Challenges to Sustainable DRC-M23 Peace: Africa File Special Edition

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Key Takeaway: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), M23, and Rwanda will likely remain involved with Qatari-brokered negotiations and the broader US-backed regional peace framework without quickly reaching a deal to avoid making concessions while reaping the rewards of US engagement. Both sides have been unwilling to concede their maximalist positions on M23’s territorial control, which will likely prolong talks and make a sustainable and lasting agreement unlikely.

Assessment:

The Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have remained at odds over M23’s territorial control in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other issues, undermining the sustainability of the Qatari-brokered preliminary peace agreement from mid-July. The DRC and M23 signed a declaration of principles agreement under Qatar’s auspices on July 19.[i] The two sides agreed to de-escalate conflict and observe a formal ceasefire.[ii] They also agreed to implement “confidence-building measures” intended to lay the groundwork for a second stage of talks to start by August 8 aimed at reaching a final peace deal.[iii]

The DRC and M23 have argued over a key but unclear component of the declaration agreement that called for the “restoration of government authority on all national territories” in a final peace deal.[iv] The two sides offered differing interpretations of what “restoring state authority” means within hours of signing the declaration in mid-July. The Congolese communications minister said that the declaration encompasses M23’s “nonnegotiable” withdrawal and the return of the Congolese army, the police, and judicial and civil authorities to M23-occupied areas.[v] M23 has said that it has no plans to withdraw from occupied areas in the eastern DRC on several occasions since signing the declaration.[vi]

The two sides have largely observed the ceasefire but have disagreed publicly on its longer-term implementation and critical dispute-resolution mechanisms since signing the declaration. The DRC rejected M23’s proposal to withdraw at least three miles from the frontlines and establish a demilitarized zone between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces.[vii] French state media reported in late July that there had still been “no concrete progress” in establishing an oversight mechanism to monitor the ceasefire’s implementation.[viii]

Figure 1. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The two sides have disagreed on prisoner releases—a key confidence-building measure. The declaration committed both sides to facilitate the release of prisoners and detainees.[ix] The DRC rejected M23’s demand for the immediate release of more than 780 prisoners held by the DRC and reiterated that it would grant amnesty on only a “case-by-case basis” as part of any final peace deal.[x] M23 conditioned its participation in the second stage of talks on the release and transfer of all M23 prisoners to Goma, the M23-controlled North Kivu provincial capital.[xi]

The DRC, M23, and Rwanda will likely remain involved in the Qatari-led peace talks despite these challenges and the broader US-backed peace framework to reap the dividends of US engagement. The US-backed regional framework includes security provisions from a US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda from late June and plans for a regional economic framework that aims to spur economic growth and facilitate billions of dollars of US investment in the DRC and Rwanda.[xii] The economic aspects of the framework center around regional economic cooperation in sectors including energy, infrastructure, mining, national park management and tourism, and public health.[xiii]

The regional framework includes US investment in the upstream and midstream aspects of the DRC’s and Rwanda’s mining sectors.[xiv] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported in late July that the United States could reach a bilateral economic deal with the DRC as early as late August when US President Donald Trump plans to host a signing ceremony for the June peace deal with DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, DC.[xv]

Figure 2. Peace Processes Multiply in the Great Lakes

Source: Yale Ford.

CTP continues to assess that the long-term sustainability of the US-backed regional framework will likely be contingent on the DRC-M23 talks. The deal deferred the resolution of the M23 conflict to the Qatari-led talks, but the United States made a DRC-M23 peace agreement a precondition to the economic framework.[xvi] The declaration agreement between the DRC and M23 stated explicitly that the second stage of talks will aim to “align” with the US-brokered agreement.[xvii] Several important ventures as part of the regional economic framework, including the Rubaya coltan mine in Masisi district in North Kivu and the Ruzizi hydropower project near Bukavu in South Kivu, are in M23’s and Rwanda’s zone of control.[xviii] It remains unclear how those projects will be developed without solving the issue of M23’s territorial control.

Figure 3. DRC Peace Process

Source: Liam Karr.

Congolese elites stand to benefit in several ways from US engagement. Congolese elites in the DRC government would benefit financially from profitable joint projects with the United States in the DRC’s mining sector. Mining revenues have accounted for roughly two-thirds of the DRC government’s total revenues since 2019.[xix] Tshisekedi and his inner circle effectively control all major aspects of the DRC’s mining sector.[xx] The regional economic framework would lead to significant US investment in the mining sector and help the Congolese government lessen its dependence on China who controls close to 80 percent of mining operations in the DRC.[xxi]

The DRC government stands to benefit from increased defense cooperation with the United States. The United States has increased bilateral defense cooperation with the DRC since brokering the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement in late June. French state media reported in late July that the United States ruled out direct military intervention in the DRC but has discussed training sessions with the Congolese army (FARDC), primarily to strengthen the FARDC’s ability to protect US investments.[xxii] A defense partnership with the United States, even if limited, would help the DRC address a major liability—the structural weakness of the FARDC, which has been unable to put up an effective fight against M23 or defend the DRC’s national territory for decades.

Tshisekedi likely aims to use US backing to ensure his regime’s survival and isolate his political enemies as part of a “minerals-for-security” deal. M23’s advances in 2025 weakened Tshisekedi politically and exposed the deep flaws in the DRC government’s military strategy.[xxiii] FARDC units in the eastern DRC historically have been ineffective because the Congolese government has prioritized loyalty over competency to preserve patronage networks and coup-proof the FARDC. Rumors of a potential coup have circulated in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, on several occasions in 2025.[xxiv]

Figure 4. M23 Advances in 2025

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The return of former DRC President Joseph Kabila has put pressure on the ruling regime as Kabila attempts to strengthen his own political influence and lead a unified political opposition bloc that could challenge Tshisekedi’s coalition and reclaim power.[xxv] The French investigative magazine Jeune Afrique quoted an insider source to the US-led negotiations in late June who said that a finalized US-DRC partnership would isolate Kabila and strengthen Tshisekedi by allowing the US to “sanction anyone who undermines the contract that binds them with the DRC.”[xxvi]

Rwanda will likely continue supporting the DRC-M23 talks to avoid international pressure and benefit from formalized mineral supply chains in the region. Rwanda likely seeks to legitimize the export of minerals mined in the DRC and avoid sanctions and political backlash over its illegal control of conflict minerals. The US regional economic framework aims to restrict illegal economic pathways for mineral exploitation and “formalize end-to-end mineral value chains that link both countries,” according to the US State Department.[xxvii] Some European countries and multinational technology companies such as Apple have stopped buying minerals sourced from the DRC and Rwanda and called for embargo on Rwandan mineral exports.[xxviii] The European Union sanctioned a gold refinery based in Rwanda for “illegally importing gold from M23-controlled regions” in the eastern DRC in early 2025.[xxix]

M23 will likely remain in the talks to buy time to consolidate control over occupied areas in the eastern DRC. M23 has expanded its well-organized parallel administration in the eastern DRC and largely replaced the DRC government since late February. The rebel group has instituted its own leadership structures down to the local level and devoted significant resources to provide basic services, establish an alternative financial system, secure and police large population centers, adjudicate social and legal matters, and facilitate transportation and trade in the eastern DRC.[xxx]

Staying in the talks gives M23 and Rwanda time to gain even greater leverage by consolidating stronger de facto control over occupied areas. An entrenched M23 administration would be even more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that sees M23 gradually incorporated into a Congolese government administration. M23’s control over the eastern DRC aligns with Rwanda’s long-term strategy to protect and strengthen its political and economic influence and establish a buffer zone on the border with Rwanda. The UN noted in July 2025 that M23 and Rwanda likely aim to govern occupied areas in the long term through an “autonomous region” in the eastern DRC.[xxxi]

Staying in the talks could buy time for M23 to prepare and plan for a new offensive. M23 faced supply line vulnerabilities as it moved further away from its center of gravity in the eastern Kivu provinces and its rear supply base in Rwanda in early 2025.[xxxii] The rebel group struggled to assert control and maintain a solid defensive perimeter around urban areas, especially in South Kivu, while pursuing offensives on multiple lines of advance. M23 absorbed at least 7,000 new fighters into its ranks in early 2025, however, and has continued mass recruitment efforts in mid-2025.[xxxiii] The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 deployed new recruits to areas not yet under M23’s occupation to capture new territory and spread M23’s ideology.[xxxiv]

Both sides have been unwilling to make concessions on M23’s territorial control, however, which will likely prolong talks and make a sustainable long-term agreement unlikely. The lack of clarity around M23 control and the return of government authority will likely be a major obstacle in the upcoming round of talks. The July declaration deferred negotiations over the “root causes” of the conflict—some of which have gone unresolved for decades—and the issue of M23’s territorial control to the second stage of talks scheduled to start by August 8 and be resolved by August 18.[xxxv] Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior Africa adviser, said that the restoration of state authority was “one of the most important clauses” of the declaration.[xxxvi] CTP assessed previously that the two sides will likely be unable to clearly resolve this central issue and other points of divergence in a sustainable fashion that includes agreed-upon dispute-resolution mechanisms within the 10-day time frame for August talks.[xxxvii]

The DRC has refused to make major concessions in the talks and is unlikely to recognize M23’s de facto control over parts of the eastern DRC. The DRC rejected M23’s proposal for autonomy and has demanded the group’s dissolution without prospect for reintegration.[xxxviii] Tshisekedi risks severely undermining his credibility and legitimacy among his power base in Kinshasa by ceding territory to M23.[xxxix] Tshisekedi branded M23 as a “terrorist” group and an “illegitimate Rwandan proxy” in the past and heavily leaned into anti-Rwandan rhetoric during his successful reelection campaign in January 2024.[xl] Tshisekedi’s political allies have been vocal in the need to forcefully deal with the threat of M23 and Rwanda.

M23 has been equally maximalist and will likely continue efforts to supplant DRC government institutions regardless of the outcome of the DRC-M23 talks. M23 has proposed an arrangement that would legitimize M23 control of the Kivu provinces and called for “federalism,” whereby it would “comanage” occupied areas with the central government but maintain autonomy in matters of defense and economic policy.[xli] M23’s efforts to build a parallel administration signal that the group intends to govern occupied areas in the long-term. The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 has not shown “a genuine commitment” to peace talks with the DRC government.[xlii] The July UN report also quoted M23 and Rwandan officials saying that M23 will refuse to vacate occupied territory.[xliii]

M23 may already have the requisite strength to relaunch its military campaign and could conduct southward or westward offensives to gain leverage if talks stall or collapse. M23 and Rwanda conducted several offensives in early 2025 to bolster their leverage in peace talks. Angolan-mediated peace talks with Rwanda collapsed after the DRC rejected Rwanda’s demand for the DRC to hold direct negotiations with M23 for the talks to continue in late 2024.[xliv] Rwanda then provided “decisive” support—6,000 troops and advanced military technology—to back an M23 offensive in the first quarter of 2025 that ended in M23’s capture of the North and South Kivu provincial capitals.[xlv] M23 conducted a more limited offensive a few weeks later and captured the Walikale district capital in North Kivu to augment its leverage and force direct peace talks with the DRC in March.[xlvi]

M23 could target the Uvira district capital in South Kivu if talks stall or collapse. Uvira is the second-most-populated city in South Kivu and a transportation hub with access to Lake Tanganyika and Burundi’s economic capital, Bujumbura, roughly 16 miles to the east.[xlvii] The DRC relocated the South Kivu provincial government to Uvira after M23 captured Bukavu in early 2025.[xlviii] M23’s control of Uvira would significantly weaken the FARDC’s ability to move troops and military equipment in South Kivu and be a major threat to Burundi, the DRC’s main military ally in the eastern DRC.

M23 and the FARDC have both reinforced their positions in South Kivu and traded accusations that each is planning an imminent offensive since early July. Both sides reportedly reinforced their positions in several areas in South Kivu, including in Kamanyola village—about 45 miles north of Uvira on the RN5 where the frontlines have been frozen since March.[xlix] Both sides have accused each other of threatening to launch an offensive with the recent deployments.[l] M23 has used the pretext of a threat from the FARDC and FARDC-aligned groups to justify its past advances in the eastern DRC.

Figure 5. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province (August 2025)

Source: Yale Ford, Calvin Hodges, and Liam Karr.

A southward M23 offensive would risk regional escalation and likely proceed only if Rwanda was willing to abandon its prior deconfliction efforts with Burundi, however. M23 advanced within roughly 20 miles of Uvira at the peak of its southward advance in late February 2025 before the group voluntarily withdrew to Kamanyola, which CTP assessed at the time was likely due to an agreement between Burundi and Rwanda.[li]

Figure 6. M23 and Allies Advance in Southern Kivu (February 2025)

Source: Liam Karr, Yale Ford, and Nick Markiewicz.

M23 could alternatively conduct a westward offensive to recapture Walikale town and advance on Kisangani in central DRC. The United States pressured Rwanda and M23 to halt its offensive to show goodwill in peace talks after it captured Walikale in March.[lii] M23 could relaunch a westward offensive to retake Walikale, which would then set conditions for the group to advance to Lubutu town and its nearby airport—located about 125 west along the RN3—and the DRC’s fourth-largest city, Kisangani, which is more than 250 miles northwest.[liii] Kisangani is a major FARDC logistics hub where the FARDC pilots attack drones and has built up a significant amount of military personnel and equipment in recent months. French outlet Africa Intelligence reported in late June that the FARDC recently procured at least four new attack drones and has already deployed at least 50 armored vehicles to Kisangani for a potential M23 offensive.[liv]

Figure 7. M23 Advances Westward Toward DRC Interior (March 2025)

Source: Liam Karr, Yale Ford, and Nick Markiewicz.

Greater external pressure on either side could lead them to abandon their maximalist positions. The United States and Qatar could apply pressure on both sides to make concessions to retain the advantages of US engagement. The United States reportedly asked M23 to “be more flexible” with respect to the DRC’s negotiating position.[lv] Sanctions on Congolese and Rwandan actors could push the sides toward agreeing to and upholding a deal. The US Congress introduced a resolution encouraging “the use of targeted economic sanctions and visa restrictions against individuals and entities that are corrupt, obstructing peace, perpetrating violence, or committing human rights abuses” in the DRC in late June.[lvi]

Rwanda and M23 are unlikely to make concessions without coordinated international pressure. Kagame has said on multiple occasions in 2025 that Rwanda would face the consequences of sanctions and “tighten our belts” for its unilateral military action in the eastern DRC that it deems existential.[lvii] Rwanda has strengthened its partnerships with the West over the last decade, which has partially deterred sanctions on Rwanda, unlike the last time that M23 seized Goma in 2012. Rwanda’s bilateral and multilateral military deployments across Africa align heavily with Western interests, especially amid growing aversion from some African governments toward UN and Western military interventions.[lviii] Rwanda has also focused on growing its economy to position itself to attract foreign investment as an economic hub for Western countries and businesses.[lix]

Congolese officials may not implement the concessions they agree to—as they have historically—without sustained international pressure. M23 does not pose a direct existential threat to the DRC government, as it would have to travel roughly 500 miles to reach the DRC’s economic engine in the mineral-rich Katanga region and nearly 1,000 miles to Kinshasa across poor roads. This distance has contributed to the government reneging on previous deals as international focus wanes. Kabila initially agreed to a peace deal with the former iteration of M23 in 2013 but never implemented it. The current iteration of M23 arose when the DRC again refused to implement the agreement after negotiations stalled in November 2021.[lx]

Other local and regional actors could undermine the sustainability of the broader peace framework even if the DRC and M23 reach an agreement. Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo militias are excluded from the Qatari-brokered talks, and the DRC is unlikely able to control these militias who have clashed regularly with M23 throughout 2025 despite the various peace initiatives.[lxi] CTP assessed previously that the lack of a comprehensive agreement involving an array of armed actors increases the risk that unaddressed issues undermine existing peace deals.[lxii]

Burundi and Uganda, two major military players with thousands of troops deployed in the eastern DRC, are also not included in the broader peace framework. Both countries pursue their own strategic interests in the eastern DRC to the detriment of regional stability, and their exclusion could undermine existing peace deals.[lxiii] Observers of the conflict in the DRC have assessed that Rwanda’s decision to reactivate M23 in 2021 was motivated primarily by its need to protect its influence in the eastern DRC against Uganda.[lxiv]

Africa File Data Cutoff: August 6, 2025, at 10 a.m.

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