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Contributor: Miles Charles

Key Takeaways:

• Cameroon. Cameroonian President Paul Biya is facing a split within his ruling coalition amid uncertainty about his plans to run for his eighth, seven-year presidential term in October elections at age 92. The election will have implications for US counterterrorism interests, geopolitical competition with China and Russia, and opportunities for economic investment.
• JNIM. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen launched a series of simultaneous attacks across Mali. The operation was a tactical defeat but could have strategic benefits for the group by contradicting the Malian junta’s narrative that the security situation is improving, especially in economically and politically sensitive areas, such as western Mali.
• ISSP. A regional IS Sahel Province commander surrendered to Malian forces in northeastern Mali, signaling a potential leadership purge within the group that could lead to further defections.
• Russia. Russia has continued to grow its non-military engagement with the Sahelian juntas. Russia’s cooperation with the Sahel is part of a strategic effort to supplant Western influence in Africa and assert itself as a revitalized great power.

Assessments:

Cameroon

Authors: Liam Karr and Yale Ford

Longtime allies of Cameroonian President Paul Biya announced that they are running in October’s presidential elections amid uncertainty about Biya’s plans to run for another term. Biya’s former spokesperson Issa Tchiroma Bakary­—known as Tchiroma—resigned from his government post to run for the presidency on June 26. Cameroonian Tourism Minister and former Prime Minister Bello Bouba Maïgari formally declared his candidacy two days later.[i]

Maïgari and Tchiroma were two of Biya’s most senior allies from northern Cameroon and influential members of predominantly northern-based parties aligned with Biya’s Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM).[ii] Tchiroma said in his announcement that he is running to “put an end to the old system.”[iii] The Cameroonian government banned all political activities by Tchiroma’s political party in a northern area of Cameroon after he announced his candidacy.[iv]

Biya has ruled Cameroon since 1982 but has yet to announce his run for reelection in the October 2025 elections. Biya has maintained a strong grip on the Cameroonian government and effectively kept Cameroon a one-party state since the 1990s.[v] Independent observers have accused Biya, who would be running for his eighth term of rigging previous elections using his party’s control of the electoral commission, judiciary, and other key institutions.[vi]

The bids of Biya’s former allies signal a potential fracture between Biya's regime and the northern-based elites amid rumors of 92-year-old Biya’s failing health. CPDM elites and partners have sought to replicate their past electoral strategy of using a coalition of smaller parties to prop up Biya.[vii] Both Maïgari and Tchiroma have allied with Biya for over three decades and backed him in at least the previous three elections in 2004, 2011, and 2018.[viii] Cameroonian media reported that the two defections could open the door for other northern elites to defect from the CPDM.[ix] The defections come as the Cameroonian government has tried to downplay concerns about Biya’s age and his viability to serve another seven-year presidential term.[x]

The recent defections could fragment the CPDM’s electoral base in northern Cameroon, which is a key electorate. The three provinces in Cameroon’s northern region—Adamawa, North, and Far North—hold significant electoral sway, as they account for up to 40 percent of the voting population in Cameroon.[xi] The political platforms of Maïgari and Tchiroma together control about a quarter of local governments in the north.[xii] Maïgari and Tchiroma helped translate this influence into support for Biya and could now undermine CPDM’s base in the north. Cameroon political analysts have assessed that Maïgari and Tchiroma may be unpopular alternatives to Biya for many voters, however, due to their long-standing association with the CPDM.[xiii]

Government persecution of Cameroonian opposition groups has limited the opposition’s ability to capitalize on the infighting among the CPDM and its allies. Thirty Cameroonian opposition parties agreed to form a coalition around former minister Maurice Kamto, who was Biya’s main challenger in the 2018 elections and claimed to have won.[xiv] The coalition is a notable inflection in Cameroonian opposition politics, which has historically failed to mount an effective challenge to Biya in Cameroon’s first-past-the-post voting system due to their disunity.[xv] The government banned two coalitions, including Kamto’s­—the Alliance politique pour le changement (APC)—and changed the date of parliamentary elections to make Kamto legally ineligible to be a candidate.[xvi] The Cameroonian government has harassed Kamto and his party and limited their political activities and movements in recent weeks.[xvii]

The election will have implications for US interests in regional security, geopolitical competition, and regional investment. Cameroon is strategically located between central and western Africa, with its northern regions just below the ever-turbulent Sahel and southern Cameroon along the Atlantic coast on the Gulf of Guinea. The country faces Salafi-jihadi insurgents with ties to the Islamic State and Boko Haram in the far north of the country and an insurgency in the English-speaking regions in western Cameroon. Both conflicts have killed thousands and displaced nearly one million Cameroonians, with the Anglophone crisis directly involving US citizens from the Cameroonian diaspora.[xviii] US forces have provided training and military assistance to help Cameroon contain the Salafi-jihadi insurgency and improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.[xix] US defense officials visited Cameroon in 2024 to discuss regional security, and Cameroonian forces in April 2025 participated in African Lion 25, US Africa Command’s largest annual exercise.[xx]

US engagement with Cameroon helps balance Cameroon’s growing ties with both China and Russia. China elevated Cameroon to a comprehensive strategic partner—the second-highest category of bilateral relations—at the most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2024.[xxi] The upgrade reflects over a decade of growing defense and diplomatic ties between the two countries, including joint anti-piracy drills in the Gulf of Guinea.[xxii] Cameroon signed an updated version of a prior military agreement with the Kremlin involving weapons sales, training, and intelligence sharing in April 2022, feeding Russia’s narrative that it was not isolated in the weeks and months after it invaded Ukraine in February 2022.[xxiii] Russian-linked media platforms have pushed information operations spreading anti-Western and antidemocratic messaging in Cameroon as part of Russia’s broader campaign to supplant the West, particularly in Francophone Africa.[xxiv] The Wagner Group has also used Cameroon to support its regional operations, such as basing one of its radio networks in Douala and using Douala port to ship illicit timber and other goods from the Central African Republic.[xxv]

Cameroon also holds significant business potential, although China currently dominates foreign investment due in part to rampant corruption in the Biya regime. The US State Department notes that Cameroon offers “immense investment potential” in infrastructure, agriculture and extractive industries, consumer markets, modern communication technology, electricity and telecommunication infrastructure, and the financial sector.[xxvi] Cameroon has the largest economy in the Central African Economic and Monetary Union.[xxvii] Corruption has been a major deterrent to private US investment, however, with bribe and patronage networks contributing to Cameroon ranking in the worst quarter of countries for corruption worldwide.[xxviii] China has had no issues engaging with corrupt elites in Cameroon—as elsewhere in Africa—and has invested billions in Cameroon through its Belt and Road initiative.[xxix]

JNIM

Authors: Liam Karr with Miles Charles

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen launched a series of simultaneous attacks across Mali. JNIM attacked two Malian army positions in central Mali and five army positions in western Mali, including a regional capital—Kayes city—and border posts with Mauritania and Senegal, on July 1.[xxx] JNIM militants reportedly quickly overwhelmed security posts on the towns’ perimeters before targeting key security installations, such as military barracks, police stations, and government buildings.[xxxi] The group also conducted attacks against industrial sites in western Mali.[xxxii]

Figure 1. JNIM July 1 Offensive

Source: Liam Karr.

The offensive was a tactical defeat for JNIM. The Malian army claimed to have killed at least 80 militants as it repelled the incursions, including at least 30 militants in Kayes city alone.[xxxiii] The Malian army published media supporting its claims, whereas JNIM has not published any footage of security force casualties as it usually does, further supporting the narrative that Malian forces largely repulsed the attacks.[xxxiv] These losses could set back JNIM in western Mali in the short term, given the group’s networks in the area are newer and weaker compared to central and northern Mali. 

The operation could have strategic benefits for the group by contradicting the Malian junta’s narrative that the security situation is improving, especially in economically and politically sensitive areas such as western Mali. The seven attacks all took place in the Kayes and Segou regions, which border the west and east sides of the Koulikoro region, respectively, where Mali’s capital region is encompassed. JNIM has already increased attacks surrounding Bamako since 2023 and carried out its first attack on the capital in nearly a decade in September 2024.[xxxv] The July 1 attacks follow several large-scale attacks that overran military posts in JNIM’s more entrenched areas of operation in central and northern Mali in May and June.[xxxvi] This sequence of attacks highlights that the group is not only strengthening in its core areas of operation but also in new areas previously less affected by the insurgency.

The offensive particularly highlighted JNIM’s growing strength in western Mali, which had been largely unaffected by the insurgency before 2022. JNIM’s attack on Kayes city was the group’s first attack on the regional capital. The attack on the Diboli border post was the group’s closest-ever attack to Senegal--less than a mile from the border. The group has since announced a blockade on Kayes city and Nioro.[xxxvii] JNIM uses sieges to punish civilians for cooperating with security forces and highlight the state’s inability to protect and provide for the targeted populations. 

The attacks are the result of years of growing JNIM activity in western Mali. JNIM activity in the Kayes region grew sevenfold between 2021 and 2024, and JNIM has already carried out more attacks in the Kayes region in 2025 than it did in the entirety of 2024.[xxxviii] Local sources told the Timbuktu Institute—a Senegalese think tank—that the group had supply points in at least four communes and the Baoulé forest.[xxxix] JNIM has used its presence in Kayes to establish rear support zones and cross-border networks in Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal that it uses to fundraise and recruit in those countries.[xl] The Malian army has already carried out more operations against JNIM in Kayes in 2025 than it did in 2023 and 2024 combined, highlighting the seriousness of the threat.[xli]

Figure 2. JNIM Areas of Operation in Western Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

JNIM has used its presence in western Mali to generate revenue and threaten vital economic activity in the area. The World Bank reported in 2015 that Kayes was the second-highest contributor to Mali’s overall gross domestic product (GDP)—trailing only Bamako.[xlii] This likely understates the importance of Kayes, given it holds nearly 80 percent of Mali’s total gold production. Gold production as an industry accounts for up to 9 percent of Mali’s entire GDP, half of its tax revenues, and 80 percent of its exports.[xliii] JNIM announced in early June that all foreign companies would have to secure permission from the group to operate in Mali and has since conducted several attacks in western Mali against mining companies and foreign employees, including on July 1.[xliv] The group has inserted itself into other sectors of the local economy, including livestock trade, smuggling, and logging.[xlv]

ISSP

Authors: Liam Karr with Miles Charles

A regional IS Sahel Province (ISSP) commander surrendered to Malian forces in northeastern Mali, signaling a potential leadership purge within the group. ISSP military commander Oubel Boureima (Oubel) surrendered himself to Malian forces in northeastern Mali on June 28.[xlvi] Oubel was the military commander of ISSP’s military zone covering the Haoussa area, situated along the Niger River Valley from the Niger border to Gao.[xlvii] Oubel has since accused ISSP of following “lies” and encouraged others to defect.[xlviii]

Oubel was likely preempting ISSP efforts to remove him as part of a leadership purge of the Haoussa military zone following years of internal rivalries and infighting over ideological divisions. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) reported that Oubel’s fighters were less ideologically motivated and operated more like a “criminal or mafia-style group” that primarily carried out more attacks against civilians, such as cattle theft and looting.[xlix] This approach to civilians caused tensions with other IS factions, and the ISSP internal police amputated Oubel faction fighters as shari’a punishment for cattle theft in 2023. The incident caused two days of fighting between ISSP factions that resulted in 40 deaths. ISSP militants killed the other commander of the Haoussa zone in December 2024, and there were further internal clashes in January and May 2025.[l] IS West Africa Province, which hosts the regional IS office that oversees ISSP, has conducted similar leadership purges to rein in stray factions.[li]

Oubel’s flight could lead to further ISSP defections in this area. ACLED reported that Oubel’s faction already had a higher defection rate than other ISSP military zones. This pattern led other ISSP members to accuse Oubel of encouraging defections, which he has publicly done since surrendering to the Malian forces himself.[lii] His calls could lead to further defections, given the substantial personal following he and other ISSP commanders have developed within their military zones. Oubel’s faction also faces more substantial counterterrorism pressure from Malian and Russian forces, which has already contributed to low morale and a high rate of defections.[liii] The fighters in Oubel’s faction have ties with pro-government militias and other local groups.[liv] These connections serve as communication channels for fighters looking to defect.

Russia

Authors: Liam Karr with Miles Charles

Russia has continued to grow its development and economic engagement with the Sahelian juntas. Malian junta leader Assimi Goita met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials during a trip to Moscow in late June.[lv] Mali and Russia signed several agreements during Goita’s visit, including deals on nuclear energy cooperation and trade.[lvi] Burkina Faso separately signed an agreement with Russia on nuclear energy cooperation.[lvii] Burkina Faso has been working with Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom to construct a nuclear power plant in Burkina Faso since 2023.[lviii] The deals are the first major engagement between the juntas and Russia since the foreign ministers from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger--the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in April 2025.[lix]

The AES is a strategic project for Russia to supplant Western influence in Africa and assert itself as a revitalized great power. Russia has used defense cooperation to replace Western military partnerships with the AES states in the Sahel. Russian trade and investment still lag behind China and EU member countries and will likely continue to do so, given the downward projections for the Russian economy.[lx] Nuclear power projects attempt to prove that Russia can address Africa’s energy needs—a major demand on the continent—as much as other great powers such as China or the collective West.[lxi]

The AES is a pro-Russian economic, military, and political bloc that the Kremlin wants to use as a model and conduit across the continent. CTP has previously noted the multi-sectoral efforts of the AES and its relationship with Russia across the diplomatic, economic, and defense spheres.[lxii] The AES has simultaneously withdrawn from and undermined several neutral or Western-aligned regional political and security institutions, including the Economic Community of West African States and security alliances backed by the African Union, UN, and the West.[lxiii] The AES helps attract additional states in West Africa and the Sahel deeper into the Russian orbit. CTP has previously recorded that Chad, Sudan, and Togo have all grown closer to Russia as they have grown closer to the AES.[lxiv]

Africa File Data Cutoff: July 3, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.