Iran Updates

 

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                                                                                          

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, June 6, 2025

Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024.[i] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[ii] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months.[iii] Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles.[iv] The sources stated that an Iranian firm, Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Company, ordered the material from a Hong Kong-based company. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months.[v] Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels, Golbon and Jairan, delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[vi] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which oversees part of Iran’s missile research and development, took delivery of the cargo.[vii] Iran also previously engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire ammonium perchlorate from China.[viii]

The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Western sources previously estimated that 1,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can fuel up to 260 medium-range ballistic missiles.[ix] If the 800 ballistic missiles that the Wall Street Journal referred to are medium-range missiles, this would suggest that Iran purchased around 3,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate from China.[x] Iran may have purchased this amount of ammonium perchlorate to compensate for the loss of some sodium perchlorate that China recently shipped to Iran. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that the explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26 destroyed some of the sodium perchlorate that China shipped to Iran in early 2025.[xi] 

Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that Iran plans to send part of the ammonium perchlorate to Iranian-backed militias, including the Houthis in Yemen.[xii] Iran has previously exported ammonium perchlorate to members of the Axis of Resistance. The US Navy intercepted a vessel in the Gulf of Oman that was carrying around 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate from Iran to Yemen in November 2024, for example.[xiii] The recent shipments may also improve Iran’s ability to provide ballistic missiles to Russia for its war with Ukraine. Iran began sending Fateh-360 ballistic missiles, which are solid-fuel missiles, to Russia in September 2023.[xiv]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites.[xv] The IAEA's recent quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirmed Iran’s non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.[xvi]  An unspecified senior Western diplomat told the Associated Press on June 5 that the goal of the planned non-compliance resolution is to “resolve the [Iranian nuclear] issue.”[xvii] The diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution that declared Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[xviii] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[xix]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.[xx] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[xxi] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions.

Israeli officials informed the United States that Israel will not strike Iran unless US President Donald Trump signals that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations have failed, according to two unspecified Israeli sources.[xxii] An unspecified Israeli source told Axios on June 5 that Israeli officials said that Israel will not "surprise" the United States with a military strike on Iran. A separate Israeli source added that Israeli officials said that there is ”no logic” in attacking Iran if a "good diplomatic solution” is reached. Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22.[xxiii] US officials told Axios that the next round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations is not expected to take place this weekend.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Chinese Support for the Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024. Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months. Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months. Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites. An unspecified senior Western diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.

Iran Update, June 5, 2025

Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US-Iran talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on June 4 that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to "participate" in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[i] Russia’s offer to mediate the negotiations comes after Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly rejected a recent US nuclear proposal to Iran because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[ii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse.[iii] Iran and Russia have held several meetings since March 2025 to discuss the dispute between Iran and the United States over Iran’s nuclear program.[iv] Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium.[v] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk."[vi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.[vii] Russia’s support for Iran’s domestic uranium enrichment is inconsistent with the stated US position against uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[viii]

Iran and Russia have deepened political and military cooperation in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Russia with Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones.[ix] Iran reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets in January 2025, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s to Iran.[x] Russia has also supported and cooperated with Iran’s Axis of Resistance in recent years. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East.[xi] Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel during the October 7 War, including by providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[xii] Iran and Russia signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, which further illustrates their close collaboration and alignment in working to erode US global influence.[xiii]

Iran is leveraging its membership in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to try to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in Brazil on June 4 and 5.[xiv] Ghalibaf called for a joint legislative charter among BRICS members to counter sanctions.[xv] Ghalibaf urged BRICS members to use alternative financial tools, such as BRICS Pay, and conduct commercial transactions using national currencies instead of the US dollar. Ghalibaf met with Brazilian officials on the sidelines of the forum to promote the expansion of bilateral ties through the Iran-Brazil Joint Economic Commission.[xvi]

Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin separately attended a meeting for central bank governors of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states in Beijing on June 2.[xvii] Farzin proposed the creation of a joint bank for SCO member states in order to facilitate financial transactions among members and reduce reliance on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Iran’s emphasis on cooperation with BRICS and SCO members is part of a broader Iranian effort to build a parallel international order that challenges “Western dominance” and US “unilateralism.“[xviii]

Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site.[xix] Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site in October 2024.[xx] The brigade is located roughly 8 miles from Khomeini’s mausoleum and about 7 miles from the Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport. Sabahi Fard has inspected at least 12 Iranian air defense sites across Iran since April 2025.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk." Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.
• Iranian Efforts to Undermine Sanctions: Iran is leveraging its membership in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to try to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in Brazil on June 4 and 5. Ghalibaf called for a joint legislative charter among BRICS members to counter sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin separately attended a meeting for central bank governors of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states in Beijing on June 2. Farzin proposed the creation of a joint bank for SCO member states in order to facilitate financial transactions among members and reduce reliance on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
• Iranian Preparations for a Potential Strike: Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site. Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site.

Iran Update, June 4, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[i] Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Axios reported on June 2 that the US proposal would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil during the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[ii] The United States reportedly seeks to establish the consortium outside of Iran. Iran would be required to halt all enrichment after the establishment of the consortium. Khamenei delivered a speech on June 4 in which he stated that enrichment in Iran "is a red line."[iii] Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless" and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium.[iv] Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.   

 

Iran may accept the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium if it operates on Iranian soil. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Axios on June 3 that Iran is open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium’s enrichment facility is located in Iran.[v] Two unspecified Iranian officials separately told the New York Times on June 4 that Iran is planning to “bargain” for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands in the Persian Gulf to maintain its right to enrichment on Iranian soil.[vi] An unspecified Arab diplomatic source told Israeli media on June 3 that the United States may propose placing the consortium on one of the disputed islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, or Lesser Tunb.[vii] Iran seeks for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands, rather than the disputed islands, given that the former are internationally recognized as Iranian territory while the latter are claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

 

The Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times added that Iran is open to the consortium idea because Iran “does not want talks to fail."[viii] It is in Iran's interest to prolong the nuclear talks, given that it likely calculates that prolonging the talks will delay or prevent snapback sanctions and a potential US or Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump accused Iran of “slow-walking [its] decision” after Khamenei rejected the US proposal on June 4. Iran has not yet submitted a formal response to the US proposal, which could reflect internal debates in Iran about how to reject the US zero enrichment demand in the proposal while also ensuring that the negotiations do not collapse.

 

Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[ix] This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[x] Militants launched two rockets from Tasil, Daraa Province, into the southern Golan Heights.[xi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) briefly operated in Tasil in April 2025.[xii] Israeli media reported on June 3 that the rockets landed in open areas and did not cause any casualties.[xiii] The IDF launched several retaliatory air and artillery strikes targeting Syrian military sites and towns in southwestern Syria on June 3.[xiv] The targeted military sites included the new Syrian army’s 121st Brigade base near Kanaker, Rif Dimashq Province, and the 175th Brigade base near Izraa, Daraa Province.[xv]

 

Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack.[xvi] Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack and released a video that reportedly showed the rockets landing in the Golan Heights.[xvii] The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades is a Hamas-aligned Palestinian resistance group that announced its formation on June 3.[xviii] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave also claimed responsibility for the attack and published a video of the alleged rockets in their launching positions on June 3.[xix] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave is an anti-Israel militia formed in January 2025 that uses iconography widely associated with or inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.[xx] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave Spokesperson Abu al Qasim gave a speech on June 4 in which he stated that the Syrian government has become a “defeatist project demanding normalization” with Israel to gain “some personal and moral privileges.”[xxi] Qasim stated that this attack was a “clear warning” and that the group will conduct additional attacks targeting Israel in the future.[xxii] Qasim also noted that the group will attack “whoever tries to strip Syria of its resistance identity.”[xxiii] 

 

This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz posted on X on June 3 that Israel holds Syrian President Ahmed al Shara “directly responsible for every threat” and attack on Israel from Syrian territory.[xxiv] The IDF also stated on June 3 that the Syrian transitional government will continue to bear consequences “as long as hostile activity continues from its territory.”[xxv] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement that reaffirmed that Syria “has not and will not” pose a threat to any country in the region.[xxvi] The ministry added that some external actors are seeking to destabilize the region to advance their own interests.[xxvii] Israel has repeatedly expressed concern regarding threats to Israel from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xxviii] The IDF has conducted ground and air operations in southern Syria since December 2024 with the aim of eliminating these threats, including Iranian-backed networks in Syria.[xxix] The Syrian transitional government has repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory to the 1974 deconfliction line.[xxx] Israel and Syria have taken steps in recent weeks to ease tensions. Several unspecified sources told Western media on May 27 that Israeli and Syrian officials are holding direct talks on joint security and “broader political understandings” to calm tensions and prevent further conflict.[xxxi] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara also reportedly expressed willingness to normalize relations with Israel during meetings with US officials in April 2025.[xxxii] Renewed tension between Israel and Syria could undermine the countries’ recent efforts to prevent military escalation and reach a political and diplomatic understanding.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) spokesperson announced on June 4 that the LEC arrested an “ISIS-affiliated network” in Tehran.[xxxiii] LEC forces arrested 13 individuals who were part of the network, including the leader, members of support and coordination teams, and suicide operatives. LEC forces seized suicide vests and backpacks, among other equipment. The network reportedly planned to execute attacks at public ceremonies across Iran, likely during the current flurry of commemoration ceremonies for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini. Police departments across Tehran, Esfahan, Qom, and Alborz provinces coordinated to arrest the individuals. Iranian officials have recently articulated a clear commitment to border security amid an uptick in militant activity since December 2023.[xxxiv] Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, has conducted several attacks in Iran in recent years. ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony in Kerman Province in January 2024 commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.[xxxv] ISKP separately conducted two attacks targeting the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province, in October 2022 and August 2023.[xxxvi]

 

Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework member opposed to Sudani claimed on June 4 that Sudani is paying voters to vote for him.[xxxvii] The source also claimed that Sudani is using prominent members of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition to increase support for his coalition. The Shia Coordination Framework member accused Karbala Governor Nassif al Khattabi and Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, who are members of Sudani’s coalition, of using public funds in their electoral campaigns. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) head Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki are running against Sudani in the upcoming November 2025 elections and have recently accused Sudani and members of his coalition of corruption.[xxxviii] It is unclear who made the recent allegations against Sudani, Khattabi, and Fayadh. Sudani has derived a large amount of popular support among the Iraqi population for his anti-corruption policies.[xxxix] Corruption charges against Sudani, real or fabricated, could diminish support for his coalition.

 

The Shia Coordination Framework reportedly rejected a proposal by Sudani for a “political consensus” to prevent conflicts during the formation of the next government after the parliamentary elections.[xl] A Shia Coordination Framework member told Iraqi media on June 4 that Sudani sought to negotiate an agreement with the Coordination Framework to allocate control of the presidency, speakership, and premiership. Sudani reportedly sought to negotiate this agreement to prevent deadlock in parliament following the elections. The Iraqi Parliament failed to elect a president and prime minister for a year following the 2021 elections for multiple reasons, including disputes between Iranian-backed parties and Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xli]

 

Sudani is likely attempting to secure a second premiership. Iraqi public polling throughout the Sudani administration has shown that Sudani is popular among voters and will likely win a significant portion of seats in parliament in the November 2025 elections.[xlii] Unspecified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani had formed alliances with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors.[xliii] A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization told Iraqi media on May 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework would not prevent Sudani from serving a second term, indicating that the Shia Coordination Framework has discussed the possibility of Sudani continuing to serve as prime minister.[xliv]

 

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless" and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium. Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.
• Israel-Syria Tensions: Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3. This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack. Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries.
• Iranian Internal Security: The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) spokesperson announced on June 4 that the LEC arrested an “ISIS-affiliated network” in Tehran. LEC forces arrested 13 individuals who were part of the network, including the leader, members of support and coordination teams, and suicide operatives. LEC forces seized suicide vests and backpacks, among other equipment. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, has conducted several attacks in Iran in recent years.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework separately rejected a proposal by Sudani for a “political consensus” to prevent conflicts during the formation of the next government after the parliamentary elections.

Iran Update, June 3, 2025

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi likely discussed the Lebanese government’s efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution during a visit to Beirut on June 3.[i] Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi that all reconstruction aid for Lebanon must go through state institutions and rejected any efforts to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution.[ii] Rajji’s comments likely refer to recent Iranian efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution as the Lebanese state and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have simultaneously cracked down on Hezbollah activity across Lebanon. Iran recently attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah through Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, for example.[iii] Iran will likely seek to establish other means through which to financially and materially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution. Araghchi told Lebanese officials that Iran seeks to open a “new page” in its relationship with Beirut. Araghchi emphasized Iran’s readiness to expand political and economic relations with Lebanon and reaffirmed Iran’s support for Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty during a meeting with Rajji.[iv]

US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[v] Trump's statement follows an Axios report on June 2 that the recent US written nuclear proposal to Iran would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil for a negotiated period of time.[vi] Axios reported that the proposal also calls for the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Reuters on June 2 that Iran plans to reject the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” because it does not "soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.”[vii] Iranian media and officials have similarly expressed disapproval of the US proposal, citing "excessive [US] demands” and have reiterated that domestic uranium enrichment is an Iranian "red line.”[viii] Iranian plans to reject the US proposal suggest that the proposal calls on Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment after enriching uranium at three percent for a period of time.[ix] The US proposal may allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent until the regional nuclear consortium is established, after which Iran would not be allowed to enrich any uranium domestically. Iranian officials have previously stated that Iran would agree to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, which is the enrichment limit in the 2025 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)[x] Iran would therefore likely not reject the US proposal if it allowed Iran to permanently enrich uranium at near-JCPOA levels, which further suggests that the US proposal requires Iran to eventually halt all domestic uranium enrichment.

Iran is likely continuing to try to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 2 that the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a resolution at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to recent IAEA reports.[xi] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with 17 ambassadors from IAEA Board of Governors member states and separately with the E3 ambassadors to the United Nations (UN) on June 3.[xii] Gharibabadi warned them against implementing "any politically motivated action" against Iran.  Gharibabadi likely sought to convince the IAEA Board of Governors member states to vote against a non-compliance resolution at the upcoming meeting. A non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism. The E3 has recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[xiii] 

Gharibabadi held a separate meeting with the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to the UN on June 3, likely to encourage them to challenge efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[xiv] Any JCPOA signatory (the United States, the E3, China, and Russia) can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[xv] China and Russia, therefore, have limited ability to block the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran. China and Russia are also members of the IAEA Board of Governors and could vote against a non-compliance resolution. There are, however, 35 members in the Board of Governors, and an IAEA resolution requires a two-thirds majority to be approved.[xvi]

Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xvii] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.[xviii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Strait of Hormuz in early May 2025.[xix] Senior Iranian military officials have also inspected defense and combat capabilities at military bases and air defense sites across southeastern Iran in recent weeks.[xx] This activity is likely part of a broader Iranian effort to simultaneously deter and prepare for a potential strike on Iran. Hassani's threat to attack US ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean is consistent with Iranian aspirations to develop a naval presence beyond the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[xxi]

Shia Coordination Framework members are reportedly encouraging Iraqis, including those in Sadrist strongholds, to register to vote in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections even though Sadr announced that he will not compete in the elections.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraqi media reported on June 3 that several current and former Shia parliamentarians have implied that Sadr will participate in the upcoming elections despite the fact that Sadr announced in late March 2025 that his party will not participate in the elections.[xxiii] Iraqi media also reported on June 3 that Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned about an Iraqi boycott of the elections, particularly in central and southern Iraq.[xxiv] These parties are likely specifically concerned that Shias in central and southern Iraq will boycott the elections given that such a boycott would result in fewer votes for Shia Coordination Framework parties. Iraqi media reported on June 3 that over nine million eligible Iraqi voters are expected to boycott the elections.[xxv]  Shia Coordination Framework members may be suggesting that Sadr will participate in the upcoming elections in order to encourage Iraqi Shias who were planning to boycott the elections to vote. The Shia Coordination Framework may calculate that, if Sadr ultimately does not participate in the elections, individuals who planned to vote for Sadr may instead vote for a Shia Coordination Framework party. Iraqi voters must update their voter registration by June 15 to be able to vote in the elections.  Sadr denounced any attempt by political parties to use his name implicitly or explicitly on May 31, possibly referring to its use as a campaign tactic.[xxvi]

Data from the Iraqi electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, shows that Iraqi voters have most frequently updated their voter registration in Ninewa Province and Baghdad’s Rusafa District.[xxvii] The Shia Coordination Framework recently announced that it will run in unified alliances in Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Diyala Provinces.[xxviii] CTP-ISW assessed that the Shia Coordination Framework will compete in unified alliances in these provinces to ensure that it does not split the vote and enable more unified Kurdish or Sunni alliances to win more seats.[xxix] Rusafa District is a Sadrist support zone.[xxx] A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc told Iraqi media on June 3 that Sadiqoun is conducting a national campaign to encourage Iraqis in poor areas to participate in the upcoming elections.[xxxi] Sadr’s base has historically included poor Shia.[xxxii]

Two unspecified US officials told Fox News on June 2 that the United States has closed or transferred control of three bases in northeastern Syria to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[xxxiii] The two officials said that the United States has closed Mission Support Site Green Village and transferred control of Mission Support Site Euphrates to the SDF.[xxxiv] Both sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province and supported SDF counter-ISIS operations. The United States also withdrew from a third unspecified position, according to the US officials.[xxxv] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack similarly said on June 2 in an interview with Turkish media that the United States will reduce its presence in Syria from "eight bases to five to three” and will “eventually” reduce its presence to one base.

The officials speaking to Fox News added that 500 US troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks.[xxxvi] These withdrawals are consistent with the US Department of Defense’s announcement on April 18 that the United States will reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to “less than a thousand” in the coming months.[xxxvii] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024, when the United States increased the number of troops to 2,000 US personnel.[xxxviii]

Barrack said that the United States has encouraged the SDF to resolve its disputes with the transitional government and integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[xxxix] Middle East Eye also reported on June 3 that the United States has mediated talks between the SDF and Turkey about the US withdrawal from Syria, handover of ISIS prisons and camps, and SDF integration into the MoD.[xl] The Syrian MoD is expected to soon deploy to northeastern Syria to backfill the SDF as part of a recent integration agreement, but Damascus and the SDF do not yet appear to have agreed to the terms of these deployments.[xli]  Outstanding disagreements between the SDF and Damascus could pull resources and attention away from the SDF to conduct counter-ISIS operations in northeastern Syria if the integration process is not smooth or worse, is unsuccessful.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi likely discussed the Lebanese government’s efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution during a visit to Beirut on June 3. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi that all reconstruction aid for Lebanon must go through state institutions and rejected any efforts to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution. Rajji’s comments likely refer to recent Iranian efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution as the Lebanese state and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have simultaneously cracked down on Hezbollah activity across Lebanon.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium. Trump's statement follows an Axios report on June 2 that the recent US written nuclear proposal to Iran would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil for a negotiated period of time. Axios reported that the proposal also calls for the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Reuters on June 2 that Iran plans to reject the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” because it does not "soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.” Iranian plans to reject the US proposal suggest that the proposal calls on Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment after enriching uranium at three percent for a period of time.
• Iranian Threats to Maritime Shipping: Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework members are reportedly encouraging Iraqis, including those in Sadrist strongholds, to register to vote in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections even though Sadr announced that he will not compete in the elections. The Shia Coordination Framework may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections.
• US Military Withdrawal from Syria: Two unspecified US officials told Fox News on June 2 that the United States has closed or transferred control of three bases in northeastern Syria to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The two officials said that the United States has closed Mission Support Site Green Village and transferred control of Mission Support Site Euphrates to the SDF. Both sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province and supported SDF counter-ISIS operations. The officials speaking to Fox News added that 500 US troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks.

Iran Update, June 2, 2025

Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[i] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. The Associated Press reported on May 31 that Iran possesses 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 9.8 significant quantities, as of May 17.[ii] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[iii] Iran had 274.8 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 6.6 significant quantities, in February 2025, by comparison. The IAEA report added that Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,247.6 kilograms, which marks a 953.2-kilogram increase since February 2025.[iv]   The IAEA report does not provide a month-to-month breakdown of Iran's uranium enrichment activity. It is therefore unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. Iran has previously increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to try to gain leverage in negotiations.[v] It is unclear, however, why Iran would pursue rapid enrichment amid the current US-Iran negotiations and potentially increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The IAEA report comes as Iran has taken other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. Iran has also conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[vi]

The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”[vii] The report noted that Iran has failed to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve concerns about undeclared nuclear sites and material in Iran. The IAEA confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at three locations—Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Turquzabad—until the early 2000s.[viii] The IAEA published the comprehensive report on May 31 in response to an IAEA censure resolution in November 2024. The censure resolution was proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany).[ix] The IAEA's quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirm Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

The United States and the E3 are planning to submit a resolution that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to the recent IAEA reports, according to unspecified diplomats.[x] The United States and the E3 will reportedly submit the resolution at the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. The resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xi] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution declaring Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[xii] The Board of Governors referred Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006, which led to the imposition of sanctions on Iran.[xiii] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 30 that Iran would respond to a resolution by "expand[ing] nuclear work."[xiv]

Iran is likely trying to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on June 1, during which Araghchi asked Grossi to explain "Iran's cooperation with the [IAEA]" at the Board of Governors meeting and warned that Iran would respond to "any inappropriate move by the European parties," almost certainly referring to snapback sanctions.[xv] Araghchi separately met with Grossi in Cairo, Egypt, on June 2.[xvi] Araghchi and Grossi’s meeting comes amid rising tensions between Iran and the E3. The E3 has threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran if the United States  and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025. An Iranian hardline outlet described a recent meeting between Iran and the E3 on May 16 as “tense.”[xvii]  The same outlet claimed that the E3 demanded that any future agreement include a JCPOA-style snapback clause—a demand that Iranian officials have condemned as “illegal.”[xviii] Iranian officials have previously threatened a "serious response" if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions.[xix] Iran could increase its near weapons-grade uranium stockpile or further expand its nuclear program in other ways in response to snapback sanctions.

The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31.[xx] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Axios reported that the United States and IAEA would oversee the consortium and that the United States wants the consortium’s enrichment facilities to be located outside of Iran, citing an unspecified source. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson  emphasized on June 2 that a regional consortium "cannot in any way replace enrichment inside Iran.”

It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. The New York Times reported that the US nuclear proposal calls on Iran to completely cease uranium enrichment. Axios reported on June 2 that the proposal would allow "low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian soil" for an unspecified period of time.[xxi] Axios reported that Iran would reduce uranium enrichment to 3 percent, which is below the 3.67 percent limit in the JCPOA.  The proposal also reportedly bars Iran from building new enrichment facilities conducting centrifuge research and development, and enriching uranium at underground facilities for an unspecified period of time. Under the proposal, Iran would limit enrichment activity at above-ground facilities and "dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium."

Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.[xxii] An unspecified Iranian diplomat close to the Iranian negotiating team told Reuters on June 2 that Iran is drafting a negative response to the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” due to its failure to address Iranian interests or soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.[xxiii] The source added that Iran’s nuclear negotiations committee, which is under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assessed that the US proposal is “completely one-sided” and does not serve Iran’s interests.[xxiv] An Iranian expert close to the regime similarly stated on June 1 that the contents of the US nuclear proposal decrease the chances of Iran and the United States reaching a new deal.[xxv]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office called on the international community to “act now” against Iran following the release of the IAEA reports on May 31. Netanyahu’s office described the reports as “a clear warning sign” that Iran is "totally determined to complete its nuclear weapons program."[xxvi]  These statements come amid reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear negotiations collapse..[xxvii] US President Donald Trump recently called on Netanyahu to avoid taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. [xxviii]

The Iranian armed forces are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.  The Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow.[xxix] Israeli airstrikes into Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable, and it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems. The IDF rendered an Iranian S-300 inoperable in April 2024 by striking the S-300's tomb stone engagement radar.[xxx] Iran displayed an S-300 with a “new, Iranian-designed” radar in February 2025.[xxxi] The Artesh Air Defense Force conducted air defense exercises in northern and western Iran in January 2025, including near Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor.[xxxii]

Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran. Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and his deputy, Brigadier General Ali Akbar Talebzadeh, inspected the 10th Tactical Air Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on June 2.[xxxiii] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard recently inspected Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and May 30.[xxxiv] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi conducted an inspection at the same air defense zone on May 16.[xxxv]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) is waging a campaign against Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, likely to damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. An AAH parliamentarian claimed on June 2 that parliament will question Fayyadh over his alleged support for certain Sunni groups.[xxxvi] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali claimed on April 1 that Turkey equips the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces, the former of which integrated into the 59th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigade in 2017.[xxxvii] AAH-controlled media similarly claimed in mid-April 2025 that Turkey and ”Baathists” train and equip these forces.[xxxviii] AAH-controlled media also claimed that Fayyadh took several trips to Turkey to facilitate the integration of these groups into the PMF.[xxxix]  AAH has supported legislation that would require Fayyadh to retire and likely seeks to replace Fayyadh with someone more favorable to AAH.[xl] Fayyadh will compete in the November 2025 parliamentary elections as part of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, while Khazali will reportedly compete on a separate list.[xli] AAH may calculate that it can damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections by highlighting his alleged ties to Turkey and support for the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume its attack campaign against US forces in Iraq in a statement commemorating the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on June 2.[xlii] Kataib Hezbollah threatened that it would inflict “severe blows” on the United States if the United States ”procrastinat[es]” its withdrawal from Iraq. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xliii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support operations since 2023.[xliv] The Wall Street Journal reported on May 31 that cross-border transactions increased from $50 million to $1.5 billion between January and April 2023 after the US Treasury and New York Federal Reserve took steps in 2022 to curb Iranian money laundering through Iraqi banks. Under this new method, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would purchase large quantities of pre-paid Visas and Mastercards in Iraq and transport them into neighboring countries to withdraw the funds. The armed factions would withdraw cash from an ATM and transfer the money back to Iraq through electronic transfers or the hawala system. In Iraq, the militias would exchange the US dollars to Iraqi dinars for up to 21% above the official market rate.   Mastercard blocked over 100,000 Iraqi-issued cards and removed 4,000 merchants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suspected of being involved in fraudulent Iraqi transactions. Visa similarly sent alerts warning of fraud for approximately 70,000 Iraqi cards and approximately 5,000 UAE vendors. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Iranian regime have exploited lax oversight and loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to circumvent US sanctions on Iran.[xlv] The funds obtained through these loopholes are used to fund various Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces in the region.

 

The United States will allow the Syrian transitional government to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[xlvi] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told Reuters on June 2 that the United States reached an “understanding” that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will integrate foreign fighters into the ranks of the new Syrian army “with transparency.”[xlvii] Barrack said that the United States prefers to keep foreign fighters under the command of the Syrian state rather than to exclude them.[xlviii] Barrack’s comments constitute a significant departure from the United States’ demand in March 2025 that the Syrian government bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, including military positions.[xlix] Unspecified sources close to the Syrian MoD told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and his advisers argued to Western officials that excluding foreign fighters from the army could push them toward groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[l] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has historically integrated numerous foreign militias into its military structure and many of these groups, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), are extremely loyal to HTS.[li] The Syrian government's integration of these fighters into the new chain of command reduces the risk that these fighters join extremist armed groups, particularly given a recent uptick in activity by Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria in May 2025.[lii]

Three unspecified Syrian defense officials said on June 2 that the MoD is planning to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters, including fighters from TIP, into the newly-formed 84th Division.[liii] TIP is an al Qaeda-affiliated Uyghur jihadist group that has fought alongside HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[liv] The group is fully subordinate to HTS despite its al Qaeda affiliation and will therefore likely follow the chain of command of the new Syrian army. TIP political official Osama Bughra confirmed to Western media on June 2 that the group now operates “entirely under the MoD’s authority.”[lv] Syrian defense officials said that Syrian fighters will also join the 84th Division, which suggests that the unit will not be completely composed of foreign fighters.[lvi]

It is unclear if the Syrian transitional government’s decision to integrate TIP into the 84th Division will complicate its nascent relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has long opposed Uyghur militants’ activities in Syria and maintained a strategic partnership with the former Assad regime in order to suppress TIP.[lvii] PRC Representative to the United Nations (UN) Fu Cong recently called on the Syrian government to fight against “foreign terrorist fighters,” including TIP and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on March 25.[lviii] ISW assessed in late January 2025 that the containment of TIP, ETIM, and other Uyghur groups would likely shape the PRC’s Syria policy.[lix] PRC officials may calculate that TIP’s inclusion in the Syrian government can sufficiently contain the group and prevent it from threatening the PRC. The PRC has pursued a diplomatic relationship with the new transitional government and PRC officials have conducted three official visits to Damascus since February 2025.[lx] Syria has invited Chinese investment for its reconstruction and growth and recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a Chinese firm to invest in free trade zones in Rif Dimashq and Homs provinces.[lxi]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31. Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) is waging a campaign against Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, likely to damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. AAH may calculate that it can damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections by highlighting his alleged ties to Turkey and support for the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Brigades.
• Threat to US Forces: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume its attack campaign against US forces in Iraq in a statement commemorating the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on June 2. Kataib Hezbollah threatened that it would inflict “severe blows” on the United States if the United States ”procrastinat[es]” its withdrawal from Iraq.
• Iraqi Militia Funding: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support operations since 2023. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 31 that cross-border transactions increased from $50 million to $1.5 billion between January and April 2023 after the US Treasury and New York Federal Reserve took steps in 2022 to curb Iranian money laundering through Iraqi banks.
• Iranian Preparations for Potential US or Israeli Strikes: Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow. Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran.
• Syrian Army Formation: The United States will allow the Syrian transitional government to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria. US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told Reuters on June 2 that the United States reached an “understanding” that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will integrate foreign fighters into the ranks of the new Syrian army “with transparency.” Unspecified sources close to the Syrian MoD told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and his advisers argued to Western officials that excluding foreign fighters from the army could push them toward groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Three unspecified Syrian defense officials said on June 2 that the MoD is planning to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters, including fighters from TIP, into the newly-formed 84th Division.

Iran Update, May 30, 2025

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conducted two attacks in late May 2025 targeting transitional government forces in eastern Suwayda Province, demonstrating that ISIS retains a presence along ground lines of communication (GLOC) between the central Syrian desert and southern Syria.[i] ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) vehicles in separate attacks in Tulul al Safa on May 22 and 28.[ii] These IED attacks are the first attacks that ISIS has claimed in southern Syria since 2023 and the first attacks that ISIS has claimed against the Syrian transitional government.[iii] The attacks targeted vehicles from the Free Syrian Army and the 70th Division, which are Syrian opposition units that are supported by the United States in the al Tanf Deconfliction Zone.[iv] ISIS has probably maintained attack cells in southern Syria and along the GLOCs leading to central Syria since 2023 despite the lack of attacks. ISIS claimed a large number of attacks in Daraa Province in 2023 that it had conducted months prior.[v]

These attacks demonstrate that ISIS maintains cells between the central Syrian desert and southern Syria, where the group has historically sheltered some senior leadership in recent years.[vi] ISIS fighters could use the GLOCs between southern and central Syria to retreat from southern Syria into central Syria or vice versa when under pressure. ISIS uses central Syria’s sparsely populated desert as a sanctuary where it can rest, refit, and train new fighters. ISIS maintained likely support zones in eastern Suwayda Province in 2022 and the Assad regime ambushed ISIS “supply” vehicles in Tulul al Safa in June 2022, demonstrating that ISIS previously operated in this rural area and used it to resupply fighters.[vii] ISIS announced in mid-May 2025 that it has a growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria, but historic ISIS activity in eastern Suwayda suggests that these attacks are not part of the group’s alleged expansion.[viii]

These IED attacks are part of a trend of increased activity by Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria in May 2025, however. Syrian Interior Ministry Spokesperson Noureddine al Baba said that ISIS activity has spiked in the period since the fall of the Assad regime due to ISIS cells’ seizure of former Assad regime weapons.[ix] The transitional government has conducted three large-scale raids targeting ISIS cells in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, and Deir ez Zor provinces since May 17, compared to three counter-ISIS raids between December 2024 and early May.[x]

Gulf leaders are reportedly urging Iran and the United States to conclude a nuclear deal. Gulf countries likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they are concerned that the collapse of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations could trigger a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran, which could in turn prompt an Iranian retaliation against Gulf states or oil trade routes. Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders reportedly urged US President Donald Trump to prioritize a nuclear agreement with Iran and prevent military escalation during Trump’s recent Gulf visit in mid-May, according to three sources speaking to Axios on May 29.[xi] An unspecified source told Axios that Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders warned Trump that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities may threaten Gulf states that host US bases. Unspecified sources similarly told Reuters on May 30 that Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman told Iranian leaders in April 2025 to “seriously” consider Trump’s proposal for a nuclear deal.[xii]

Gulf countries may be concerned that Iran would attack US bases or energy infrastructure in the Gulf or close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for a US or Israeli strike on Iran. Senior Iranian military commanders, including Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have repeatedly threatened in recent months to strike US bases in the Middle East in response to a strike.[xiii] Senior Iranian military officials have also recently threatened to disrupt international shipping. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to an attack on Iran by disrupting international commercial shipping.[xiv] Gulf leaders likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they seek to avoid disruptions to international shipping and oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, given that such disruptions would cause economic downturn.

Senior Iranian military commanders are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on May 30, to conduct an operational assessment of military units and defense capabilities at the site.[xv] Sabahi Fard and Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi conducted separate inspections at the same air defense zone on April 4 and May 16, respectively. These inspections follow AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri’s May 12 order to implement a new operational plan around the Nazeat Islands in the Strait of Hormuz to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities, fortify air defenses, and integrate advanced command-and-control infrastructure.[xvi]

Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear and economic issues, which illustrates cooperation between major US adversaries. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations by supporting Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated on May 30 that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations may "require" another round of trilateral deputy-level consultations between Iran, China, and Russia.[xvii] Iran, China, and Russia previously met in March and April 2025 in Beijing to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[xviii] Ulyanov stated in early March 2025 that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk."[xix] China has separately defended “Iran’s right to” peaceful nuclear energy and criticized sanctions on Iran.[xx] International Atomic Energy Agency Director (IAEA) Rafael Grossi stated in March 2025 that Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[xxi] The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the UN reportedly also met on May 29 to coordinate positions on the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxii] Ulyanov emphasized the importance of trilateral coordination before the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. Ulyanov's timeline is notable given that Iran and the United States are reportedly trying to reach a "political framework text" before the June Board of Governors meeting.[xxiii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.[xxiv] Iran, China, and Russia previously issued a joint statement in March 2025 effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[xxv]

Iran and China continue to cooperate to undermine the US "maximum pressure" campaign targeting Iranian oil exports. Bloomberg reported on May 30 that vessels responsible for shipping illicit Iranian oil to China are disabling their transponders to conduct ship-to-ship transfers in order to obfuscate the origin of the shipments.[xxvi] These vessels are disappearing from tracking systems near eastern Malaysia, a hotspot for Iranian ship-to-ship transfers.[xxvii] The unsanctioned San Marino-flagged Vani oil tanker sailed from Shandong Province, China, to the eastern Malaysian coast and "went dark" on May 15 and reappeared on May 20 fully loaded after conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the US-sanctioned Guyana-flagged oil tanker Nora.[xxviii] The Nora had sailed from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Malaysian coast. Starboard Maritime Intelligence data flagged an "encounter” between the two vessels east of Singapore, which indicates that the two vessels were either less than 50m apart for 10 minutes or less than 200m apart for 30 minutes.[xxix] Vani is currently headed to Qingdao, China, a hub for illicit Iranian oil exports.[xxx] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which helps Iran circumvent US sanctions.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• ISIS Activity in Syria: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conducted two attacks in late May 2025 targeting transitional government forces in eastern Suwayda Province, demonstrating that ISIS retains a presence along ground lines of communication (GLOC) between the central Syrian desert and southern Syria. ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) vehicles in separate attacks in Tulul al Safa on May 22 and 28. These IED attacks are the first attacks that ISIS has claimed in southern Syria since 2023 and the first attacks that ISIS has claimed against the Syrian transitional government. ISIS has probably maintained attack cells in southern Syria and along the GLOCs leading to central Syria since 2023 despite the lack of attacks.
• Cooperation Between Iran, Russia, and China: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear and economic issues, which illustrates cooperation between major US adversaries. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations by supporting Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated on May 30 that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations may "require" another round of trilateral deputy-level consultations between Iran, China, and Russia. The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the UN reportedly met on May 29 to coordinate positions on the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.
• Gulf Countries' Concerns about Regional Escalation: Gulf leaders are reportedly urging Iran and the United States to conclude a nuclear deal. Gulf countries likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they are concerned that the collapse of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations could trigger a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran, which could in turn prompt an Iranian retaliation against Gulf states or oil trade routes. Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders reportedly urged US President Donald Trump to prioritize a nuclear agreement with Iran and prevent military escalation during Trump’s recent Gulf visit in mid-May, according to three sources speaking to Axios on May 29. Unspecified sources similarly told Reuters on May 30 that Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman told Iranian leaders in April 2025 to “seriously” consider Trump’s proposal for a nuclear deal. Gulf countries may be concerned that Iran would attack US bases or energy infrastructure in the Gulf or close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for a US or Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran Update, May 29, 2025

A US journalist reported on May 29 that Iran and the United States are trying to reach a "political framework text" before the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10.[i] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, which expires in October 2025, allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[ii] The IAEA releases a quarterly verification and monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear program.[iii] The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the IAEA’s next quarterly report at the June Board of Governors meeting. The IAEA previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” about Iranian nuclear activities in addition to the IAEA’s regular verification and monitoring reports.[iv] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on May 28 that the IAEA will release the comprehensive report "soon."[v] The IAEA’s next quarterly report and the comprehensive report will both almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA, which will lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. The E3 recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[vi]  Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran’s willingness to resolve the nuclear issue.[vii]

IAEA Deputy Director General and head of the IAEA Safeguards Department Massimo Aparo inspected two undeclared Iranian nuclear sites in Tehran Province on May 28 as part of the March 2023 IAEA-Iran Joint Statement.[viii] The joint statement identified three locations in Iran that contain undeclared nuclear material and equipment: Turquzabad, Varamin, and Marivan.[ix] The IAEA reported in May 2023 that Marivan is "no longer an outstanding issue,” which suggests that Aparo visited the Turquzabad and Varamin sites during his visit to Iran.[x]  The most recent IAEA Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement report from February 2025 stated that there was no progress toward implementing the March 2023 Joint Statement between November 2024 to February 2025.[xi]

The United States and Syria continued to strengthen ties on May 29. The United States Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani raised the US flag over the US Ambassador’s residence in Damascus on May 29.[xii] The United States lowered the flag at the residence in 2012 following former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s violence crackdown on protestors.[xiii] The United States has not yet reopened its embassy in Syria, which it also closed in 2012. Barrack stated that Syria will no longer be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism during the flag raising ceremony.[xiv] US President Donald Trump must submit a report to Congress certifying that the Syrian government does not support acts of international terrorism before the United States can remove this designation.[xv] The State Sponsor of Terrorism designation restricts US foreign assistance, bans defense exports and sales, enforces controls on certain dual-use items, and restricts other forms of financial assistance.[xvi] The US Treasury issued a Syria General License 25 on May 23, which lifted most sanctions on Syria.[xvii] Barrack also suggested potential negotiations between Israel and the Syrian transitional government to establish a “non-aggression” agreement and discuss border issues during the ceremony.[xviii]

Hezbollah appears to be cooperating with the Lebanese state to disarm itself in southern Lebanon while likely attempting to regenerate its forces north of the Litani River. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Wall Street Journal on May 28 that the Lebanese state has achieved about 80 percent of its objectives to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[xix] Unspecified senior Arab officials said that the United States has provided Israeli intelligence to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) about Hezbollah’s remaining stockpiles and positions in southern Lebanon.[xx] An unspecified Israeli military official said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is "pleased by” the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah.[xxi] Hezbollah has reportedly cooperated with the LAF to reassert state control over southern Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, including by reportedly ordering its fighters who are not from southern Lebanon to vacate positions and allowing the LAF to take control of the area.[xxii] Unspecified senior Lebanese security officials confirmed on May 28 that Hezbollah has cooperated with the LAF to disarm it in southern Lebanon.[xxiii]  Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF in the south likely reflects its degraded state and its prioritization of "sheltering and rebuilding” its forces.[xxiv] Hezbollah also likely seeks to focus its near-term efforts on recalibrating its domestic political strategy and resecuring its political future in Lebanon.

The Syrian transitional government’s frequent interdictions of weapons shipments heading to Lebanon from Syria suggests that Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles north of the Litani River even while cooperating with the LAF in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah efforts to rebuild weapons stockpiles are likely part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) frequently interdicts weapons moving from Syrian territory into northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, often along well-established smuggling corridors that Hezbollah formerly operated with Assad regime- and Iranian-backed smugglers. The GSS recently seized over 100 rockets and dozens of machine guns in a shipment transiting Homs Province on May 25.[xxv] Syrian media reported that the munitions were heading to Hezbollah.[xxvi] Syrian authorities also seized similar shipments of rockets, launchers, and artillery shells in Homs Province on May 22 and 28 that were en route to Lebanon.[xxvii] Many of these shipments were likely headed to Hezbollah-affiliated fighters in the Bekaa Valley, given that the weapons were interdicted in Homs Province, which borders the Bekaa Valley. These consistent smuggling busts indicate that Hezbollah is attempting to rebuild its stockpiles of rockets and other munitions through pre-established smuggling networks. The replenishment of equipment and munitions stockpiles is a key element of a force’s regeneration.[xxviii] Hezbollah may calculate that cooperation with the LAF in the south will buy enough goodwill with the Lebanese and Israeli governments to ensure its long-term survival and allow it to focus on reconstitution north of the Litani River. Iran is likely supporting or attempting to support efforts to send weapons to Hezbollah, given Iran’s recent efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution.[xxix]

The Syrian transitional government has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria, which may decrease weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and GSS forces targeted an Iranian-linked weapons and drug smuggling network along the Syria-Iraq border on May 20.[xxx] The GSS has seized several weapons caches used by smuggling cells in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, since May 20.[xxxi] Iranian-backed militias controlled the Albu Kamal border and used its infrastructure as a key node in the ground line of communication to between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah during Bashar al Assad’s rule.[xxxii] The Syrian transitional government asserted control over the border crossing shortly after the fall of the Assad regime and has begun to dismantle the Iranian-backed smuggling network that operated there.[xxxiii] The transitional government’s stronger control over the eastern Syrian border could reduce the amount of materiel that Iran and its allies can transport through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon and thereby slow down Hezbollah’s reconstitution.

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: A US journalist reported on May 29 that Iran and the United States are trying to reach a "political framework text" before the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.
• US-Syria Ties: The United States and Syria continued to strengthen ties on May 29. The United States Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani raised the US flag over the US Ambassador’s residence in Damascus on May 29. Barrack stated that Syria will no longer be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism during the flag raising ceremony. US President Donald Trump must submit a report to Congress certifying that the Syrian government does not support acts of international terrorism before the United States can remove this designation.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah appears to be cooperating with the Lebanese state to disarm itself in southern Lebanon while likely attempting to regenerate its forces north of the Litani River. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Wall Street Journal on May 28 that the Lebanese state has achieved about 80 percent of its objectives to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. An unspecified Israeli military official said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is "pleased by” the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah. The Syrian transitional government’s frequent interdictions of weapons shipments heading to Lebanon from Syria suggests that Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles north of the Litani River even while cooperating with the LAF in southern Lebanon. The Syrian transitional government has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria, which may decrease weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.

Iran Update, May 28, 2025

The US Treasury lifted most sanctions on Syria on May 23. The US Treasury issued Syria General License (GL) 25 to provide “immediate sanctions relief” to Syria in accordance with US President Donald Trump’s May 13 order to lift all sanctions on Syria.[i] The removal of sanctions will allow the United States to conduct transactions with the Syrian transitional government, the Syrian Central Bank, and state-owned businesses.[ii] GL 25 also removed the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designations on Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Interior Minister Anas Khattab.[iii] The United States previously designated both individuals as SDGTs for their membership in al Qaeda in Iraq in 2013 and 2012, respectively.[iv]  The US Treasury noted that GL 25 does not lift sanctions on ”terrorist organizations,” perpetrators of human rights abuses, drug traffickers, or former Assad regime members.[v] GL 25 does not have an expiration date, but the US Treasury stated that the United States implemented GL 25 with the understanding that Syria will not provide a “safe haven for terrorist organizations” and will protect its ethno-religious minority communities.[vi] The US State Department separately issued a 180-day waiver under the Caesar Act on May 23 to ensure that the Caesar Act does not obstruct economic investment in Syria or prevent the provision of critical humanitarian assistance to Syrians.[vii] US congressional approval is required to permanently repeal the Caesar Act. The State Department’s temporary waiver may allow for the international community to provide short-term reconstruction assistance to Syria, however.

The European Union (EU) adopted a resolution to lift economic sanctions on Syria on May 28 but also imposed sanctions on Turkish-backed Syrian army commanders and armed factions that committed human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March 2025.[viii] The European Union removed sanctions on 24 entities, including the Syrian Central Bank and oil and media companies.[ix] The EU Council released a statement that it lifted “all” economic sanctions on Syria except those “based on security grounds.”[x] EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas stated that the decision to remove sanctions is “reversible and conditional” and warned that the European Union can re-impose sanctions on Syria if the Syrian transitional government does not continue to make “progress.”[xi]

The European Union imposed new sanctions on two Syrian army commanders and three Turkish-backed armed factions for committing human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March.[xii] The EU Council sanctioned 62nd Division Commander Mohammad al Jassem (Abu Amsha) and 76th Division Commander Saif al Din Boulad (Sayf Abu Bakr) for commanding forces that conducted arbitrary killings, torture, and other targeted violence against civilians, particularly Alawites, in early March 2025.[xiii] The European Union also sanctioned Abu Amsha’s Suleiman Shah Brigade and Abu Bakr’s Hamza Division.[xiv] The European Union sanctioned another Turkish-backed militia, the Sultan Murad Division, for its involvement in human rights abuses on the coast, though the European Union did not sanction Sultan Murad Division Commander Fahim Issa.[xv] Issa currently holds a prominent role in the Ministry of Defense (MoD)  as the defense minister’s assistant for the northern region.[xvi]

Shara’s promotion of militants who have committed human rights abuses to prominent defense positions will threaten Syria’s long-term stability. Shara has allowed men, such as Abu Amsha, Sayf Abu Bakr, and others, to continue to operate with relative impunity in Syria and has even promoted several of these men to high-ranking positions within the new Syrian army.[xvii]  The promotion of these commanders, and the fact that these commanders have remained in their positions even after widespread allegations of participation in the coastal massacres, suggests that Damascus will not hold these men accountable for their previous and recent abuses.[xviii] Shara likely promoted men such as Abu Amsha, Abu Bakr, and Fahim Issa to senior positions within the Syrian army and government because he is reliant on their support and loyalty to consolidate his control over Syria. Shara appears to be prioritizing the near-term centralization of state authority over longer-term security and stability in doing so.

Shara’s promotion of individuals who have previously committed human rights abuses against Syrian minority communities will likely increase these communities’ distrust in the transitional government, which threatens to destabilize the Syrian transition. Syrian minority communities, such as the Alawites and the Kurds, will likely look at Damascus’s elevation of these commanders as a threat to their safety and as an indicator that Damascus prioritizes maintaining the loyalty of extremist Sunni Arabs over protecting minorities. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) condemned Damascus's appointment of Abu Hatem Shaqra and stated that the decision “taint[s] state institutions.”[xix] Locals from Ismaili-majority Salamiyah in Hama Province recently expressed alarm after the MoD deployed Abu Amsha and his division to the area.[xx] Syrian social media users circulated rumors in late April 2025 that Abu Amsha and his 62nd Division were deploying to Jaramana to conduct violence against Druze citizens, which generated immense fear in the Druze community.[xxi] Alawite insurgents have used the massacres that Sunni Arabs committed against Alawites on the coast in early March to recruit support for the insurgency.[xxii] These incidents highlight how Damascus’s retention of thugs and warlords in positions of power creates an atmosphere of distrust between minority communities and the transitional government. Long-term stability requires most Syrians to trust the government and for the government to represent all Syrians. Damascus’s potential alienation of minority communities is not conducive to building an inclusive state over the next five years. The removal of destabilizing elements from the transitional government could reduce the risk of renewed major internal conflict. 

The international community, including the United States, should maintain individual sanctions on these commanders even as it removes sanctions that target Syrian government and economic institutions. The United States has already sanctioned Abu Amsha, Abu Bakr, and Abu Hatem Shaqra, who recently assumed command of the 86th Division and has been accused of committing abuses against civilians.[xxiii] Other commanders who lead sanctioned factions, such as Sultan Murad leader Fahim Issa, should be held responsible for actions taken before the fall of the Assad regime and actions taken as leaders within the new Syrian army. It is unclear if Shara will make efforts to curb the influence of these commanders in the future given the possible political ramifications of doing so. Targeted sanctions by the international community may incentivize Shara to remove these powerful faction leaders or give him the necessary political cover to do so.  

Iran and the United States appear to be trying to secure an interim nuclear deal before negotiating a comprehensive nuclear agreement. It is unclear if the reported interim deal that Iran seeks will satisfy US demands. Western media reported in late April 2025 that Iran asked the United States to negotiate an interim deal.[xxiv] The New York Times reported on May 28 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff has dropped his opposition to an interim deal, citing unspecified participants in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxv] Reuters separately reported on May 28 that Iran may be willing to agree to an interim "political deal" that would require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment for one year and ship part of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad or convert it into fuel plates. The United States would reportedly release frozen Iranian funds and recognize Iran's right to uranium enrichment in exchange, according to two Iranian sources.[xxvi] The United States previously agreed to release $6 billion of frozen Iranian assets as part of a prisoner swap agreement with Iran in August 2023, but Iran did not gain access to these funds due to the start of the October 7 War in October 2023.[xxvii]  It is unclear whether the United States would agree to acknowledge Iran’s right to uranium enrichment given that US officials have repeatedly emphasized that Iran cannot maintain its uranium enrichment program.[xxviii] The Iranian sources also told Reuters that Iran would not dismantle its nuclear program or infrastructure or close its nuclear installations.[xxix] It is unclear whether the United States would accept an interim deal in which Iran could maintain its nuclear infrastructure because such a deal would allow Iran to keep its centrifuges. Iran could quickly restore its highly enriched uranium stockpile if it retains its centrifuges. Former UN Weapons Inspector David Albright warned on April 18 that Iran could enrich enough weapons-grade uranium in 25 days for a nuclear weapon, even with a small low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, if it maintains all of its current centrifuges.[xxx]

 

Iran may be portraying itself as willing to make concessions in order to prevent the talks from collapsing and potentially triggering an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami claimed on May 28 that Iran could "reconsider the acceptance of American inspectors through the IAEA" if "Iran's demands are taken into account and an agreement is reached."[xxxi] Eslami may have made this statement to try to portray Iran as making a concession to the United States given that Iran has previously excluded US inspectors from inspections of its nuclear sites.[xxxii] Eslami’s statement, as well as Iran’s reported willingness to reach an interim ”political deal,” come amid reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear talks collapse.[xxxiii] Axios reported on May 27 that US officials are concerned that Israel may strike Iran’s nuclear facilities or take other actions to undermine the talks.[xxxiv] Trump recently called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxxv] Iran has conducted military inspections and air defense exercises in recent months in preparation for a potential strike.[xxxvi]

 

Iran is continuing to deepen ties with non-Western countries to try to challenge the US-led world order. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with several senior officials in Moscow on May 27 and 28 on the sidelines of the 13th Moscow International Security Conference.[xxxvii] Ahmadian met with the following individuals:

 

• Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji: Ahmadian and Araji discussed the implementation of the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement.[xxxviii] This agreement requires Iraq to disarm and relocate Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region away from the Iranian border.[xxxix] Ahmadian emphasized the need to remove "espionage networks” near the Iranian border.
• Brazilian Presidential Adviser Celso Amorim: Ahmadian and Amorim called for expanding scientific and commercial cooperation between Iran and Brazil. Iran and Brazil are both members of BRICS.[xl] Amorim affirmed Brazil’s support for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy and enrichment activities. Ahmadian previously traveled to Brazil in April 2025 to attend a BRICS security summit, where he discussed security arrangements among BRICS member states.[xli] Iran separately participated in a defense exhibition in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in early Aprill 2025.[xlii]
• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu: Shoigu stated that bilateral cooperation between Russia and Iran is developing “in all fields” based on the guidance of the two countries’ leaders.[xliii]
• Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev: Ahmadian and Patrushev discussed the bilateral agreements and the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[xliv] The INSTC is a trade route that connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[xlv]

Iran Update, May 27, 2025

Salafi-jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have increased their activity in Syria in May 2025. Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson Noureddine al Baba said that ISIS activity has spiked in the period since the fall of the Assad regime due to ISIS cells’ seizures of former Assad regime weapons stocks.[i] ISIS cells have since attempted to “infiltrate” MoD positions and recruit regime remnants.[ii] The transitional government has conducted three large-scale raids targeting ISIS cells in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, and Deir ez Zor provinces since May 17, compared to a single counter-ISIS raid between December 2024 and early May.[iii] Interior Ministry forces seized ammunition, explosive devices, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and suicide vests on May 25 from the ISIS cell in Rif Dimashq.[iv] The ISIS cell reportedly seized this weapons stockpile during the fall of the Assad regime, which demonstrates that ISIS has the capability to rebuild and arm its cells even in areas currently under firm transitional government control in western Syria.[v] ISIS has also recently developed the ability to conduct attacks in the Middle Euphrates River Valley with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, which require significant logistical tails and support zones.[vi] ISIS announced in mid-May that it has a growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria.[vii] The Islamic State has also attempted to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment.

The agreement between the Syrian government and Kurdish-dominated authorities in northeastern Syria to transfer internally displaced persons (IDPs) from al Hol camp may create an opportunity for ISIS to recruit new fighters and reengage supporters.  The Syrian transitional government reached an agreement with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) on May 26 to evacuate Syrian citizens held in ISIS prison camps in northeastern Syria, according to the Associated Press.[viii] Al Jazeera reported that the government and the SDF will review detainee files for IDPs in al Hol, presumably to vet whether the IDPs can be released.[ix] Kurdish authorities announced that local AANES authorities, transitional government representatives, and an international coalition delegation created a “joint mechanism” to return families from al Hol camp in Hasakah Province.[x] The Syrian transitional government lacks the capacity to effectively rehabilitate and integrate Syrian families returning from al Hol camp, some of whom are supportive of ISIS. Al Hol camp houses an estimated 37,000 people, and the majority of camp inhabitants are the family members of ISIS fighters.[xi] Kurdish authorities refuted reports that the administration of the camp will be transferred to the Syrian transitional government in the near future and denied that they discussed this with the visiting delegation or with Damascus.[xii] The authorities did not refute reports that some IDPs would be returned to their homes, however. These returnees will provide fertile ground in which ISIS can embed itself, if it chooses to do so.

The Syrian transitional government will likely struggle to rehabilitate and integrate ISIS-affiliated families and individuals that return from al Hol camp, which risks creating an opportunity for ISIS recruitment in Syria.  Only countries that have repatriated small numbers of fighters and possessed both the administrative and financial means and will to do so have successfully reintegrated ISIS family members.[xiii] Iraq began to repatriate thousands of ISIS-affiliated families and IDPs in 2021 and has faced immense challenges doing so since.[xiv]  The Iraqi government struggled to integrate ISIS families and IDPs into their new communities, and returnees often faced extreme isolation and suspicion from these communities, which in many cases were victims of ISIS violence.[xv] The treatment of returnees by their neighbors was not dependent on whether or not the returnees were actually ISIS supporters; their neighbors usually assumed any returnee was associated with ISIS.[xvi]

The transitional government is still attempting to build a state with functioning institutions after Assad’s collapse, meaning it faces additional challenges that Iraq does not.  Iraq has a fully functional police force and military, despite their flaws. It also has some rudimentary resettlement organizations and a Migration Ministry.[xvii] Syria’s institutions are not yet fully functional. Some of the residents of al Hol remain hardened ISIS supporters, and others will face severe isolation from their communities upon their return. Isolation has historically led to recidivism and provides an opportunity for ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups, such as Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, to generate support networks in areas where they were not previously active.[xviii] ISIS remains a viable insurgency in Syria that aims to recruit fighters.

A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) described its operational concept in Syria on May 21. A Saraya Ansar al Sunnah leader said that the group is building control zones in rural areas before expanding to attack zones in likely government-controlled cities.[xix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s operational concept may complicate the transitional government’s efforts to combat the group because the transitional government will naturally prioritize urban areas with large populations and significant economic potential over outlying rural areas. Other insurgent groups, including al Qaeda in Iraq, have used a similar strategy focused on rural areas with success. CTP-ISW has not observed an increase in attacks claimed by Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, but the group likely continues to pursue this operational strategy. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah announced on May 21 that it would cease to publish public claims of its attacks targeting minority groups due to operational security concerns.[xx] Unclaimed attacks consistent with Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s tactics have continued in western Syria since May 21.[xxi]

US President Donald Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action that would potentially jeopardize US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22, according to Axios.[xxii] Israeli media reported that the phone call was characterized by ”heated disagreements.”[xxiii] US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stated on May 25 that Trump ”wants...Netanyahu to be on the same page with him” following Noem's meeting with Netanyahu in Jerusalem.[xxiv] Noem told Fox News in an interview on May 26 that she urged Netanyahu to ”stay united and let [the US-Iran nuclear negotiations] process play out.”[xxv] An unspecified Israeli official told Axios on May 27 that Noem told Netanyahu to ”give [the United States] a week,” likely to allow the US and Iran to continue negotiations.”[xxvi] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Mossad Director David Barnea arrived in Washington, DC, on May 26 to meet with US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe to discuss Iran.[xxvii] These conversations follow reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear talks collapse.[xxviii]

Iran appears to be evaluating some Omani-mediated offers about uranium enrichment following the fourth and fifth round of talks with the United States. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly proposed after the fourth round of US-Iran talks on May 11 that Iran suspend uranium enrichment for up to three years as part of a potential agreement and to build trust, according to Western media.[xxix] Iran and the United States subsequently held a fifth round of talks in Rome on May 23, which primarily focused on the US demand for zero enrichment.[xxx] Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani told Iranian media on May 26 that Oman had reportedly proposed during the fifth round of US-Iran talks that Iran suspend enrichment for six months and resume later.[xxxi] Iran did not accept this offer, according to Ardestani. Araghchi also separately stated on May 25 that Iran is reviewing proposals from the Omani foreign minister aimed at overcoming obstacles in the recent indirect talks.[xxxii] Ardestani is only a parliamentarian, and it is unlikely he would be privy to this sort of information about the talks. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi briefed the Iranian Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Commission on May 25 and discussed the details of the recent US-Iran talks with its members.[xxxiii]

Pro-Assad Alawite insurgent attacks targeting the Syrian transitional government and Sunni communities have become increasingly rare compared to the height of insurgent activity in March 2025.  Insurgents have largely stopped attacks on transitional government forces in the Alawite-majority coastal Syria, though there was a high-profile attempted prison break by Assadist remnants in Latakia Province on May 20.[xxxiv] The lack of insurgent attacks in April and May 2025 contrasts sharply with insurgent activity before March 2025, when insurgents targeted government forces multiple times per week. This suggests that the insurgency has weakened significantly since March 2025.

Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity. The pro-Assad Alawite insurgency portrays itself as Assadist remnants who, at minimum, seek to restore Assad-era power structures in Syria, if not Assad himself.[xxxv] Assad relied upon his Alawite community, other minorities, and a small, select group of Sunnis to rule Syria.[xxxvi] The entire Alawite community did not support Assad, and many Alawite notables opposed him.[xxxvii] Many Syrian Alawites are unlikely to join a pro-Assad insurgency even if they remain distrustful of the Syrian transitional government. Government forces have also arrested Assad-linked insurgents, seized weapons stockpiles in insurgent support zones, and conducted community-based outreach to individual Alawite towns in coastal Syria.[xxxviii] These efforts have probably disrupted insurgent operations, though the recent prison break attempt illustrates the continued offensive capabilities among small insurgent cells. These government operations also probably benefit from poorly executed insurgent operations that have resulted in the capture of insurgents and presumably intelligence from detained fighters.[xxxix] This could have enabled intelligence-driven operations, though it is unclear to what degree government operations are driven by intelligence.

Fighting in southern Syria between local Sunni fighters, Druze militias, and government forces has also largely ceased since early May 2025.  Negotiations with Druze leaders since April 30 to establish mechanisms to address the recent violence between Sunni militants, Druze militias, and government forces in Druze-majority towns and regions in southern Syria have largely halted violence and insurgent attacks in Druze-majority areas.[xl] Druze leaders also remain distrustful of the government, but new security mechanisms that allowed Druze militias to retain their weapons calmed the situation.

The Houthis may be attempting to increase the speed of their drones, which decreases the flight time of the drones and gives less warning to the target.[xli] The Yemeni National Resistance Forces intercepted a Houthi shipment on February 13 containing jet-propulsion engines that are likely used for jet-powered drones, according to a Yemeni think tank report on May 22.[xlii] Iran’s Shahed-238 jet-powered drone has a top speed of 600 km/h, though the greater engine weight has implications for fuel capacity and warhead size.[xliii] CTP-ISW has not yet observed jet-powered Houthi drones, but a Houthi jet-powered drone with a similar speed to the Shahed-238 could reach Eilat, Israel, from Saada in two hours and 48 minutes and the center of the Red Sea from Saada in 25 minutes. This is significantly faster than the propeller-driven Shahed-136, which has a top speed of 185 km/h and takes nine hours to reach Eilat from Saada and one hour and 20 minutes to reach the center of the Red Sea from Saada.[xliv] The increased speed means that friendly air defenses have less time to detect and intercept the target. Israel and its partners intercepted every drone launched from Iran during the April 2024 Iranian attack on Israel in part because of the distances and time involved. Ukraine, by comparison, finds it relatively more difficult to intercept Russian-launched, Iranian-designed Shahed drones because of the shorter distances and times involved.[xlv]

The increased speed of Houthi drones is unlikely to meaningfully increase the rate at which the drones penetrate Israeli air defenses, given the distance involved. The increased speed could increase the threat to maritime shipping if the Houthis resume their attack campaign, however. Israeli aircraft routinely destroyed drones launched from Iraq during the October 7 War, even though a Shahed-136 takes only roughly two hours and 10 minutes to travel from western Iraq near Rutba, Anbar Province, to the northern Israeli border.[xlvi] The Houthis could return to targeting international shipping at any time and for any reason, however.[xlvii] Jet-powered drones would make intercepting Houthi attacks more difficult, given the shorter distances involved. US Navy vessels have intercepted Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles, which are far faster than jet-powered drones, however. The Houthis could also use these jet-powered drones to target or threaten to target sites in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Houthis have previously targeted energy infrastructure Saudi Arabia and the UAE during the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen.[xlviii] The Houthis, since they ceased attacks on the Gulf after the 2022 ceasefire agreement, have threatened attacks on both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to deter them from supporting for anti-Houthi forces in Yemen.[xlix]

Iran is continuing to strengthen ties with revisionist actors such as Russia and North Korea. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian arrived in Moscow on May 27 for the three-day 13th Moscow International Security Conference.[l] Russian state media reported that the conference will focus on strengthening global security cooperation and feature a Russian defense exhibition.[li] Delegates from over 150 countries will reportedly attend the conference, including delegations from BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. North Korean media reported that a delegation led by North Korea's Minister of State Security will attend the conference.[lii] Iran's engagement with BRICS and the SCO is part of a broader Iranian effort to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance."[liii] Ahmadian emphasized the importance of developing BRICS and the SCO upon his arrival in Moscow.[liv] Ahmadian also stated that he will meet with officials on the sidelines of the summit and discuss progress on the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with unspecified Russian officials.[lv] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the agreement, which covers military, economic, energy, and nuclear cooperation.[lvi] Iran has provided significant support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones. Iran also reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighters' jets in January 2025, which illustrates Iran and Russia’s mutual defense cooperation, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s.[lvii] Russia has also coordinated with Iran on the latter’s nuclear program during US-Iran negotiations.[lviii]

The Shia Coordination Framework announced on May 27 that it will run in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din provinces in “unified alliances,” likely to ensure it does not split the vote between its constituent parties.[lix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. This announcement follows Iranian pressure on Shia Coordination Framework leaders to remain unified ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties can remain an influential bloc in the formation of the Iraqi government.[lx] The Shia Coordination Framework likely wants to run together in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din to ensure that they do not split the vote and enable more unified Kurdish or Sunni parties to win more seats. The Shia Coordination Framework would risk dividing the Shia among multiple parties. Divisions among these Shia political parties cost them many seats in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[lxi] The disunity of the parties that later formed the Shia Coordination Framework meant that they split votes, which enabled smaller but better-organized parties to win certain seats.

The Framework probably feels less pressure to run as a unified list in the southern, Shia-dominated provinces, because there are fewer alternatives that could beat them. Shia Coordination Framework parties have reportedly registered to run on multiple lists. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali will oppose each other on competing lists in most Iraqi provinces.[lxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the south in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that enabled more unified Shia political movements, like Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Sadrist Movement, to win seats against the other fractious Shia parties.[lxiii] Sadr announced in late March 2025 that his party would not participate in the elections.[lxiv] Sadr is a mercurial political leader and could change his mind about participating in the elections before November 2025. But Sadr’s absence in these elections means the Framework only faces a threat from small, independent parties in the south.

 

Key Takeaways:

• ISIS in Syria: Salafi-jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have increased their activity in Syria in May 2025. A Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson noted the increase in activity after three recent raids targeting ISIS cells in May.
• Syrian IDP Camps and ISIS: The agreement between the Syrian government and Kurdish-dominated authorities in northeastern Syria to transfer internally displaced persons (IDPs) from al Hol camp may create an opportunity for ISIS to recruit new fighters and reengage supporters. Iraq began to repatriate thousands of ISIS-affiliated families and IDPs in 2021 and has faced immense challenges doing so since. The transitional government is still attempting to build a state with functioning institutions after Assad’s collapse, meaning it faces additional challenges that Iraq does not.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran appears to be evaluating some offers regarding uranium enrichment following the fourth and fifth round of talks with the United States. US President Donald Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action to potentially jeopardize US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22, according to Axios.
• Syrian Insurgencies: Pro-Assad Alawite insurgent attacks targeting the Syrian transitional government and Sunni communities have become increasingly rare compared to the height of insurgent activity in March 2025. Multiple factors including a lack of Alawite support, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity.
• Houthi Drone Capabilities: The Houthis may be attempting to increase the speed of their drones, which decreases the flight time of the drones and gives less warning to the target. The increased speed of Houthi drones is unlikely to meaningfully increase the likelihood they penetrate Israeli air defenses, given the distance involved. The increased speed could increase the threat to maritime shipping if the Houthis resume their attack campaign, however.
• Iran, Russia, and North Korea: Iran is continuing to strengthen ties with revisionist actors such as Russia and North Korea. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian arrived in Moscow on May 27 for the three-day 13th Moscow International Security Conference.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework announced on May 27 that it will run in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din provinces in “unified alliances,” likely to ensure it does not split the vote between its constituent parties. The Framework probably feels less pressure to run as a unified list in the southern, Shia-dominated provinces, because there are fewer alternatives that could beat them.

Iran Update, May 26, 2025

Truck drivers across Iran have launched a nationwide strike over rising insurance and maintenance costs and worsening economic conditions.[i] The truck drivers are protesting the government's plan to cut the amount of subsidized diesel allocated to truckers.[ii] Strikers also cited unaffordable insurance premiums, stagnant freight rates, and deteriorating road infrastructure.[iii] The government-subsidized insurance premium for truck drivers increased by approximately 45 percent earlier this year.[iv] The strike began in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, which is Iran’s primary shipping hub, on May 18 and has since spread to other major Iranian cities.[v] Economic-related protests and strikes have the potential to escalate into anti-regime protests similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2019.[vi]

The ongoing strikes will likely worsen Iranian freight transport issues, especially after a recent explosion at a major port in Bandar Abbas. The Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, which handles 85 percent of Iran’s container traffic and a significant share of oil exports, suffered a major explosion on April 26 that has disrupted container traffic and cost Iran an estimated 25 million US dollars per day.[vii] The ongoing strike has reportedly strained domestic freight transport, particularly agricultural distribution during the harvest season.[viii] Iranian officials rejected claims that fruit and vegetable prices increased by 50 percent and stated that only a few staples saw "temporary” increases due to recent transport issues.[ix] An Iranian judiciary official reported on May 26 that Fars Province security forces arrested and prosecuted individuals who blocked the movement of freight trucks on roads.[x] Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) forces separately clashed with strikers in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, on May 25 with pepper spray.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Internal Unrest in Iran: Truck drivers across Iran have launched a nationwide strike over rising insurance and maintenance costs and worsening economic conditions. The ongoing strikes will likely worsen Iranian freight transport issues, especially after a recent explosion at a major port in Bandar Abbas.

Previous Iran Updates

• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023