Ethiopia and Eritrea Near Conflict; Egypt Forms anti-Ethiopia Coalition; Mali Retakes Kidal: Africa File, October 8, 2026

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Authors: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo

Contributors: Alexander Brown and Victoria Hutchinson

Key Takeaways:

• Ethiopia. Ethiopian federal forces captured the Tigray regional capital Mekele and have advanced north and west toward operationally significant towns, likely spurring Eritrea to deploy a limited number of reinforcements into northern Ethiopia to support the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, although reported Eritrean incursions are unconfirmed. Continued attacks by Amhara Fano militias along key supply lines between Amhara and Tigray and growing tensions between federally backed Amhara and Tigray militias in recently captured areas pose latent challenges to the federal government’s ability to consolidate its gains and sustain its advance.
• Horn of Africa. Egypt hosted a regional summit with Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan to coordinate future cooperation on several issues, most of which involve countering Ethiopia’s actions and regional objectives in the Nile River Valley and Red Sea. Egypt has attempted to form a de facto anti-Ethiopia alliance in recent years but has faced challenges in forging a coherent regional bloc due to limited strategic alignment between Egypt and most countries in the region.
• Mali. Malian forces and their Russian allies took a regional capital in northern Mali that separatist rebels and their al Qaeda–linked allies had held since April, with security forces likely to expand their offensive toward rebel support zones along the Algerian border in the near future. The Malian junta likely leveraged its improved ties with Algeria to help facilitate the offensive.

Assessments:

Figure 1: Africa File, October 1, 2026.

Source: Emily Bjerke

Assessments:

Ethiopia

Authors: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo with Alexander Brown

Ethiopian federal forces captured the Tigray regional capital Mekele and have advanced north and west toward operationally significant towns including Abiy Addi, Adigrat, and Adwa, while sustaining air pressure on TPLF-held areas. The Ethiopian federal military (Ethiopian National Defense Force, ENDF) and Tigray Peace Force (TPF)—a federally backed anti–Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) Tigrayan armed group—advanced west from the Afar region, where they had previously reversed initial rebel gains, to capture Mekele on October 3.[1] The ENDF and TPF did not face significant resistance from the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), the TPLF’s military wing, as the TPLF had preemptively withdrawn from Mekele.[2] The TPLF claimed that it had withdrawn to prevent damage to Mekele and said it would continue fighting.[3] TDF forces south of Mekele along the A2 highway also withdrew west amid the federal advance, allowing federal forces along that axis to advance the final 25 miles north to Mekele and connect with the federal forces that had advanced from the east.[4] Multiple sources reported that TPLF leadership had relocated in the direction of Adwa, with Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) reporting that TPLF leaders were in Ahferom district, which is on the A2 roughly 20 miles from Adigrat to the east and Adwa to the west.[5]

Figure 2. ENDF Continues Advancing in Tigray

Source: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr; Alexander Brown and Ziv Zellars.

Ethiopian federal forces have advanced roughly 30 miles north toward the city of Adigrat along the A2 highway since capturing Mekele. Two open-source mappers and the conflict reporter Sajid Nadeem reported that the ENDF captured Agula and Wukro on October 4, after the TDF preemptively withdrew from both towns.[6] The towns are 50 and 43 miles south, respectively, of Adigrat along the A2. Several sources have reported that the ENDF has since redeployed additional forces from Mekele, presumably to support further advances along this axis.[7]

The ENDF temporarily halted its northward advance at Wukro, however, likely to avoid opening itself to a TPLF counterattack that could flank and encircle its forces. The ENDF either withdrew from Wukro or never fully entered Wukro until October 7.[8] The retreating TDF forces had withdrawn from Wukro to positions in Abreha We Atsbeha and Atsbi, which are five miles west and 10 miles east of Wukro, respectively, via side roads. Atsbi also connects to Tigrayan and allied supply lines that extend to the Eritrean border via Afar and can be used to flank Wukro entirely and cut the A2 via a side road that connects directly to Agula.

The ENDF has simultaneously advanced west from Mekele into TPLF-controlled central Tigray toward Adwa. The ENDF advanced west from Mekele to capture Hagere Selam on October 5 and reportedly captured Abiy Addi—an operationally significant town roughly 60 miles from Mekele to the east and Adwa to the north, although the Critical Threats Project (CTP) was unable to verify the claim.^[9] Abiy Addi is a key gateway between TPLF-controlled areas in central Tigray, including the group’s historical guerrilla sanctuaries in the nearby Kola Tembien mountains, and ENDF-controlled southern Tigray.

ENDF and TDF have clashed near the Tekeze River on key roads leading to Shire, the capital of Tigray’s Northwestern zone 155 miles northwest of Mekele, with neither side yet to make notable advances.^[10] The TDF reportedly attempted to advance southwest along the B30 highway into Tselemti district, which federally backed forces control, on October 3 and October 4.[11] The ENDF reportedly halted the advance and then crossed the Tekeze River approximately 30 miles southwest of Shire into TPLF-controlled northwestern Tigray.[12] Open-source analyst The Ethiopian Conflict Map and pro-TPLF analyst Yonas Nigussie reported that the ENDF had also conducted drone strikes around the B30 and in Shire as well.[13] A lack of reported activity aside from artillery fire exchanges between the ENDF and TDF near the Tekeze crossing along the B30 on October 5 indicates that the ENDF has not made notable gains along the road, however.[14] The Ethiopian Conflict Map also reported clashes between the ENDF and TDF near Dedebit, a town along a secondary road near a Tekeze River crossing approximately 55 miles west of Shire, on October 2.[15]

The ENDF has supplemented its ground operations with airstrikes on TPLF-held population centers.[16] The ENDF has reportedly conducted strikes on Adigrat, Adwa, Axum, and Shire since October 3.[17] The strikes in Adwa on the night of October 4 to October 5 damaged multiple hotels and killed nine people.[18] Reuters also reported ENDF airstrikes on Sheraro, which is approximately 25 miles northeast of the Tekeze crossing along the secondary Humera–Shire Road (highway 90), that killed eight people on the night of October 4 to October 5.[19]

The TPLF has signaled that it is waging an asymmetric-style defense and intends to eventually launch a counteroffensive, as it seeks to repeat the success it had in overturning initial ENDF gains during the first Tigray War. TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael had preemptively warned on October 1 that the TDF was selectively engaging ENDF forces and that any town losses would be temporary, as Tigrayan forces know “where and when” to strike and would launch a counteroffensive.[20] Debretsion’s statement echoes the TPLF’s approach at the beginning of the Tigray War, when the ENDF initially advanced quickly into Tigray and captured Mekele within a month of the conflict starting in November 2020.^[21] TPLF leadership and military forces subsequently withdrew to mountainous and rural central Tigray, where they regrouped and fought a guerrilla insurgency before launching a counteroffensive that led the TDF to retake Mekele within a month by late June 2021.^[22] The TDF then pushed south via the A2 highway, reaching as close as 85 miles from Addis Ababa by November 2021 before a federal counteroffensive involving new externally-provided drones exploited the TDF’s overextended lines and pushed them back to Tigray.^[23] CTP has previously assessed that waning popular support for the TPLF, internal cohesion challenges within the TPLF, and improved Ethiopian drone capabilities have undermined the TPLF’s current strength compared to its strength during the Tigray War.^[24]

Eritrea likely deployed reinforcements to support the TPLF and halt the ENDF advances. There have been growing reports from a variety of sources that Eritrean forces have deployed into Tigray since early October. Several independent researchers and Ethiopian sources reported between October 3 and October 5 that Eritrean forces deployed into Tigray near several border towns.[25] Sajid Nadeem claimed that several confirmed ENDF drone strikes near these towns over this period, including Irob, Rama, and Sheraro, were targeting Eritrean forces.[26] Agence France-Presse (AFP), ACLED, Deutsche Welle Amharic, and Reuters then reported that Eritrean reinforcements had traveled through Adigrat heading south on the A2 in the direction of the front lines around Wukro on October 7, citing locals in the town.[27] Pro-Ethiopian federal government X accounts separately circulated at least two new videos and four pictures claiming to show Eritrean forces moving along the road between Adigrat and Idaga Hamus and in Idaga Hamus, which is 12 miles south of Adigrat.[28] The Ethiopian Conflict Map denied the reported Eritrean presence in Adigrat on October 7 and said that Eritrean forces had actually reinforced TDF positions in Atsbi, which is 25 miles southeast of Idaga Hamus via side roads, after traveling through rebel-controlled territory to the east in northern Afar.[29]

CTP has independently corroborated some aspects of these claims but has been unable to fully confirm these mounting reports. CTP and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) geolocated the October 7 media from pro-Ethiopian government X accounts to Idaga Hamus and the road between Adigrat and Idaga Hamus.[30] CTP-ISW and other open-source analysts determined that the media was from no earlier than 2024, meaning the videos and images are not reused footage from the Tigray War.[31] Satellite imagery from October 8 showed a destroyed truck on the road between Adigrat and Idaga Hamus, confirming ACLED and AFP reporting and at least one of the videos claiming that Ethiopian drone strikes had targeted suspected Eritrean forces in the area.[32] CTP-ISW could not verify the exact time most of the media was captured, however, or whether the militants and vehicles in the images are Eritrean military. The sources reporting the alleged border incursions over October 3 to 5 did not include any supporting media or evidence, and CTP was unable to verify any of the reports via supplementary sources and a review of satellite imagery.[33]

Any recent Eritrean incursion is likely limited and may have already been abandoned, decreasing the immediate risk of direct, full-scale ground conflict between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, but regional tensions are continuing to rise. AFP and ACLED each separately reported on October 8 that Eritrean forces in Adigrat had retreated northward, with ACLED claiming they were already withdrawing back across the border.[34] Eritrean forces likely intend to primarily provide advisory, logistics, and light infantry support, possibly embedded into TDF units. A senior Ethiopian official told Reuters that Eritrea had deployed one mechanized division and three infantry divisions, each consisting of about 1,500 soldiers, on October 7.[35] CTP has been unable to find any large-scale Eritrean military buildup near the Ethiopia-Eritrea border in reviews of satellite imagery.

Eritrea likely aimed to shore up the TPLF buffer zone along the Eritrean border rather than launch a full-scale invasion of northern Ethiopia. CTP previously assessed that Eritrea could become more involved in the conflict as fighting spread north and threatened to reach its border. One of several reasons that Eritrea partnered with the TPLF was to establish a buffer zone in northern Ethiopia, so that Ethiopia cannot follow through on its overt determination to gain sea access via Eritrea’s port of Assab.[36] The ENDF would also be able to use Adigrat to open another line of advance toward TPLF-controlled Adwa, which is 65 miles west of Adigrat via the B20. ENDF control over the Adigrat–Adwa corridor would represent the failure of this Eritrean buffer zone strategy, as the ENDF would have two launchpads for any potential offensive against Eritrea that are roughly 20 miles from the Eritrean border along the two major highways connecting Ethiopia to the Eritrean capital, Asmara.

Diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have completely broken down, which raises the risk of miscalculation and future conflict given the lack of deconfliction channels. ENDF Chief of Staff Birhanu Jula accused Eritrea of financially supporting the TPLF and facilitating support from external actors to the rebel group in the initial aftermath of the rebel offensive on September 25.[37] The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on October 1 that it was closing the Ethiopian embassy in Eritrea and expelling 10 Eritrean diplomats from Ethiopia “in response to Eritrea’s direct and indirect acts of hostility and belligerence against Ethiopia.”[38] Eritrea responded by cutting diplomatic ties and condemning alleged Ethiopian support for Eritrean opposition groups and Ethiopia’s desire for sea access via Eritrean ports as “a publicly pronounced declaration of war.”[39] The Ethiopian communication minister demanded that “Eritrean forces operating in Tigray must leave Ethiopian territory without delay” on October 7 amid reports of Eritrean forces deploying south of Adigrat.[40] The Eritrean information minister responded by accusing Ethiopia of setting conditions to launch a war to seize the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab, which Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and other Ethiopian officials have demanded access to and implicitly threatened to annex by force, citing “self-defense” terms.[41]

Egypt has also publicly supported Eritrea amid the crisis, further fueling regional tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Ethiopia and Egypt. ENDF Chief of Staff Birhanu also accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting the TPLF and other Ethiopian rebels in his September 25 comments, and his accusation that Eritrea was “facilitating support from external actors” to the TPLF presumably refers to Egypt and/or Sudan.[42] Ethiopia ordered the expulsion of an Egyptian diplomat from Ethiopia on October 1, and Egypt responded by expelling an Ethiopian diplomat from Egypt.[43] Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki met in Egypt on October 3, with the Eritrean Ministry of Information stating that Isais highlighted the “convergent positions of Egypt and Eritrea on regional matters.”[44] The two countries then released a multilateral statement with Somalia and Sudan, following a summit held on October 4, that included a commitment to uphold “respect for the sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity of the countries of the region; upholding the principles of good-neighboring; [and] rejecting interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region under any pretext.”[45] The statement fits Eritrea’s framing of the rising tensions in northern Ethiopia as a pretext for an Ethiopian invasion of Eritrea to seize Assab.

The Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) rebel group has separately disrupted key federal supply lines into Tigray via the Amhara region.[46] The AFNM has attacked several areas on and around the A2 and B30—the main north–south highways connecting Amhara and Tigray.[47] The AFNM captured Wurgessa, which is on the A2 highway in eastern Amhara, approximately 30 miles south of Woldia and 40 miles north of Dessie, on October 3.[48] The AFNM then captured Mehal Meda, which is in southeastern Amhara, 50 miles north of Debre Berhan on a series of secondary roads connecting the interior of Amhara’s North Shewa zone to the A2, on October 7. The AFNM separately attacked the town of Dabat, along the major B30 highway that connects northern Amhara to central Tigray on October 7. Dabat is nearly 150 miles north of Bahir Dar, 50 miles north of Gondar, and 45 miles south of the Tigrayan border, where ENDF and TDF forces have clashed multiple times since late September.[49] AFNM also attacked ENDF forces around Lalibela, a town 40 miles northwest of Woldia that has a nearby airport and sits along a series of secondary roads that connect northeastern Amhara to central and southern Tigray, in late September and early October.[50]

Figure 3. Amhara Pressures ENDF Supply Lines in Northern Ethiopia

Notes: Attack zones are areas where units conduct offensive maneuvers. Contested support zones are areas where multiple groups conduct offensive and defensive maneuvers. A group may be able to conduct effective logistics and administrative support of forces but has inconsistent access to local populations and key terrain. Support zones are areas where a group is not subject to significant enemy action and can conduct effective logistics and administrative support of forces. The Critical Threats Project adapts its mapping definitions for insurgencies from US military doctrine, including US Army FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations. Our maps are assessments and reflect analysts’ judgment based on current and historical open-source information on security incidents, political and governance activity, and population and geographic factors. Please contact us for more information on specific maps.

Source: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Fano has previously targeted these same areas to advance its own objectives to degrade Ethiopian supply lines throughout Amhara. Fano launched an offensive in late 2025 that captured towns around Lalibela and along A2 and B22 highways to encircle Woldia before ENDF drone counterattacks and drone strikes cleared these areas.[51] A Fano offensive in mid-2024 temporarily captured several towns along the B30 north of Gondar and even involved Fano briefly entering part of Gondar.[52] The current offensive benefits the AFNM’s Tigrayan allies, but this pattern further supports CTP’s assessment that pragmatic self-interest is guiding operational coordination among the various Alliance for Survival members, as the AFNM is escalating long-standing campaigns to disrupt federal supply lines as it seeks to exert more influence over key roads and population centers in Amhara.[53]

Growing tensions between federally backed Amhara and Tigray militias in recently captured areas underscore the challenges the federal government faces in consolidating control over disputed areas where the government has relied on armed groups outside the formal federal security framework. The federal government has relied on nonstate armed groups in past conflicts. The federal government partnered with Amhara ethno-nationalist forces, including Fano militias, during the first Tigray war from 2020 to 2022. Fano took up arms against the federal government shortly after the war, however, due to the federal government sidelining the group from the Tigray peace process and, in Fano’s view, failing to represent Amhara interests.^[54] The federal government’s support for other Amhara ethno-nationalist forces that de facto governed disputed areas of southern and western Tigray after the war also undermined the Pretoria peace agreement between the federal government and TPLF, as the peace deal mandated that the Amhara forces withdraw from Tigray.^[55] The federal government has backed the TPF as a proxy force to counter the TPLF since its formation in early 2025.[56] The TPF is led by allies of former TPLF spokesperson and Tigray Interim Administration head Getachew Reda, who is currently an adviser to the prime minister.[57]

The federal government has given the TPF primary security responsibilities in Tigray, which has led to confrontations between the TPF and the federally backed Amhara ethno-nationalist forces. The TPF has played a key role in securing federally captured areas of Tigray, including Mekele and southern Tigray.^[58] The Ethiopian news outlet Addis Standard reported that tensions between the TPF and the Raya Zeb Amhara militia grew as federal forces, including the TPF, captured southern Tigray in early October 2026.^[59] Two pro-Amhara ethno-nationalist X accounts reported that fighting between the two factions subsequently broke out around Alamata, which is approximately 110 miles south of Mekele, due to attempts by the federal police and TPF to consolidate control.^[60] The sources reported that the fighting killed over 20 civilians and militiamen.^[61] The Ethiopian Conflict Map claimed on October 6 that federal forces and the TPF had disarmed the Raya Zeb, although CTP was unable to verify the claim.^[62] A related Amhara political committee has called on the Amhara regional government to support Amhara claims to the area.^[63]

Horn of Africa

Author: Liam Karr

Egypt hosted a regional summit with Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan to coordinate future cooperation on several issues, most of which involve countering Ethiopia’s regional actions and objectives in the Nile River Valley and Red Sea. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki met in Egypt on October 3, with the Eritrean Ministry of Information stating that Isaias highlighted the “convergent positions of Egypt and Eritrea on regional matters.”[64] Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Abdel Fattah al Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, then joined Sisi and Isaias for a quadrilateral summit in Egypt on October 4.[65] The four countries released a joint statement, called the el Alamein joint declaration, and agreed to establish a mechanism to monitor the outcomes of the discussions for future summits to be held “periodically and whenever necessary.”[66]

The el Alamein joint declaration did not directly mention Ethiopia, but it reiterated several stances these countries have adopted directly in response to Ethiopia’s actions in the region.[67] Point two of the declaration said the summit addressed the need to uphold “respect for the sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity of the countries of the region; upholding the principles of good-neighboring; [and] rejecting interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region under any pretext…” Points 4A and 4B specifically emphasized agreement on the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia, Sudan, and their national institutions, condemning any parallel entities in Sudan and recognition of Somaliland. These points are thinly veiled criticism of Ethiopia’s support for the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces and flirtation with recognizing Somaliland in exchange for sovereign sea access on the Somaliland coast since 2024. Point two encompasses language that Eritrea has used in accusing Ethiopia of planning to invade Eritrea to capture the Red Sea port of Assab. Point 4D of the declaration emphasized that “governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states,” which these countries have repeatedly invoked to reject Ethiopian claims that it has a right to sea access and a stake in Red Sea discussions. Point 4E reiterated long-standing Egyptian demands regarding the construction and operationalization of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and other Ethiopian dams on the Nile River, including rejecting “unilateral measures” that negatively affect downstream countries and the obligation for “prior notification, consultation, and consensus.”

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Ethiopian government have reiterated their previous stances in reaction to the summit. Abiy reiterated in his re-inauguration address on October 5 that his administration will ensure that Ethiopia obtains direct sea access.[68] The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately stated on October 5 that Ethiopia has claims to a role in the governance of the Nile River and Red Sea.[69]

Egypt has attempted to form a de facto anti-Ethiopia alliance in recent years to strategically encircle and isolate Ethiopia and to coerce Addis Ababa into making concessions on its Nile and Red Sea agenda. Egypt has sought to strengthen regional support for its Nile position vis-à-vis its dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD. Egypt has strongly supported the SAF in the Sudanese civil war because it views the SAF as the best guarantor of stability on its southern border and because it views the SAF as an indispensable partner in Nile politics. The SAF has decades-long ties to the Egyptian military and has been the strongest supporter of Egypt’s positions on the GERD among the various Sudanese actors that have been in power over the last decade.[70] Egypt has also sought to develop ties with upstream Nile countries (to the south), which have all voiced opposition to the 20th-century Nile agreements that favor Egypt, to weaken these countries’ alignment with Ethiopia on Nile issues. Egyptian outreach has included various deals on agriculture, defense, education, energy, health, and water across Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda.[71] The el Alamein statement is the most overt support that Eritrea and Somalia—neither of which are in the Nile River Basin—have given to Egypt’s position on the GERD, as Somalia had sought to hedge between Egypt and Ethiopia, and Eritrea had not commented on the GERD at all since 2013.

Egypt has simultaneously signed bilateral maritime and port development agreements with other Red Sea countries surrounding Ethiopia to isolate Ethiopia and prevent sovereign Ethiopian Red Sea access. Cairo signed bilateral agreements between December 2025 and July 2026 on maritime transport and port development with Djibouti concerning the port of Doraleh; Eritrea concerning the ports of Assab, Massawa, and Marsa Fatima; and Somalia concerning unspecified ports.[72] These port investments directly undermine some Ethiopian arguments surrounding sea access, such as Assab being unused and needing development and use that Ethiopia can provide, and the inadequacy of other ports where Djibouti and Somalia have offered Ethiopia commercial access.[73] Emirati and Ethiopian sources also reported that the port development agreements with Djibouti and Eritrea enable Egyptian ships to refuel and resupply at the ports.[74]

Egypt has sought to bring Eritrea and Somalia into a multilateral anti-Addis Ababa coalition since 2024 and has now incorporated the SAF-backed Sudanese government into this effort. Sisi has held bilateral meetings with Isaias and Mohamud every year since 2024, and the three leaders held a trilateral summit in Eritrea in October 2024 to coordinate action on regional security issues.[75] The three countries committed to “advance strategic cooperation” through a trilateral committee, which met for the first time in Egypt in January 2025.[76]

Figure 4. African Partnerships in the Horn of Africa

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.

Note: FGS stands for Federal Government of Somalia, RSF stands for Rapid Support Forces (of Sudan), TPLF stands for Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Ethiopian rebels), and LNA stands for Libyan National Army.

Egypt has faced challenges in forging a coherent regional bloc due to limited strategic alignment between Egypt and most countries in the region. Egypt has failed to isolate Ethiopia, especially on its primary issue—the GERD. Upstream countries have continued to advance Ethiopian-supported plans to transform the Nile Basin Initiative into the Nile River Basin Commission, which would transform the institution from a nonbinding coordination platform into a recognized international multilateral body with expanded legal powers to ensure the “equitable and reasonable utilization” of Nile waters.[77] These countries have also strengthened defense and economic cooperation with Ethiopia in recent years, particularly Kenya and Sudan, which are purchasing Ethiopian energy exports from the GERD and cooperating on the multibillion-dollar Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) regional infrastructure project.[78] Non–Nile Basin countries have also avoided taking sides given their lack of a stake in the issue, with the Djiboutian and Somali presidents emphasizing the need for cooperation and dialogue while praising the GERD as a continental achievement and asset when they attended its inauguration in 2025.[79]

Egypt has even struggled to fully isolate Ethiopia among the core countries involved in the el Alamein declaration, as they are only tactically aligned with Egypt insofar as it affects their own national interests. Somalia has continued to cooperate with Ethiopia and primarily uses cooperation with Egypt to disincentivize Ethiopia from potentially recognizing Somaliland. Abiy and Mohamud have met at least seven times since 2025, including on September 28, days before Mohamud traveled to the multilateral summit, to deconflict and discuss regional issues; Ethiopia has also abstained from meddling in Somalia’s ongoing political crisis to avoid alienating Mohamud.[80]

Senior Sudanese figures have also sought to de-escalate tensions between the SAF and Ethiopia in recent months to avoid a direct conflict that would distract both sides from their primary targets, despite both sides continuing to publicly accuse each other of supporting their domestic adversaries. Malik Agar, Transitional Sovereignty Council Vice President and head of the SAF-aligned Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North, helped facilitate two phone calls between Burhan and Abiy in May amid heightened tensions over an alleged Ethiopian drone strike in Sudan.[81]

Eritrea has particularly grown closer to Egypt as its relations with Ethiopia have deteriorated. This timing indicates that Eritrea is at least partially using Egypt to deter and counter any Ethiopian interest in Assab rather than support broader Egyptian objectives, such as the GERD.

Mali

Author: Liam Karr with Victoria Hutchinson

Malian forces and their Russian allies took a regional capital in northern Mali that separatist rebels and their al Qaeda–linked allies had held since April, with security forces likely to expand their offensive toward rebel support zones along the Algerian border in the near future. Malian army forces and their Russian and Tuareg militia allies captured Kidal town on October 6, after Azawad Liberation Front (Front de libération de l'Azawad, FLA) rebels preemptively retreated from the town after amid a large Malian air and ground offensive across the region.[82] The Malian army and its Russian and Tuareg militia auxiliaries sent a large reinforcement convoy consisting of nearly 300 armored vehicles, trucks, and motorcycles from the Gao region to bases in Anéfis, in the Kidal region, on October 3.[83] Multiple sources reported that a convoy of roughly 80 vehicles then traveled further north to the government base in Aguelhok, while another convoy of 80 to 100 vehicles then began moving toward rebel-held Kidal in the following days.[84]

Malian forces simultaneously conducted a series of airstrikes targeting FLA–Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) positions across Kidal region from October 4 to 6 near Anéfis, Kidal town, and Tinzaouaten—a town on the border with Algeria.[85] Malian officials claimed that the strikes killed at least 10 militants and destroyed several vehicles, while the FLA claimed to down a Malian one-way attack drone and alleged that the other strikes targeted civilians.[86] Local sources reported seeing Turkish TB2 and Akinci drones during Malian airstrikes.[87] FLA spokesperson Mohamed Mouloud Ramadan stated that their withdrawal from Kidal was a “temporary” measure, intended to “protect lives and equipment,” adding that the withdrawal had occurred “without any direct combat” between the FLA and Malian forces.[88]

Figure 5. Mali Retakes Kidal

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Malian forces and their Russian and Tuareg allies likely plan to continue advancing north to degrade FLA-JNIM rear support zones near the Algerian border, including Tinzaouaten. The Malian army claimed that it had continued a “major offensive” across northeastern Mali that included air and ground operations in the In-Tassik, Tin-Assalak, and Abeibara sectors of Kidal.[89] Malian and Russian forces previously secured areas around Abeibara and Tessalit, which are roughly 50 and 244 miles from Kidal, during their 2024 offensive before attempting to advance toward Tinzaouaten.[90] JNIM and Tuareg rebels avoided decisive engagements until they conducted separate ambushes on a large convoy traveling to Tinzaouaten, in which they killed nearly 50 Malian soldiers and at least 80 Russian auxiliaries, in July 2024.[91] The seizure of Tinzaouaten is a major operational objective as the border town serves as the main rear rebel stronghold in northern Mali, from which insurgents can continue to sustain operations across arid northern Mali and continually threaten Kidal, and it has also taken on added symbolic significance due to the attack in 2024.[92]

The Malian junta likely leveraged its improved ties with Algeria to help facilitate the offensive. Algeria and Mali restored diplomatic ties after more than a year in July 2026. The two neighbors initially cut diplomatic ties after Algeria shot down a Malian drone which it claimed had violated its airspace, near Tinzaouaten in March 2025.[93] The two reopened their airspace and reinstated ambassadors in July 2026, and Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga met with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in Algiers on August 24.[94]

Mali likely leveraged these restored ties to support the recapture of Kidal. President Tebboune reaffirmed on October 4 that Algeria would “step up” if Mali or Niger asked.[95] Mali conducted strikes targeting Tinzaouaten, which had previously caused the diplomatic breakdown in 2025. Mali presumably coordinated the strikes with Algeria given the lack of Algerian opposition, and multiple X accounts reported that Algeria closed its border to prevent fighters from fleeing the area.[96]

Algeria has continued to push for diplomatic efforts in northern Mali despite ostensible openness to Malian military activity in the region. Regional diplomatic and security sources contacted by Agence France-Presse reported that Algeria may have asked Tuareg rebels not to resist so that it might position itself as a mediator between them and the Malian government.[97] Algeria has long supported mediation efforts between the Malian government and Tuareg communities in northern Mali to stabilize its southern border, including helping mediate the now-defunct 2015 Algiers Accord and three other major peace deals between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government since 1991. The Malian junta withdrew from the 2015 deal and launched military offensives to seize northern Mali from insurgent forces in 2023 and 2024, raising tensions with Algeria, which maintained ties with Tuareg rebels and Malian opposition groups and continued to advocate for dialogue.[98]

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