Russia-Africa Summit; Sudan’s Drone War Intensifies: Africa File, November 5, 2026

To receive the Africa File, Ethiopia War Security Review, or Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Contributors: Ziv Zellars

Key Takeaways:

• Russia. The third Russia-Africa summit did not mark a major inflection in Russia’s engagement with African partners. Russia sought to remedy its persistent shortcomings as an economic partner and continued to focus on defense, education, media, and nuclear energy as areas of either low cost or competitive advantage.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have intensified their drone campaigns against each other, further increasing the humanitarian burden on civilians. Both sides’ campaigns have increased tensions between the SAF-led Sudanese government and neighboring Ethiopia and South Sudan.
• Ethiopia. Unverified reports claimed that Ethiopian and Eritrean forces exchanged fire near the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, as the conflict in northern Ethiopia risks becoming a low-intensity border war that could lead to further escalation between the two countries.

Figure 1. Africa File, November 5, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke.

Assessments:

Russia

Author: Liam Karr

The third Russia-Africa summit did not mark a major inflection in Russia’s engagement with African partners. Delegations from 48 African countries attended the summit from October 28 to 29 in Moscow. Head-of-state attendance at the summit continued to lag despite a marginal rebound since the 2023 summit, as only 21 heads of state attended.[1] This figure is only a marginal improvement on the 17 who attended the last summit in 2023, amid heavy Western pressure to isolate Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and far from the 43 heads of state that attended the first summit in 2019.[2] China notably had 51 heads of state attend its most recent Africa summit in 2024, in Beijing.[3]

Senior Russian officials continued pushing long-standing rhetorical narratives that frame African countries as part of an anti-Western bloc seeking a multipolar world order, despite African countries repeatedly signaling that their interests are best served by diversifying and balancing ties with China, Russia, and the West over choosing sides.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Africa and Russia are united by their desire for a “just and multipolar world order,” and the final summit declaration emphasized that Russia and Africa share a responsibility to form a more multipolar and balanced world order.[5] The declaration also said that Russia and African states agreed to combat the legacy of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and any form of xenophobia—rhetoric that Russian officials have used for years to present Russia as a non-colonial alternative and fuel anti-Western sentiment in African countries.[6]

Russia did not fully address its deceptive recruitment of African nationals to fight in Ukraine, which will likely continue in the absence of comprehensive and united pushback from African leaders. Russian efforts to recruit African nationals to fight in Ukraine has become a growing concern for some African countries in recent years, but Russian leaders did not publicly acknowledge the issue during the summit. Ukrainian intelligence assessed in February 2026 that Russia had recruited nearly 1,800 Africans to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine, and an investigation by a nonprofit African journalist organization claimed that as of June 2026 more than 3,000 Africans had enlisted in Russia’s armed forces since October 2022.[7] Kenya’s national intelligence service independently assessed in an official government investigation that foreign and local Russian agents had recruited more than 1,000 Kenyans to Russia.[8] Independent reporting has outlined a repeated pattern of Russian-linked recruiters based in Russia and other countries luring African recruits to Russia through fake labor trafficking schemes that meet constituent criteria of human trafficking.[9]

Russia had already shifted recruitment pipelines away from countries that have pursued the issue on a bilateral basis, allowing Russian officials to present a fait accompli as a sign of goodwill at the summit without changing its overall policy. Ghanaian and Kenyan officials said they secured promises from Putin during their bilateral meetings that Russia would halt recruitment of their nationals.[10] An investigative report from independent Russian investigative outlet iStories said that Russia had already placed both countries on a recruitment stop list in February 2026, however, and Lavrov had already told his Ghanaian and Kenyan counterparts that Russia would work to stop illegal recruitment after they raised the issue during previous engagements in 2026.[11] Ukrainian intelligence has assessed that recruitment has shifted to more permissive states, such as Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, throughout 2026.[12]

Russia focused on reducing trade barriers and signed a handful of publicized economic deals, but its shortcomings as an economic power on the continent continue to limit its partnerships, even as Russian officials tout growing trade ties. Russia signed several memoranda of understanding and framework agreements to increase trade, investment, and development with multilateral African blocs, including the African Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Southern African Development Community, and the Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area.[13] Putin claimed during his plenary speech that the agreements would help regulate cooperation in trade, economic, technical, scientific, social, humanitarian, and cultural spheres.[14] Putin encouraged Russia and Africa to establish more active cooperation between Russian banking institutions and the pan-African payment and settlement system during the speech.[15]

Russian officials also highlighted efforts to remove bilateral trade barriers with individual African countries and conduct more transactions in rubles. Putin claimed in his plenary speech that 47 African countries qualify for Eurasian Economic Union tariff preferences, with customs duties reduced to zero for 32 of them, and that the ruble accounts for 85 percent of Russia-Africa trade settlements.[16] The Nigerian and Russian customs services signed an agreement on customs cooperation.[17] South African and Sudanese officials signaled interest in free-trade arrangements that would create opportunities for further economic cooperation.[18] Russian banks Sberbank and T-Bank launched ruble-converted QR payments in Egypt, with T-Bank also launching the system in Kenya and Tanzania.[19]

Putin emphasized the importance of agricultural engagements and growing economic ties more broadly, while African leaders courted Russian investment in their bilateral meetings throughout the summit, but there were few major, tangible bilateral agreements.[20] The Russian aluminum company Rusal and the Ghanaian state-owned Ghana Integrated Aluminium Development Corporation signed an agreement to develop a bauxite mine at Ghana’s Nyinahin deposit.[21] The mine would aim to produce up to 5 million tons of ore annually, and the wider deposit is estimated to exceed 100 million total tons.[22] The agreement also included a second phase to build a $1.5 billion refinery with an annual capacity of 1.2 million tons.[23] Rusal holds a majority stake in the joint ventures implementing the projects, and Ghana holds a minority stake that includes a 10 percent non-dilutable share.[24] Russia also signed agreements to establish intergovernmental commissions with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, and South Sudan, and Russia signed intergovernmental cooperation framework agreements with the Central African Republic, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda.[25] The Kremlin also claimed to sign additional unspecified bilateral agreements covering science and innovation, healthcare, transportation, agriculture, road infrastructure, information and technology trade, and space exploration during the summit.[26]

Russia is not a major trade partner for many African countries and has failed to follow through on economic promises made at past summits. Russia pledged to double trade with Africa in five years from $20 billion to $40 billion at the first summit in 2019.[27] Trade instead shrunk to about $14 billion by 2024, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[28] Putin highlighted in his plenary address that trade had grown by about 50 percent since 2019 and surpassed $27 billion in 2025.[29] This figure still falls far short of Putin’s initial goals, however, and is skewed in favor of Russia, which exports about seven times more than it imports from Africa and accounts for less than 1 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa.[30] These figures are also heavily concentrated in North Africa, where 70 percent of Russian trade takes place and where the majority of Russian FDI is tied to the el Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt.[31] European Union (EU), Chinese, and US FDI in Africa is substantially higher than Russian investment, and Russian trade figures represent roughly a tenth of Chinese and European trade with Africa and less than a quarter of US trade with Africa.[32]

The Kremlin continued to tout its role as a security partner in Africa but faces several constraints, which have led to decreasing Russian arms sales to Africa and a narrowing scope of defense cooperation with African partners that does not involve arms sales in recent years. Putin highlighted in his plenary address that Russia has intergovernmental military and military-technical cooperation agreements with 45 African countries and trains African military and law enforcement personnel at Russian institutions, and the summit’s final declaration noted that Russia and African countries agreed to cooperate to counter terrorists’ use of new technologies.[33] The Kremlin signed three bilateral military agreements during the 2026 summit: an unspecified agreement with South Sudan and arms deals with Ethiopia and Ghana.[34] Ethiopia received the first two of a previously agreed-to 12 Su-35 fighter jets during the summit and announced it would be acquiring four S-400 air-defense batteries.[35] The Kremlin folded peace and security initiatives related to counterterrorism, transnational organized crime, and capacity-building into broader, nonbinding framework agreements with the African Union that covered several other nonmilitary areas and built on preexisting memoranda of understanding.[36]

Russia faces arms constraints owing to the significant demands of its ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian global arms exports declined by 64 percent from 2021 to 2025, compared with the previous five years, owing largely decreased Russian arms exports to Russia’s North African partners, Algeria and Egypt, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.[37] Russian arms exports to Africa are a small portion of its overall arms sales, but Russia was still the third-largest arms exporter on the continent and the second-largest arms exporter in sub-Saharan Africa from 2021 to 2025, trailing China in both counts and the United States in the former.[38] The CEO of the Russian state-owned defense export company Rosoboronexport has claimed in recent years that the company works with 46 African countries, which comprise 30 percent of its total contracts, amounting to roughly $4 billion.[39]

Russia has also prioritized sending dozens of trainers to “coup-proof” vulnerable African regimes in recent years over the large deployments that it initiated in Libya and Mali over the past decade. Russian manpower constraints due to Ukraine partly fuel this shift by decreasing Russia’s ability to support further large-scale deployments. CTP has also previously assessed that Russian challenges in the Sahel may decrease Russia’s appeal as a more comprehensive defense partner. Russian partners have faced growing strategic threats throughout 2026 as worsening Salafi-jihadi insurgencies have directly and indirectly threatened Russian forces, which helped repel a major insurgent offensive in Mali in April 2026 and repel a coup attempt in Niger in August 2026. The juntas had not faced such frequent acute threats before 2026, and the proliferating threats undermine their hold on power and Russia’s international image and appeal by extension. CTP also previously assessed that the institutional shift from the Wagner Group to Africa Corps since 2023 has made Russian forces in Africa less willing to support major deployments or activities that are not directly tied to Russian strategic interests.

Figure 2. Russia Pursues Mediterranean Sea to Atlantic Ocean Corridor

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia advanced nuclear cooperation with several countries, furthering its use of nuclear energy diplomacy as a key comparative advantage. Putin touted Russia’s status as a global leader in nuclear energy during his plenary session speech and highlighted that Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation Rosatom is involved in the vast majority of planned large-scale nuclear power plants (NPPs)  worldwide.[40] Rosatom signed preliminary roadmap agreements with Ghana, Togo, and Uganda to begin exploratory and preparatory work for nuclear units and accompanying soft and hard infrastructure in all three countries.[41] Ghana and Uganda are interested in NPPs, while Togo is interested in a floating small modular reactor (SMR). Rosatom and Russian government officials also discussed ongoing NPP projects with Egypt and Ethiopia. The Russian-backed el Dabaa NPP in Egypt was scheduled to become partially operational in 2026 and fully operational in 2030, more than a decade after 2015, when Egypt and Russia initially signed agreements.[42] Ethiopia most recently signed an action plan to develop an NPP in October 2025, after having initially signed an exploratory agreement with Rosatom in 2023.[43]

Russian officials also discussed floating SMRs and uranium nuclear fuel-related activities with African partners. The Rosatom director said that Rosatom is studying floating SMRs with Egypt, Namibia, Tanzania, and Togo, and that five other unspecified African countries had expressed “significant interest.”[44] Russian officials discussed uranium mining with Tanzania and both uranium mining and nuclear fuel provision with South African officials.[45]

Figure 3. Russian Nuclear Energy Cooperation in Africa

Sources: Liam Karr; The Independent.

Russia has identified nuclear energy as a key competitive advantage in Africa and around the world. Nuclear energy deals create multiple revenue and export-market opportunities for the Kremlin and help Russia secure long-term influence with partner countries, which rely on Russia for expertise, financing, fuel, training, and technology.[46] Russia has sought to acquire these deals by offering a comprehensive package through Rosatom that includes generous financing options, education, training, and infrastructure support.[47] Energy is a high priority for many African countries, 22 of which have signed nuclear energy agreements with Russia in the past decade, at least eight of which relate to NPPs.[48] These deals still face many hurdles that have prevented any exploratory projects beyond Egypt’s el Dabaa plant from reaching the construction phase, including high upfront capital costs and small and underdeveloped African electric grids. The Kremlin’s fuel-related activities, such as uranium mining, separately increase its grip on the nuclear fuel market, which has caused dependency problems for the West.[49]

The Kremlin also focused on continuing to grow educational and media ties, which are low-cost efforts that create useful human networks and boost Russia’s perception in Africa. Russian state-owned media outlets Sputnik, TASS, and RT held the Russia-Africa Media Forum in the run-up to the full summit on October 26. The forum involved more than 200 participants from 46 African countries.[50] RT claimed to sign agreements and memoranda with media organizations from ten African countries, including the first agreements CTP has recorded with Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania.[51] RT had already doubled its African TV channel partners from 30 in 2023 to 60 in 2025 and launched a free online international journalism training program in 2023 that it claims has trained more than 1,000 media personnel in Africa.[52] The Russian state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, which operates Sputnik and RIA Novosti, signed cooperation agreements on journalism education with Ethiopia’s Debre Markos University and Niger’s Higher School of Journalism and Communication.^[53] Rossiya Segodnya and TASS signed separate cooperation and content-sharing agreements with Moroccan News outlet Hespress and the state-run Ethiopian News Agency, respectively.[54]

Russian officials emphasized the importance of Russian media cooperation to overcome “Western disinformation.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Western elites of using information warfare and disinformation as its “last remaining strength” to “stay afloat” during a press conference with African leaders and noted that Russia was doing a good job of getting information out despite Western efforts to suppress Russian media.[55] The TASS director general claimed that “the voice of African media is beginning to sound” and is ending Western media hegemony, although he warned that “Western information attacks” were fighting back by targeting critical Russian-African media partnerships.[56]

Figure 4. Russian Information and Media Engagement in Africa

Source: Liam Karr; European Parliament, Institute for the Study of War, and Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Russia has sought to create a pro-Russian media ecosystem in Africa for more than a decade to strengthen Russian soft power by advancing anti-Western and pro-Kremlin narratives and information operations. Putin has emphasized building media cooperation agreements between Russian outlets and local partners around 2015 and has brought African journalists to train in Russia as part of RT and Sputnik programs for nearly a decade.[57] These training programs regularly bake false Russian narratives about the West and “anti-Russian fake news” into course modules among standard journalism courses.[58] The US Department of Defense–funded Africa Center for Strategic studies reported in 2024 that Russia backed at least 80 information campaigns in 22 African countries.[59] These narratives often frame Russia and other revisionist powers as anti-imperial allies of Africa in countering the “exploitative” West by disparaging Ukraine, the United States, and the West directly or seeking to cultivate a positive public opinion about Russian engagement.[60] The Kremlin is using multiple security agencies, including the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the military intelligence–controlled Africa Corps to support these various lines of effort in Africa.[61]

The Kremlin also highlighted its efforts to bring African students to Russian universities and discussed ways to further deepen Africa-Russia educational ties, which the Kremlin uses to create pro-Russian human networks in Africa.[62] Putin highlighted educational exchanges as an area of focus in most of his bilateral meetings with African counterparts.[63] Putin said at his closing press conference that Russia increased its state scholarship quota for African students by 5,500 places for the 2026–27 academic year and that that African partners supported expanding branches of Russian universities and Russian-language centers on the continent.[64] Putin explicitly said during the closing press conference that graduates of Russian universities become “people we can rely on” in their home countries.[65]

Sudan

Authors: Michael DeAngelo with Ziv Zellars

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has waged a drone attack campaign against key energy infrastructure in Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)–controlled Sudan since late October 2026 as part of a broader effort to undermine the SAF’s military and political objectives. The RSF began a large-scale campaign targeting fuel facilities and power stations across central, eastern, and northern Sudan on October 22 by reportedly striking several fuel depots in al Rahad, which is approximately 50 miles southeast of el Obeid, the North Kordofan state capital and the SAF’s central Sudan headquarters.^[66] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) has since recorded 21 sets of RSF strikes on fuel facilities or power stations, including in or around the cities of Ad Damazin, Wad Madani, Rabak, Sinja, Omdurman, and Khartoum, the Sudanese capital.^[67]

Figure 5. RSF Drone Campaign in SAF-Controlled Sudan

Note: SAF stands for Sudanese Armed Forces. RSF stands for Rapid Support Forces.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Ziv Zellars.

The RSF’s ongoing campaign supports larger RSF objectives to degrade military supply lines and undermine SAF governance efforts. The strikes on fuel depots and pipelines obstruct SAF efforts to fuel their military operations and cause shortages for civilians, undermining the SAF-led Sudanese government’s ability to restore security and services to the population.^[68] The strikes on power stations have cut electricity in dozens of SAF-controlled population centers, further threatening the SAF’s political objectives.^[69]

The RSF has frequently employed drones that target key infrastructure and population centers to undermine the SAF's ability to govern throughout the Sudanese civil war, although the paramilitary group has intensified its efforts since mid-2026. The RSF began drone attack campaigns in late 2024 and first targeted Port Sudan—the former de facto capital of SAF-controlled territory—in May 2025, striking the airport, fuel facilities, and a power station.^[70] The paramilitary group repeatedly struck Khartoum and other major cities in the months that followed.^[71] The RSF has increased the frequency and lethality of its drone strikes since June 2026, however. The RSF’s average monthly drone strikes have risen by approximately 60 percent and tended to cause more fatalities compared with the previous four five-month periods.^[72]

Figure 6. Average Monthly RSF Drone Strikes in Sudanese Civil War, October 2024—October 2026

Note: RSF stands for Rapid Support Forces.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Ziv Zellars; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The SAF has intensified its own drone attack campaign in densely populated areas in RSF-controlled Sudan since October 2026, increasing the humanitarian toll on civilians. The military has intensified strikes on commercial centers, residential areas, and heavily trafficked routes in west-central and central Sudan to target RSF leadership and supply hubs.^[73] Several times the SAF has struck RSF bases in Nyala, which is RSF’s headquarters, and reportedly targeted RSF commanders’ convoys and refuges.^[74] The strike campaign has also prioritized commercial centers across RSF-controlled territory, with CTP recording 10 sets of SAF strikes against markets and other commercial areas since mid-October, including in the cities of Ad Daein, el Fasher, and Nyala.^[75] The campaign comes as the military sets conditions on the ground in central Sudan to advance west along Sudan’s main east–west highway toward RSF-controlled Sudan.^[76]

Figure 7. SAF Drone Campaign in RSF-Controlled Sudan

Note: SAF stands for Sudanese Armed Forces. RSF stands for Rapid Support Forces.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Ziv Zellars.

The intensification of SAF strikes in densely populated areas has heavily impacted civilians. SAF drone strikes caused more fatalities in October than in the previous three months combined, with four sets of strikes largely responsible for the sharp increase.^[77] The SAF struck a market in Nyala on October 16, reportedly killing at least 30 people, mostly civilians.^[78] The military then reportedly struck two transit hubs in Muglad and al Dibab, which are just south of Babanusa in West Kordofan state, on October 18.^[79] The SAF claimed that it had killed 84 RSF fighters, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, while Sudanese sources told The Guardian and Sudan War Monitor that several dozen civilians died.^[80] The most deadly strike occurred on October 19 in the Amiet market north of the town of Abyei, which is in a special administrative area disputed by Sudan and South Sudan. The SAF reportedly targeted a long-standing RSF fuel depot, but the strike killed between 153 and 226 people, including several dozen civilians.^[81] The SAF also struck another market in Nyala that was regarded as an RSF hub on October 26.^[82] Doctors Without Borders and Sudanese sources cited by the Associated Press confirmed at least a dozen civilian deaths in the total fatality count, which the Sudanese human rights group Emergency Lawyers and the SAF’s special operations spokesperson separately reported was over 100 people.^[83]

Figure 8. Average Monthly SAF Drone Strikes in Sudanese Civil War, April—October 2026

Note: SAF stands for Sudanese Armed Forces.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Ziv Zellars; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Both sides’ campaigns have increased tensions between the Sudanese government and neighboring Ethiopia and South Sudan. The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged formal complaints with the United Nations Security Council and African Union Peace and Security Council on November 1 that accused Ethiopia of allowing the RSF to launch drone attacks from Ethiopian territory.^[84] The Sudanese government also released a report alleging that the RSF had launched at 70 drone attacks from Ethiopian territory, including the Asosa and Bahir Dar airports, from February to October 2026, with 28 of the attacks occurring in October.^[85] The Sudanese government first accused Ethiopia of hosting RSF drones in March.^[86] Ethiopia and the Sudanese government have since retaliated diplomatically against each other. Ethiopia ordered the closure of the Sudanese consulate in Asosa, which is the capital of western Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, on November 4.^[87] The Sudanese government reportedly responded by ordering the closure of the Ethiopian consulate in Gedaref, which is the capital of eastern Sudan’s Gedaref state.^[88]

Tensions between Ethiopia and the SAF have grown throughout 2026 as Ethiopia has become more involved in backing the RSF and the SAF has provided havens for Ethiopian rebels actively fighting the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia has served as a key supply hub and rear base for the RSF since late 2025, which has coincided with an RSF ground offensive in southeastern Sudan’s Blue Nile state and a subsequent increase in drone strikes targeting SAF-controlled territory in the state.^[89] Open-source analyst Rich Tedd has tracked increasing Emirati-linked flights to Ethiopia, which have been connected to RSF weapons shipments, throughout 2026, with October having the highest number of flights thus far.^[90] CTP previously assessed that the Sudanese government’s ties with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and other Ethiopian rebel groups likely influenced Ethiopia’s decision to support the RSF.^[91] The Sudanese government has allowed the TPLF, which launched an offensive with allied rebel groups against the Ethiopian federal government in late September 2026, to maintain safe havens in eastern Sudan despite Ethiopian demands to crack down on the rebels.^[92]

South Sudan, meanwhile, condemned the SAF strike in the disputed Abyei area amid its broader balancing act between the Sudanese government and the RSF. The South Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation summoned the Sudanese ambassador to South Sudan on October 19 to convey their disapproval of the strike.^[93] South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit also issued a statement on October 21 denouncing the strike and saying that Abyei “must not become a theatre for the conflict in Sudan.”^[94] The RSF has established supply lines through South Sudan, however, and South Sudanese militiamen have fought for the RSF.^[95] South Sudan has sought to allay SAF concerns over RSF supply lines by overseeing a revenue-sharing agreement between the RSF and SAF for the Heglig oil facilities, which the RSF captured in late 2025.^[96]

Ethiopia

Authors: Michael DeAngelo

Unverified reports claimed that Ethiopian and Eritrean forces exchanged fire near the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, as the conflict in northern Ethiopia risks becoming a low-intensity border war that could lead to further escalation between the two countries. Two conflict trackers on X and an official from the Tigray Peace Force (TPF)—a Tigrayan armed group backed by the Ethiopian federal government—reported that the two sides clashed in the border area south of Tserona, an Eritrean town approximately 65 miles northwest of Adigrat, Ethiopia, between October 30 and November 1.[97] Both conflict trackers alleged that the unverified clashes involved ground fighting and Ethiopian artillery and drone strikes.[98] Deutsche Welle cited a TPF official who claimed that Ethiopian federal forces took the border area of Egela, Ethiopia, from Eritrean and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces on November 1.[99] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) was unable to confirm any of the unverified claims. The Ethiopian news outlet Wazema Radio and a pro-Fano account on X separately reported clashes between Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray Defense Force (TDF), the TPLF’s military wing, around Egela on November 2 and 3.[100]

Figure 9. Alleged Ethiopia-Eritrea Clashes

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

Eritrean forces and the TDF have worked to secure both sides of Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Eritrean forces and the TDF allegedly withdrew to border areas near Badme (Eritrea), Rama (Ethiopia), and Zalambessa (Ethiopia), the latter two of which Egela is between, in mid-October 2026 amid Ethiopian federal pressure.[101] The conflict analyst and mapper The Ethiopian Conflict Map reported on October 13 that Eritrean forces had “entrenched” themselves north of Rama and Zalambessa on the Eritrean side of border, and in areas further west near Badme.[102] Ethiopian federal forces then withdrew from Rama and Zalambessa between October 17 and 19 amid a TDF counteroffensive in central Tigray.[103] The TDF retook Rama on October 22 and have reportedly since clashed with federal forces east of the town.[104]

Confirmed clashes between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces could devolve into a more sustained, low-intensity border war that increases the risk of further escalation. CTP previously assessed that an armed standoff along the border would likely result in a low-intensity border war that would involve Ethiopian air assets in the short term.[105] Low-intensity fighting would increase the risk of escalation, either through miscalculation or deliberate action. Ethiopian and Eritrean officials have accused each other of provoking a larger war since early October, and the two neighbors have not engaged in any direct mediation talks despite international offers and heavy pressure to de-escalate.[106] Ethiopian federal forces face capacity constraints, however, including with ongoing fighting in Tigray and the Amhara region.[107] The reported Eritrean incursions into Ethiopia in early October were also seemingly limited, both in scale and duration, indicating that Eritrea is not actively pushing for a full-scale war.[108]

Africa File Data Cutoff: November 5, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.