IS Somalia Final Stand; Egypt-Ethiopia Rivalry in Somalia: Africa File, August 28, 2025

Key Takeaways:

• Somalia—IS Somalia. US-supported Somali forces are encountering strong resistance as they try to clear IS Somalia Province’s intricate and well-defended cave complexes in northern Somalia’s Puntland region. The ongoing operations are likely targeting some of the group’s last remaining havens and major IS global leadership figures based in the area.
• Somalia—AUSSOM. The planned deployment of Egyptian forces under the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia will likely exacerbate regional tensions involving Egypt, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Somalia could become a proxy theater for Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and the Somali Federal Government may involve Egyptian forces in internal Somali disputes, which risks inflaming and further regionalizing these local conflicts.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advanced into a major refugee camp in western Sudan, as it increases pressure on encircled fighters aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces in el Fasher, the besieged North Darfur state capital. The RSF continues to commit war crimes, including crimes against humanity, as part of its offensive and will likely commit these atrocities on a larger scale should it capture el Fasher.

Figure 1. Africa File, August 28, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Somalia—IS Somalia

US-supported Somali forces are encountering strong resistance as they try to defeat IS Somalia Province (ISS) and clear the group’s last remaining havens in northern Somalia’s Puntland state. US and Puntland officials said on August 26 that they had concluded a two-week joint operation against “ISIS leadership safe havens” in northern Somalia’s Puntland region.[1] ISS ambushed Puntland forces as the Somali soldiers entered the Ballade Valley in the al Miskad mountains on August 22.[2] Puntland troops continued to advance through the valley and captured key wells despite continued ISS resistance through August 26.[3] Local sources claimed that ISS killed at least 30 soldiers and wounded 80 more in the initial August 22 ambush, although Puntland officials disputed the figures on social media.[4] The claimed casualty figures would make the operation the largest and deadliest engagement for the Puntland forces since February.[5] US Africa Command (AFRICOM) provided significant air support and launched numerous airstrikes in the valley throughout the operation.

Figure 2. Puntland 2025 Counter-ISS Offensive

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Puntland state forces are continuing to fight ISS militants without US air support.[6] Puntland forces blocked all major roads to the area and gave the encircled ISS fighters 72 hours to surrender on August 25.[7] Some reports on social media claim that Puntland and US officials decided to cease airstrikes due to the presence of women and children in the area.[8] Heavy fighting continued through at least August 27, when ISS launched its first suicide attack in response to the August operations.[9] Puntland forces claimed kill the six ISS suicide commandos involved in the attack.[10] ISS sniper fire and other attacks reportedly killed another 23 soldiers between August 25 and 27.[11]

The operation is likely targeting high-ranking ISS and possibly IS global leadership, who have so far evaded the 2025 counter-ISS offensive. Unconfirmed reports on X claimed that US airstrikes on August 23 targeted the ISS deputy chief Issa Fahiye, who plays an outsized leadership role in ISS due to the other responsibilities of ISS emir Abdulqadir Mumin.[12] The fierce IS resistance further indicates that the area is home to leadership and likely veteran fighters, given the group has avoided large-scale engagements historically.[13]

Global IS leadership figures, including Mumin, are likely present in the area. The AFRICOM and Puntland statement noted that operations targeted “ISIS leadership,” not “ISIS Somalia” leadership, which indicates the presence of global-level leadership figures. The US and some UN member states have reported since 2024 that Mumin leads the IS East Africa regional office and has become the global IS leader.[14] CTP and others have assessed that Mumin may be either the formal IS emir or head the IS Global Directorate of Provinces.[15] The directorate provides operational guidance and coordinates funding to all of IS’s global affiliates through various IS regional offices, plays a central role in external attack operations, and oversees high-level administrative affairs within the regional offices.[16] The UN reported in July that member states believed that Mumin was still be in Somalia.[17]

Puntland forces with the help of the United States and other regional allies have degraded ISS significantly since the beginning of 2025 but have only captured or killed one senior leadership figure.[18] The UN reported in July that Puntland’s 2025 anti-ISS offensive had killed nearly 200 and captured 150 of the group’s estimated 600 to 800 fighters but so far has failed to neutralize the group’s senior leadership.[19] US forces in late July reportedly captured the ISS finance chief, who directed the delivery of foreign fighters, supplies, and ammunition on behalf of IS, facilitated financial transfers for IS, and may have been the finance chief for the IS East Africa regional office—al Karrar.[20] ISS plays an outsized role in the IS worldwide network due to hosting the al Karrar office and has emerged as a key administrative and financial hub for IS’s global operations in recent years.[21]

Puntland will likely need to sustain pressure on ISS fighters in the valley and clear intricate and well-defended cave complexes to defeat the group and eliminate the high-value targets in the area. The UN assessed in 2024 and 2025 that ISS is mostly composed of foreign fighters, including veteran trainers from the Middle East.[22] Foreign fighters tend to be more hardened ideologues and will therefore be less likely to surrender.[23]

The fierce ISS resistance in Puntland resembles previous IS final stands in Raqqa, Syria, Mosul, Iraq, and Sirte, Libya. In all these instances, IS fighters used explosives, including suicide bombers, and sniper fire to inflict maximum casualties on security forces.[24] These battles lasted for months and involved thousands of casualties.[25] ISS used suicide bombers to counter the Puntland offensive in December, February, and May.[26] Puntland forces have destroyed some ISS bomb-making factories during the offensive, but the August 27 suicide commando attack shows the group still retains bombmaking capabilities.[27]

Puntland forces must sustain pressure on the encircled IS fighters to ensure IS militants are unable to slip away. ISS has built cave bunkers and tunnel networks that are difficult to clear and insulated from air cover.[28] A lapse in pressure could enable high-value targets to slip out of the area, as Osama bin Laden did in the Tora Bora cave complex in 2001.[29]

Somalia—AUSSOM

Egypt plans to deploy troops to Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in the country. The AU formally approved the Somali government’s request to include Egypt in the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on August 26 after the first batch of Egyptian AUSSOM troops completed their training program.[30] Egypt has planned to contribute troops to AUSSOM since Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab as part of the AU mission and on a bilateral basis.[31] Egypt sent soldiers to Somalia bilaterally but did not have any troops in AUSSOM when the mission began in January 2025.[32] Somalia finalized Egypt’s planned participation in AUSSOM in January but then also approved Ethiopia’s inclusion in the mission in February.[33] Egyptian officials participated in AUSSOM planning meetings a few months later in April.[34]

The Egyptian deployment will likely exacerbate regional tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia that stem from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), especially given that Egyptian troops plan to deploy to regions that border Ethiopia. CTP assessed previously that Egypt intends to threaten Ethiopia with its growing involvement in Somalia as part of Egypt’s yearslong regional effort to counter Ethiopian influence in response to the GERD.[35] Egypt has repeatedly labeled the GERD an existential threat that will degrade—or enable Ethiopia to control—its Nile water supply and argued that Ethiopia should not fill the GERD without a legally binding agreement that resolves concerns about the dam’s downstream effects.[36] The Nile is vital for Egypt’s economy and general population given that Egypt gets 90 percent of all its water from the Nile, which it uses for electric production, agriculture, and drinking water.[37] Ethiopia views the dam as a strategically vital project to fulfill its energy needs.[38]

Egypt plans to deploy troops to regions bordering Ethiopia, including areas with Ethiopian forces. Egypt reportedly plans to deploy troops to the Gedo, Hiraan, and Lower Shabelle regions.[39] Ethiopia has soldiers in both the Gedo and Hiraan regions based on the last publicly available AU sector responsibilities and on a bilateral basis to enforce a buffer zone along the Ethiopia-Somalia border.[40] Egyptian troops could alternatively take over Djiboutian positions in Hiraan or Kenyan positions in Gedo, however.[41] Ethiopia and Kenya are highly unlikely to cede their positions in Gedo and effectively outsource their border security to Egyptian forces.

Figure 3. Egypt Deploys to Somalia amid Heightened Regional Tensions

Source: Liam Karr.

The GERD dispute could escalate into a violent conflict, with Somalia serving as a potential proxy theater. The Egyptian president and foreign minister made separate warnings in August that negotiations on the dam had reached a dead end and that Egypt would act against “unilateral” actions that affect its water security.[42] CTP assessed previously that Egypt’s inroads in Somalia have become an increasingly important point of leverage with Ethiopia since the beginning of the Sudanese civil war in 2023, given that Sudan had been Egypt’s leading ally on the GERD issue.[43] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its borders as a national security risk and warned against Egyptian military participation in AUSSOM in 2024.[44] Egypt and Ethiopia traded messages implicitly threatening to attack each other’s forces in Somalia in September 2024.[45] Ethiopia’s ambassador to Somalia downplayed the idea that Egyptian forces in Somalia pose a direct threat to Ethiopia but warned that Ethiopia would respond if Egypt interfered with its forces in Somalia during an interview with Somali media on August 27.[46]

The Somali Federal Government (SFG) may intend to leverage Egyptian forces in internal Somali disputes that are intertwined with Ethiopia-Somalia tensions, which risks inflaming and further regionalizing these local conflicts. Ethiopia-Somalia relations remain fragile despite a brief détente in December 2024. Ethiopia signed a naval port deal with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in January 2024, which granted Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval base in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.[47] The SFG rejected the deal as unlawful and a violation of its territorial integrity, as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory. The SFG threatened to dismiss Ethiopia from the AU mission and increased defense cooperation with Egypt and Turkey in response.[48] Turkey mediated an agreement between Ethiopia and the SFG in December 2024, which contributed to the SFG including Ethiopia in AUSSOM in February 2025.[49] French media reported that Ethiopia has reopened talks secretly with Somaliland since the agreement collapsed in mid-2025, however.[50]

The SFG could weaponize the Egyptian deployment in ongoing internal disputes with Jubbaland state. Infighting between the SFG and Jubbaland state forces resumed in July for the first time since 2024.[51] The fighting stems from a monthslong power-sharing dispute between the SFG and Jubbaland that began in October 2024.[52] Unconfirmed reports on social media claim that Egypt plans to build military bases in the Gedo region in Beled Hawo—a town on the Ethiopia-Somalia border that Somali forces captured from Jubbaland troops in July 2025.[53] Somali media reported that the SFG plans to establish its own administration in the town.[54] Jubbaland officials have stated they are prepared to recapture the town by force if necessary, and Jubbaland troops have reinforced their positions outside of Beled Hawo in August.[55]

The deployment of Egyptian forces to the area would almost certainly escalate Ethiopia’s involvement in the Jubbaland conflict, given Ethiopia’s previous warnings about Egyptian troops on its border. Ethiopia has supported Jubbaland as a proxy historically to gain leverage over the SFG and did so again when fighting initially began in late 2024 due to its standoff with the SFG over the Somaliland port deal.[56] Ethiopian troops have continued supporting Jubbaland in the latest bout of fighting in 2025 and demanded that Somali forces withdraw from Beled Hawo.[57] Ethiopia had previously captured several airports in Somalia’s Gedo region in 2024, presumably to deny Egyptian and SFG access to the areas.[58]

Sudan

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advanced into a major refugee camp north of el Fasher, as it increases pressure on encircled fighters aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the besieged North Darfur state capital. The RSF reportedly advanced into Abu Shouk refugee camp on August 24 after it shelled the camp with heavy artillery for weeks.[59] A spokesperson for the SAF-aligned forces said that the RSF had bombarded el Fasher more intensely between August 15 and 25 than it had at any other point in the civil war, claiming that the group fired 700 to 1,000 artillery shells daily.[60] The RSF continued operations on August 25 and had captured half of the camp according to Sudanese media.[61] RSF forces are also advancing along two other axes—from Zamzam refugee camp in the south toward the el Fasher airport and from the east toward the SAF Central Reserve Headquarters.[62] SAF-aligned forces claimed to repel major RSF assaults along these axes on August 28.[63]

Figure 4. RSF Offensive on El Fasher

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps.

CTP continues to assess that the RSF likely aims to capture el Fasher by mid-to-late September, before the UN General Assembly general debate and potential US-led Sudan peace talks. The United States planned to hold peace talks in late July with the major external actors that are supporting the warring sides—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US delayed the talks until at least September, however, after the UAE—the RSF’s main backer—reportedly introduced a last-minute clause that Egypt—an SAF ally—rejected.[64] The RSF, with increased Emirati support, has used this window to launch offensives against several besieged SAF positions in central and western Sudan.[65] The RSF likely aims to conclude this offensive prior to the UN General Assembly, where there will likely be increased international attention on the civil war and potential punitive actions, and to secure maximum leverage before any potential peace talks.[66]

Figure 5. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr; Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge; Vista Maps.

The RSF continues to commit war crimes, including crimes against humanity, as part of its offensive. International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes against civilians that violate human dignity, which include murder, extermination, forcible deportation, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, disappearance, and apartheid.[67] The UN reported that the RSF killed at least 89 civilians in el Fasher and Abu Shouk between August 11 and 20.[68] The RSF summarily executed at least 16 of these civilians. The RSF explicitly targeted groups of refugees attempting to flee el Fasher on at least two occasions in August, killing nearly 30 civilians.[69] The RSF has imposed famine conditions on el Fasher systematically despite repeated international demands for humanitarian access.[70] The group has also attacked health infrastructure and personnel and explicitly targeted refugee camps such as Abu Shouk and Zamzam to clear the camps and use them as staging grounds.[71]

The RSF continues to commit acts of ethnic persecution and ethnically based violence. The UN reported that most of the 16 executed civilians that the RSF executed in August were Zaghawa, a non-Arab ethnic group that the RSF has targeted repeatedly in other attacks around el Fasher.[72] The local doctors’ association claimed that the RSF attacks on civilians fleeing el Fasher are ethnically motivated.[73]

The RSF’s crimes have affected children disproportionately. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported on August 27 that half of the 600,000 people that the RSF has displaced from el Fasher and the surrounding areas are children.[74] Half of the estimated 260,000 civilians left trapped in el Fasher are children, according to UNICEF—6,000 of which are facing severe acute malnutrition.[75] UNICEF claims to have verified over 1,000 instances around el Fasher where the RSF has killed or maimed children.[76]

CTP continues to assess that the RSF will likely commit further large-scale war crimes, including acts of ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide, if it takes Abu Shouk and el Fasher. The RSF committed mass atrocities and reportedly killed over 1,500 civilians the last time the group captured a refugee camp.[77] The RSF captured Zamzam refugee camp, which lies roughly 10 miles south of el Fasher, in April. The Guardian published a report in August detailing the nearly 72-hour massacre of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had lived in the camp.[78] The many crimes detailed in the report include graphic depictions of widespread summary executions of civilians, including women and children, rape, and the intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure and medical facilities and personnel.[79] The RSF explicitly targeted Zaghawa and other non-Arab ethnic groups during the attack.[80]

The UN and other international observers have warned repeatedly that the RSF could perpetrate a genocide if it captures el Fasher.[81] A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”[82] Acts of ethnic cleansing may amount to constituent acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”[83]

Figure 6. RSF Atrocities in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr.

The RSF has committed acts of ethnic cleansing and possible genocide repeatedly as it captures areas in western Sudan. The group has demonstrated a pattern of genocidal violence throughout its history stretching back to the Janjaweed—the Darfur-based rebel groups behind the 2000s Darfur genocide that became the RSF.[84] RSF militants systematically targeted Zaghawa and other non-Arab ethnic groups in its attack on Zamzam.[85] The largest atrocity in the war occurred when the RSF captured el Geneina, the capital of West Darfur state, in 2023. The group committed similar crimes in el Geneina as it did in Zamzam but on a much larger scale, killing up to 15,000 people.[86] The violence included a “systematic,” monthslong mass ethnic cleansing campaign, which the United States declared a genocide in January 2025, against the Massalit—another non-Arab ethnic group.[87]

Africa File Data Cutoff: August 28, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.