DRC-M23 Ceasefire Mechanism; Cameroonian Elections: Africa File, October 16, 2025

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Congolese government and M23 rebels signed a Qatari-brokered agreement to establish a ceasefire-verification mechanism in a notable breakthrough in the peace process, although the verification mechanism is only one of the two major prerequisites necessary to begin talks on a long-term peace deal. The larger issue of M23’s territorial control in the eastern DRC will likely continue to be a major obstacle to reaching a sustainable agreement.
• Cameroon. Lead opposition figure Issa Tchiroma Bakary declared victory over seven-term incumbent Paul Biya despite the absence of official results in Cameroon’s hotly contested presidential election. Growing tensions between the government and opposition make political violence likely, as has happened in past elections.
• Burkina Faso. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen has escalated the scale and severity of its attacks on Djibo, Burkina Faso, throughout 2025, likely to consolidate cross-border support zones along the Burkina Faso–Mali border.
• Madagascar. The Malagasy military took power in Madagascar in response to weeks of massive youth-led, anti-corruption protests and the resulting constitutional standoff. The crisis could affect US and allied mining operations in Madagascar, pose another challenge to the African Union and regional African institutions, and affect French or Russian influence in Madagascar and the surrounding Indian Ocean.

Figure 1. Africa File, October 16, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

The Congolese government and M23 rebels signed a Qatari-brokered agreement to establish a ceasefire-verification mechanism. Representatives from the two sides resumed a sixth round of Qatari-mediated talks and signed the agreement in Doha, the Qatari capital, on October 14.^[1] Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, hailed the agreement as a “critical step” toward a final peace deal and implementing the closely coordinated, US-backed peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda.^[2] Boulos has said previously that a sustainable deal between the two sides is the “last piece of the puzzle” to the US-led peace framework.^[3]

The mechanism agreement aims to stabilize the military conflict in the eastern DRC and establishes a new body to adjudicate alleged violations of the late July ceasefire.^[4] The body will consist of an equal number of representatives from the Congolese government and M23, along with members from the African Union, Qatar, and the United States.^[5] The mechanism will hold its first meeting within seven days of its formation and convene remotely on a monthly or ad hoc basis to coordinate verification.^[6]

The agreement relies on a ceasefire mechanism, known as the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), which was previously established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to address the 2012 M23 rebellion.^[7] The EJVM receives complaints and then investigates, verifies, and documents alleged violations.^[8] The October 14 agreement adds an equal number of Congolese government and M23 representatives to the EJVM, as well as UN forces in a logistic capacity, to form the “EJVM+.”^[9] The two sides committed to allow the EJVM+ access to territory under their control and the frontlines to produce a weekly report on the security situation.^[10]

Figure 2. Peace Processes Multiply in the African Great Lakes Region

Source: Yale Ford.

The ceasefire mechanism is a notable achievement in the DRC-M23 peace process, but it is only one of the two major prerequisites necessary to begin talks on a long-term peace deal. The October 14 agreement is an achievement because the ceasefire from late July had effectively collapsed as negotiations on the mechanism agreement progressed slowly for several weeks.^[11] The ceasefire provision prohibited new attacks, attempts to conquer new territory, and acts of sabotage, and committed both sides to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict” in the eastern DRC.^[12] Both sides had violated the ceasefire with offensive maneuvers and acts of sabotage in September and October, however, and accused each other of undermining the spirit of the late July agreement repeatedly.

Figure 3. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The two sides remain at odds over the issue of prisoner exchange, however, which has been a major obstacle to opening more substantive discussions for months. The DRC has demanded the release of about 1,500 Congolese army (FARDC) troops, whom M23 sent to training camps in early 2025, as part of a prisoner exchange process led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).^[13] M23 already released some FARDC troops in an ICRC-led swap in late April but claims that any remaining soldiers have joined M23 voluntarily, including thousands of recruits the group commissioned in August and September.^[14]

M23 has demanded the release of its more than 700 prisoners in Congolese government detention as a key precondition to advancing the talks. The Congolese government has continued to refuse a blanket release of these prisoners and said it will not release M23 prisoners accused of “serious crimes.”^[15] The Congolese government reportedly views the issue as a “subject of negotiations rather than a condition to continue talks” and has said repeatedly that amnesty for M23 combatants will be treated on a “case-by-base basis” as part of any final deal.^[16]

The two sides signed technical exchange agreements with the ICRC in a breakthrough in early September, but the ICRC will facilitate the swaps only after both sides approve each other’s prisoner lists.^[17] The delegations in Doha will reportedly try to resolve disagreements on the issue during the ongoing round of talks.^[18]

The Congolese government and M23 are still far from settling the larger issue of M23’s territorial control in the eastern DRC, which will likely be a major obstacle to reaching a sustainable agreement. The two sides have argued over a key but unclear component of the late July declaration agreement that called for the “restoration of government authority on all national territories” in a final peace deal.^[19] The Congolese government said that the declaration encompasses M23’s “nonnegotiable” withdrawal and the return of the Congolese army, the police, and judicial and civil authorities to M23-occupied areas.^[20] M23 has said repeatedly it has no plans to withdraw from occupied areas in the eastern DRC and claimed to have added thousands of troops to its ranks since signing the declaration.^[21]

CTP assessed in August that both sides’ unwillingness to make concessions on M23’s territorial control will likely prolong talks and make a sustainable long-term agreement unlikely.^[22] M23’s bolstered military and political strength have led it to raise its demands to now include autonomy and “comanagement” of North and South Kivu with the Congolese government as part of any peace deal.^[23] CTP continues to assess that DRC President Félix Tshisekedi is unlikely to cede territory to M23 because it risks severely undermining his credibility and legitimacy among his power base.^[24] Qatar has proposed at least three draft agreements without compromise since May—one of which reportedly included a detailed plan for some form of co-governance in August—and the two sides are set to discuss the latest draft agreement in the sixth round of talks.^[25]

Cameroon

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Chris Dayton

Lead opposition figure Issa Tchiroma Bakary declared victory over seven-term incumbent Paul Biya in Cameroon’s October 12 presidential election despite the continuation of the vote counting process. Tchiroma released a video on October 14 stating that he would publish a report showing the vote counts by region.^[26] Biya’s party and Minister of Territorial Administration Paul Atanga Nji denounced Tchiroma, stating that he violated election laws.^[27] The Constitutional Council is the only body with the authority to release results and must do so within 15 days of the election.^[28] The scheduled release date is October 26.^[29] Atanga previously stated that anyone who released results before the Constitutional Council would have committed “high treason.”^[30] Several other opposition parties said that they would wait for the Constitutional Council to verify the election.^[31]

The length of Biya’s tenure and governance shortcomings were primary issues in the election, which pitted Biya against his former allies. Biya has been president since 1982 and is 92 years old, with many questioning his health.^[32] The government’s bribe and patronage networks cause Cameroon to consistently rank in the worst quarter of countries for corruption worldwide.^[33] Cameroon is experiencing widespread youth unemployment and poverty, with over a quarter of its population living on or below three dollars per day according to 2021 World Bank data.^[34]

The government has responded to political challenges with repression. Biya’s regime barred former government minister Maurice Katmo, who ran against Biya in 2018, and his coalition from participating in the recent presidential election and other political activities.^[35] Katmo had managed to unify a coalition of thirty parties from the historically splintered opposition.^[36] Tchiroma—a former government spokesman and minister and spokesman until he resigned to run for president in June 2025—has tried to capitalize on widespread anti-government sentiment, citing Biya’s ineffectiveness and corruption.^[37] Bello Bouba Maïgari—a former government minister and prime minister—also split from Biya and announced his candidacy shortly after Tchiroma.^[38]

Growing tensions between the government and opposition will likely cause unrest and crackdowns, which have occurred during past disputed elections. A local source reported that pro-government and pro-opposition supporters clashed in Kousseri, Extrême-Nord region on election day.^[39] The government deployed security forces to key areas of Douala, Garoua, and Yaounde, which are the economic hub of Cameroon, Tchiroma’s stronghold, and the capital of Cameroon, respectively.^[40] Security forces surrounded Tchiroma’s house in Garoua on election day, prompting Tchiroma supporters in the area to mobilize. The two sides clashed, with security forces reportedly firing warning shots and protesters lighting fires.^[41] An unknown assailant allegedly killed a police officer.^[42] One report stated that Tchiroma escaped the area, later declaring victory on Facebook.^[43] Security forces also dispersed and arrested protesters accusing the election commission of ballot-stuffing in Douala on October 15.^[44]

Many members of the opposition distrust the integrity of the election and the Constitutional Council’s 15-day period to announce results due to past allegations of rigged elections.^[45] Independent observers have accused Biya of putting his party in control of government institutions such as the judiciary and electoral commission, allowing him to maintain power.^[46] Katmo claimed to have won the 2018 presidential election, but government figures put his support at 14 percent.^[47] The opposition organized countrywide protests, which police responded to by opening fire on protesters.^[48] Police eventually arrested Katmo for claiming victory, along with approximately 200 protesters.^[49] Protests continued until regional elections in late 2020 in defiance of the government’s ban on demonstrations.^[50] Human Rights Watch reported that security forces arrested over 550 people during those protests.^[51]

The election outcome will impact US regional interests, including containing Salafi-jihadi groups, competing with China and Russia, and bolstering business ties. Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province are waging insurgencies in far north of the country. Anglophone separatists are also waging an insurgency in western Cameroon’s English-speaking regions, involving US citizens from the Cameroonian diaspora.^[52] The Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2025 Global Terrorism Index consequently ranked Cameroon as the 10th most affected country by terrorism in the world.^[53] The US military has provided assistance focused on countering Salafi-jihadi groups and securing the Gulf of Guinea, including Cameroon in African Lion 25—US Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) largest annual exercise—in April 2025.^[54] AFRICOM Commander General Dagvin Anderson followed up on the exercise by meeting with Biya in September 2025.^[55]

US engagement with Cameroon helps balance Cameroon’s growing military and commercial ties with both China and Russia. China designated Cameroon as a comprehensive strategic partner—the second-highest category of bilateral relations—in 2024.^[56] This partnership includes anti-piracy drills in the Gulf of Guinea and infrastructure funding through the Belt and Road Initiative.^[57] The US State Department recognizes Cameroon’s “immense investment potential,” particularly in infrastructure and natural resources, which China has targeted.^[58] Cameroon also updated an agreement on weapons sales, military training, and intelligence sharing with Russia in April 2022.^[59] The Wagner Group uses Douala’s port to transport illicit timber and other material yielded from operations in the Central African Republic.^[60]

Burkina Faso

Author: Miles Charles

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has escalated the scale and severity of its attacks on Djibo, Burkina Faso, throughout 2025. JNIM claimed to kill 90 Burkinabe soldiers in an ambush near Djibo on October 9.^[61] This is the third mass fatality attack on the town and its surrounding area in 2025.^[62] JNIM has conducted seven of these attacks across the Sahel.^[63] CTP defines a mass fatality attack as an event inflicting 50 or more fatalities. JNIM attacked Djibo and Solle in May 2025, inflicting more than 200 and 60 fatalities, respectively.^[64] These mass attacks have led JNIM to inflict 26 times the number of fatalities on Djibo in 2025 compared with 2024. The group has targeted multiple troop positions around the town in 70 percent of its attacks in 2025 according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), up from 20 percent in 2024.^[65]

Figure 4. JNIM Increase the Scale of its Attacks on Security Forces in Djibo, 2024–25

Note: Data are from the Djibo commune, Soum province, Sahel region, Burkina Faso. Attacks include all direct JNIM attacks against state-backed militias and troops.

Source: Miles Charles, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

JNIM may be targeting Djibo to consolidate cross-border support zones along the Burkina Faso–Mali border. Djibo is the provincial capital of Soum and sits near the Malian border. JNIM has historically maintained support zones in the tri-border area but has more brazenly moved freely through Soum in 2025. ACLED has recorded a record five reports of JNIM militant movements in 2025.^[66] JNIM has also increasingly displaced villages across the border in central Mali since 2024.^[67] The evictions and an increase in Malian air strikes suggest that the Malian junta is unable to regularly contest ground control of these areas, allowing JNIM to operate without significant enemy action.

Figure 5. JNIM Activity in Northern Burkina Faso

Source: Liam Karr, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

JNIM would likely use these support zones to facilitate subgroup cooperation between the Katiba Macina and Ansaroul Islam.^[68] Djibo lies near the area of operational overlap between the two JNIM affiliates. Ansaroul Islam operates in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, while Katiba Macina operates in western Burkina Faso and central, southern, and western Mali. CTP assessed in May that the two affiliates may have collaborated to orchestrate the Djibo attack that killed more than 200 people.^[69]

Madagascar

Author: Liam Karr

The following text is from “What the Madagascar Coup Means for Africa, Mining, and Competition in the Indian Ocean: Africa File Special Edition,” published on October 15.

The Malagasy military took power in Madagascar in response to weeks of massive youth-led, anti-corruption protests. Youth protest organizations known as the “Gen Z Madagascar” have staged mass anti-government demonstrations in Antananarivo, Madagascar’s capital, since September 25.^[70] The protests initially began over water and electricity shortages but grew in size and scope. Protesters have rallied against widespread poverty, high living costs, poor access to tertiary education, and the alleged corruption of Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina and his allies.^[71] Nearly 75 percent of the Malagasy population is impoverished and 64 percent lack access to power.^[72] Security forces killed at least 22 civilians in crackdowns according to the UN.^[73] Rajoelina sacked his cabinet on October 8, promised to resign in a year if there are still power cuts, and said he would not run in 2028 presidential elections.^[74]

The Personnel Administration and Technical and Administrative Services Corps (CAPSAT, Corps d’administration des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques)—one of the most powerful military factions in Madagascar—mutinied and joined the protesters on October 11.^[75] CAPSAT has significant sway due to its location on the Antananarivo outskirts, key role in the military’s logistics and support operations, large size, and control over arms depots.^[76] The situation mirrors Rajoelina’s initial rise to power in 2009, when CAPSAT mutinied due to the mishandling of mass protests. The unit ultimately overthrew the former government and supported Rajoelina, who was the Antananarivo mayor at the time, in taking power.^[77]

CAPSAT gradually co-opted key security institutions in the days after its mutiny, which Rajoelina labeled as a coup.^[78] CAPSAT officers stated on October 12 that CAPSAT would issue future orders to all military forces and urged other security forces to refuse orders to shoot protesters.^[79] The newly appointed Malagasy defense minister appointed CAPSAT-backed General Démosthène Pikulas to be the new chief of defense staff on October 12.^[80] Most senior officers in the capital attended the ceremony, indicating widespread support among the military.^[81] The National Gendarmerie Intervention Force (FIGN), an elite gendarmerie unit that had been suppressing protests, became the first National Gendarmerie unit to mutiny on October 12.^[82] Pikulas installed the FIGN head as the new commander of the National Gendarmerie on October 13 and called for reconciliation and unity between the gendarmerie and military after brief clashes between the two on October 11.^[83]

The military formally took power on October 14 amid a constitutional crisis. Rajoelina reportedly fled the country on October 12, fueling claims that he is physically unable to fulfill his duties. French media reported that Rajoelina fled the country on a French military aircraft to the French-administered Réunion Island on October 12, where he took a private jet to the United Arab Emirates on October 13.^[84] Rajoelina claimed that he left for fear of his life due to an assassination attempt during a public address on October 13.^[85]

Rajoelina then attempted to dissolve Madagascar’s National Assembly as the National Assembly impeached him, exacerbating the emerging constitutional crisis. Rajoelina announced on October 14 that he had dissolved the National Assembly—the lower house of Malagasy parliament—to trigger elections, which would take place after at least 60 days.^[86] Rajoelina explicitly claimed that he consulted the leaders of the National Assembly and Senate, as legally required to dissolve parliament, but opposition figures denied that he did so.^[87] The National Assembly impeached Rajoelina hours later by a near-unanimous vote that included Rajoelina’s own party members on October 14.^[88] Rajoelina said the resolution was “null and void” because he had already dissolved the assembly.^[89]

CAPSAT seized power and announced plans to suspend most democratic institutions and quickly create a transitional government. CAPSAT’s leader, Colonel Michaël Randrianirina announced after Rajoelina’s impeachment on October 14 that CAPSAT was in charge and had suspended all democratic institutions except the National Assembly.^[90] The dissolution of the Senate prevents the Senate from electing a new Senate president to officially assume the role of head of state as mandated by the constitution. Randrianirina said that he would become president at the invitation of the High Constitutional Court; created ruling commission including security leaders and select civilian officials; and hold a constitutional referendum and elections within the next two years.^[91]

Political or military instability could affect critical mineral mining on the island, including some US and allied projects and supply chains. Madagascar is a major producer of cobalt, graphite, and nickel, all of which are used in lithium-ion batteries. Madagascar is the world’s second-largest graphite producer, with China, India, Germany, and the United States all leading purchasers. The United States purchases 4 percent of its graphite imports from Madagascar, making the island its fourth-largest supplier behind China, Canada, and Mozambique.^[92] Japan and South Korea import roughly a quarter and a third of their nickel from Madagascar, respectively.^[93]

Instability could undermine a fledgling US-owned critical minerals project. US-based Energy Fuels acquired the Toliara project in October 2024, a deposit with titanium, zirconium, rare earth, and radioactive minerals.^[94] These elements are defined as critical minerals due to their widespread use in aircraft, aerospace equipment, electric vehicles, nuclear energy infrastructure, and renewable energy systems.^[95] The company said it aimed to process these ores in Utah. The Malagasy government lifted a 2019 suspension on the project shortly after the Energy Fuels acquisition, following extensive negotiations, setting the stage for a final investment decision to operationalize the mine by early 2026.^[96]

The crisis is both a challenge and an opportunity for the legitimacy of the African Union (AU) and regional African institutions. The AU, regional African institutions such as the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and South African Development Community (SADC), and French President Emmanuel Macron urged restraint and respect for the constitution in separate statements made before the coup on October 13.^[97] These key actors also expressed unanimous interest in collaborating to support dialogue and mediation efforts prior to the military taking power. The AU Peace and Security Council specifically recommended that the AU immediately dispatch a high-level delegation to Madagascar to engage with domestic stakeholders; appoint a special envoy to Madagascar to reinforce facilitation, mediation, and stabilization efforts in the country in collaboration with SADC and IOC; and establish a follow-up mechanism to support a reconciliation and dialogue process in Madagascar.^[98]

Figure 6. African Institutions Involved in the Madagascar Crisis

Source: Liam Karr.

The AU has explicitly called for Madagascar and regional partners to reactivate the 2011 “Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar,” which ended the political crisis that resulted from the 2009 coup, to address the current crisis.^[99] The AU and SADC mediated between Madagascar’s four main factions after the 2009 coup.^[100] These African-led mediation efforts suffered many setbacks but resulted in several shaky initial power-sharing deals, a new constitution in 2010, and the SADC-backed 2011 transition roadmap.^[101] The roadmap called for the formation of a consensus government to lead until elections, the construction of an electoral framework, and national reconciliation efforts and other confidence-building measures.^[102] The transition concluded with successful elections in 2013.^[103]

The crisis could affect France’s dwindling influence on the continent and the Indian Ocean, given France’s strong ties with Madagascar and the countries’ shared involvement in regional institutions. Some protesters view Rajoelina as pro-French, which could spark anti-French backlash, as seen in other coups in former French colonies. There were isolated cases of anti-French slogans during the protests, but such sentiment was not a widespread theme, unlike in West Africa.^[104] The juntas that came to power in West African countries cut defense ties with France and pressured French businesses out of their countries.^[105] Rajoelina’s naturalized French citizenship became public during 2023 elections, which sparked backlash that he was a French puppet and should lose his Malagasy citizenship and eligibility for office according to Malagasy law.^[106] Pro-sovereigntist Malagasy news outlets have amplified articles accusing France of neocolonial practices and plotting to intervene after helping evacuate Rajoelina.^[107] Randrianirina declined to speak French in a BBC interview on October 15 because he does not like “glorifying the colonial tongue.”^[108]

France has maintained close economic and political ties with Madagascar since Madagascar gained independence from France in 1960. France is one of Madagascar’s leading economic partners, with bilateral trade exceeding $1.1 billion annually in the last three years, mostly in agricultural and textile products.^[109] Macron became the first French president to travel to Madagascar in nearly 20 years when he visited in April 2025 to finalize energy, infrastructure, technology, and tourism agreements to expand and modernize this economic partnership.^[110] Macron expressed interest in developing supply chains and partnering on critical minerals during his visit.^[111]

France has nearly 2,000 military and civilian defense personnel stationed on French islands near Madagascar as part of the Armed Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone (FAZSOI, Les forces armées de la zone sud de l’océan Indien).^[112] FAZSOI aims to protect French interests in the Indian Ocean. The FAZSOI Permanent Area of ​​Responsibility includes 14 countries from southern Africa and the Indian Ocean and 11 islands in the French Southern and Antarctic Lands.^[113] The French Defense Ministry describes FAZSOI as “the main support point of the Indian Ocean theater.”^[114] FAZSOI protects French sovereignty and shipping, provides natural disaster assistance, participates in regional training, and prepares to conduct military operations in the event of a crisis across the islands and roughly 3-million-square-kilometer exclusive economic zone.^[115]

Figure 7. Armed Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone

Source: French Army General Staff.

FAZSOI is one of several tools that France uses to boost regional cooperation, including with Madagascar, and support its regional influence. France has worked with Madagascar through FAZSOI, including providing technical assistance to Malagasy naval vessels and cooperating on humanitarian aid after cyclones.^[116] Nearly 150 Malagasy trainees train in French military academies annually.^[117] France is also a member of the IOC, which includes Madagascar and three other African Indian Ocean nations, through Réunion. France participates in international maritime security cooperation through the IOC, including extraregional cooperation with countries along Africa’s eastern coast on the Indian Ocean.^[118]

Russia has previously tried to meddle in Madagascar and could try to capitalize on the crisis to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean, although it is ill-positioned to do so.^[119] Russia has not commented on the crisis, but it likely retains an interest in Madagascar given its efforts to increase its naval power projection in key waterways on both sides of the continent. The Kremlin is working to secure naval bases on Libya’s Mediterranean Sea coast and Sudan’s Red Sea coast as part of its broader efforts to improve its power projection, including the Indian Ocean.^[120] Russia signed a naval agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe—a West African Atlantic island nation—in April 2025 that allows Russian ships to refuel at São Toméan ports, allowing Russian ships to remain in the area for longer and improving Russian naval power projection.^[121] The São Toméan deal is a template for future agreements with other willing coastal countries, including a potential pro-Russian, or at least anti-French, Malagasy government. The AU and Macron have warned against foreign interference, although there is no evidence of Russian meddling so far.^[122]

Figure 8. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

The Kremlin is more poorly positioned to quickly capitalize on the crisis, however, since subsuming control of the Wagner Group and shifting toward more traditional state-to-state relations. The late Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin quickly emerged to offer the group’s services after coups in West Africa that replaced pro-French leaders with anti-French juntas.^[123] The Kremlin has subsumed Wagner’s operations under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps since the Wagner mutiny and Prigozhin’s subsequent death in 2023, however. This shift has promoted more traditional state-to-state military arrangements and constrained Wagner’s flexibility and entrepreneurial nature.^[124]

Russia also has little to offer beyond regime protection, which may be unappealing to the new military leaders. The Gen Z protests and Madagascar’s greatest needs are development-focused, not security-focused, which is the area where Russia has had the most success making inroads. Russia could offer the new junta leaders the regime security package it has used to keep other pro-Russian authoritarian regimes in Africa, but it is unclear if the new military leaders plan on remaining in power long-term or fear a possible countercoup.^[125] Harsh international sanctions and fears of external military intervention pushed the new West African juntas further into Russia’s orbit after their coups, although the international community has yet to formally respond to CAPSAT’s power seizure.^[126]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 16, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.