Critical Threats Today

Rouhani and Erdogan met on the sidelines of a summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Islamabad on March 1. Rouhani highlighted Iran’s disapproval of Turkish military intervention in Syria and stated that “any violation of territorial integrity… especially in Syria and Iraq, is in opposition” to the Islamic Republic’s regional policies. Rouhani and Erdogan’s meeting comes amidst increased rhetorical tension between their two countries. Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu accused Iran of seeking “to turn Syria and Iraq… Shiite” in late February. Iranian officials criticized the statements and the Foreign Ministry summoned Turkish Ambassador to Iran Hakan Tekin in response. Iran has worked to bring Turkey into diplomatic initiatives to end the Syrian Civil War which exclude the U.S., but Turkish support for Syrian opposition groups remains one of the main sticking points for Iran-Turkey relations.

The combatants in Yemen’s civil war, including the Saudi-led coalition, prioritize fighting each other over countering AQAP’s expansion. Coalition-backed forces aligned with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s internationally recognized government are attempting to seize Yemen’s western coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Al Houthi-Saleh counterattacks have stalled the Hadi government offensive, however, as both groups concentrate security resources in western and northern Yemen. AQAP will continue to develop its support base in central and southern Yemen as the civil war continues. (Related reading: A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen)

Suspected al Shabaab militants detonated a car bomb that killed an intelligence officer in Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) on March 1. Al Shabaab has assassinated at least 10 government officials and clan elders since late December 2016. Al Shabaab will likely capitalize on the concentration of Somali security forces in the capital to seize strategic towns like Afgoi on the outskirts of the city. (Related Reading: US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?)

Photographs taken by LNA Air Force technicians revealed that Russia likely provided the LNA with at least one warplane in violation of a UN arms embargo. Russian officials have denied claims that Russia violated or would violate the embargo. Russian military support for Haftar will protract the Libyan conflict but will not bring it to resolution. Haftar lacks the forces to take control of Tripoli, Libya’s capital. Russia’s support for the LNA strengthens its relationship with Egypt, which Moscow is attempting to peel away from the American sphere of influence. 

Fighters from the Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), raided a village in southern Borno State in search of food on February 28. Barnawi’s faction enjoys more local support than the rival faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau, but not enough support to ensure a steady flow of supplies in extreme famine conditions in its southern safe haven in Borno State. Boko Haram-Barnawi also operates a northern safe haven in Lake Chad, however, which provides a steady supply of fish to its fighters in the north. The Nigerian Army limits freedom of movement in the area in between the two Barnawi groups. Boko Haram’s operational tempo may decrease in the near term, but its factions will resume more frequent operations once conditions improve.

An official confirmed that a U.S. airstrike killed al Qaeda deputy leader Abu al Khayr al Masri in western Syria on February 26. Al Masri is the latest in a series of al Qaeda leaders of varying statures removed from the battlefield by U.S. airstrikes. HVT strikes may disrupt specific al Qaeda operations in the near term, but they have proved insufficient to derail al Qaeda’s advance within Syria or globally.