STC refused to withdraw from positions it recently seized.[xxx] Saudi Arabia condemned the UAE’s support for the STC as “extremely dangerous” in a statement following the strikes on December 30.[xxxi] The Riyadh-based, Saudi-supported Yemeni President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President, Rashid al Alimi, declared a 72-hour state of emergency across all Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)-controlled territory following the airstrikes. Alimi also annulled a Yemen-UAE defense agreement, announced a temporary blockade of ROYG-controlled territory, and ordered Emirati forces to leave Yemen.[xxxii]

The UAE and UAE-backed actors in Yemen have also refused to back down from their support for the STC’s takeover of parts of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates. Four UAE-backed PLC members rejected Alimi’s measures in a joint statement on December 30.[xxxiii] These PLC members include STC President Aidarous al Zubaidi, STC Vice President and Southern Giant Forces Commander Abu Zaraa al Muharrami, STC Vice President and former Second Military Region (southern Hadramawt and Mahra governorates) Commander Faraj al Bahsani, and the commander of the National Resistance Forces on the West Coast, Tariq Saleh.[xxxiv] Saleh, although UAE-backed, only recently aligned with the STC, whereas the other three men have long supported the STC’s objective to establish an independent southern Yemeni state.[xxxv] The UAE announced on December 30 that it would withdraw Emirati counterterrorism personnel from Yemen in response to Alimi’s annulment of the Yemen-UAE defense agreement. Emirati counterterrorism forces have been operating under the anti-Houthi coalition since Emirati forces left Yemen in 2019.[xxxvi] The UAE notably did not state that it would halt Emirati support for UAE-backed groups in Yemen, namely the STC, however.[xxxvii] UAE-backed forces and Saudi-backed forces continued deploying to contact lines in Wadi Hadramawt on December 29 and 30.[xxxviii]

The growing rift between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and their respective local partners and supporters in eastern Yemen could pull resources and bandwidth away from coalition efforts to fight the Houthis in northern Yemen, which would create opportunities for the Houthis to exploit. It is difficult to ascertain how many STC units have left frontline positions facing the Houthis to consolidate their gains in eastern Yemen, though at least one brigade from the STC’s Southern Giant Forces participated in the STC’s seizure of Saudi-backed groups’ positions in Mahra Governorate on December 10.[xxxix] The Southern Giant Forces, commanded by STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami, is primarily based in southwestern Yemen and has played a significant role in fighting the Houthis in Shabwa and Marib governorates in central Yemen.[xl] The Southern Giant Forces operates alongside Tariq Saleh‘s UAE-backed National Resistance Forces under the Joint Forces on the West Coast.[xli] The Joint Forces on the West Coast hold key positions along Houthi frontlines in Hudaydah, Taiz, and Lahj governorates in southwestern Yemen.[xlii] CTP-ISW has not observed other STC units leaving positions along Houthi frontlines to consolidate their gains in eastern Yemen, but the growing Saudi-Emirati tensions over eastern Yemen increase the risk that either party would need to pull resources from efforts to counter the Houthis to address the ongoing territorial disputes. CTP-ISW has also not observed any Houthi mobilization or large Houthi deployments on either its southwestern or eastern frontlines at the time of this writing. The risk of the Houthis exploiting the conflict between UAE- and Saudi-backed forces for their own territorial gain remains, however.

Disagreements among Shia Coordination Framework members regarding the election of the Iraqi deputy parliament speakers reflect ongoing divisions over government formation within the coalition. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Iraqi parliament elected Sadiqoun parliamentarian and former Babil Province Governor Adnan Fayhan as the first deputy speaker on December 29.[xliii] Sadiqoun is the political wing of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq.[xliv] A parliamentarian from Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition told Iraqi media on December 30 that Sudani supported Fayhan whereas State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki backed Iraqi Foundation Coalition head and former First Deputy Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi.[xlv] The Iraqi Parliament also elected Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) parliamentarian Farhad Amin al Atroushi as second deputy speaker on December 30.[xlvi] The KDP’s original candidate for the position, Shakhwan Abdullah, and a candidate from a smaller Kurdish political party failed to win enough votes in parliament to win the position on December 29.[xlvii] Kurdish media reported on December 30 that Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri oversaw efforts to resolve disputes within the framework over the second deputy speaker position.[xlviii] A Kurdish social media observer noted that Ameri, Maliki, and Popular Mobilization Commission head and Reconstruction and Development Coalition member Faleh al Fayyadh supported Abdullah.[xlix] Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali reportedly backed a different candidate.[l] The Kurdish account described a sequence of events that led to a consensus on the second deputy speaker, which highlights the informal negotiations that Iraqi politicians engage in during the government formation process.[li] KDP leader Masoud Barzani reportedly called Iranian-backed Supreme Judicial Council head Faiq Zaidan to rally support for Abdullah and eventually likely agreed to accept Altroushi as a compromise candidate after Maliki intervened, according to the account.[lii] The account added that Barzani likely promised not to obstruct the presidential election process if Altroushi was elected as second deputy speaker.[liii] The KDP and its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), continue to negotiate which party will fill the presidency.[liv] Conflict between the KDP and the PUK over the presidency led, in part, to Iraq’s nine-month-long delay in electing a president following the parliament speaker’s election in 2022.[lv]

The debate over Iraqi deputy speakers is an extension of the framework’s current divisions over a variety of issues, including the selection of the next prime minister. The framework has yet to name its preferred candidate for prime minister. The framework’s candidate will have the opportunity to attempt to form a government after a new president is elected, as the framework is currently the largest bloc in parliament.[lvi] Multiple framework actors, including Maliki and Ameri, oppose Sudani serving a second term in office due, in part, to some actions Sudani has taken in office against Iranian-backed interests in Iraq.[lvii]  

These framework divisions could delay the election of the next Iraqi president, which the Iraqi constitution mandates must occur by January 28, 2026. The Iraqi Parliament must elect a president by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum within 30 days of the first parliament session, which corresponds to January 28.[lviii] The Iraqi Parliament failed to elect a president for more than nine months after the election of a parliament speaker following the 2021 elections due, in part, to divisions between the framework and Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s coalition.[lix] The two-thirds quorum requirement to elect a president has historically enabled parliamentarians to paralyze the government formation process by boycotting parliament sessions.[lx] Any disagreements between framework members could therefore cause parliamentarians to boycott parliament sessions and delay the election of the president. Framework parliamentarians could also threaten to boycott parliament sessions in order to extract concessions from other parties regarding ministry appointments and other positions within the Iraqi government.  

Foreign-directed and -organized Alawite insurgent networks remain active on the Syrian coast, but these networks are likely smaller, less capable, and less organized than recent Western media reports suggest. A New York Times report on December 24 highlighted the efforts that former Assad regime officials in Russia and Lebanon have taken to recruit, fund, and equip Assadist insurgents.[lxi] The former officials include former Tiger Forces Commander Suhail al Hassan, Military Intelligence Chief Kamal Hassan, and Fourth Division General Ghiath Dalla.[lxii] These commanders allegedly have access to hundreds of thousands of potential Alawite fighters across coastal Syria.[lxiii] Dalla reportedly distributed roughly $300,000 per month to fighters and has sought to acquire drones and anti-tank systems to fight the government.[lxiv] The New York Times report suggested that Alawite insurgent groups along the coast are sophisticated and well-financed by these foreign-based benefactors.[lxv]

Alawite insurgent groups’ recent activity suggests that these groups are smaller and have more limited resources than former Assad regime officials claim.  The Coastal Shield Brigade and Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad) are two Alawite insurgent groups with Assadist roots that continue to conduct insurgent activities along the Syrian coast.[lxvi] The Men of Light is reportedly associated with Suhail al Hassan.[lxvii] Both Alawite insurgent groups have largely failed since March 2025 to conduct attacks or other actions to advance their stated goal of ending Syrian government control over coastal Syria.[lxviii] The limited attacks that the Coastal Shield Brigade and Men of Light have claimed since March 2025 have failed to inflict meaningful damage to government forces or change the government’s willingness to remain deployed along the coast.[lxix] The Coastal Shield Brigade has mostly conducted attacks targeting unarmed Alawite civilians who have cooperated with the Syrian government rather than government or military targets in recent months.[lxx] The Men of Light’s inability to inflict government casualties and Coastal Shield Brigade’s attacks on civilian targets are indicative of both groups’ weak capabilities at present. Unspecified anti-government Alawite insurgents recently took advantage of the presence of civilians at Alawite-organized protests in Latakia and Tartous provinces to conduct two separate attacks on Syrian government security forces on December 28.[lxxi] These Alawite insurgents may have sought to deliberately trigger an aggressive government retaliation.[lxxii] That Alawite insurgents and insurgent groups have generally avoided attacking Syrian military targets since March 2025 and conducted two limited attacks using civilian protesters as shields indicates that Alawite insurgent groups in Syria are smaller and less organized than recent Western media reports suggest.

Ongoing Syrian security operations targeting these groups and other Alawite insurgents have likely played a role in disrupting these groups’ ability to pose a viable, large-scale threat to the Syrian government at this time. Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces killed three Men of Light insurgents and arrested one other in Baabda, Latakia Province, on December 24. The insurgents were planning to conduct unspecified attacks during upcoming New Year’s celebrations.[lxxiii] MoI forces also seized improvised explosive devices (IED), weapons, and ammunition from the cell’s safehouse.[lxxiv] It is unclear if Suhail al Hassan funded or organized these planned attacks. 

Suhail al Hassan’s alleged access to 168,000 dormant Alawite fighters is logistically implausible in present-day coastal Syria. Hassan has “verified” the identities of over 168,000 fighters in villages along Syria’s coast, according to messages obtained by the New York Times.[lxxv] The article suggested that Hassan could call on these fighters to fight on his behalf.[lxxvi]  The existence of a covert or even dormant network of this size would require Assad regime-era military organizations, command structures, and logistics to have survived the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which CTP-ISW has not observed. The number of fighters that Hassan claims to be able to mobilize is also five times greater than the United States government‘s estimates of the number of Islamic State fighters in Syria during the height of its territorial reach and activity in Syria in 2014 and 2015, further calling Hassan’s claim into question.[lxxvii]

Hassan’s exaggerated claim mirrors those from other former Assad regime officials. Three prominent former Assad officials claim to command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria, according to a December 2025 Reuters report.[lxxviii] Alawite fighters who took money from the three Assad officials indicated that they accepted payments but lacked real loyalty or willingness to fight and die for the Assadist commanders.[lxxix] That some fighters are taking payments from former Assad commanders indicates that foreign-funded networks exist and may continue to attempt to recruit fighters.  The direct threat that these fighters currently pose to the Syrian government remains low, given the current scale, performance, and organizational structure of Assadist insurgents. These networks may expand if allowed time and space to recruit and organize, however. Syrian officials warned the New York Times that continued foreign-based sectarian mobilization and international lobbying for Alawite autonomy present long-term risks to Syrian stability.[lxxx]

Recent Syrian government security tactics and civil outreach to the Alawite community indicate that the Syrian government is learning from its prior attempts to stabilize volatile situations involving minority communities. The Syrian government is attempting to repair its relations with the Alawite community following government forces’ participation in reprisal massacres along the coast in March 2025.[lxxxi] Syrian forces employed tactics designed to diffuse violence in coastal Syria in recent days. Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Security Service (GSS) units deployed to coastal Syria to respond to riots on December 28, imposed a curfew in Latakia City on December 30, and cordoned off areas of Latakia City in an effort to prevent sectarian violence between Sunnis and Alawites in the city.[lxxxii] Syrian security forces did not prevent all instances of sectarian violence, but forces’ tactics notably differed from the lack of discipline displayed by Syrian military and security forces along the coast in March 2025 and in Suwayda Province in July 2025.[lxxxiii]

The Syrian government is simultaneously using social and economic outreach in order to build stronger relationships with Alawite communities along the coast.[lxxxiv] A recently formed government-backed body, the Supreme Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace, is reportedly providing amnesties for former Assad regime conscripts, financial aid, jobs, and medical support to Alawites to gain loyalty and stabilize coastal Syria.[lxxxv] Key Syrian military leaders have also continued to engage and coordinate with local leaders and dignitaries in Latakia and Tartous provinces in November and December 2025 to address service provision and security concerns.[lxxxvi]  Improved trust and more robust partnerships between the Syrian government and the Alawite community can reduce opportunities for Assadists and Alawite insurgents to recruit fighters.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Protests: Protests in Iran have expanded geographically and demographically since December 28, and many of the recent protests adopted an explicitly anti-regime tone. Iranian government officials and some Iranian media outlets have likely adopted a relatively soft tone toward the protests thus far to prevent the protests from expanding and becoming more overtly anti-regime in nature. Some elements of the Iranian security apparatus have adopted a more hardline tone toward the protests, however.
• Iran-Israel Conflict: Iran will likely continue to rebuild its ballistic missile program despite rising Israeli concerns about Iranian reconstitution. Iranian officials emphasized that Iran will not make any concessions regarding its ballistic missile program after US President Donald Trump suggested on December 29 that the United States could support an Israeli strike on Iran's ballistic missile program. A UK-based outlet reported that Iran and Israel have exchanged messages through Russia to deescalate tensions, however.
• Emirati-Saudi Tensions in Yemen: The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s recent offensive in Yemen has caused a growing rift with Saudi Arabia as well as between UAE-backed and Saudi-backed groups in Yemen that risks fracturing the anti-Houthi coalition. The growing rift between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and their respective partners and supporters in Yemen could pull resources and bandwidth away from coalition efforts to fight the Houthis in northern Yemen, which would create opportunities for the Houthis to exploit.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Disagreements among Shia Coordination Framework members regarding the election of Iraqi deputy parliament speakers reflect ongoing divisions over government formation within the coalition. The framework's debates over Iraqi deputy speakers are an extension of the framework’s disagreements over a variety of issues regarding government formation, including the selection of the next prime minister. These framework divisions could delay the election of the next Iraqi president, which the Iraqi constitution mandates must occur by January 28, 2026.
• Alawite Insurgency: Foreign-directed and -organized Alawite insurgent networks remain active on the Syrian coast, but these networks are likely smaller, less capable, and less organized than recent Western media reports suggest. A New York Times report on December 24 highlighted the efforts that former Assad regime officials in Russia and Lebanon have taken to recruit, fund, and equip Assadist insurgents. Alawite insurgent groups’ recent activity suggests that these groups are smaller and have more limited resources than former Assad regime officials claim.

Iran Update, December 29, 2025

Small-scale protests demanding that the Iranian government address the devaluation of the Iranian rial and high inflation rates have continued for the second consecutive day in Tehran and Hamadan City, western Iran, on December 29, amid a rapid collapse of the Iranian currency since November 2025.[i] The value of the Iranian rial has deteriorated rapidly after November 2025, though its value has fallen for years due to sanctions and Iran’s general international isolation. Protests initially began in Tehran on December 28.[ii] Groups of less than roughly 100 civilians, who were reportedly Iranian ”businessmen,” marched from Lalezar Street toward the Imam Khomeini Square on December 29, demanding that the Iranian government intervene in the economy and address the high inflation rate and devaluation of the currency.  Iranian security forces halted and clashed with the protesters at the Istanbul intersection on December 29, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media and geolocated footage.[iii] Iranian security forces also launched tear gas and clashed with protesters on Boali Street in southern Hamedan City on December 29.[iv] A BBC Persian journalist reported that economic protests also occurred in Malard City, Tehran Province, and on Gheshm Island in the Persian Gulf, but did not provide footage of the protests at the time of this writing.[v] Tehran merchants announced that they will continue to protest on December 30.[vi] The protests come amid a drop in the value of the Iranian rial. The value of the Iranian rial reached 1,445,000 rials per one US dollar as of December 28, which marks its lowest value in 2025.[vii] The rial appreciated slightly to 1,371,000 rials to one US dollar on December 29, however.[viii]

Current economic-related protests come as the Iranian regime is deliberating on Iran’s 2026/27 Budget, which is set to increase taxes to relieve Iran’s budget deficit as state oil revenue decreases, but will put additional economic pressure on the Iranian people. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian defended his proposed budget in front of the Iranian Parliament’s budget oversight committee on December 28, in which Pezeshkian proposed a tax increase by 62 percent.[ix] This increase in the tax rate will worsen the economic challenges caused by inflation that are plaguing Iranians. Iranian outlets on December 28 and 29 criticized the budget for not adjusting salaries in accordance with the current 42.2 percent inflation rate.[x] The proposed 2025 budget reportedly reflects a decrease in dependency on oil revenue. Iranian oil revenue–its main source of government revenue–has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of the expected annual revenue in 2025, according to the parliamentary Budget and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman on November 6.[xi] Parliament’s budget oversight committee rejected Pezeshkian’s proposed 1405 March 2026 to March 2027 budget on December 29 and is set to provide feedback to Pezeshkian’s cabinet on December 30.[xii]

Iranian regime-affiliated media recognized the protesters' grievances as legitimate but warned that these protests could escalate into “unrest” or be exploited by Iran's adversaries. “Unrest” in this context presumably refers to anti-regime protests specifically, rather than protests over economic grievances.[xiii] IRGC-affiliated media acknowledged that Iranian merchants have been unable to pay rent for their shops due to the increase in the prices of imports and basic goods and drop in their sales, and even called on the government to take these economic protests seriously.[xiv] The regime’s anxieties over these protests spiraling out of control and escalating into anti-regime protests are valid because previous economic protests have escalated into nationwide anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[xv] Iranian regime-affiliated outlets also warned that these could be exploited by Iranian adversaries, namely Israel.[xvi] The Iranian regime has repeatedly blamed Israel and the United States for anti-regime protests over the past decade.[xvii] The IRGC published an official statement on December 29, calling on the Iranian people to stay united amid the United States and Israel’s efforts to undermine public trust and conduct “cognitive warfare.”[xviii] Mostafa Najafi, a political advisor close to former IRGC Commander and Expediency Discernment Council member Mohsen Rezaei, separately assessed on December 29 that Israel could exploit Iran's weakened position and attack Iran, and added that Israel could even convince the United States to attack Iran as well during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States.[xix] Najafi noted that the Iranian regime needs to address external perceptions of internal unrest in Iran.[xx]

The Iranian regime’s attempts to address economic issues are unlikely to provide immediate relief to the economy, however. Pezeshkian replaced Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin with former Economy Minister Abdol Nasser Hemmati on December 29, following pressure from “almost everyone in government,“ according to Najafi.[xxi] Hemmati previously served as Central Bank governor during US President Donald Trump’s first round of maximum pressure between 2019 and 2021, when inflation rates increased from around 40 percent to 45 percent and the rial‘s value more than halved.[xxii] Pezeshkian claimed that his budget involved a 20-point plan, which involved controlling energy consumption and relying on trade with regional partners to ensure people’s livelihoods, in an interview with the Supreme Leader’s official outlet on December 27.[xxiii] Pezeshkian held an emergency meeting with the government’s economic team at the Central Bank on December 29 to discuss foreign exchange, trade, and livelihood policies after Parliament’s budget oversight committee rejected his budget proposal.[xxiv] One hundred sixty-five out of 290 Iranian parliamentarians separately signed a letter to Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei on December 25, in which they expressed their concern over severe price and foreign exchange rate fluctuations.[xxv] The letter presented five solutions to remove all competitor currencies to the rial from transactions (such as gold, cryptocurrencies, and foreign currencies) to strengthen the rial.[xxvi] The Central Bank previously proposed and may have recently implemented other mechanisms, including exporting transactions to a secondary market to encourage exporters to return foreign currencies faster and increase the foreign currency reserve to help stabilize the foreign exchange market.[xxvii] These mechanisms mean that, in theory, the Central Bank does not need to rely as much on building foreign reserves to control the exchange rate and subsequently inflation.[xxviii] It remains uncertain whether any of these mechanisms would work in practice, as it would require public trust in the rial to stabilize inflation and the government’s handling of the economy, which is currently lacking.

Unspecified anti-government Alawite fighters took advantage of civilian protests over legitimate Alawite grievances to attack government security forces in coastal Syria on December 28. Prominent Alawite leader Ghazal Ghazal called for Alawites in Syria to protest on December 27 in response to Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s December 26 attack on an Alawite Mosque in Homs City, which killed eight people.[xxix] Alawites organized protests in Latakia and Tartous provinces on December 28, demanding federalized governance, greater state protection for Alawites, an end to sectarian attacks, and the release of former Assad regime detainees arrested after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xxx] These demands are legitimate, but it is unclear to what degree anti-government actors deliberately organized and stoked them. The protests quickly became chaotic as pro-government counter-protestors and government forces became involved.[xxxi] Unspecified anti-government Alawite fighters, who were concealed among protestors, took advantage of this chaos and opened fire on General Security Service (GSS) forces at the Azhari Roundabout in Latakia City.[xxxii] The attack killed one GSS member.[xxxiii] Unspecified anti-government Alawite fighters, who were similarly concealed among protestors, also threw a grenade at GSS forces in Baniyas, Tartous Province, wounding two GSS members.[xxxiv] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deployed armored units and military police to Tartous and Latakia cities in response to the attacks.[xxxv]

The unspecified attackers may have been Alawite insurgents who deliberately sought to trigger an aggressive government retaliation. One member of both the Men of Light (Saraya al Jawad) and the Coastal Shield Brigade infiltrated civilian protests in Latakia City on December 28, during which they threatened to attack security forces.[xxxvi] The Men of Light is an Assadist insurgent group that has conducted low-level attacks targeting government forces since August 2025 and is reportedly affiliated with former Assad regime special forces commander Suhail al Hassan.[xxxvii] The Coastal Shield Brigade is an Assadist insurgent group founded in February 2025 by Hassan and Miqdad al Fatiha, a former Assad regime Republican Guard commander.[xxxviii] The Men of Light reportedly graffiti-ed infamous Assad regime slogans, including “Assad or we burn the country,” during the protests in Latakia City on December 28, despite publicly denying their responsibility.[xxxix] Assadist insurgents previously ambushed government forces in March 2025, triggering widespread government atrocities against Alawite civilians.[xl] The insurgents may have sought to trigger similar reprisals amid the protests.

Assadist-style slogans at the protests and the attacks themselves suggest some limited support among the protesters for Alawite insurgent groups and fertile grounds for recruitment.  Alawite protestors in Jableh, Latakia Province, reportedly chanted ”with blood and with soul we defend you Ghazal,” which modifies an infamous pro-Assad chant “with blood and with soul we defend you Bashar.”[xli] The adoption of Assadist-style slogans among some Alawite protestors further indicates some support for an Assadist Alawite insurgency. Independent Syrian researcher Gregory Waters claimed that most Alawite civil society organizations rejected the December 28 protests due to their Assadist ties, but even small groups of insurgents could pose a threat to the new Syrian government.[xlii]

The Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may soon announce a formal military integration agreement, but the two sides retain their core disagreements over decentralization and will continue to debate this issue in the coming months.  An unspecified SDF source told Syrian media on December 25 that the SDF and the Syrian government may announce a US-brokered military agreement before December 30.[xliii] The agreement specifies the mechanisms under which the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces will integrate into the Syrian defense and interior ministries.[xliv] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi was expected to travel to Damascus on December 29—almost certainly to meet with Syrian government officials and discuss or finalize the integration agreement—but “logistical and technical arrangements” delayed his visit.[xlv] Abdi’s delayed meeting with the Syrian government may impact any planned finalization or announcement of the military agreement under discussion.[xlvi] The Syrian government and the SDF have traded a proposal back and forth over the past two weeks that details the mechanisms of the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian state.[xlvii] Syria and Turkey had imposed a deadline of December 31, 2025, for the SDF to integrate into the state, but Western and Kurdish sources told Reuters on December 18 that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent.[xlviii]

The SDF and the Syrian government will continue to negotiate over the type of authority that the Syrian government will wield over the currently autonomous northeastern Syrian region in the coming months, regardless of any momentum towards the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian state. The reported contents of the recent military integration proposal to the SDF still do not address core political disagreements between the transitional government and SDF, such as decentralization, Kurdish constitutional rights, and control of oil fields in northeast Syria, which have stalled integration talks since March 2025.[xlix] Abdi stated during an SDF advisory body meeting on December 25 that the ”constitutional issues” being discussed require more time for both parties to reach a solution, adding that decentralization must be incorporated within the Syrian constitution.[l] Neither the SDF nor the Syrian government has conceded its position or changed its views on the centralization of state power.

The new Iraqi Parliament elected Progress Party parliamentarian Haibat al Halbousi as parliament speaker on December 29.[li] Haibat al Halbousi is the cousin of former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi, which indicates that Mohammad al Halbousi likely negotiated a deal with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to support Haibat’s election. Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, which is aligned with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization and former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, removed Mohammad al Halbousi from his position as parliament speaker in 2023, ostensibly for “forgery.”[lii] The court removed Halbousi after he reportedly blocked a parliamentary vote that would have called for the expulsion of the US ambassador[liii]. The ruling was unconstitutional, and Halbousi said that unspecified parties sought to use the ruling to “sow divisions“ in society.[liv] Halbousi’s replacement, former First Deputy Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, supported the expulsion of US forces by Iranian-backed militias[lv] The militias then repeatedly blocked Halbousi’s preferred candidate from winning the speakership throughout early 2024 and escalated their efforts to expel US forces with Mandalawi’s support.[lvi] The timing of Halbousi’s removal in November 2023, combined with the militias‘ efforts to prevent the speakership from going to a Halbousi-backed candidate in the months following, strongly suggests that the militias orchestrated his removal. The assumption of the speakership by Halbousi ally indicates that Halbousi has cut a deal with the militias, though the specifics of that deal are unclear.

Haibat al Halbousi has served as a parliamentarian from Anbar Province since 2018 and the parliamentary Oil and Energy Committee Chairman since 2022.[lvii] The parliament speaker chairs parliamentary elections and, along with its two deputies, sets the agenda for parliament sessions.[lviii] The speakership is historically held by a Sunni.[lix] The Progress Party was the best-performing Sunni political party in the 2025 parliamentary elections.[lx] The Iraqi Parliament will now have until January 28, 2026, to elect an Iraqi president by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum.[lxi] The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) continue to negotiate which party will receive the presidency.[lxii]

 

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely use Parliament’s election of an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-linked deputy parliament speaker to further their control of the Iraqi Parliament. The Iraqi Parliament elected Sadiqoun parliamentarian and former Babil Province Governor Adnan Fayhan as the first deputy speaker and KDP parliamentarian Shakhwan Abdullah as the second deputy speaker on December 29.[lxiii] Sadiqoun is Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political bloc and won 27 seats in the recent elections.[lxiv] Fayhan helped plan Asaib Ahl al Haq’s 2007 attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Council that killed multiple US soldiers.[lxv] The first deputy speaker can chair parliamentary sessions in the speaker’s absence and, along with the second deputy speaker, helps the speaker set the agenda for parliament sessions.[lxvi] Fayhan would also assume control of the speakership if the speaker was removed, as Halbousi was in November 2023.[lxvii]

 

Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi demonstrated how the deputy speaker can use their position to meet the interests of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, despite pushback from the parliament speaker, when Mandalawi attempted to move forward with the passage of the Popular Mobilization Authority Law in July 2025.[lxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Popular Mobilization Authority Law would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[lxix] CTP-ISW assessed in July 2025 that some Iraqi parliamentarians, including Mandalawi, may have threatened to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani to pressure Mashhadani to place the Popular Mobilization Authority Law on the parliament agenda.[lxx] Mandalawi later chaired a session in early August 2025, after which Mashhadani accused Mandalawi of violating the parliamentary bylaws for chairing the session and called it ”invalid.”[lxxi] Mandalawi chaired this session as over 120 parliamentarians submitted a petition to place the Popular Mobilization Authority Law on the agenda for a vote.[lxxii] Mandalawi reportedly did not raise the law during the session that he chaired, but this instance demonstrates the deputy speaker’s ability to take action without the speaker’s oversight.[lxxiii] The Iraqi Parliament completed its first and second readings of the draft bill before Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the bill in late August 2025, prior to a vote due to US pressure.[lxxiv] The next prime minister would need to submit the law to parliament again before parliament could vote on it.[lxxv] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s stated interest in the law’s passage, as well as the militia’s strategic aim to increase the power of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, makes Fayhan’s control over parliament concerning to US interests in Iraq. [lxxvi]

 

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Economic Conditions: Small-scale protests demanding that the Iranian government address the devaluation of the Iranian rial and high inflation rates have continued for the second consecutive day in Tehran and Hamadan City, western Iran, on December 29 amid a rapid collapse of the Iranian currency since November 2025. Current economic-related protests come as the Iranian regime is deliberating on Iran’s 2026/27 Budget, which is set to increase taxes to relieve Iran’s budget deficit as state oil revenue decreases, but will put additional economic pressure on the Iranian people.
• Anti-Government Insurgents in Syria: Unspecified anti-government Alawite fighters took advantage of civilian protests over legitimate Alawite grievances to attack government security forces in coastal Syria on December 28. The unspecified attackers may have been Alawite insurgents who deliberately sought to trigger an aggressive government retaliation. Assadist-style slogans at the protests and the attacks themselves suggest nascent support for Alawite insurgent groups and fertile grounds for recruitment.
• SDF Integration: The Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces may soon announce a formal military integration agreement, but the two sides retain their core disagreements over decentralization and will continue to debate this issue in the coming months.
• Iraqi Government Formation: The new Iraqi Parliament elected Progress Party parliamentarian Haibat al Halbousi as parliament speaker on December 29. Haibat al Halbousi is the cousin of former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi, which indicates that Mohammad al Halbousi likely negotiated a deal with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to support Haibat’s election. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely use Parliament’s election of an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-linked deputy parliament speaker to further their control of the Iraqi Parliament.

Iran Update, December 26, 2025

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seized a “foreign” tanker near Gheshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on December 24. The IRGC claimed the tanker was smuggling four million liters of oil.[i] The IRGC Navy also detained 16 non-Iranian crew members, according to local judicial authorities in Hormozgan Province on December 26.[ii]  Neither the IRGC nor Iranian media has disclosed the name of the tanker or the nationality of its crew members. CTP-ISW is unable to confirm the incident or verify the name of the tanker using commercially available maritime tracking data at this time.

It is possible that Iran seized the tanker in response to recent US seizures of tankers in the Caribbean Sea. The US Coast Guard seized a reported ghost fleet tanker, the Bella 1, in an unspecified location in the Atlantic Ocean on December 25 after a five-day pursuit through the Caribbean.[iii] An attributed IRGC X account posted the following Islamic verse: ”throw the enemy’s stone back in the same direction it was thrown from, because evil is repelled only by evil” on December 24, around the same time as the IRGC Navy’s seizure of the tanker near Gheshm Island.[iv] The same account quoted the following Quranic verse at the same time of the seizure of the oil tanker Talara on November 14: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you.[v] US special operations forces intercepted a shipment of military-related equipment from China to Iran in the Indian Ocean at some point in November 2025.[vi] It is unclear if the IRGC statement or the Talara seizure on November 14 was in response to this seizure. The seizure of the Talara also followed an unspecified explosion on the M/V Falcon in the Red Sea in October.[vii] The non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran reported that the Falcon was an Iranian shadow fleet vessel that transports illicit Iranian oil.[viii] The United States has also seized three oil tankers near Venezuela in December 2025.[ix]

Iran announced on December 21 the deployment of Artesh Naval flotillas to escort commercial vessels, amid Iranian concern over US tanker seizures. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei and the Embassy in Caracas called the US seizure of oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 an act of “piracy.”[x] The Skipper has historically transported illicit Iranian oil.[xi] Artesh Navy Commander Admiral Shahram Irani announced on December 21 that the Artesh Navy deployed the 103rd and 104th flotillas on overseas missions and added that one of the fleets will be “tasked with escorting commercial ships.”[xii] CTP-ISW cannot determine the composition of the Artesh 103rd and 104th flotillas as of the time of writing.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly demanding major concessions from the United States if the militias agree to US demands to disarm. These concessions would not support US policy objectives in Iraq. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source told Iraqi media on December 26 that unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Iraqi federal government have outlined a nine-point “roadmap” that addresses the military and political role of militias in Iraq.[xiii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias similarly told regional media on December 23 they would be willing to “normalize relations” with the United States if the United States removed sanctions on unidentified militia leaders, committed not to strike the militias, scheduled a final withdrawal from Iraq, and removed US opposition to unspecified aspects of militia involvement in the formation of the next Iraqi government.[xiv] These concessions come after repeated US demands that Iraq disarm the militias and reduce Iranian influence in the Iraqi government. [xv]The rumored concessions that Iraqi militias are demanding of the United States would undermine the stated US policy objective in Iraq, which is to reduce Iranian influence in the Iraqi military and government.[xvi]

It is unclear which Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are involved in the creation of this reported counterproposal, as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are divided over the issue of disarmament.[xvii] Some members of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee--a coordinating body consisting of several of the militias--have called in recent days for militias to disarm and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[xviii]  There are three blocs within the committee. The first bloc, which includes militias Kataib Imam al Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, accepts disarmament.[xix] The second, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, is attempting to obfuscate the relationship between the state and the militias.[xx] The third and most hardline group, which includes Kataib Hezbollah, is outright refusing disarmament.[xxi] The Shia Coordination Framework also stated on December 22 in which it expressed support for disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and restricting weapons to the Iraqi state.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are the political wings of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.

Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh made comments on December 26 that are consistent with Iran’s reported efforts to push its partner militias in Iraq to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement.[xxiii] Sadegh acknowledged on December 26 the capacity of Iraqi militias to make independent decisions about disarmament but noted that Iran has unspecified concerns about the consequences of any decision by the militias.[xxiv]  Amwaj media noted on November 3 that Iran would consider supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) while pushing its larger partner militias in Iraq to focus on politics.[xxv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xxvi] CTP-ISW assessed on November 4 that Iran may decide to build a large cadre of ideological militias over which Iran has strong control that would supplement pro-Iranian political parties in the Iraqi federal government while avoiding sanctions on Iraq.[xxvii]

Recent Syrian government operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) are coordinated with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which enables US forces to target mid- and low-ranking ISIS commanders throughout Syria. US forces were previously unable to target ISIS commanders throughout Syria during Assad’s rule and were limited to isolated high-profile raids against Islamic State “caliphs.” Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) security forces, in coordination with the Global Coalition, conducted separate raids on December 24 and 25 across Rif Dimashq Province that arrested the ISIS “governor” of Damascus Province, killed the ISIS “governor” of Houran (Daraa) Province, and arrested an ISIS cell leader, respectively.[xxviii] “Houran Province” refers to a region of southwest Syria that includes Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra provinces.[xxix] MoI security forces separately arrested three ISIS fighters in Afrin, Aleppo Province, on December 25.[xxx] The MoI’s recent joint counter-ISIS operations with the Global Coalition follow US airstrikes that struck more than 70 ISIS sites across the government-controlled central Syrian desert on December 19 and 20.[xxxi] The United States conducted the strikes in response to an ISIS-inspired insider attack that killed two US soldiers and a US civilian interpreter in Palmyra, Homs Province, on December 13.[xxxii] US and MoI forces also previously destroyed 15 ISIS weapon caches in Rif Dimashq Province in November 2025.[xxxiii] The recent joint MoI–Global Coalition counter-ISIS operations in Rif Dimashq highlight the Syrian government’s value as a counter-ISIS partner, since US forces could not operate in Syrian government territory or support counter-ISIS operations there before Assad fell in December 2024 due to Assad’s hostility toward the United States and the high risks involved in operating deep inside Assad-held territory.[xxxiv] Assad’s fall and US cooperation with the new Syrian government now allow US forces the opportunity to disrupt ISIS reconstitution through coordinated ground raids and airstrikes.  

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group, claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Alawite Mosque in a Homs City Alawite neighborhood on December 26.[xxxv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely attacked this target to reignite the Sunni-Alawite sectarian strife that has recently occurred in Homs City. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS that seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia.[xxxvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s December 16 IED attack on an Alawite Mosque in Homs City’s Alawite neighborhood of Wadi Dahab killed at least eight people and wounded 21 others.[xxxvii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed it conducted the attack ”in cooperation” with another unspecified Salafi-jihadi group.[xxxviii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah previously warned on December 16 that it would conduct a “major” attack.[xxxix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s December 26 posts, which claimed responsibility for the attack, exaggerated the attack’s casualty figures, denied that the attack targeted Sunnis, and vowed to increase the group’s attacks against minorities to further spread fear.[xl] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah previously claimed it assassinated an Alawite man in Wadi Dahab, Homs City, in April 2025.[xli] Homs City and specifically Alawite majority neighborhoods, including Wadi Dahab, have consistently been the site of sectarian violence between Alawites and Sunnis since the fall of Assad in December 2024.[xlii] A previous murder of a Sunni Bedouin couple on the outskirts of Homs City in November 2025 triggered an isolated sectarian fighting between Sunnis and Alawites in Western Homs City after the killer wrote sectarian slogans in the couple’s blood on the walls of their house.[xliii] Syrian government authorities later revealed the killer was a relative of the couple who intended to rob them, but the incident demonstrated that Sunni–Alawite relations in Homs City remain extremely fragile.[xliv] A Syrian human rights organization reported in May 2025 that unknown actors have specifically targeted Alawites in Western Homs City in numerous sectarian attacks since the beginning of 2025.[xlv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely intended for its IED attack to capitalize on fragile Sunni-Alawite relations with the goal of igniting sectarian fighting in Homs City that would enable it to recruit from disaffected Sunnis in the area. 

This is the first attack Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has claimed since July 2025 and is the group’s most significant attack since it claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting a church in Rif Dimashq Province in June 2025.[xlvi] It remains unclear if Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s decision not to claim attacks from July to December 2025 represents an effort to conceal its activity or if the group was unable to operate due to government scrutiny. Sarya Ansar al Sunnah previously claimed on December 6 that its activity has “recently significantly declined” due to the Syrian security forces’ “arrest and persecution” campaigns in collaboration with the Global Coalition, which suggests that it was unable to operate if it is being truthful.[xlvii] This attack demonstrates that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah still controls a covert network capable of major attacks in Homs City, regardless of whether the group deliberately concealed its activity or if government forces prevented active military operations.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia may be reaching a compromise designed to restrain the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) after its recent gains in eastern Yemen. The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry blamed the STC for causing “unjustified escalation” when it launched its offensive into eastern Yemen and reiterated its demands for STC withdrawal in a December 25 statement.[xlviii] Saudi Arabia also recognized the “just” southern Yemeni cause in the statement.[xlix] Saudi Arabia then conducted an airstrike targeting the STC near Wadi Nahb, Ghayl bin Yamin District, Hadramawt Governorate, on December 26 after the STC engaged fighters loyal to Amr bin Habrish, a former leader of the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA) who is currently in Riyadh.[l] The Saudi strike caused no casualties, but it was the first Saudi airstrike targeting STC positions since the STC offensive began in early December.[li] The STC condemned the strike, but its patron, the UAE, said that it welcomed Saudi efforts to support security and stability in Yemen.[lii] The UAE did not acknowledge the airstrike in its message, though it would almost certainly have been aware of the strike before the message’s publication.[liii] The UAE’s decision to make no comment on the airstrike suggests that it will not support the STC in a standoff with Saudi Arabia and that the UAE seeks to reach a compromise that will prevent a further weakening of the anti-Houthi coalition.

Key Takeaways

• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Tanker Seizure: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seized a “foreign” tanker near Gheshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on December 24. The IRGC claimed the tanker was smuggling four million liters of oil. It is possible that Iran seized the tanker in response to recent US seizures of tankers in the Caribbean Sea.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Disarmament: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly demanding major concessions from the United States if the militias agree to US demands to disarm. These concessions would not support US policy objectives in Iraq.
• Syrian State-Global Coalition Counterterrorism Efforts: Recent Syrian government operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) are coordinated with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which enables US forces to target mid- and low-ranking ISIS commanders throughout Syria. US forces were previously unable to target ISIS commanders throughout Syria during Assad’s rule and were limited to isolated high-profile raids against Islamic State “caliphs.”
• Saraya Ansar al Sunnah Attacks in Syria: Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group, claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Alawite Mosque in a Homs City Alawite neighborhood on December 26. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely attacked this target in order to reignite the Sunni-Alawite sectarian strife that has recently occurred in Homs City.
• Saudi-UAE Deliberations in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia may be reaching a compromise designed to restrain the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) after its recent gains in eastern Yemen. The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry blamed the STC for causing “unjustified escalation” when it launched its offensive into eastern Yemen and reiterated its demands for STC withdrawal in a December 25 statement.

Iran Update, December 24, 2025

The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) reported on December 24 that unspecified sources in Tehran told ISPI that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized the initial development of miniaturized nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles in October 2025.[i] ISPI is the only source that has reported information about the supreme leader authorizing the development of miniaturized nuclear warheads.[ii] This source has not previously offered in-depth analysis of or verifiable information about the Iranian nuclear program. ISPI reported that Khamenei did not authorize uranium enrichment beyond 60 percent, however.[iii] ISPI noted that producing deliverable, miniaturized nuclear warheads poses significant technical challenges and requires weapons-grade uranium enriched to 90 percent, which Iran does not currently possess.[iv]

Iran has previously explored alternative nuclear weapon paths that do not require warhead miniaturization. The New York Times reported in February 2025 that a “secret team” of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is “exploring” a faster approach to building a nuclear weapon in a “matter of months.”[v] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times that Iran could build an “older-style nuclear weapon” using the new approach, but noted that such a weapon would not fit on a ballistic missile and would likely be less reliable than a modern weapon.[vi]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development: The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) reported on December 24 that unspecified sources in Tehran told ISPI that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized the initial development of miniaturized nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles in October 2025. ISPI is the only source that has reported information about the supreme leader authorizing the development of miniaturized nuclear warheads. Iran has previously explored alternative nuclear weapon paths that do not require warhead miniaturization.
• Russo-Syrian Relations: Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on December 23 to discuss expanding military cooperation between the two countries. CTP-ISW previously assessed in October 2025 that Russia is unlikely to provide Syria with Russian arms imports or direct Russian training at a time when it is facing a materiel shortage in its war against Ukraine.

Iran Update, December 23, 2025

Israel is reportedly considering a plan that outlines “stringent conditions” for southern Lebanon in return for Israel “forgoing military action,” according to Lebanese media.[i] It is unclear whether “forgoing military action” refers to Israel refraining from conducting a new, expanded operation in Lebanon or Israel stopping its current military activity in Lebanon. The reported Israeli plan would divide southern Lebanon into three areas: the current Blue Line that demarcates the Israel-Lebanon border, a “red line,” and a “line of interest.”[ii] The proposed “red line” would reportedly include Israel’s five permanent positions in southern Lebanon.[iii] The “line of interest,” also referred to as the “green line,” would act as a buffer and economic zone with strict restrictions on civilian access.[iv] The “line of interest” closely mirrors the economic zone that the United States proposed in September 2025.[v] The US economic zone, which aims to economically transform southern Lebanon, would reportedly stretch from Mount Hermon in southeastern Lebanon to Shebaa and Naqoura in southwestern Lebanon and cover at least 27 southern Lebanese towns.[vi] It is unclear if the “line of interest” would cover this same area. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reportedly propose this plan to US President Donald Trump during their meeting on December 29.[vii] This Israeli proposal comes after Israeli and Lebanese officials agreed to discuss opportunities for economic cooperation during meetings on December 3 and 19, according to Netanyahu.[viii] It is unclear if Israel presented its proposal to Lebanese officials during either meeting.

Lebanon and Israel continue to disagree on several key issues, which may hinder the implementation of diplomatic initiatives such as Israel’s proposal. An unspecified senior source told US-based al Monitor on December 22 that Israeli and Lebanese officials voiced different priorities during the December 19 meeting.[ix] Lebanese officials rejected Israel’s proposal for an economic zone and emphasized that displaced Lebanese civilians must be allowed to return to border towns before Israel and Lebanon can discuss other issues, such as economic cooperation.[x] Israeli officials have contrastingly maintained that Israel and Lebanon should first establish an economic and security zone along the Israel-Lebanon border before addressing other issues.[xi] Lebanese and Israeli officials also continue to disagree on the timeline for Hezbollah’s disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[xii] Lebanese officials have repeatedly stated that negotiations and the implementation of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) plan to disarm Hezbollah are contingent upon Israel ceasing its operations in Lebanon and fully withdrawing from Lebanese territory.[xiii] Israeli officials have repeatedly emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[xiv] These outstanding issues have previously caused Israeli and Lebanese diplomatic efforts to reach a “dead end.”[xv]

The LAF’s limited progress in preventing Hezbollah’s reconstitution could also undermine Israeli-Lebanese diplomatic efforts to prevent a renewed conflict in Lebanon. Israeli security sources told al Monitor on December 22 that they are concerned that Hezbollah is reconstituting its capabilities faster than the LAF is disarming the group.[xvi] Israeli and US officials have echoed these concerns and repeatedly warned that Israel could use military action against Hezbollah if the LAF fails to confront Hezbollah’s efforts to reconstitute.[xvii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on December 20 that Israel will act in Lebanon if it feels threatened by Hezbollah.[xviii] Lebanese media reported on December 22 that Netanyahu will show Trump reports about Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its military capabilities during his upcoming visit to the United States to secure “a green light” to launch an operation in Lebanon.[xix] The Lebanese government has taken some steps to limit Hezbollah’s smuggling and financing efforts, including closing several illegal border crossings, cracking down on Hezbollah’s presence at the Beirut airport, and increasing regulations on Lebanese financial institutions.[xx] There are still approximately 136 illegal border crossings between Syria and Lebanon as of July 2025 that Iran can use to transport weapons and funds to Hezbollah, however.[xxi] A US official told Saudi media on December 21 that Iran is using “every possible means” to send weapons to Hezbollah, including dozens of land routes via Syria and maritime routes to Lebanese ports.[xxii]

Iranian regime entities continue to emphasize that Iran is prioritizing the expansion of its missile program to reestablish deterrence against Israel. An Iranian outlet affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of the Supreme Leader’s representatives to the Defense Council, reported on December 23 that Iran formed the Defense Council to restructure its defense strategy and restore deterrence through “hard power.”[xxiii] Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, established the Defense Council following the Israel-Iran War.[xxiv] The outlet stated that the Defense Council's most significant achievement since the war has been the reconstruction and improvement of Iran’s defense capabilities, most likely referring to Iran’s missile and air defense capabilities.[xxv] A political analyst close to former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander and Expediency Discernment Council member Mohsen Rezaei confirmed on December 23 that Iran recently conducted a missile exercise.[xxvi] Najafi stated that the missile exercise and recent threats from Iranian officials are part of an effort “to restore deterrence” ahead of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States.[xxvii] Western media recently reported that Netanyahu will brief US President Donald Trump on options to strike Iranian ballistic missile sites during his visit to the United States.[xxviii] Iran has taken concrete steps since the war to rebuild its missile program, including reconstructing infrastructure at at least two missile bases.[xxix] Iran has also imported a chemical precursor for solid missile fuel and attempted to obtain fuel mixers from the People’s Republic of China.[xxx] Iran has historically prioritized missile development as a deterrent against potential Israeli attacks.[xxxi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that this approach is deeply embedded in Iranian military doctrine and is unlikely to change in the near future.[xxxii]

 

The outlet affiliated with Shamkhani separately called on the regime to develop a mechanism for "strategic information dissemination" to manage popular perceptions and retain public trust during periods of conflict.[xxxiii] The outlet argued that narrative warfare and psychological operations have become an “inseparable part” of modern conflicts and called on the regime to strengthen its “narrative management” in addition to its “hard power.”[xxxiv] The outlet’s call for “strategic information dissemination” is consistent with Iranian officials’ belief that Israel sought to use psychological operations during the Israel-Iran War to degrade Iranian national unity and overthrow the Iranian regime.[xxxv] The regime may believe that increasing its control over media narratives and increasing the dissemination of regime propaganda are necessary to counter such psychological operations and protect Iranian internal security in future conflicts with Israel.  

Key Takeaways

• Israeli-Lebanese Diplomatic Efforts: Israel is reportedly considering a plan that outlines “stringent conditions” for southern Lebanon in return for Israel “forgoing military action,” according to Lebanese media. Lebanon and Israel continue to disagree on several key issues, which may hinder the implementation of diplomatic initiatives such as Israel’s proposal. The LAF’s limited progress in preventing Hezbollah’s reconstitution could also undermine Israeli-Lebanese diplomatic efforts to prevent a renewed conflict in Lebanon.
• Iranian Efforts to Restore Deterrence: Iranian regime entities continue to emphasize that Iran is prioritizing the expansion of its missile program to reestablish deterrence against Israel. Iran has taken concrete steps since the war to rebuild its missile program, including reconstructing infrastructure at at least two missile bases.

Iran Update, December 22, 2025

Iran is likely prioritizing ballistic missile production due to both organizational inertia within the Iranian defense apparatus and the need to restore deterrence in what it views as an ongoing war with Israel. The reconstitution appears to be an effort to restore deterrence against Israeli attack, though a reconstituted ballistic missile program could be used to attack Israel. One former senior Iranian official has doubled down on investment in the ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War to “restore deterrence,” while a current senior official advocated for new technical improvements to the missiles, for example.[i] These officials probably calculate that more and higher-quality missiles are needed to penetrate Israeli defenses, given the effectiveness of Israeli ballistic missile interceptors and the decreasing Israeli interceptor stockpile. The reconstitution of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities is nonetheless increasing anxiety in Israel over the quantity of missiles Iran now possesses (see below).

An Israeli journalist reported on December 9 that Iran had reconstituted its missile stockpile to around 2,000 “heavy” ballistic missiles, which presumably refers to medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel. This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles. The United States intercepted a shipment with components for Iran’s ballistic missile program, which could have included mixers, in the Indian Ocean in November 2025 (more on this incident below). Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capabilities over other defense priorities. Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities, which Israel damaged during the Israel-Iran War, and reconstructing buildings at these sites that previously housed planetary mixers.[ii] Planetary mixers are essential for turning a chemical precursor of solid fuel, sodium percolate, into ballistic missile fuel.[iii] Israel destroyed Iran’s planetary mixers in October 2024, and Western media assessed in September 2025 that Iran still did not have the necessary planetary mixers to produce solid missile fuel.[iv] Western diplomats also told Israeli media on December 8 that Iran is using older manufacturing methods to continue producing ballistic missiles, which may refer to the less efficient “trough-type mixers” that can also produce solid fuel.[v]

Iranian defense officials view ballistic missiles as a critical piece of their defense strategy, and a hypothetical Iranian decision to abandon the ballistic missile program would be antithetical to the way that Iranian commanders view their capabilities and relative strengths. Iran’s decision to prioritize ballistic missiles after their failure to penetrate Israeli defenses during the Iran-Israel War in June 2025 may appear unwise to Western observers, but this ignores the primacy with which Iranian officials view ballistic missiles in their defense strategy. Iranian officials would probably find it extremely difficult to come to a personal conclusion and then convince the bureaucracy to conclude that ballistic missiles must be abandoned, given that most of Iran’s defense community has long viewed and continues to view ballistic missiles as a critical element of their defense strategy both now and in the future. Missiles, in addition to Iran’s Axis of Resistance, have long acted as the central pillar of Iran’s regional defense strategy, and Iranian officials have long considered the ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.

Senior Iranian officials have continued to laud Iran’s missile capabilities as an essential piece of Iranian defense strategy, even after the Israel-Iran War.[vi] A former IRGC Navy commander said that the missile program contributed to Iran’s ”success” during the war.[vii] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[viii] Another senior official illustrated the need for more investment in the program by calling for various technical improvements to the missiles to improve their ability to penetrate ballistic missile defenses.[ix] Iranian military officials would need to garner enormous political backing in order to alter a pillar of Iranian defense strategy for decades, and so far, no sizeable group of officials has challenged the importance of the missile program in the public discourse.

Iran’s ability to produce ballistic missiles at scale only six months after the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 is causing Israeli anxieties over Iranian capabilities and intent to attack Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to brief US President Donald Trump on the United States’ options for joining or assisting future Israeli attacks on Iranian ballistic missile sites during Netanyahu’s upcoming visit to the United States on December 29, according to an unspecified source and four former US officials.[x] Israeli officials reportedly view Iran’s efforts to rebuild ballistic missile production facilities and repair air defense systems as “more immediate concerns” than Iran reconstituting its nuclear enrichment sites.[xi] Axios reported on December 21 that Israeli military intelligence and Mossad do not assess that the pace at which Iran is rebuilding its ballistic missile capabilities necessitates "urgency to take military action” within the next two to three months. The Israeli sources stressed that Iran’s ballistic missiles could “become a more urgent issue later in the year,” presumably referring to late 2026.[xii] Israeli media highlighted Israel’s threat perception and noted that the Iranian regime may only need between one and two years to acquire enough ballistic missiles to overwhelm Israeli air defenses. This calculation is based on Iran reaching a production rate of about 300 ballistic missiles per month.[xiii]  The Wall Street Journal reported in June 2025, during the war, that Israel was “running low on defensive Arrow interceptors.”[xiv] Defensive Arrow interceptors enable Israel to counter long-range ballistic missiles.[xv] Israel used 52.3 percent of its interceptor stockpile during the war, according to the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).[xvi]

Reports about a possible Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force missile exercise coordinated across multiple bases in Iran have also contributed to Israeli fears of a rising Iranian ballistic missile threat.[xvii] IRGC-affiliated media reported on December 22 that the IRGC Aerospace Force launched missiles as part of its missile exercise in unspecified locations in five provinces.[xviii] The exercise reportedly spanned across Khorramabad, Lorestan Province, Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province, Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, Tehran Province, and Esfahan Province.[xix] Iranian media did not provide any more specific details on the exercise, such as the types of missiles launched.  

The regime may have been rehearsing the synchronization and coordination of large-scale missile strikes from bases spread across the country through the exercise. Iran’s ability to launch coordinated, large-scale missile attacks targeting Israel during the June 2025 war grew constrained as Israel destroyed Iranian missile launchers across different regions of Iran, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent in June 2025.[xx] Unspecified sources told anti-Iranian regime media on December 20 that Western intelligence agencies detected “unusual” IRGC Aerospace Force activity, including irregular drone, missile, and air defense units' command-and-control signals, deployments, and logistical movements.[xxi] These activities, if accurate, would also be consistent with Iranian efforts to rehearse the synchronized deployments of missile, drone, and air defense assets. Exercises to improve coordination and synchronization do not necessarily need to involve missile launches.

The regime may be attempting to obscure details about the exercise and therefore downplay the extent to which the IRGC may be preparing for future conflict. Iranian state media denied the IRGC-affiliated news report on the IRGC exercise, calling it “not accurate.”[xxii] Another Iranian media outlet affiliated with Supreme Leader’s representative to the Defense Council circulated a news report about the exercise before later removing the article.

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir warned US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper on December 20 that the IRGC Aerospace Force missile exercise and other operational steps could be ”cover for a surprise attack“ on Israel.[xxiii] Zamir referred to an IRGC exercise that “began several days ago.“[xxiv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also stated on December 22 that Israel is "aware that Iran is conducting military exercises" and "making the necessary preparations,“ warning that any attacks on Israel will be met with a ”very harsh response."[xxv] An unspecified US source told Axios on December 22 that US intelligence agencies have no indication that Iran is preparing for an attack.[xxvi]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iranian missile production. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 22 that a shipment of planetary mixers was expected to travel from the PRC to Iran in recent weeks but that the “shipment ultimately did not reach its destination,” citing Western intelligence sources.[xxvii] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special forces recently boarded and seized a vessel in the Indian Ocean carrying PRC-made components destined for Iran's missile program.[xxviii] It is possible that this vessel was carrying the planetary mixers shipment that the Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported. Iran currently lacks planetary mixers. The PRC has previously helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile program by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The PRC previously sent two shipments of sodium perchlorate to Iran in February and June 2025, and European intelligence sources have been tracking a further 10 to 12 shipments following the Israel-Iran War.[xxix]

Iran may retaliate against the United States’ attempted seizure of an Iranian-linked tanker in the Caribbean Sea with disruptive activity in the Persian Gulf.[xxx] US authorities obtained a seizure warrant for the Bella 1 tanker on December 21 due to the vessel's “previous involvement in the Iranian oil trade.”[xxxi] The Bella 1 loaded oil in August 2025 at Kharg Island, which is Iran’s primary oil export hub, and later offloaded its cargo to another tanker near Oman before continuing to the Caribbean Sea.[xxxii] The United States has not seized the Bella 1 as of this writing. Senior Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and its allies seize Iranian exports in recent months.[xxxiii] The IRGC also conducted various combat operations in the Persian Gulf as part of their annual naval exercise in the Persian Gulf in early December as a warning to its adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[xxxiv] The IRGC Navy also named this year’s exercise after deceased IRGC Navy commander Mohammad Nazeri, who was reportedly involved in the seizure of two US patrol boats and 10 US personnel in the Persian Gulf in January 2016.[xxxv] Iran responded to US seizures of Iranian weapons shipments under US President Donald Trump's first maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[xxxvi]

Senior Turkish and Syrian officials met in Damascus on December 22, very likely to discuss the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) response to a recent government integration proposal.[xxxvii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and intelligence head Hussein Salama met with a Turkish delegation in Damascus on December 22. The Turkish delegation included Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin.[xxxviii] Shaibani announced in a post-meeting press conference with Fidan that the Syrian government is reviewing a recent SDF response to the integration proposal.[xxxix] Reuters reported on December 18 that the Syrian government recently sent a new integration proposal to the SDF that will facilitate the SDF integration into the Syrian army as three divisions and smaller brigades in exchange for reduced SDF command authority and the entry of other Syrian army units into SDF-held areas.[xl] Syrian officials almost certainly discussed the SDF’s response to this proposal with Turkish officials. Turkey has repeatedly threatened to attack the SDF if it fails to integrate into the Syrian state and has expressed security concerns about the future of northeastern Syria under SDF influence.[xli] Turkish Defense Minister Guler reiterated the Turkish demand that the SDF must integrate individually rather than as a single unit as recently as December 20.[xlii] It is unclear whether Guler or other Turkish officials have moderated their red lines on the terms of the SDF’s integration at this time. Fidan, who plays a large role in Turkey‘s Syria file, recently expressed optimism about the negotiations and said that Turkey would not resort to military action against the SDF.[xliii]

Syria and Turkey have imposed a deadline for the SDF to integrate into the state by December 31, 2025. Shaibani declared that the Syrian government has not seen ”any serious steps“ from the SDF towards implementing the integration agreement on December 22.[xliv] A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent.[xlv] 

The recent US strikes targeting the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria illustrate how US cooperation with the Syrian government enables the United States to deny ISIS sanctuary in government-controlled territory. ISIS previously used Assad-held areas west of the Euphrates River as a sanctuary largely free from persistent US interference. CENTCOM struck more than 70 ISIS sites across the government-controlled central Syrian desert on December 19 and 20 near Palmyra in Homs Province, Maadan in Raqqa Province, and in the desert regions of Deir ez Zor Province.[xlvi] CENTCOM conducted the strikes in response to an ISIS-inspired insider attack that killed two US soldiers and a US civilian interpreter in Palmyra on December 13.[xlvii] A US official told the New York Times that unspecified US partner forces conducted 10 counter-ISIS raids in Syria and Iraq following the Palmyra attack that provided intelligence for CENTCOM’s December 19 air operation.[xlviii]  Jordanian fighter aircraft supported the operation as part of Jordan’s first counter-ISIS strikes in Syria since 2018.[xlix]

ISIS previously used central Syria as an area to reconstitute itself, free from US interference. The Assad regime, which previously controlled central Syria, conducted ineffective counter-ISIS operations that failed to disrupt ISIS reconstitution. US forces were unable to enter Assad-held areas, given the hostility between Assad and the United States. The fall of Assad, combined with US cooperation with the Syrian government, has now enabled the United States to conduct strikes and other operations to disrupt ISIS reconstitution. A US official told NBC News on December 19 that the operation intended to strike areas where ISIS is attempting to reorganize to destroy their positions and forces on a large scale.[l] Two unspecified US sources told Western media that US retaliatory strikes may continue for several weeks or even a month.[li]

The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) arrested an ISIS “leader,” six ISIS fighters, and seized weapons and ammunition from an ISIS safehouse in Daraya, a Damascus suburb, on December 21.[lii] Rif Dimashq Province GSS commander Major General Ahmed al Dalati told Syrian media that the security forces arrested an active ISIS “leader” and six fighters who were prepared for “terrorist” activities.[liii] The counter-ISIS raid in Daraya corresponds to a rising number of counter-ISIS operations in the Damascus area. The GSS previously arrested three ISIS fighters and seized several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other munitions from an ISIS safehouse in Kanaker, Rif Dimashq Province, on December 3.[liv] The GSS also arrested an ISIS fighter in Damascus City on December 17 and seized IEDs and several commercial quadcopter drones that ISIS could easily convert into FPV one-way attack drones to use against government forces or civilians.[lv] ISIS has increased the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory since Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on November 10.[lvi]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is divided over calls from some of its factions to disarm and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state, according to committee sources and the militia leaders’ diverging public statements.[lvii] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lviii] These divisions are visible in the factions’ recent statements and represent different approaches to dealing with a reported plan by the Shia Coordination Framework to disarm the militias.[lix]

• Accept disarmament: Kataib Imam al Ali leader Shibl al Zaidi and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Haider al Gharawi issued separate statements on December 18 and 19, respectively, that called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[lx] Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali also appeared to support disarmament in a December 19 speech to his supporters.[lxi] The group's military spokesperson denied on December 22 that it intends to surrender its weapons, however.[lxii]
• Obfuscate the militia-state relationship: Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi claimed in a December 20 interview with Iraqi media that the militia does not need to call for restricting weapons to the state because they “are basically within it.”[lxiii] Fartousi’s claim that weapons are already restricted to the Iraqi state is false because it ignores the reality that many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—such as his faction Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada—possess weapons and are neither integrated into the Iraqi security forces nor answer to the Iraqi prime minister.[lxiv]
• Refuse disarmament: Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba each issued statements on December 20 that rejected calls to disarm and restrict weapons to the state due to the ongoing presence of foreign forces in Iraq.[lxv] Kataib Hezbollah claimed on December 20 that the group will only discuss disarmament after “all occupation forces,” including US and Turkish forces, withdraw from Iraq.[lxvi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba military aide Abdul Qadir Karbalai similarly claimed on December 20 that the presence of US troops in Iraq justifies the militia’s retention of arms.[lxvii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced in October 2025 that between 250 and 350 US advisers would remain at Ain al Asad airbase in Anbar Province to support US counter-ISIS operations in Syria.[lxviii] Both militias’ ideological commitment to armed resistance suggests that both groups would resist disarmament even if all US and Turkish troops withdraw from Iraq, however.[lxix]  

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran is likely prioritizing ballistic missile production due to both organizational inertia within the Iranian defense apparatus and the need to restore deterrence in what it views as an ongoing war with Israel. Iranian defense officials view ballistic missiles as a critical piece of their defense strategy. A hypothetical Iranian decision to abandon the ballistic missile program would be antithetical to the way that Iranian commanders view their capabilities and relative strengths.
• Israeli Threat Perceptions: Iran’s ability to produce ballistic missiles at scale only six months after the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 is causing Israeli anxieties over Iranian capabilities and intent to attack Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu plans to brief US President Donald Trump on options for US involvement in potential Israeli strikes against Iranian missile sites during his December 29 visit to the United States. Israeli intelligence agencies do not believe Iran’s current missile production pace requires urgent military action within the next few months, but warn it could become a more urgent issue later in 2026.
• IRGC Missile Exercise: Reports about a possible Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force missile exercise coordinated across multiple bases in Iran have also contributed to Israeli fears of a rising Iranian ballistic missile threat. IRGC-affiliated media reported on December 22 that the IRGC Aerospace Force launched missiles as part of its missile exercise in unspecified locations in five provinces. The regime may have been rehearsing the synchronization and coordination of large-scale missile strikes from bases spread across the country through the exercise.
• Syrian-Turkish-SDF Negotiations: Senior Turkish and Syrian officials met in Damascus on December 22, very likely to discuss the SDF’s response to a recent proposal that will facilitate the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army as three divisions and smaller brigades. It is unclear whether Turkish officials have moderated their red lines on the terms of the SDF’s integration at this time.
• US Strikes in Syria: CENTCOM struck more than 70 ISIS sites across the central Syrian desert on December 19 and 20 near Palmyra in Homs Province, Maadan in Raqqa Province, and in the desert regions of Deir ez Zor Province. The recent US strikes targeting ISIS in Syria illustrate how US cooperation with the Syrian government enables the United States to deny ISIS sanctuary in government-controlled territory. ISIS previously used Assad-held areas west of the Euphrates River as a sanctuary largely free from persistent US interference.

Iran Update, December 19, 2025

The United States struck dozens of ISIS-affiliated targets in Syria on December 19 in direct response to the ISIS-affiliated killing of two US soldiers and a civilian interpreter in Palmyra on December 13.[i] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the US operation aims to eliminate ISIS fighters, infrastructure, and weapons sites.[ii] Unspecified US officials told Western media that US fighter jets, attack helicopters, and rocket artillery struck dozens of suspected ISIS sites across central Syria.[iii] Syrian media reported airstrikes and explosions in desert regions in Homs, eastern Raqqa, and western Deir ez Zor provinces.[iv] CTP-ISW will publish a complete analysis on US strikes in Syria in the December 22, 2025, Iran Update.

The Islamic State’s (IS) recognition of the December 13 attack on US forces in Palmyra may encourage Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated or -inspired fighters to attempt to conduct similar insider attacks on US or Syrian forces. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13.[v] IS did not explicitly claim involvement in the attack but praised the attack for targeting the “joint forces” of the United States and Syrian government.[vi] IS’s acknowledgement and praise of the Palmyra attack in a December 18 editorial suggests that IS encouraged and inspired the attack but probably did not have foreknowledge of the operative’s plans.[vii] The attack‘s perpetrator was a recent Syrian internal security forces recruit whom Syrian authorities had flagged before the attack for imminent dismissal over his “extremist” beliefs.[viii]  CTP-ISW assessed on December 15 that recent ISIS calls to monitor US forces and attack Syrian government forces “whenever and wherever possible” may have motivated the perpetrator.[ix]

IS supporters and followers will likely interpret IS’s praise of the Palmyra attack as encouragement to conduct similar “green-on-blue" or insider attacks targeting US or Syrian forces. Many IS supporters online have interpreted IS’s acknowledgement of the Palmyra attack as a claim of responsibility for the attack, according to a BBC Salafi-jihadi expert on December 19.[x] The interpretation that IS claimed the attack may encourage other attacks against US or Syrian forces, regardless of whether IS actually intended its acknowledgement as a claim. IS publishes weekly editorials in its publication, al Naba, to disseminate its ideology and propaganda to IS followers across the world. IS supporters often use these editorials to guide and shape their militant activities, including determining permissible targets and acceptable courses of action. A western Syria-based ISIS-aligned group, Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, interpreted IS’s praise for Palmyra attack as encouragement for individual fighters to conduct further attacks without deference to a “chain of command” as long as the fighters “follow [ISIS’s] methodology.”[xi]

IS’s veneration of the Palmyra attack may signal to IS followers that the organization has adapted its understanding of the permissibility of joining Syrian government forces with the intent to conduct insider attacks. The BBC expert noted that IS supporters have recently debated online if infiltrating Syrian government forces to carry out insider attacks is permissible, particularly given that IS has repeatedly called upon supporters to defect from the “apostate” Syrian government since the fall of the regime.[xii] IS’s approval of the recent insider attack may, however, encourage previously hesitant fighters or supporters to attempt to infiltrate Syrian security or military forces to conduct similar attacks.

Decentralized and isolated ISIS-inspired cells or individuals continue to present a serious threat to US and Syrian forces operating in Syria. That IS acknowledged but did not claim the Palmyra attack suggests that IS was not aware of the attack before it was conducted and that the group has not infiltrated Syrian government forces in any extensive way at this time. The editorial referred to the attackers as those “who have made up their minds,” which suggests that while ISIS believes that the attackers were committed supporters, it also knows that the attackers decided to attack US and Syrian forces independent of formal direction and were not formal members of ISIS.[xiii]  Individuals who are inspired by ISIS can still fulfill ISIS’s goals of driving a wedge between the Global Coalition and Syria by posing a major threat to US and Syrian forces operating in Syria. ISIS-inspired individuals operating individually or within decentralized, disconnected two to three-person cells are much more difficult for friendly forces to detect and dismantle because they are less likely to be connected to or in communication with other ISIS networks. US and Syrian forces have collaborated in recent months to dismantle ISIS cells and detain or kill ISIS leaders across Syria.[xiv]

Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam Ali leader Shibl al Zaidi called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and integrate into the Iraqi state in a statement published on X on December 18, which would constitute an initial step towards satisfying the first condition in the 2026 Nation Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).[xv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would need to demobilize their extralegal militias and reintegrate them into society, not merely place them under the PMF, to satisfy the first condition of the NDAA’s Iraq section. The NDAA lays out three conditions that the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) must meet for Iraq to receive 75% of funds under the Coalition Train and Equip Fund (CTEF): first, extralegal militias operating outside of the control of the Iraqi state must disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate; second, they must answer to the Iraqi prime minister; third, the Iraqi government must hold the militias accountable if the militias break the law. The PMF contains a number of Iranian-backed militias, but other militias operate outside even nominal government control, separate from the PMF.[xvi] Zaidi’s statement is also consistent with an earlier, reported Shia Coordination Framework plan to comply with the reported US demand that the Iraqi federal government disarm six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Imam Ali and Kataib Hezbollah. The framework is considering a plan to publicly disarm the six militias and integrate them into the PMF.[xvii]  All of the militias except Kataib Hezbollah reportedly agreed to the SCF’s plan, which suggests that Kataib Hezbollah is more ideological than the other militias.[xviii] The reported framework plan and Zaidi’s proposal for disarmament and integration integrates extralegal militias into the PMF but does not satisfy the first condition because it does not demobilize or reintegrate these militias into society.

Key Takeaways

• US Airstrikes in Syria: The United States struck dozens of ISIS-affiliated targets in Syria on December 19 in direct response to the ISIS-affiliated killing of two US soldiers and a civilian interpreter in Palmyra on December 13. CTP-ISW will publish a complete analysis on US strikes in Syria in the December 22, 2025, Iran Update.
• ISIS-aligned Attack in Syria: The Islamic State’s recognition of the December 13 attack on US forces in Palmyra may encourage Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated or -inspired fighters to attempt to conduct similar insider attacks on US or Syrian forces.
• Integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam Ali leader Shibl al Zaidi called for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm and integrate into the Popular Mobilization Forces in a statement published on X on December 18, which would constitute an initial step towards satisfying the first condition in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act’s Iraq funding. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would need to demobilize their extralegal militias and reintegrate them into society, not merely place them under the PMF, to satisfy the first condition of the NDAA’s Iraq section.

Iran Update, December 18, 2025

Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources speaking to Reuters expressed relative optimism about the progress on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government. A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent. One SDF source characterized the most recent proposal from the government to the SDF as “the closest” the two sides have been to a deal.[i] The Syrian transitional government reportedly recently sent a new integration proposal to the SDF ahead of the December 31 deadline for SDF integration.[ii] Unspecified Western, Syrian, and Kurdish officials told Reuters on November 18 that the proposal “expressed openness” to integrating the SDF as three main divisions, along with some smaller brigades, under the condition that the SDF ”cedes" some of its command structure and opens its territory to other Syrian army units.[iii] The Reuters report was unclear on what ”cedes” means in the context of a command structure, but it appears to imply some degree of subordination. The transitional government’s recent proposal resembles an October 2025 verbal, US-brokered agreement on SDF integration that included a stipulation for three divisions and other independent brigades.[iv]

Several sources said that the proposal is unlikely to produce a comprehensive breakthrough and that any agreement reached before the end of the year will fall short of fully integrating the SDF into the Ministry of Defense (MoD), however.[v] The reported contents of the transitional government’s recent proposal to the SDF still do not address core political disagreements between the transitional government and SDF, such as decentralization, Kurdish constitutional rights, and control of oil fields in northeast Syria, which have stalled integration talks since March 2025.[vi] Neither the Syrian transitional government nor the SDF has officially commented on the status of negotiations at the time of this writing. A separate Western source told Reuters that negotiators will extend the March 10 agreement’s year-end deadline to “save face.”[vii] A Kurdish official involved in the March 10 integration negotiations similarly indicated on December 15 that negotiators would extend the agreement’s deadline.[viii]

Turkish and Saudi media have corroborated and expanded on details discussed in the Reuters report. A Turkish analyst reported on December 17 that the Syrian government submitted a “final” 13-point proposal to integrate the SDF.[ix] The journalist stated that the proposal would reorganize the SDF into three Syrian army divisions, deploy additional government forces to northeastern Syria, and place the SDF under MoD authority.[x] SDF sources separately told Saudi media on December 18 that they received a Syrian government proposal calling for the integration of three SDF divisions into the MoD.[xi] Placing the three SDF divisions under the MoD would be consistent with the Reuters reporting that the latest government proposal required that the SDF "cedes“ some of its command structure to the MoD, assuming cedes implies subordination.  The SDF sources added that an SDF delegation will travel to Damascus “soon” to discuss several outstanding military integration items, including the future of female SDF units, specific SDF commanders in the MoD, and the SDF’s internal security forces.[xii] Saudi media also reported that the Syrian government and SDF agreed to complete negotiations on the military and security aspects of the March 10 agreement this year, but will postpone negotiations on unaddressed political questions, such as decentralization and the constitution, until next year.[xiii] A pro-government Syrian source suggested that these political questions were impeding ongoing negotiations, however.[xiv]   Reuters, Saudi, and Turkish media’s reports on the details of the Syrian government’s proposal to the SDF, however, contradict a December 17 claim by Syria in Transition (SIT) that the government’s proposal closely resembled the SDF’s ideal outcome for integration negotiations and would preserve SDF autonomy. [xv]  SIT’s reported terms of the Syrian government proposal violate several redlines articulated by the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the most recent proposal in recent days after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkey’s Syria policy. CTP-ISW has therefore adjusted its December 17 assessment that the Turkish government is the “main impediment” to an agreement at this time.[xvi] The Turkish government has repeatedly threatened military action against the SDF, and Fidan—as recently as December 6—demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian army as individuals, not as divisions.[xvii] Fidan’s rejection of the three-division integration, which had been originally suggested in October 2025, indicated that Turkey—not the SDF—was the main impediment to negotiations. Fidan met with Barrack on December 16 to discuss the SDF integration into the Syrian army, after which Fidan immediately changed his position.[xviii] Fidan said on December 17 that Turkey would not resort to military action against the SDF and that he is ”optimistic” about the integration negotiations.[xix] This change in official Syrian government position, combined with increased optimism from Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources about the negotiations, suggests that Turkey has dropped its opposition to the most recent proposal after the Barrack visit.

Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah military sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, which marks its most extensive wave of airstrikes in recent months.[xx] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on December 18 that it struck Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon that the group used to train its fighters, store weapons, and conduct military operations.[xxi] Israel reportedly struck the Qaalat Jabbour training complex near Medioun, Western Bekaa District, which is one of Hezbollah’s main training complexes that houses barracks, warfare simulation complexes, and shooting ranges.[xxii] Israel previously struck the complex in January 2024.[xxiii] The IDF also announced that it killed a Hezbollah fighter in Taybeh, southern Lebanon, on December 18.[xxiv]

These Israeli strikes focused on targets that the IDF has regularly struck and do not represent an inflection in target selection change at this time, despite the larger wave of strikes. The IDF has regularly conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters, weapons, and infrastructure since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in order to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution and remove any threat to northern Israeli towns.[xxv] Israel previously expanded its targets to include Hezbollah‘s communications network and senior leadership before it launched its large-scale ground and air operation in October 2024.[xxvi] An informed source told Saudi media on December 18 that Israel informed the United States that it does not have a deadline for launching an operation against Hezbollah and that the option of an expanded operation is ”on the table.”[xxvii] The United States is reportedly under the impression that Israel has removed the deadline to give Lebanese authorities ”room to maneuver” while keeping the ”threat of using military force in place,” according to a Saudi media report on December 18.[xxviii] The Saudi media report also stated that the Israeli government is urging northern Israeli citizens to return to their towns despite military activity in the region.[xxix] Israel previously evacuated northern Israeli communities along the Israel-Lebanon border in October 2023 as the likelihood of escalation and its cross-border engagements with Hezbollah intensified.[xxx] There has been no Israeli reservist call-up since early November 2025.[xxxi] The December 18 Israeli strikes occurred on the eve of the ceasefire monitoring committee meeting, during which Israeli and Lebanese officials will hold their second round of direct talks.[xxxii]

Iranian media have described the merger of Baluch militant groups in southeastern Iran under the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) as a “symbolic” rebranding of Jaish al Adl aimed at broadening their support base.[xxxiii] Four Baloch organizations in Sistan and Baluchistan in southeastern Iran announced on December 10 that they have unified under one coalition: the MPF.[xxxiv]  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media and hardliner outlets stated that the formation of this group is an attempt by Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, to “hide [its] record full of terror" and survive after incurring "heavy losses" in recent IRGC counterterrorism operations.[xxxv] IRGC-media stated that the new group was "a combination of the same old elements.” Jaish al Adl is almost certainly the most active group in MPF and appears to be the strongest member of the coalition.  

 

The following groups merged to form the MPF:   

 

• Jaish al Adl – The successor to former Sistan and Baluchistan-based Salafi Jihadi Sunni Baloch militant organization Jundallah, which disintegrated in 2012 after the Iranian regime executed its former leader Abdul Malik Rigi in 2010.[xxxvi] Jaish al Adl has historically stated that its objectives are to protect the rights of Sunni Muslims in Iran and establish an independent Baloch state.[xxxvii] Salahoddin Farooghi has commanded Jaish al Adl since its establishment in 2012.[xxxviii] Jaish al Adl operates in three districts across Sistan and Baluchistan Province. IRGC-affiliated media reported that Jaish al Adl has an intelligence branch focused on assassinating Sunni leaders within the Iranian regime.[xxxix] Jaish al Adl reportedly uses guerrilla tactics, ambush methods, and remotely controlled IEDs and land mines in their attacks.[xl] One UN member state told the United Nations that Jaish al Adl has tactical ties to Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP). The member state alleged that ISIS-KP previously provided suicide bombers to Jaish al Adl for its April 2024 attack on Iranian military sites in Rask and Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xli]
• Jaish al Nasr – A militant organization that splintered from Jundallah in 2010 after Abdul Malik Rigi’s execution following a dispute.[xlii] Jaish al Nasr reintegrated with Jaish al Adl in 2016 after the Iranian regime assassinated former Jaish al Nasr leader Abdul Rauf Rigi in Dalbandin, Pakistan, in 2014, according to Iranian and regional media.[xliii]
• Pada Baloch Movement – An anti-Iranian regime Baloch group established in 2017. CTP-ISW has not observed any recent recorded militant activity by this group.[xliv]
• Mohammad Rasul Allah Group – An anti-Iranian regime Baloch group established in the mid-70s.[xlv] CTP-ISW has not observed any recent recorded militant activity by this group.

 

Iranian media is likely framing the MPF as a “rebranding” of Jaish al Adl, at least partly in an effort to discourage Iranian Baloch public support for the group. Several Iranian media outlets have accused Jaish al Adl of killing Baloch and other Iranian civilians in its previous attacks.[xlvi] The MPF stated on December 10 in its new charter that it seeks “deep political change” in Iran. The MPF called on Baloch Muslims and all “freedom-seeking” Iranians to conduct “civil actions,” such as displaying MPF flags, sharing the MPF’s charter, and writing anti-regime slogans in public areas, to demonstrate their solidarity with the organization.[xlvii] The MPF has published footage of its new coalition flag in various locations across Sistan and Baluchistan and Shiraz provinces.

Key Takeaways

• Syrian Transitional Government Negotiations with the SDF: Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources speaking to Reuters expressed relative optimism about the progress on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government. A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent.
• Turkey’s Position on SDF Integration: Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the most recent proposal to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense in recent days after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkish Syria policy. CTP-ISW has therefore adjusted its December 17 assessment that the Turkish government is the “main impediment” to an agreement at this time.
• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah military sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, which marks its most extensive wave of airstrikes in recent months. These Israeli strikes focused on targets that the IDF has regularly struck and do not represent an inflection in target selection change at this time, despite the larger wave of strikes.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media has described the merger of Baluch militant groups in southeastern Iran under the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) as a “symbolic” rebranding of Jaish al Adl aimed at broadening their support base, likely at least partly in an effort to discourage Iranian Baloch public support for the group.

Iran Update, December 17, 2025

The Iranian regime announced new Artesh appointments on December 17 as part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leadership following the Israel-Iran War.[i] Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami appointed Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as his assistant for air defense affairs.[ii] Alireza Sabahi Fard most recently served as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander.[iii] Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[iv] Sabahi Fard’s new appointment may reflect Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of Iranian air defenses under Sabahi Fard’s command during the Israel-Iran War. Israel established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems during the first 24 hours of the conflict.[v]

Khamenei separately appointed Brigadier General Bahman Behmard as the new Artesh Air Force commander based on Hatami’s recommendation.[vi] Behmard replaced Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, who became Hatami‘s adviser for aviation affairs.[vii] Behmard previously served as the commander of the Artesh Air Force 1st Tactical Air Base in Tehran and 4th Tactical Air Base in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, and most recently served as the Deputy Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Operations Deputy.[viii]

These appointments are part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leaders after the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian regime has signaled that it urgently seeks to improve its air defense capabilities to better defend against potential future attacks on Iranian territory. Iran has expressed interest in acquiring advanced air defense systems and aircraft from Russia, such as the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jet, given that it currently lacks advanced air defense systems and fighter aircraft.[ix]

All sources for the above graphic are included in the endnote section at the end of this update.[x]

Ansar al Furqan recently conducted a tactically sophisticated attack targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. This attack is demonstrative of the growing threat that anti-regime Baloch groups in southeastern Iran have posed to the Iranian regime since late 2022. Ansar al Furqan, which is a Salafi-jihadi group, claimed that it killed at least 16 Iranian intelligence and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) personnel at a checkpoint in Fahraj, Kerman Province, on December 16.[xi] Iranian media reported that the group only killed three LEC personnel and one civilian at the checkpoint, however.[xii] Ansar al Furqan claimed that its fighters launched the attack on the checkpoint from three axes and initially killed the security forces at the checkpoint before ambushing reinforcements that arrived at the checkpoint following the initial attack.[xiii] Ansar al Furqan claimed that 43 of its fighters participated in the attack. The group also said that the attack marked the second phase of “Operation Sayf al Furqan.”[xiv] Ansar al Furqan stated that the first phase of “Operation Sayf al Furqan” took place in August 2025 when the group allegedly killed over 50 Iranian security personnel in Golkhani, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xv] Iranian media did not report any casualties among Iranian forces in the August 2025 attack. Ansar al Furqan did not specify a motive for the August 2025 attack, but the group’s spokesperson stated on December 16 that the recent attack on the Fahraj checkpoint was in response to Iranian officials insulting a companion of Prophet Mohammad.[xvi] Ansar al Furqan has reportedly not merged with the newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is notable given that Ansar al Furqan operates in southeastern Iran like the MPF.[xvii] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi organization, and several other Baloch groups established the MPF on December 10.[xviii] MPF fighters killed four Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base personnel from the Imam Hossein Battalions near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 10.[xix]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is reportedly “ready” to begin disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers as part of the second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan. This effort would mark an unprecedented step by the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River.[xx] Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said on December 17 that the LAF is “ready” to move to the second phase of its disarmament plan, which covers the area between the Litani and Awali rivers and does not have a specified timeline, according to Lebanese media.[xxi] The Awali River is located roughly 18 miles north of the Litani River.[xxii] Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said on December 11 that the LAF had completed 90 percent of its disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon, in reference to the LAF’s disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River under the first phase of its plan.[xxiii] Berri is Hezbollah’s highest-ranking ally within the Lebanese state and was heavily involved in negotiating the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah.[xxiv] The ceasefire agreement only mandated that the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River, but the Lebanese cabinet agreed in August 2025 to pursue Hezbollah’s complete disarmament.[xxv] LAF disarmament efforts north of the Litani River would be an unprecedented step toward disarming Hezbollah throughout Lebanon beyond what is mandated in the ceasefire. Mitri’s statement comes amid the LAF’s recent searches of Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon following Israeli pressure on the LAF to search private property and rural areas.[xxvi] The LAF searched a Hezbollah tunnel near Touline, southern Lebanon, on December 17 in response to an Israeli request through the ceasefire monitoring committee, according to videos published by Lebanese media.[xxvii] The LAF has previously reported searching Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon without sharing video or photo evidence.[xxviii] The LAF also searched a reported Hezbollah building for weapons in Yanouh, southern Lebanon, on December 13 after Israel threatened to strike the building.[xxix] The LAF reportedly found no Hezbollah weapons or ammunition at either location, however.[xxx] Israeli officials have repeatedly warned in recent weeks that Hezbollah is reconstituting faster than the LAF is disarming the group.[xxxi] Senior Israeli officials noted in late October 2025 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon.[xxxii] Syrian authorities have also interdicted multiple weapons shipments likely bound for Hezbollah in recent weeks.[xxxiii] Syrian authorities seized around 100 rocket-propelled grenades near Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on December 17, for example.[xxxiv]

Hezbollah will likely resist the LAF’s efforts to disarm it north of the Litani River more strongly than it has done in southern Lebanon. A Lebanese official and two unspecified security sources told Reuters in October 2025 that the LAF seeks to avoid inflaming tensions in Lebanon and buy time for Lebanese politicians to reach a consensus on what should happen to Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani River.[xxxv] The Lebanese government has historically approached the issue of Hezbollah weapons located north of the Litani River differently because Hezbollah is deeply entrenched in some northern Lebanese communities, such as the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs, where disarmament is a sensitive political issue that is widely opposed by Hezbollah’s Shia support base.[xxxvi] Hezbollah and its supporters largely view disarmament in southern Lebanon as part of implementing the 2006 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701, which designates areas south of the Litani River as a demilitarized zone.[xxxvii] Hezbollah and its supporters view disarmament north of the Litani River as an attempt to strip the organization of its right to “resistance” and an attack on Lebanese Shia communities, however.[xxxviii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has consistently noted that Hezbollah will retain its weapons north of the Litani River, insisting that agreements, such as UNSC 1701 and the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, only limit Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon.[xxxix] Qassem‘s statements indicate that Hezbollah will not be as willing to cooperate or hand over its weapons in areas north of the Litani as the group reportedly did in southern Lebanon.[xl] CTP-ISW has not observed Hezbollah cooperate with the LAF’s disarmament process thus far, but Hezbollah has claimed that it is cooperating with the Lebanese government to disarm in the south.[xli] Hezbollah is also reportedly concentrating most of its rearmament activity in areas north of the Litani River.[xlii] Hezbollah’s continued rejection of its complete disarmament and recent activity in northern Lebanon could complicate the LAF’s ability to implement the next phase of its disarmament plan.

Several Syrian and Kurdish sources have indicated that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government may imminently implement the March 10 agreement or extend the deadline for the implementation of the agreement. An unspecified Syrian government source told Syrian media on December 16 that the SDF and Syrian government have reached an agreement on the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which is the basis for the March 10 agreement.[xliii] The source added that the mechanism for integrating the SDF into the MoD “will be announced in the coming days.”[xliv] Hassan Mohammad Ali, who is a senior member of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), separately said in a December 15 interview with Emirati media that the March 10 agreement only stipulated that the SDF and Syrian government “would strive to implement” the agreement by the end of the year.[xlv] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing.[xlvi] The March 10 agreement stipulates that both sides “shall work toward implementing the agreement no later than the end of the current year,” but does not set a hard deadline.[xlvii] Ali added that the March 10 agreement will succeed, but that its implementation could face delays and would require “patience and political will from both sides.”[xlviii] Ali stated that the Syrian government submitted a military integration proposal and reached an initial agreement with the SDF to form three SDF divisions in northeastern Syria, but that the technical details of the SDF’s future relationship with the MoD are still under discussion.[xlix]

[l]These reports come as US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on December 16. Unspecified Turkish government sources told UK-based Saudi media that the meeting focused primarily on the implementation of the March 10 agreement.[li] Fidan is the main Turkish official in charge of Turkey’s Syria policy. Senior Kurdish officials directly involved in the integration negotiations with the Syrian government said on December 13 that they perceived a less hostile Turkish approach toward the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[lii]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely prefers to implement or extend the deadline of the March 10 agreement over conducting a joint Syrian-Turkish offensive against the SDF that would further destabilize Syria. The Syrian transitional government has reportedly asked Turkey to delay any military action against the SDF twice in 2025, first in January and again in September.[liii] Shara likely remains committed to negotiations with the SDF despite the lack of progress in implementing the March 10 agreement, as any offensive against the SDF would further destabilize Syria.[liv] Shara told Syrian state media in September 2025 that he had done “everything” to prevent a “battle or war” with the SDF, which was likely in reference to his efforts to prevent a Turkish offensive.[lv]

The Turkish government appears to be the main impediment to the implementation of the March 10 agreement and is the main party pushing for the end-of-year deadline. Fidan recently rejected the SDF’s proposal to integrate three SDF divisions into the MoD and suggested on December 6 that Turkey seeks to bar senior SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the MoD.[lvi] Turkey likely pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from US- and French-brokered integration negotiations with the SDF in Paris in August 2025.[lvii] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a December 12 speech that Turkey has called for “the implementation of the March 10 agreement, which risks escalating into a crisis if resisted.”[lviii] A pro-Erdogan newspaper interpreted Erdogan’s speech as Turkey’s “final warning” to the SDF on December 17.[lix] The same pro-Erdogan newspaper also said on December 17 that the SDF has until December 31 to integrate into the Syrian MoD.[lx]

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly appointed three Syrian National Liberation Front (NLF)-affiliated commanders to oversee military affairs in central, western, and southern Syria as “assistant defense ministers.”[lxi] The MoD probably appointed these commanders to improve the MoD’s capacity to supervise armed groups operating under the MoD across Syria. The NLF is a Turkish-backed coalition of civil war opposition factions that formed in 2018.[lxii] The Syrian MoD likely appointed these three NLF-affiliated commanders due to their loyalty to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and experience within the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Fateh al Mubin operations room that helped topple the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxiii]  HTS has supported and coordinated with the NLF since 2022 to weaken the NLF and draw it into HTS’s sphere of influence.[lxiv] The Syrian MoD, now led by former HTS commanders, has appointed numerous other NLF commanders to prominent positions within the MoD.[lxv]

The positions of these three new appointees will presumably mirror the role of Brigadier General Fahim Issa, who oversees the MoD’s affairs in northern Syria.[lxvi] Issa is a Turkish ethno-nationalist who formerly commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is a European Union-sanctioned civil war faction that fought within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.[lxvii] Issa has likely used his personal ties and experiences with Turkish-backed groups in northern Syria to facilitate their integration into the Syrian army, as seen through his meetings with militia leaders in Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, in May 2025.[lxviii] Issa also presumably supervises the Defense Ministry’s affairs in the northern region, given that he accompanied an MoD delegation to meet with Russian military officials in Moscow in October 2025.[lxix] Russia currently maintains forces in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[lxx] The three new commanders who will oversee MoD affairs in western, southern, and central Syria may increase the MoD’s institutional capacity and build the ministry's influence among local factions in these regions, which is an essential step in the professionalization process for the Syrian army.[lxxi] The new appointments are as follows:

• Assistant Defense Minister for the Central Region: Brigadier General Fadlallah al Hajji (Abu Yamen).[lxxii] Abu Yamen is a prominent pro-Turkish Syrian opposition figure who formerly led Faylaq al Sham. The Turkey-based Syrian Interim Government appointed Abu Yamen as Chief of Staff of its Defense Ministry, which oversaw the SNA, in 2017.[lxxiii] Abu Yamen assumed command over the NLF after its formation in 2018 and reportedly participated in the offensive that toppled the Assad regime alongside NLF forces in 2024.[lxxiv] He has served as the director of the MoD’s Higher Military Academy since February 2025.[lxxv] The “central region” presumably refers to parts of the Syrian central desert as well as Aleppo, Raqqa, and Rif Dimashq provinces.
• Assistant Defense Minister for the Southern Region: Brigadier General Ahmed Issa al Sheikh (also known as Abu Issa).[lxxvi] Abu Issa led the Suqour al Sham Brigades in the Idlib countryside during the early years of the Syrian Civil War before joining the Islamic Front and the NLF.[lxxvii] He maintained a close relationship with HTS and fought within the Fateh al Mubin operations room.[lxxviii] The “southern region” almost certainly refers to Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda provinces in addition to Damascus and parts of Rif Dimashq Province.
• Assistant Defense Minister for the Western Region: Brigadier General Mohammad Diaa Saleh Tahan (also known as Abu Saleh Tahan).[lxxix] Abu Saleh Tahan was a founding member of hardline Islamist group Ahrar al Sham and oversaw its military wing from 2014 to 2016.[lxxx] He defected from Ahrar al Sham in 2016 to join Jaysh al Ahrar, which briefly joined HTS when it formed in 2017 before splitting from the group.[lxxxi] Jaysh al Ahrar, under Abu Saleh Tahan’s leadership, joined the NLF and fought in the offensive that collapsed the Assad regime.[lxxxii] The “western region” presumably refers to coastal Syria, the Lebanese border areas, and parts of Homs and Hama provinces.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Military Appointments: The Iranian regime announced new Artesh appointments as part of a broader reshuffling of senior Iranian military leadership following the Israel-Iran War. Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami appointed Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as his assistant for air defense affairs. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei separately appointed Brigadier General Bahman Behmard as the new Artesh Air Force commander based on Hatami’s recommendation.
• Anti-Iranian Regime Baloch Groups: Ansar al Furqan recently conducted a tactically sophisticated attack targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. This attack is demonstrative of the growing threat that anti-regime Baloch groups in southeastern Iran have posed to the Iranian regime since late 2022.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is reportedly “ready” to begin disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers as part of the second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan. Hezbollah will likely resist the LAF’s efforts to disarm it north of the Litani River more strongly than it has done in southern Lebanon.
• Syrian March 10 Agreement: Several Syrian and Kurdish sources have indicated that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government may imminently implement the March 10 agreement or extend the deadline for the implementation of the agreement. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara likely prefers to implement or extend the deadline of the March 10 agreement over conducting a joint Syrian-Turkish offensive against the SDF that would further destabilize Syria.
• Syrian Ministry of Defense Appointments: The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly appointed three Syrian National Liberation Front-affiliated commanders to oversee military affairs in central, western, and southern Syria as “assistant defense ministers.” The MoD probably appointed these commanders to improve the MoD’s capacity to supervise armed groups operating under the MoD across Syria.

Iran Update, December 16, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Threat of Baloch Militant Groups to Iranian Regime Security: The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, released a video on December 11 in which it called on Iranians to engage in protest activities against the Iranian regime.
• ISIS Activity in Syria: Syrian security forces detained a cell of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighters in northern Idlib Province that has conducted at least three attacks targeting Syrian government forces along the M5 highway since November 28. This cell may have been operating in the southern Aleppo-northern Idlib countryside for some time, but its three most recent attacks are part of an increase in ISIS attacks targeting Syrian government forces since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assessed that Hezbollah has likely not reconstituted its military capabilities and weapons stockpiles to the point that the group could conduct a large-scale attack on Israel at this time. The IDF did not specify whether its assessment only evaluated Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a large-scale attack against Israel from southern Lebanon or from any part of Lebanon.

Iran Update, December 15, 2025

The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) likely seeks to conduct insider or “green-on-blue" attacks targeting US forces in Syria as part of an effort to reduce US forces’ trust in Syrian partner forces and disrupt the United States’ ability to effectively work with Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13.[i] Three US servicemembers and two Syrian fighters were also injured in the attack.[ii] Syrian forces killed the attacker at the scene.[iii] Palmyra is located in Syria’s central desert (also known as the Badia), which is a sparsely populated region that ISIS has used as a sanctuary to rest, refit, and train new fighters, particularly since its territorial defeat in 2019.[iv] The December 13 attack marked the first ISIS-affiliated attack on US forces in Syria since 2019.[v] Insider or “green-on-blue" attacks risk significantly reducing trust between the force that is attacked and its partner force, which can adversely impact the two forces’ ability to achieve joint tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Insider attacks cause the force that is attacked to take additional security precautions when operating alongside or meeting with the partner force, for example.

Recent Islamic State (IS) calls to monitor US forces and attack Syrian government forces may have motivated the recent attack. A BBC Salafi-jihadi expert noted on December 13 that high-profile IS supporters have encouraged ISIS sympathizers to conduct attacks against the Syrian transitional government “whenever and wherever possible” in the weeks since Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on November 10.[vi] The expert also stated that IS has encouraged its Syrian supporters to conduct what resembles pattern of life analysis on the movements of US forces and coalition partners in Syria.[vii] The expert added that prominent ISIS supporters launched a coordinated online campaign that urged sympathizers to kill foreigners, including US citizens.[viii] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated on December 13 that it had warned US officials about possible ISIS attacks on US forces.[ix]

The attacker and any accomplices were able to conduct this attack because the Syrian government has needed to rapidly expand local security forces to meet the state’s security needs after the fall of the Assad regime. Institutions like the MOI’s security forces have evolved from small organizations that operated in Hayat Tahrir al Sham-controlled Idlib Province into large organizations that oversee security in most of Syrian territory. This transformation has required local Syrian authorities to rapidly recruit personnel in order to address the sudden and significant increase in security tasks assigned to local forces. This approach appears to have enabled some individuals affiliated with ISIS or who hold ISIS-aligned views, such as the Palmyra attacker, to join units in the Syrian army or Syrian MoI. The Palmyra attacker joined the MoI’s Badia Security Directorate about two months ago as a base guard and was one of 5,000 recruits.[x] The MoI spokesperson explained in a December 13 statement that internal evaluations had flagged the attacker for “extremist” beliefs on December 10 and that the MoI planned to dismiss him on December 14.[xi] The perpetrator carried out the attack on December 13 while off duty.[xii] It remains unclear whether the attacker was an active member of ISIS or just held ISIS-aligned beliefs. Syrian security forces, in collaboration with US forces, arrested five suspects in Palmyra on December 13 and 14 in connection with the attack, which suggests that the attack was not a lone wolf attack.[xiii]

ISIS’s effort to sow divisions between the United States and Syria appears to be unsuccessful at this time because senior US officials have indicated that the recent attack “reinforces” the United States’ policy of supporting Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. The United States currently maintains about 1,000 personnel in Syria who provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other Syrian partners, such as the Syrian Free Army.[xiv] US intelligence sharing with Syrian MoI forces has led to numerous successful counter-ISIS raids across Syria in recent months.[xv] US forces also assist SDF units in managing and securing ISIS-affiliated detention camps in northern Syria.[xvi] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack stated on December 14 that the attack on US forces does not “invalidate,” but rather “reinforces,” the United States’ strategy of supporting Syrian partners to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.[xvii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani on December 14, and a Syrian state readout of the call noted that Rubio expressed the United States’ “continued support” for the Syrian government and joint counterterrorism efforts.[xviii] US President Donald Trump blamed the attack on ISIS and promised a “very serious [US] retaliation” on December 13.[xix] Trump gave no indication that the attack would change the United States’ policy toward or engagement with the Syrian government.

ISIS has increased the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10. ISIS fighters killed four MoI officers near Maarat al Numan, Idlib Province, on December 14.[xx] ISIS gunmen on motorcycles also engaged two Syrian 80th Division fighters near Ghanzawi, Aleppo Province, on December 15 and severely injured one fighter.[xxi] ISIS began publicly claiming attacks on Syrian government and former regime figures across Syria at a higher rate after November 28, following a long period in which ISIS rarely acknowledged attacks in government-held areas.[xxii]

The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations that seeks to facilitate “deep political change” in Iran, outlined its objectives in a charter on December 10.[xxiii] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, and several other Baloch groups established the Mobarizoun Popular Front on December 10.[xxiv] The other groups that comprise the Mobarizoun Popular Front include the Pada Baloch Movement, Nasr Movement of Baluchistan, and Mohammad Rasul Allah Group.[xxv] The Mobarizoun Popular Front stated in its charter on December 10 that it seeks to increase cohesion among anti-regime Baloch organizations, likely to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of attacks against the regime.[xxvi] The Mobarizoun Popular Front also stated that it seeks to use “up-to-date" insurgent tactics to confront the regime.[xxvii] The group added that it will conduct media and diplomatic activities in addition to “legitimate defense,” which suggests that the organization will use media engagement and public messaging to try to cultivate legitimacy in Iran.[xxviii] The organization lastly called for increasing coordination and cooperation with all anti-regime parties and groups across Iran. This call suggests that the Mobarizoun Popular Front may view itself as a vanguard for a popular uprising against the Iranian regime. Vanguardism is a method that some social movements, like Marxism-Leninism and Salafi-jihadism, employ that posits that a “small core of committed individuals [is] necessary to mobilize the masses” to remake society.[xxix] The Mobarizoun Popular Front's use of the word “mobarizoun” in its name also suggests that the group views itself as a vanguard. Mobarizoun were individuals in the 7th century Middle East who engaged in duels with opposing forces prior to a main battle between two armies.[xxx] The Mobarizoun Popular Front may therefore view itself as a vanguard that can initiate and incite “resistance” against the Iranian regime.[xxxi]

Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Second Class Abbas Malekizadeh as the new Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters commander on December 13, possibly in response to the recent establishment of the Mobarizoun Popular Front.[xxxii] The Artesh Ground Forces is responsible for defending Iran from foreign attacks, and the Southeast Regional Headquarters oversees Artesh Ground Forces units in Hormozgan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces, as well as in parts of Yazd Province.[xxxiii] Malekizadeh replaced Brigadier General Amir Gholam Alian, who had commanded the headquarters since August 2020.[xxxiv] Malekizadeh had previously served as the deputy commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters since at least July 2022.[xxxv] Malekizadeh served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade, which is based in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, prior to becoming the deputy commander of the Southeast Regional Headquarters.[xxxvi]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual-use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025.[xxxvii] A second unspecified US official familiar with the seizure stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran’s missile program.[xxxviii] US officials did not identify the vessel or its owner.[xxxix] The PRC has previously helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile program by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The PRC sent at least two shipments of sodium perchlorate to Iran before the Israel-Iran War, and European intelligence sources are tracking 10 to 12 shipments to Iran following the war, according to CNN.[xl] Iranian efforts to procure components and solid fuel ingredients for its missile program from the PRC are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[xli] An Israeli journalist recently reported on December 11 that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” ballistic missile stockpile to approximately 2,000 missiles.[xlii]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy possibly seized the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker Talara on November 14 in response to the US interdiction of the PRC-origin, Iran-bound vessel.[xliii] The United States interdicted the vessel on an unspecified date in November 2025. The IRGC circulated a Quranic verse on X after the Talara’s seizure that suggested Iran seized the Talara in retaliation for a previous incident.[xliv] Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that the United States and its allies could enforce United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which calls on United Nations member states to inspect any Iranian vessel within their territorial waters suspected of ”carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[xlv]

Iranian Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[xlvi] Sabahi Fard’s removal from these positions may reflect Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with Sabahi Fard’s performance during the Israel-Iran War. Elhami previously served as deputy commander of the Artesh Air Defense Force, commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Academy, and operations deputy of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters.[xlvii] Former Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander in February 2025.[xlviii] Sabahi Fard maintained his position as Artesh Air Defense Force commander, which he had held since June 2018, when he was appointed as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander.[xlix] The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[l] Sabahi Fard’s removal is notable given the poor performance of Iranian air defenses under his command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems in the first 24 hours of the war.[li] The regime has not appointed Sabahi Fard to a new position at the time of this writing.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi Arabia remain at odds over the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen. Saudi and Emirati defense ministry delegations met with STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi and STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami in Aden on December 12.[lii] Saudi media reported that the officials were expected to discuss the withdrawal of "any forces from outside the eastern governorates."[liii] Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors, including PLC President Rashid al Alimi, continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as the "only option for restoring normalcy” in the region.[liv] Zubaidi and Muharrami told the Saudi delegation in Aden that the STC will not withdraw from its newly seized territory, according to three STC sources speaking to a Yemen analyst.[lv]

The STC's refusal to withdraw from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates comes amid the STC’s continued efforts to legitimize its authority over these areas and frame its recent military action as necessary to fight the Houthis. Zubaidi formed the "Preparatory Committee for the Southern Fatwa Authority" on December 13, stating that the committee would "steadily pursue” the secession of southern Yemen.[lvi] The secession of southern Yemen is a long-standing STC aim. A Yemen analyst assessed that the creation of the committee reflects the STC's efforts to establish long-term governance and normalize the idea of an independent southern state.[lvii] STC leaders have also continued to meet with ROYG officials, including Parliament Speaker Sultan al Barakani, to discuss governance and joint efforts to fight the Houthis.[lviii] An STC spokesperson told Saudi media that the offensive aimed to address security threats from the east, such as Houthi smuggling from Oman, and claimed that ROYG’s failure to combat such threats forced the STC to intervene.[lix] The STC’s rhetoric is almost certainly part of a broader STC effort to justify its recent actions and frame itself as the most viable leader of Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement. 

Key Takeaways

• Attack on US Forces in Syria: ISIS likely seeks to conduct insider or “green-on-blue" attacks targeting US forces in Syria as part of an effort to reduce US forces’ trust in Syrian partner forces and disrupt the United States’ ability to effectively work with Syrian partners to defeat ISIS. A suspected ISIS-aligned Syrian security forces member killed two US servicemembers, a US civilian interpreter, and a Syrian internal security officer in Palmyra, Homs Province, in an insider attack on December 13. ISIS’s effort to sow divisions between the United States and Syria appears to be unsuccessful at this time because senior US officials have indicated that the recent attack “reinforces” the United States’ policy of supporting Syrian partners to defeat ISIS.
• Threat of Baloch Militant Groups to Iranian Regime Security: The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations that seeks to facilitate “deep political change” in Iran, outlined its objectives in a charter on December 10. The coalition stated in its charter that it seeks to increase coordination and cooperation with all anti-regime parties and groups across Iran. This call suggests that the Mobarizoun Popular Front may view itself as a vanguard for a popular uprising against the Iranian regime.
• PRC Military Support for Iran: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual-use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025. A second unspecified US official stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran’s missile program.
• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi Arabia remain at odds over the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen. The STC continues to take efforts to legitimize its authority over these areas and frame its recent military action as necessary to fight the Houthis, while Saudi-backed leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to claim that they are the rightful leaders of the Republic of Yemen Government.

Iran Update, December 12, 2025

The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)’s funding for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) significantly decreases the ability for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to successfully operate in pursuit of Iranian objectives unless the Iraqi government is both extremely pro-Iranian and willing to lose US security funding. The new NDAA requires that the Iraqi government make credible steps on three conditions, or the ISF will not receive more than 75 percent of the funds authorized under the NDAA. These conditions are:

• Condition 1. The Iraqi government must take credible steps to reduce the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are not integrated into the “Iraqi security forces” through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process” (DDR).[i]
• Condition 2. The Iraqi government must take credible steps “to strengthen the authority and operational control of the prime minister of Iraq as commander-in-chief.”[ii]
• Condition 3. The Iraqi government must take credible steps to “investigate and hold accountable members of Iran-aligned militia groups or members of the ISF operating outside of the formal chain of command” who attack US or Iraqi personnel or engage in “illegal or destabilizing” activities.[iii]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attempt to circumvent the 2026 NDAA’s conditions by establishing facade groups within the PMF and obfuscating their distortion of the official command and control structures within the PMF. These conditions considerably strengthen US leverage over the Iraqi government. Greater US leverage decreases the militias’ freedom of maneuver substantially. These militias have a long history of using facade groups and nominally unaffiliated military units to obfuscate their loyalty to Iran, their destabilizing activities, and their responsibility for attacks targeting US personnel, Israel, and energy infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan.[iv] The NDAA directly targets this practice by conditioning continued Defense Department funding in support of the ISF on the Iraqi government’s ability to reduce the capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The militias could slightly alter the use of facade militias and unaffiliated units tactic by establishing nominally unaffiliated PMF brigades that in fact answer to a militia chain of command that ultimately answers to the IRGC Quds Force. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could attempt to circumvent these conditions using the facade tactic in the following ways:

• Circumventing Condition 1. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could use the covert nature of their extralegal militias to create nominally new PMF brigades while claiming that their covert elements had been disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated. The NDAA calls for a “publicly verifiable” DDR process. The covert nature of extralegal Iranian-backed Iraqi militias means that these militias could withhold complete unit rosters—if such documents exist—to quietly insert covert Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commanders and fighters into new or existing PMF units, even if they executed a performative and public DDR process. These elements would still be constrained by the third NDAA condition, however.
• Circumventing Condition 2. The militias could obfuscate their distortion of the official chain-of-command by claiming that they follow the chain of command while receiving orders through extralegal channels. The 5th Iraqi Army Division, for example, was nominally unaffiliated in 2017 but in fact answered to the Badr Organization, not the army’s chain of command.[v] Such changes may be difficult to detect without a careful review of the behavior of individual units and the positions of individual commanders.
• Circumventing Condition 3. The militias could use their pervasive political and judicial influence to “arrest” commanders and fighters before quietly releasing them at a later date. Previous Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi arrested several commanders involved in illegal activities before powerful militia political interests intervened to get the commanders and fighters released.[vi] Many of these releases are widely reported, which indicates that the militias would need to further alter their tactics to successfully circumvent this condition.[vii]

 

These conditions may also require a resolutely pro-Iran government to overcome. The United States is currently attempting to prevent the formation of an extremely pro-Iran government. Five unspecified prominent Iraqi officials told regional media that the United States has conveyed that it will refuse to engage with any senior security official or prime minister affiliated with Iranian-backed militias.[viii] An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework member told regional media on December 12 that the framework may select a “consensus candidate“ as a result of US pressure.[ix]  The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose alliance of Iraqi Shia parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP will continue to assess Iraqi reactions to these conditions. The Iraqi federal government and Iraqi militias have so far failed to react.

 

An Israeli journalist reported that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” missile stockpile to around 2,000 missiles, which is consistent with other Israeli reports that Iran has prioritized rebuilding its missile program and stockpile after the Israel-Iran War.[x] “Heavy” ballistic missiles presumably refer to medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. This assumption would suggest that Iran reconstituted its stockpile from between 1,100 and 1,300 missiles to 2,000 missiles between June 2025 and December 2025, also assuming that post-war Israel Defense Forces (IDF) estimates about the missile stockpile were correct.[xi] CTP-ISW assessed on December 9 that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[xii] Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[xiii]

 

This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles. Israeli Military Intelligence head Major General Shlomi Bender told US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz on December 8 that Israeli damage to Iran’s ballistic missile industry was “less severe” than initially assessed, and that Iran has already restored its production capacity.[xiv] Iran could theoretically use a trough mixer, though planetary mixers are more efficient.[xv]

 

An unspecified Israeli official told the Israeli journalist that the rebuilt ballistic missile program is an unacceptable threat.[xvi] The official said that Israel “must coordinate with the [United States on] the red lines and actions [Israel] will take in the future, perhaps even in the near future.”[xvii]

 

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media proposed on December 12 that Iran establish a “joint operations room” with the Axis of Resistance to mitigate their weaknesses in the wake of conflict since October 7, 2023.[xviii] The concept of an Axis of Resistance joint operations room is not new, and Iran has historically relied on joint operations rooms to coordinate activity across the Axis of Resistance.[xix] Iran and the Axis of Resistance use these joint operations rooms to accomplish operational objectives in pursuit of their shared strategic objectives, but Hamas’ October 7 attack was poorly coordinated and resulted in a series of Israeli operations that badly degraded elements of the Axis.[xx] Operations rooms could be used for expansive objectives on the regional level — such as destroying Israel — as well as less expansive objectives on the country level, like expelling US forces from Iraq. This new proposal demonstrates how Iran is considering mechanisms to facilitate learning from unsuccessful Axis of Resistance campaigns in this period of reconstitution for the Axis of Resistance.[xxi]

 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) is emphasizing its intent to establish an independent state to Western diplomats as it consolidates control on the ground in eastern Yemen. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt, which successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[xxii] These eight governorates were previously part of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990.[xxiii] UK-based The Times reported on December 12 that an unspecified STC source told Western diplomats that Yemen will never be unified again as it ”prepares to declare an independent state.”[xxiv] The source added that the STC's declaration came at a meeting with members of the United Nations Security Council on December 9, during which the STC made it clear that ”the 1990 unity was over.”[xxv] These remarks align with the STC’s recent statements, which indicates that the group views its consolidation in eastern Yemen as a step toward formalizing independence.[xxvi] The STC has had long-standing secessionist aims, and many of its leaders led or fought for the South during the 1994 Civil War.[xxvii]

 

The STC is continuing to consolidate administrative control and establish new military units in eastern Yemen. STC-affiliated ministers issued new political and security appointments on December 12 that placed “sensitive positions” in al Mahra Governorate under STC influence, including control of the Shahn border crossing, which is the primary commercial crossing between Yemen and Oman.[xxviii] STC officials also appointed new heads for the Geological Survey and Mineral Resources Authority and al Ghaydah International Airport.[xxix] These new appointments would likely strengthen the STC’s leverage over border access, trade flows, and energy-related infrastructure in eastern Yemen.

 

The STC also dismissed the commander of the Yemeni Army’s 123rd Infantry Brigade and appointed Jalal Ali Mohammed al Jaari as the new brigade commander.[xxx] The 123rd Infantry Brigade is a Yemeni army unit in the 2nd Military Region and is stationed at al Hat Camp, al Mahra Governorate.[xxxi] Yemeni media reported on December 12 that the STC also deployed forces from southern governorates, including Dhaleh, Aden, and Abyan, to Mahra Governorate, and ordered officers and personnel originating from northern governorates to leave the governorate to consolidate STC control.[xxxii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the STC will likely backfill these positions because they are located in southern Yemen, where the STC seeks to establish an independent state.[xxxiii]

 

Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander General Metin Tokel met with Syrian defense officials in Damascus on November 12 amid indicators that Turkey may be preparing for potential offensive operations in northeastern Syria. Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Tokel discussed several “issues of mutual interest,” including strengthening Syrian-Turkish military cooperation, in Damascus on November 12.[xxxv] Tokel and Qasra almost certainly discussed efforts to enhance Syrian-Turkish defense cooperation under the military cooperation agreement that Turkey and Syria signed in August 2025.[xxxvi] The agreement stipulates that Turkey will provide the Syrian government with weapons, military equipment, training, and logistical support.[xxxvii] Syrian military commanders are currently training in Turkey under this agreement.[xxxviii]

The timing of Tokel’s visit to Syria is notable because the Turkish government continues to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson reiterated on December 12 that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian army on an ”individual basis” and not ”as units,” which is a demand that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan identified as a Turkish red line on December 6.[xxxix] Senior Turkish political and defense officials warned on December 12 that the SDF is failing to integrate into the Syrian government and noted that the SDF’s integration agreement with the Syrian government is set to expire at the end of 2025.[xl] Coordination between Syrian and Turkish ground forces would be a necessary part of possible preparations for a joint offensive or Turkish operations in Syrian territory.

The Turkish Defense Ministry denied on December 12 that recent footage of Turkish units deploying to Syrian positions suggested that the Turkish army was preparing for an operation.[xli] Turkish forces deployed reinforcements on December 7 to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province, according to Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish sources.[xlii] The ministry characterized the movement captured in the footage as “routine troop rotations.”[xliii] A spokesperson for an SDF faction similarly told Saudi media on December 11 that the SDF has not observed any Turkish “readiness for a major military operation” along the SDF-Syrian or SDF-Turkish frontlines.[xliv] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor indicators of a possible Turkish-Syrian operation in northeastern Syria.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Influence in the Iraqi Government: The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)’s funding for the Iraqi Security Forces significantly decreases the ability for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to successfully operate in pursuit of Iranian objectives unless the Iraqi government is both extremely pro-Iranian and willing to lose US security funding. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attempt to circumvent the 2026 NDAA’s conditions by establishing facade groups within the PMF and obfuscating their distortion of the official command and control structures within the PMF. The NDAA’s conditions may also require a resolutely pro-Iran government to circumvent, however. The United States is currently attempting to prevent the formation of an extremely pro-Iran government. 
• Iranian Ballistic Missile Production: An Israeli journalist reported that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” missile stockpile to around 2,000 missiles, which is consistent with other Israeli reports that Iran has prioritized rebuilding its missile program and stockpile after the Israel-Iran War. This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles.
• Iran’s Deterrence Strategy: Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media proposed on December 12 that Iran establish a “joint operations room” with the Axis of Resistance to mitigate their weaknesses in the wake of conflict since October 7, 2023.
• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) is emphasizing its intent to establish an independent state to Western diplomats as it consolidates control on the ground in eastern Yemen. The STC is continuing to consolidate administrative control and establish new military units in eastern Yemen.
• Turkish-Syrian Defense Cooperation: Turkish Army Ground Forces Commander General Metin Tokel met with Syrian defense officials in Damascus on November 12 amid indicators that Turkey may be preparing for potential offensive operations in northeastern Syria. The timing of Tokel’s visit to Syria is notable because the Turkish government continues to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Iran Update, December 11, 2025

Correction: CTP-ISW has updated its December 11, 2025, assessment about how Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will respond to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The previous version of this assessment mischaracterized the provisions of the NDAA.

CTP-ISW additionally removed a sentence from its December 12, 2025, update that incorrectly suggested that the United States Government provides funding to Iranian-backed and -affiliated groups and institutions in Iraq. We apologize for this error.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed National Resistance Front (NRF) Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who controls Yemeni government-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate near the Houthi frontlines, echoed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) rhetoric that frames the recent STC offensive as necessary to fight the Houthis.[i]  The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and confirmed on December 8 that it had successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[ii] Saleh declared his willingness to cooperate with the STC against the Houthis and other terrorist groups in a phone call with STC President Aidarous al Zubaidi on December 11.[iii] STC and NRF-affiliated media reported that Saleh echoed the STC’s justification for its recent seizures of key areas of Hadramawt and Mahra governorates as a “true starting point” to launch an offensive against the Houthis in northern Yemen during his call with Zubaidi.[iv] Saleh’s call with Zubaidi notably came after Saleh met with Saudi-supported Yemeni President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashid al Alimi as well as other unspecified Saudi officials in Riyadh on December 10.[v] Saleh is one of the seven vice presidents on the PLC.[vi] Saleh stated on the sidelines of his Riyadh meetings that “republican ranks,” likely referring to the anti-Houthi coalition, should focus on the battle against the Iranian-backed Houthis.[vii] Saleh is originally from northern Yemen and is the nephew of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Tariq Saleh previously served as a commander in the Presidential Guard until the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014.[viii] Saleh and the NRF have historically sought the unification of Yemen, which contrasts with the STC’s long-standing secessionist aims.[ix] The STC’s claim that its actions in Hadramawt and Mahra are meant to disrupt Houthi supply lines aligns with Saleh’s goal of removing the Houthis from northern Yemen, however.[x] The UAE has historically backed Saleh.[xi]

The STC continues to portray itself as a reliable military and political standard bearer for the anti-Houthi coalition.[xii] STC Vice President Major General Ahmed Saeed bin Brik described the STC as “an active and responsible partner in supporting regional and international security and stability” on December 11.[xiii] The UAE-backed Security Belt Forces (SBF) General Commander Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah al Wali similarly praised the STC’s offensive in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates and confirmed the SBF’s commitment to defending the STC‘s operation on December 11.[xiv] 26 southern Yemeni political groups separately published a joint statement on December 11 in which they confirmed their allegiance to the STC and Zubaidi as their leader.[xv] Most of the groups appear to have been aligned with the STC before the STC offensive.

Alimi and other non-UAE-backed Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) actors in Yemen continue to call for the complete withdrawal of STC forces from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates.[xvi] Alimi stressed the need for STC forces to hand back security authority to local leaders in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates in separate phone calls with Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi and Mahra Governor Muhammad Ali Yasser on December 11.[xvii] Other non-UAE-backed officials also published statements on December 10 condemning the STC’s “unilateral actions” and warning that “external networks” outside the 2019 PLC framework could influence decision-making.[xviii]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated on December 11 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by the United States’ December 31 deadline. It is possible that the LAF’s disarmament efforts will not meet Israel’s criteria for Hezbollah’s disarmament, however. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said on December 11 that the LAF has completed 90 percent of its disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon.[xix] Berri added that the LAF will complete its disarmament plan in southern Lebanon by the December 31 deadline set in the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xx] The LAF has, however, not met key Israeli demands regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament. The LAF has reportedly rejected Israeli demands to conduct “house-to-house searches” because the LAF seeks to avoid “civil strife.”[xxi] Hezbollah has historically used civilian homes to store weapons.[xxii] An Israeli military source told Israeli media on December 9 that the LAF cannot disarm Hezbollah because it does not search private property.[xxiii] Israel has repeatedly warned in recent weeks that the Israel Defense Forces may increase its operations in Lebanon, citing the LAF’s insufficient progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xxiv] US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus reportedly recently warned Lebanese officials that Israel will conduct “major and decisive strikes” in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley if Hezbollah does not hand over “drones and precision missiles,” presumably to the LAF, by January 1.[xxv] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports that the LAF has seized arms from Hezbollah fighters or raided any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present.

The United States Congress’s repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will reopen the Syrian economy to global investment. President Trump is expected to sign the NDAA into law on December 22.[xxvi]  The Caesar Act was the most stringent layer of US sanctions imposed on Syria and imposed secondary sanctions that targeted anyone who provided financial support to the Syrian government.[xxvii] Congress’s repeal requires President Trump to submit an unclassified report to Congress within 90 days of the NDAA’s passage that confirms that the Syrian transitional government is meeting eight key US security demands.[xxviii] The US President will be required to submit biannual reports to Congress for the next four years on the status of these demands.[xxix] The US demands include:

• Continuing to cooperate with US forces on counter-ISIS efforts[xxx]
• Removing foreign fighters from senior government and military positions[xxxi]
• Protecting Syrian religious and ethnic minorities[xxxii]
• Avoiding unprovoked attacks on nearby states, including Israel[xxxiii]
• Implementing the March 10 agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces[xxxiv]
• Combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and weapons and drug trafficking[xxxv]
• Prosecuting government security forces responsible for post-2024 atrocities[xxxvi]

The repeal of the Caesar Act removes a major obstacle to Syria’s economic recovery by reopening Syria’s access to foreign capital, imports, and reconstruction investment. The Syrian Economy Minister, Nidal al Shaar, praised Congress’s repeal of the Caesar Act and described the Caesar Act as the “biggest obstacle facing the Syrian economy.”[xxxvii] Shaar added that the repeal of the Caesar Act will inject foreign currency into Syria’s economy and allow Syria to import basic materials, machinery, and key technologies to revitalize stalled factories and support price stability in local markets.[xxxviii] The World Bank estimated in October 2025 that the Syrian Civil War left Syria with $216 billion in reconstruction costs, but the Caesar Act sanctioned anyone who supported the Syrian government or its key sectors.[xxxix] These sanctions blocked Gulf investment into Syria and obstructed Syria’s post-Assad economic recovery.[xl] The Congressional repeal of the Caesar Act does not include a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the act, but the US President can decide to impose new targeted sanctions on Syrian individuals, businesses, or government institutions if Syria fails to meet US demands for two consecutive reporting periods.[xli] Any future US sanctions on Syria would target Syrian citizens, businesses, or government institutions. Foreign banks may be more willing to lend money to investors for projects in Syria because they do not have to worry about the reimposition of Caesar sanctions, as they likely did with the six-month Caesar Act waivers that Trump issued prior to the full repeal. President Trump and Congress reportedly plan to lift more sanctions on Syria in 2026, according to a Washington-based Syria researcher.[xlii]

The 2026 NDAA seeks to weaken Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi Security Forces. The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and is “a part of the Iraqi armed forces,” according to the 2016 Popular Mobilization Commission Law.[xliii] The NDAA states that “Iraqi security forces” can only receive up to 75 percent of their allocated funds from the 2026 US Defense Department budget until the US Defense Secretary certifies to Congress that the Iraqi federal government has taken “credible steps” to weaken Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xliv] These steps include:

• Reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are not integrated into the “Iraqi security forces” through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process,”[xlv]
• Strengthening the Iraqi prime minister’s “authority and operational control” over the “Iraqi security forces”, and[xlvi]
• Investigating militia members who operate outside of the “Iraqi security forces’” chain of command to attack US personnel, among other activities.[xlvii]

The NDAA defines “Iraqi security forces” as the “military and other security forces of or associated with” the Iraqi government. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades as well as forces that operate outside of the PMF.[xlviii] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xlix] Iraq’s ruling Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered multiple options to meet US demands to disarm the militias, including integrating the militias into the PMF.[l] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on November 7 that integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would likely preserve their existing networks and political influence.[li] Any integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security apparatus must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[lii]

The US Defense Secretary can issue a six-month waiver if reduced US security funding to Iraq harms US national security interests. A previous version of the NDAA stipulated that the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, which equips and trains elements of the Iraqi security establishment, could only receive up to 50 percent of its allocated budget for 2026 until the US Defense Secretary certified to Congress that the Iraqi federal government had taken the above “credible steps” to weaken Iranian-backed militias.[liii] The NDAA clarifies that funds allocated to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan are not affected by the “credible steps” outlined above.[liv]

Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups established the “People’s Fighters Front” (JMM) on December 10, which highlights how anti-regime militant groups operating in southeastern Iran continue to pose a significant threat to Iranian security. Jaish al Adl, which frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran, previously announced on November 29 that it had merged with other Baloch groups.[lv] JMM stated that it seeks to “restore and protect the economic, political, cultural, and religious dignity” of Iranians and overthrow the “Velayat-e-Faqih regime,” which is a reference to the Iranian regime.[lvi] JMM claimed its first attack targeting Iranian security forces near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 10. JMM fighters killed four Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base personnel from the Imam Hossein Battalions near Zahedan on December 10.[lvii] The Imam Hossein Battalions is a highly trained unit in the Basij paramilitary organization.[lviii] It is notable that JMM decided to conduct its inaugural attack near Zahedan given that Zahedan has historically been a hotspot for anti-regime activity, which has been exacerbated by the Iranian regime’s poor treatment of Sunni Baloch communities.[lix] Iranian security forces violently suppressed Sunni Baloch protesters in Zahedan in September 2022 in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[lx] The formation of JMM reflects greater coordination between anti-regime Baloch organizations in southeastern Iran, which could increase the threat these groups pose to Iran’s internal security and regime stability. 

The United States seized an oil tanker, Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that has illicitly transported Iranian oil.[lxi] This seizure will likely increase Iran’s concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to block Iranian oil exports. Skipper’s beneficial owner and operator is Nigeria-based Thomarose Global Ventures Ltd., and its registered owner is Marshall Islands-based Triton Navigation Corp.[lxii] US Attorney General Pam Bondi stated that Skipper has transported sanctioned oil from Venezuela and Iran.[lxiii] Skipper has also conducted at least two ship-to-ship transfers to export illicit Iranian oil to China in 2025, according to two maritime analytics firms. [lxiv] The United States sanctioned the vessel in 2022 for its role in illicit Iranian oil shipments under the vessel’s former name Adisa.[lxv] Iran's embassy in Caracas condemned the seizure and claimed that it was a violation of international laws and norms.[lxvi] The recent seizure comes amid Iranian concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to prevent Iranian oil exports. Iran recently conducted a two-day naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman that likely sought to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare Iranian forces for potential future maritime escalation.[lxvii]

Key Takeaways

• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: United Arab Emirates-backed National Resistance Front Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who controls Yemeni government-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate near the Houthi frontlines, echoed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s rhetoric that frames the recent STC offensive as necessary to fight the Houthis.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated on December 11 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by the United States’ December 31 deadline. It is possible that the LAF’s disarmament efforts will not meet Israel’s criteria for Hezbollah’s disarmament, however.
• Congress’s Repeal of the Ceasar Act: The United States Congress’s repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will reopen the Syrian economy to global investment.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Influence in the Iraqi Government: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may use the 2026 NDAA’s broad definition of the term “Iraqi security forces” to try to retain their influence in Iraq by integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces.
• New Anti-Regime Militant Group in Iran: Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups established the “People’s Fighters Front” (JMM) on December 10, which highlights how anti-regime militant groups operating in southeastern Iran continue to pose a significant threat to Iranian security.
• Iranian Concerns About Potential US Seizures of Iranian Vessels: The United States seized an oil tanker, Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that has illicitly transported Iranian oil. This seizure will likely increase Iran’s concerns that the United States and its allies may seize Iranian vessels to block Iranian oil exports.

Iran Update, December 10, 2025

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed elements of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) are each attempting to frame their respective coalitions as the most viable leaders for Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement.[i] The STC is attempting to present itself as the sole organized and effective force that can fight against the Houthis while it simultaneously attempts to undermine and diminish the strength of Saudi-backed groups. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi characterized the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as “a starting point for [a] serious battle” to eliminate Houthi control over northern areas of Yemen during a meeting with the ROYG’s Bayda governor in Aden on December 10.[ii] The Houthis still control the majority of territory within Bayda Governorate, but the ROYG retains its own ”governors-in-exile“ for northern Houthi-controlled governorates.[iii] Zubaidi’s efforts to approach officials like the Bayda governor may be part of an effort to consolidate his and the STC’s legitimacy and forge unity among anti-Houthi players within these strategic governorates. Zubaidi added that the anti-Houthi coalition cannot counter the Houthis with ”a vulnerable rear” in eastern Yemen due to Houthi smuggling routes in these areas.[iv] This statement about smuggling routes is both a justification for the STC seizure of eastern Yemen as well as an effort to delegitimize the ROYG forces previously controlling eastern Yemen by framing them as inept and unable to successfully prevent the Houthis from acquiring weapons and equipment. Smuggling across eastern Yemen is endemic, and the STC will have significant difficulty stopping smuggling if it tries to do so.[v] STC-affiliated media on December 10 called Zubaidi ”the right leader of this stage” and justified the STC‘s offensive in eastern Yemen as “necessary“ to save the people of eastern Yemen from ”further horrors.”[vi]

Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the ROYG and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates. Saudi-supported Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi called on PLC members to meet in Riyadh “soon” to discuss eastern Yemen, according to a senior PLC official on December 10.[vii]  The PLC official said that Alimi is also reportedly taking “all necessary measures to preserve unity” and to reject “unilateral actions” outside the agreed-upon PLC leadership framework.[viii]

Saudi Arabia almost certainly backs Alimi’s summons in order to re-impose unity on Yemen’s disparate anti-Houthi factions. Yemeni actors will presumably view it as a summons from Saudi Arabia, given their past experiences with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia frequently uses the legitimacy of its Yemeni partners to provide a Yemeni veneer to Saudi political maneuvers. Saudi Arabia similarly gathered Yemeni factions in Riyadh in 2022 before using their presence to orchestrate the ouster of former Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his replacement with Alimi.[ix] Saudi Arabia could use the summons to reprimand the STC and attempt to compel it to de-escalate with Alimi and northern Yemeni factions within the ROYG.

Saudi Arabia is simultaneously engaging its partners located in Yemen. A Saudi delegation travelled to Mukalla City, Hadramawt Governorate, and met with local officials and Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi on December 9.[x] Delegation lead Major General Mohammed al Qahtani called on the STC to withdraw and for the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces to assume responsibility for security in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates.[xi] Qahtani later told Yemeni media that the Saudi delegation‘s visit resulted in an agreement with all parties in Hadramawt, including the STC, on ”measures” to support de-escalation and stability.[xii]  Another PLC member who has criticized the STC’s recent actions, Marib Governor Sultan al Arada, held two meetings with senior ROYG security and administrative officials in Marib City on December 9 and 10.[xiii] Arada is a key Yemeni government loyalist and anti-Houthi military and political leader who has defended Marib against successive Houthi attacks by uniting the governorate‘s various communities against the Houthis.[xiv]

The STC is also attempting to consolidate local control in Hadramawt Governorate amid Saudi and Saudi-backed groups’ efforts to force STC forces to withdraw from the area. STC Barshid Brigade Commander Abdul Daim al Shuaibi, who is currently based in Wadi Hadramawt, stated on December 10 that STC forces will not withdraw from Hadramawt Governorate after Qahtani's remarks inspired speculation that the STC may withdraw.[xv] Shuaibi even claimed that STC forces will advance to ”Zamakh, Manwakh, al Dhuwaibi, and all border regions,” which border Saudi Arabia and the Houthi-controlled territory in northeastern Yemen, to ”fulfill their national duty.”[xvi] The newly appointed Hadramawt Tribal Alliance head, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed al Kathiri, who is also a member of the STC, separately asserted on December 10 that ”the people of Hadramawt” will now control the governorate’s security during a meeting with local tribal leaders.[xvii] The people of Hadramawt, coming from an STC official, is code for pro-South local leaders. Self-rule has been a long-held demand of some Hadrami tribal leaders, who have criticized both the Aden-based ROYG and Sanaa-based Houthis.[xviii] Other local Hadrami leaders have criticized the STC, and ROYG will almost certainly attempt to politically mobilize these leaders against the STC takeover. Kathiri proposed that all relevant Hadrami parties hold a dialogue to create a “roadmap” that guarantees consensus and unifies Hadrami actors.[xix] STC National Assembly head and STC Presidency member Ali Abdullah al Kathiri also called for the Hadrami elite to align with STC forces at the meeting.[xx] Khalid al Kathiri requested that the Saudi- and UAE-led contingents of the anti-Houthi coalition “adhere to the principles of local leadership.”[xxi] Another prominent STC leader, Fadi Hassan Baoum, separately discussed improving local services with Hadramawt Governorate’s representatives for the Yemen Gas Company and the tax office on December 10.[xxii] Baoum’s meetings indicate that the STC is attempting to assume control over administrative services within the governorate.

Key Takeaways

• STC Takeover in Southern Yemen: The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed elements of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) are each attempting to frame their respective coalitions as the most viable leaders for Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement. The STC characterized its recent seizure of key areas in eastern Yemen as “a starting point for [a] serious battle” to eliminate Houthi control over northern areas of Yemen.
• Saudi and Saudi-backed Efforts: Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the ROYG and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates. Saudi Arabia is almost certainly behind efforts by the Yemeni president to reimpose unity on Yemen’s disparate anti-Houthi factions.
• The STC in Hadramawt: The STC is also attempting to consolidate local control in Hadramawt Governorate amid Saudi and Saudi-backed groups’ efforts to force STC forces to withdraw from the area. The leader of a Hadrami tribal alliance proposed that locals control Hadramawt’s security moving forward. The ROYG will almost certainly attempt to politically mobilize Hadrami leaders critical of the STC against the STC takeover.

Iran Update, December 9, 2025

Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term. A senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told the Israeli Knesset on December 8 that Iran has resumed large-scale production of ballistic missiles.[i] Western diplomats also told Israeli media that Iran’s “top priority” is to restore the ballistic missile project, even if Iran does not appear to be advancing its nuclear program.[ii] The diplomats also told Israeli media on December 8 that Iran is using older manufacturing methods to continue producing ballistic missiles.[iii] Older manufacturing methods could refer to “trough-type mixers,” which are less efficient than the planetary mixers that Israel destroyed in October 2024, although CTP-ISW is unable to verify the type of mixers that Iran is currently using at the time of this writing.[iv] Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities, which Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War, since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[v] Iranian officials have long considered the ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.

The Iranian assumption that Israel will resume the Israel-Iran War in the short term is likely animating the decision to prioritize the Iranian missile program over other defense priorities. Iranian officials have repeatedly publicly stated that they expect the war between Iran and Israel to resume imminently since the war ended in June 2025.[vi] Iranian officials continue to say that they view ballistic missiles as a key deterrent to Israeli strikes, despite the ineffectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles in the Israel-Iran War. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[vii] Another former IRGC commander emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities played in its “success” during the war.[viii] Iranian officials are likely calculating that rapidly increasing their ballistic missile stockpile will deter the Israelis from resuming the war despite the missiles’ failures in June 2025. Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[ix]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, said that it intends to establish an independent state in southern Yemen in the near future.[x] The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and has had long-standing secessionist aims. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and confirmed on December 8 that it has successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[xi] These eight governorates previously comprised the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous Qassem al Zubaidi told STC leadership on December 9 that southern Yemen is currently at a critical transition period that the STC will manage.[xii] He added that the next phase will require building the institutions required for a future independent state in southern Yemen. Anti-Houthi media reported that Zubaidi is expected to declare the south an independent state.[xiii] Hundreds of individuals continued to participate in likely STC-orchestrated demonstrations in southern Yemen for a third day on December 9, calling for the secession of southern Yemen.[xiv]

Saudi forces have continued to withdraw from positions in southern Yemen, including some positions near Houthi frontlines. Unspecified military sources told a Yemeni media outlet on December 8 that the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) is preparing to withdraw from its positions in al Mudharabah and Ras al Arah districts in Lahij Governorate, which is near the Houthi frontlines.[xv]  A Yemen analyst reported that Saudi-backed forces withdrew from some positions in Aden and Lahij governorates to positions in Marib Governorate.[xvi] Marib is controlled by PLC Vice President and Marib Governor Sultan al Arada, who is a key Yemeni government loyalist and anti-Houthi military and political leader who has defended Marib against successive Houthi attacks by uniting the governorate‘s various communities against the Houthis.[xvii] The Yemen analyst added that Saudi forces have very likely also withdrawn from some positions in Mahra Governorate, including al Ghaydah Airport.[xviii] The STC will likely backfill these positions in Lahij, Aden, and Mahra governorates because they are located in southern Yemen, where the STC seeks to establish an independent state.

Saudi Arabia and several major Yemeni groups and organizations not backed by the UAE have criticized the STC offensive. Saudi Chairman of the Special Committee on Yemen Major General Mohammad Obeid bin Julaighm stated on December 9 that Saudi Arabia is calling for all STC forces to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates during a meeting with Hadrami officials.[xix] A Saudi delegation led by Julaighm has been in Hadramawt Governorate since December 3 to discuss the “eventual transfer of certain positions” to the NSF.[xx] Consultation and Reconciliation Authority Vice President Abdulmalik al Makhlafi stated on December 8 that the STC offensive is a "coup, not a secession" and "is still incomplete from a legal and political standpoint, which makes it easier to reverse it."[xxi] The Consultation and Reconciliation Authority was formed under former Yemeni President Mansour Hadi to support the PLC and unify the various actors within the anti-Houthi coalition.[xxii]

US and Western officials have reiterated their long-standing support for the unified Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) following meetings with Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi and Saudi officials. Western officials, including the British and French ambassadors to Yemen and officials from the US Embassy in Yemen, reiterated their support for the ROYG and the PLC following their meeting with Alimi.[xxiii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately held a phone call with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud on December 9 to discuss the situation in Yemen.[xxiv] The United States supports a unified Yemen under the ROYG, which is recognized by the UN.

The Houthis are using the STC offensive to continue to frame non-Houthi groups as proxies of foreign actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. This messaging is consistent with the group’s continuous efforts to weaken the anti-Houthi coalition. Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Farah claimed on December 5 that the STC, ROYG, and the Saudi-backed militias serve foreign patrons and do not serve Yemeni interests.[xxv] Senior Houthi media advisor Ahmed al Shami published a video on X on December 5 of alleged damage caused by the STC takeover and claimed that the STC has "starved and abused” the Yemeni people."[xxvi] Other Houthi officials and pro-Houthi journalists have criticized the STC and NSF for allowing Saudi Arabia and the UAE to use Hahdramawt and al Mahra governorates as a battleground for their objectives.[xxvii] This Houthi rhetoric is part of a long-standing Houthi information operation to frame non-Houthi groups as proxies of foreign actors and delegitimize the broader anti-Houthi coalition.

The Syrian government reportedly sent the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a “revised” and “detailed” integration proposal on December 6 that likely Kurdish sources equated to the SDF’s “complete subjugation” to the Syrian army on Turkish terms.[xxviii]  Unspecified but “well-placed” sources told Al Monitor on December 8 that they believe that Turkey dictated the proposal‘s terms.[xxix]  The sources did not provide specifics.[xxx] The unspecified sources are likely affiliated with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) or the SDF due to their knowledge of the proposal, their framing of its terms as “subjugation,” and their belief that Turkey is behind the proposal’s terms.[xxxi] The Syrian government has not commented on the details of the proposal at the time of this writing. The Syrian government and SDF have engaged in months-long negotiations about the terms of the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian state. The two sides reached a ”verbal” and ”preliminary” agreement in October 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) through several distinct formations, including at least three divisions and several independent brigades.[xxxii] Syrian sources also suggested in October that the SDF would retain de facto security control over Hasakah Province.[xxxiii] Kurdish commanders and politicians publicly expressed their support for the informal understanding and sent Damascus a list of 70 Kurdish commanders for leadership positions within the army, General Staff, and elsewhere in the MoD in late October.[xxxiv] The characterization of the new proposal by Al Monitor’s sources, however, suggests that the December 6 proposal omits several or all of these details included in the October agreement.[xxxv]

Turkey may have contributed to the reported changes within the Syrian government's revised proposal, given that Turkey has vehemently rejected key elements of the October agreement between the Syrian government and SDF. Turkish security sources indicated on December 7 that Turkey seeks to bar SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the Syrian army, which suggests that Turkey has probably rejected most—if not all—of the 70 commanders that the SDF requested take up leadership positions in the MoD.[xxxvi] Turkey’s calls for SDF fighters to integrate into the MoD as individuals and demand for “one command structure” also suggest that Turkey has rejected the integration of SDF divisions into the MoD as blocs and opposes allowing former SDF commanders to lead any unit formed from individually integrated SDF personnel.[xxxvii]

The SDF is unlikely to accept any proposal that requires Kurdish fighters to join the Syrian army as individuals, which decreases the likelihood that the SDF will integrate into the state by the end of the year under terms acceptable to the Syrian and Turkish governments. The SDF has firmly maintained that there must be Kurdish formations within the new army in order to "preserve” elements of Kurdish security and autonomy.[xxxviii] The SDF has sought to join the Syrian army as a ”bloc” in order to maintain weapons and networks that would allow Kurdish fighters to defend against possible attacks from Sunni groups within the army—such as former Syrian National Army factions—that have previously attacked Kurdish fighters.[xxxix] The Syrian and Turkish governments have given the SDF until the end of 2025 to complete its integration into the Syrian state.[xl] An SDF rejection of a new government proposal decreases the feasibility that the SDF will integrate into the state under terms acceptable to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. Any delay in SDF integration also raises the risk of renewed conflict in northeastern Syria. Recent reported Turkish deployments, high-level meetings between Syrian and Turkish defense officials, and statements from Turkish officials and security sources suggest that Turkey is preparing for potential joint offensive operations against the SDF if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian MoD by the end of the year.[xli] The Syrian government has not explicitly acknowledged interest or intent to participate in such an operation, but news outlets affiliated with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have continued to allege that the Syrian army is preparing to launch a “large-scale operation” alongside Turkey after the end-of-year deadline expires.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Production: Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term.
• The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, intends to establish an independent state in southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia and at least some Yemeni groups not backed by the UAE have criticized the STC offensive.
• SDF Integration into the Syrian State: The Syrian government reportedly sent the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a “revised” and “detailed” integration proposal on December 6 that likely Kurdish sources equated to the SDF’s “complete subjugation” to the Syrian army on Turkish terms. The SDF is unlikely to accept any proposal that requires Kurdish fighters to join the Syrian army as individuals, which decreases the likelihood that the SDF will integrate into the state by the end of the year under terms acceptable to the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Iran Update, December 8, 2025

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, has seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates in eastern Yemen since December 3.[i] The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and seeks to establish an independent state in southern Yemen.[ii] The STC launched an operation on December 3 to "restore stability to Wadi [Hadramawt], end the state of security breakdown, and halt the exploitation of the region by forces alien to [Wadi Hadramawt] and the governorate."[iii] Wadi Hadramawt is a relatively heavily populated region in Hadramawt and has historically been a stronghold for various Saudi-influenced military and political factions. An STC official told Emirati media on December 3 that the STC advanced into Hadramawt to confront a "rebellion" led by tribal forces that demanded greater control over local resources.[iv] STC-backed forces clashed with Yemeni government-affiliated First Military Region forces, which controlled the northern part of the governorate (including Wadi Hadramawt), on December 3 before STC forces took control of Seiyun, the largest city in Wadi Hadramawt.[v] STC forces also expanded their operation to seize key areas of Mahrah Governorate.[vi] Senior STC official Amr al Bidh told Reuters on December 8 that the STC has extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen. These eight governorates previously comprised the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to unification in 1990.[vii] The STC itself emerged from long-running divisions between northern Yemenis and southern Yemenis that have their roots in the conflict between north and south Yemen prior to unification. The STC operation forced some Saudi-backed forces to withdraw from some areas of southern Yemen.

Yemeni actors close to or openly allied with the STC and the UAE have supported or not explicitly condemned the STC’s operation to seize control of these governorates. Some actors have reiterated the STC’s secessionist aims. UAE-backed National Resistance Front (NRF) Commander Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, who is also one of the Yemeni government President Leadership Council’s (PLC) seven vice presidents, told NRF forces on December 7 that the STC's recent operation represents a "reorganization of the area of operations."[viii] STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami has similarly not condemned the STC offensive and has held several meetings with ROYG officials, including the Yemeni interior minister, in the office of Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi, since the STC's operation.[ix] Alimi traveled to Saudi Arabia on December 5 and the STC removed Alimi’s portrait and the ROYG flag from Alimi’s office after its fighters stormed the Presidential Palace on December 6.[x] A Yemen analyst suggested on December 8 that Muharrami presented himself as "an active state actor operating within the PLC framework" during his meetings with ROYG officials.[xi] Muharrami appears to be acting both as a representative of the STC and the PLC, but his presence in Alimi’s office without Alimi’s photograph or a Yemeni flag is notable because it implies Muharrami and the STC have sidelined Alimi. STC leaders in Hadramawt Governorate also called on December 8 for schools and government buildings to fly the former PDRY flag instead of the ROYG flag.[xii] The STC commonly uses the PDRY flag. Its demand that schools use the PDRY flag instead of the ROYG flag implies that the STC does not view the ROYG as legitimate in the south, however.

Hundreds of individuals participated in a likely STC-orchestrated demonstration in Khor Maksar, Aden Governate, on December 7, calling for the secession of southern Yemen.[xiii] An STC leader, Momen al Saqqaf, delivered a speech at the demonstration and emphasized that the recent events mark "the beginning of a new phase to impose a new reality."[xiv] STC member Raafat al Thaqali called on STC President and PLC Vice President Aidarous Qassem al Zubaidi to respond to popular demands for the establishment of a fully sovereign state in the south of Yemen.[xv]

There are several non-STC-aligned elements within the PLC that remain active in non-Houthi controlled areas of northern Yemen that border southern Yemen governorates, particularly around Taiz and Marib governorates. PLC Vice President and Marib Governor Sultan al Arada stated on December 8 that the recent developments threaten Yemeni and regional stability, and that "actions taken outside the national consensus" give the Houthis an opportunity to expand their influence in Yemen.[xvi] He emphasized the importance of greater support for President Alimi and the Yemeni government to prevent internal fragmentation. [xvii]

The STC offensive may increase tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while increasing Emirati influence in Yemen. Saudi forces have reportedly withdrawn from several parts of southern Yemen, including parts of Aden and Mahrah governorates and from Perim Island in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, since December 3.[xviii] Some social media users have circulated footage of Saudi forces reportedly mobilizing toward the al Wadiah border area near the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.[xix] A Yemen analyst reported on December 7 that Saudi-backed forces are mobilizing near al Wadiah, citing unspecified sources.[xx] It remains unclear how Saudi Arabia will respond to the STC offensive. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have historically had conflicting objectives in Yemen. Alimi reportedly warned on December 7 that any actions outside the framework of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which forced the STC to recognize the legitimacy of ROYG and subordinate its structures to ROYG, will threaten Yemen’s stability.[xxi] Alimi told US, French, and British diplomats on December 7 that he rejects any "unilateral measures” that undermine the ROYG.[xxii]

Recent meetings between Saudi officials and their Hadrami contacts suggest that Saudi Arabia was not forewarned about the pending STC operation and that Riyadh is still determining how it should react. A Saudi delegation led by Chairman of the Special Committee on Yemen Major General Mohammad Obeid bin Julaighm has held meetings with various factions in Hadramawt Governorate since December 3 to discuss the “eventual transfer of certain positions” to the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces.[xxiii] A delegation of Hadramawt tribal leaders and forces also arrived in Saudi Arabia on December 6 to discuss recent developments in Hadramawt.[xxiv]

The Turkish government has continued to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) by December 31, 2025. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters on December 6 that the SDF has shown “no intention” of honoring the March 2025 agreement to integrate the SDF into the Syrian state and instead seeks to circumvent the agreement.[xxv] Fidan added that “there can only be one army, one command structure,” but caveated that “in local administration, [the SDF and Syrian government] can reach a different settlement and different understandings."[xxvi] Fidan separately said on December 6 that he wants the SDF to immediately expel its non-Syrian members, including those from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, according to Turkish media.[xxvii] Unspecified Turkish security sources told a pro-Erdogan Turkish newspaper on December 7 that Syria and Turkey will launch a joint military offensive against the SDF if the SDF does not comply with the March 2025 agreement.[xxviii]

Anonymous Turkish security sources separately told a Turkish journalist on December 7 that Turkey will “not accept the appointment” of senior Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) leaders to leadership positions “within the Syrian government,” which indicates that Turkey seeks to bar SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the Syrian army.[xxix] The YPG is the dominant faction within the SDF.[xxx] The Syrian transitional government previously agreed in October 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades.[xxxi] Turkey’s rejection of any appointment of senior YPG leaders to “leadership positions” effectively prevents senior SDF leaders from commanding the division- and brigade-level units proposed under the October 2025 agreement.[xxxii] The security sources also noted that Turkey insists on SDF members joining the Syrian MoD as individuals.[xxxiii] Turkey’s call for SDF fighters to integrate into the MoD as individuals and demand for a “one command structure” indicates that Turkey rejects the integration of SDF divisions into the MoD as blocs and opposes allowing former SDF commanders to lead any unit formed from individually integrated SDF personnel.[xxxiv] 

Corroborated reports of Turkish military deployments to northeastern Syria further suggest that Turkey may be preparing for potential joint offensive operations in the area.  Turkish forces deployed reinforcements on December 7 to Afrin and Manbij in Aleppo Province, according to Turkish, Syrian, and Kurdish sources.[xxxv] Kurdish media reported on December 7 that a Turkish convoy consisting of 20 heavy and medium vehicles entered Ras al Ain in Raqqa Province, which is located along the Turkish-occupied Peace Spring frontlines.[xxxvi] A local pro-Syrian government, anti-SDF source published a video of the reported Turkish military deployment on December 7 that shows three Turkish armored vehicles and three unspecified Turkish transport vehicles on an unspecified road in northern Syria.[xxxvii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the size or composition of these deployments, or whether they are specifically intended for offensive combat operations.[xxxviii] The Turkish military could launch offensive operations against the SDF from Turkish-occupied areas of Syria, including the Peace Spring region, given Turkey’s existing positions and air superiority over the SDF.[xxxix] The Turkish military reportedly maintains more than 60 active positions in the Peace Spring area, including at least two command bases and a renovated airstrip.[xl] The Turkish military previously deployed heavy military assets to Kuweires Airbase, Aleppo Province, near the MoD-SDF frontlines on September 28.[xli] The SDF also does not possess adequate air defense systems that it would need to counter Turkish close air support.[xlii]

Fidan’s statements and Turkey’s potential military preparations come amid senior Turkish and Syrian military officials’ discussions about enhancing military cooperation between the two countries. Turkish Chief of General Staff Selcuk Bayraktaroglu and Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra reportedly discussed ways to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries in Damascus on December 5.[xliii] Bayraktaroglu also reportedly inspected a joint Turkish-Syrian operations room on December 5.[xliv] Independent Turkish media described Bayraktaroglu’s visit as a Turkish attempt to “intimidate” the SDF, while pro-government Turkish media claimed that his visit was a “warning to the SDF.”[xlv] The Turkish and Syrian officials may have also discussed the August 2025 Turkish-Syrian military agreement.[xlvi] Turkish and Syrian defense officials formalized a military training and “consultation” deal in Ankara on August 13 following Syria’s July 23 request for Turkish assistance to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities.[xlvii] Unspecified regional sources told independent Turkish media on December 7 that Syrian forces have been training with Turkish military advisers, weapons, ammunition, and equipment “for some time” to prepare for “potential clashes.”[xlviii]

Israel and the United States began a week-long naval exercise off the coast of Israel on December 7 to prepare for “regional threats.”[xlix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on December 7 that the exercise, codenamed “Intrinsic Defender,” aims to improve naval coordination between the Israeli Navy and US 5th Fleet and prepare for “various regional threats.”[l] Iran and Iranian-backed groups have frequently posed maritime and aerial threats to Israel and international shipping, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel.[li] This exercise also comes after the IRGC Navy conducted a two-day naval exercise on December 4 and 5 in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Sea of Oman, which likely aimed to simultaneously deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare for potential future maritime escalation.[lii] The IRGC tested several missiles, drones, fast attack craft, and air defense systems during the exercise.[liii] The IRGC tested a ballistic missile named “303” but Iranian media did not provide any details about this missile. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated on December 6 that Iran tested a missile during the exercise that had a range of over 1,375 kilometers, possibly in reference to the “303” ballistic missile.[liv] Tangsiri also warned that the IRGC Navy is prepared for any conflict that could take place in the maritime domain.

The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the US Congress is expected to vote on in the coming days, demands that the Iraqi federal government take “credible steps” toward reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in order to receive US security funding in 2026.[lv] The NDAA allocates the Department of Defense’s 2026 budget.[lvi] The NDAA states that the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq, which equips, trains, and supports elements of the Iraqi security establishment, can only receive up to 50 percent of its 2026 budget until the US Defense Secretary certifies to Congress that the Iraqi federal government has taken “credible steps” in three main areas regarding Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lvii] These areas include:

1. Reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias not under the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through a “publicly verifiable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process,”[lviii]
2. Strengthening the Iraqi prime minister’s “authority and operational control” over the ISF, and
3. Investigating militia members who operate outside the ISF’s formal chain of command to attack US personnel, among other illegal activities.[lix]

The NDAA stipulates that the US Defense Secretary can issue a six-month waiver if the lack of US security funding harms US national security interests.[lx]

 

It is unclear if the NDAA’s use of the term “Iraqi Security Forces” refers to the Iraqi security apparatus as a whole or to the ISF specifically. Iranian-backed actors could try to use this ambiguity to retain their influence in Iraq. The Iraqi security establishment includes the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) while the ISF does not. The United States has consistently pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lxii] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades as well as forces that operate outside of the PMF.[lxiii] Iraq’s ruling Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly considered multiple options to meet US demands to disarm the militias, including integrating the militias into the PMF.[lxiv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors could exploit the NDAA’s lack of specificity to deem integrating the militias into the PMF as satisfactory to meet US demands, as the PMF is a part of the security apparatus but retains significant independence from the Iraqi state. CTP-ISW assessed on November 7 that integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF would likely preserve their existing networks and political influence.[lxv] Any integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security apparatus must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[lxvi]

Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour gave speeches to students at the IRGC-controlled Command and Staff University and Imam Hossein University, respectively, on December 7.[lxvii] Both officials called on the Iranian armed forces to develop and utilize advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence.[lxviii] Mousavi emphasized the need for Iran to keep up with technological developments and strengthen the armed forces’ “preemptive capabilities.”[lxix] Iranian media noted that developing “preemptive capabilities” is consistent with Iran’s “active deterrence” strategy, which is an offensive strategy that Iran has employed since at least 2014.[lxx] “Active deterrence” emphasizes the need for Iran to intervene in situations abroad in order to expand Iranian influence and confront threats before they endanger Iran.[lxxi] Pakpour highlighted applications for artificial intelligence in surveillance and targeting and stated that “stealth technology” could improve Iranian missiles’ ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses.[lxxii] Pakpour emphasized that “more work should be done at Imam Hossein University in areas such as air defense and stealth technology.”[lxxiii] Mousavi and Pakpour’s emphasis on technological developments comes after Israel reportedly used artificial intelligence to identify Iranian targets during the war.[lxxiv]

 

Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels.[lxxv] The diplomats stated that Israel would likely attack Iran if Iran takes “serious steps” to enrich uranium and advance its ballistic missile capabilities, and if the United States and Iran do not reach a nuclear deal. The European diplomats did not provide any evidence for these assertions, however. Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that Israel and the United States damaged during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.[lxxvi] The Institute assessed on November 21 that Iran’s clean-up efforts at three nuclear weaponization sites “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”[lxxvii] There are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war. Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the war, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons.[lxxviii] A political analyst with ties to the Iranian regime assessed on December 7 that the probability of a “limited” and ”targeted” Israeli attack on Iran is high and that President Donald Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy aims to uphold “the status quo” by containing Iran rather than pursuing strategic reconciliation or full-scale war.[lxxix] The analyst claimed that the United States aims to keep Iran in a permanent state of “defense and effort to preserve survival” and prevent Iran from rebuilding its deterrence and influence.[lxxx] The analyst suggested that Iran can impose costs on Israel and Arab states to reduce their willingness to contain Iran in line with the US National Security Strategy.[lxxxi]

Key Takeaways

• The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council’s Advance in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, has seized key areas of Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates in eastern Yemen since December 3. Yemeni actors close to or openly allied with the STC and the UAE have supported or not explicitly condemned the STC’s operation to seize control of these governorates. Some actors have reiterated the STC’s secessionist aims. The STC offensive may increase tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while increasing Emirati influence in Yemen.
• Turkish Military Preparations in Syria: The Turkish government has continued to outline political justifications for a potential joint Turkish–Syrian military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense by December 31, 2025.
• Israeli and US Naval Exercise: Israel and the United States began a week-long naval exercise off the coast of Israel on December 7 to prepare for “regional threats.” Iran and Iranian-backed groups have frequently posed maritime and aerial threats to Israel and international shipping, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel.
• US Security Aid to Iraq: The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the US Congress is expected to vote on in the coming days, demands that the Iraqi federal government take “credible steps” toward reducing the operational capacity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in order to receive US security funding in 2026. It is unclear if the NDAA’s use of the term “Iraqi Security Forces” refers to the Iraqi security apparatus as a whole or to the ISF specifically.
• Iranian Efforts to Advance Military Technology: Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities.
• Potential Israeli Operation Against Iran: Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels. Iran has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, but there are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war.

Iran Update, December 5, 2025

Former senior Assad regime officials are likely funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Reuters reported on December 5 that former Military Intelligence Chief Major General Kamal Hassan and Bashar al Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, have formed rival Alawite militias in coastal Syria that seek to secede coastal Syria from transitional government control and restore Assad-era power structures, citing 48 informed anonymous sources.[i] Makhlouf and Hassan have reportedly spent over $6 million and $1.5 million, respectively, to recruit and pay the salaries of Alawite fighters in Syria and Lebanon.[ii] Unspecified Assadist and Syrian government sources told Reuters that Hassan and Makhlouf’s militias are also competing to gain access to 14 Assad-era command-and-control rooms scattered across coastal Syria and dozens of weapons caches.[iii] Tartous Province Governor Ahmed al Shami confirmed the existence of the Assad-era command rooms in the region but stated that the “centers have been significantly weakened” and that “there is no concern about their continued existence.”[iv] Reuters reported that Hassan also established a charity in Lebanon to build influence among Alawites who fled from Syria to Lebanon after the Assad regime fell in December 2024.[v] Thousands of Syrians tied to the Assad regime and Hezbollah fled coastal Syria to northern Lebanon after Assad was ousted, and Hassan may seek to recruit these Alawite refugees to participate in a potential future pro-Alawite insurgency.[vi]  The General Security Service (GSS) arrested a Makhlouf-funded insurgent cell in Latakia in October as well as a pro-Alawite insurgent commander in August who had ties to Makhlouf, which highlights Makhlouf’s efforts to actively support cells in coastal Syria that could participate in an Alawite insurgency.[vii]

Assadist officials’ claims that three prominent former Assad officials command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria are almost certainly an exaggeration. Reuters reported that internal documents from Makhlouf’s and Hassan’s factions claim that these officials control 54,000 and 12,000 fighters, respectively.[viii] The Assad regime officials have reportedly not yet mobilized the fighters because “the time is not yet right.”[ix] Reuters also reported that Bashar al Assad’s brother, Maher, commands 25,000 fighters in and outside of Syria that he could mobilize, citing former Assad commanders in Lebanon.[x] CTP-ISW has not observed a consistent level of violence or insurgent activity in coastal Syria that would be expected if the three former Assad regime officials actually commanded this number of fighters. Reuters reported that fighters on the coast are accepting money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, which suggests that many of the fighters are “ghost soldiers” who accept small payments but lack real loyalty or willingness to fight for either Makhlouf or Hassan.[xi] An anonymous local Alawite militia commander stated that the payments from Makhlouf and Hassan are insufficient but noted that “there is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years.”[xii]  Five other militia commanders echoed this commander's sentiment and said that Makhlouf attempted to buy their loyalty with “crumbs of money.”[xiii] The commanders' evident disdain for their patrons indicates that it is unlikely that Makhlouf or Hassan could launch a large-scale Alawite insurgency in coastal Syria because these commanders would be unlikely to risk their lives for their patrons. The GSS, with help from the Alawite community, dismantled an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-linked Assadist insurgent cell in Sheikh Badr, Tartous Province, on November 12, which suggests that an insurgency that seeks to restore Assadist power structures may lack broad Alawite support.[xiv] The pro-Assad Alawite insurgency has continued at a relatively low level since the height of the Alawite insurgency in March 2025, despite Makhlouf and Hassan’s efforts. Several Alawite insurgent groups remain active in coastal Syria but have conducted limited and largely ineffective attacks targeting the transitional government, and these groups currently lack the capabilities to force the transitional government to cede control of coastal Syria.[xv]

Many Alawites in Syria continue to hold grievances toward the Syrian transitional government that malicious actors may seek to exploit, but the vast majority of the Alawite community does not appear inclined to use violence to address these grievances. Alawites in Syria have repeatedly called for autonomy since the fall of the Assad regime because they are skeptical of the transitional government’s ability and willingness to protect their communities, particularly after some government forces participated in reprisal massacres against Alawites in coastal Syria in March 2025.[xvi] Some members of the Alawite community have also argued that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised under the new government.[xvii] Assadists like Makhlouf and Hassan may attempt to present themselves as defenders of the Alawite community and exploit the community’s grievances toward the government to recruit fighters. Prominent voices within the Alawite community have advocated against violence, however, and violence in coastal Syria has remained at low levels since March 2025.  Over 1,000 Alawite protestors participated in peaceful demonstrations on November 25 along the Syrian coast and western Hama Province following an incident of sectarian violence in Homs City.[xviii] These protests largely remained peaceful at the request of prominent Alawite leaders.[xix]

 

The Syrian government has additionally taken steps in recent months to build stronger relationships with some Alawite communities along the coast. The recent dismantlement of an IRGC-affiliated Assadist cell with the help of the Alawite community in rural Tartous on November 12 indicated that some GSS units are improving their counter-insurgency approach in rural minority areas by working with locals.[xx] Syrian security forces additionally worked to prevent counter-protesters from attacking Alawite protesters and de-escalated attempts to instigate violence on November 25.[xxi] High-ranking senior government officials have continued to engage with local Alawite leaders and dignitaries in order to build trust and improve community engagement, including through economic development.[xxii] Four Syrian aides stated that a former Assad-era military commander and current adviser to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Khaled al Ahmad, is financing jobs and other economic opportunities within the Alawite community to combat unemployment in the community.[xxiii] The governor of Tartous Province called Khaled al Ahmad a “crucial” individual in building trust between Alawites and the government.[xxiv]  Improved trust and more robust partnerships between the Syrian government and the Alawite community can reduce opportunities for Assadists and Alawite insurgents to recruit fighters.

Key Takeaways

• Assadist Insurgency Efforts: Former senior Assad regime officials are likely funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Assadist officials’ claims that three prominent former Assad officials command nearly 100,000 dormant insurgent fighters in and near coastal Syria are almost certainly an exaggeration.
• Alawite-Syrian Government Relations: Many Alawites in Syria continue to hold grievances toward the Syrian transitional government that malicious actors may seek to exploit, but the vast majority of the Alawite community does not appear inclined to use violence to address these grievances. The Syrian government has additionally taken steps in recent months to build stronger relationships with some Alawite communities along the coast.

Iran Update, December 4, 2025

Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supports his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes Maliki, is currently considering multiple candidates for prime minister, including Maliki.[ii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised primarily of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the prime minister.[iv] Maliki likely claimed that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while in office because he believes it could garner him US support for another term.

 

Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the PMF, into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister. This effort would harm Iraqi stability because Maliki pursued authoritarian and sectarian policies when he previously served as prime minister that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Maliki has continuously defended the PMF throughout the United States’ efforts to dissolve it in 2025.[v] He did, however, state in February 2025 that the PMF should be “reconsidered and rehabilitated” to have an “exclusive” connection to the prime minister.[vi] Maliki’s proposed modification of the PMF bears resemblance to the extra-constitutional Office of the Commander and Chief, which Maliki used to bypass the chain of command and directly influence Iraqi security affairs.[vii] Maliki centralized power, weakened multiple Iraqi institutions, and exacerbated Sunni grievances toward the Shia-dominated Iraqi federal government while in office.[viii] His mismanagement of the Iraqi security forces played a pivotal role in the speed of ISIS’s seizure of almost a third of Iraqi territory in 2014.[ix] Maliki then used the threat of ISIS to accelerate his pre-existing effort to form a popular army, which he proceeded to staff with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and place under the purview of the Office of the Commander and Chief. Maliki used this force to coerce his political enemies and increase his power.[x] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa, which called for Iraqis to mobilize against ISIS and is often credited with creating the force that would become the PMF, further propelled Maliki’s mobilization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xi] The United States ultimately delayed support for Iraq in 2014 until Maliki was removed from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[xii]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.[xiii] Iraqi state media reported on December 4 that the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Funds had designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations and froze the groups’ assets in mid-November 2025.[xiv] The committee later announced that it would remove the Houthis and Hezbollah from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[xv] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered an investigation of the incident on December 4.[xvi] Two Iraqi officials told the Associated Press on December 4 that the Iraqi federal government reversed its terrorist designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[xvii] The militias reportedly accused the government of targeting regional allies and risking conflict with Iran. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors condemned the Iraqi federal government's designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah on December 4.[xviii] This incident comes as the United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.[xix]

The Iraqi federal government accused “outlaws” on December 3 of committing the November 26 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xx] The Iraqi federal government often uses the term “outlaws” to accuse Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of conducting attacks without explicitly implicating the militias. The November 26 drone attack targeting the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province caused material damage and sparked a fire but did not cause any casualties.[xxi] A committee formed by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to investigate the attack announced the results of its investigation on December 3.[xxii] The committee said that "outlaws” launched two drones at the gas field, one of which hit the gas field and the second landed outside the field.[xxiii] The Iraqi federal government has previously used the term “outlaws” and similar phrases to obfuscate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ culpability in attacks to avoid political blowback.[xxiv] The Iraqi federal government blamed a November 2020 rocket attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad on “outlaws,” even though Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds (formerly called Ashab al Kahf) claimed responsibility for the attack.[xxv] CTP-ISW assessed on November 28 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack on Khor Mor to try to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed political parties in the government formation process.[xxvi] The Shia Coordination Framework, which has controlled the federal government since 2022 and is poised to control the next government following the recent elections, includes the political wings of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvii] The committee did not specify if the perpetrators of the November 26 Khor Mor attack also attempted to conduct a drone attack targeting Khor Mor on November 23.[xxviii] Kurdish security forces intercepted the drone on November 23.[xxix]

It remains unclear which Iranian-backed Iraqi militia conducted the November 26 attack on Khor Mor. The committee said that the perpetrators launched the November 26 attack from eastern Tuz Kharmatu District, Salah al Din Province, and that the attack was the eleventh attack against the gas field.[xxx] Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-controlled PMF brigades under the now defunct PMF Northern Axis, which operated in the Tuz Kharmatu District, have notably previously conducted multiple attacks targeting the Khor Mor Gas Field.[xxxi] Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh ordered the integration of the Northern Axis into the Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command in August 2024.[xxxii] The Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command is led by a Badr Organization-affiliated commander.[xxxiii] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba led a drone strike campaign targeting oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan following the 2021 parliamentary elections to deter the Kurdistan Democratic Party from allying with Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xxxiv] No Iranian-backed Iraqi militia has claimed the November 26 attack at the time of this writing and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, denied that it was involved in the November 26 attack.[xxxv] Lower-ranking fighters could have independently conducted the attack, or militia leadership could have allowed fighters to conduct the attack without publicly sanctioning it, however.

A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party suggested that Turkey will no longer consider the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be a “terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its integration into the Syrian state. Turkey has long considered the SDF to be a terrorist organization due to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) historic ties to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the dominant faction within the SDF.[xxxvi] Justice and Development Party (AKP) Spokesperson Omer Celik told Turkish media on December 2 that the SDF would “cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over airports, border crossings, and oil fields that it controls to the Syrian government and integrates into the Syrian state per the March 10 agreement.[xxxvii] The SDF-approved March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF will transfer its control over border crossings, oil and gas fields, and Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria to the transitional government.[xxxviii] Turkey probably views the SDF’s transfer of key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as a mechanism through which to reduce the SDF’s perceived threat to Turkey because it would limit the SDF’s access to the Turkish border and the SDF’s revenue from oil fields. The SDF has not yet transferred control of any of these resources or infrastructure to the Syrian transitional government, however.[xxxix]

Celik’s reference to a possible change in Turkey’s threat perception suggests that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s compliance with the March 10 agreement, which possibly indicates positive momentum in the integration process as the end-of-year integration deadline approaches. Both Turkey and the Syrian government have maintained that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian state by the end of the year.[xl] Turkey has consistently called for the SDF’s military and administrative integration into the Syrian state since March 10.[xli] Turkey has also argued in recent months that the SDF is not complying with the March 10 agreement and has likely pushed the Syrian government to coerce the SDF to implement the agreement.[xlii] Celik’s remarks about a possible change in Turkey’s perception of the SDF suggest that the SDF’s integration may be proceeding along the lines agreed to by the Syrian government and SDF. The Syrian government and SDF reached a limited breakthrough in October 2025 and agreed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Army in three divisions and several independent brigades after months of stalled negotiations.[xliii] There have been few updates on the progress or development of these units, but a Syrian Democratic Council official noted on December 4 that dialogue is “currently underway” between the SDF and Syrian government after US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack met with senior Syrian officials in Damascus on December 1.[xliv]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.[xlv] The exercise took place in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC Navy claimed on December 4 that it alerted US vessels in the region about the exercise.[xlvi] The Iranian regime’s primary English language news outlet stated on December 4 that this exercise sends a “dual message” of peace toward Iran’s regional partners and a warning to Iran’s adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[xlvii] The IRGC Navy previously used this annual exercise to signal Iran’s commitment to “sustainable security” in the region but did not issue a warning to the United States and its allies.[xlviii] The IRGC Navy also named this year’s exercise after deceased IRGC Navy commander Mohammad Nazeri, who was reportedly involved in the seizure of two US patrol boats and 10 US personnel in the Persian Gulf in January 2016.[xlix] Senior Iranian military officials have consistently threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States blocks Iranian oil exports since the Israel-Iran War.[l] 

Key Takeaways

• Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Political Efforts: Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly told the United States via unidentified mediators that he would disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the United States supports his bid to become prime minister, according to an unidentified senior Iraqi official speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3. Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment, including the PMF, into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister.
• Iranian Influence in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.
• Militia Activity in Iraq: The Iraqi federal government accused “outlaws” on December 3 of committing the November 26 drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi federal government often uses the term “outlaws” to accuse Iranian-backed Iraqi militias of conducting attacks without explicitly implicating the militias.
• Turkey’s View of the Syrian Democratic Forces: A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party suggested that Turkey will no longer consider the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be a “terrorist organization” if the SDF hands over key resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its integration into the Syrian state. The spokesperson’s statement suggests that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s compliance with the March 10 agreement, which possibly indicates positive momentum in the integration process as the end-of-year integration deadline approaches. 
• Iranian Military Posture: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.

Iran Update, December 3, 2025 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.”[i] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an action would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts, however. Kaabi threatened that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would “shove a rock down [Savaya’s] mouth” if the United States does not stop his "interference.“[ii] Kaabi also suggested that the Iraqi federal government has adopted “timid and silent stances” toward Savaya.[iii] Iraqi media reported on December 2 that Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are the political wings of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. CTP-ISW assessed on December 2 that the exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions would be unlikely to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government because Iraqi political parties often appoint loyalists to act as proxies for them in key government institutions.[v] Savaya has also made several comments in recent weeks that may have upset Kaabi, including Savaya’s statement that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the drone attack that targeted the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province on November 26.[vi] CTP-ISW similarly continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack to try to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed Iraqi parties in the government formation process.[vii]

An attack by Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba or other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Savaya would likely harm militia interests regarding the ongoing Iraqi government formation process. Government formation is important for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests in the country.[viii] An Iraqi militia attack against Savaya could cause some Iraqi parties to decide not to align with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a conflict with the United States, for example. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.[ix]

The Shia Coordination Framework’s internal divisions over the selection of the next prime minister are likely due, in part, to US pressure on the framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership. Framework sources told Iraqi media on December 3 that the framework did not reach an agreement on the next prime minister during a framework meeting on December 2.[x] Internal divisions and disputes reportedly caused tension among framework parties during the meeting. Iraqi media has noted that the framework is considering a variety of individuals for the premiership, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, and Iraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri.[xi] Iraqi media reported on December 1 that the framework is seeking a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who does not face objections from framework parties or any “regional or international forces influential in Iraqi politics,” which suggests that the framework is trying to balance pressure from Iran and the United States regarding government formation.[xii] Iran and the United States have historically exerted major influence in Iraqi government formation, particularly in the selection of prime ministers.[xiii] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iranian-backed parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xiv]

US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq has previously divided the framework. Iraqi media reported in August 2025 that framework members are divided into two “camps” regarding US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi state security service primarily composed of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xv] The first camp supports challenging US objections to the PMF, while the second camp is concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq.[xvi] The United States has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders if the Iraqi federal government does not dissolve the PMF.[xvii] CTP-ISW assessed in August that framework members with armed groups in the PMF likely support strengthening the institution.[xviii] Iraqi media also reported in October 2025 that unspecified framework parties were in a “political rush” to receive US support prior to the November 2025 elections, which highlights how framework parties vary in their degree of willingness to work with the United States.[xix]

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on December 2 that Iran likely sought Russian assistance in 2024 to develop laser-based conventional military systems rather than laser technology for nuclear weapons testing.[xx] The Institute’s assessment comes after the Financial Times reported on November 19 that a group of Iranian scientists traveled to Russia in November 2024 to visit a Russian military laser technology company.[xxi] A former CIA analyst told the Financial Times that Iran may have been seeking “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test.”[xxii] The Institute stated that Iran already has the equipment and expertise necessary to conduct such a validation test without using laser-based diagnostic systems.[xxiii] The Institute assessed that the Iranian delegation was, instead, likely seeking Russian assistance to advance Iran’s anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems.[xxiv]

Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years. Israel has conducted a series of drone attacks on Iran in recent years, including a drone strike on a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Karaj, Alborz Province, in 2021, a strike that destroyed a drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah Province in 2022, and a drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan in 2023.[xxv] These attacks may have driven Iran to seek to develop laser-based anti-drone systems, which cost significantly less than traditional air defense systems.[xxvi] Israel also used small drones in June 2025 to kill Iranian nuclear scientists and destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which may further drive Iran to develop its anti-drone capabilities.[xxvii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on December 3 that it has launched a one-way attack drone force in the Middle East, which highlights how drones will continue to play a large role in future conflicts in the region.[xxviii] Russia may be able to share knowledge about laser-based anti-drone systems with Iran given that Russia has developed such systems to counter Ukrainian drone strikes.[xxix] Russia unveiled a truck-mounted anti-drone laser system in October 2025, for example, that can detect, track, and destroy small drones by damaging onboard sensors, wiring, and batteries and causing the drone to crash.[xxx] Iran would likely prioritize laser-based anti-drone systems over laser-based anti-ballistic missile systems in the near future given that the latter requires much more energy than the former.[xxxi] Most existing laser-based air defense systems, such as the Israeli Iron Beam, can shoot down small drones, rockets, and other systems, but currently do not have the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles.[xxxii]

Iraqi Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi announced on November 26 that all forces under the US-led International Coalition in Iraq are now in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as part of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Muhammadawi caveated that four or five individuals remain in Baghdad to manage unspecified diplomatic and logistical tasks.[xxxiii] The US forces in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region do not appear to include the 250 to 350 “military advisors and support personnel” who remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria.[xxxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxxv] A US official told Reuters in September 2025 that the United States planned to reduce its military presence from 2,500 personnel to less than 2,000 and redeploy the majority of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxxvi] Muhammadawi added that a joint committee will negotiate with the United States between January and June 2026 to draft a memorandum of understanding that addresses the future US presence in Iraq and future US-Iraq security cooperation.[xxxvii] The committee will include Muhammadawi, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Abdul Amir Yarallah, Peshmerga Affairs Ministry Secretary General Bakhtiar Mohammad, and several other unspecified individuals.[xxxviii]  

Israel and Lebanon sent diplomatic representatives to hold direct talks at a ceasefire monitoring committee meeting on December 3 amid warnings that Israel may soon launch a new operation targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon.[xxxix] Former Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Simon Karam and Israeli National Security Council Senior Director for Foreign Policy Uri Rasnick led the Lebanese and Israeli delegations, respectively, during the committee meeting in Naqoura.[xl] The November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon established the committee, which includes representatives from the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon, and the United Nations, to monitor Israel and Hezbollah’s compliance with the ceasefire.[xli] Western sources told Lebanese media that the Israeli and Lebanese representatives discussed Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israeli strikes in Lebanon, and the potential for economic cooperation in southern Lebanon to build trust between Israel and Lebanon during the committee meeting.[xlii] The Israeli-Lebanese talks mark a positive step for dialogue between the two countries—which have not directly engaged in talks since 1983—particularly amid recent Israeli warnings that Israel is preparing to potentially increase its operations in Lebanon due to frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xliii] An unspecified source told Lebanese media that Lebanese officials left the meeting with the impression that Israel will allow the LAF “a chance to do its job,” in reference to Hezbollah disarmament.[xliv] Neither Lebanon nor Israel has changed its position on key outstanding issues, however. An informed source told Lebanese media that the December 3 ceasefire monitoring committee meeting did not address the issue of the LAF searching private property, which Israel has demanded that the LAF do.[xlv] An Israeli Channel 13 journalist reported on November 28 that the LAF has until US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus leaves Beirut on December 6 to demonstrate to Israel that it has made unspecified progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xlvi] Israeli state broadcaster Kan described on December 2 a “significant [Israeli] escalation” in Lebanon as “inevitable.”[xlvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Militia Threatens US Envoy: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.” Iraqi media reported on December 2 that Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an action would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts, particularly the ongoing Iraqi government formation process.
• Iranian Anti-Drone Capabilities: The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on December 2 that Iran likely sought Russian assistance in 2024 to develop laser-based conventional military systems rather than laser technology for nuclear weapons testing. The Institute assessed that the Iranian delegation was likely seeking Russian assistance to advance Iran’s anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems. Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: Iraqi Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi announced on November 26 that all forces under the US-led International Coalition in Iraq are now in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as part of the US withdrawal from Iraq. 250 to 350 “military advisors and support personnel” remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria.
• Israel-Lebanon Relations: Israel and Lebanon sent diplomatic representatives to hold direct talks at a ceasefire monitoring committee meeting on December 3. The Israeli-Lebanese talks mark a positive step for dialogue between the two countries—which have not directly engaged in talks since 1983—particularly amid recent Israeli warnings that Israel is preparing to potentially increase its operations in Lebanon due to frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.

Iran Update, December 2, 2025

Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran.  Iran is holding the “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in East Azerbaijan Province from December 1 to 5.[i] Iran faces security threats along its northwestern border near East Azerbaijan Province from Kurdish groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).[ii] All ten members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, Belarus, and China, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[iii] The SCO has historically emphasized counterterrorism as a key goal of the institution.[iv] Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Oman, and Iraq also attended as observers.[v] IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first-person view (FPV) drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.[vi] These drones, when employed at scale, can ”perform a wide array of functions but have been particularly transformative in creating a nearly-transparent battlefield.”[vii] This transparency has applications outside of conventional warfare, as seen in Ukraine. Drones could be employed in Iran to assist counter-insurgency operations in border regions or to help suppress protests, for example.

Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[viii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Unspecified Iraqi political sources told Iraqi media on December 2 that the framework may change its government formation strategy in response to US pressure.[ix] A framework member confirmed that the framework discussed its response to Savaya on December 1.[x] The framework is reportedly trying to find a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who is acceptable to the framework and any “regional or international forces influential in Iraqi politics,” which suggests that it is trying to balance Iranian and US pressures regarding government formation.[xi] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence within the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iran-aligned parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xii]

The exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions is unlikely to curb Iran’s influence within Iraqi government institutions, however. Many Iraqi political parties appoint loyalists to senior civil service positions, known as “special grades,” within key ministries to act as a proxy for the party.[xiii] These “special grades” include director-general and deputy minister and enable the Iranian-backed parties to divert state resources for their benefit.[xiv]  Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties could use the ”special grades” system to retain control of key ministerial roles even if their publicly affiliated candidates were barred from senior ministry roles. These parties could also promote long-time ”special grade” officials loyal to them while still claiming that the appointments are ”technocratic.” Either method would be difficult to detect without an in-depth, detailed understanding of the internal workings of Iraqi ministries. 

 

The Suwayda National Guard conducted several politically motivated arrests and killings of prominent Druze individuals in Suwayda Province on November 28, likely as part of an effort by the Suwayda Autonomous Government to discourage dissent and to consolidate political control. The Suwayda National Guard arrested ten individuals on November 28 and accused them of participating in a “conspiracy” in coordination with the Syrian transitional government to conduct attacks in Suwayda Province.[xv] A media figure close to Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri reinforced the accusations on November 28 by claiming that the individuals planned to kidnap Suwayda Autonomous Government leaders, use car bombs, and attack public areas with improvised explosive devices.[xvi] The Suwayda National Guard arrested Sheikh Raed al Matni, Sheikh Maher al Falout, prominent Druze businessman Assem Abu Fakhr, Gandhi Abu Fakhr, and three relatives of transitional government-allied Laith al Balous, among others.[xvii] Suwayda National Guard members recorded themselves torturing Sheikh Matni on November 29 and forcibly shaving his moustache and beard, which hold religious significance for the Druze.[xviii]  The Suwayda National Guard reportedly delivered Matni’s body, which showed visible signs of torture, to the entrance of the Suwayda City hospital on December 2.[xix] Sheikh Matni helped form the Suwayda Military Council in February 2025, which was a Druze militia that fought transitional government forces during the intercommunal violence in Suwayda in July 2025.[xx] Some Syrian and Turkish media reports claim that Matni had a close relationship with Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri, but that the relationship deteriorated after Matni opposed Hijri’s formation of the Suwayda National Guard in August 2025.[xxi] A separate pro-government Syrian source claimed the Suwayda National Guard arrested Matni for proposing a negotiated settlement with the Syrian transitional government.[xxii] The Suwayda National Guard also tortured and killed Sheikh Falout and businessman Assem Abu Fakhr.[xxiii] The National Guard’s arrest, torture, and reported killing of prominent locals who may have challenged the Suwayda Autonomous Government likely aims to deter dissent by increasing the perceived cost of opposition to its rule. The autonomous government may weaponize the allegations of a Damascus-sponsored coup against the Suwayda government to justify additional repressive measures in the name of community security.

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan presented a plan for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that aligns with the SDF leadership’s federalized vision for Syria as the March 10 agreement’s December 31 deadline approaches. Imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan presented a detailed plan to Turkish parliament members involved in the PKK disarmament process on November 24 that calls for the SDF to join the Syrian military but maintain its own internal security structures.[xxiv] This statement marks the first time that Ocalan has explicitly called for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian military but retain its internal security forces. Ocalan stated in February 2025 that ”all [PKK] groups must lay [down] their arms,” which Turkish officials took to mean that the SDF would be pressured into disarming and integrating into the Syrian transitional government under the MoD.[xxv] This belief is based on the Turkish government’s conflation between the PKK, the SDF, and the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF in February 2025 but rejected Ocalan’s call to disarm and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.”[xxvi]  Ocalan’s newly articulated vision more closely aligns with Abdi’s demand for a decentralized Syrian state and for the SDF to retain local security control in northeastern Syria.[xxvii] Abdi said on November 24 that the SDF seeks a ”decentralized Syria” that allows local populations in northeastern Syria to elect their own military, administrative, and security representatives.[xxviii]

Both the SDF and the Syrian government have refused to concede their fundamental negotiating positions, which would require them to change their views on the centralization of state power as the year-end March agreement deadline approaches. The Syrian transitional government insists that a central authority should rule Syria through appointed governors and views SDF decentralization as a path toward secession.[xxix] The SDF views decentralization as a way to secure local authority over regional affairs and sees the government’s push to concentrate power in Damascus as an attempt to impose autocratic rule.[xxx] The Syrian government and the SDF hold opposing, zero-sum positions on centralization, and their dispute risks renewed conflict in Syria if neither side compromises.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Military Cooperation with US Adversaries: Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran. IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first-person view drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions. The exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions is unlikely to curb Iran’s influence within Iraqi government institutions, however.
• Suwayda Political Consolidation: The anti-Syrian government Suwayda National Guard conducted several politically motivated arrests and killings of prominent Druze individuals in Suwayda Province on November 28, likely as part of an effort by the anti-Syrian government Suwayda Autonomous Government to discourage dissent and to consolidate political control.
• Syrian Democratic Forces’ Integration: Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan presented a plan for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense that aligns with the SDF leadership’s federalized vision for Syria as the March 10 agreement’s December 31 deadline approaches. Both the SDF and the Syrian government have refused to concede their fundamental negotiating positions, which would require them to change their views on the centralization of state power. The lack of compromise increases the risk for renewed conflict in the short term.

Iran Update, December 1, 2025

Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario. An Israeli security source told Israeli media on November 30 that Iran is attempting to rearm its regional partners, including the Houthis, Hezbollah, and unspecified groups in the West Bank and Syria, for potential action against Israel.[i] The source added that Iran is in “an arms race” because Iran understands that Israel will launch an operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government fails to meet the United States’ December 31 deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[ii] A political council member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Iranian media on December 1 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have worked to develop an “advanced security plan” to improve organizational structure, enhance drone and missile capabilities, and fortify militia headquarters in preparation for “any upcoming military operation“ against Israel.[iii] Israeli and Arab media reported on December 1 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that Israel intends to carry out an operation against Hezbollah soon, ”that will continue until [the group] is disarmed.”[iv] Barrack reportedly warned Sudani that Israel would strike Iraq if any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias intervene in a potential Israeli operation against Hezbollah and urged Sudani to stop any militia activities to ”support Hezbollah... financially or militarily.”[v] US officials have previously warned Iraqi officials that they must deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militia from targeting Israel or the United States. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi on November 4 that the United States would act against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria.[vi]

Iran’s reported preparations for a potential Israel-Hezbollah conflict suggest that Iran could push its Axis of Resistance partners to proactively fight Israel, despite the major defeats that multiple Axis partners and Iran have sustained in the past two years.  Iran largely restrained itself and the rest of the Axis from fully engaging Israel and the United States at various points throughout the Israel-Hamas War. Iran only partially activated its Axis partners following the Hamas October 7 attack. Iran did not activate pre-existing plans for Hezbollah to launch ground attacks into northern Israel after the October 7 attacks, for example. Some Iranian officials have recently called for Iranian partners to remove this ”restraint,” which may suggest that Iran views its previous approach against Israel as a mistake. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei, for example, urged Hezbollah on November 25 to abandon its ”restraint” and strike Israel for its killing of Hezbollah’s ”de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai on November 23.[vii]

Iran is facing several internal issues and is in the process of rebuilding its diminished military capabilities, which may make the regime hesitant to become directly involved in a renewed Israel-Hezbollah conflict, however. Iran is reportedly facing increased “turmoil” and infighting within the regime due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[viii] Iran has also undertaken efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program and its weapons stockpiles and reshuffle senior military leadership after Israel destroyed key weaponry and killed a significant number of senior Iranian military officials during the Israel-Iran War.[ix] Iran’s need to rebuild and re-focus domestically will limit Iran’s ability to meaningfully rebuild some of its partner forces on a short timeline, however.

Some of Iran's other partners, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, may also be hesitant to conduct kinetic operations against Israel in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may hesitate to get involved in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions for their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is significant for the Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[x] Iraqi militias could face political repercussions for engaging in a conflict. Some Iraqi parties could decide against aligning with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a war with Israel, for example. Iran’s partners in Iraq conducted attacks targeting Israel and US military positions in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not claim the attacks to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and causing negative political repercussions ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xi] The militias’ inaction during the war highlights that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may not be willing to engage in activities that could disrupt their political efforts. External militia operations that trigger US or Israeli action in Iraq are generally unpopular in Iraq.

Hezbollah is also likely hesitant to pursue any direct action against Israel that could trigger a full-scale conflict and disrupt the group’s reconstitution efforts. An Israeli media outlet reported on December 1 that Hezbollah is pursuing the “dual objective” of indirectly retaliating for Tabatabai’s death while ensuring that its retaliation will not warrant an Israeli response that could lead to a “full-scale war” in Lebanon.[xii] The Israeli outlet added that Hezbollah may request that the Houthis launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel on Hezbollah’s behalf.[xiii] The Houthis may be willing to act on Hezbollah’s behalf in this specific situation due to Tabatabai’s role in training Houthi fighters.[xiv] The Houthis may not be willing to engage in a broader escalation, however. The Houthis did not support Hezbollah kinetically during or after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024, despite Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stating that there is “complete solidarity” between the Houthis and Hezbollah.[xv] The Houthis instead have linked their campaign against Israel to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xvi] Hezbollah’s continued hesitancy to act directly against Israel, nonetheless, suggests that the group fears escalation because of its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control. Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack directly targeting Israel or Israeli forces would presumably prompt a large Israeli response, because Israel has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force.[xvii] Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks by targeting Hezbollah fighters, military infrastructure, and supply lines.[xviii]

Jaish al Adl announced on November 29 that the group has merged with other Baloch militia groups and will continue its activities in Iran.[xix] Jaish al Adl has posed one of the largest internal security threats to the Iranian regime, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[xx] The group‘s attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province have demonstrated sophisticated operational and organizational capabilities. Likely Jaish al Adl fighters killed an IRGC Ground Forces officer along the Bampur-Delgan road and separately killed two Basij members along the Khash-Zahedan road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 1, though Jaish al Adl has not claimed either attack or any others since October 2025.[xxi] Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have recently visited Pakistan to discuss bilateral economic, border security, and counterterrorism cooperation.[xxii] Larijani traveled to Pakistan on November 24 and met with multiple Pakistani officials, including Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Pakistani PM Shahbaz Sharif.[xxiii] Larijani called for enhanced Iran-Pakistan intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation.[xxiv]

The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort.[xxv] The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[xxvi] The Sahand capsized in Bandar Abbas Port on the Persian Gulf in July 2024.[xxvii] The Kurdistan reportedly carries eight Ghadr and Ghadir anti-ship missiles with a 200-kilometer to 300-kilometer range, vertical-launch Navab air-defense missiles with a 25-kilometer range for low-altitude threats, and Kian one-way attack drones with a roughly 2,000-kilometer range.[xxviii] Iran has constructed several forward base ships and other offensive vessels since 2021 to execute expeditionary and out-of-area operations.[xxix] Iran has sometimes built these vessels by converting old commercial tankers. The Iranian Artesh has also developed a variety of forward-base and long-range surface ships, including the Makran, which was the first Artesh Navy’s forward base ship.[xxx] The Makran carries drones, helicopters, and anti-ship missiles, which enable months-long deployments for out-of-area missions.[xxxi]

These Iranian ships are not likely to survive conventional naval engagements with the United States, but they can support attacks on international commercial traffic. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.[xxxii] Iran would have to deploy naval mines and fast attack crafts to close the Strait. Iran also sees its naval capabilities as another form of deterrence. Senior Iranian military commanders claim that Iran did not use its naval capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because Iran deliberately held those capabilities in reserve and saw no reason to expand the conflict.[xxxiii] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani also announced on November 29 that the Artesh Navy will name its next "floating base" Khuzestan, which indicates that the Iranian Artesh is institutionalizing this class of long-endurance support ships as a core element of its future naval force.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Plans for a Potential Israel-Hezbollah Conflict: Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario, but Iran and many of its key partners have strong incentives not to threaten Israel at this time if it can be avoided.
• Jaish al Adl Militancy: Jaish al Adl announced on November 29 that the group has merged with other Baloch militia groups and will continue its activities in Iran. Jaish al Adl has posed one of the largest internal security threats to the Iranian regime, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests.
• Iranian Navy Modernization: The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort. The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.

Previous Iran Updates

• November 2025
• October 2025
• September 2025
• August 2025
• July 2025
• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023