3 hours ago

Somali Supreme Court Overrules Federal Government; SAF Advances West on Central Sudan Highway: Africa File, November 12, 2026

Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr

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Contributors: Ziv Zellars

Key Takeaways:

  • Somalia. The Somali Supreme Court invalidated President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s March 2026 term extension and mandated federal elections within 90 days, intensifying the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS’s) political standoff with the national opposition amid uprisings in multiple federal member states. The FGS’s political disputes threaten to create security gaps for al Shabaab to exploit amid international counterterrorism troop withdrawals.
  • Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has advanced along the main east–west highway in central Sudan, as the military attempts to expel the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the North and South Kordofan states and advance into RSF-controlled western Sudan. The RSF advanced on a secondary front in southeastern Sudan's Blue Nile state, however, which could distract the SAF from the main front lines in central Sudan.

Figure 1. Africa File, November 12, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke.

Assessments:

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Ziv Zellars

The Somali Supreme Court invalidated President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s March 2026 term extension and mandated federal elections within 90 days, intensifying the political standoff between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and national opposition. The court ruled on November 5 that the FGS had unlawfully extended Mohamud’s term when it approved a new constitution in March 2026.[1] The new constitution delayed federal elections by one year and extended his term by exactly one year, until May 15, 2027.[2] The court also called on the FGS and national opposition to reach a consensus on an election plan within 30 days and hold federal elections within 90 days.[3]

The Somali Supreme Court’s ruling supports the national opposition’s resistance to the term extension and delayed elections. The leading national opposition coalition, the Somali Future Council (SFC), endorsed the court’s ruling on November 7.[4] A main SFC leader, former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, had initially filed the motion challenging the new constitution with the Somali Supreme Court.[5] The SFC has been locked in political standoff with the FGS since the approval of the new constitution, which the SFC denounced as an illegitimate power grab. The opposition has mobilized against the FGS by holding press conferences, organizing public demonstrations, and threatening to hold parallel elections.[6] The FGS has responded by restricting SFC leaders’ movements and cracking down on public demonstrations.[7] The standoff has continued since clashes in early June between forces loyal to the two sides in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, despite international mediation efforts.[8]

The FGS has challenged the Somali Supreme Court’s authority since the ruling and reaffirmed its own electoral agenda, although the FGS has also moderated its public stance. The FGS had ordered the dismissal of Somali Supreme Court Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed before the ruling, but the court rejected the order.[9] The Somali attorney general and defense minister rejected the ruling shortly after the court announced it.[10] Federal forces then reportedly took over the court, and the FGS removed Yusuf from office and installed a new chief justice on November 7, which the SFC denounced.[11] The FGS and SFC reportedly agreed to talks from November 14 to 18 that the United States, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the European Union will mediate, however.[12] FGS security officials and SFC leaders held preliminary talks on November 10.[13] The Somali information minister stated after that the FGS still plans to hold direct elections but is open to technical compromises, which it had not previously stated.[14]

The FGS is also facing armed uprisings in the Hirshabelle and South West states over its moves to install pro-FGS governments that are further straining federal authority and political bandwidth. The influential Hawadle clan launched a rebellion in Hirshabelle’s Hiiraan region in late October 2026 due to the FGS favoring a member from a different clan for the state presidency, which Hawadle members have argued violated traditional power-sharing agreements.[15] Hawadle militiamen seized key government facilities in Beledweyne, the Hiiraan regional capital, on October 30.[16] A key Hawadle leader then called on the clan to mobilize against the FGS on November 6, causing groups of Hawadle from the federal security forces to defect.[17] Former Somali intelligence head Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbalolshe, who is a leader of the uprising, stated that the clan plans to form a new Hiiraan regional government.[18] Mohamud offered on November 8 to move the Hirshabelle state capital to Hiiraan in an effort to ease tensions, but Sanbalolshe rejected the offer.[19]

South West state opposition forces have increasingly threatened the FGS-backed South West state government’s control of the state in late 2026. The opposition forces have sought to overthrow the South West state government since the FGS deposed then-South West state president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen) in March and set up a pro-FGS administration.[20] Opposition forces loyal to Laftagareen launched a rebellion in May 2026, recently captured three district capitals in early and mid-October, and have attacked Baidoa—the de facto South West state capital—at least nine times, most recently on November 2.[21]

Figure 2. South West Opposition Offensive Against Federally Backed State Government

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Ziv Zellars.

The FGS’s political disputes threaten to create security gaps for al Shabaab to exploit amid international counterterrorism troop withdrawals. Uganda announced on November 2 that it had begun withdrawing its approximately 2,000 troops stationed in Somalia on a bilateral basis and would complete the process quickly.[22] Ugandan forces were responsible for securing key infrastructure and supply lines into Mogadishu.[23] The Associated Press reported that African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) forces—the FGS’s most significant external supporter on-the-ground—will take over Ugandan bases, although Uganda and the other AUSSOM member countries also plan to completely withdraw their AUSSOM forces by the end of 2027.[24] The United States separately redeployed forces stationed at the Baledogle Air Base, which is 65 miles northwest of Mogadishu, to “other parts of Somalia” in late October.[25] The United States reportedly used the base to train Somali troops and conduct airstrikes.[26]

Al Shabaab has already taken advantage of the FGS’s disputes in Hirshabelle and South West. Al Shabaab announced a peace agreement with Hawadle factions, who play a fundamental role in enabling federally backed counterterrorism operations in central Somalia, in Hiiraan in early October.[27] Al Shabaab has separately increased its monthly attacks in South West by approximately 35 percent since March.[28] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) also previously assessed that South West opposition forces are almost certainly deconflicting and possibly coordinating with al Shabaab.[29] CTP has repeatedly assessed since late 2025 that al Shabaab may also exploit the national political crisis to target sensitive areas in and around Mogadishu.[30]

Figure 3. Al Shabaab Increases Activity Following Federal Takeover in South West State, 2026

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Ziv Zellars; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr and Ziv Zellars

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has advanced along the main east–west highway in central Sudan, as the military attempts to expel the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the North and South Kordofan states and advance into RSF-controlled western Sudan. The SAF and allied militias advanced west from al Ayara to capture um Sumeima—approximately 40 miles west of el Obeid, the SAF's central Sudan headquarters and the North Kordofan state capital—on November 5.[31] A spokesperson from the allied Joint Forces militia claimed that the advancing forces had destroyed or captured dozens of RSF combat vehicles.[32] The paramilitary RSF and SAF have traded control of um Sumeima several times since 2025, and the RSF had used the town as a staging ground for attacks on el Obeid throughout 2026.[33] The recapture of the town gives the SAF control of the entire main east–west highway in North Kordofan and gives the SAF positions along the highway on the West Kordofan state border.

The SAF also continued making gains on an alternative axis through the North Kordofan desert and advanced into West Kordofan for the first time since late 2025. The military captured um Marahik, which is 140 miles northwest of el Obeid, on November 3.[34] The SAF then reportedly took Iyal Bakhit, which is approximately 115 miles northwest of el Obeid, and several nearby villages on November 7.[35] The Critical Threats Project previously assessed that the SAF’s gains in rural North Kordofan were setting conditions to support the SAF’s primary effort to advance west along Sudan’s main east–west highway toward the RSF-controlled Darfur region.[36] SAF gains to the north create opportunities for the SAF to flank RSF positions on the highway in West Kordofan towns such as al Khawai, which is approximately 70 miles west of el Obeid, as the rural villages link to the highway via secondary roads.[37]

Figure 4. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Offensive in Central Sudan

Note: RSF stands for Rapid Support Forces.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr.

The SAF has also attempted to advance south of el Obeid to capture an RSF salient along the main north–south highway linking North and South Kordofan with secondary highways leading to West Kordofan. The SAF briefly seized Kazgil—approximately 30 miles south of el Obeid—on November 5, although the RSF reportedly retook the town.[38] Kazgil is a key frontline position in an RSF salient along the highway between SAF-controlled el Obeid and Dilling, which is 100 miles to the south. The salient includes the key crossroads South Kordofan town of al Dabibat, which links to secondary highways that run into West Kordofan and Darfur.

The RSF advanced on a secondary front in southeastern Sudan's Blue Nile state, however, which could distract the SAF from the main front lines in central Sudan. The paramilitary group captured Sali, which is 80 miles south of Ad Damazin, the Blue Nile state capital, on November 3.[39] The SAF had used Sali as a key defensive position on Blue Nile’s main north–south highway, which leads toward vital agricultural areas and population centers in the Nile River Valley.[40] The RSF then reportedly took al Keili, which is another SAF base approximately 10 miles east of Sali, on November 4.[41] The RSF also reportedly advanced on an alternative axis via secondary roads that connect to the main highway, recapturing Bakori—approximately 80 miles southeast of Ad Damazin—on November 5.[42]

Figure 5. Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Offensive in Blue Nile State

Note: SAF stands for Sudanese Armed Forces.

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr.

The RSF’s gains in Blue Nile could distract the SAF from its central Sudan offensive, as past RSF advances have diverted SAF resources to the secondary front. The SAF sent special forces units and other reinforcements to Blue Nile in late August to counter an RSF offensive.[43] The military replaced its Blue Nile commander on November 8.[44]

Africa File Data Cutoff: November 12, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c977ppnezep6o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-supreme-court-rules-president-parliament-terms-expired-orders-elections-within-90-days; https://x.com/TheDailySomalia/status/2118305443084681566; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-parliament-approves-constitution-change-extend-presidents-term-delay-2026-03-05

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-parliament-approves-constitution-change-extend-presidents-term-delay-2026-03-05; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/somali-parliament-approves-new-constitution/3850086

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c977ppnezep6o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-supreme-court-rules-president-parliament-terms-expired-orders-elections-within-90-days; https://x.com/TheDailySomalia/status/2118305443084681566

[4] https://x.com/TheDailySomalia/status/2119470012033282318

[5] https://www.hiiraan dot com/politics4/2026/Oct/206555/former_somali_president_warns_electoral_dispute_threatens_national_unity_and_security.aspx; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-opposition-first-court-challenge-new-constitution

[6] https://www.caasimada dot net/golaha-mustaqbalka-oo-si-adag-u-diiday-goaanka-bf-ee-dastuurka-kuna-dhawaaqay; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalias-opposition-says-president-loses-legitimacy-after-may-15; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/mogadishu-fear-return-somalia-political-crisis; https://x.com/ArlaadiMnetwork/status/2044284666333802530; https://x.com/SMSSomaliTV1/status/2044291040731918588

[7] https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2026/May/205115/former_somali_president_says_troops_blocked_access_to_his_home_ahead_of_mogadishu_protest.aspx; https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-security-forces-deployed-around-ex-pm-s-residence-ahead-of-rally; https://x.com/GaroweOnline/status/2053351739739320717; https://x.com/GaroweOnline/status/2053229000080937365; https://x.com/SomaliGuardian/status/2053227791177425173; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/somalia-fgs-sfc-tanzania-russia-kremlin-sudan-saf-tasis-africa-file-june-11-2026#Somalia

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-military-opposition-allied-militias-trade-fire-ahead-anti-government-2026-06-04; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpdpwgxl1qzo; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2026/Feb/204499/federal_governmentopposition_talks_end_without_breakthrough_on_elections.aspx; https://issafrica dot org/iss-today/more-instability-for-somalia-as-another-election-deadline-lapses; https://x.com/BaidoaOnline/status/2076306838065213903; https://horseedmedia got net/wadahadalladii-dowladda-federaalka-iyo-golaha-mustaqbalka-oo-natiijo-laaan-ku-soo-dhammaaday/423937; https://en.kaabtv dot com/insight-why-somalias-election-talks-collapsed; https://x.com/TheDailySomalia/status/2074448016509919684

[9] https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-president-dismisses-chief-justice-constitution-ruling; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2026/Nov/206692/somali_supreme_court_rejects_chief_justices_dismissal_accuses_president_of_interfering_in_constitutional_case.aspx

[10] https://www.hiiraan dot com/news/2026/Nov/wararka_maanta06-195425.htm; https://www.caasimada dot net/garyaqaanka-guud-ee-df-oo-ka-horyimid-goaankii-maxkamadda-sare-kun-dhawaaqay-inuu; https://horseedmedia dot net/wasiir-fiqi-oo-eedeymo-u-jeediyey-dr-baashe-yuusuf-iyo-garsoorkii-maxkamadda-sare/427225

[11] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c977ppnezep6o; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2026/Nov/206698/somali_opposition_condemns_troop_deployment_at_supreme_court_accuses_hassan_sheikh_of_judicial_interference.aspx; https://www.aljazeera dot com/video/newsfeed/2026/11/10/security-forces-seized-top-court-somalias-ex-chief-justice-says; https://sonna dot so/en/article/New-Chief-Justice-of-the-Supreme-Court-Officially-Assumes-Office; https://somaliatoday dot com/politics/somali-opposition-calls-chief-justices-dismissal-a-coup-2026-11-08

[12] https://www.dawan dot africa/news/somali-president-invites-opposition-groups-to-nov-14-18-talks-on-elections; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-opposition-agrees-talks-president-electoral-breakthrough; https://www.caasimada dot net/beesha-caalamka-oo-door-weyn-ka-ciyaaraysa-wada-hadallada-df-iyo-mucaaradka; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news/2026/Nov/wararka_maanta10-195464.htm

[13] https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2026/Nov/206750/somali_military_and_intelligence_chiefs_meet_opposition_ahead_of_november_political_forum.aspx; https://shabellemedia dot com/dowladda-federaalka-iyo-xubno-ka-tirsan-madasha-mustaqbalka-oo-kulan-ku-yeeshay-muqdisho

[14] https://shabellemedia dot com/somalia-government-open-to-election-compromise-but-insists-on-one-person-one-vote-minister-says; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-president-rejects-opposition-consensus-election; https://sonna dot so/en/article/President-Hassan-Sheikh-Mohamud-Pledges-Final-Push-Against-Al-Shabaab-and-a-Return-to-Direct-Elections-as-Somalia-Closes-a-Historic-Independence-Week; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/somalia-fgs-puntland-africa-file-july-16-2026#Somalia

[15] https://somaliatoday dot com/politics/guudlaawe-re-elected-president-of-somalias-hirshabelle-2026-10-24; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-president-endorses-ali-gudlawe-next-hirshabelle-leader

[16] https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2026/Oct/206654/macawisley_fighters_seize_beledweyne_compound_amid_tensions.aspx; https://hornreview dot org/2026/11/07/the-beledweyne-breach-and-the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-in-somalia

[17] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-federal-troops-gather-at-clan-leader-s-residence-in-beledweyne-amid-rising-tensions; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/hawadle-troops-defect-to-beledweyne-as-federal-command-over-sna-fractures; https://thesomalidigest dot com/ugaas-yusuf-ugaas-hassan-hawadle-soldiers

[18] https://thesomalidigest dot com/abdullahi-sanbalolshe-hiiraan-administration; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-ex-spy-chief-al-shabab-alliance-president

[19] https://shabellemedia dot com/somalias-president-offers-hirshabelle-capital-to-hiiraan-amid-political-tensions; https://www.hiiraan dot com/politics4/2026/Nov/206727/former_nisa_chief_rejects_hassan_sheikhs_proposal_to_make_beledweyne_hirshabelle_capital.aspx

[20] https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/why-somalia-s-south-west-state-broke-off-5395052; https://www.hortabin dot com/baidoa-becomes-focus-of-somalia-political-confrontation; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/rift-between-somalias-president-and-southwest-state-leader-erupts-into-violence; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-national-army-takes-control-part-biggest-city-south-west-state-2026-03-30; https://www.hiiraan dot com/news/2026/May/wararka_maanta13-193712.htm; https://shabellemedia dot com/somalias-parliament-speaker-wins-south-west-state-presidential-election

[21] https://www.caasimada dot net/lafta-gareen-oo-war-culus-soo-saaray-kadib-degmooyinkii-ay-qabsadeen-ciidankiisa; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-government-loses-bay-region-towns-baidoa-laftagaren; https://www.caasimada dot net/dagaal-ay-ka-qayb-qaateen-ciiidanka-itoobiya-oo-ka-dhacay-duleedka-baydhaba

[22] https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/2117187964761485709; https://apnews.com/article/somalia-mogadishu-uganda-troops-withdrawal-alshabab-74cfed8c1b27536790a64cde24d77a5f; https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-begins-withdrawing-troops-from-somalia-after-two-decades/a-79829903

[23] https://apnews.com/article/somalia-mogadishu-uganda-troops-withdrawal-alshabab-74cfed8c1b27536790a64cde24d77a5f; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8zxlqxwed4do; https://thesomalidigest dot com/uganda-peoples-defence-forces-bilateral-contingent-somalia

[24] https://apnews.com/article/somalia-mogadishu-uganda-troops-withdrawal-alshabab-74cfed8c1b27536790a64cde24d77a5f; https://thesomalidigest dot com/uganda-peoples-defence-forces-bilateral-contingent-somalia; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/11/12/burundi-hurries-to-withdraw-troops-before-end-of-aussom,110919094-art

[25] https://hornobserver dot com/articles/3793/US-Troops-Withdraw-from-Belidogle-Military-Airfield-as-Security-Situation-Evolves-in-Southwest-Somalia; https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-troops-somalia-baledogle-airfield; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/11/ugandans-start-withdrawal-from-somalia-us-leaves-key-base.php

[26] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/11/ugandans-start-withdrawal-from-somalia-us-leaves-key-base.php; https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/2022-12-10/troops-somalia-special-forces-8370078.html; https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/exclusive-u-s-operates-drones-from-secret-bases-in-somalia-special-operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down; https://www.vice.com/en/article/somalia-is-looking-like-another-full-blown-us-war

[27] https://thesomalidigest dot com/al-shabaab-hawadle-deal-mahaas; https://www.somaliguardian dot com/news/somalia-news/somalia-al-shabaab-hawadle-deal-end-war-somalia; https://x.com/CivicPulseh6nc/status/2106435927492988940; https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/2106741701796663558; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaab-somalia-algeria-niger-libya-morocco-haftar#Somalia

[28] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) database, available by subscription at https://acleddata.com/conflict-data/data-export-tool

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaab-somalia-algeria-niger-libya-morocco-haftar#Somalia

[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/m23-withdraws-from-uvira-saudi-uae-red-sea-competition-al-shabaab-attacks-mogadishu-rsf-genocide-el-fasher-africa-file-december-18-2025#somalia; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/nigeria-iran-rwanda-m23-ethiopia-sudan-rsf-somalia-africa-file-march-5-2026#Somalia; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/aussom-shabaab-somalia-puntland-fgs-somalia-iswap-boko-nigeria-africa-file-august-13-2026#Somalia-AUSSOM

[31] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/heavy-fighting-outside-el-obeid; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2118337993169592795; https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5338514-sudanese-army-rsf-clash-fierce-battles-kordofan

[32] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5338514-sudanese-army-rsf-clash-fierce-battles-kordofan

[33] https://sudantribune dot com/article/302834; https://sudantribune dot com/article/303469; https://sudantribune dot com/article/305464; https://sudantribune dot com/article/315091; https://3ayin dot com/en/bulletin38-; https://x.com/yasseralfadol/status/2066534547852861644; https://x.com/RadioDabanga/status/2066116933024374901; https://x.com/bsdl522953/status/2065490457245646963

[34] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2117676806954471575; https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2117919380738592955; https://x.com/bsdl522953/status/2117655533654053039; https://x.com/IvaDlebeR/status/2117661527889047801

[35] https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2119100434258489459; https://sudantribune.com/article/321005

[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ethiopia-tigray-tplf-fano-china-prc-djibouti-jnim-mali-sudan-saf-rsf-somalia-aussom#Sudan

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ethiopia-tigray-tplf-fano-china-prc-djibouti-jnim-mali-sudan-saf-rsf-somalia-aussom#Sudan

[38] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/heavy-fighting-outside-el-obeid; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/sudanese-army-regains-control-of-2-areas-in-north-kordofan-after-clashes-with-rsf/4113350; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2118308463432671237; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2118327886709215344

[39] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rebel-coalition-seizes-control-sali-latest-advance-blue-nile; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2117575025616187594; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2117570898207326441

[40] https://x.com/criticalthreats/status/2118099384860897438

[41] https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2117894711285530974; https://x.com/Mona998_1/status/2117932540656783574; https://rapidsupportforce dot com/en/news-details/New-Fung

[42] https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2118308322197786664 https://x.com/IvaDlebeR/status/2118326091299586472; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ethiopia-tigray-tplf-fano-china-prc-djibouti-jnim-mali-sudan-saf-rsf-somalia-aussom#Sudan

[43] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/sudanese-army-deploys-brigade-in-blue-nile-state-amid-fighting-with-rsf/4040937; https://sudantribune dot com/article/318160; https://x.com/SudaneseAF/status/2094709700273070125; https://x.com/FCB6O/status/2094714291572097531; https://3ayin dot com/en/bulletin-51-; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ethiopia-tigray-tplf-fano-china-prc-djibouti-jnim-mali-sudan-saf-rsf-somalia-aussom#Sudan

[44] https://sudantribune dot com/article/321027; https://darfur24 dot com/2026/11/09/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b4-%d9%8a%d8%ac%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%87-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%a7