Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2023

April 20, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet on April 19 amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev announced on April 19 the “appointment” of Russian Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sergei Avakyants to the headquarters overseeing Russia’s military sports training and patriotic education centers, a clear demotion for one of the seniormost commanding officers in the Russian Navy.[1] It is unclear why a Kremlin official initially announced Avakyants’ reappointment instead of the Ministry of Defense. The Russian Pacific Fleet reported on April 20 that Avankyants is changing position due to his reaching the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) age limit for military service (65 years).[2] However, Russian state media outlet TASS reported that its sources claimed that Avakyants’ demotion was not due to his old age.[3] Several Russian general officers – including current Russian theater commander in Ukraine and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces Oleg Salyukov – have served in the Russian armed forces beyond turning 65. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a surprise readiness check of the Pacific Fleet on April 14 that is still ongoing as of April 20.[4] Russian state wire TASS reported on April 20 that two sources close to the Russian Pacific Fleet’s management stated that current Commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet Admiral Viktor Liina may take command of the Pacific Fleet and that Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Vorobyov may command the Baltic Fleet.[5]

The Kremlin clearly demoted Avakyants from a senior operational commander to a military bureaucrat overseeing programmatic work, despite Russian officials’ framing of the shift as a new “appointment.” Avakyants’ demotion may be connected to the poor performance of Pacific Fleet naval infantry (such as the 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades) around Vuhledar since early 2023. Avakyants alternatively may have failed in some manner to conduct large-scale drills in the Pacific. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin linked Avakyants’ dismissal to the Pacific Fleet drills and sarcastically questioned if someone could conduct drills within the Russian MoD, likely advocating for the dismissal of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[6] Another milblogger welcomed Avakyants’ dismissal, stating that Russia needs to appoint younger commanders like Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.[7]

A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s ineffective use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces in Ukraine. The milblogger argued on April 20 that Russian forces are relying on VDV, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry units to conduct ground attacks in Ukraine due to a lack of high-quality infantry, despite VDV and Spetsnaz units not initially being prepared for conducting combined arms operations.[8] The milblogger argued that VDV, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry units need to carry out their intended purposes and not serve as the Russian military’s elite infantry and assault groups in Ukraine.[9] The milblogger particularly criticized Spetsnaz units for not conducting enough sabotage and targeting operations and VDV units for being too large and requiring expensive specialized equipment that is not useful in the current tactical realities in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger asserted that the Russian military will not be able to normalize command, management, and planning for major operations until it establishes clear roles for VDV, naval infantry, and Spetsnaz units.[11] The milblogger additionally admitted that the Russian military has in practice formed light infantry units without transports for some time, despite the Russian military’s doctrinal focus on ”motorized rifle” (mechanized infantry) units. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s most elite forces – VDV and Spetsnaz – are diluting their combat effectiveness and doctrinal specialties with poorly trained mobilized personnel and volunteers due to high casualties sustained in Ukraine.[12] The milblogger’s criticism of the use of these elite forces further suggests that these units’ reputation as Russia’s elite fighting force in Ukraine is questionable.

The Russian State Duma adopted a law on April 20 that grants members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s (DNR and LNR) Militias veterans' status and could apply to select PMC or other irregular personnel but fails to explicitly address the status of PMC groups as legal entities.[13] The law (adopted in its third reading) provides veteran status to members of the DNR and LNR Militias who have fought since Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, as well as to personnel who served in unspecified organizations which “contribute to the tasks of the Russian Armed Forces” in Ukraine. This framing will likely allow the Kremlin to provide veteran status to select PMC personnel without recognizing the legality of PMCs like the Wagner Group, for which Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long campaigned.[14]  Prigozhin focused on the lack of recognition of the Wagner Group, though this law would have been an unusual way for the Kremlin to legally recognize Wagner. Prigozhin griped that unnamed Russian entities seek to “forever remove [Wagner] from the history of Russia.”[15] Prigozhin claimed that he is happy for the DNR and LNR militiamen and that he is okay not receiving recognition until authorities eventually punish the individuals who stole Wagner’s recognition.

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Russian border during a meeting with government officials on April 19.[16] Putin claimed that he personally traveled through the Gukovo checkpoint, which connects Rostov and Luhansk oblasts, when returning from his recent trip to occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.[17] Putin stated that poor road conditions at the checkpoint caused a civilian backup and forced trucks delivering perishable goods to wait for hours before passing through, causing shipment delays and price increases in occupied territories.[18] Putin added that some trucks must bypass the checkpoint entirely as the roads are too narrow and practically nonexistent.[19] Putin called on Russian special services and law enforcement to increase the number of inspection complexes and employees at checkpoints and ordered Russian officials to improve roads around checkpoints and establish routes from Rostov-on-Don to Luhansk Oblast.[20]

Putin’s orders indicate that Russia intends to maintain customs checkpoints with the illegally annexed eastern regions out of security concerns. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers complained that Russian checkpoints at the international customs line significantly slowed down Russian deliveries of ammunition to the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast.[21] The Kremlin’s failure to implement meaningful integration policies and secure occupied Ukraine is likely undermining Russia’s ability to provision forces on the front line, as ISW has previously assessed.[22] Putin is likely attempting to remedy the delays by expanding staffing to speed up inspections at the checkpoints and is not entertaining the possibility of removing these obstructions. Russia previously intensified security measures and inspections around the Kerch Strait Bridge, the Kremlin likely continues to use these checkpoints for similar security reasons.[23] The Kremlin may also use these checkpoints to prevent the mass movement of men from occupied Ukraine escaping forced mobilization, to stop Russian mobilized personnel from fleeing to Russia, and to maintain Russian filtration measures. The existence of these checkpoints further highlights that Russian officials do not view the residents of occupied Ukraine as Russian nationals and are governing as the occupying power they are, despite ongoing claims the illegally annexed territories are part of Russia.

Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss announced his resignation on April 20, reportedly in response to an offer from Russian President Vladimir Putin to work at the federal level.[24] The reason for Uss’ promotion is currently unclear but may be part of Putin’s efforts to strengthen control over regional officials.

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet Sergei Avakyants amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. It is unclear if the Kremlin demoted Avakyants due to his poor performance in the ongoing rills or for other reasons.
• A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces as frontline infantry in Ukraine.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a law granting members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Militias veterans' status which could possibly cover PMC personnel but does not formally recognize PMC formations.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint during a meeting with government officials, indicating continued Russian challenges integrating illegally annexed Ukrainian territory.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine out of concern for a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to improve their tactical positions in the Kreminna area and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near the southern outskirts of Kreminna and near Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian sources reported battles near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces are operating near the settlement.[26] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that previous Russian claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Spirne (13 km south of Bilohorivka) were premature and that Ukrainian forces still control the settlement as of April 20.[27] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in the direction of Torske (15 km west of Kreminna), Terny (17 km northwest of Kreminna), and Nevske (17 km northwest of Kreminna).[28]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Tymikva, Kharkiv Oblast (32km northwest of Svatove) and Andriivka, Luhansk Oblast (15 west of Svatove).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued assault operations in Bakhmut and its vicinity on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 22 Russian attacks in the Bakhmut direction – specifically in Bakhmut city and in the area of Khromove (2km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian conventional forces attempted to advance towards Stupochky (about 14km southwest of Bakhmut) while Wagner Group forces continued to attack Ukrainian forces from central, southern, and northern parts of Bakhmut.[31] A Russian source claimed that Wagner forces are changing the direction of the main attack against Bakhmut and are intensifying efforts to advance towards the O0506 highway that runs through Khromove into Bakhmut.[32] A milblogger claimed that Wagner forces attacked near Khromove and were able to advance to an unspecified highway - likely the O0506 - that Ukrainian forces use as a ground line of communication (GLOC) into Bakhmut.[33] Geolocated footage posted on April 20 showed Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions northwest of Khromove.[34] A Wagner-affiliated source published a video purportedly showing Wagner tank crews firing at Ukrainian forces in central Bakhmut using T-90 tanks.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner forces are ”confidently” holding positions in the area of the Bakhmut administration building and the central square forces while Ukrainians hold a ”relatively small” portion of the urban area.[36]

Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka; within 5km northeast of Avdiivka in Kamianka; and within 15km west of Avdiivka in Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled numerous Russian attacks on Marinka and Pobieda, 23km and 27km southwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to encircle Ukrainian forces in Marinka and unsuccessfully resumed ground attacks near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[39] The milblogger claimed that a Russian assault on Sieverne from the direction of Vodyane forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from unspecified positions.[40] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued to launch assaults on Marinka and Nevelske, and that fighting is ongoing in the vicinity of Novobakhmutivka (about 15km northwest of Avdiivka).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in the area of Krasnohorivka (about 9km north of Avdiivka), where fighting is currently ongoing.[42] Geolocated footage also showed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) artillery elements of the 14^th “Kalmius” Artillery Brigade providing fire support to the 80^th “Sparta” Separate Reconnaissance Battalion by striking Ukrainian positions north of Vodyane.[43] Elements of the DNR‘s “Pyatnyshka” Volunteer Battalion are operating in the Avdiivka direction.[44] The DNR‘s 5th Brigade of the 1^st Army Corps continued operating in the Marinka direction.[45]

Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions southwest of Donetsk City on April 20 but did not make any territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Prechystivka and Vuhledar within 60km southwest of Donetsk City.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack in the direction of Prechystivka, and Ukrainian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force near Pavlivka (about 48km southwest of Donetsk City).[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian “Grim” (“Thunder”) Tactical Group Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 20 that Russian forces in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast are equipping defensive lines, looting, and transporting looted goods in cars, as Russian forces feel insecure about their positions.[48] Pletenchuk noted that discourse about the likely upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive is filling the Russian information space.[49] Pletenchuk stated that minefields actively inhibit Russian advances in an unspecified area in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces will transfer 400 conscripts from Izyumivka (14km northwest of Feodosia) to defensive positions in Volodymyrivka, Crimea (18km southwest of Yevpatoria).[50] Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces operated a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system, normally a military district-level asset, near Novodanylivka (36km southwest of Hulyaipole) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, which could indicate a Russian prioritization to augment Russian defensive positions along this line.[51]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Russian forces may have made marginal territorial gains to the south and southeast of Hulyaipole but caveated his report, stating that this information is unconfirmed.[52] Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on April 20.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing some formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an audio intercept on April 19 in which a Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) soldier claimed that unspecified Russian authorities cut off and shut down the BARS volunteer soldier program and terminated his contract.[54] The soldier stated that the Wagner Group PMC and the Russian MoD-operated Redut PMC are taking over the contracts of the former BARS soldiers.[55] Russian State Duma Deputy Fedot Tumusov claimed on April 19 that Wagner PMC and the “Veterany” PMC of the 3rd Army Corps forcibly enlisted six mobilized residents of the Sakha Republic.[56] Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA reported on April 13 that the “Wolves” PMC – which likely has ties to the Wagner Group PMC – forced 100 mobilized soldiers in Stakhanov, Luhansk Oblast, to join its ranks.[57]

Russian volunteer formations have suffered major losses and likely have abysmal morale. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Russian volunteers of the “Nevsky” volunteer formation deployed in Donetsk Oblast experience low morale and psychological strain due to personnel losses, ammunition shortages, and uncertainty regarding potential reinforcements. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that an increasing number of Russian soldiers want to leave their units and return home.[58] Low morale among volunteer fighters decreases the effectiveness of Russian forces deployed on the front lines and intensifies the urgency and difficulty of the Kremlin’s ongoing aggressive campaigns to increase contract service recruitment.[59]

Major personnel losses continue to force Russian force structures to evolve. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) noted on April 20 that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claimed visit to the Dnepr Group of Forces on April 18 is one of the first public references to the existence of the Dnepr Group of Forces organization. The UK MoD noted that the existence of this seemingly new group of forces indicates Russian forces’ structural adaptation from traditional Russian operational formations organized along Russian military districts, possibly due to heavy losses among Russia’s regular units.[60]

Russian authorities continue to respond to and prepare for the digitization of Russia’s conscription and mobilization processes. St. Petersburg authorities on April 20 joined Moscow authorities in conducting a trial period of issuing digital summons in preparation for the upcoming large-scale digitization of the conscription and mobilization process.[61] Sever.Reallii reported on April 20 that Russian authorities blocked the Russian opposition Yabloko Party’s St. Petersburg chapter from conducting a planned demonstration against the digital summonses law. The authorities claimed that the Yabloko protestors erroneously filed a permit application for a demonstration and that the application was submitted outside the formal 14-day advanced notice period.[62] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace analyst Mikhail Komin assessed on April 19 that Russian authorities are competing to control digitalization reforms and the database containing information on all residents eligible for military service. Komin noted that the timeline and complexity of the reforms further increase the low likelihood that the reforms will succeed.[63]

Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on April 20 that Russian forces received a new batch of Shahed drones from Iran.[64] Several Russian and Ukrainian sources reported a series of Shahed attacks across Ukraine on April 19 and 20.[65] Humenyuk stated that these attacks ended a temporary Russian pause in Shahed drone use in anticipation of new deliveries.[66]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 20 that the Coordination Council of the occupied Kherson Oblast branch of the Russian social group “Movement of the First” met for the first time with Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravstov. Saldo claimed that more than 200 young activists have traveled to youth camps in Russia for vacation and study since the regional Movement of the First group was established in February 2023. Saldo claimed that the group has established 58 primary organizations in occupied Kherson Oblast to help teachers promote Russian history and patriotism in the classroom.[67]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce their candidacy for highly performative preliminary elections in occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov announced on April 20 that he submitted his candidacy to participate in the All-Russian United Russia Party preliminary voting, which will take place from May 22-28.[68] Rogov urged residents to ensure that Zaporizhia Oblast flourishes by specifically supporting the Kremlin-backed United Russia Party.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continued conducting exercises as part of a Belarusian Command Staff exercise in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on April 20 that the Belarusian 19^th Mechanized Brigade completed its participation in the Belarusian command staff exercise at the 227^th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.[70] Unspecified Belarusian chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN) elements participated in the Belarusian command staff exercise in an unspecified location on April 20.[71] Unspecified Belarusian tank elements participated in exercises at an unspecified training ground in Brest Oblast on April 20.[72]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.