AU Somalia Mission in Peril; Puntland Consolidates Control: Africa File, August 13, 2026

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Contributor: Aaryaman Shah

Key Takeaways:

• Somalia—AUSSOM. The African Union mission in Somalia began an accelerated handoff of responsibility to the Somali military amid uncertainties about the mission’s future and Somali forces’ ability to assume full responsibility for Somali security. Al Shabaab will likely exploit any lapse in counterterrorism pressure, as it has already intensified operations across central and southern Somalia and northeastern Kenya in recent months.
• Somalia—Puntland. The Puntland state government recently seized three Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)–aligned bases, consolidating its control over security forces in northern Somalia’s Puntland state. The Puntland state government’s consolidation of control foils the FGS’s plan to weaken the anti-FGS state government and, therefore, the anti-FGS opposition, at least in the short-term.
• Nigeria. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is facing several internal and external challenges, including fighting with security forces and Boko Haram, as well as internal tensions among its leaders and within its fighter base. ISWAP has remained resilient, however, and maintained a high rate of activity across northeastern Nigeria throughout 2026.

Assessments:

Somalia-AUSSOM

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The African Union Stabilization and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) began an accelerated handoff of responsibility to the Somali National Army (SNA) amid uncertainties about the future of AUSSOM and the SNA’s capacity. The SNA assumed control of the Buurhakaba base—approximately 35 miles southeast of Baidoa, the de facto South West state capital—from Ethiopian AUSSOM forces on August 8.^[1] Ethiopian forces had controlled the base since 2014.^[2] Buurhakaba is on the main road connecting Baidoa to Mogadishu, the Somali capital, although al Shabaab contests or controls large portions of the road, including around Buurhakaba.^[3] The Somali news outlet Radio Dalsan reported that the handoff is part of a broader shift in responsibility to the SNA, as the SNA is allegedly supposed to assume control of three more major bases in the near future.^[4]

Figure 1. African Union Stabilization and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Hands Over Buurhakaba Base to Somali Military

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

AUSSOM has accelerated its drawdown timeline due to anticipated cuts in external support that will jeopardize its ability to sustain operations after 2026. AUSSOM’s Concept of Operations scheduled the bulk of the handoffs to the SNA for 2028 in advance of the mission end date in December 2029.^[5] The United States announced in early July 2026 that it would not support a renewal of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) for 2027, however.^[6] UNSOS has already started soliciting offers on the UN’s online marketplace to auction its assets in anticipation of the office closure.^[7] AUSSOM depends on UNSOS to fulfill an indispensable support role, as the office provides logistics and medical services, including casualty evacuations, as well as aviation, communications, and other technical support.^[8] The AU stated that UNSOS’s closure “carries significant implications for logistical sustainment, operational posture and financing of the Mission.”^[9] AUSSOM member states held a summit on July 31 in which they agreed to move up the mission end date by 12 to 18 months but left AUSSOM’s future beyond 2026 largely dependent on the UN and member states, which had already struggled to fund the mission.^[10] The Somali news outlet Baidoa Online separately reported that Ethiopia has allegedly asked AUSSOM to accelerate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, specifically.^[11]

The FGS is already distracted and overstretched, particularly due to its involvement in a nationwide political crisis. The FGS under Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud extended Mohamud’s term and has sought to implement direct elections. These moves have put the FGS at odds with the leading national opposition coalition, the Somali Future Council (SFC), which has threatened to hold parallel elections.^[12] The FGS has responded by seeking to forcibly suppress any opposition to its political agenda and co-opt federal member state forces and governments. FGS-aligned forces have recently clashed with anti-FGS forces in Mogadishu and in Puntland and South West states, and the FGS has also deployed forces to Galmudug and Hirshabelle states to set conditions for FGS-favored candidates to win upcoming state elections.^[13] Those deployments reportedly included Turkish-trained Gorgor units, which play a key role in combating al Shabaab.^[14] The SFC accused the FGS of diverting resources away from counterterrorism to fulfill its political agenda in a letter to the AUSSOM summit participants in late July.^[15] Radio Dalsan reported that some FGS officials are unsure whether FGS forces can hold positions vacated by AUSSOM.^[16]

Turkey could help partially fill the void left by reduced AU or UN support. Somalia is Turkey’s anchor state in the Horn of Africa, and Turkey has become a key military and political backer and infrastructure investor for the FGS.^[17] Turkey has sought to increase its military involvement in Somalia in recent years, and the Turkish parliament extended troop deployments to Somalia by two years on July 27.^[18] The Turkish forces have trained the SNA and protected Turkish infrastructure projects, including an aerospace base under construction outside Mogadishu.^[19] Turkey has also stationed both drones and F-16 fighter jets in Somalia and significantly increased the rate of airstrikes targeting al Shabaab in 2026 compared with previous years, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[20]

Al Shabaab will likely exploit any lapse in counterterrorism pressure, as it has already intensified operations across central and southern Somalia and northeastern Kenya in recent months. Al Shabaab has intensified its efforts to consolidate control of the Mogadishu outskirts, increasing its attacks in Lower Shabelle region by approximately 60 percent during the June to August 2026 period compared to January to May.^[21] These efforts are focused on key ground lines of communication into Mogadishu, particularly ones that connect al Shabaab-controlled territory in southern Somalia to the Mogadishu outskirts. Al Shabaab also detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting SNA convoys that included Gorgor special forces units near the town of Awdheegle—located approximately 45 miles southwest of Mogadishu on a key road—on August 10, reportedly killing at least 10 soldiers and injuring at least another 20.^[22] Al Shabaab claimed that the IED attacks resulted in 52 casualties.^[23]

Figure 2. Al Shabaab Increases Attacks in Lower Shabelle Region

Sources: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

Al Shabaab may be using these support zones to launch a new attack campaign in the capital. Al Shabaab conducted more attacks in Mogadishu from August 1 to August 7 than it had in any whole month since January 2026, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[24] Baidoa Online reported on August 6 that the FGS had warned of potential imminent al Shabaab attacks on hotels and government facilities, which al Shabaab has frequently targeted over the past decade despite a lull in such attacks since 2025.^[25] The FGS’s primary intelligence agency (NISA) then announced on August 7 that it had arrested nine al Shabaab members plotting attacks in Mogadishu.^[26] The SNA has since reportedly deployed reinforcements on key roads into Mogadishu.[27] Al Shabaab has previously used ground lines of communication from the Mogadishu outskirts to conduct operations in the city, including in a complex assault on a high-value al Shabaab detainee center near the presidential palace in early October 2025 that involved a suicide vehicle-borne IED.^[28] Al Shabaab also specifically exploited Somalia’s last election deadlock from 2021 to 2022 to increase suicide bombings in Mogadishu.^[29]

Al Shabaab separately captured an operationally significant village in central Somalia that serves as a gateway to FGS-controlled towns in the Hiraan region. Al Shabaab captured the town of Teedan—55 miles east of Beledweyne, the Hiraan regional capital—on August 2.^[30] Al Shabaab reportedly advanced from Mahas and Moqokori and overran SNA positions after a two-day battle, claiming to kill 41 soldiers and injure another 40.^[31] The FGS had controlled Teedan since a 2022 counteroffensive across central Somalia, the gains of which al Shabaab has effectively erased. Capturing Teedan positions al Shabaab closer to Hiraan’s population centers, as the town sits at the intersection of multiple secondary roads that connect separately to Beledweyne and Matabaan, a district capital 45 miles northeast of Beledweyne. A village head in Matabaan district reported on August 11 that al Shabaab has advanced into the district since capturing Teedan.^[32] NISA claimed that it had conducted an operation in Mahas on August 12 that neutralized local al Shabaab leaders who were responsible for planning the group’s operations in Hiraan.[33]

Figure 3. Al Shabaab Advances in Hiraan Region

Sources: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Hannah Ochs; ACLED.

Al Shabaab could also take advantage of reduced pressure to increase operations in neighboring countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya, although major external operations are likely not al Shabaab’s priority. Al Shabaab conducted more attacks in Kenya’s Mandera country in June and July 2026 than it did from January to May combined, including one attack on July 28 that killed five Kenyan soldiers.^[34] Al Shabaab has continued targeting Kenyan forces in Mandera in August, reportedly having conducted at least five attacks.^[35] Kenya has reportedly deployed reinforcements to the Somali border.^[36] Al Shabaab has launched offensives into neighboring countries before, including Ethiopia in 2022.^[37] However, Ethiopia has a bilateral agreement outside AUSSOM to station forces in Somalia to protect the Ethiopian border, and Kenya also has a bilateral agreement with Somalia that could serve as the basis for future bilateral deployments.^[38] Al Shabaab offensives into neighboring countries also risk reinvigorating efforts to sustain AUSSOM, which al Shabaab is seeking to force out of Somalia.

Somalia-Puntland

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Aaryaman Shah

The Puntland state government recently seized three Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)-aligned bases, consolidating its control over security forces in northern Somalia’s Puntland state. Puntland state forces captured the FGS-aligned Puntland Security Force (PSF) headquarters near the airport in Galkayo, a major city split between Galmudug and Puntland states, on August 5.^[39] Puntland state forces targeted the base with artillery for hours before overrunning it and arresting 161 PSF fighters, according to the Puntland state police.^[40] Other PSF fighters retreated, reportedly into Galmudug-controlled Galkayo.^[41] Puntland State President Said Abdullahi Deni stated that Puntland state forces had conducted a “planned security operation” to stop the FGS from “undermining” the state government by amassing troops and weapons at the base.^[42] The Puntland state government reported that Puntland state forces had clashed with PSF forces the day prior due to an FGS attempt to send weapons into Puntland-controlled Galkayo.^[43] The PSF has increasingly aligned with the FGS against the Puntland state government during Deni’s tenure due to Deni sidelining the PSF in favor of the Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency, which is more directly under his control.^[44]

The Puntland state government subsequently forced the surrender of FGS-aligned forces in Puntland. The Puntland state government gave all forces in Puntland operating outside its control two days to surrender or integrate into state forces on August 5.^[45] The governor of Puntland-controlled Mudug region, where Galkayo is located, separately stated that the state government would take action against forces who do not comply.^[46] The Puntland state government also announced on August 6 that it would prosecute any individuals, including officials and politicians, who aid FGS-aligned forces.^[47]

Puntland state forces enforced the order by taking over two more FGS-aligned bases, without resistance. Puntland state forces assumed control of a key PSF base in Bosaso, which is Puntland’s main port city, on August 6 after negotiations with the present PSF units.^[48] The PSF units withdrew before Puntland state forces took control of the base.^[49] Puntland state forces then assumed control of a local FGS-aligned militia base in Armo, which is approximately 60 miles south of Bosaso, on August 8.^[50] Talks similar to those in Bosaso reportedly failed, but the FGS-aligned forces still withdrew to the mountainous area around Karkaar, which is approximately 75 miles south of Armo.^[51] Puntland state forces reportedly pursued the FGS-aligned forces, although fighting has not broken out.^[52] The Puntland state police announced on August 10 that the state government would integrate some of the surrendered FGS-aligned forces into state forces.^[53]

The Puntland state government’s consolidation of control foils the FGS’s plan to weaken the anti-FGS state government and, therefore, the anti-FGS opposition, at least in the short-term. The FGS had been attempting to co-opt security forces in Puntland against the state government. The FGS unilaterally appointed a new Somali National Army (SNA) commander for Puntland in mid-June 2026, sparking a standoff between the FGS and state government.^[54] The Puntland state government ordered its security forces to restrict FGS-aligned force movements beginning on June 18.^[55] The Somali news outlet Garowe Online and a senior PSF official then claimed that the FGS had formally integrated the PSF into an SNA unit based in Bosaso.^[56] Both sides continued to mobilize forces across the state throughout July, with the FGS recruiting new fighters and reportedly supplying aligned forces.^[57] Puntland state forces clashed with a PSF convoy traveling from Bosaso on July 20, accusing the convoy of being affiliated with the FGS.^[58]

The FGS’s actions in Puntland were part of a broader ongoing effort to consolidate control of Federal Member States (FMS) to reduce nationwide resistance to its electoral and constitutional agenda. Puntland is a member of the Somali Future Council (SFC)—the leading national opposition coalition—along with Jubbaland state and Mogadishu-based opposition leaders. The FGS and SFC are in an ongoing deadlock over the FGS’s extension of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term and implementation of direct elections, both of which the SFC has refused to accept.^[59] The FGS has cracked down on the opposition and uncooperative FMS, leading to clashes in Puntland, South West state, and Mogadishu—the Somali capital—and additional FGS deployments in Galmudug and Hirshabelle state.^[60]

Figure 4. Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

The FGS faces constraints to escalating its actions in Puntland in the short-term amid other demands on its forces. FGS-aligned forces are still stationed in neighboring North East state and Galmudug-controlled Galkayo.^[61] The Puntland state government degraded the FGS’s ability to challenge its influence with its recent campaign, however. The FGS is also devoting resources to South West state, where opposition forces aligned with the former South West state president, whom the FGS deposed in March 2026, are contesting the de facto capital of the FGS-backed state government, Baidoa.^[62] The FGS has additionally deployed forces to Galmudug and Hirshabelle in preparation for upcoming state elections in which it has favored candidates.^[63] Al Shabaab has simultaneously intensified operations in central and south-central Somalia amid uncertainties over the future of the African Union’s counterterrorism force, which plays a key role in defending the Mogadishu outskirts, beyond 2026.^[64]

Nigeria

Authors: Aleksandar Wiebler and Liam Karr.

Fighting between Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram has flared up since late July, as resource competition drives conflict between the two groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram have fought several times since July 27, marking the deadliest period of fighting between the two groups since November 2025. Boko Haram fighters launched a series of surprise attacks against ISWAP in both the Lake Chad Basin and Sambisa Forest areas of Borno state on July 27 and 29.^[65] ISWAP retaliated roughly 10 days later, mustering a large force from several of the group’s Borno camps to overrun Boko Haram’s Sambisa Forest–based Gazuwa faction in Bula Muge and their stronghold in Gazuwa. ISWAP militants reportedly killed seven senior Boko Haram commanders, alongside three fighters, in the attack.^[66] CTP last tracked major jihadist infighting in November 2025, when dozens of Boko Haram and ISWAP militants died in similar cycle of retaliatory violence that spread across the groups’ overlapping spheres of influence in Borno.^[67]

Figure 5. ISWAP and Boko Haram Fighting Escalates Across Northeastern Nigeria

Source: Aleksandar Wiebler.

Note: ISWAP stands for “Islamic State West Africa Province.”

Recent clashes were likely fought over financial resources and access to revenue streams. Boko Haram’s Gazuwa faction first ambushed ISWAP officials transporting a large sum of cash (40 million Naira or ~$29,000) in the Bama Local Government Area (LGA) on July 27.^[68] The group’s Lake Chad–based Bakura faction subsequently launched two coordinated surprise attacks against ISWAP positions in the Lake Chad islands, targeting Mangari in Biu LGA and Tumbun Allura in Kukawa LGA. Boko Haram militants killed large numbers of ISWAP fighter in the July 29 fighting, with Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) reporting around 20 ISWAP deaths across both attacks. Control of the Lake Chad islands provides critical sources of revenue for both groups, as the taxes imposed by the groups on fishermen and farmers yield millions of dollars annually.^[69]

ISWAP continues to face pressure from external counterterrorism efforts after suffering major losses following a counterterrorism offensive in May. Nigerian and US forces inflicted heavy losses on ISWAP in mid-May when the Nigerian Air Force and AFRICOM conducted joint strikes, killing high-ranking ISWAP leader Abu Bilal al Mainuki and 140 to 175 fighters.^[70] AFRICOM Commander Dagvin Anderson, announced shortly thereafter that most US personnel would be withdrawn from Nigeria and that future assistance would be primarily oriented around intelligence cooperation.^[71]

The Nigerian military has since continued to launch operations targeting ISWAP across the country’s northeast, claiming to neutralize several commanders in recent weeks. Nigerian forces released images of a surrendering militant, who the army claimed handled ISWAP’s finances for the group’s Jubillaram enclave on July 25.^[72] The Nigerian army also announced that it had injured a senior ISWAP police commander near Arege on August 5 and killed a senior qaid (commander) alongside several other fighters in the Sambisa Forest on August 8.^[73] Such posts and communications are likely intended to showcase the military’s progress against groups like ISWAP while encouraging defections and surrenders under Nigeria’s Operation Safe Corridor.^[74]

ISWAP is also dealing with internal struggles, such as ongoing internal rifts within the group leadership, incorporating foreign fighters, and health challenges amid the ongoing rainy season. Suspected senior ISWAP leader Ba Shuwa executed four members of the group’s Shura Council on August 6 in an apparent internal purge. The purged council members include Babakura Wanjam, a prominent ISWAP cleric, and Mallam Burin, a commander based in the Lake Chad islands.^[75] Nigerian open-source security network Zagazola Makama claimed that ISWAP purged the four Shura Council members for interacting with a “subversive” Nigerian army psychological operation (PSYOP) campaign online.^[76]

ISWAP had already reportedly been dealing with heightened internal tensions related to the increased presence of foreign fighters in recent months and years. Nigerian security forces have increasingly publicized the presence of foreign fighters within ISWAP. Footage recovered from an abandoned camcorder showed foreign fighters participating in the group’s failed attack on Cross Kauwa on July 11.^[77] Two non-sub-Saharan bombmakers died on August 4 after the improvised explosive device that they were building exploded prematurely.^[78] IS has previously sent Middle Eastern trainers to the Lake Chad Basin and publicly called for hijra (migration) to Africa.^[79] IS has also established support networks in North Africa to facilitate the flow of foreign fighters to its West African affiliates and established a foreign fighter hub for Middle East fighters in northern Somalia since 2023, all of which create potential pathways for foreign fighters to reach ISWAP.^[80]

The increasing influence of foreigners within ISWAP’s ranks has caused internal disputes and distrust. Nigerian security analyst and researcher Malik Samuel reported in a May 2026 article that foreigners within ISWAP are often seasoned jihadists with combat experience and expertise from the Middle East seeking new campaigns, and that they likely value themselves above local fighters.^[81] These dynamics provoke animosity among foreign fighters, who believe they are not adequately rewarded for their skills, and local fighters, who accuse them of receiving preferential treatment and not understanding the group’s local customs.^[82] The Nigerian media outlet Human Angle (HumAngle) has claimed that foreigners within ISWAP have imposed strict rules regarding the group’s social media usage, mirroring the paranoia and digital silence seen in many Middle Eastern jihadist cells.^[83] The claims that ISWAP purged the four Shura Council members due to online activity further indicates ISWAP’s internal paranoia surrounding technology use.^[84]

ISWAP has also recently suffered from a spike in cholera cases caused by the onset of the rainy season. The group executed two of its own fighters on July 9 in Biu LGA, likely to stop the spread of the disease, which had reportedly killed nine other fighters in the Timbuktu Triangle area near the Sambisa Forest.^[85] Militants subsequently attacked Cross Kauwa on July 12 in hopes of plundering medical supplies but sustained heavy casualties from defending Nigerian troops.^[86]

ISWAP has remained active despite these challenges. ACLED has already recorded more ISWAP attacks in 2026 than it did in the entirety of 2025, largely due to a major ISWAP offensive in the first quarter of 2026.^[87] ISWAP’s rate of operations have since significantly decreased since the death of al Mainuki, although this decrease is likely due to a combination of factors, including the culmination of its offensive and the onset of rainy season, and its average of over six attacks per week since May 16 is still higher than its weekly average of between five and six attacks across the entirety of 2025.^[88]

Nigerian military communications have frequently highlighted the assassinations and surrenders of high-ranking jihadists, but it is unlikely such developments are significantly impacting ISWAP’s ability to operate. Extensive research indicates that decapitation strikes on high-ranking jihadist militants have only short-term impacts on most large, bureaucratic groups due to their ability to quickly replace leaders.^[89] The Nigerian army has also historically released inaccurate information regarding the elimination of high-level militant leaders. The army had already claimed to have killed the now deceased al Mainuki in 2024, for example.^[90] The army most recently claimed to have neutralized ISWAPs’ chief propagandist while defending Cross Kauwa on July 11 and released a Boko Haram obituary video that was over seven years old as proof.^[91]

ISWAP remains dominant over Boko Haram in Borno, as it continues to contain its rivals and manage further escalation. The Zagazola network reported that ISWAP inflicted severe losses on the Gazuwa faction’s commander corps, overran the faction’s main camp, and forced it to retreat into a fallback stronghold in the waterlogged Sambisa Forest.^[92] ISWAP similarly dislodged the Gazuwa faction temporarily during the November fighting, however, and ISWAP has not yet retaliated against the Bakura faction, which inflicted heavy casualties on ISWAP during the November fighting.^[93] CTP analysis of ACLED data suggests that most reported instances of Boko Haram control activity take place in Cameroon and that the group has been less active overall in 2026.^[94]

Africa File Data Cutoff: August 13, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.