DRC-M23 Peace Prospects: Africa File, August 7, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC, Rwanda, and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels will likely remain involved in the Qatari-led peace talks and the broader US-backed peace framework—despite various challenges—to reap the dividends of US engagement. Both sides have been unwilling to make concessions on M23’s territorial control, however, which will likely prolong talks and make a sustainable long-term agreement unlikely.
• Somalia. Infighting between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and Jubbaland state in southern Somalia has resumed since the beginning of July for the first time since December 2024. Tensions between Ethiopia and the SFG could also fuel the conflict.
• Mozambique. IS Mozambique Province conducted a series of attacks in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province since late July that has displaced thousands. ISMP launched the offensive south of its typical area of operations, likely to evade counterinsurgency pressure, capitalize on overstretched security forces, and boost its propaganda output.

Figure 1. Africa File, August 7, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

The following section is adapted from “Challenges to a Sustainable DRC-M23 Peace Deal: Africa File Special Edition.”

The Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have remained at odds over M23’s territorial control in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other issues, undermining the sustainability Qatari-brokered peace talks. The DRC and M23 signed a declaration of principles agreement under Qatar’s auspices on July 19.[i] The two sides agreed to de-escalate conflict and observe a formal ceasefire.[ii] They also agreed to implement “confidence-building measures” intended to lay the groundwork for a second stage of talks to start by August 8 aimed at reaching a final peace deal.[iii]

The DRC and M23 have argued over a key but unclear component of the declaration agreement that called for the “restoration of government authority on all national territories” in a final peace deal.[iv] The two sides offered differing interpretations of what “restoring state authority” means within hours of signing the declaration in mid-July. The Congolese communications minister said that the declaration encompasses M23’s “nonnegotiable” withdrawal and the return of the Congolese army, the police, and judicial and civil authorities to M23-occupied areas.[v] M23 has said that it has no plans to withdraw from occupied areas in the eastern DRC on several occasions since signing the declaration.[vi]

The two sides have largely observed the ceasefire but have disagreed publicly on its longer-term implementation and critical dispute-resolution mechanisms since signing the declaration. The DRC rejected M23’s proposal to withdraw at least three miles from the frontlines and establish a demilitarized zone between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces.[vii] French state media reported in late July that there had still been “no concrete progress” in establishing an oversight mechanism to monitor the ceasefire’s implementation.[viii]

Figure 2. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The two sides have disagreed on prisoner releases—a key confidence-building measure. The declaration committed both sides to facilitate the release of prisoners and detainees.[ix] The DRC rejected M23’s demand for the immediate release of more than 780 prisoners held by the DRC and reiterated that it would grant amnesty on only a “case-by-case basis” as part of any final peace deal.[x] M23 conditioned its participation in the second stage of talks on the release and transfer of all M23 prisoners to Goma, the M23-controlled North Kivu provincial capital.[xi]

The DRC, M23, and Rwanda will likely remain involved in the Qatari-led peace talks and the broader US-backed peace framework despite these challenges to reap the dividends of US engagement. The US-backed regional framework includes security provisions from a US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda from late June and plans for a regional economic framework that aims to spur economic growth and facilitate billions of dollars of US investment in the DRC and Rwanda.[xii] The economic aspects of the framework center on regional economic cooperation in sectors including energy, infrastructure, mining, national park management and tourism, and public health.[xiii]

The regional framework includes US investment in the upstream and midstream aspects of the DRC’s and Rwanda’s mining sectors.[xiv] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported in late July that the United States could reach a bilateral economic deal with the DRC as early as late August when US President Donald Trump plans to host a signing ceremony for the June peace deal with DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, DC.[xv]

Figure 3. Peace Processes Multiply in the Great Lakes

Source: Yale Ford.

CTP continues to assess that the long-term sustainability of the US-backed regional framework will likely be contingent on the DRC-M23 talks. The deal deferred the resolution of the M23 conflict to the Qatari-led talks, but the United States made a DRC-M23 peace agreement a precondition to the economic framework.[xvi] The declaration agreement between the DRC and M23 stated explicitly that the second stage of talks will aim to “align” with the US-brokered agreement.[xvii] Several important ventures as part of the regional economic framework, including the Rubaya coltan mine in Masisi district in North Kivu and the Ruzizi hydropower project near Bukavu in South Kivu, are in M23’s and Rwanda’s zone of control.[xviii] It remains unclear how those projects will be developed without solving the issue of M23’s territorial control.

Figure 4. DRC Peace Process

Source: Liam Karr.

Congolese elites stand to benefit in several ways from US engagement. Congolese elites in the DRC government would benefit financially from profitable joint projects with the United States in the DRC’s mining sector. Mining revenues have accounted for roughly two-thirds of the DRC government’s total revenues since 2019, and US investment would help the government lessen its dependence on China.[xix] The United States has also discussed training sessions with the Congolese army (FARDC), primarily to strengthen the FARDC’s ability to protect US investments.[xx] A defense partnership with the United States the structural weakness of the FARDC, which has been unable to put up an effective fight against M23 or defend the DRC’s national territory for decades. Tshisekedi likely aims to use US political backing to ensure his regime’s survival and isolate his political enemies as part of a “minerals-for-security” deal.[xxi]

Figure 5. M23 Advances in 2025

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Rwanda will likely continue supporting the DRC-M23 talks to avoid international pressure and benefit from formalized mineral supply chains in the region. Rwanda likely seeks to legitimize the export of minerals mined in the DRC and avoid sanctions and political backlash over its illegal control of conflict minerals. The US regional economic framework aims to restrict illegal economic pathways for mineral exploitation and “formalize end-to-end mineral value chains that link both countries,” according to the US State Department.[xxii] Some European countries and multinational technology companies such as Apple have stopped buying minerals sourced from the DRC and Rwanda and called for embargo on Rwandan mineral exports.[xxiii] The European Union sanctioned a gold refinery based in Rwanda for “illegally importing gold from M23-controlled regions” in the eastern DRC in early 2025.[xxiv]

M23 will likely remain in the talks to buy time to consolidate control over occupied areas in the eastern DRC. M23 has expanded its well-organized parallel administration in the eastern DRC and largely replaced the DRC government since late February.[xxv] Staying in the talks gives M23 and Rwanda time to gain even greater leverage by consolidating stronger de facto control over occupied areas. An entrenched M23 administration would be even more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that sees M23 gradually incorporated into a Congolese government administration. M23’s control over the eastern DRC aligns with Rwanda’s long-term strategy to protect and strengthen its political and economic influence and establish a buffer zone on the border with Rwanda.[xxvi] Staying in the talks could buy time for M23 to prepare and plan for a new offensive, given the group’s forces and supply lines became overstretched as it expanded further away from its center of gravity in the eastern Kivu provinces and its rear supply base in Rwanda in early 2025.[xxvii]

Both sides have been unwilling to make concessions on M23’s territorial control, however, which will likely prolong talks and make a sustainable long-term agreement unlikely. The lack of clarity around M23 control and the return of government authority will likely be a major obstacle in the upcoming round of talks. The July declaration deferred negotiations over the “root causes” of the conflict—some of which have gone unresolved for decades—and the issue of M23’s territorial control to the second stage of talks scheduled to start by August 8 and be resolved by August 18.[xxviii] Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior Africa adviser, said that the restoration of state authority was “one of the most important clauses” of the declaration.[xxix] CTP assessed previously that the two sides will likely be unable to clearly resolve this central issue and other points of divergence in a sustainable fashion that includes agreed-upon dispute-resolution mechanisms within the 10-day time frame for August talks.[xxx]

The DRC and M23 have refused to make major concessions on territorial control in the talks and have signaled they are unlikely to do so. The DRC rejected M23’s proposal for autonomy and demanded the group’s dissolution without prospect for reintegration.[xxxi] Tshisekedi risks severely undermining his credibility and legitimacy among his power base in Kinshasa by ceding territory to M23.[xxxii] M23 has been equally maximalist and will likely continue efforts to supplant DRC government institutions regardless of the outcome of the DRC-M23 talks. M23 has proposed an arrangement that would legitimize M23 control of the Kivu provinces and called for “federalism,” whereby it would “comanage” occupied areas with the central government but maintain autonomy in matters of defense and economic policy.[xxxiii] The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 has not shown “a genuine commitment” to peace talks with the DRC government and that Rwandan officials said M23 would not vacate occupied territory.[xxxiv]

Read CTP’s full forecast of DRC-M23 negotiations here, which covers potential paths for military escalation, a successful peace agreement, and long-term challenges to the US-backed peace framework.

Read a one-page summary of the report here.

Somalia

Authors: Liam Karr and Edie Tesfaye

Infighting between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and Jubbaland state in southern Somalia has resumed since the beginning of July for the first time since December 2024. Somali National Army (SNA) forces reportedly airlifted into Beled Hawo, Gedo region, on July 22, and attacked Jubbaland state forces in the town, killing at least 10 people.^[xxxv] Jubbaland forces repelled the attack, which led the SNA forces to retreat to a base on the town outskirts. SNA forces launched another attack on July 30 and captured the town.^[xxxvi]

Jubbaland forces—supported by Ethiopian soldiers—separately attacked a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) camp in Dolow, Gedo region, on July 27.^[xxxvii] Jubbaland forces killed at least two NISA personnel and arrested the camp commander and several others.^[xxxviii] Dolow’s district commissioner reportedly has close relations with Ethiopian troops stationed in the town.^[xxxix]

Figure 6. Somali Infighting Along the Ethiopia-Somalia Border

Source: Liam Karr.

The fighting is part of a monthslong political dispute and power struggle. The relationship between the SFG and Jubbaland ruptured in October 2024 due to a disagreement over future one-person one-vote elections in Somalia. Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, also known as Madobe, withdrew from National Consultative Council meetings—a political body including the Somali president, prime minister, and presidents of the federal member states—after saying that the new system would undermine Jubbaland’s regional autonomy.^[xl] Madobe won reelection for a third term on November 25 after the Jubbaland parliament abolished term limits in July 2024.^[xli] The SFG earlier said in November 2024 that it would not recognize the results of the Jubbaland elections and accused Madobe of overstaying his term.^[xlii]

These tensions turned violent at the end of 2024. The SFG initially deployed troops to Ras Kamboni—a town in Jubbaland near the border with Kenya—in November, exchanging gunfire with Jubbaland forces.^[xliii] The SFG ostensibly said that the purpose of the November deployment was to fight al Shabaab, but the timing indicates that it was in response to the Jubbaland elections.^[xliv] Jubbaland forces captured Ras Kamboni in December after clashes with the SNA that led to the surrender of dozens of SNA soldiers.^[xlv]

Tensions between Ethiopia and the SFG could also fuel the conflict. Ethiopia supported Jubbaland in 2024 due to its standoff with the SFG over Ethiopia’s port agreement with Somaliland. Ethiopia signed a naval port deal with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in January 2024, which granted Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval base in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.^[xlvi] The SFG rejected the deal as unlawful and a violation of its territorial integrity, as it considers Somaliland to be part of its territory.^[xlvii]

Ethiopia turned to Jubbaland as a proxy to gain leverage over the SFG, as it has done historically.^[xlviii] Ethiopian forces arrested SNA soldiers in Jubbaland in November and clashed with the SNA in Jubbaland in December.[xlix] The SFG also accused Ethiopia of shipping weapons to Jubbaland and flying Jubbaland officials to Ethiopia to plot against the government.^[l] Ethiopian troops attacked SNA forces in Dolow in December, killing several Somali soldiers.^[li]

Ethiopia and Somalia reached a brief détente in December, but relations are still fragile. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed in December to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial sea access via Somalia as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration.^[lii] The Ankara Declaration collapsed in mid-2025, however, after the two sides failed to reach a technical agreement on a port outlet.[liii] Ethiopia rejected Somalia’s proposal to comanage one of four commercial ports as it seeks sovereign sea access to set up a naval base, which Somalia will not accept.[liv] Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has reportedly discretely resumed talks with the new Somaliland administration, which could re-inflame tensions with the SFG.^[lv] The Somali president accepted the credentials of the Ethiopian ambassador on August 5 for the first time since April 2024, however.^[lvi]

Ethiopia has already supported Jubbaland in the latest round of fighting. Ethiopian troops stationed in Doolow backed Jubbaland in the attack on an SNA camp on July 27.^[lvii] Ethiopian officials have denied their involvement in the attack and emphasized that Ethiopia wants to avoid confrontation.[lviii] Ethiopian forces have demanded the immediate withdrawal of the SNA from Beled Hawo and warned that the SNA’s presence threatens the stability of the Ethiopian border. Senior Ethiopian military officials met with Jubbaland authorities and elders in Dolow on August 2.[lix] Jubbaland leaders have also stated they will not cede Beled Hawo and are prepared to recapture the town if necessary.^[lx]

Mozambique

Authors: Yale Ford and Calvin Hodges

IS Mozambique Province (ISMP) conducted a series of attacks in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province since late July that has displaced thousands. ISMP claimed to perpetrate 13 attacks in Ancuabe and Chiúre districts in southern Cabo Delgado between July 22 and August 3.^[lxi] The group carried out hit-and-run raids on local administrative centers and targeted civilians as part of the offensive.^[lxii] At least seven of the attacks concentrated in Chiúre district from July 24 to July 31, including at attack that killed 18 local militia fighters.^[lxiii]

The attacks triggered a mass displacement of people. The surge in attacks displaced nearly 60,000, including over 51,000 in Chiúre, in two weeks from July 23 to August 3, according to the UN.^[lxiv] Previous ISMP offensives in Ancuabe and Chiúre displaced an estimated 14,000 and 91,000 people in late 2024 and early 2024, respectively.^[lxv]

ISMP launched the offensive south of its typical area of operations, likely to evade recent counterinsurgency pressure. The offensive marks ISMP’s fourth incursion into southern Cabo Delgado since early 2024 and its first sustained activity since late 2024.^[lxvi] ISMP conducted a series of attacks in Ancuabe and Chiúre and in northern Nampula province in November 2024 but then were largely inactive in those areas in early 2025.^[lxvii] ISMP’s incursion into Ancuabe was the group’s first recorded violent activity in the district since March 2025, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[lxviii] UK-based Zitamar News reported in mid-July that a detachment of 60 ISMP insurgents—about 20 percent of ISMP’s total forces per UN estimates—began moving south from Macomia district in central Cabo Delgado before splitting off into two smaller groups in Ancuabe and launching its attack campaign in late July.^[lxix]

ISMP may have moved southward in response to recent attacks by security forces. ISMP attacks surged in southern Cabo Delgado after insurgents faced counterinsurgency pressure in northern districts and moved southward where the Mozambican military maintains a more limited presence during previous offensives.^[lxx] Mozambican and Rwandan forces conducted a successful offensive against ISMP that reportedly killed “dozens” of insurgents and dislodged an ISMP contingent from one of its strongholds near the coast in Macomia in late June.^[lxxi]

Figure 7. ISMP Pushes South in Cabo Delgado

Source: Yale Ford.

ISMP maintained a presence in Cabo Delgado’s northern districts in late July, however, which signals that ISMP also likely aimed to stretch Mozambican forces and take advantage of security force gaps in southern Cabo Delgado. ISMP subgroups conducted attacks in several districts across central and northern Cabo Delgado in mid and late July.^[lxxii] The Mozambican military has a smaller footprint in the south than it does in northern districts.^[lxxiii] Security forces in Ancuabe and Chiúre reportedly did not engage with ISMP during the late July offensive, and the Mozambican defense minister said that ISMP took advantage of security forces’ minimal presence and poor response to move freely and terrorize the local population.^[lxxiv] Observers of the conflict assessed that ISMP has previously conducted southern offensives in coordination with attacks in the north to overextend security forces’ supply lines across a large geographical area in Cabo Delgado.^[lxxv]

ISMP additionally likely conducted the offensive at least partially for propaganda purposes. The group promoted the recent attacks with a media campaign that showed attacks targeting Christians through executions and burning churches and public buildings. The group also publicized its evangelization efforts—called dawah—in several districts. These themes follow well-established IS propaganda topics across its global affiliates.^[lxxvi] Previous ISMP offensives in southern Cabo Delgado aligned with global IS campaigns to maximize the group’s propaganda utility for IS central media.^[lxxvii]

Africa File Data Cutoff: August 7, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.