Al Shabaab Ambush in South West State; Algeria Deploys to Niger: Africa File, October 29, 2026

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Contributors: Ziv Zellars and Tyler Davila

Key Takeaways:

• Somalia. Al Shabaab ambushed Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) forces, who had launched a counteroffensive against opposition forces in South West state, inflicting mass casualties on federal forces. Tensions between the FGS and local factions in central and south-central Somalia have provided openings for al Shabaab to exploit, including by potentially coordinating with opposition forces.
• Algeria. Algeria authorized a troop deployment to northern Niger, likely to advance several shared economic and security objectives in Niger. The deployments are part of Algeria’s new, more assertive approach to its Sahel strategy, which aims to outcompete its North African neighbors, Morocco and the eastern Libyan Haftar regime.

Figure 1. Africa File, October 29, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke.

Assessments:

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Ziv Zellars

Al Shabaab ambushed Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) forces, who had launched a counteroffensive against opposition forces in South West state, inflicting mass casualties on federal forces. South West state opposition forces captured five key towns in the Bay region from October 8 to 16, including Buurhakaba, which is 40 miles southeast of Baidoa, the de facto South West state capital.^[1] The FGS subsequently announced that it would mount a counteroffensive, Operation Banooda, and the anti-FGS Somali news outlets Baidoa Online and Somali Guardian reported that the Somali military had deployed over 200 military vehicles and 2,000 soldiers toward Buurhakaba from the nearby Baledogle Airfield by October 26.^[2]

Al Shabaab halted the advance and inflicted mass casualties on federal forces when it ambushed the federal reinforcements on October 26 near the town of Leego, which is 30 miles southeast of Buurhakaba. Al Shabaab claimed to have killed 413 federal soldiers, wounded or captured more federal personnel, and captured and destroyed at least several Somali military vehicles, reportedly including Turkish armored vehicles.^[3] Reuters and Baidoa Online cited federal security sources who said that several dozen soldiers had died, with one Reuters source reporting over 140 casualties.^[4]

Figure 2. Al Shabaab Ambushes Federal Forces in South West State

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Hannah Ochs; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attack drones, the latter of which al Shabaab has not publicly confirmed to have used before, reportedly targeted federal forces during the ambush. The Somali Ministry of Defense confirmed that al Shabaab used vehicle-borne IEDs, which damaged several Somali military vehicles.^[5] Multiple Somali outlets also reported that one-way attack drones and drones rigged to drop explosives targeted federal forces near Leego, although the Critical Threats Project (CTP) could not confirm the reports.^[6] Unverified reports indicated that Turkish fighter jets or drones accidently struck Somali federal forces when providing them with air support, however, although the Somali Office of National Security denied the reports.^[7] Al Shabaab has previously used drones for propaganda and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, rather than attacks.^[8] The United Nations and Africa Center for Strategic Studies have reported that al Shabaab members have received advanced weapons training from the Yemeni Houthis and sought to acquire attack drones, however.^[9]

The FGS has sought to downplay the ambush, although the activity of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud indicate that the attack has alarmed the FGS. The Somali Ministry of Defense released a statement on October 27 not acknowledging any losses and instead claiming that federal forces had killed nearly 75 al Shabaab militants and wounded another 56.^[10] Mohamud’s cabinet reportedly held an emergency meeting on October 27, however, and the Somali Stream news outlet reported that Mohamud canceled his planned trip to the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow from October 28 to October 29.^[11] The Somali defense ministry reaffirmed its intent to continue Operation Banooda and reported that the head of the Somali National Army’s ground forces visited “front-line positions” near Leego on October 28.^[12] Baidoa Online reported on October 28 that the Somali military is deploying additional forces to the area.^[13]

Tensions between the FGS and local factions in central and south-central Somalia have provided openings for al Shabaab to exploit, including by potentially coordinating with opposition forces. The FGS deposed former South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen) in March 2026 to establish a pro-FGS state administration, causing an opposition uprising by Laftagareen-aligned forces since May that federal and state forces have been unable to quell.^[14] CTP has recorded eight sets of clashes between opposition and state forces in or on the outskirts of Baidoa, among other locations, with the most recent occurring on October 26.^[15]

Al Shabaab has taken advantage of the instability by increasing its activity in South West and almost certainly deconflicting and possibly coordinating with opposition forces in the state. The Salafi-jihadi group has increased monthly attacks in South West by approximately 25 percent since the FGS deposed Laftagareen, compared with its previous monthly average in 2026.[16] Al Shabaab may also be coordinating with the South West opposition forces amid repeated FGS and South West state government accusations of al Shabaab participation in opposition attacks since August.^[17] Vehicle-borne IEDs, which al Shabaab has relied on as a key tactic for years, have reportedly targeted federal and South West state forces during clashes with the opposition forces.^[18] South West opposition forces have also moved freely through al Shabaab support zones to capture towns where al Shabaab has applied long-term pressure, including Buurhakaba.^[19] South West opposition officials have repeatedly denied that opposition forces are collaborating with al Shabaab.^[20]

Figure 3. Al Shabaab Increases Activity Following Federal Takeover in South West State, 2026

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Ziv Zellars; ACLED.

The FGS is separately embroiled in an escalating political dispute with the influential Hawadle clan in Hirshabelle state’s Hiiraan region. Hawadle members have challenged the recent Hirshabelle state election in which the FGS’s favored candidate, who is from a different clan in the Middle Shabelle region, won reelection, arguing that the state presidency should switch to the Hawadle clan according to traditional power-sharing agreements.^[21] Hirshabelle State Vice President Yusuf Ahmed Hagar Dabageed, who is Hawadle and reportedly seeks the state presidency, stated that he will not vacate his seat until a settlement is reached.^[22] Former Somali intelligence head Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbalolshe, who is also Hawadle, recently stated that the clan plans to form a new regional government in Hiiraan.^[23] Sanbalolshe also claimed that he had met in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the leaders of the Jubbaland and Puntland states and Somaliland, all of whom oppose the FGS, to seek support for an armed uprising against the FGS.^[24] Several Somali news outlets reported on October 27 that Hawadle militiamen have begun mobilizing around Beledweyne, the Hiiraan regional capital.^[25]

Al Shabaab has made inroads with the Hawadle amid the political dispute in Hirshabelle despite long-standing animus between the group and the clan. Al Shabaab announced an agreement in early October to cease hostilities with influential Hawadle factions.^[26] Hawadle militiamen previously played a key role in the federally backed counterterrorism offensive against al Shabaab in 2022 and 2023.^[27] Sanbalolshe reportedly did not rule out collaborating with al Shabaab when discussing plans to oppose the FGS in late October.^[28]

Al Shabaab separately conducted its first operations against government forces in northern Somalia's Puntland state since early 2024. Al Shabaab has detonated two IEDs and conducted a mortar attack around Galgala—40 miles south of Bosaso, Puntland’s main port city—since October 19.^[29] The attacks injured several people and killed a Puntland state soldier.^[30] Al Shabaab had previously shifted its attention away from Puntland after the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) had gained the upper hand in their inter-jihadi rivalry by early 2024.^[31] ISS’s preeminence resulted in a US- and Emirati-backed Puntland state counteroffensive that greatly weakened the group.^[32]

Puntland state partners have immediately responded to al Shabaab’s increased activity. The US Africa Command conducted an airstrike against al Shabaab militants in the Cal Madow mountains between Bosaso and Galgala on October 19.^[33] The UAE also reportedly conducted two airstrikes against al Shabaab militants in the same area on October 20 and 21, the first reported Emirati strikes in Puntland since the FGS canceled bilateral agreements with the UAE in January 2026.^[34] Open-source analyst Rich Tedd has reported an uptick in suspected Emirati activity at Bosaso airport since mid-September 2026, although it is unclear whether this is tied to Emirati activity in Somalia or elsewhere in the Horn of Africa.^[35] Agence France-Presse also cited two Puntland state officials who stated that the Puntland state government plans to announce an offensive against al Shabaab in the near future.^[36]

Algeria

Authors: Liam Karr and Victoria Hutchinson with Tyler Davila

Algeria authorized a troop deployment to northern Niger as it implements its new, more assertive approach to its Sahel strategy. Algeria’s Parliament approved a resolution authorizing the deployment of army units to northern Niger on October 25, two days after Algeria’s Parliament summoned all members to an emergency meeting to discuss a possible military intervention in Niger.^[37] Nigerien Minister of State and National Defense General Salifou Modi had met with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune on October 21 before signing a new military and defense cooperation agreement with Algerian General of the Army Saïd Chengriha that same day.^[38] This was Modi’s second working visit with General Chengriha in just over a week, following an October 13 meeting in Algiers where they discussed border security and counterterrorism efforts.^[39] Algeria has hosted visits by Nigerien President Abdourahamane Tiani, Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, and General Modi over the past month.^[40]

Algeria has had forces in Niger since it deployed air squadrons in support of the Nigerien junta during the attempted coup in Niamey in late August. Algeria sent four Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets, an Ilyushin Il-78 refueling aircraft, and an Ilyushin Il-76 military transport plane, and their support teams to Niamey after disgruntled Nigerien forces attempted to overthrow Nigerien junta leader Abdourahamane Tiani on August 29.^[41] The fighter jets remain stationed at Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 in Niamey.^[42] CTP previously assessed that Algeria’s response to the Niger coup attempt could signal that it is taking a more assertive approach to protecting its interests in the Sahel. The recent parliamentary approval would mark Algeria’s first foreign troop deployment since it sent troops to Egypt to fight against Israel in the 1973 War.^[43] Algeria has historically exercised a noninterventionist foreign policy and did not legally support foreign deployments until constitutional amendments in 2020.^[44]

This decision comes amid rekindling relations between Algeria and its Sahelian neighbors, after a diplomatic rupture following Algeria’s downing of a Malian drone near their shared border in April 2025. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso withdrew their ambassadors to Algeria after Algeria shot down a Malian drone over the border town of Tinzaouaten in April 2025.^[45] President Tebboune hosted President Tiani from February 15 through 16 to mend diplomatic relations, and in early August Algeria donated two Mi-24V attack helicopters and two Mi-171 helicopters.^[46] The improved relations between Algeria and Niger likely helped facilitate Algeria’s subsequent rapprochement with Mali. ^[47] Malian forces and their Russian allies took the regional capital Kidal town in northern Mali—which the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l’Azawad, FLA) and its al Qaeda–linked allies Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen  had held since April—on October 6.^[48] President Tebboune reaffirmed two days before the operation that Algeria would “step up” if Mali or Niger asked, and Algerian forces reportedly closed the border as operations were ongoing to prevent rebels from fleeing into Algeria.^[49]

The deployments likely aim to advance several shared economic and security objectives in Niger. The Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune stated that troops will be deployed to northern Niger to “protect energy and economic interests” in Niger. Algeria’s state-owned oil company Sonatrach has been collaborating with Niger and Nigeria on the $13 billion Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) since 2009, but the project was largely dormant until the countries signed a series of agreements in 2022 to begin crucial preconstruction work.^[50] The TSGP is planned to run roughly 2,565 miles from southern Nigeria through Niger to Algeria’s Hassi R’Mel gas hub, and the pipeline is expected to transport as much as 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year when completed.^[51] The new section, slated for construction in early 2027, will stretch roughly 750 miles from Algeria’s border with Niger to Aoulef in southern Algeria before connecting with Algeria’s existing pipeline network.^[52] Sonatrach has also recently advanced several agreements for several oil sites in Niger, including an oil refinery in the southern Zinder region and two oil drilling sites near the Algerian border in northern Niger’s Agadez region that Sonatrach claims hold a combined 268 million barrels of proven reserves.^[53] Algeria inaugurated a four-well drilling site in Kafra, obtained an exploration permit for Bilma, and signed a partnership agreement to provide technical maintenance and training at the Zinder refinery—all in August 2026.^[54]

Figure 4. Algeria Deploys Forces to Niger

Note: CFLN stands for Coordination des forces libres du Niger (Coordination of Free Forces of Niger). FPJ stands for Front Patriotique pour la Justice (Patriotic Front for Justice). FPL stands for Front Patriotique de Libération (Patriotic Liberation Front). GNS stands for Government of National Stability. MPLJ stands for Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice). SLOR stands for Southern Liberation Operations Room.

Source: Liam Karr; ACLED.

The Algerian parliament resolution explicitly authorized the deployment of troops to Madama, a critical outpost for influencing trans-Saharan trafficking and rebel networks.^[55] The base in the area is located in the Bilma department, approximately 60 miles south and 150 miles southeast of the Libyan and Algerian borders, which makes it vital for monitoring the movement of arms, drugs, fuel, goods, and people between southern Libya and the Sahel.^[56] The Sahara border zone has long served as a rear base for numerous armed groups operating across the Sahel-Sahara region, as it is a largely ungoverned space with gold and oil deposits and trafficking networks between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.^[57] Chadian, Libyan, and Nigerien rebel groups have relocated to the Agadez region in northern Niger in recent years due to heightened pressure on the Chadian and Libyan sides of the border and Niger’s lack of capacity to control its side of the border.^[58] The Nigerien groups in the area have attacked oil pipelines in other areas of Niger and aim to overthrow Algeria’s partners in the Nigerien junta.^[59]

Algeria and Niger may also be seeking to contain the influence of the eastern Libya–based Haftar regime, which has sought to increase its influence in the Sahel-Sahara border zone to control rebel and trafficking networks linked to southern Libya and strengthen ties with international partners amid intensified efforts to reunify Libya. Haftar-aligned forces began to turn a blind eye to Nigerien rebel groups in the border area in 2025 in response to Niger’s failure to control its side of the border and reportedly began strengthening ties with Nigerien rebel groups in mid-2026 in retaliation for Niger’s growing ties with the rival western Libya–based Government of National Unity (GNU).^[60] The Haftar regime and Chad operationalized a joint border force in February 2026 and have launched operations led by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF, also known as the Libyan National Army) into Chadian and Nigerien territory to target Chadian and Libyan rebels throughout 2026, but these efforts have seemingly not targeted the Nigerien rebel groups, including the Patriotic Liberation Front (Front Patriotique de Libération, FPL), which have rear bases in Chad and Libya.^[61] The LAAF has also cracked down on all fuel trade with Niger to prevent fuel from reaching rebel groups based in the northern Niger border area, indirectly affecting Nigerien border communities and patronage networks.^[62] The Haftar regime then in June 2026 released FPL leader Mahmoud Sallah, who promptly launched a restructuring and recruitment drive.^[63] Multiple Paris-based investigative outlets reported that the Haftar regime provided the FPL with vehicles and weapons as part of Sallah’s release and promised to provide additional equipment “in the coming months,” although the same sources have since reported that the LAAF has confined Sallah to southwestern Libya to keep him as a bargaining chip.^[64]

The Haftar regime has also strengthened ties with the FLA, infringing on Algeria’s traditional role as the primary interlocutor with Malian Tuareg rebels.^[65] Algeria has long supported the rival GNU, criticized the Haftar family as a destabilizing influence, and asserted that it views LAAF military activity in southwestern Libya as a threat.^[66] The Haftar regime has made inroads with the FLA in recent years, exacerbating these Algerian fears. The regime avoided cracking down on the FLA to keep Tuareg elements within its LAAF border coalition and position itself as another mediator in northern Mali.^[67] These ties helped the regime mediate prisoner swaps involving the FLA in August.^[68] The FLA uses rear logistic bases in Haftar-controlled parts of southern Libya to coordinate and support operations in Mali, and FLA leaders unsuccessfully sought to secure more direct financial and military support from the Haftars during a meeting in Benghazi in September 2026.^[69] French media reported that Saddam Haftar—son and suspected heir of Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar—had promised the FLA that he would advocate for them “to his own international partners” and discussed equipment supplies during the August hostage negotiations.^[70

Figure 5. Rebel Networks in the Sahel-Sahara Border Zone

Note: CCMSR stands for Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République (Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic). CFLN stands for Coordination des forces libres du Niger (Coordination of Free Forces of Niger). FACT stands for Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (Front for Change and Concord in Chad). FAL stands for Forces Armées Libres (Free Armed Forces). FLA stands for Front de Libération de l'Azawad (Azawad Liberation Front). FPJ stands for Front Patriotique pour la Justice (Patriotic Front for Justice). FPL stands for Front Patriotique de Libération (Patriotic Liberation Front). GNS stands for Government of National Stability. GNU stands for Government of National Unity (GNU). MADP stands for Mouvement armé pour la défense du peuple (Armed Movement for the Defense of the People). MPLJ stands for Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice). MPN stands for Mouvement patriotique nigérien (Nigerien Patriotic Movement). SLOR stands for Southern Liberation Operations Room.

Source: Critical Threats Project.

Niger and Algeria have reportedly cultivated links with GNU-linked southern Libyan rebels in the Southern Libya Operations Room (SLOR), an armed group that is increasingly challenging Haftar’s forces along the southern border from havens in northern Niger.^[71] The Nigerien junta released 18 Libyans, including an officer from the Libyan region of Fezzan that both rival Libyan governments had demanded be turned over to their control, to GNU authorities in late June as part of a prisoner swap involving Nigerien soldiers in SLOR custody.^[72] The swap was part of a growing rapprochement between the Nigerien junta and the GNU that has led to high-level meetings between GNU and Nigerien officials in April, June, July, and September to outline and implement defense and economic cooperation. Paris-based Africa Intelligence reported in September that GNU and Nigerien officials were negotiating to secure a supply corridor for SLOR through Nigerien territory, and the Italian outlet Agenzia Nova reported on October 16 that the GNU was interested in negotiating SLOR access to Madama, where Algerian forces are now expected to deploy.^[73] Reports have not formally linked Algeria to SLOR, although a former Nigerien rebel speculated, in a May 2026 Afrique XXI report by independent African investigative journalists, that Algeria may already be supporting SLOR.^[74]

Algeria’s efforts in Niger and its Sahel strategy more broadly are part of its competition with its North African neighbors, including Morocco. Algeria and Morocco are competing for economic and political influence across the Sahel, partially to gain support from African and European countries for their positions in the Western Sahara dispute. Morocco is attempting to construct its own $25 billion African Atlantic Gas Pipeline to link Nigeria to Europe and serve as an Atlantic outlet for the landlocked Sahel states, bypassing the instability of the central Sahel area.^[75] The Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline would follow the Atlantic coastline, linking several West African countries, including oil fields in Senegal and Mauritania, before connecting to the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline that links Morocco and Spain.^[76] Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative is designed to make Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara the main Atlantic Ocean and European link for the landlocked Sahel states.^[77] The plan aims to connect Morocco’s transportation and shipping infrastructure to the Sahelian countries alongside other large-scale development projects in agriculture, solar energy, education, and healthcare.^[78] Morocco has made its $1.2 billion port project in the Western Saharan port city of Dakhla the designated outlet for the Sahelian countries within the initiative, which has partially contributed to the Sahelian states publicly recognizing Morocco’s claim over the disputed territory in recent years.^[79]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 29, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.