JNIM Economic Warfare: Africa File, September 11, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has begun forcibly enforcing its blockade on western Mali, escalating a new phase of economic warfare on Mali’s most economically and politically sensitive areas. The campaign undermines the legitimacy of the Malian junta, could seriously degrade popular support for the junta, and will have a harmful ripple effect on surrounding countries.
• Somalia. Al Shabaab is setting conditions to recapture another district capital in central Somalia. The recapture of Harardhere, a coastal district capital, would support al Shabaab’s efforts to pressure the remaining Somali Federal Government–controlled population centers in central Somalia and give al Shabaab access to another logistic point along the Indian Ocean.
• Ethiopia. Ethiopia officially inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) despite Egypt’s and Sudan’s objections. GERD concerns are exacerbating tensions across the Horn of Africa.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 has launched a systematic state-building project to translate its military gains in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo into a de facto autonomous region.

Figure 1. JNIM Economic Warfare: Africa File, September 11, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Mali

Author: Liam Karr

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has escalated the rate of attacks in western Mali as it intensifies its economic warfare campaign in the region and begins enforcing its blockade of key towns. A JNIM spokesperson reaffirmed the group’s siege on Kayes and Nioro towns in western Mali and explicitly threatened fuel tankers and vehicles from the Diarra transport company in a video released on September 3.[1] JNIM had initially announced the siege in early July following a mini-offensive in which it simultaneously attacked several border posts and towns across western Mali on July 1, but Mali’s rainy season had already decreased road traffic in recent weeks.[2] JNIM militants have attacked several fuel tankers and buses at least seven times in various parts of southern and western Mali since September 3.[3] Several Malian companies, including Diarra transport, have suspended operations in response to the uptick in attacks.[4] Unconfirmed reports on social media claimed some businessmen struck a deal with JNIM for safe passage of certain fuel tankers.[5]

Figure 2. JNIM’s Areas of Operation in Western Mali

Note: Data are from Kayes, Koulikoro, and Sikasso regions.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

CTP has previously reported on an ongoing surge in JNIM attacks against foreign companies since May 2025.[6] JNIM has attacked foreign companies and foreign workers in Mali 11 times in 2025, all of which have occurred since May.[7] The surge follows JNIM explicitly threatening that all companies operating in Mali must secure permission from JNIM to continue operations on June 7.[8]

The campaign threatens to cripple Mali’s national economy, which could cause severe financial strain for the Malian government and cause food and fuel inflation for Malian civilians. JNIM’s new blockades are targeting vital trade and transit corridors. Nearly half of all Malian imports are Ivorian and Senegalese products.[9] At least 60 percent of Mali’s total trade passes along the Northern Bamako-Dakar Corridor, which consists of the RN1 and RN3 in Mali, while some Senegalese sources claim the figure is as high as 80 percent.[10]

Mali lacks many alternative trade routes or methods. The Malian government has long avoided overreliance on any one port or transit corridor. JNIM has spent years establishing support zones along the borders with Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Mauritania, however, and has operationalized these support zones throughout 2025 to enforce the ongoing siege. The group has already heavily degraded the corridors running from Benin, Ghana, and Togo via Burkina Faso. Over 90 percent of Malian trade traffic occurs via road due to Mali’s dilapidated rail infrastructure, and any rail reconstruction efforts would be equally vulnerable to insurgent attacks.[11]

These trade routes are particularly important for food and fuel. Mali imports nearly all its petroleum from Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal—60 and 35 percent, respectively—accounting for more than half of its imports from both countries.[12] Agricultural products are the next highest import category.[13] The World Bank also identified border posts along the Dakar-Bamako corridor and Conakry-Bamako corridor as key to regional food security.[14] JNIM targeted the post on the Dakar-Bamako corridor—Diboli—during its July 1 attacks.

The group’s broader economic campaign also threatens the mining industry, which is vital to the Malian government’s budget. The World Bank reported in 2015 that Kayes was the second-highest contributor to Mali’s overall gross domestic product, trailing only Bamako.[15] This figure likely understates Kayes’s importance, given that the region is the hub for Malian gold mining, accounting for nearly 80 percent of industrial gold production.[16] Gold accounted for more than 90 percent of Mali’s total exports—more than $5 billion—in 2023 and reportedly makes up half of Mali’s tax revenues and a quarter of the government budget.[17] Nearly half of the JNIM attacks on foreign companies have targeted mines in Kayes.[18]

JNIM’s campaign will likely have a harmful ripple effect on surrounding countries, particularly Senegal. Senegal generated nearly $500,000 from Malian truck traffic taxes, equaling more than 10 percent of Senegalese government tax revenues.[19] Mali imported $1.22 billion of Senegalese products in 2023, making it the largest importer of Senegalese products. This trade accounted for nearly a quarter of all Senegalese exports and doubled the share of the next highest country—Switzerland. Senegal exports more to Mali than it does to all of Asia or all of Europe.[20] Mali imported $1.5 billion of products from Côte d’Ivoire in 2023, making it the third-largest purchaser of Ivorian products and the largest purchaser in Africa.

The campaign undermines the legitimacy of the Malian junta and could degrade popular support for the junta, increasing the risk of protests or coup plots. The Malian army has increased patrols and conducted a series of drone strikes in western Mali on September 7 and 8, but Malian officials have denied that any blockade is in effect.[21] These tactics fail to counter JNIM’s blockade tactics, which is predicated on small groups of militants who ambush soft targets. The deteriorating security situation in more economically and politically sensitive areas of the country contradicts the junta’s claim that it is improving the security situation. This narrative is key to the junta’s founding rationale and argument for the continued delay back to civilian and democratic governance. The junta has high popular support in these more insulated areas, but more regular attacks and inflationary price shocks on essential items like food and fuel could shatter the junta’s narrative.

The Malian junta has already suffered several destabilizing blows since early August, including an alleged coup plot. JNIM captured Farabougou, a key town in central Mali, on August 19 and has since struck an agreement with local leaders to shadow-govern the town.[22] The town is critically located near the highway connecting central and southern Mali along the Mauritanian border and is symbolically important to the junta as the site of one of its first major counterinsurgency operations after taking power.[23] The fall of Farabougou came weeks after the junta claimed to thwart a coup plot in early August.[24] CTP and others have assessed that the arrests are likely related to internal power struggles and possible discontent with the deteriorating security situation.[25]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Al Shabaab has increased its presence outside of Harardhere, Mudug region, one of the last remaining Somali Federal Government (SFG)–controlled district capitals that the SFG regained during its 2022 offensive. Somali media reported that al Shabaab militants have allegedly arrived from Galgadud, Hiraan, and Middle Shabelle regions and set up positions surrounding Harardhere district in the last two weeks.[26] August 2025 was al Shabaab’s most active month in Harardhere district since February, with more kinetic events and personnel movements being reported than April through July combined, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.[27] Harardhere is a critically located coastal town, with a port and roads leading to el Dheere, a district capital to the southwest, and Puntland state to the northeast.

Figure 3. Al Shabaab Activity in Harardhere District, March–August 2025

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Al Shabaab has already almost entirely overturned the gains of the SFG-led, US-backed offensive in central Somalia from 2022 to 2023.[28] Harardhere is one of only two district capitals that the SFG regained during the offensive and still controls. Al Shabaab has relinked support zones connecting its southern stronghold to its havens in central Somalia and already captured more territory than it controlled prior to the 2022 offensive.[29]

Figure 4. Al Shabaab Retakes Central Somalia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The Somali National Army has deployed forces on roads leading into Harardhere, but tensions between the SFG and crucial local militias are undermining the town’s security. Local Ma’awisley militia leaders—a coalition of local resistance groups that have helped the SFG combat al Shabaab across central Somalia and have been key to SFG gains since 2022—recently criticized the SFG for failing to provide promised supplies and salaries to their members.[30] The commanders stated that they may withdraw from Harardhere and other localities if they do not receive assistance.[31] The SFG-allied Hirshabelle state administration has echoed the same criticism recently, stating that the SFG has not adequately supported Somali forces in Hiraan Region.[32]

Al Shabaab’s recapture of Harardhere would give the group a logistic hub to support operations on the coastal road stretching from Harardhere to Mogadishu to the southwest. Retaking Harardhere would eliminate a second SFG front on al Shabaab safe havens in central Somalia. The group would likely take advantage of the situation to increase pressure on el Dheere, which is 140 kilometers southwest and the only other district capital regained during the 2022 offensive that the SFG still controls. Al Shabaab has already begun isolating el Dheere by cutting off SFG lines of communication from Adale, Middle Shabelle region, a major coastal town located further southwest. Al Shabaab has drastically increased its activity in Adale in 2025, conducting more attacks from January through June than it did from 2021 through 2024 combined.[33]

Al Shabaab would likely use greater sea access to reestablish ties with Somali pirates and increase its ties to the Houthis, facilitating arms smuggling and the possible movement of militants. The UN reported that militants from the groups have met multiple times, which has resulted in the Houthis sending arms to al Shabaab and training al Shabaab fighters.[34] Reports have detailed al Shabaab’s facilitation of arms shipments from Iran and other actors to the Houthis.[35] Harardhere has been a destination for arms from the Arabian Peninsula in the past, and recent weapons shipments from Yemen have traveled as far as al Shabaab–controlled ports even further south.[36] Harardhere could be a destination for the advanced weaponry that al Shabaab has reportedly requested from the Houthis, potentially including drones and missiles.[37]

Al Shabaab could reengage with Somali pirates to diversify and expand its revenue streams. Piracy represents an alternative revenue stream for al Shabaab, which relies on tax collection from domestic industries.[38] Harardhere is a small-to-medium port and a historic piracy base.[39] Al Shabaab embedded itself in piracy networks in the 2000s and 2010s, collecting a portion of earnings in exchange for ensuring pirates could operate in its support zones.[40] The Carnegie Endowment for Peace reported in March 2025 that al Shabaab is allegedly collaborating similarly with pirates again.[41] Piracy off the Horn of Africa has drastically increased since 2023, with 47 instances in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean compared with zero from 2020 to 2022.[42]

Ethiopia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on September 9 despite objections from Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Kenyan President William Ruto, and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hailed the GERD as a pan-African achievement that will further economic development.[43] The GERD is projected to increase Ethiopia’s revenue by $1 billion annually through electricity exports neighboring countries.[44] The dam will also double domestic electricity generation, which will help bring electricity to the approximately 50 percent of Ethiopians do not have electricity.[45]

Ethiopia operationalized the GERD despite opposition from Egypt and Sudan, which are downstream countries on the Nile River. Egypt and Sudan cited the lack of a trilateral water-access agreement among them and Ethiopia as the reason for their objections.[46] Both countries are concerned that Ethiopia can weaponize their water supply. Egypt and Sudan have reiterated their commitment to the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, which guarantees their water access but not Ethiopia’s.[47] Ethiopia has offered to engage in dialogue regarding a new deal with other countries in the Nile River basin, including Egypt,Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.[48] High-level Egyptian and Sudanese officials met in early September to align publicly against the GERD and reiterate their objections.[49]

The absence of a water-access agreement will fragment the region diplomatically, pitting Ethiopia against Egypt and Sudan. Issues related to water access are contributing to the formation of a de facto bloc to contain Ethiopia. The bloc also includes Eritrea and Somalia, as both are concerned about Ethiopia’s efforts to secure Red Sea access, either by invading Eritrea or recognizing the de facto breakaway Somaliland region in northern Somalia.[50] Egypt took advantage of Eritrea and Somalia’s concerns to form closer ties with the two countries. The three countries held a trilateral summit in October 2024, pledging greater security coordination.[51]

Somalia has not fully aligned itself with against Ethiopia, maintaining relations with Ethiopia while continuing to strengthen ties with Egypt. The Somali defense minister supported the Arab League’s authority to issue a statement in favor of Egypt and Sudan last week.[52] Somalia also hosted an Egyptian military delegation last week to prepare for an upcoming Egyptian troop deployment to combat al Shabaab.[53] Somali President Mohamud restored diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in January 2025, however, and attended the GERD inauguration.[54] Somalia has been hedging, likely to receive more support from Egypt while avoiding escalation with Ethiopia.

Uganda and South Sudan have separately voiced support for Ethiopia because the GERD will supply them with electricity.[55] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has mediated between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, but CTP has previously assessed that the UAE is more likely to support Ethiopia in the case of diplomatic escalation.[56] The UAE and Ethiopia have strong ties, including the UAE providing an air bridge for Ethiopia during the war in Tigray and backing some Ethiopian efforts to secure a Red Sea port.[57]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

The following text is an excerpt from CTP’s latest report, “M23’s State-Building Project“

Rwandan-backed M23 has launched a systematic state-building project to translate its military gains in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) into a de facto autonomous region. The M23 conflict in the eastern DRC traces back to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which helped spark the First and Second Congo Wars in the late 1990s. Rwanda then backed insurgencies in the post-war era, including the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), to protect its interests in the eastern DRC. Former CNDP members established the first Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) iteration in 2012 and briefly captured Goma in 2013, before Rwanda—under significant international pressure—cut its support and the group’s senior leadership went into exile. M23 reemerged in late 2021, and the group has since steadily expanded its territorial control with significant Rwandan backing, despite various international and African-led peace initiatives to bolster pro-Congolese government forces against M23 and mediation efforts between the DRC and Rwanda.

M23 and Rwanda launched a large-scale offensive that captured extensive territory, including the North and South Kivu provincial capitals—Goma and Bukavu, in early 2025 after regional peace efforts broke down in late 2024. The United Nations reported that M23 had doubled its territorial control in early April compared to late 2024.[58] The group has largely replaced the Congolese government in urban areas and now also controls half of the district capitals—called “territories” in the eastern DRC—in North and South Kivu. CTP estimates that M23 operates in a geographical area that spans nearly 5,800 square miles with five million people—about half the size of Belgium with the population of Ireland.

Figure 5. M23 Advances in 2025

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

M23’s primary focus since early 2025 has been expanding its parallel government to newly captured areas to facilitate its state-building efforts. The group had established administrative structures and controlled activities in its strongholds before it captured Goma and Bukavu.[59] M23 has used the urban infrastructure and administrative networks in Goma and Bukavu, however, to accelerate and centralize these efforts on a wider scale and rapidly establish state-like structures in these cities and their surrounding areas. M23 has appointed officials down to the local level and devoted significant resources to provide basic services, establish an alternative financial system, secure and police large population centers, adjudicate social and legal matters, and facilitate transportation and trade in the eastern DRC in 2025.[60] CTP has recorded at least 90 new appointments to the estimated 125 senior-level positions in M23’s civilian administration across North and South Kivu in 2025.

Read a full list of M23’s military and political appointees here

Figure 6. M23 Territorial Administrations

Source: Liam Karr.

M23’s comprehensive state-building project is a notable inflection from previous Rwandan-backed insurgencies. The RCD and CNDP’s parallel structures were heavily security-focused and limited in scope to actions such as protecting majority-Tutsi communities, collecting taxes, and exploiting minerals.[61] These groups did not undertake significant efforts to reform existing administrative structures, nor did they allocate resources to improve critical infrastructure, for example. M23 established parallel governing structures in 2012-2013, but the systems were short-lived and mostly localized.[62] The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 now aims to govern occupied areas in the long term through an “autonomous region” in the eastern DRC.[63]

Africa File Data Cutoff: September 11, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.