Wagner Out, Africa Corps In: Africa File, June 12, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Russia. The Russian Wagner Group formally withdrew from Mali, as the Kremlin continues to transition control of its military operations in Africa to the Ministry of Defense–backed Africa Corps. The shift to more overt Russian state military involvement in Africa creates myriad domestic and geopolitical risks for the Kremlin. Russia may accordingly adapt its engagement in Africa to the detriment of its current and prospective partnerships.
• Somalia. Al Shabaab seized more territory, as it continues its offensive to reconnect its support zones in central and southern Somalia. The offensive threatens to destabilize Mogadishu and undo gains made during the US-backed Somali counterterrorism offensive in 2022. The recent killing of a senior al Shabaab commander will likely disrupt the group’s operations temporarily but is unlikely to have a meaningful effect beyond the short term.

Assessments:

Russia

Author: Liam Karr

The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it had left Mali, signaling the formal transition of the Russian military presence in Mali to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD)–backed Africa Corps. Wagner announced on its official Telegram that its troops would return home and that its mission in Mali was accomplished.[1] Wagner’s claim of mission accomplished is at odds with the fact that the Malian junta has continued to lose control over its national territory since Wagner arrived in late 2021. Wagner did help the Malian junta make key gains against non-jihadist Tuareg separatist rebels in northern Mali, including the regional capital Kidal.[2] But al Qaeda- and IS-affiliated insurgents are stronger than ever, and Wagner failed to defeat the Tuareg rebels after it suffered massive losses near the Algerian border in July 2024.[3] The rebels have since rekindled their historic partnership with al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), creating a more united front against the Malian government in northern Mali.[4] The Malian government has backed local agreements between JNIM and local communities in central Mali—one of the first places that Wagner deployed and regularly operated—and JNIM attacked the Malian capital for the first time in nearly a decade in 2024.[5]

Wagner’s withdrawal is part of the Kremlin’s plan to consolidate the Russian military presence in Mali—and Africa writ large—under the MOD-backed Africa Corps. Africa Corps announced on June 6 that it would remain in Mali despite Wagner’s withdrawal.[6] Africa Corps is itself part of an effort that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses aims to centralize Russian state control over informal volunteer-based units, such as the Wagner Group.[7]

The Russian MOD has worked to subsume Wagner’s operations in Mali and across the globe since the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and the subsequent death of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023. The Kremlin faced pushback from Malian authorities and the thousands of Wagner fighters in the country who were hesitant to subordinate themselves to the MOD.^[8] The MOD reached an internal “power-sharing” compromise in early 2024, which gave the MOD a limited degree of control over the Wagner Group deployment in Mali but ultimately led to little tangible change.^[9] French media and Kremlin-linked Russian milbloggers reported in early 2025 that Africa Corps would replace Wagner in Mali after the previous contract for Russian forces in Mali expired in February 2025.[10] The Kremlin has increased military equipment shipments to Mali intended for Africa Corps since December 2024 and Africa Corps recruitment in early 2025 as part of this effort.[11] Russian insider sources reported in mid-May that Wagner deployments would formally end in June-July 2025.^[12]

Figure 1. Russian Military Positions in the Sahel

Source: Liam Karr; West Africa Maps.

The MOD is also trying to transition from Wagner to Africa Corps in the Central African Republic (CAR)—the last bastion of Wagner operations in Africa. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited the CAR and Mali during a regional tour in March. Jeune Afrique reported in March that Yevkurov had already been negotiating with Central African authorities to replace Wagner with Africa Corps for “several months.”^[13] Central African President Faustin-Archange Touadéra maintained demands to retain key Wagner advisers and keep Wagner’s role as his personal bodyguard service, however, during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in January 2025.^[14] The Kremlin has struggled equally to directly co-opt Wagner personnel. Wagner members in the CAR were not required to sign new contracts with the MOD after the creation of Africa Corps in 2024 as they were in every other African country.^[15] Veteran Wagner Group personnel still maintain the most influential contact with Touadéra and control Russia’s lucrative wood and gold trade operations in the CAR.^[16]

The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps may uproot elite connections that Wagner personnel had developed with their African counterparts. The Russian government viewed Wagner’s handling of proxy forces and partnerships as a major asset.[17] African partners, especially elites, in the CAR and Mali developed close relationships with Wagner commanders and pushed against discarding Wagner due to these personal ties.^[18] These ties helped Wagner gain entry to both countries and cultivate business and political influence. Wagner’s ties have been crucial at the local level as well; the group operates alongside local militias in some areas. Wagner-linked Telegram chats claim that 70-80 percent of Africa Corps is comprised of former Wagner members, signaling that the Kremlin has sought to retain these ties and experience among the more rank-and-file.[19]

More direct MOD involvement allows the Kremlin to better align its military presence in Africa with its strategic priorities. Russia has long been interested in increasing its influence in Chad to supplant France in the region and to exploit Chad’s strategic location in the central Sahel. The Wagner Group had previously sought to do so by supporting Chadian rebels.[20] The Kremlin reset relations with former junta leader and now President Mahamat Déby in 2024, however, and is seeking to increase ties with the regime directly.[21] Chad asked France and the United States to withdraw their forces later in 2024 and has shown an openness to the Russian-backed Sahelian juntas.[22]

Russia has sought a Red Sea naval base in Sudan for more than a decade.[23] The Wagner Group initially sought to support this goal, as well as its own business aims, through ties to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[24] Wagner continued supporting the RSF in the early stages of the Sudanese civil war in 2023.[25] The Kremlin, however, began supporting the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in 2024—who control Sudan’s coastline and have since captured Khartoum—in exchange for promises of a Russian naval base.[26] There has been no indication that Wagner has continued supporting the RSF since the beginning of 2024.

Figure 2. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia is considering building a military base in the CAR, which would bolster its strategic depth in Africa and serve as a rear hub for its operations across Africa. CAR officials have sought a permanent Russian base capable of housing up to 10,000 soldiers since at least 2019 as a security guarantee against any potential rebel resurgence.[27] The CAR is not strategically located, which has led the Kremlin to ignore this ask and even consider withdrawing forces from the CAR altogether.[28] Russian officials throughout 2025 have signaled an openness to this base and increasing the number of forces in the CAR, however, as part of ongoing negotiations with the Central African government to allow a greater Africa Corps presence in the country.[29] French magazine Jeune Afrique reported that Russia has accelerated talks for a base in the CAR since the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria to strengthen the self-sufficiency of its Africa network alongside other logistic hubs such as Libya or Russian plans for Sudan.[30]

More public MOD involvement in Africa means that the Kremlin can no longer use Wagner’s ambiguous status to distance itself from Russian operations in Africa, making the Kremlin more vulnerable to domestic and geopolitical blowback for its activities. The Kremlin used Wagner’s status as a private military company to gloss over military setbacks suffered in Africa despite directly funding and supporting the group’s operations. Wagner’s legal gray status as a private military company helped the Kremlin obscure contractor deaths as opposed to Russian servicemember deaths.[31] The Kremlin regularly used Wagner as a scapegoat when things went wrong. For example, debacles such as the Tinzaouten ambush in northern Mali that killed up to 84 Russian soldiers in 2024 and the failed deployment into Mozambique in 2019-20 were passed as Wagner failures—not Russian failures.[32]

The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps will likely drive the Kremlin to more openly acknowledge Russian casualties and setbacks suffered in Africa, which would be domestically unpopular. Russian recruitment officials have told Russian media that Africa Corps recruits are entitled to some state benefits, such as additional one-time payments for having children and compensation for being wounded or killed.[33] Casualty compensation means that the Kremlin cannot obscure casualties suffered in Africa because it will have to report casualties to the affected families. Such casualties are widely unpopular among the Russian public, with affected families often questioning what their family members are fighting and dying for.[34]

The responsibility for Russian operations in Africa will now land squarely with the Kremlin, which will become a direct referendum on the Russian state as a security partner. This shift is an opportunity for the Kremlin to achieve one of its long-term strategic goals to position itself as a revitalized great power and global military force. This opportunity also carries clear risk, however. Failures and setbacks will be a public humiliation for the Kremlin, opening Russia to many of the same risks that the United States has faced in its counterinsurgency partnerships. Such setbacks can range from tactical defeats to more strategic defeats, such as the US experience with the fall of Kabul.

African countries will equally understand that their decisions directly affect the Kremlin’s international image and can use this factor to their advantage. The situation may incentivize current or prospective partners to more openly “shop the market” and play Russia off potential competitors, as African leaders frequently do with the West.[35] For example, the Central African government contacted US security contractors in late 2023, which helped revive the Kremlin’s waning interest in the country.[36]

Russia may change its strategic and operational behavior in Africa to mitigate the possible dangers of more visible Kremlin involvement in Africa operations. Such shifts would likely create another set of risks, however, which could limit Russian defense partnerships and their value for the Kremlin and African partners. The risk to Russian prestige may lead Russia to get more deeply entrenched in long-term conflicts to “save face,” which would ensnare the Kremlin in its own series of “forever wars.” Wagner was more immune to such long-term entanglements and even abruptly withdrew from places, such as Mozambique, when the benefits outweighed the costs.[37] Africa Corps cannot abandon the Sahelian regimes or let the security situation seriously deteriorate without making the Kremlin look like a bad partner, however. There is no clear end to this commitment, given the lack of signs that the Sahelian regimes and their Russian partners can defeat the continually strengthening Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency. The CAR has lobbied Russia to establish a base in the CAR partly due to the belief that a base would ensure Russia’s long-term engagement in the country. These missions will be domestically unpopular and a resource drain for the Kremlin. Such resources include weapons systems, such as small numbers of T-72 tanks and electronic warfare systems deployed in Mali, that are needed at scale in Ukraine.[38]

Russian forces may become more conflict- and casualty-averse, which would change how Russia engages with current or prospective African partners. High casualties would be both domestically unpopular and possibly damage Russian prestige, although some partner states view Russian casualties as a positive signal that Russian forces are willing to take risks. Other Russian private military companies that are part of Africa Corps additionally have much less practical experience with combat operations than Wagner and have focused instead on more casualty-averse functions, such as training.[39] Russia becoming more casualty-averse would influence Russian strategic behavior, as it more carefully chooses its partners and avoids large-scale counterinsurgency missions like those that Wagner undertook in the CAR and Mali. Russian forces could also become more casualty-averse in already-existing deployments, which would change how or whether Russian forces participate in some campaigns and operations in places like the CAR, Libya, and Mali.

The Kremlin may also become more risk-averse in Libya and Mali to support Russian objectives to maintain a strong partnership with Algeria. Algeria has maintained a close relationship with Russia that includes significant defense ties and cooperation in international institutions that dates back to the Soviet Union and has persisted after Russia invaded Ukraine in March 2022.[40] Algeria has signaled increasingly, however, that it views Russia’s activity in the neighboring Sahel and Libya as a threat to Algerian and regional stability.[41] Algeria has sought greater cooperation with Europe and the United States directly and indirectly in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and destabilizing activity around Algeria in Africa. Algerian and US military engagement reached a new peak in early 2025 after the two countries signed a wide-reaching memorandum of understanding and elevated discussions between top military leaders.[42]

African partners, in turn, may be less interested in working with Russia if it becomes more casualty- and risk-averse. Wagner’s willingness to sustain casualties and engage in geopolitically risky campaigns was a key comparative advantage for African partners.[43] Wagner’s foray into northern Mali was one of its only major achievements in Mali, and its support for the Libyan National Army in Libya enabled one of the biggest offensives in the Libyan civil war in the past decade.[44] Russian forces will be a lesser-equipped, lesser-trained, and worse-behaved version of Western partner forces if they shift to more non-combat roles and are less willing to support risky campaigns. These shortcomings limit Russia’s appeal to prospective partners and could lead current partners to explore additional options. Russia will continue to be a popular tool for African countries seeking to balance against perceived Western neocolonialism, authoritarians who want to consolidate political control, and militaries who are unable to get weapons from the West due to democracy and human rights concerns. The People’s Republic of China, the Gulf states, Iran, and Turkey, however, can all fill these needs to varying degrees, however, meaning Russia still lacks a clear comparative advantage.[45]

The Kremlin may have given final control of Africa Corps to a Russian oligarch instead of the MOD, but the ownership situation is unlikely to significantly alter the various risks that the Kremlin faces. ISW assessed on June 11 that the Kremlin may have given control of Africa Corps to Russian billionaire Gennady Timchenko.[46] ISW cited Russian insider sources who claimed that the Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which is the part of the MOD tasked with overseeing Africa Corps, failed to meet the Kremlin’s deadlines to develop Africa Corps.[47] CTP and ISW reported throughout 2024 that Africa Corps faced significant recruiting shortages, which impacted its ability to expand operations in partner countries like Burkina Faso and Niger.[48] The struggle to secure buy-in from former Wagner members and African partner countries impacted its ability to consolidate Wagner operations in the CAR and Mali. The insider source claimed that Timchenko and his designated commander—former convict Konstantin Mirzayants—used these failures to supplant the GRU.[49] Africa Corps recruiting has notably surged in early 2025, which aligns with the general timeline of this internal power struggle.[50]

The Kremlin will still face many of the same risks with Africa Corps replacing Wagner, regardless of who controls the group. The MOD has at the very least retained administrative control over Africa Corps, clearly linking the Russian state to the project. Timchenko is also reportedly trying to regain Putin's favor.[51] This internal political dynamic makes Timchenko more likely to clearly align with the Kremlin’s strategic priorities and avoid humiliating blunders that would damage Russian prestige. Prigozhin’s demise also serves as a stark warning against running afoul of the Kremlin. Timchenko’s ownership of Africa Corps would likely keep Russian engagement more personality-dominated, however, as it was during the Wagner Group era. This feature will keep Russian engagement fluid and responsive and allow Africa Corps to more quickly capitalize on opportunities as they arise.

Somalia

Author: Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Liam Karr

Al Shabaab captured two key areas in central Somalia as it continues its 2025 offensive to reestablish support zones there and connect them to its center of gravity in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab captured El Hareeri, Hiraan region, on June 11 following a six-day battle between Somali security forces and al Shabaab for the town.^[52]  El Hareeri sits on a network of roads that connects to key areas in central Somalia, including Moqokori and Mahas--the last Somali-controlled towns in the southeastern Hiraan region. Al Shabaab forces advanced within 45 miles of both towns from the east, west, and south by mid-April, and unspecified local security officials told Somali media in June that al Shabaab aimed to capture the towns.^[53]

Al Shabaab also captured Hawadley, which lies approximately 39 miles north of Mogadishu, on June 3.^[54] Hawadley is located in the Shabelle River valley along a major north-south road between the district capital Bal’ad and Jowhar--the regional capital of Middle Shabelle and capital of Hirshabelle state. Al Shabaab already infiltrated parts of the Shabelle River valley north and south of Jowhar to relink its support zones in central and southern Somalia in March.^[55] The valley is also a possible staging ground for al Shabaab attacks on the main highway connecting Mogadishu and central Somalia or Mogadishu directly. Al Shabaab’s capture of Hawadley threatens to entrench an al Shabaab support zone in the valley. Seasonal rains reportedly flooded Hawadley in early June, howver, which may prevent al Shabaab from moving effectively in and out of the town in the short term.^[56]

Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Central Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson

Al Shabaab has captured several operationally critical areas of central Somalia since it launched an offensive in the region in early 2025. These gains have enabled the group to reconnect its support zones in southern and central Somalia for the first time since 2022 and create a buffer for the group‘s key control zones in the neighboring Galgadud region. Al Shabaab’s gains include the recapture of Adan Yabal, which was al Shabaab’s administrative headquarters in central Somalia for over a decade before Somali forces captured the town in December 2022.^[57]

The Somali National Army (SNA) killed a regional al Shabaab commander in central Somalia region, which may temporarily disrupt al Shabaab planning and logistics for its ongoing offensive in central Somalia.^[58] The SNA launched airstrikes in El Hareeri, Hiraan region, that killed al Shabaab commander Nur Abdi Roble, also known as Nuunuule, on June 6.^[59] The airstrike also killed a logistics head for al Shabaab’s combat units and a senior field commander.^[60] Roble had been a member of al Shabaab for 17 years and served as the regional commander for al Shabaab operations in Mudug, Galgaduud, Hiraan, and Middle Shabelle regions, according to the Somali government.^[61] Roble reportedly organized a complex attack targeting the SNA in Cowsweyne in August 2023 that killed dozens of soldiers.^[62] The attack led Somali forces to retreat from several towns in previously captured areas and resulted in the collapse of the government’s frontline in southern Galmudug.^[63]

The killing of Roble is highly unlikely to disrupt al Shabaab’s operations in central Somalia in the long term, however. Al Shabaab’s hierarchical but decentralized command structure gives the group flexibility to replace even senior leaders within days or weeks.^[64] Al Shabaab named a new leader for the group five days after a US airstrike killed al Shabaab’s late leader Ahmed Godane in September 2014, for example.^[65]

Figure 4. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The al Shabaab offensive in central Somalia threatens to inflict a strategic setback on the Somali Federal Government (SFG) by undoing gains made during the US-backed Somali counterterrorism offensive in 2022. These losses would undermine the SFG’s domestic and international credibility in its ability to eventually retake its national territory from al Shabaab. Many of Somalia’s international partners praised the 2022 offensive as the first Somali-led counterterrorism offensive to retake significant territory from al Shabaab.^[66]  The offensive stalled in 2023, however, and the SFG’s clan-based coalition began to collapse in 2024 due to domestic and regional political issues.^[67] The offensive benefited from al Shabaab’s missteps that alienated locals in the area, the Somali president’s clan ties in the area, and the prevalence of strong clan militias in the area.^[68] The SFG was unable to consolidate its gains despite these favorable conditions, which are not present in al Shabaab’s center of gravity in southern Somalia.

Africa File Data Cutoff: June 12, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.