Iran Updates

 

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                                                                              

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, May 16, 2025

Israel targeted Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports on May 16 as part of an Israeli campaign to disrupt the Houthi ability to enable attacks targeting Israel.[i] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated after the airstrikes on May 16 that Israel will continue to strike Houthi targets “including [Houthi] leadership and all infrastructure that enables [the Houthis] to attack [Israel].”[ii] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Israel’s main airport, Ben Gurion Airport, to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.[iii] The Houthis have launched four ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport since May 12.[iv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepts many of these missiles with its ballistic missile defenses, but some missiles have penetrated Israeli defenses.[v]

 

The IDF targeted Salif and Hudaydah ports likely because the Houthis use these ports to generate revenue and smuggle weapons that they use to launch drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.[vi] The United Nations, through the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, inspects vessels in Djibouti before the vessels offload cargo at Yemeni ports.[vii] UN ambassadors have previously warned that there has been a surge in Iranian ships bypassing international inspections and offloading uninspected cargo at Hudaydah Port since 2023.[viii] The solid fuel missiles, which Iran smuggles to the Houthis and the Houthis use to target Israel, cannot be disassembled for transit and then reassembled. The challenges inherent in transporting these missiles mean that Iran needs to move solid fuel missiles on larger vessels that presumably require more robust port facilities than smaller dhows commonly used to smuggle weapons to the Houthis.[ix] The Palestine-2 and Zulfiqar solid fuel ballistic missiles that the Houthis use to strike Israel are 10 meters long, for example, which makes them more difficult to transport on small dhows.[x] The IDF previously targeted Hudaydah Port on May 5, which decreased the port's capacity by 50 percent, according to the Basha Report.[xi] The Basha Report estimated that the May 16 airstrikes reduced the port's capacity by an additional 10 to 20 percent.[xii]

 

The Houthis probably forced cargo vessels to stay at Hudaydah Port after the Israeli evacuation notices on May 14 to discourage Israeli airstrikes on certain areas of Hudaydah Port. The IDF also published evacuation orders for the Hudaydah, Salif, and Ras Issa ports on May 11 and May 14.[xiii] The IDF struck near berth three and seven on May 16, according to the Basha Report.[xiv] Two Panamanian-flagged, Emirati-owned vessels and one Panamanian-flagged and -owned vessel were docked at berths two, four, and six, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence and Basha Report.[xv] A Comoros-flagged vessel was also at Hudaydah Port, north of berth seven.[xvi] The Houthis were reportedly not allowing the vessel at berth four to leave the port, which is consistent with Starboard Maritime Intelligence data.[xvii] Starboard‘s data indicates that the vessel at berth four arrived on May 15 and did not leave before the time of the strike.[xviii] The Houthis have previously employed a similar strategy and held vessels hostage at Houthi-controlled ports as leverage with international actors.[xix] All four vessels in and around Hudaydah Port at the time of the strike previously stopped at Djibouti Port, suggesting that the vessels complied with the UNVIM inspections regime described above.[xx]

US airstrikes targeting Sanaa City in March 2025 reportedly killed Houthi drone and missile chief Zakaria Abdullah Yahya Ahmed Hajar, who reportedly previously trained in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria.[xxi] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force reportedly trained Hajar in drone warfare and worked closely with him.[xxii] Saudi Arabia added Hajar to their designated terrorist list in August 2022 for his involvement in Iranian weapons smuggling to the Houthis, Houthi attacks on international shipping, and Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia.[xxiii] The United States killed several Houthi drone and missile experts during its airstrike campaign against the Houthis between March and May 2025.[xxiv]

The Islamic State is attempting to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s ruling coalition consists of a wide variety of Sunni Arab groups that were opposed to the Assad regime, some of which are hardline Salafi-jihadists.[xxv] These Salafi-jihadists remained allied with Shara as he disavowed the Islamic State in 2013 and then al Qaeda in 2016.[xxvi] Other hardliners broke with Shara both times, remaining with the Islamic State in 2013 and al Qaeda in 2016.[xxvii] The Islamic State is again attempting to divide Shara’s following by appealing to hardline and foreign Salafi-jihadists in Ahmed al Shara’s coalition.[xxviii] The Islamic State criticized Shara for cooperating with the United States after his meeting with Trump on May 14 and Shara’s previous efforts to eliminate the influence of “non-state actors and non-Syrian armed groups,” which is a key US demand. The Islamic State encouraged those fighters to join the Islamic State instead.[xxix]

The Islamic State likely hopes to exploit discontent with the transitional government’s ideological moderation and cooperation with the United States. Salafi-jihadi factions linked to Shara’s original coalition that helped overthrow Assad are at ideological odds with the transitional government’s stated approach to respect and preserve the rights of Syrian minorities, though Shara subordinated these factions to himself in the late 2010s and early 2020s and has taken steps to ensure their loyalty.[xxx] Some individuals within these factions have repeatedly expressed discontent with the direction of the government.[xxxi]  Both al Qaeda-linked ideologues and the Islamic State have made similar arguments criticizing Shara’s Western ties in the past.[xxxii]

This Islamic State recruitment drive is likely an attempt to further infiltrate transitional government-controlled areas of Syria.[xxxiii] The Islamic State noted its growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria.[xxxiv] The group has had a presence in western Syria under both the Assad regime and the transitional government. It attacked a major Shia shrine south of Damascus in summer 2023, and the Syrian transitional government thwarted an Islamic State plot to target the same shrine in January 2025.[xxxv]  Islamic State cells have not successfully conducted attacks in western Syria since the fall of Assad, but Salafi-jihadi groups ideologically aligned with the Islamic State and explicitly opposed to the new government, like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, have claimed tens of attacks targeting religious minorities across western Syria.[xxxvi] ISIS-aligned groups like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah have taken advantage of the porous security situation in western Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, which ISIS could similarly exploit to further infiltrate from eastern Syria.[xxxvii]

 

The Iraqi political debate over the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to invite Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara to the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17 illustrates the continued divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, repeatedly criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s invitation to Shara to attend the summit due to Shara’s former membership in al Qaeda in Iraq.[xxxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri notably defended Sudani’s invitation to Shara, however.[xxxix] Maliki and Khazali will reportedly run on separate lists against Sudani’s coalition, which will include Ameri.[xl] Shara announced on May 13 that Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani would attend the summit in his place due to internal Iraqi opposition to his participation.[xli] Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri on May 13, suggesting that Sudani may have caved to Khazali and Maliki’s pressure and discussed the pressure with Ameri before ensuring Shara declined the invitation to the summit. Shara announced he would not attend the summit on May 13 without specifying reasons for his absence.[xlii]

 

The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. A State of Law parliamentarian criticized unspecified Iraqi political parties for portraying Iraq as weak in order to attack the Iraqi federal government in an interview on May 14.[xliii] The parliamentarian added that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on May 14 to “secure the Arab Summit,” implying that Ghaani sought to create unity among the Iranian-backed parties. Ghaani arrived one day after Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri, and would presumably need to forge unity after the political sparring over the invite to Shara. Many Iranian-backed factions, including Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al Haq, threatened the summit if Shara attended, while Ameri defended Shara’s invite. Iran is especially concerned about tensions between the Shia Coordination Framework ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.[xliv] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that advantaged a more unified opposition.[xlv]

 

Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably do not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. An informed source told Iraqi media on May 15 that Ghaani emphasized to several Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including Maliki and Ameri, that the Iraqi federal government should help recover Syrian debt to Iran.[xlvi] Iranian parliamentarians and former diplomats calculate that Iran spent about 30 billion US dollars to bolster the Assad regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify this number.[xlvii] Ghaani’s effort to secure Syrian debt to Iran follows US President Donald Trump’s announcement on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, despite several legal obstacles to doing so.[xlviii] Ghaani may have discussed this with Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians due to Shaibani’s planned attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad, where Iraqi leaders could engage Shaibani.[xlix] Ghaani reportedly discussed other Iranian “desires” regarding sanctions relief and the US-Iran nuclear negotiations for the Iraqi federal government to raise at the summit with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji on May 14.[l] It is not clear what Iraq could offer Syria to entice the new Syrian government to repay Assad’s debts to Iran. The money and other support that Tehran gave Assad would have been used to attack the Syrians who currently control Syria.

 

Iran and the Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that Ghaani approached to mediate Syria’s debt repayment continue to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media in late February 2025 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian government due to Iranian opposition, demonstrating the reality that Iran is still hostile towards Syria.[li] Iran also views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. Iranian officials have also expressed concern that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[lii] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Shara as “terrorists.”[liii] It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.

 

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. Ghaani reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with Shia Coordination Framework leaders on May 15.[liv] Turkey maintains at least 136 permanent military bases across northern Iraq and has built 121 of these bases since 2018 to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to BBC analysis.[lv] The PKK announced on May 9 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[lvi]

 

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures appear to believe that political and diplomatic pressure will be sufficient to ensure a Turkish withdrawal upon PKK disarmament, but Turkey has not expressed willingness to withdraw at this time. Turkey exerts major influence within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its own influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense.[lvii]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously struck a Turkish base in Ninewa Province and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[lviii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strikes on Houthi-Controlled Ports: The Houthis probably forced cargo vessels to stay at Hudaydah Port after the Israeli evacuation notices on May 14 to discourage Israeli airstrikes on certain areas of Hudaydah Port. Israel targeted Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports on May 16 as part of an Israeli campaign to disrupt the Houthi ability to enable attacks targeting Israel. The IDF targeted Salif and Hudaydah ports likely because the Houthis use these ports to generate revenue and smuggle weapons that they use to launch drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.
• ISIS Recruitment Efforts in Syria: The Islamic State is attempting to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment. The Islamic State likely hopes to exploit discontent with the transitional government’s ideological moderation and cooperation with the United States. This Islamic State recruitment drive is likely an attempt to further infiltrate transitional government-controlled areas of Syria.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Parties Remain Divided: The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invite to Shara. The Iraqi political debate over the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to invite Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara to the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17 illustrates the continued divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework.
• Iran Seeks Debt Reimbursement from Syria: Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably does not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.
• Iran and Turkey in Iraq: Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. The IRGC Quds Force commander reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with key pro-Iran political leaders. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions. This is the first meeting between Iran and the E3 since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks.

Iran Update, May 15, 2025

Iranian vessel may have harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[i] It is unclear if the collision was intentional or an accident. UKMTO reported that the merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency (VHF) messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be “local authorities.“[ii] The unidentified individuals instructed the vessel to stop and allow authorities to board it. The incident occurred west of Siri Island, which Iran controls. This incident occurred shortly before Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri ordered the deployment of missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12.[iii] Bagheri stated on May 12 that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces "if the US military makes a mistake.” Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani separately claimed on May 15 that Iran recently “neutralized” US naval activity in the Persian Gulf using “light naval units.”[iv]  Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[v] 

Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and delay a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on May 15 that the United States and Iran are "very close" to reaching a nuclear deal and that Iran has “sort of” agreed to US demands.[vi] An unspecified Iranian source familiar with the negotiations told Reuters on May 15 that Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment.[vii] Senior US officials, including lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff, have previously stated that Iran can “never” have an enrichment program.[viii] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this US demand.[ix] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani told NBC News on May 14 that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and willing to limit enrichment to “civilian levels."[x] "Civilian levels" likely refers to the 3.67 percent enriched uranium limit set by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Reuters reported that the United States and Iran also disagree on where and how Iran would transfer its highly enriched uranium stockpile to another location, citing unspecified Iranian sources.[xi] Iran's rejection of the US demands for zero uranium enrichment may jeopardize the talks or force negotiations toward a less expansive agreement than what the United States reportedly desires. 

The Houthis are unlikely to seriously engage in the Saudi-led peace roadmap because doing so would undermine their objectives to control all of Yemen. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on May 13 that the United States asked the Houthis to return to the peace process, which Saudi Arabia initiated in 2022, as part of the US-Houthi ceasefire.[xii] US President Donald Trump stated during a press conference in Doha on May 15 that “we want [the Houthis] to get along with Saudi Arabia.”[xiii]  CTP-ISW assessed on May 9 that the Houthis have little incentive to participate meaningfully in peace negotiations given that the Houthis have not suffered any military defeats that would compel them to re-engage in peace talks.[xiv] The Saudi-led and UN-facilitated roadmap envisioned a political settlement among Yemen’s factions, including the Houthis, and would presumably work toward some kind of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[xv] The Houthis consider themselves to be Yemen’s legitimate government and will likely oppose any negotiations that could reduce their authority in northern Yemen or undermine their objective to control the entire country.  

Amwaj Media separately reported on May 13 that the Houthis have agreed to release United Nations (UN) employees that the group has taken hostage as part of the ceasefire agreement, according to several Yemeni sources with knowledge of the US-Houthi ceasefire process.[xvi]  The Houthis have taken dozens of UN workers hostage in recent years.[xvii]

Key Takeaways: 

• Activity in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian vessel may have harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel and attempted to collide with other vessels about 80 nautical miles northwest of Jebel Ali, the United Arab Emirates. It is unclear if the collision was intentional or an accident. The incident occurred west of Siri Island, which Iran controls. This incident occurred shortly before Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri ordered the deployment of missile-capable fast attack craft (FAC) to Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf on May 12. Bagheri stated on May 12 that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces "if the US military makes a mistake.”
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and delay a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on May 15 that the United States and Iran are "very close" to reaching a nuclear deal and that Iran has “sort of” agreed to US demands. An unspecified Iranian source familiar with the negotiations told Reuters on May 15 that Iran and the United States continue to disagree on the issue of Iranian uranium enrichment. Senior US officials, including lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff, have previously stated that Iran can “never” have an enrichment program. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this US demand.
• US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis are unlikely to seriously engage in the Saudi-led peace roadmap because doing so would undermine their objectives to control all of Yemen. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on May 13 that the United States asked the Houthis to return to the peace process, which Saudi Arabia initiated in 2022, as part of the US-Houthi ceasefire. CTP-ISW assessed on May 9 that the Houthis have little incentive to participate meaningfully in peace negotiations given that the Houthis have not suffered any military defeats that would compel them to re-engage in peace talks. Amwaj Media separately reported on May 13 that the Houthis have agreed to release United Nations (UN) employees that the group has taken hostage as part of the ceasefire agreement, according to several Yemeni sources with knowledge of the US-Houthi ceasefire process.

Iran Update, May 14, 2025

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13.[i] Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March.[ii] Some Latakia Province GSS personnel took part in the March 2025 massacres.[iii]   The committee charged with investigating the violence has yet to release its report.[iv] Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report. The Alawite community remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. A lack of transitional justice could stoke protests and increase distrust in the government, which risks future political instability. It would similarly disincentivize minority communities from disarming due to fears for their safety.

Ahmed al Shara has continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. Syrian Deputy Defense Minister Fahim Issa met with several unspecified Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated leaders near Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, on May 13.[v] Issa previously commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is an SNA faction, and has overseen the “northern region” within the Syrian MoD since April 2025.[vi] The SNA currently controls Ras al Ain.[vii] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support of these SNA commanders to avoid infighting among powerful factions, which would hinder his efforts to establish control over Syria. Shara almost certainly recognizes that alienating these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force would be too difficult a task for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks that these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria if they chose to mobilize these networks against the Syrian government. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.[viii] Shara’s decision to pursue state building and power consolidation in this way will likely instill feelings of insecurity among members of the Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite communities, which may discourage these communities from cooperating with the government despite their desire to be part of a unified Syria.  Systemic issues that arise from choices that Shara makes to consolidate power may not have immediate implications, but they will likely weaken the Syrian state in the long term.

The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13.[ix] Unspecified Syrian security sources told Saudi media that these appointments are part of the foreign, defense, interior, and justice ministries’ new plans and procedures to enhance security, enforce the law, and restore public confidence.[x] The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries. Shara’s decision to position loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the policies of the Syrian government and its security services. The newly-appointed individuals include:

• Abdul Qader al Tahhan (Abu Bilal Quds) as Deputy Interior Minister for National Security Affairs.[xi] Tahhan was previously the Aleppo sector commander in al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and the HTS-led Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[xii] Tahhan also led the al Quds Battalion, an Aleppo-based Islamist opposition group, and commanded several battalions within Jaysh al Fatah.[xiii] Jaysh al Fatah was a coalition of Syrian Islamist opposition groups that formed in March 2015.[xiv]
• Hakim al Deiri (Dia al Din al Omar) as GSS Director of Latakia Province.[xv] Deiri previously served as the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Public Security Spokesperson.[xvi] Deiri was also the Deir ez Zor Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025.[xvii]
• Muhammad Taha al Ahmad as Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs.[xviii] Ahmad served as SSG Minister of Economy from November 2017 to December 2019 and SSG Minister of Agriculture from December 2019 to December 2024.[xix] Ahmad also served as the Director of Civil Administration in the Islamist opposition coalition Jaysh al Fatah prior to 2017.[xx]

Iran Update, May 13, 2025

Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected military positions in southern Iran on May 12 to prepare for a possible escalation against the United States and approved deployments of military assets to the Nazeat islands around the Strait of Hormuz.[i] Bagheri ordered the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy, in coordination with local and tactical commanders, to implement a new operational plan around the Nazeat Islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities, fortify air defenses, and integrate advanced command and control infrastructure.[ii] Bagheri explicitly stated that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states hosting US forces "if the US military makes a mistake.”[iii] The Nazeat islands—including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island—are key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[iv] The IRGC has recently deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands, though it is unclear if Bagheri ordered these specific deployments.[v] AFGS-affiliated media published an article on May 13 showcasing IRGC Navy surveillance footage of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower from a Mohajer-6 drone and highlighted a new underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province, likely to signal Iranian capability to surveil and strike US naval assets.[vi] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[vii] The deployments to Nazeat could enable similar activities again. These activities follow new implicit US threats, including a statement by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on May 9 that raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran if ongoing US-Iran talks fail.[viii]

Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi told the Parliament’s National Security Commission on May 13 that uranium enrichment is Iran’s “red line” and emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on missile or regional defense issues.[ix] Gharibabadi warned that Iran will ”see no need to continue the negotiations” if the United States continues to demand zero uranium enrichment. Gharibabadi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi—who led the most recent round of technical talks in Oman on April 26—will likely lead Iran’s technical team in future technical negotiations that will almost certainly focus on Iranian uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s centrifuge stockpile.[x] Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei separately stated on May 13 that several parliamentarians called for suspending nuclear negotiations until the United States publicly recognizes Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.[xi] Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister and lead Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, have said that Iran will not negotiate ”on the principle of enrichment itself.”[xii]

Iran reportedly proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, according to Western and Iranian media.[xiii] The consortium would return enrichment levels to 2015 JCPOA levels at 3.67 percent.[xiv] It would also give Saudi Arabia and the UAE access to Iranian nuclear technology. Iran previously proposed a similar consortium between Iran and the Persian Gulf states in 2007.[xv] This new proposal is likely part of Iran's efforts to maintain some level of uranium enrichment.[xvi]

Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create sufficient disruption to prevent US operations.[xvii] Control of the airspace is continuum that stretches from air parity, which is when no force controls the air, to air supremacy, which is when the opposing force--in this case the Houthis--is incapable of any effective interfering with friendly air operations..[xviii] Air superiority, which falls between air parity and air supremacy, means a friendly force can operate without "prohibitive" interference from the opposing force.[xix] The Houthis shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones and reportedly nearly struck an F-35 and an F-16 during the US air campaign between March 15 and May 5.[xx] The Houthis probably possess the ability to shoot down F-16s. The Houthis use an Iranian-made version of the SA-6 Gainful, which other US adversaries have used to shoot down F-16s.[xxi] US Central Command (CENTCOM) was able to continue air operations despite this surface-to-air missile fire, and it is unclear to what degree Houthi air defenses impeded CENTCOM air operations, if at all.

 A well-designed air campaign can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means. A relatively brief air campaign is unlikely to achieve long-term strategic effects like the destruction of an enemy’s missile program, because the adversary can usually rebuild the assets that are destroyed in the air campaign.  The Houthis can replenish their losses from the air campaign through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market, thus demonstrating the air campaign’s limitations.[xxii]

US President Donald Trump announced that he will order the cessation of “all” US sanctions on Syria at the Riyadh Investment Forum on May 13.[xxiii] Trump said that the United States will ”tak[e] them all off” in order to give Syria a ”chance at greatness.”[xxiv] US sanctions on Syria have severely limited the international community’s ability to contribute to Syria’s post-war reconstruction. Trump's announcement does not immediately lift US sanctions on Syria, however. The United States has levied numerous sanctions on Syria targeting the Assad regime and Iranian-backed actors in Syria since 1979, which are:

• State Sponsor of Terrorism designation: The United States designated Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1979, which has restricted US foreign assistance, banned defense exports and sales, and placed controls over the export of dual-use items.[xxv] Trump must submit a report to Congress certifying that the Syrian government is not supporting acts of international terrorism before the proposed recession can take effect.[xxvi]
• Sanctions by executive order: Trump can repeal sanctions that former US presidents decreed by executive order from 2004 to 2012.[xxvii]
• Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) designations: The United States formally designated Jabhat al Nusra—HTS's predecessor—as an FTO and SDGT in 2012 as an alias for al Qaeda in Iraq.[xxviii] Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio each have the power to revoke SDGTs and FTOs, respectively.[xxix] Trump did not specify whether he would lift individual SDGT designations on Syrian officials. The US State Department designated Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara as an SDGT in 2013 but revoked the $10 million bounty on Shara in December 2024 after US officials met with Shara.[xxx] Shara was still listed as an SDGT as of May 13.[xxxi] The United States also listed current Interior Minister Anas Khattab as an SDGT in 2012 for his membership in al Qaeda in Iraq.[xxxii]
• Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019: The Caesar Act is the most stringent layer of UYS sanctions imposed on Syria. The Caesar Act targets anyone who provides support to the Syrian government, supports the Syrian oil and gas industry, exports aircraft or military equipment, or provides construction or engineering directly or indirectly to the Syrian government.[xxxiii] This discouraged several Gulf countries from supporting Syrian reconstruction during the early days of its transition.[xxxiv] The US Congress will need to pass a new law to repeal the Caesar Act. The US president cannot repeal the act unilaterally.

Trump did not specify on what timeline he would remove US sanctions on Syria. Trump’s announcement still marks a significant inflection in US policy towards Syria, regardless of the timeline for which the sanctions will be lifted. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani called Trump’s announcement a ”new beginning on the path to reconstruction.”[xxxv] Trump is expected to meet directly with Shara in Riyadh on May 14, according to White House-affiliated  sources.[xxxvi]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is attempting to incentivize the Trump administration to waive sanctions by offering the United States investment opportunities in Syria. Syrian officials told Western media on May 8 that Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with the United States that includes US private sector participation in all areas of Syrian reconstruction, at the exclusion of China or other powers.[xxxvii] Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa, who recently met with Shara to discuss US investment in Syria with US energy executive Jonathan Bass, said that Shara explicitly authorized envoys to propose several opportunities for US investment in Syria to Trump, including allowing a US entity to manage Syria’s oil and gas resources.[xxxviii] Bass told Western media that Shara told him he wants a ”Trump Tower” in Damascus.[xxxix]

Shara‘s is likely offering the United States exclusive investment opportunities as a bargaining chip to convince the United States to remove sanctions because Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures.” US diplomats gave the Syrian government a list of eight demands in mid-March 2025 that Damascus would need to address before the United States would consider removing sanctions.[xl] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands and has taken tangible steps to do so, including forming a committee to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice and cracking down on Palestinian and Iranian-backed militant groups in Syria.[xli] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however. Shara has appointed several loyal foreign fighters to high-ranking positions in the Syrian government and has said that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries.[xlii] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that reduces Russian and Chinese engagement in Syria, a key US strategic priority, could ease pressure resulting from his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria. It is not clear whether the Syrian government’s investment offers to the United States influenced Trump’s May 13 announcement.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Military Planning in the Persian Gulf: Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create "prohibitive” disruption that would prevent effective US operations.
• US Sanctions Policy in Syria: US President Donald Trump announced that he will order the cessation of “all” US sanctions on Syria at the Riyadh Investment Forum on May 13. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is attempting to incentivize the Trump administration to waive sanctions by offering the United States investment opportunities in Syria.

Iran Update, May 12, 2025

Iran’s refusal to accept US demands for zero uranium enrichment and the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program could stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. The United States and Iran held their fourth round of nuclear talks in Oman on May 11.[i] US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff stated prior to the talks that Iran can ”never” have an enrichment program.[ii] Witkoff stated that Iran must dismantle its three enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan and can no longer have centrifuges. Witkoff added that a new nuclear agreement would not include sunset provisions, which are provisions that expire after a certain period of time. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) included a sunset provision that restricted Iranian uranium enrichment for 15 years. Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, rejected Witkoff’s statements and emphasized that Iran will not accept zero enrichment. Araghchi stated, for example, that Iran is willing to accept limits on its uranium enrichment but “the principle of enrichment itself is simply non-negotiable.”[iii] Iranian officials have recently stated that Iran would agree to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 JCPOA levels.[iv] Anti-Iranian regime media previously reported on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks were “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands prior to the fourth round of talks.”[v]

Iran is also very unlikely to curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Witkoff stated on May 8 that the United States remains committed to ending Iranian support for its regional proxies but will address this issue in "later phases" of the negotiations.[vi] Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected this demand. Iranian Parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei stated on May 12 that Iran’s "regional power" is non-negotiable, almost certainly referring to Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance.[vii] Iran has continued to support its regional proxies, including by sending missiles to Iraqi militias and supporting the financial reconstitution of Hezbollah, for example. [viii]

Senior Iranian commanders appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran amid new implicit US threats. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri visited Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval sites in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on May 12 to inspect their operational readiness.[ix] Other senior Iranian commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, accompanied Bagheri.[x] Bagheri stated that the AFGS reviewed all operational plans in southern Iran and claimed that the plans showed “full readiness to confront any potential threat.”[xi] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately visited the Fifth Tactical Air Base in Khuzestan Province on May 11 to assess combat readiness and inspect facilities, including barracks and a weapons depot.[xii] Senior Iranian commanders have conducted inspections of air defense sites and military bases across Iran in recent weeks, likely to ensure that units remain prepared for a potential strike.[xiii] The recent inspections come amid new implicit threats from US officials about potential military action against Iran if the current US-Iran nuclear negotiations do not result in an agreement. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff warned on May 9 that it would be ”very unwise” for Iran to reject US demands.[xiv] Witkoff stated that if the May 11 talks with Iran were ”not productive,” then the United States would ”take a different route.”[xv] Unspecified sources close to Witkoff similarly told Israel media on May 10 that if the May 11 talks with Iran did not yield ”significant progress,” then the United States would consider putting the "military option back on the table.[xvi] US President Donald Trump stated on May 12 that Iran is acting "intelligently and reasonably" in ongoing negotiations over the country's nuclear program.[xvii]

The United States and Iran have tentatively agreed to hold a fifth round of technical nuclear talks. An unspecified senior US official said that the US administration was “encouraged” by the outcome of the May 11 talks and confirmed that Iran and the United States agreed to continue technical negotiations.[xviii] Western media previously reported that the technical talks are focused on Iranian uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s centrifuge stockpile.[xix]

NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW’s May 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to bolster military cooperation at the expense of US allies. Reuters reported on May 10, citing two Western security officials and an unspecified regional official, that Iran is preparing to provide Russia with an unspecified number of Fateh-360 launchers in the near future.[xx] Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[xxi] A Ukrainian military source told The Times in September 2024 that Iran provided over 200 Fateh-360 ballistic missiles to Russia.[xxii] The Fateh-360 is a solid-fueled missile that has a range of around 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[xxiii] CTP-ISW has not observed reports of the Russian military launching Iranian-provided missiles against Ukraine. Iran began providing Russia with Shahed drones in fall 2022, and Russia began producing and using its own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023.[xxiv] Russia continues to deepen military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia's use of Iranian missiles against Ukraine would mark a significant intensification of Russo-Iranian cooperation.[xxv]

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) announced on May 9 that it will dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[xxvi] The PKK is a left-wing Kurdish militant organization based in Kurdish-majority areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran that launched an insurgency against Turkey in 1984.[xxvii] Turkey views the PKK as a terrorist organization.[xxviii] The PKK announced on May 9  that it has “completed its historical mission” and will "dissolve its organizational structure.”[xxix] The PKK made this decision during a two-day conference between May 5 and 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil Mountains. The PKK convened the meeting in response to imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call for the group to disarm in late February 2025.[xxx] Ocalan made this call after months of negotiations with the pro-Kurdish Turkish People’s Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party and politicians allied with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxxi] The PKK statement declared that the organization’s years of militancy have pushed the Kurdish issue to a point ”where it can be resolved through democratic politics.”[xxxii] The statement called on PKK followers to ”participate in the process of peace and democratic society,” which suggests that PKK members will continue to try to achieve the group‘s objective of cementing greater Kurdish autonomy.[xxxiii]  It is unclear how the group intends to accomplish this objective, but it may try to do so by engaging in political movements throughout the region rather than through military means.

The successful disarmament of the PKK may facilitate the integration of Kurdish fighters affiliated with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Turkish-allied Syrian transitional government. The PKK’s historic ties to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which comprises the majority of the SDF, has led Turkey to launch multiple campaigns targeting the YPG in Syria since 2016.[xxxiv] The SDF, which has begun integrating into the Syrian state, has predicated its integration into the state on Turkey halting attacks targeting its fighters.[xxxv] A successful PKK disarmament could remove a possible obstruction to the transitional government’s ability to centralize state control over northern Syria. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani stated that the PKK’s disarmament is an important step for the entire region during a press conference in Ankara on May 12.[xxxvi] The Turkish government welcomed the PKK’s announcement and stated that it will “follow closely the practical steps to be taken.”[xxxvii] It is unclear if all PKK fighters will heed their leaders’ call to disarm. About 4,000 to 5,000 PKK fighters operate across Turkey, Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Iran, according to a 2019 force estimate.[xxxviii] A spokesperson for Erdogan’s Justice and Development (AKP) Party said that the group’s dissolution must apply to ”all branches and extensions of the PKK.”[xxxix] The refusal of certain PKK-linked elements to disarm could cause Turkey to resume attacks targeting alleged PKK targets in northern Syria.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are likely conducting a coordinated disinformation campaign against the Syrian transitional government. A BBC investigation published on May 11 found that approximately 50,000 accounts on X appear to have coordinated the spread of sectarian rhetoric, hate speech, and disinformation since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xl] Many of the accounts have usernames with randomly generated characters, which indicates that the accounts are bots.[xli] BBC reported that approximately 60 percent of the posts originated from outside Syria and were concentrated in Iran and Axis of Resistance strongholds, including Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.[xlii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-establish itself in Syria.[xliii]

This disinformation campaign is likely intended to generate sectarian tensions and discontent with the transitional government within the Syrian population, which could enable Iran to re-entrench itself in Syria. BBC reported that the bot accounts flooded the information space with posts that contained sectarian language.[xliv] The accounts also posted old footage and imagery of sectarian violence and falsely portrayed the violence as recent sectarian events in Syria.[xlv] Iranian media has circulated reports of sectarian violence in Syria and has highlighted the transitional government’s alleged failure to address security concerns since the fall of the Assad regime.[xlvi] Reports of sectarian violence in the information space, regardless of whether they are real or false, risk generating feelings of insecurity within the Syrian population and discouraging cooperation between the Syrian population and government. A fractured Syrian state could enable Iran and Iranian-backed actors to exploit security gaps to reestablish their influence in Syrian and rebuild ground lines of communication through Syria to members of the Axis of Resistance.

The disinformation campaign could drive Syrian communities to seek out alternative sources of security to the transitional government. The disinformation campaign supports pro-Alawite insurgent efforts to undermine confidence in the transitional government. Insurgents seek to exploit fear and grievances within a population to establish themselves as the primary security guarantor. The bot accounts, which intentionally spread reports of violence, generate an outsized perception of threats against a community and undermine confidence in the transitional government’s ability to provide basic protection. CTP-ISW has observed a relative decline in insurgent activity since March 2025, but insurgent groups have not abandoned their objectives to eject government forces from Alawite areas and undermine the new Syrian government. There is no evidence that Iran is cooperating with the pro-Alawite insurgency at this time.

The Houthis are continuing to acquire military equipment from abroad, which the Houthis could use to rebuild their military capabilities following the recent US air campaign in Yemen.[xlvii] The southwestern Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF) intercepted 64 satellite communications devices and equipment that the Houthis could use to build improvised explosive devices (IED). The NRF seized the equipment on May 10 from two vessels in the Red Sea that were en route to the Houthi-controlled Ras Issa Port.[xlviii] The NRF is an armed anti-Houthi Yemeni faction that controls territory in southwestern Yemen near Mokha.[xlix] The NRF published a video showing that the satellite communications devices were made by a UAE-based satellite technology company.[l] The NRF also confiscated at least three million detonators and 3,500 kilometers of wire, which the Houthis could reportedly use to build explosive-laden boats, one-way attack drones, and remotely or infrared-triggered IEDs.[li] The Houthis could use this equipment to attack commercial and military vessels transiting the Red Sea.[lii] The Houthis have previously imported dual-use equipment from the international market, which they can repurpose to increase their domestic arms production. The Yemeni coast guard and Omani customs previously seized shipments of Chinese-made military equipment intended for the Houthis, such as hydrogen fuel cells for powering missiles and drone propellers, in August 2024 and March 2025, respectively.[liii]

The Houthis are continuing to pursue their October 7 War objectives by attacking Israel in order to try to pressure Israel to stop operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[liv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) published evacuation orders for three Houthi-controlled ports—Hudaydah, Ras Issa, and al Salif—on May 11.[lv] These orders follow the Houthi ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport on May 4.[lvi] An Israeli defense official told Israeli media on May 12 that a Houthi ballistic missile, likely aimed at Israel, landed in Saudi Arabia or off the coast of Saudi Arabia.[lvii] The Houthis have not claimed the ballistic missile attack at the time of this writing.  

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) warned vessels near the Hudaydah Port on May 11 that they are at high risk of collateral damage because of “sustained kinetic activity” near the port since mid-March.[lviii] UKMTO published this warning before the IDF issued evacuation orders for Hudaydah Port.[lix] US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted numerous airstrikes targeting Houthi targets at and near the Hudaydah Port between March 17 and May 5.[lx]

The Lebanese government and armed forces are taking a number of steps that may, in time, cement the successes that Israel achieved in its 2024 military campaign against Hezbollah.[lxi] The Wall Street Journal reported on May 10 that Lebanese airport authorities have fired several Hezbollah-affiliated employees at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport and are inspecting all planes and passengers that arrive at the airport.[lxii]  Iran has tried to use the Beirut airport to smuggle funds to Hezbollah since the loss of its overland transport route through Syria due to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxiii] The Wall Street Journal also reported that Lebanese authorities have arrested unspecified smugglers and are enforcing unspecified previously-unenforced laws.[lxiv] These steps to prevent Iranian smuggling efforts to reconstitute Hezbollah via the Beirut airport come as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are simultaneously working to dismantle Hezbollah positions and destroy weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon.[lxv] UNIFIL has identified over 225 weapons caches in southern Lebanon and “referred“ them to the LAF since November 2024, for example.[lxvi]

The Lebanese government and armed forces must continue to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution in order to cement the successes that Israel achieved against Hezbollah during the October 7 War.  Israeli operations in Lebanon in late 2024 defeated Hezbollah.[lxvii] Defeat is achieved when an enemy force "temporarily or permanently [loses] the physical means or the will to fight.”[lxviii] Hezbollah maintains the willingness to rebuild and has taken steps to reconstitute its forces since November 2024 despite Israel’s defeat of the organization in the October 7 War.[lxix] The Lebanese government and armed forces must therefore continue to take steps, such as those outlined by the Wall Street Journal, to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting.

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Iran’s refusal to accept US demands for zero uranium enrichment and the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program could stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations. The United States and Iran held their fourth round of nuclear talks in Oman on May 11. US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff stated prior to the talks that Iran can ”never” have an enrichment program. Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, rejected Witkoff’s statements and emphasized that Iran will not accept zero enrichment.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to bolster military cooperation at the expense of US allies. Reuters reported on May 10, citing two Western security officials and an unspecified regional official, that Iran is preparing to provide Russia with an unspecified number of Fateh-360 launchers in the near future. Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.
• PKK Dissolution: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) announced on May 9 that it will dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity. It is unclear if all PKK fighters will heed their leaders’ call to disarm. About 4,000 to 5,000 PKK fighters operate across Turkey, Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Iran, according to a 2019 force estimate. The successful disarmament of the PKK may facilitate the integration of Kurdish fighters affiliated with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Turkish-allied Syrian transitional government.
• Iranian and Axis of Resistance Disinformation Efforts: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are likely conducting a coordinated disinformation campaign against the Syrian transitional government. A BBC investigation published on May 11 found that approximately 50,000 accounts on X appear to have coordinated the spread of sectarian rhetoric, hate speech, and disinformation since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. This disinformation campaign is likely intended to generate sectarian tensions and discontent with the transitional government within the Syrian population, which could enable Iran to re-entrench itself in Syria.
• Houthi Reconstitution: The Houthis are continuing to acquire military equipment from abroad, which the Houthis could use to rebuild their military capabilities following the recent US air campaign in Yemen. The southwestern Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF) intercepted 64 satellite communications devices and equipment that the Houthis could use to build improvised explosive devices (IED). The NRF also confiscated at least three million detonators and 3,500 kilometers of wire, which the Houthis could reportedly use to build explosive-laden boats, one-way attack drones, and remotely or infrared-triggered IEDs.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: The Lebanese government and armed forces are taking a number of steps that may, in time, cement the successes that Israel achieved in its 2024 military campaign against Hezbollah. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 10 that Lebanese airport authorities have fired several Hezbollah-affiliated employees at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport and are inspecting all planes and passengers that arrive at the airport. The Lebanese government and armed forces must continue to take steps, such as those outlined by the Wall Street Journal, to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting.

Iran Update, May 9, 2025

The verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time.[i] The United States reportedly passed three demands to the Houthis via Oman, according to a Yemeni analyst. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap. The Houthis have followed the first condition to cease attacks on US commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, but have demonstrated that they will not comply with the second demand to stop targeting Israel.[ii] The Houthis attacked Ben Gurion Airport and the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 9, for example (see below for more information on this attack). 

The Houthis could re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap and technically follow a second of the three demands. The Houthis are unlikely to engage seriously in peace talks because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them to the negotiating table, however.[iii] The roadmap includes a ”political process under UN auspices” that would presumably work towards some form of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[iv] The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government.  The Houthis appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a ”victory.“[v]

The Yemeni analyst stated that Saudi Arabia was “fully informed” of the US proposal and Omani mediation efforts, but the extent of the Houthi engagement remains unclear.[vi] Riyadh and the Houthis almost reached a deal before the October 7 War broke out in 2023 and have maintained communication since.[vii] The timing of the US-Houthi ceasefire is particularly significant as US President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia on May 13 and 14, although Yemen is reportedly not on the agenda for his Riyadh meetings, according to the Yemeni analyst.[viii]

The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering the Red Sea in greater numbers. The ceasefire only applies to US vessels, according to the reported terms, though US officials have suggested that the agreement covers all ships..[ix] The Houthis have implied that they will not attack other ships. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi referred to the Houthi maritime attack campaign in the past tense on May 8, suggesting the campaign would not continue.[x] The last Houthi attack on commercial shipping was in November 2024, though the Houthis threatened to resume the attack campaign in March 2025. The Houthis may be interfering with international shipping, however. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 9 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Red Sea lasting several hours.[xi] The Houthis have interfered with GPS systems in the past.[xii] These disruptions, combined with the ambiguity surrounding the ceasefire, suggest that the safety of commercial shipping in this maritime corridor remains under threat.

Israeli defense officials gave conflicting information about whether the US THAAD missile defense system succeeded or failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile on May 9. The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area in central Israel on May 9.[xiii] Israeli defense officials stated on May 9 that the US THAAD system successfully intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile, but other unspecified Israeli defense sources said that the THAAD system failed to intercept the missile.[xiv] The unspecified Israeli defense sources said the Arrow 3 intercepted the missile.[xv]

Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time.[xvi] Yemeni sources posted new photos and information showing Hezbollah advisers in Yemen on May 8. [xvii]The IDF killed both Hezbollah advisers in Fall 2024 during the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[xviii] One Hezbollah commander, Ali Adel Ashmar, played a major role in the capture of Amran and Sanaa cities, which happened in July and September 2014, respectively.[xix] This suggests that Hezbollah played a major role in advising the 2014 Houthi campaign. Hezbollah also sent Mohammad Hussein Srour, who at the time of his death was Hezbollah‘s Aerial Command commander, to Yemen to support the development of Houthi missile capabilities and drone manufacturing.[xx] Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.[xxi] This demonstrates how Iran and its key proxies and partners share lessons learned, techniques, and capabilities over time and across the region. The Houthi commanders in Iraq today surely share lessons learned from their Hezbollah advisers in the 2010s, as well as the lessons the Houthis have learned over two decades of war against several different regional and international powers.

Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”[xxii] Iranian sources added that shifting US demands on Iran’s missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance are complicating progress in the negotiations. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on April 16 that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible.[xxiii] An Iranian expert close to the regime separately stated on May 1 that the fourth round of talks originally scheduled for May 3 was postponed due to “contradictory US positions.”[xxiv]  US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff initially said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, but later demanded all enrichment be stopped and eliminated.[xxv] Witkoff then said in a Breitbart interview on May 9 that he hoped that Iran would “voluntarily“ stop enrichment before adding that the US “red line“ is that “an enrichment program can never exist in Iran again.“[xxvi] Araghchi confirmed on May 9 that the fourth round of talks will take place in Muscat, Oman, on May 12.[xxvii] An Iranian Parliamentarian claimed on May 6 that the talks were postponed partly due to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi’s reported desire to join the nuclear talks as a European representative.[xxviii] The Parliamentarian also claimed that Grossi provided reports to the United States suggesting that Iran is ”very close” to a nuclear bomb.[xxix] Araghchi held a phone call with Grossi on May 9 to discuss cooperation between Iran and the agency and the current status of the US-Iran nuclear talks.[xxx]  CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Iran will accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program, as Iran views uranium enrichment as its ”undeniable right” and sees giving up as a core national red line. CTP-ISW also continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to concede on its missile program, as the missile program is essential to its defense strategy, especially given the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces.[xxxi]

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi visited the Abdanan Air Defense Group in Ilam Province on May 9 to assess its combat readiness and defensive capabilities.[xxxii] Mousavi emphasized the key role of air defense in protecting Iran’s airspace, and stressed the importance of modern training, advanced technologies. Various senior Iranian commanders including Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh conducted several inspections on Iranian air defense zones in southeastern, south and western Iran in recent weeks.[xxxiii] The amount and frequency of these air defense inspections are highly unusual. Senior Iranian commanders do not typically visit so many air defense sites within such a short period of time. Iranian commanders are presumably conducting these inspections to ensure that units remain prepared for a strike.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”[xxxiv] PKK-affiliated media reported that the PKK held a two-day conference from May 5 to 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil Mountains after imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for the group to disarm.[xxxv] Ocalan made the historical call in late February 2025 after months of negotiations with the pro-Kurdish Turkish People’s Equality and Democracy (DEM) party and politicians allied with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxxvi] The PKK said it would provide “relevant documents and information” along with its upcoming announcement.[xxxvii] A Turkish journalist who previously wrote for a pro-Erdogan newspaper reported on May 9 that the PKK is expected to announce that it will end all operations against Turkey and will disband itself, citing two sources familiar with the matter.[xxxviii] The PKK Executive Committee said in late February 2025 that it would disarm in response to Ocalan’s call to dissolve the group, but several high-ranking PKK leaders have continued to insist since Ocalan’s call that Turkey must free Ocalan from prison before the group officially disarms.[xxxix] Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[xl] DEM Party co-chair Pervin Buldan told PKK-affiliated media on May 9 that Erdogan will “imminently” make a statement on the PKK announcement.[xli]

The PKK’s possible refusal to disarm may result in a Turkish decision to resume attacks on alleged PKK targets in northern Syria, which could further complicate the US-backed Syrian Defense Forces’ (SDF) integration into the Syrian state. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as the “PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[xlii] Turkey often equates the entirety of the SDF and the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK.[xliii] YPG elements in the SDF, while linked to the PKK, have prioritized the protection of Syrian Kurds over the achievement of PKK objectives in recent months. Turkey has linked its campaign to disarm the PKK through Ocalan to the US-backed SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[xliv] Turkish officials stated in late February 2025 that they believed Ocalan’s call for the PKK to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into disarmament and integration into the Syrian transitional government under the Defense Ministry.[xlv] This belief is based on the Turkish government's conflation between the PKK, the SDF, and the YPG, which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF, but he rejected Ocalan’s call and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.”[xlvi] Abdi later agreed to integrate the SDF and Kurdish-controlled territory into the Syrian state in March 2025.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Houthi Ceasefire: The verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap.
• Houthis and the Saudi-Led Roadmap: The Houthis are unlikely to seriously re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them to the negotiating table. The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a ”victory.“
• Red Sea and Shipping Prices: The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering the Red Sea to a greater degree.
• The Axis of Resistance in Yemen: Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time. Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.
• Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): The PKK announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”

Iran Update, May 8, 2025

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US-Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel.[i] Abdulmalik’s statements demonstrate how the Houthis view the Red Sea attack campaign as one element of a broader Houthi strategic effort to pressure Israel to end its campaign in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to maritime shipping attacks, but the Houthis will continue to fire on other Israeli economic targets in pursuit of the same objectives. The Houthis have already shifted to targeting Israeli airports, for example. Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire as a victory against the United States. Abdulmalik implied that the ceasefire would not be permanent by adding that “when” the United States gets involved in a “third round” of airstrikes, the Houthis will confront the United States again.[ii] The Houthis could resume attacks at any time and for any reason they choose.

Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign.[iii] The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Houthi oil offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between April 2 and May 5.[iv] This initially created fuel shortages and posed challenges for both the Houthis’ military operations and separately civil service provision in Houthi-controlled territories, but the Houthis gradually learned techniques to ensure service continuity despite the airstrikes.[v] The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras Issa Port alone cost the Houthis approximately $700 million worth of damage, according to a Yemeni economist.[vi] The Yemeni Oil Company announced on May 8 that they have successfully repaired the Ras Issa Oil Port’s filling platforms and would restore fuel distribution to all their stations within 24 hours, which demonstrates that even serious damage can be rapidly fixed.[vii] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[viii] Even the best-designed air campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means.

International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US-Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.[ix] Shipping companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May 8.[x] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial shipping or just US vessels.[xi]  Other regional events, such as a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, could prompt the Houthis to target international shipping again in the future if the Houthis see a benefit in doing so. The Houthis claimed a likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi Arabia in 2019 during the 2019 US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that the Houthis will sometimes support Iran’s regional objectives even at risk to the Houthi movement.[xii] The US airstrikes only addressed the tactical manifestations of the Houthi threat to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea rather than resolving the underlying strategic and political drivers motivating the Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street Journal added that industry experts expect it could take months to restore shipping confidence.[xiii] The persistent risk that the Houthis could disrupt global maritime commerce for months--if not years--at a time underscores the seriousness of the Houthi strategic and economic threat.

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.[xiv] Unspecified Syrian transitional government officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 7 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President Donald Trump to discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[xv] Shara reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming Gulf visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa.[xvi] Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[xvii] Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[xviii] Bass and Moustafa said that Shara "responded favorably" to the idea of the US waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the investment possible.[xix] An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official confirmed Shara’s interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a relationship with the United States that includes ”energy and economic ties.”[xx] Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also interested in participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian reconstruction.[xxi] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged Shara’s reported request.

Shara’s proposal may seek to obtain full sanctions relief from the United States by offering investment in Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures,” and could view possible investment in Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining chip.[xxii] The United States under the first Trump administration previously sought to allow US companies to invest in energy infrastructure in northeastern Syria, and Shara could calculate that a similar scheme would help him obtain sanctions relief.[xxiii] US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the Assad regime currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria. Shara and Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to attain partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in December 2024 and have communicated back and forth about several “confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria observe.[xxiv] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[xxv] The government has also taken tangible steps to honor the US request that it limit Palestinian military and political activity in Syria.[xxvi] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[xxvii] Shara said on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove them from the current Syrian army ranks or offices.[xxviii] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that creates opportunities for US industry in Syria could mitigate his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria.

Syrian officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall Plan-style" program in which US and other Western companies would invest in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxix] That the Syrian officials reportedly specified that Shara would be willing to exclude China suggests that the Syrian government may be attempting to exploit a perceived US interest in curbing the PRC’s influence abroad in order to spur US interest and investment in Syria. Bass said that Shara wants ”Boeing” and ”US telecom” and not ”Huawei,” referring to the Chinese telecommunications company that has invested heavily in partnerships in the Middle East.[xxx]

Recent steps by the Syrian government suggest that it seeks to develop genuine economic partnerships with US adversaries like China and Russia if it cannot secure sanctions relief and economic assistance elsewhere, however. The Syrian government most recently hosted PRC officials on March 27 and discussed ”enhancing cooperation,” which CTP-ISW assessed was likely related to securing Chinese support for the transition.[xxxi] Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met with Chinese transport and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss Chinese investment in Syria within the past week.[xxxii] The Syrian government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with Russia in recent months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria, and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[xxxiii] Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they seek to increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8 following a press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and Chinese support for Syria’s ”sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[xxxiv]

A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.[xxxv] Reuters originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions exemption, but the United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions exemption.[xxxvi] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[xxxvii] An unspecified Syrian financial source told Western media that the grant is conditional and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry personnel.[xxxviii] The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month, but has yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[xxxix]  The unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from the initiative.[xl] Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late February 2025 due to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach US sanctions.[xli] Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh welcomed the exemption and said that the Syrian government hopes it will be followed by further measures to ease sanctions.[xlii] Barniyeh is an economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and Oklahoma State universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[xliii] Barniyeh participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime's economy in the early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[xliv]

Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[xlv] Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[xlvi] The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[xlvii] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[xlviii] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[xlix] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that he wants to "blow up" Iran's nuclear centrifuges either “nicely" through an agreement with Iran or ”viciously."[l]

 

An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in London.[li] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[lii] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an ”advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[liii] It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies about its operations.[liv] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece, and Azerbaijan.[lv] Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[lvi] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[lvii] Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic targets in the region and beyond, however.[lviii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US-Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US-Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.
• Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.
• Syrian Salaries: A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.
• Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.
• Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom: An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel.

Iran Update, May 7, 2025

The Houthis will likely exploit the ceasefire with the United States to reconstitute themselves while continuing to target Israel. US airstrikes from March 15 to May 5 targeted Houthi weapons and ammunition depots, sites related to missiles and drones, and Houthi leadership.[i] It is unclear how much the US airstrikes degraded Houthi capabilities, however. A Saudi news outlet said that some US assessments report that US airstrikes destroyed 80 percent of the Houthis’ missile stockpile.[ii] An Israeli war correspondent assessed on May 6 that the Houthis still have dozens of ballistic missiles and hundreds of drones, which can reach Israel.[iii] CNN reported that an unspecified US official said that the air campaign had only ”limited” effects, however. The air campaign will only have temporary effects, regardless of the degree to which the campaign degraded Houthi capabilities. The Houthis can replenish their drone and missile arsenal through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market.[iv] US airstrikes have also targeted and killed mid-level Houthi commanders and technical experts, which presumably temporarily disrupted the Houthi chain of command.[v] The Houthis are a well-entrenched military and political organization with decades of wartime experience, which will make it possible for the Houthis to rapidly replace dead commanders and experts.[vi] Iran, Axis of Resistance partners, and surviving Houthi commanders and experts can train and develop less experienced replacements.

Houthi officials have clarified that their ceasefire with the United States does not include Israel, and that they will continue to attack Israel in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[vii] The Houthis launched three drones targeting Eilat Airport in southern Israel and an Israeli military target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 7 after the US ceasefire took effect.[viii] The Israel Defense Force (IDF) intercepted one of these drones.[ix] These attacks likely represent a continuation of the Houthi effort to ”blockade” Israel, but the Houthis have decided to target Israeli airports rather than Israeli shipping. Attacks targeting Israel use different weapon systems than the attacks targeting maritime shipping. Attacks targeting Israel require medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range drones, while maritime shipping attacks can use shorter-range drones and anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. This means that the Houthis can rebuild their anti-ship missile stockpile that they will need for future campaigns in the Red Sea.[x]

The Houthis will almost certainly resume attacks targeting international shipping again in the future and can do so for reasons and at a time of their choosing. An unspecified Houthi spokesperson separately told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships until Israel transfers aid into the Gaza Strip.[xi] The Houthi spokesperson also said that they will assess any future US support for Israel and determine their position accordingly.[xii] The Houthis initiated their campaign in October 2023 to impose an ”economic blockade” against Israel by targeting vessels that entered Israeli ports.[xiii] This campaign frequently targeted vessels that had no clear ties to Israel, however.[xiv] The Houthis could launch a similar campaign in the future when they want and for reasons they choose. The Houthis will have internalized the lessons learned during this round of escalation, which could make their attacks more effective in the future.

The Houthi-US ceasefire is reportedly a “verbal understanding” rather than a formal agreement, and the conditions remain ambiguous.[xv] An unspecified US official told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the ceasefire was a “verbal understanding” instead of a formal agreement.[xvi] Neither US nor Houthi officials have explained the specific terms of this ceasefire.[xvii] Anonymous Iranian officials also told the New York Times and Amwaj media separately that Iran used its influence over the Houthis to convince the Houthis to agree to a ceasefire.[xviii] It is unclear why Iran would have needed to convince the Houthis to take this ceasefire. The Houthis are required only to stop attacks targeting maritime shipping, something they have not done since November 2024. The United States, in return, ceases its air campaign.

Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Power outages have increased in Iran in recent days due to the energy crisis in Iran. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over the repeated power outages.[xix] The Iranian Interior Ministry ordered all provincial governors on May 7 to open all government offices, banks, and municipal offices nationwide from only 6 am to 1 pm starting May 10 to reduce electricity consumption.[xx] The ministry also announced that Thursdays will be an official holiday across all provinces until September 22 to further ease strain on the energy grid. The Iranian Management of Electric Power Generation and Transmission Organization (Tavanir) cut electricity to approximately 700 banks in Tehran Province for exceeding consumption limits and warned that high-usage customers who ignore warning messages will face additional power cuts.[xxi]  It remains unclear how the regime will address the worsening shortages and the mounting economic losses caused by outages and the subsequent business closures. Iranian officials stated that electricity shortages have caused around 20 billion US dollars in losses to Iranian industries nationwide.[xxii] New blackouts also could trigger protests. Natural gas cuts in January 2023 sparked demonstrations in northeastern Iran, and nationwide blackouts during the June 2021 heatwave fueled widespread public unrest.[xxiii] Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis will likely exploit the ceasefire with the United States to reconstitute themselves while continuing to target Israel. The air campaign will only have temporary effects, regardless of the degree to which the campaign degraded Houthi capabilities. The Houthis can replenish their drone and missile arsenal through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market. The Houthi-US ceasefire is reportedly a “verbal understanding” rather than a formal agreement, and the conditions remain ambiguous.
• Houthis and Attacks on Israel: Houthi officials have clarified that their ceasefire with the United States does not include Israel, and that they will continue to attack Israel in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis will almost certainly resume attacks targeting international shipping again in the future and can do so for reasons and at a time of their choosing. An unspecified Houthi spokesperson separately told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships until Israel transfers aid into the Gaza Strip.
• Iranian Internal Unrest: Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over recent repeated power outages. Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.

Iran Update, May 6, 2025

The Omani Foreign Minister announced a “ceasefire” between the United States and the Houthis after the Houthis reportedly agreed to end attacks on international shipping.[i] US President Donald Trump said that the United States will stop attacks on the Houthis, and in return, the Houthis will stop targeting maritime shipping.[ii] The Houthis have not targeted shipping through the Red Sea since November 2024, making it unclear what concessions the Houthis provided to the United States. The United States launched the air campaign to ensure freedom of navigation, but it is unclear how long it will take for the risk-averse shipping industry to return to transiting the Red Sea.[iii] Shipping prices remain higher than before October 2023, in part because shipping has not returned to the Red Sea for fear of Houthi attacks.[iv]  The United States began the campaign against the Houthis because the Houthis threatened to restart their attack campaign in the Red Sea if Israel violated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, and the air campaign sought to establish deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis.[v]

A very senior Houthi official framed the announcement as a victory and reiterated that they will continue to “support Gaza” against Israel.[vi] Mohammad Ali al Houthi, one of the senior-most Houthi officials, said that the Houthis will continue to “support Gaza,” though it is not clear if the Houthis will continue to conduct maritime attacks. Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea said on May 4 that by targeting Ben Gurion International Airport, the Houthis could continue to blockade Israel.[vii] This may suggest that the Houthis will attempt to “blockade” Israel by attacking other Israeli assets.

The Houthis will very likely use the end of US airstrikes to rebuild their anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile stockpiles to target shipping in the future. The Houthis have learned that they can disrupt international shipping markets at any time and for any reason of their choosing with minimal consequences. The US air campaign probably inflicted some tactical setbacks for the Houthis by targeting weapons depots, communications sites, supply chains, and command –and –control assets. A US official told CNN that the effect on Houthis operations was “limited.”[viii] But all air campaigns generate only temporary effects, and the Houthis will be able to rebuild these assets while implementing lessons learned on how to better harden and protect their facilities.

The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia.[ix] The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.[x] The United States previously increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in March 2025.[xi] Senior Iranian military officials threatened to target Diego Garcia in response to the initial US build-up in March 2025.[xii] This suggests that Iran may perceive the US deployments as a threat. The military buildup comes amid US-Iran nuclear talks and Houthi attacks on Israel.

Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term. Syrian media reported on May 5 that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) to lead the newly-formed 86th Division.[xiii] Ahrar al Sham, a once-powerful Islamist group during the civil war, expelled Shaqra for banditry and other crimes.[xiv] Shaqra then founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a faction within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[xv] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[xvi] Shaqra has limited experience commanding forces in combat, and it is unclear what practical qualifications he has as a division commander.[xvii] Shaqra does have a large number of fighters and a ”mafia-like network” that could benefit Shara.[xviii] This suggests that Shara is offering concessions to a powerful warlord rather than selecting a competent combat commander.

Damascus has also appointed several other SNA commanders accused of human rights abuses to high-level commands within the new army, including Suleiman Shah commander Abu Amsha, Hamza Division commander Sayf Abu Bakr, and Sultan Murad commander Fahim Issa.[xix] Shaqra and these other SNA commanders all commanded SNA factions that retain their influence through local networks and have major international backers, like Turkey.[xx] Fahim Issa, for example, is close to Turkish hardline politician and Erdogan ally Devlet Bahceli.[xxi] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support and cooperation of these groups to avoid infighting with powerful factions that would make it more difficult for him to extend his control over Syria. Shara recognizes that ignoring these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force is too difficult for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria.  

These decisions will likely make integrating minority armed groups much more difficult, particularly the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Shaqra and other SNA commanders' previous abuses against minority communities in northeastern Syria, such as the Kurdish and Yazidi populations, will likely threaten Shara’s efforts to expand and legitimize central authority over Syria in the long term. Shaqra’s new 86th Division will reportedly operate in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor, and Hasakah provinces, which are sensitive commands given their large Kurdish population and the ongoing negotiations over the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s integration into state security services.[xxii] A spokeswoman for the SDF’s Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) condemned Damascus’s appointment of Shaqra on May 6 and argued that it “legitimizes impunity and perpetrates violence against women and indigenous peoples.”[xxiii] Shara risks disrupting Damascus’s negotiations and cooperation with communities whose support it needs, such as the Kurds.

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara could use an HTS-controlled administrative supervisory department to exert control over government ministries run by “independent,” non-HTS ministers. The Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection is a department within the government that the Assad regime used to “control, rather than supervise or inspect” government departments and ministries, according to a French journalist.[xxiv] Shara appointed Amer Namas al Ali to lead the Central Authority on May 4.[xxv] Ali was a member of Jabhat al Nusra and subsequently HTS.[xxvi] He reportedly helped structure HTS’s civilian Idlib-based government, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[xxvii] Ali’s appointment suggests that Shara could use the Central Authority to exert control over government ministries controlled by non-loyalists. Shara appointed nine “independent” ministers to his cabinet on March 29, who do not have ties to HTS or the SSG and are professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[xxviii] These "independent” ministers lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[xxix] Shara made these appointments under considerable domestic and international pressure to broaden his ruling coalition, and placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have caused significant internal blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions.[xxx] He could exert his control by using bureaucratic bodies if he used the Central Authority to control or influence decisions in the ministries, as the Assad regime did.

 Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 6.[xxxi] Radan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ethiopian Federal Police to expand bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Radan separately visited Burkina Faso on May 6 to advance bilateral police cooperation and share security expertise.[xxxii] Radan has led high-level security engagements since 2023 with Iraq, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Tajikistan, and Russia, all of which resulted in agreements focused on intelligence sharing and training programs.[xxxiii] Iranian (LEC) commanders traditionally rarely traveled abroad, but Radan started increasing his foreign engagements as part of an effort that likely aligns with Iranian strategy to professionalize and modernize the Iranian law enforcement apparatus and to export Iranian military, defense, and enforcement technologies. This cooperation likely includes the exchange of expertise on oppressive policing tactics, crowd control, digital surveillance, and methods for suppressing dissent—capabilities that the Iranian regime has honed through decades of internal security operations. Cooperation with African countries would also allow Iran to build trust while simultaneously opening new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams. Iran previously pursued barter-style defense deals to gain critical resources, in which Iran received roughly 9 tons of Venezuelan gold in 2020 in exchange for technical support and refinery equipment.[xxxiv] These transactions reflect the Iranian strategy to leverage security exports to access hard currency and natural resources, alongside efforts to pair arms deals with economic outreach in Africa to secure uranium, expand influence, and mitigate sanctions pressure.[xxxv]

Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives. The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit, held in Iran from April 27 to May 1, highlighted Iran's focus on four priority sectors, including mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment.[xxxvi] Iranian officials announced plans to increase annual trade with Africa to 10 billion US dollars, backed by projects such as building industrial parks, refineries, and developing shipping lines and air routes to improve logistics.[xxxvii] Iran also signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners during the summit and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms, including a 2 billion Euro credit line and a new Iran-Africa development fund.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Omani Foreign Minister announced a “ceasefire” between the United States and the Houthis after the Houthis reportedly agreed to end attacks on international shipping. US President Donald Trump said that the United States will stop attacks on the Houthis, and in return, the Houthis will stop targeting maritime shipping. The Houthis will very likely use the end of US airstrikes to rebuild their anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile stockpiles to target shipping in the future. The Houthis have learned that they can disrupt international shipping markets at any time and for any reason of their choosing with minimal consequences.
• US Deployments to Diego Garcia: The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia. The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.
• Syrian Army Appointments: Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term.
• Iran in Africa: Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives.

Iran Update, May 5, 2025

Iran unveiled a new solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with electronic protective measures (EPM), new navigation and homing systems, and a maneuverable reentry vehicle on May 4.[i] The new missile, Qassem Basir, is an upgraded version of Iran's Haj Qassem missile.[ii] The new missile has a reported range of approximately 1,200 km.[iii]  Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh stated that the missile is equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), infrared homing, an inertial navigation system, and EPM.[iv] These features appear designed to address failures in Iran’s April and October 2024 missile attacks on Israel. The vast majority of the missiles in both strikes were either intercepted or malfunctioned and failed to reach their targets.[v] Both attacks ultimately failed to inflict serious damage due to the inaccuracy of the missiles. The attacks demonstrated that the Iranian missile and drone arsenals failed at present to provide the deterrent effect that Iranian leaders had envisioned. Nasir Zadeh told Iranian media that the Qassem Basir missile was developed to address those challenges. The infrared homing system improves accuracy by detecting and locking onto targets based on heat signatures. The MaRV allows the warhead to shift trajectory during the reentry phase, helping it evade missile defenses that rely on fixed-path predictions. The EPM protects the missile’s guidance system from jamming and other forms of electronic interference.

Iranian officials continued to threaten US bases, likely to try to shape Western decision-making and discourage a potential strike on Iran. Nasir Zadeh warned on May 4 during the unveiling of the Qassem Basir that Iran holds large missile stockpiles and will target US and Israeli assets in the region if necessary.[vi] Speaker of Parliament Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf similarly stated on April 29 that any attack on Iran will "expose all US bases" in the region.[vii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh previously stated that Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles because its missiles can already reach all US bases in the region.[viii] Qassem Basir missiles, along with Iran's other short- and medium-range systems, can reach Tel Aviv and US bases in Iraq and Syria. The Qassem Basir, which was designed after Iran employed other missiles against the US THAAD and Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense systems, could be an important piece of future strike packages. 

Iranian officials continued to categorically reject full dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program and zero uranium enrichment after statements from US officials about full dismantlement and zero enrichment. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on May 2 that Iran has the right to maintain a "complete nuclear fuel cycle", including uranium enrichment, as a Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty signatory.[ix] Armed Forces General Staff affiliated Defa Press similarly published an article on May 3 titled “Why is uranium enrichment Iran’s inalienable right.”[x] The article emphasized that Iran will not “surrender” its peaceful nuclear program and will continue to pursue nuclear energy and uranium enrichment. Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei echoed these statements and rejected any calls to dismantle Iran's nuclear industry.[xi] These statements come as senior US officials expressed support for full dismantlement and zero uranium enrichment. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 1 that Iran can retain a peaceful nuclear program if it "imports enriched uranium."[xii] US President Donald Trump stated on May 4 that "total dismantlement...is all [he] would accept."[xiii]

The Houthis may have used multiple ballistic missiles in an attempt to overwhelm Israeli and US ballistic missile defenses on May 4. One Houthi ballistic missile struck near Israel’s sole international airport, forcing Israel to shut down flight operations.[xiv] Local sources said that the Houthis launched multiple systems towards Israel.[xv] An analyst for a Saudi media outlet also claimed that the Houthis have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.[xvi] Either tactic could improve the Houthis' ability to penetrate ballistic missile defenses and would represent an effort by the Houthis to operationalize lessons learned from the success and failure of previous attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed that the Arrow 3 interceptor missile experienced a technical failure that caused it to fail to shoot down the Houthi missile.[xvii] The missile crashed into a parking lot near Ben Gurion Airport. The impact injured eight people and shut down airport operations. The May 4 attack is part of the Houthis’ effort to blockade Israel and damage the Israeli economy. The Houthis have said that their maritime attack campaign targets shipping to damage Israel’s economy, and attacks on Ben Gurion Airport could similarly damage the economy.

The successful May 4 attack demonstrates the risks inherent in relying on ballistic missile defense and airstrikes to defend against and respond to Houthi attacks. The Houthis will almost certainly continue to attack Israel and maritime shipping unless the United States renders them unwilling or unable to do so.[xviii] Ballistic missile defense will not stop every missile, and a single Houthi missile could have outsized strategic effects if it is not intercepted. The Houthis are learning new lessons to improve their ability to bypass Israeli and Western air defenses that they can employ elsewhere in the region or share with their partners in Iran.

Israel responded to the May 4 attack with airstrikes on Houthi facilities in Hudaydah Port and a likely weapons production site in Bajil District, eastern Hudaydah Governorate, on May 5.[xix] Houthi authorities also evacuated staff from Sanaa Airport immediately following their successful airstrike, anticipating Israeli retaliation even before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally vowed a response on May 5.[xx]

The Syrian transitional government will likely allow Suwaydawi armed factions to retain heavy weapons, at least in the short term, in a concession designed to build Druze support for the Damascus government. Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakour has led negotiations with Druze leaders since April 30 to establish mechanisms to address the recent violence between Sunni militants, Druze militias, and government forces in Druze-majority towns and regions in southern Syria.[xxi] Top Druze sheikhs announced on May 3 that they agreed on several provisions with Damascus.[xxii] These provisions included ceding control of the Damascus-Suwayda road to the state and deploying the General Security Services (GSS) in the province.[xxiii] Syrian media reported that Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, a Druze leader who has consistently rejected integration into the Syrian government, also demanded during the negotiations that the government allow Suwayda armed factions to retain heavy weapons.[xxiv] Bakour confirmed that the government approved the requests issued by Druze leaders, although he did not explicitly acknowledge that the government agreed to the heavy weapons provision.[xxv] Damascus may have agreed to Hijri’s demand in order to develop goodwill with prominent Druze sheikhs and military leaders in the short term, as the transitional government begins to integrate Suwaydawi fighters into state security services. The Druze likely view the retention of weapons stockpiles as potential self-defense against attacks on the community following the recent confessional violence in Jaramana and Ashrafiyeh.[xxvi] Nearly all of the Druze factions distrust the government to varying degrees and likely seek to retain equipment and stockpiles as an insurance policy against possible future attacks from both non-government and government-affiliated groups.

Damascus is likely to attempt to gradually increase its control over Druze areas over the long term, however. Southern Syria-based media reported that the Druze-Damascus agreement is only intended to serve as an initial “formula” for coordination between Druze and the Syrian state and that its future will depend on how its implementation unfolds.[xxvii] Damascus aims to centralize its control over Syrian territory, and it would be inconsistent with these aims to allow Druze fighters to retain heavy weaponry over the long term. The Syrian Constitutional Declaration declared that weapons will only belong to the state, and the Syrian government has thus far forcibly disarmed armed groups—particularly those integrating into security forces—and confiscated their stockpiles.[xxviii] The government collected heavy weapons and equipment from Druze militias in Jaramana, Rif Dimashq, on May 4, although this likely reflects government concerns about Jaramana’s regime networks and affiliations.[xxix]   

Damascus will also form a fully Suwaydawi police force with a Damascus-appointed commander, likely in order to ensure the police remain responsive to the state.[xxx]  Local Suwayda police have already integrated into the Interior Ministry, according to Governor Bakour.[xxxi] Bakour said that a non-Suwaydawi officer will command these police forces.[xxxii] Bakour’s insistence that a non-local remain in command of police suggests that Damascus intends to implement a chain of command that will be responsive to the state, regardless of the force’s Suwaydawi composition. Local Suwaydawi police began to deploy to positions on May 4 and backfilled the GSS in Soura Kabira, the northern entrance to Suwayda Province.[xxxiii]

Several armed groups, including likely Sunni militias, have continued to conduct attacks targeting Druze populations in Suwayda Province. Sunni militias from outside eastern Daraa and Suwayda provinces appear to be attempting to incite anti-Druze sentiment and attacking Druze areas in western Suwayda. Southern Syria-based media reported that Sunni militias traveled to the eastern Daraa countryside to attack Druze towns from nearby hills.[xxxiv] These groups reportedly arrived armed with mortars and small arms and attempted to mobilize locals against the Druze in villages and through social media.[xxxv] These attacks appear to be distinct from those conducted by Sunni tribal fighters, who have continued to engage Druze militias in several locations across Suwayda Province, including the western countryside, since April 30.[xxxvi] Several anti-Druze narratives circulated on social media on May 4 and May 5, including false claims that Druze fighters shut down mosques in Suwayda Province.[xxxvii] These narratives likely seek to mobilize support amongst Sunni hardline elements against the Druze population, particularly in the aftermath of the circulation of an audio recording in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insulted the Prophet Mohammad on April 28.[xxxviii]

The Suwayda Military Council (SMC) may also be conducting attacks targeting pro-government elements within Suwayda Province. The group, which is a Druze armed faction with reported ties to Israel and Assad-era generals, recently rejected any loyalty to the Damascus government and condemned government forces’ deployments to Suwayda Province.[xxxix] An unknown armed group attacked a group of Suwaydawi journalists in Suwayda City on May 5.[xl] The journalists were reportedly covering the implementation of the security agreement with Damascus.[xli] Several Syrian sources accused the SMC, or armed groups ”affiliated with al Hijri,” of conducting the attack.[xlii] SMC leader Tariq al Shoufi recently declared that the SMC is loyal to Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri and is ”at [his] disposal.”[xliii] It is unclear why a group affiliated with Hijri—who is party to the agreement—would attack journalists unassociated with the agreement’s implementation. Men of Dignity leader Laith al Balous warned on May 2 that unspecified “gangs” have conducted several attacks targeting Druze in Suwayda Province rather than ”al Hijri loyalists.”[xliv] Balous said he intended to cooperate with the GSS to deter these groups from conducting attacks.

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continued to implement the transfer of the Tishreen Dam to transitional government forces on May 5. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) executive council co-chairs announced the end of “resistance” at the Tishreen Dam on May 5 and remembered soldiers and civilians killed during the operation to hold the dam under SDF control.[xlv]AANES, which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, had called for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there in January 2025.[xlvi] The announcement of the end of “resistance” at the Tishreen Dam signifies that the SDF is no longer maintaining forces there to defend against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advances. This SDF withdrawal is consistent with a deconfliction agreement reached between the SDF and the transitional government around the Tishreen Dam in April 2025.[xlvii] The announcement is notable because the SDF had stalled the implementation of the agreement over the past month, and rumors spread in the Syrian information space that the ceasefire between the SDF and SNA had broken down and fighting was imminent.[xlviii] SDF representatives met with the transitional government delegation led by Hussein al Salama to discuss the implementation of the March 10 SDF-Damascus agreement, including SDF disengagement from Tishreen Dam.[xlix] This ongoing coordination emphasizes that the dam transfer is underway.

The Syrian transitional government appointed Hussein al Salama (Abu Musab al Shuhayl) as head of the General Intelligence Service.[l] Salama was born in al Shuhayl, Deir ez Zor Province, and joined Jabhat al Nusra in the early years of the Syrian Civil War.[li] He established the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) intelligence service alongside former interim General Intelligence Service head and current Interior Minister Anas Khattab.[lii] Salama led negotiations with the SDF in the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo.[liii] He also led recent negotiations with the SDF in Deir ez Zor Province on April 12.[liv] 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran unveiled a new solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with electronic protective measures, new navigation and homing systems, and a maneuverable reentry vehicle on May 4. Iranian officials continued to threaten US bases with missile attacks, likely to try to shape Western decision-making and discourage a potential strike on Iran.
• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Iranian officials continued to categorically reject full dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program and zero uranium enrichment after statements from US officials about full dismantlement and zero enrichment.
• Houthi Missile Attack: The Houthis may have used multiple ballistic missiles in an attempt to overwhelm Israeli and US ballistic missile defenses on May 4. One Houthi ballistic missile struck near Israel’s sole international airport, forcing the Israelis to shut down flight operations.
• Druze-Syrian Government Negotiations: The Syrian transitional government will likely allow Suwaydawi armed factions to retain heavy weapons, at least in the short term, in a concession designed to build Druze support for the Damascus government. The government will likely attempt to increase its control over Druze areas over the long term, however.
• Continued Violence in Southwestern Syria: Several armed groups, including likely Sunni militias, have continued to conduct attacks targeting Druze populations in Suwayda Province.
• SDF-Syrian Government Negotiations: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continued to implement the transfer of the Tishreen Dam to transitional government forces on May 5.

Iran Update, May 2, 2025

Druze armed faction leaders agreed on May 1 to deploy Druze and Syrian transitional government security forces over key areas in Suwayda Province. Prominent Druze sheikhs announced that locals from Suwayda Province will join the Ministry of Interior’s General Security Services (GSS) during a meeting with religious and military leaders in Suwayda City.[i] Syrian media reported on May 2 that 700 Suwaydawi fighters have quickly joined the GSS’s ranks, and over 1,500 Suwaydawi fighters applied to join the GSS.[ii] An unannounced local militia leader will supervise these Suwaydawi GSS forces.[iii] This agreement is similar to a deal that Druze militias negotiated with the transitional government in early March, which established Suwaydawi-led security forces in the province with logistical support from the Interior Ministry.[iv] It is not clear how effectively this early deal was implemented, and it did not attempt to integrate Druze fighters directly into the GSS. The GSS is the government’s primary force tasked with addressing security threats throughout western Syria. The GSS is dominated by Sunnis in some provinces, though the makeup of the GSS in Suwayda is unclear. Some of the GSS units deployed to Suwayda have protected Suwaydawi Druze from attacks by Sunni Bedouin.[v]

The deployment of Suwaydawi forces alongside non-local government forces could secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists and build trust between the Druze community and the Syrian government. The agreement is part of an effort to address the recent violence between Sunni militants, Druze militias and civilians, and government forces in Druze-majority towns and regions in southern Syria. Syrian state media reported that the GSS began to deploy to positions in the western Suwayda countryside and around Suwayda city on May 1 and 2.[vi] It remains unclear whether GSS units in Suwayda Province moving forward will be fully comprised of Suwaydawi fighters. Suwaydawi and non-Suwaydawi GSS units will likely operate side-by-side in the short term, given that GSS forces from outside the province had already begun deploying to positions there.[vii]

This agreement does not explicitly require the main Druze factions in Suwayda Province to disarm yet. Men of Dignity leader Laith al Balous confirmed that he and his faction agreed to activate Interior Ministry forces comprised of locals on May 2, but he did not address whether the Men of Dignity planned on turning in their weapons to the state in the near term.[viii] Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakour declared that the Syrian government will not allow any armed elements outside of the state to operate in Suwayda province, however.[ix] Syrian media reported that an army brigade is expected to be formed soon in Suwayda Province, and the brigade will also be comprised of local fighters.[x] The Syrian government will probably expect Suwaydawi factions to dissolve before integrating into security services like the GSS or MoD.

The Syrian government will likely work with pro-government Druze factions, like the Men of Dignity, while sidelining Druze groups with former regime networks in order to dilute their influence within the Druze community. This is similar to the strategy the government employed against the Eighth Brigade in Daraa Province in April 2025, when the government politically undermined Eighth Brigade commander Ahmed al Awda before disarming his force.[xi] The Syrian government employed a firmer strategy to address security in Jaramana, Rif Dimashq, than in Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya or Suwayda Province. Jaramana is a former Assad regime stronghold that is likely anti-government due to the privileges it lost after the collapse of Assad’s regime.[xii] A May 1 agreement between the Syrian government officials and Jaramana notables called on Druze militias to immediately surrender their heavy weapons to the state and ordered a larger GSS presence within the city.[xiii] Syria’s security forces also began the process of collecting all unlicensed weapons within the town.[xiv] This is very similar to Damascus’s early efforts to rein in Awda, when Damascus initially demanded Awda turn in his heavy weapons in January 2024.[xv] The government did not make similar efforts to disarm the communities in Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya or Suwayda Province.[xvi] The government likely attempted to disarm Jaramana more aggressively because of its regime networks and affiliations.

Some Druze armed groups have continued to denounce the Syrian government as illegitimate. Unknown armed groups attacked several security checkpoints staffed by GSS units around Suwayda City on March 2.[xvii] The Suwayda governor suggested that the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a Druze armed faction with reported ties to Assad-era generals, conducted the attacks.[xviii] The group widely rejected government forces’ deployments to Suwayda Province in a statement and accused the Syrian government of spreading ”takfiri” ideology.[xix] The statement announced that the SMC aligns itself with Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, a prominent Druze leader who has consistently rejected integration into the Syrian government.[xx] The SMC’s statement illuminates key differences between elements of the Druze community that support gradual integration into the Syrian state and those that seek to maintain regional autonomy.

The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel used an airstrike near the Syrian Presidential Palace to send a “clear warning message” to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on May 1.[xxi] The Israeli leaders are attempting to pressure the Syrian government into stopping recent violence against the Syrian Druze and removing transitional government forces south of Damascus.[xxii] The airstrike struck an open area near the Presidential Palace and did not cause any major damage.[xxiii] The Israeli leaders threatened additional airstrikes if the violence against Druze did not stop on April 30.[xxiv] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara condemned the attack on the Presidential Palace and said that Israel was attempting to ”destabilize the country and exacerbate security crises.“[xxv] Shara remains very unlikely to respond to Israel in a hostile or direct fashion due to his lack of military capacity and instead focuses on unifying Syria under his control. Shara has also taken concrete steps to contain the violence against the Druze south of Damascus. Local Sunnis from the nearby town of Meliha, not the Syrian government, initially attacked the Druze communities south of Damascus. Some reports said government forces looted local homes and harassed locals, however.

The Israeli airstrikes are unlikely to pressure Shara into “allowing the Druze...to protect themselves” or because Shara has already begun to form the joint Druze-transitional government forces needed to secure Druze communities on his own accord. The airstrikes are similarly unlikely to prevent the government from sending its forces into Druze communities, especially if these forces become more integrated with Druze militias (see below). Some of these forces have unilaterally protected Druze communities, while others have worked side-by-side with Druze militias to protect Druze communities. Some of government forces harassed locals, looted homes, and were accused of extrajudicial killings. The GSS has mixed reliability as a security organization that often depends on whether its units are comprised of local fighters, disciplined HTS outfits, or unaffiliated individuals.[xxvi] The Syrian government must hold poorly disciplined units, individuals, and commanders responsible for their crimes. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara also lacks influence over local attackers targeting Druze who are unaffiliated with the GSS, owing to the Syrian government’s limited number of available forces to deploy to maintain security across Syrian territory.

Government efforts to build joint Druze militia-government units will make it increasingly complicated for Israel to demand demilitarization in southern Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded in February 2025 that the Syrian transitional government fully demilitarize southern Syria and reiterated that goal on May 1.[xxvii] He called for transitional government forces to withdraw from 11,241 square kilometers of territory in Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra Provinces or face consequences like airstrikes on government positions.[xxviii] Israel conducted airstrikes killing two GSS members in Quintera Province in January 2025 and has repeatedly struck government military sites in southern Syria.[xxix]  Transitional government forces deployed to southern Syria on May 1 to control clashes between Bedouin and Druze communities in Daraa and Suwayda.[xxx] Many Druze militias will now presumably assume security tasks for the government (see above), as Israel has demanded, while other Druze will join government security institutions, such as the GSS.  Local media reported that an Israeli drone strike in Suwayda Province killed four Syrians on May 2 after GSS forces deployed into the province and after Druze fighters agreed to integrate into those formations.[xxxi] The integration of Druze militiamen into transitional government forces will risk Israeli airstrikes that strike Druze individuals or even units if Israel continues its demand of a demilitarized southern Syria.

Iran is reportedly weighing a compromise to dilute part of its enriched uranium stockpile domestically while exporting the remainder—potentially to Russia—as part of ongoing nuclear talks with the United States.[xxxii] Unspecified sources told Reuters on May 2 that Iranian officials proposed to cap uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent, expand International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to nuclear sites, and limit stockpile size and centrifuge types. Iran also reportedly offered to reduce its enrichment infrastructure to around 5,000 centrifuges—down from 15,000 centrifuges that are currently operational—dilute and export its 60 percent enriched uranium under IAEA scrutiny. The proposed cap for uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent is the same as the cap under the 2015 nuclear deal. Iran also reportedly floated the possibility of selling enriched uranium to the United States. An unspecified regional source told Reuters on May 2 that Iran plans to retain a diluted portion of its stockpile domestically while exporting the rest, likely to Russia.[xxxiii] Russia has positioned itself to mediate and store Iranian enriched uranium since March 2025.[xxxiv] Russia’s role in mediating US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests, given Russia’s alignment with Iran. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov, for example, downplayed concerns by claiming that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium poses “no weapons risk.”[xxxv]

Iran also suggested that it would not build a nuclear-capable missile as a “gesture of goodwill” but rejected halting its broader missile program.[xxxvi] Iranian officials repeatedly reaffirmed that Iranian missile program remains off the table in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States.[xxxvii] Iran’s stance reflects that the missile program is essential to its defense strategy, especially due to the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces. The missile program’s centrality to Iran’s defense strategy makes it unlikely that Iran would agree to include missile restrictions in the ongoing negotiations.[xxxviii] Iran‘s refusal to compromise on its missile program could jeopardize the talks or force negotiations toward a less expansive agreement than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly seeks.

Iran has continued to resupply the Houthis and provide intelligence on ship movements to improve Houthi targeting in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, according to unspecified US officials speaking to Saudi news outlets on May 2.[xxxix] US forces intercepted a likely Iranian weapons shipment to the Houthis a few days prior to May 2, according to a US official speaking to Saudi news outlets on May 2.[xl] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statement on X on April 30, which called out Iran for providing ”lethal support to the Houthis.”[xli] Other sources told the same Saudi news outlet that Iranian vessels in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden provided intelligence on ship movements to the Houthis.[xlii] Iran has previously deployed commercial vessels off the coast of Yemen to provide targeting intelligence for the Houthis’ attacks on commercial shipping and US military vessels transiting the Red Sea.[xliii] Former US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz also told ABC News on March 16 that the United States is prepared to target Iranian ships providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis.[xliv]  

Key Takeaways:

• Druze Integration into the Syrian Security Sector: Druze armed faction leaders agreed on May 1 to deploy Druze and Syrian transitional government security forces over key areas in Suwayda Province. The Syrian government will likely work with pro-government Druze factions, like the Men of Dignity, while sidelining Druze groups with former regime ties in order to dilute the influence of former Assad supporters within the Druze community.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Syria: The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel used an airstrike near the Syrian Presidential Palace to send a “clear warning message” to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on May 1. The Israeli airstrikes are unlikely to pressure Shara into “allowing the Druze...to protect themselves,” or because Shara has already begun to form the joint Druze-transitional government forces needed to secure Druze communities on his own accord.
• Iran-US Talks: Iran is reportedly weighing a compromise to dilute part of its enriched uranium stockpile domestically while exporting the remainder—potentially to Russia—as part of ongoing nuclear talks with the United States. Iran also suggested that it would not build a nuclear-capable missile as a “gesture of goodwill” but rejected halting its broader missile program.
• Houthis and Iran: Iran has continued to resupply the Houthis and provide intelligence on ship movements to improve Houthi targeting in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, according to unspecified US officials speaking to Saudi news outlets on May 2.

Iran Update, May 1, 2025

The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze...to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze.[i]  An effort to pressure the government to respond as directed assumes that the Syrian government has control over the Sunni fighters attacking Druze communities outside Damascus. Many of these fighters are ad-hoc collections of locals who are attacking the Druze.[ii] Some government forces have attacked the Druze.[iii] The government deployed General Security Service (GSS) units to cordon off the Druze areas, however, and some of these forces fought alongside local Druze fighters to repulse attacks by Sunni fighters.[iv] The government’s deployments alongside local fighters, while other government-linked fighters attack local Druze, suggest that the government does not exert perfect command and control over its forces. The government’s limited control over some extremist elements of its ruling coalition, as well as the localized nature of some of the attackers, indicates that it will be impossible to use airstrikes to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the attacks.

Damascus very likely already wants to stop the violence because the attacks on the Druze make it more difficult to secure the external support Damascus needs to maintain its hold on power. The government faces an extremely dire economic situation and needs external aid and economic support, particularly from the West. Many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have repeatedly emphasized that Syria must prevent violence and hold those responsible accountable.[v] The government will need to convince these countries that the government is deserving of their support.

The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff ordered the IDF to strike Syrian government targets “if the violence against the Druze does not stop.”[vi] The government’s limited ability to demand that extremists stop their attacks means that even if the airstrikes did successfully pressure the Syrian government to make demands of Sunni fighters, it is unclear that government demands would have any effect. The government also has significant capacity issues, and airstrikes targeting the Syrian government will only make government efforts to stop the violence more difficult.

It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only ground forces prepared to physically defend the Druze communities by force can protect the Druze. It is unclear if Israel is willing or able to protect the Druze in places like Sahnaya and Jaramana, which are roughly 45km and 58km from the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, respectively. Such a ground operation would be an extremely complex military undertaking. The lack of Druze support for Israeli intervention and the destabilizing effects of a ground operation in Syria mean a ground operation would likely fail and increase the threat to Israel by empowering extremists. Some Druze have protested against Israeli interference in Syria.[vii]

Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community. The ongoing violence is not solely government against Druze violence. The current violence involves pro-government Druze factions, Druze militias associated with former Assad regime networks, local Sunni fighters, and government forces that are responsive to former Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) networks, and others.[viii] The Syrian Druze are a politically diverse community (see discussion on different Druze positions below). Some key Druze powerbrokers are negotiating with the government to end the ongoing violence, as GSS and Druze forces have cooperated on the ground.[ix] A decision by Damascus to rely on joint Druze-government units could successfully de-escalate the situation while extending government control over well-known bastions of pro-regime sentiment in Jaramana.[x] The government has already taken steps to form joint units.[xi] The government’s decision to immediately engage local leaders and cooperate with some Druze militias suggests that Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and his allies have learned from the experiences with Alawite militias in western Syria, where the failure to engage local leaders and Alawites contributed to continued tension.

Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.[xii] Government officials immediately ordered former Ahrar al Sham commander and 40th Division Commander Colonel Binyan al Hariri (Abu Fares Daraa) to deploy the 40th Division to Soura Kabira to secure the area after fighting between tribal fighters and Druze militiamen along the Damascus-Suwayda highway.[xiii] Government forces also began to deploy along the border between Suwayda and Daraa provinces on April 1.[xiv] These deployments follow several attacks that tribal groups launched on Druze towns along the western Suwayda border.[xv] Security forces are expected to soon deploy across Suwayda Province.[xvi] These are tangible steps that suggest that the transitional government appears to be learning how to better contain violence targeting minorities and rebuild local trust since sectarian-motivated violence swept coastal Syria in March 2025.

CTP-ISW defines violence between the Muslim and Druze communities as “confessional” rather than “sectarian” because “sectarian violence” refers to violence between different religious denominations. “Confessional violence” refers to violence between different religions. Most Druze consider themselves a distinct religious group from Islam.[xvii]

Top Druze leaders continued to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. Men of Dignity leader Laith al Balous and two prominent Druze sheikhs met with the governors of Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra provinces on April 30 and agreed to a ceasefire in Jaramana and Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya. Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri released a fiery statement after the meeting that compared the recent attacks on the Druze community to the massacres that targeted Alawites on the coast in early March.[xviii] The number of civilians killed and harmed in the recent attacks on Druze-majority areas in and around Damascus is several orders of magnitude lower than the number of civilians killed and harmed in Alawite areas along the coast.[xix] Syrian and Turkish media reported that fewer than five civilians were killed in southern Syria.[xx] Armed groups affiliated with the transitional government killed 420 unarmed people in western Syria in early March, including 39 children.[xxi] Hijri, who has consistently criticized the government, announced that he “no longer trusts a government that kills its own people” and called upon "international forces to intervene immediately.”[xxii] The clear fractures between Druze leaders on engaging the government did not prevent Balous and other Druze leaders from presumably negotiating the deployment of GSS forces across Suwayda Province.

Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation.”[xxiii] Halbousi’s Progress Party and Khanjar’s Sovereignty Party will reportedly compete in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections together or form a post-election alliance, according to a recent Iraqi media report. CTP-ISW assessed on April 28 that Halbousi may be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[xxiv] The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with the April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Mashhadani, Khanjar, and Halbousi’s other historical rivals are members of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition that formed in early January 2025 and has explicitly supported long-held Sunni political demands.[xxv] Halbousi has also recently called for political action to achieve Sunni political demands, such as after the Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of a law that favored Sunnis in February 2025.[xxvi] A Halbousi-Khanjar alliance would greatly increase Sunni electoral strength, as Halbousi’s party and Khanjar’s former party were the two highest-performing Sunni parties in the 2021 elections.[xxvii]

The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism. The United Nations implemented UNIVIM in 2016 to stop prohibited cargo, such as weapons, from being exported to Yemen, while ensuring that Yemen retained access to food and other necessary supplies.[xxviii] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 1 that the Houthis are prohibiting oil tankers and cargo ships, including UNVIM cleared vessels, from leaving Ras Issa Port on the Hudaydah coastline.[xxix] The Houthis reportedly fired warning shots after one vessel attempted to exit, and armed Houthi fighters boarded other vessels.[xxx]  There were at least 14 vessels anchored near Ras Issa Port on May 1, according to Maritime Traffic data. Many of these vessels travelled from Djibouti, where UNVIM officials inspect vessels transporting cargo to Yemeni ports. Houthi Foreign Minister Gamal Amer also recently called for the termination of UNIVIM in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and the UN Security Council President, suggesting the Houthis may be using the vessels as hostages to renegotiate UNVIM or pressure the UN to change how the UNVIM operates.[xxxi]

The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.[xxxii] The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported on May 1 that US-Iran talks were rescheduled at the suggestion of the Omani foreign minister.[xxxiii] Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi said the talks were rescheduled for "logistical reasons."[xxxiv] Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized in recent months that Iran will not negotiate under military threat or economic pressure.[xxxv] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth threatened military action against Iran in response to Iran’s support for the Houthis in an April 30 tweet.[xxxvi] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, who has led the US delegation in the first three rounds of US-Iran talks, retweeted Hegseth's comments. The United States separately sanctioned several entities and vessels on April 29 and 30 that were involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade, respectively.[xxxvii] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 1 that US sanctions are not helping the US and Iran resolve nuclear disputes, and the next round of talks will be scheduled "depending on the US approach."[xxxviii] An Iranian expert close to the regime stated on May 1 that talks were postponed due to what unspecified Iranian sources called “contradictory US positions.“[xxxix] The sources also said that the United States was trying to change the general framework of the talks. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes between Iran and the United States is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran has repeatedly indicated it is unwilling to make concessions on.[xl] Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) were also scheduled to hold talks in Rome on May 2 ahead of US-Iran talks.[xli] It is unclear if Iran-E3 talks will also be postponed.

Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reported on May 1 that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil in April 2025.[xlii] United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) estimated that Iranian oil exports to China made up 97 percent of Iran's total oil exports in April.[xliii]  Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS security summit in Brazil on May 1.[xliv] Both officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral economic ties to "challenge unilateralism in the international arena.” Iran's participation in BRICS is part of its broader efforts to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance."[xlv] UANI also reported that Iran increasingly used tankers previously involved in Russian oil trades, further illustrating cooperation between major US adversaries.[xlvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel in Syria: The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze...to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze. The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks, because the government cannot order the extremists to stop. It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community.
• Violence in Southern Syria: Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.
• Druze-Damascus Relations: Top Druze leaders continue to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. This demonstrates the political diversity among Syria’s Druze community.
• Iraqi Politics: Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation. The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with CTP-ISW’s April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework.
• Houthis and the UN: The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism.
• Iran-US Talks: The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.
• Iran-China Cooperation: Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.

Iran Update, April 30, 2025

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Confessionalist-motivated armed clashes spread to additional Druze majority communities near Damascus on April 29 and 30.[i] Tensions initially rose between the Druze community and Muslims after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insulted the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media on April 28.[ii] The General Security Forces and Defense Ministry deployed forces to Sahnaya and Ashrafieh Sahnaya to address "outlaw" attacks that targeted both Druze civilians and transitional government forces manning checkpoints.[iii] Druze militias also deployed to restore security in the towns.[iv] At least 16 General Security Forces died in the small arms and mortar attacks conducted at least in part by local Druze militias.[v] At least one Druze fighting with the transitional government through the Men of Dignity faction died in the clashes.[vi] There were also reports that some local Druze and government forces fought together against attacking Sunni extremists, however, which illustrates the complexity of the situation and diversity of the actors involved.[vii] Syrian Defense Ministry forces withdrew from Ashrafiyeh after search and cordon operations ended with several arrests on April 30.[viii]

The transitional government appears to have responded slightly better to the recent spate of violence compared to the sectarian-motivated violence that swept coastal Syria in March 2025. The General Security Service reportedly prevented additional external Sunni groups from entering Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya and participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians on April 30.[ix] Sunni gunmen from neighboring towns have still been able to target Druze communities in initial attacks, but by cordoning off areas of violence, the transitional government has reduced retribution killings and cycles of violence.[x] Druze militia leaders accused ”extremist individuals who recently joined the Ministries of Defense and Interior” of targeting Druze, however.[xi] The transitional government‘s ability to respond and protect these communities is imperfect. A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) and hostile to the transitional government claimed that it attacked Druze civilians in Sahnaya at the start of several hours of clashes.[xii] The transitional government has also learned to engage local notables and community power brokers early on in these crises. Governors from Suwayda, Rif Dimashq, and Damascus met with Druze leaders from Suwayda near Ashrafiyeh during the clashes to end the crisis.[xiii] A transitional government delegation also met with Jaramana’s Druze leaders on April 29 and agreed to hold attack perpetrators responsible.[xiv]

Confessionalist violence in Rif Dimashq may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. Slow governmental response to large-scale confessionalist-motivated attacks against the Druze community epitomizes Druze fears about the new government. Kurdish political parties recently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[xv] Continued confessionalist violence will exacerbate bandwidth problems that the Syrian transitional government is attempting to solve through military recruitment and integration of minority groups into the Defense Ministry.  

Iran reportedly urged unity amongst Iranian-backed Iraqi political leaders ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025, likely to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[xvi] An informed source told Iraqi media on April 30 that Iran recently sent a message to Shia Coordination Framework leaders encouraging the parties to remain unified and to avoid competing on separate lists in the upcoming elections.[xvii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Shia Coordination Framework reportedly plans to run at least three lists in the elections, with opposing lists currently led by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law coalition head Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali.[xviii] Shia Coordination Framework parties have continuously disagreed in recent months on various issues, including Iraqi government attempts to integrate the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces into the Iraqi security establishment and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xix] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections, due to inter-party competition that advantaged a more unified opposition like Sadr’s Shia National Movement.[xx]

Iran likely shares Iraqi concerns that Sadr’s non-participation in the upcoming elections will cause instability, but hopes that the Shia Coordination Framework's unity will overcome Sadr’s popularity. Iran’s message to the Shia Coordination Framework also reportedly emphasized the importance of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s participation in the elections.[xxi] Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the elections and called on his followers to boycott the elections.[xxii] Iraqi politicians from across the political spectrum have called on Sadr to reverse his decision, likely due to the concern that Sadr could use a position outside of government to destabilize a future government.[xxiii] Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xxiv] A Sadrist source told Iraqi media on April 28 that Sadr could reverse his decision depending on unspecified Iraqi political developments within the next two months.[xxv] Sadr’s Shia National Movement ran on a single list in the 2021 elections, which allowed Sadr to win the largest share of seats in the election.[xxvi] The withdrawal of Sadr’s political bloc from Parliament in 2022 after failing to form a government without Iranian-backed Iraqi parties allowed the Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in Parliament.[xxvii] Iran likely views both Sadr’s participation in the elections and the Shia Coordination Framework’s unity as vital to ensure stability that will enable continued Iranian influence in Iraq. Either a major electoral loss caused by fractured pro-Iranian blocs or Sadr’s destabilizing activities could imperil Iran’s influence.

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will hold talks in Rome on May 2.[xxviii] Iran likely aims to coordinate with the E3 on snapback sanctions ahead of the fourth round of US-Iran talks in Rome on May 3. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said on April 28 that the E3 will not hesitate to reinstate snapback sanctions against Iran if Iran's nuclear program threatens European security.[xxix] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xxx] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The E3 reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[xxxi] This deadline is approximately consistent with US President Donald Trump's 60-day nuclear deal deadline.[xxxii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that reaching a deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

• Violence in Syria: Confessionalist-motivated armed clashes spread to additional Druze majority communities near Damascus on April 29 and 30. Confessionalist violence in Rif Dimashq may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis on Israeli actions in Syria related to the Druze on May 1.
• Iraqi Election Preparations: Iran reportedly urged unity amongst Iranian-backed Iraqi political leaders ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025, likely to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government. Iran likely shares Iraqi concerns that Sadr’s non-participation in the upcoming elections will cause instability, but hopes that the Shia Coordination Framework's unity will overcome Sadr’s popularity.
• US-Iran Talks: Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will hold talks in Rome on May 2. Iran likely aims to coordinate with the E3 on snapback sanctions ahead of the fourth round of US-Iran talks in Rome on May 3.

Iran Update, April 29, 2025

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[i] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[ii] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government’s inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.

The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.[iii] The Houthis claimed that the facility was a migrant detention center run by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), but IOM denied that it maintained the facility.[iv] IOM did confirm that it was a migrant facility. The Houthis have similarly provided inconsistent casualty numbers.[v] The facility is located next to a military base, according to publicly available maps.[vi] It is unclear whether the Houthis still operate this military base. An unspecified US defense official told Reuters that CENTCOM is conducting a battle-damage assessment and inquiry into these claims.[vii] A UN report condemned Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeting the same detention center in Saada in 2022 that killed 66 people and injured 113 more.[viii]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.[ix] Qassem said that the Lebanese state—not Hezbollah—would need to fulfill these goals.[x]  Iranian media falsely portrayed this statement as a priority that Hezbollah would pursue on its own, rather than a priority that Qassem believes the Lebanese state and people should adopt.[xi] Qassem reiterated Hezbollah’s commitment to the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement and stated that the Lebanese government serves as the main negotiator and armed force responsible for enforcing the ceasefire with Israel.[xii] Qassem secondarily called on the Lebanese state to prioritize the reconstruction of infrastructure in Lebanon. Qassem also voiced support for a stronger Lebanese state and for removing the IDF. Qassem stated that assuming these co-occurring priorities would facilitate the revival of Lebanon.

Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has faced considerable financial challenges after the end of major fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. These challenges have prevented Hezbollah from rapidly reconstructing pro-Hezbollah areas as Hezbollah did after previous rounds of fighting.[xiii] Hezbollah’s effort to blame the government may be an attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s political capital in Lebanon after the war and amid slow reconstruction.

Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to “justice.”[xiv] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[xv]  A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[xvi] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[xvii] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[xviii] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an “organized attack” against security services when they arrived at the scene.[xix] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[xx] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[xxi]

Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. The Druze community has held significant reservations about Syrian Transitional President Shara’s government since the fall of the regime. Slow governmental response to large-scale confessionalist-motivated attacks against the Druze community epitomizes Druze fears about the new government. Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri denounced the attackers as terrorists similar to al Qaeda and ISIS and criticized the Syrian transitional government’s lack of protection of the Druze community in a speech on April 29.[xxii] This is similar to how Hijri recently described HTS as the ”armed terrorist faction” that controls Damascus, suggesting that he views Shara‘s HTS-dominated government forces and the likely Sunni attackers of Jaramana in a similar light.[xxiii] A Suwayda-based news outlet accused the government of remaining ”silent” on the numerous anti-Druze demonstrations that took place in Syrian cities.[xxiv] Other minority groups, such as the Kurds in northeastern Syria, are likely watching this incident with alarm. Kurdish political parties recently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[xxv] The transitional government’s inability to prevent confessionalist violence against minority groups is unlikely to build Kurdish confidence that the government will protect them if they disarm.  

Shara’s government took several initial steps following the Jaramana attacks that suggest it may move more resolutely to protect the Druze community. A transitional government delegation met with Jaramana’s Druze leaders on April 29 and agreed to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible.[xxvi] The GSS also coordinated with Druze militias to escort hundreds of Druze university students from Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces back to Jaramana and Suwayda Province.[xxvii] Security services were also deployed to Druze areas across Syria.[xxviii] These are minor steps that certainly do not meet the expectations that the Druze or Kurdish communities have demanded of Shara, however. Shara is unlikely to allay the fears of these groups without repeated concrete actions that take real steps towards protecting Syria’s minority communities.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Priorities: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners. Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government.
• Iran-China Relations: The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the IRGC, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.
• Druze-Government Relations in Syria: Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state.

Iran Update, April 28, 2025

Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials.[i] The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran is unlikely to make concessions on.[ii] Iranian officials repeatedly stressed that negotiations must remain strictly limited to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief and reaffirmed that zero uranium enrichment and missile discussions are non-negotiable red lines.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi called the talks serious and technical and added that while some disagreements are serious and complex, progress so far has been good, but warned that Iran’s optimism should remain “extremely cautious.”[iv] US President Donald Trump stated that the talks are going “very well” and that a "deal is going to be made" without "starting to drop bombs."[v] While Iranian and US officials described the talks as positive and productive, Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.

It is not clear what restrictions the United States hopes to put on Iran’s missile program. Iranian missile development could increase the threat from Iran’s missile program. Iran has previously hinted at ambitions to develop missiles with ranges beyond 2,000 kilometers, which would significantly expand the missile ranges to include US bases in the region, such as Diego Garcia. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases in the region in recent months in response to any military action.[vi] An unspecified senior Iranian military official stated that Iran could target Diego Garcia Island, located about 3,700 kilometers from Iran’s southern coast.[vii] Iran’s current missile range is around 2,000 kilometers, meaning Iran would need longer-range missiles or significant warhead modifications to reach such targets.[viii] These threats underscore how expanded missile capabilities would directly increase Iran’s threats beyond the Middle East. The Iranian missile program is one of the core pillars of Iran’s military strength, due to the weakness of its conventional armed forces, which makes it further unlikely that Iran would agree to include missile restrictions in the ongoing nuclear talks.  

The next round of indirect US-Iran talks is tentatively scheduled for May 3 in an undisclosed location in Europe, with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) experts expected to join the technical talks.[ix] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo separately met with AEOI Deputy Chief Behrouz Kamalvandi in Tehran on April 28 to discuss outstanding safeguards issues.[x]

 

A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26.[xi] Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[xii] The explosion occurred within the Sina Port and Marine Services Company (SPMCO) premises at the port.[xiii] SPMCO is subject to US Treasury secondary sanctions for its affiliation with the Mostazafan Foundation and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[xiv] The Associated Press reported on April 27 that the explosion was caused by the improper handling of a shipment of solid fuel intended for ballistic missiles, citing a private security firm.[xv] An unspecified individual with ties to the IRGC told the New York Times on April 26 that a container of sodium perchlorate exploded at the port and triggered a series of fires.[xvi] Sodium perchlorate can be converted to ammonium perchlorate, which is the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas in early 2025.[xvii] The IRGC Procurement Department of the Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), partially responsible for Iran's ballistic missile research and development, reportedly received the first shipment.[xviii] The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.

 

The presence of Chinese chemicals, regardless of whether the chemicals caused the explosion, further illustrates how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities. Western officials estimated that recent Chinese shipments of sodium perchlorate, if converted to ammonium perchlorate, can fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[xix] That amount of ammonium perchlorate can also produce larger quantities of smaller munitions that require less solid fuel, including shorter-range ballistic missiles. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which undermines the US maximum pressure campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero. Chinese assistance to Iran has likely exacerbated US military concerns with Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

 

The explosion at the port may further exacerbate Iran's deteriorating economic conditions. Iran will reportedly lose approximately $25 million per day since it halted operations at the port on April 26.[xx] Shahid Rajaee is Iran's largest port and accounts for 85 percent of Iran's shipping container traffic, including a significant portion of its oil exports.[xxi] The loss of the port—even temporarily—will likely worsen Iran's economic conditions and could cause internal unrest. Iranian media reported 70 deaths and over 1,200 confirmed injuries on April 28, which may also further stoke anti-regime sentiment and unrest.[xxii]

 

The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action. It is unclear if the attack overwhelmed air defenses or how close the projectiles came to hitting the Truman.  The Houthis claimed the attack on April 28, without specifying the number of systems they used in the attack.[xxiii] The US Navy confirmed on April 28 that a US Navy F/A-18 and tow tractor aboard the USS Harry S. Truman fell overboard into the Red Sea.[xxiv] An unspecified US official told CNN that the Truman made a ”hard turn” to evade Houthi fire, which contributed to the F/A-18 and tow tractor falling overboard.[xxv] The US Navy confirmed that the Truman remains fully operational, and all crew are accounted for. The Houthis will continue to optimize their strike packages and implement lessons learned as part of an effort to target and ultimately impact US Navy vessels in the Red Sea.

The Houthis claimed on April 26 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea.[xxvi]

 

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an eight-point framework agreement on March 10 that did not attempt to resolve the main issues between the two parties and appeared to lay out starting positions for future negotiations.[xxvii] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[xxviii] The Kurds expressed frustration after the government unveiled the Constitutional Declaration on March 13, which concentrated power in Shara’s hands and did not make allowances for popular participation in the political process.[xxix]

Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), have since unified and called on April 26 for a federal Syrian structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[xxx] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism "divisive" and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve "national unity."[xxxi] Shara emphasized that national unity remains a "red line" and reaffirmed that Damascus would protect Kurdish rights within a single governing entity.[xxxii]

Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and ”unity” as mutually exclusive concepts.[xxxiii] Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.[xxxiv] The Kurdish parties are simultaneously calling for greater Kurdish representation in the political process in Syria, thus demonstrating that the Kurds seek to be a part of the Syrian state.[xxxv] The calls for representation reflect that Shara has not upheld his responsibilities under the agreement regarding participation in the political process. There are currently no members from a major Kurdish political party in Shara’s cabinet.

The continued Damascus-Kurdish tension over the formation of the Syrian state and its structure could be further enflamed by the formation of the People’s Assembly in the coming weeks. Shara will appoint one-third of the representatives to the assembly, and a committee that Shara appoints will tap the remaining two-thirds of the assembly.[xxxvi] The formation of this assembly will be a key indicator of the direction of the Syrian state and the seriousness with which Shara intends to stick to his commitments under the March 10 Agreement.

 

Unverified reports continued to circulate in the Syrian information space that the Syrian transitional government and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are building up forces near Tishreen Dam in anticipation of renewed hostilities.[xxxvii] Syrian sources claimed that unspecified Syrian MoD factions deployed to Tishreen Dam on April 28.[xxxviii] Some sources indicated that the MoD sought to assert control over the dam by deploying forces, while other sources asserted the deployment was a show of force after rumors circulated that the ceasefire at the dam collapsed.[xxxix] International Coalition and NGO groups also reportedly deployed to the dam on April 28.[xl] The SDF was separately deployed to several villages on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xli] Turkey, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, and Syrian transitional government forces have not engaged the SDF near Tishreen Dam, eastern Aleppo Province, since early April.[xlii]

Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed political parties likely conspired to remove Halbousi as parliamentary speaker in late 2023 by using an unconstitutional Federal Supreme Court decision.[xliii] The Federal Supreme Court is heavily influenced by Iranian-backed factions.[xliv] Halbousi reportedly formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali in January 2025 after Halbousi’s Sunni rivals formed a bloc that excluded Halbousi.[xlv] This new bloc, the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, includes Mashhadani and top Iraqi Sunni rivals of Halbousi.[xlvi] The formation of this new coalition and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.[xlvii] Iranian-backed groups tried and failed to remove Mashhadani from his post as parliament speaker in January 2025 after he passed a law that favored Sunnis, for example.[xlviii]

The Baghdad Court of Appeals dismissed the charges that caused Halbousi’s removal as speaker in November 2023 on April 27.[xlix] The degree of control and coercion that Iranian-backed groups in Iraq exercise makes it improbable that such a decision would be taken without their acquiescence. The lack of response by Iranian-backed groups and their allies similarly suggests that they do not disapprove of the acquittal. Halbousi’s acquittal could pave the way for him to unseat Mashhadani before or after the upcoming November 2025 elections, which would support Halbousi’s ambition of returning to the speakership and the Iranian-backed groups’ desire to remove Mashhadani.

 

The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence on the Syrian government.[l] The Syrian government responded on April 14 to a letter that US diplomats sent in mid-March 2025 that laid out eight “confidence-building” measures.[li]  The Syrian government letter said that the transitional government plans to fully address five of the eight demands, including the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[lii]  A source familiar with the Syrian transitional government's approach to retaining foreign fighters said that Damascus seeks to delay a decision that would prevent the government from appointing foreign fighters to senior Syrian government roles for as long as possible.[liii] CTP-ISW assessed on March 26 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara would likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[liv] Damascus asked for further talks to establish "mutual understandings" around the place of foreign fighters in Syria and about permissions for US airstrikes in Syria.[lv] The letter pledged that Syria would not tolerate any threats to Western, Israeli, or US interests.[lvi]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials. One of the key disputes is reportedly over whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program. Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.
• Chemical Explosion in Iran: A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26. Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. China delivered the same precursor to Bandar Abbas earlier this year. These chemicals further illustrate how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities.
• Houthi Attack Campaign Against US Navy: The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action.
• Syrian Kurd-Syrian Government Negotiations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and ”unity” as mutually exclusive concepts. Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.
• Iraqi Politics: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani. The formation of a new coalition that includes Mashhadani and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.
• Syrian Sanctions Relief: The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government.

Previous Iran Updates

• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023