Critical Threats Today

A regular summary of al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa as well as major events in Iran.

These are the major events from February 24 for Iran and for al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa.  Please see the Iran News Roundup, the Gulf of Aden Security Review, and the weekly Threat Update for more details.

Iran
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February 27, 2017

Moderate-conservative politician Ali Motahari defended the 2009 Green Movement following Supreme Leader Khamenei’s dismissal of reformists’ “national reconciliation” initiative.

Deputy Parliament Speaker Motahari stated, “The people have had grievances with the government” following the 2009 Green Movement. Motahari also criticized the government’s crackdown on political dissidents as “narrow-minded and severe.” Motahari’s comments are likely in reaction to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other hardliners’ rejection of the reformist-driven initiative for “national reconciliation” in Iran. Over 40 political prisoners connected to the 2009 Green Movement called the current moment an “opportunity to achieve dialogue and national reconciliation” in an open letter to Iran’s government in mid-January.  A controversial figure in the Iranian political establishment, Motahari has challenged the limits of the Judiciary’s power and denounced the house arrest of Green Movement leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

Citations & Links

Yemen
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February 27, 2017

AQAP is securing a safe haven in southern and central Yemen in the context of the Yemeni civil war.

AQAP conducted a complex attack on headquarters used by Emirati-backed security forces in Zinjibar city, Abyan governorate, southern Yemen. The group framed the attack as retaliation for violations committed by the Emirati-backed forces, including detentions that have angered the population within which AQAP has cultivated its support base. AQAP drove Emirati-backed forces from northern Abyan in early February 2017. It may pursue the same objective in southern Abyan in the near term in order to expand a permissive environment and build its support base. (Related reading: How the U.S. Should Re-Engage in Yemen)

Citations & Links

Horn of Africa
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February 27, 2017

Somali citizens celebrated President Farmajo’s selection for Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Khaire.

Al Shabaab’s campaign to generate insecurity in Mogadishu and degrade the legitimacy of the federal government has not yet eroded Farmajo’s public support. Farmajo’s popularity will likely decline if the current pace of attacks continues, however.

Citations & Links

West Africa
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February 27, 2017

ISIS or al Qaeda may be able to exploit a schism within Boko Haram to expand in West Africa.

The unpredictability of Boko Haram emir Abu Bakr Shekau had prevented ISIS or al Qaeda from developing an operational relationship with his group. A schism in fall 2016 sidelined Shekau’s faction, which continues to weaken. Shekau killed his spokesman in December 2016 to thwart an alleged coup attempt, indicating internal dissent. Shekau's group is also struggling to feed its fighters in the midst of a famine in the Lake Chad Basin. Fighters from Shekau’s faction, as well as new recruits, will likely gravitate toward a rival Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. This faction, which ISIS has recognized as its affiliate in West Africa, has developed a local support base that allows it to access adequate supplies. Barnawi’s faction has objectives that reach beyond Nigeria, as well as historical ties to the al Qaeda network in the Sahel region. Either ISIS or al Qaeda may leverage the growing strength of Barnawi’s faction to expand its footprint in West Africa. 

Citations & Links

Libya
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February 27, 2017

The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may be losing control of Libya’s capital, Tripoli.

Hardline Islamist militias aligned with a rival government are challenging GNA-aligned militias for control of strategic sites in the city. Clashes have escalated in the past 24 hours, forcing civilians to evacuate contested neighborhoods. A security breakdown in Tripoli would increase instability throughout Libya and strain limited security resources, including those of U.S. counterterrorism partners. ISIS in Libya, which is degraded but not defeated following the loss of its stronghold in Sirte, would seize the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities without resistance. (Related reading: Fighting Forces in Libya: January 2017)

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