Iran Updates

 

 

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Maps

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.               

                                                                                                                                           

Previous versions of static maps are available in our past publications

Recent Iran Update

Iran Update, April 28, 2025

Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials.[i] The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran is unlikely to make concessions on.[ii] Iranian officials repeatedly stressed that negotiations must remain strictly limited to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief and reaffirmed that zero uranium enrichment and missile discussions are non-negotiable red lines.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi called the talks serious and technical and added that while some disagreements are serious and complex, progress so far has been good, but warned that Iran’s optimism should remain “extremely cautious.”[iv] US President Donald Trump stated that the talks are going “very well” and that a "deal is going to be made" without "starting to drop bombs."[v] While Iranian and US officials described the talks as positive and productive, Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.

It is not clear what restrictions the United States hopes to put on Iran’s missile program. Iranian missile development could increase the threat from Iran’s missile program. Iran has previously hinted at ambitions to develop missiles with ranges beyond 2,000 kilometers, which would significantly expand the missile ranges to include US bases in the region, such as Diego Garcia. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases in the region in recent months in response to any military action.[vi] An unspecified senior Iranian military official stated that Iran could target Diego Garcia Island, located about 3,700 kilometers from Iran’s southern coast.[vii] Iran’s current missile range is around 2,000 kilometers, meaning Iran would need longer-range missiles or significant warhead modifications to reach such targets.[viii] These threats underscore how expanded missile capabilities would directly increase Iran’s threats beyond the Middle East. The Iranian missile program is one of the core pillars of Iran’s military strength, due to the weakness of its conventional armed forces, which makes it further unlikely that Iran would agree to include missile restrictions in the ongoing nuclear talks.  

The next round of indirect US-Iran talks is tentatively scheduled for May 3 in an undisclosed location in Europe, with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) experts expected to join the technical talks.[ix] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo separately met with AEOI Deputy Chief Behrouz Kamalvandi in Tehran on April 28 to discuss outstanding safeguards issues.[x]

 

A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26.[xi] Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[xii] The explosion occurred within the Sina Port and Marine Services Company (SPMCO) premises at the port.[xiii] SPMCO is subject to US Treasury secondary sanctions for its affiliation with the Mostazafan Foundation and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[xiv] The Associated Press reported on April 27 that the explosion was caused by the improper handling of a shipment of solid fuel intended for ballistic missiles, citing a private security firm.[xv] An unspecified individual with ties to the IRGC told the New York Times on April 26 that a container of sodium perchlorate exploded at the port and triggered a series of fires.[xvi] Sodium perchlorate can be converted to ammonium perchlorate, which is the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas in early 2025.[xvii] The IRGC Procurement Department of the Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), partially responsible for Iran's ballistic missile research and development, reportedly received the first shipment.[xviii] The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.

 

The presence of Chinese chemicals, regardless of whether the chemicals caused the explosion, further illustrates how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities. Western officials estimated that recent Chinese shipments of sodium perchlorate, if converted to ammonium perchlorate, can fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[xix] That amount of ammonium perchlorate can also produce larger quantities of smaller munitions that require less solid fuel, including shorter-range ballistic missiles. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which undermines the US maximum pressure campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero. Chinese assistance to Iran has likely exacerbated US military concerns with Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

 

The explosion at the port may further exacerbate Iran's deteriorating economic conditions. Iran will reportedly lose approximately $25 million per day since it halted operations at the port on April 26.[xx] Shahid Rajaee is Iran's largest port and accounts for 85 percent of Iran's shipping container traffic, including a significant portion of its oil exports.[xxi] The loss of the port—even temporarily—will likely worsen Iran's economic conditions and could cause internal unrest. Iranian media reported 70 deaths and over 1,200 confirmed injuries on April 28, which may also further stoke anti-regime sentiment and unrest.[xxii]

 

The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action. It is unclear if the attack overwhelmed air defenses or how close the projectiles came to hitting the Truman.  The Houthis claimed the attack on April 28, without specifying the number of systems they used in the attack.[xxiii] The US Navy confirmed on April 28 that a US Navy F/A-18 and tow tractor aboard the USS Harry S. Truman fell overboard into the Red Sea.[xxiv] An unspecified US official told CNN that the Truman made a ”hard turn” to evade Houthi fire, which contributed to the F/A-18 and tow tractor falling overboard.[xxv] The US Navy confirmed that the Truman remains fully operational, and all crew are accounted for. The Houthis will continue to optimize their strike packages and implement lessons learned as part of an effort to target and ultimately impact US Navy vessels in the Red Sea.

The Houthis claimed on April 26 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea.[xxvi]

 

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an eight-point framework agreement on March 10 that did not attempt to resolve the main issues between the two parties and appeared to lay out starting positions for future negotiations.[xxvii] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[xxviii] The Kurds expressed frustration after the government unveiled the Constitutional Declaration on March 13, which concentrated power in Shara’s hands and did not make allowances for popular participation in the political process.[xxix]

Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), have since unified and called on April 26 for a federal Syrian structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[xxx] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism "divisive" and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve "national unity."[xxxi] Shara emphasized that national unity remains a "red line" and reaffirmed that Damascus would protect Kurdish rights within a single governing entity.[xxxii]

Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and ”unity” as mutually exclusive concepts.[xxxiii] Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.[xxxiv] The Kurdish parties are simultaneously calling for greater Kurdish representation in the political process in Syria, thus demonstrating that the Kurds seek to be a part of the Syrian state.[xxxv] The calls for representation reflect that Shara has not upheld his responsibilities under the agreement regarding participation in the political process. There are currently no members from a major Kurdish political party in Shara’s cabinet.

The continued Damascus-Kurdish tension over the formation of the Syrian state and its structure could be further enflamed by the formation of the People’s Assembly in the coming weeks. Shara will appoint one-third of the representatives to the assembly, and a committee that Shara appoints will tap the remaining two-thirds of the assembly.[xxxvi] The formation of this assembly will be a key indicator of the direction of the Syrian state and the seriousness with which Shara intends to stick to his commitments under the March 10 Agreement.

 

Unverified reports continued to circulate in the Syrian information space that the Syrian transitional government and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are building up forces near Tishreen Dam in anticipation of renewed hostilities.[xxxvii] Syrian sources claimed that unspecified Syrian MoD factions deployed to Tishreen Dam on April 28.[xxxviii] Some sources indicated that the MoD sought to assert control over the dam by deploying forces, while other sources asserted the deployment was a show of force after rumors circulated that the ceasefire at the dam collapsed.[xxxix] International Coalition and NGO groups also reportedly deployed to the dam on April 28.[xl] The SDF was separately deployed to several villages on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xli] Turkey, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, and Syrian transitional government forces have not engaged the SDF near Tishreen Dam, eastern Aleppo Province, since early April.[xlii]

Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed political parties likely conspired to remove Halbousi as parliamentary speaker in late 2023 by using an unconstitutional Federal Supreme Court decision.[xliii] The Federal Supreme Court is heavily influenced by Iranian-backed factions.[xliv] Halbousi reportedly formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali in January 2025 after Halbousi’s Sunni rivals formed a bloc that excluded Halbousi.[xlv] This new bloc, the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, includes Mashhadani and top Iraqi Sunni rivals of Halbousi.[xlvi] The formation of this new coalition and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.[xlvii] Iranian-backed groups tried and failed to remove Mashhadani from his post as parliament speaker in January 2025 after he passed a law that favored Sunnis, for example.[xlviii]

The Baghdad Court of Appeals dismissed the charges that caused Halbousi’s removal as speaker in November 2023 on April 27.[xlix] The degree of control and coercion that Iranian-backed groups in Iraq exercise makes it improbable that such a decision would be taken without their acquiescence. The lack of response by Iranian-backed groups and their allies similarly suggests that they do not disapprove of the acquittal. Halbousi’s acquittal could pave the way for him to unseat Mashhadani before or after the upcoming November 2025 elections, which would support Halbousi’s ambition of returning to the speakership and the Iranian-backed groups’ desire to remove Mashhadani.

 

The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence on the Syrian government.[l] The Syrian government responded on April 14 to a letter that US diplomats sent in mid-March 2025 that laid out eight “confidence-building” measures.[li]  The Syrian government letter said that the transitional government plans to fully address five of the eight demands, including the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[lii]  A source familiar with the Syrian transitional government's approach to retaining foreign fighters said that Damascus seeks to delay a decision that would prevent the government from appointing foreign fighters to senior Syrian government roles for as long as possible.[liii] CTP-ISW assessed on March 26 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara would likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[liv] Damascus asked for further talks to establish "mutual understandings" around the place of foreign fighters in Syria and about permissions for US airstrikes in Syria.[lv] The letter pledged that Syria would not tolerate any threats to Western, Israeli, or US interests.[lvi]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials. One of the key disputes is reportedly over whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program. Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.
• Chemical Explosion in Iran: A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26. Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. China delivered the same precursor to Bandar Abbas earlier this year. These chemicals further illustrate how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities.
• Houthi Attack Campaign Against US Navy: The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action.
• Syrian Kurd-Syrian Government Negotiations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and ”unity” as mutually exclusive concepts. Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.
• Iraqi Politics: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani. The formation of a new coalition that includes Mashhadani and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.
• Syrian Sanctions Relief: The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government.

Iran Update, April 25, 2025

Iran and the United States will hold separate technical- and high-level talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 26. Iranian media reported on April 25 that Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will lead Iran's technical team.[i] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal.[ii] US State Department Director of Policy Planning Michael Anton will lead the US technical team.[iii] The New York Times previously reported that the technical-level talks will focus on Iranian uranium enrichment and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying Iranian compliance with a nuclear agreement.[iv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the high-level talks in Oman.[v]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implied that Iran's recent cooperation with the United States to reach a nuclear deal is "temporary" during a speech to government officials on April 24.[vi] Khamenei may have emphasized the temporary nature of US-Iranian cooperation to assuage the concerns of hardline officials who oppose negotiations with the United States. Khamenei's main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States, at least temporarily, will help preserve regime stability by improving Iranian economic conditions and reducing the chance of a direct conflict with the United States.

CENTCOM Spokesperson Dave Eastburn stated on April 24 that CENTCOM has struck over 800 Houthi targets, including command-and-control sites, air defense systems, and advanced weapons production sites, since the start of the US air campaign on March 15. Eastburn said that the strikes have killed “hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders.”[vii]  Eastburn told CNN that “credible open sources” have reported “over 650 Houthi casualties” in CENTCOM airstrikes since March 15.[viii] Eastburn stated that Houthi ballistic missile launches have decreased by 87 percent and Houthi drone attacks have decreased by 65 percent since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign.[ix]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Iran and the United States will hold separate technical- and high-level talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 26. Iranian media reported on April 25 that Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will lead Iran's technical team. The New York Times previously reported that the technical-level talks will focus on Iranian uranium enrichment and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying Iranian compliance with a nuclear agreement.
• US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: CENTCOM Spokesperson Dave Eastburn stated on April 24 that CENTCOM has struck over 800 Houthi targets, including command-and-control sites, air defense systems, and advanced weapons production sites, since the start of the US air campaign on March 15. Eastburn said that the strikes have killed “hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders.” Eastburn stated that Houthi ballistic missile launches have decreased by 87 percent and Houthi drone attacks have decreased by 65 percent since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign.

Iran Update, April 24, 2025

Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran may calculate an interim deal would delay or prevent snapback sanctions or a strike.[i] Axios reported that Iran said it may not be possible to reach a final deal by US President Donald Trump's proposed 60-day deadline. Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement and previously warned that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[ii] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly told Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that he wants to focus on reaching a comprehensive deal within 60 days, but the two parties could reach an interim deal if both sides agree they need more time.[iii] Axios previously reported on April 10 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[iv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[v] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[vi] Iran agreed to yield its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures.[vii] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.

IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi continued to hold meetings on ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks. Grossi met with Witkoff on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[viii] Grossi separately met with the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese permanent representatives to the UN on April 24 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program.[ix] Iran, Russia, and China continue to present a unified position on US-Iran nuclear negotiations.

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited two air defense sites responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear facilities on April 24.[x] Sabahi Fard and Hajizadeh visited the Khondab Air Defense Group site near the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor in Markazi Province to inspect military units and defense capabilities at the site. The two commanders also inspected the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) air defense site in Esfahan Province.[xi]

Sabahi Fard previously inspected the Fordow air defense site near the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on April 16.[xii] These continued inspections likely reflect a broader Iranian effort to assess and reinforce air defense readiness around key nuclear facilities amid concerns about potential US or Israeli strikes.[xiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, according to two unspecified sources with knowledge of the issue who spoke to Axios. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Iranian Air Defense Inspections: Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran Update, April 23, 2025

A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) is conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the now-deposed Bashar al Assad regime. The group—Saraya Ansar al Sunnah—called for the killing of an Assad informant in Aleppo on April 13 and has claimed two killings targeting informants since then.[i] The group has conducted 19 other attacks targeting former Assad officials and the Alawite minority in western Syria as well.[ii] The group has also announced that it will attack the Druze community in southwestern Suwayda Province.[iii]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah appears to support IS and share its extremist ideology. The group has stated that it seeks to excommunicate the “apostates” who fought IS, suggesting that the group opposes Assad supporters and the transitional government and could eventually fight both.[iv] The group has also stated that it rejects worldly laws and modern borders, meaning that it recognizes neither the transitional government nor the borders of the Syrian state.[v] These statements indicate that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah would only acknowledge an Islamic polity under its interpretation of Sharia law, and that does not conform to internationally recognized borders. These views are extremely close to those of IS. The group denied that it cooperates with IS but acknowledged that cooperation “may happen in the future and will be announced as [it] happens.”[vi]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely seeks to destabilize the fragile political transition in Syria as part of its effort to establish an Islamic state. The group opposes a Syrian state that includes Alawites, Druze, or Shia, further indicating that it opposes the ongoing transition.[vii] The group’s killing of Syrians considered close to the Assad regime may be meant to stoke renewed conflict between Assad regime elements and the transitional government. These killings could generate support for the group from other sectarian Islamists and encourage Assad loyalists to reorganize militarily to defend themselves. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah could probably co-opt easily s ome of the sectarian Islamists that have already formed vigilante groups to attack Assad loyalists.[viii] A reorganized force of Assad loyalists could seriously threaten the transitional government. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah could exploit the ensuing tensions to recruit new fighters and form an armed, hardline opposition to the current transition process. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is not currently strong enough to seriously threaten the transitional government, though it could strengthen over time.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is exploiting real grievances in Syria caused by a lack of transitional justice in order to justify its attacks on Assad loyalists. The group’s killing of alleged Assad loyalists reflects that some Syrians believe that there has been no justice for the atrocities that the Assad regime committed.[ix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely views the punishment of Assad loyalists as secondary to the establishment of an Islamist state, however. Concerted efforts by the transitional government to hold former Assad officials accountable should undermine Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s messaging, nonetheless. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns the extrajudicial killings conducted by Saraya Ansar al Sunnah and vigilante groups of all political persuasions.

Iran has reportedly established ties with extremist groups to destabilize the Syrian transition, meaning that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s destabilizing activities could support Iranian objectives.[x] There is no evidence that Iran supports Saraya Ansar al Sunnah at this time. But Iran has previously engaged other extremist Salafi-jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda, in support of its objectives.[xi]

Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on April 23 that Iran is constructing a security perimeter around two underground nuclear tunnel complexes located within Mount Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz enrichment complex, citing commercially available satellite imagery.[xii] The International Atomic Energy Agency has not visited either site. Imagery from March 2025 shows partially erected wall panels and road grading and leveling efforts to install a security perimeter. The security perimeter appears to encircle the base of the mountain and join with one side of the perimeter around Natanz. Iran announced in September 2020 that it was building a tunnel complex near Natanz to make advanced centrifuges after a former centrifuge production facility was destroyed in July 2020.[xiii] More advanced centrifuges enable Iran to enrich uranium at a faster rate.[xiv] These centrifuges may allow Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program in the event that, after a nuclear deal, Iran decreases its amount of highly enriched uranium and then the nuclear deal collapses. The second, much smaller, tunnel complex located within Mount Kolang Gaz La was revealed in 2007 but was inactive until recently, according to ISIS.[xv] ISIS reported that the complex may store enriched uranium stockpiles or centrifuge-related equipment. The report also stated that construction of the security perimeter has been ongoing at least since 2023, but has accelerated in recent months. The United States and Israel have repeatedly threatened to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.[xvi]

Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Vice Premier Din Xuexiang and Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, China, on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations and deliver a written message from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[xvii] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s intent to brief China, alongside Russia, on all nuclear-related developments, citing China’s roles as a UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board member.[xviii] Unspecified diplomatic sources told anti-regime media that Araghchi also carried a written message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Chinese President Xi Jinping, affirming that the any agreement with the United States ”solely intended to reduce tensions” and Iran will not alter its ”Look to the East” policy or the terms of its 25-year Sino-Iranian cooperation agreement.[xix] The Look to the East policy aims to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, like China, to expand its global partnerships and boost its economic and political interests.[xx] China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil. China’s Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions.[xxi] Iran reportedly seeks to include provisions in a potential nuclear deal to guarantee oil exports—especially to China—and prevent future US “maximum pressure“ sanctions that could disrupt its energy revenues.[xxii]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria.  Shara alluded to procuring weapons from Russia or additional countries as part of developing new military basing agreements in an interview with the New York Times published on April 23.[xxiii] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage over the medium term, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over shipping arms and other military equipment to Syria. Russia will likely already face materiel shortages in 2026 and 2027 if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate, and many of these assets will be difficult to replace.[xxiv]  Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria.[xxv] These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian basing rights in Syria. Syrian and Western media  have reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia’s former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[xxvi]

Shara will likely pursue weapon supply agreements with alternative partners as it becomes clear Russia will not exchange arms for basing rights. The Syrian transitional government’s armor, mechanized vehicles, and aircraft consisted predominantly of Russian-made models seized from the Assad regime.[xxvii] Some of these systems were probably inoperable by the fall of the regime, though Israeli airstrikes have also destroyed a significant portion of Syrian stocks since December 2024.[xxviii]  It is unclear at this time how Shara would finance these arms purchases from other states, given the dire state of Syria’s economy.  Shara confirmed to the New York Times that he had not yet received offers from ”other nations to replace Syrian arms.”[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Salafi-Jihadi Group in Syria: A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) is conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the now-deposed Bashar al Assad regime. The group has stated that it seeks to excommunicate the “apostates” that fought IS, suggesting that the group opposes Assad supporters and the transitional government and could eventually fight both. The group likely seeks to destabilize Syria’s fragile transition.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz.
• Iran, China, and Russia Continue Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries.
• Syria and Russia: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria.

Iran Update, April 22, 2025

Unspecified Iranian sources told a Qatari-owned, London-based outlet on April 22 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are progressing “beyond belief.”[i] Iran could calculate that by framing the talks as positive, even if the reality does not match, Iran could delay a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program or the imposition of snapback sanctions on Iran. The Iranian sources claimed that the United States, which was represented by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, did not demand complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program and expressed approval to the principle of Iran’s right to enrich uranium during the nuclear talks. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, which is the same level agreed upon in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[ii] The sources stated that they believe Iran and the United States will reach an agreement within the next two months.[iii]  Iran’s negotiating team could calculate that presenting the talks as positive could enable them to continue the talks and thereby avoid negative consequences while still failing to make any serious concessions.

Former Iranian diplomat Abdolreza Faraji Rad also told the Qatari-owned outlet on April 22 that the upcoming US-Iran technical talks will focus on “enrichment levels and centrifuges.”[iv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei confirmed on April 22 that the US and Iran agreed to reschedule the technical talks from April 23 to April 26 at the suggestion of Oman.[v] Rad stated that the outcome of the technical talks would be presented to US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on April 26.[vi] The head of a Tehran-based think tank stated that the technical talks will focus on what to do about Iran’s reserves of 60 percent enriched uranium.

Syrian authorities arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Damascus after the United States requested that the transitional government expel Palestinian militants in exchange for partial sanctions relief. The General Security Services (GSS) arrested PIJ’s Syria Operations Commander Khaled Khaled and PIJ’s Organizing Committee head Yasser al Zafari in Damascus on April 19 and 17, respectively.[vii] PIJ released a statement on April 22 in which it asked ”our brothers in the Syrian government” to release the two men.[viii]  The Syrian Interior Ministry acknowledged the arrests but did not clarify why it arrested the pair.[ix] The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to ”[crack] down on extremist groups” and end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief.[x] It is unclear if the PIJ arrests are tied to this request, but Shara may view the pursuit of Palestinian groups with long-standing ties to Iran and the Assad regime as a compromise that would be favorable to the United States but also palatable to his Syrian constituents. The Assad regime has hosted Syria-based PIJ fighters over the years and allowed PIJ to base its headquarters in Damascus.[xi] It is unclear how many Palestinian militias currently operate in Syria, given that the Syrian government has largely expelled other Axis of Resistance militias, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xii]

The new Syrian People’s Assembly may more closely resemble previous Shura councils used by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions, rather than a Western-style legislative branch. Syrian constitutional committee member Ahmed al Qabri told Qatari-owned, London-based media on April 18 that the Syrian transitional government, which is led by Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara has begun “consultations” to select committee members that will select two-thirds of the People’s Assembly.[xiii] The People’s Assembly is a transitional legislative body that will propose, adopt, and amend Syrian laws, according to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration.[xiv] Shara’s direct hand in forming the People’s Assembly enables him to wield significant influence over who and which groups will be represented in the body. The constitution declaration allows Shara to directly appoint one-third of the body’s members.[xv] Electoral sub-committees will choose the other two-thirds of the Assembly’s members.[xvi] A supreme committee, which is directly appointed by Shara, will "oversee” these electoral sub-committees, suggesting the Shara-appointed Supreme Committee could veto any actions taken by the electoral sub-committees.[xvii]

The methods through which Shara will form the People's Assembly imitate how HTS elected the members of its Shura Council. The HTS General Shura Council effectively served as the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government’s legislature from 2017 to 2024.[xviii] The majority of Idlib residents did not participate in electing the council’s members, however. HTS tasked a small number of representatives with nominating and “electing” members of the council.[xix] Representatives were chosen from “diverse” northern Syrian regions, tribes, camps, and unions, but the methods of their selection allowed HTS to wield influence over the council appointments.[xx] Syrian opposition media reported in 2021 that the majority of the council’s candidates were “pre-determined” and approved by HTS.[xxi] Other Syrian groups, like Ahrar al Sham, previously used Shura Councils to grant representation to the different armed groups that fought under their banner.

Such a consultative body differs from Western expectations of representative democracy, as it does not derive its authority from the people in the form of popular elections. It is unlikely that the similarities between HTS’s former General Shura Council’s and the People’s Assembly’s elections are a coincidence. Current Syrian Justice Minister and close Shara adviser Mazhar al Wais noted in December 2024 that Shara, when asked about parliamentary-style rule, spoke instead of “advisory and consultative councils” and specifically compared a possible Syrian parliament to a Shura Council.[xxii] This does not necessarily suggest that Shara will renege on his commitment to eventually hold “free and fair elections” to elect a permanent representative legislature.[xxiii] The People’s Assembly is only designed to be a transitional mechanism, but the Constitutional Declaration notes that the transition will last for five years.[xxiv] Council members are only permitted to serve for 30 months or until a permanent constitution is drafted and proper elections are held.[xxv] Shara could theoretically plan to introduce a consultative-style body in the short term as a precursor to a Western model of parliament in the coming years as Syria stabilizes. He has not made explicit promises about doing so, however.

Suwaydawi political and civil society factions established the “National Assembly” in Suwayda on April 19 in opposition to the Syrian transitional government.[xxvi] The National Assembly interim leader Omar al Aysami stated that the organization opposes the Syrian National Dialogue Conference and subsequent transitional Constitutional Declaration, which centralized power under transitional Syrian President Ahmed al Shara.[xxvii] Aysami added that the National Assembly seeks to establish a unified, representative, political institution that derives legitimacy from the people. The National Assembly also seeks to organize armed factions and weapons under a single command within the province. The Druze community, which is predominantly located in Daraa and Suwayda provinces, has been fractured into distinct armed factions, but many have held similar reservations about joining the transitional government.[xxviii] These factions appear to be coalescing into a unified coalition. CTP-ISW warned on March 17 that widespread Suwaydawi rejection of the constitution could impact ongoing governance and military integration agreements.[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified Iranian sources told a Qatari-owned, London-based outlet on April 22 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are progressing “beyond belief.” Iran could calculate that by framing the talks as positive, even if the reality does not match, Iran could delay a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program or the imposition of snapback sanctions on Iran.
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Damascus: Syrian authorities arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Damascus after the United States requested that the transitional government expel Palestinian militants in exchange for partial sanctions relief.
• Syria’s Legislative Branch: The new Syrian People’s Assembly may more closely resemble previous consultative or advisory councils used by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions, rather than a Western-style legislative branch. The methods through which Shara will form the People's Assembly imitate how HTS elected the members of its Shura Council, and senior former HTS officials have explicitly compared a future Syrian parliament to a Shura Council.
• Political Opposition to the Syrian Transitional Government: Suwaydawi political and civil society factions established the “National Assembly” in Suwayda on April 19 in opposition to the Syrian transitional government.

Iran Update, April 21, 2025

Iran and the United States held a second round of nuclear talks in Rome on April 19.[i] The New York Times reported that Iran and the United States agreed on an agenda for “rapid-paced negotiations” during the talks on April 19.[ii]  Fast-paced negotiations would not necessarily indicate that Iran and the United States have made progress toward resolving outstanding issues, such as Iranian uranium enrichment levels. Iranian officials told the New York Times that the “rapid-paced negotiations” would not require Iran to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. Iranian officials have emphasized in recent days that Iran is willing to reduce its uranium enrichment but have rejected demands to completely dismantle the Iranian nuclear program.[iii]

 

Senior US, Iranian, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials conducted a series of meetings on the sidelines of the nuclear talks in Rome. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Rome on April 19.[iv] Grossi previously met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on April 16 and17 to discuss technical issues and the US-Iran talks.[v] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also met with Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Tajani in Rome on April 19.[vi] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer was reportedly in Rome at the time of the talks..[vii] Dermer and Witkoff met in Paris on April 18.[viii]

 

Iran and the United States plan to hold technical-level discussions in Muscat, Oman, on April 23, followed by a third round of high-level talks in Muscat on April 26.[ix] The New York Times reported that the technical-level talks will focus on the maximum level to which Iran could enrich uranium and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying Iranian compliance with a nuclear agreement.[x] The Wall Street Journal reported on April 19 that major intelligence gaps remain in the IAEA’s understanding of Iran’s nuclear program.[xi] Iran’s removal of monitoring equipment and limits on inspector access in recent years has contributed to these intelligence gaps.[xii]

 

The US Department of Defense will reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to "less than a thousand US forces” in the coming months.[xiii] Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell announced on April 18 that the reduction of troops will be a “deliberate and conditions-based process.”[xiv] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024, when the United States increased the number of troops to 2,000 US personnel.[xv] Two senior US officials told the New York Times on April 17 that the United States will close three bases in Syria, including Mission Support Site Green Village and Mission Support Site Euphrates.[xvi] Both bases have enabled US forces to support Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in zones where ISIS cells operate. A full US withdrawal from Syria would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. Parnell said that US Central Command (CENTCOM) will remain “poised” to conduct airstrikes targeting ISIS members in Syria and will continue to support coalition partners to degrade ISIS .[xvii] Parnell called on the international community to repatriate their nationals from detention camps in northeastern Syria.[xviii]

 

Anti-Assad groups appear to be conducting acts of vigilante justice in response to the Syrian transitional government’s failure to prosecute and hold accountable former Assad regime officials. A group of Aleppo-based former opposition fighters formed a “task force” on April 21 to kill former Assad regime members.[xix] A Syrian source claimed that the group has begun tracking former regime members in Aleppo Province.[xx] A former opposition fighter killed a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) sniper in Talkalakh, Homs Province, on April 20.[xxi] The opposition fighter claimed that he had filed a complaint with the government that accused the sniper of killing his relatives. The opposition fighter stated that he took matters into his own hands after the government failed to respond to his complaint. Anti-government Salafi-jihadi militia Saraya Ansar al Sunnah separately claimed on April 19 that it executed a recently-imprisoned former regime member in Rabiah, Hama Province.[xxii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah said that the execution was part of a new campaign targeting former regime members who were recently released from prison.[xxiii] The Syrian transitional government has released at least three groups of former Assad regime officials from Adra Prison in Damascus since March 2025.[xxiv] Most of the released prisoners are former SAA personnel, including commissioned officers.[xxv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah separately killed an alleged former regime informant in Homs Province on April 20.[xxvi]

These acts of vigilante justice highlight the urgent need for the Syrian transitional government to conduct transparent transitional justice. The transitional government has thus far failed to publicly prosecute high-profile former Assad regime members who committed crimes against the Syrian people under Assad. The transitional government must charge, prosecute, and sentence former Assad regime members to demonstrate its commitment to transitional justice. Vigilante justice undermines trust in the transitional government and can create fear among those being targeted.

Documents leaked by Iraqi militias suggest that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s time in Camp Bucca may have been instrumental in enabling him to return to Syria to establish Jabhat al Nusra. The documents are also mostly consistent with Western reporting and Shara’s own statements about his background. US forces detained Shara in 2005, probably only months after he returned to Iraq at some point between late 2003 and early 2005.[xxvii] Shara spent five years at Camp Bucca after a brief stay at Abu Ghraib.[xxviii] Camp Bucca was a notorious incubator for future Islamic State (IS) commanders and Shara’s detainment at Bucca probably enabled him to build relationships with the “intermediaries” who put him in contact with IS “caliph” Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.[xxix] Leaked internal IS letters suggest that Shara and Baghdadi had a contentious relationship with major ideological differences.[xxx] These differences, combined with Shara’s relatively minor status, probably explains why Baghdadi only gave Shara 50-60,000 USD and 6 other fighters to establish Jabhat al Nusra after Shara originally asked for 100 men.[xxxi]

 

Saudi media reported on April 19 that the Houthis have placed landmines around Hudaydah City in preparation for a potential Yemeni Armed Forces ground offensive, citing unspecified government sources.[xxxii] The Houthis have previously used landmines to fortify Houthi positions against Yemeni Armed Forces attacks.[xxxiii] Landmines are a relatively inexpensive way for the Houthis to fortify their defensive positions on the coastal plains in Hudaydah Governorate against a potential ground incursion from the south.

 

Cryptocurrency fraud investigation company TRM Labs reported on April 17 that the Houthis are part of a cryptocurrency network that includes Russian and Chinese military equipment manufacturers.[xxxiv] TRM Labs reported that eight Houthi cryptocurrency addresses sent over $900 million to addresses connected to a Russian broker that sells drones and other military equipment on behalf of Chinese manufacturers.[xxxv] The Houthi addresses sent transactions through an intermediary address, which has conducted several transactions on behalf of financial facilitators linked to Hezbollah. US-sanctioned Houthi financier Said al Jamal’s network is also part of this cryptocurrency network. The US Department of the Treasury previously connected five cryptocurrency addresses to Jamal in December 2024.[xxxvi] TRM Labs reported that these five addresses have received over $330 million in incoming transactions.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Talks: Iran and the United States held a second round of nuclear talks in Rome on April 19. Senior US, Iranian, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials conducted a series of meetings on the sidelines of the nuclear talks in Rome. Iran and the United States plan to hold technical-level discussions in Muscat, Oman, on April 23, followed by a third round of high-level talks in Muscat on April 26.
• US Military Withdrawal from Syria: The US Department of Defense will reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to "less than a thousand US forces” in the coming months. Two senior US officials told the New York Times on April 17 that the United States will close three bases in Syria, including Mission Support Site Green Village and Mission Support Site Euphrates. A full US withdrawal from Syria would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute.
• Vigilante Justice in Syria: Anti-Assad groups appear to be conducting acts of vigilante justice in response to the Syrian transitional government’s failure to prosecute and hold accountable former Assad regime officials. The transitional government has thus far failed to publicly prosecute high-profile former Assad regime members who committed crimes against the Syrian people under Assad. The transitional government must charge, prosecute, and sentence former Assad regime members to demonstrate its commitment to transitional justice.
• Ahmed al Shara: Documents leaked by Iraqi militias suggest that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s time in Camp Bucca may have been instrumental in enabling him to return to Syria to establish Jabhat al Nusra. The documents are also mostly consistent with Western reporting and Shara’s own statements about his background. Camp Bucca was a notorious incubator for future Islamic State (IS) commanders and Shara’s detainment at Bucca probably enabled him to build relationships with the “intermediaries” who put him in contact with IS “caliph” Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
• Houthi Military Preparations: Saudi media reported on April 19 that the Houthis have placed landmines around Hudaydah City in preparation for a potential Yemeni Armed Forces ground offensive, citing unspecified government sources. The Houthis have previously used landmines to fortify Houthi positions against Yemeni Armed Forces attacks.

Iran Update, April 18, 2025

Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that caps Iranian uranium enrichment but would leave the necessary infrastructure in place to enable Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program if the deal collapsed. Anti-regime Iranian media reported that Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that capped Iranian uranium enrichment but preserved Iranian nuclear infrastructure, such as advanced centrifuges.[i] The reported plan does not include a timeline for the phases of the deal. This proposal would likely preserve Iran’s ability to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program. Former UN weapons inspector David Albright warned on April 18 that Iran could make enough weapons-grade uranium in 25 days, even with a small low-enriched uranium (LEU) stock, if it maintains all of its current centrifuges.[ii] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[iii] Iran has increased its number of its operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[iv]

 An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on April 18 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will refuse any deal that requires Iran to dismantle centrifuges, halt uranium enrichment, and reduce its stockpile below Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[v] The reported Iranian proposal lacks sunset clauses, but it leaves Iran’s centrifuge infrastructure intact, which allows Iran to rapidly rebuild its stockpile of enriched uranium.[vi] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately stated on April 18 that the United States seeks a durable deal that will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon both now and in the future.[vii]  The Iranian proposal does not achieve the stated US government objective of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon now and in the future because it leaves the necessary infrastructure in place to rapidly build a weapon if the deal collapses.

Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on April 18 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Mossad Director David Barnea in Paris  to discuss the upcoming US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on April 19.[xiv] Iran and the United States will continue the second round of negotiations in Rome, Italy, on April 19.[xv]

An analysis of available satellite imagery from a Chinese military-affiliated satellite company shows that the vast majority of Houthi attacks took place in areas imaged by the Chinese company. An open-source analyst posted a map on X on April 17 that shows the available satellite imagery overlaid with Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.[xvi] It is unsurprising that a commercial satellite company would take images of a highly trafficked maritime route like the Red Sea, but the Houthi access to the imagery could improve Houthi targeting capabilities when used in conjunction with other Houthi targeting methods. This map comes after reports that this Chinese military-linked satellite company, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd, provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17.[xvii]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck Houthi fuel stockpiles and oil export and import facilities at Ras Issa Port, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 17.[xviii] CENTCOM stated that they conducted these airstrikes to ”eliminate” the Houthis‘ fuel source and isolate the Houthis economically.[xix] The strikes damaged vessels at the port, three oil depots, oil transporters, and pipelines.[xx] This satellite imagery also showed possible oil leaks into the Red Sea.[xxi] A Yemeni economic analyst estimated that CENTCOM airstrikes on Ras Issa Port, which the Houthis have controlled since 2016, resulted in approximately $700 million worth of losses for the Houthis.[xxii] A Saudi news outlet noted that the Houthis received millions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil and gas exports, among other Houthi energy imports, through Ras Issa Port.[xxiii] The Houthi-run Health Ministry reported that these CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 74 people and injured 171 others.[xxiv] Many of the casualties were workers at the port.

A large proportion of US airstrikes have targeted Hudaydah Governorate, likely in an effort to degrade Houthi targeting capabilities and degrade other Houthi infrastructure. CENTCOM has conducted at least 112 airstrikes in at least 33 sorties targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Governorate on the Red Sea coast, since the start of its airstrike campaign on March 15.[xxv] Hudaydah Governorate is important because it hosts Hudaydah Port, Yemen’s largest port, and Ras Issa and al Salif ports. The coastal radar systems in Hudaydah allow the Houthis to track maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, facilitating their drone and missile attacks on international shipping.[xxvi]  CENTCOM airstrikes in Hudaydah have reportedly targeted and killed mid-level commanders who coordinate logistics in Houthi-controlled areas, and Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[xxvii]

An air campaign can only achieve temporary effects. The temporal effects of this air campaign could be significant, however, and could deter the Houthis from continuing attacks if the United States renders the Houthis unwilling to continue. A campaign to permanently prevent the Houthis from using Hudaydah Governorate to launch attacks targeting international shipping would require a ground operation to take and hold ground.

The US will withdraw from three bases in northeastern Syria, including two positions designed to support counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province.[xxviii] Two senior US officials told the New York Times on April 17 that the US will close three bases: Mission Support Site Green Village, Mission Support Site Euphrates, and an unspecified smaller third facility.[xxix] Both mission support sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province.[xxx] These bases have enabled US forces to support Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations along the Euphrates River in zones where ISIS cells operate and collect zakat from locals.[xxxi] The New York Times reported that the US withdrawal began on April 17, which locally based Syrian media also confirmed.[xxxii] The officials also said that the United States will withdraw about 600 of the 2,000 US troops currently deployed and that the remaining 1,400 US troops will remain stationed in Syria.[xxxiii] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024.[xxxiv]

The officials said that the United States will assess after 60 days whether to withdraw additional troops from Syria.[xxxv] A full US withdrawal from Syria would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. US forces provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the SDF and assist SDF units in managing and securing detention camps in northern Syria. The Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) is expected to soon deploy to northeastern Syria in order to backfill the SDF as part of a recent integration agreement, but MoD forces are unlikely to provide any suitable replacement for US forces, at least in the short term. Syrian transitional government forces deployed for the first time in former SDF-controlled territory will need time to organize their forces and understand their new areas of operation. The international coalition reportedly conducted a joint patrol with the SDF and MoD forces along the M4 highway between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr on April 18, likely in preparation for MoD deployments in the region. [xxxvi]

The United States reportedly brokered a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on April 17.[xxxvii] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi led an SDF delegation to meet with Turkish officials at the Tishreen Dam, which marked the first direct meeting between the two sides.[xxxviii] Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched near-daily attacks on SDF positions across northeastern Syria from November 2024 through late March 2025.[xxxix] Turkish officials have consistently demanded that the SDF fully disarm and integrate into the Syrian MoD before reaching a ceasefire agreement.[xl] It is unclear what the terms of this ceasefire agreement are and to what degree the SDF has fulfilled previous Turkish demands.

The Houthis claimed on April 18 that the group shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone with a locally produced missile over Sanaa Governorate.[xli] The Houthis have claimed that they have shot down 20 drones since the beginning of the October 7 War.[xlii] A Yemen analyst reported that the Houthis likely used relatively makeshift air defenses to quickly fire before moving to avoid strikes in response.[xliii] The same analyst noted that many of these systems are repurposed radar and optical systems from the former Yemeni Armed Forces or supplied by Iran and built with Chinese technology.[xliv] These air defense systems can intercept slow, relatively low-flying drones, but cannot destroy cruise missiles or advanced fighter aircraft.[xlv]

 

Iraqi media reported on April 17 that the Iraqi federal government replaced Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades controlled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with PMF brigades close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani along the Iraq-Syria border.[xlvi] “Official sources” told al Aalem that the PMF 44th and 72nd Brigades had deployed near Sinjar and al Qaim, respectively, following the withdrawal of PMF units affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Liwa al Taluf from near al Qaim. The PMF 44th and 72nd Brigades are known as “shrine militias” that are loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani and the Iraqi Defense Ministry.[xlvii] The “official sources” and a “prominent” Iranian-backed Iraqi militia member added that these deployments are part of an Iraqi federal government plan to “reduce international and tribal pressure” on the government to remove the militias from the border.[xlviii] An advisor to the Anbar Provincial Council told al Aalem that the incoming PMF brigades are “more disciplined and have an excellent relationship with the Anbar tribes.”[xlix] CTP-ISW has not observed photo evidence of these redeployments. It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would withdraw from their positions on the Syria-Iraq border because the militias derive significant economic benefit from controlling these border crossings.[l] UK-based media reported in late December 2024 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that had recently withdrawn from Syria to Iraq after the collapse of the Assad regime would soon begin moving from the al Qaim area due to unspecified regional and international pressure on the Iraqi federal government to remove militias from the Syrian border.[li]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Proposed Nuclear Deal: Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that caps Iranian uranium enrichment but would leave the necessary infrastructure in place to enable Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program if the deal collapsed.
• China-Houthi Connections: An analysis of available satellite imagery from a Chinese military-affiliated satellite company shows that the vast majority of Houthi attacks took place in areas imaged by the Chinese company. An open-source analyst posted a map on X on April 17 that shows the available satellite imagery overlaid with Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.
• CENTCOM Airstrikes in Ras Issa, Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck Houthi fuel stockpiles and oil export and import facilities at Ras Issa Port, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 17.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: A large proportion of US airstrikes have targeted Hudaydah Governorate, likely in an effort to degrade Houthi targeting capabilities and degrade other Houthi infrastructure. An air campaign can only achieve temporary effects. A campaign to permanently prevent the Houthis from using Hudaydah Governorate to launch attacks targeting international shipping would require a ground operation to take and hold ground.
• US Withdrawal from Syria: The United States will withdraw from three bases in northeastern Syria, including two positions designed to support counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province. The US troop presence in Syria will drop from 2,000 to 1,400 under the current drawdown plan.
• Turkey-SDF Ceasefire Agreement: The United States reportedly brokered a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on April 17.

Iran Update, April 17, 2025

Senior Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on April 17. Saudi Arabia may seek to reassure Iran about its positions on a potential strike on Iran and a potential ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[i] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent statements by senior Iranian officials threatening to attack any base “used by Americans” in a potential strike on Iran.[ii] These threats likely seek to discourage US partners in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, from supporting an attack on Iran. Iran previously threatened in October 2024 that it would attack Saudi energy infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supported an Israeli attack on Iran.[iii] Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that Saudi Arabia would not support an attack on Iran.

Salman, accompanied by Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to reassure Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[iv] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent reports that some Gulf countries and anti-Houthi factions in Yemen are exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government ground offensive against the Houthis.[v] Unspecified Saudi officials told Western media on April 14 that Saudi Arabia would not participate in a ground offensive.[vi] Iran views the Houthis as an integral part of the Axis of Resistance, particularly since Israel has significantly degraded other key members of the Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and Hamas.[vii]

A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17.[viii] This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against US vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis are continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade. The US government raised concerns to the Chinese government about Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd. (CGSTL) providing satellite intelligence to the Houthis.[ix] The Chinese government reportedly ignored these concerns. CGSTL has ties to the Chinese military through China’s military-civilian “fusion” program, which aims to integrate private sector work with military research and development, according to research done by a Washington-based security consulting firm.[x] CGSTL’s provision of satellite intelligence to the Houthis is part of ongoing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian support to the Houthis. Houthi-owned military communications and domestic surveillance companies have reportedly imported Chinese-made communications equipment.[xi] Iran and Russia have provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis, which aids Houthi attacks on international shipping.[xii] The Yemeni coast guard and Omani customs have previously seized shipments of Chinese-made military equipment to the Houthis, such as hydrogen fuel cells for powering missiles and drone propellers.[xiii] The Houthis reportedly told China and Russia in March 2024 that the Houthis would not target Chinese and Russian-flagged vessels transiting the Red Sea, according to several sources with knowledge on Houthi leadership discussions.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) deployed an Israeli EL/M-2084 radar at the Emirati Bosaso military base on the coast of the autonomous Puntland region of northern Somalia.[xiv] The UAE reportedly replaced an older radar system with the new EL/M-2084, which has a range of 256 nautical miles.[xv] The UAE could use this radar to detect various types of projectiles, including low-flying drones and high-altitude ballistic missiles, over the Gulf of Aden.[xvi] The UAE could also use the radar to detect Houthi attacks on internationally-recognized Yemeni government targets, such as gas and oil export terminals in southern Yemen that the Houthis have previously targeted.[xvii] These energy export terminals are the internationally-recognized Yemeni government’s economic lifeline.[xviii]

The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief.[xix]  The Washington Post reviewed a list of eight “confidence-building” conditions that US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi delivered to Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[xx] The United States is considering extending an existing sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions exemption if the Syrian transitional government fulfills these conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[xxi] The US Department of State and Department of the Treasury confirmed in early April that they were considering further “waivers, licenses, and assistance from foreign partners and allies” for Syria.[xxii] The list of conditions includes counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing structure.”[xxiii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[xxiv] The United States also called on the Syrian government to “issue a formal public declaration banning all Palestinian militias and political activities” and to deport members of these Palestinian groups.[xxv] Shara is unlikely to be willing or able to ban all Palestinian political activity in Syria but could agree to expel Palestinian militias from Syria in exchange for sanctions relief. The Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, which includes Palestinian militias such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has sought to destabilize the new Syrian government and weaken the government’s control over Syria.[xxvi] It is unclear how many Palestinian militias currently operate in Syria given that the Syrian government has largely expelled other Axis of Resistance militias, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xxvii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to indicate that he seeks to develop stronger diplomatic and political relations with the Syrian transitional government. Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Russian interests in Syria with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani in Moscow on April 17.[xxviii] Putin emphasized that Russia supports Syrian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and discussed providing aid to Syria with Thani.[xxix]  Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria. These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia appears to have begun an incentives-based economic relationship with Syria and has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria.[xxx] Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[xxxi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia might try to use these economic incentives to secure basing rights in Syria.[xxxii] Thani said during a joint press conference with Putin that he and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara discussed Russo-Syrian relations during Shara’s visit to Qatar on April 15 and that Shara is “determined to continue this cooperation.”[xxxiii]

Syrian media reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia’s former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[xxxiv] The Syrian government and SDF likely permitted Russia to maintain limited forces at these bases while negotiations have continued since December 2024. Russia’s presence at Hmeimim and Tartus has generated significant attention given their relevance to Russian strategic objectives in the Mediterranean Sea, but Syrian media reported that a likely small contingent of Russian forces also remain at Qamishli, which is located in SDF-held territory.[xxxv] A Kurdish source posted a video on April 17 that showed a Russian An-72 transport aircraft on Qamishli’s airstrip.[xxxvi] Two Russian-flagged vehicles approached the aircraft.[xxxvii]  SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi stated on April 14 that a Russian presence at Qamishli was “not a concern” and that Shara appears to be considering allowing Russia to maintain its force presence in Syria under a new agreement.[xxxviii] 

Key Takeaways:

• Saudi Defense Minister in Iran: Senior Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on April 17. Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that Saudi Arabia would not support an attack on Iran. Salman, accompanied by Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to reassure Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.
• China-Houthi Cooperation: A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17. This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against US vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis are continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade.
• US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is unlikely to be willing or able to ban all Palestinian political activity in Syria but could agree to expel Palestinian militias from Syria in exchange for sanctions relief. The Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, which includes Palestinian militias such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has sought to destabilize the new Syrian government and weaken the government’s control over Syria.
• Russian Cooperation with the Syrian Transitional Government: Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to indicate that he seeks to develop stronger diplomatic and political relations with the Syrian transitional government. Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Russian interests in Syria with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani in Moscow on April 17. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia might try to use economic incentives to secure basing rights in Syria.

Iran Update, April 16, 2025

Iran is unlikely to accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on April 16 that uranium enrichment is a “real and undeniable right” and “not subject to negotiation.”[i] Araghchi stated that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible. Araghchi likely referred to recent remarks by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff regarding "zero uranium enrichment," in which Witkoff originally said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent before clarifying that any nuclear deal must “stop and eliminate” Iranian nuclear enrichment.[ii] Iranian officials have consistently rejected the concept of zero uranium enrichment and stated that Iran may reduce enrichment to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[iii] Iranian Expediency Discernment Council member and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately stated on X on April 16 that US statements reflect ”confusion and disarray” within the Trump administration and reinforce Iranian distrust caused by the U S withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018.[iv] Rezaei’s remarks align with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s guidance in his April 15 speech. Khamenei said Iran must “proceed carefully” in the US-Iran talks and signaled deep skepticism toward the United States while supporting negotiations to mitigate pressure and preserve regime stability.[v] Khamenei will likely remain skeptical of any agreement with the Trump administration, given Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA.[vi]

Senior Iranian officials appear increasingly concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited Fordow Air Defense Group in Qom Province on April 16 to evaluate the unit’s operational readiness.[vii] The air defense site, also known as Hazrat-e Masoumeh Air Defense Group, is located approximately 16 km east of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).[viii] Fordow is a highly fortified underground uranium enrichment facility built into a mountain and reportedly designed to withstand military strikes, making it one of Iran’s most secure nuclear sites.[ix] Iran previously conducted air defense exercises near the Fordow nuclear facility in January 2025.[x] Sabahi Fard’s visit marks the fourth stop in the ongoing Iranian air defense inspections that began on April 4.[xi]

Recent statements by unspecified US officials suggested the reported US drawdown in Syria will decrease US forces to no fewer than 1,000, roughly the same number of US forces present in Syria before the recent increase in 2024. An unspecified US official told Reuters on April 15 that the United States may decide to reduce its force presence in Syria by half, which would be consistent with the size of previous US deployments in Syria.[xii] The official said that the US plans to reduce its presence in Syria and that this could reduce US troops to approximately 1,000 personnel.[xiii] A second unspecified US official said that the size of the US withdrawal is uncertain but was ”skeptical of a decrease of that scale, suggesting that the drawdown will be no less than 1,000 personnel.[xiv] Earlier reports in Israeli media lacked this context and reported that the United States will begin to withdraw from Syria by mid-June 2025.[xv] The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025.[xvi] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024, when the United States increased the number of troops to 2,000 US personnel to meet CENTCOM requirements.[xvii] It is unclear if the October 7 War or the fall of Assad increased CENTCOM’s force requirements.

At least 25 Arab tribes have condemned the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since April 14, probably in reaction to continued SDF demands to decentralize Damascus’s control in northeastern Syria.[xviii] The tribes rejected what they called a “separatist project” imposed on Arab-majority areas.[xix] ”Separatist project” is an often-used reference to the SDF’s efforts to secure decentralization and federalization in northeastern Syria under the transitional government. The SDF does not seek to secede from Syria. Unspecified Arab tribal leaders recently met with the SDF in Raqqa Province in response to the SDF’s call for a show of support.[xx] Other Arab tribal leaders condemned these meetings and clarified that the individuals involved did not represent their tribes’ official positions.[xxi] The tribal leaders instead expressed their support for the transitional government in Damascus. Some Arab political groups announced the formation of a new council on April 15 to oppose SDF control in northeastern Syria and to present a unified front for negotiations with Damascus.[xxii] The SDF has already withdrawn from Aleppo City but has not yet negotiated with the transitional government over territorial redistribution in the Arab-majority Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces.[xxiii] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has repeatedly called for a federalist structure to maintain the SDF’s control in northeastern Syria.[xxiv] The recent condemnations, the formation of this council, and the reported creation of anti-SDF Arab militia organizations reflect long-standing tension between the SDF and the local Arab communities it governs.[xxv] The SDF has historically used a heavy-handed approach with Arab communities and suppressed certain Arab groups while empowering others, which has alienated some local Arabs and increased support for the HTS-led transitional government.[xxvi]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is probably exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government offensive against the Houthis, while the UAE also attempts to avoid triggering Houthi attacks on the Emirates. The UAE has discussed a ground offensive with US officials in recent weeks.[xxvii] US private security contractors are also reportedly advising Yemeni factions backed by the UAE to support a ground offensive, suggesting possible Emirati involvement..[xxviii] The UAE has extensively used private contractors in Yemen, and it is doubtful that UAE-backed factions could hire private contractors without Emirati approval.[xxix] Bloomberg separately reported on April 16 that the Yemeni Armed Forces are discussing a potential ground offensive with the United States and Gulf Arab allies to remove the Houthis from the Red Sea coast, citing people involved in the discussions.[xxx]  

 

A senior Emirati official denied reports that the UAE is involved in a ground campaign plan, probably out of concern that Emirati involvement in a Yemeni government offensive would trigger attacks.[xxxi] The UAE fears Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi and Dubai because these attacks could threaten the Emirati economy if they were sustained over a longer period. These fears are particularly poignant in the aftermath of a nearly 18-month Houthi attack campaign targeting Israel, which is 300km further from Yemen than Dubai. A previous successful Emirati-backed offensive against the Houthis in January 2022 triggered Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi, after which the Emirati-backed offensive promptly stopped.[xxxii]

 

A Saudi official also denied reports of a Yemen Armed Forces ground offensive against the Houthis, according to Reuters on April 16.[xxxiii] Unspecified Saudi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that Saudi Arabia would not get involved in a ground offensive over concerns that Saudi Arabia’s participation would cause the Houthis to resume drone and missile attacks targeting Saudi territory.[xxxiv] The Houthis launched numerous drone and missile attacks targeting Saudi sites, mostly energy infrastructure, from the start of the Saudi-Emirati-led coalition air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen in 2015 until the ceasefire in 2022.[xxxv]

 

Oman-based Houthi spokesperson and chief negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam has a multitude of different responsibilities within the Houthi regime, including smuggling and intelligence operations, according to Yemeni media investigations.[xxxvi] An independent Yemeni defense outlet connected Abdulsalam to a Houthi smuggling network managing operations across Omani border checkpoints, in addition to operations via the Red Sea.[xxxvii] Abdulsalam also reportedly manages a Yemen-based communications company that imports equipment that can be repurposed for domestic surveillance, military communications, and weapons production from the international market, including China, to Houthi-controlled territory.[xxxviii] This company facilitates the Houthis' internal communication and surveillance over the population in Houthi-controlled territory.[xxxix]

 

The Houthis, supported by Iran, have long used communications equipment to maintain internal control and oppress the Yemeni population.[xl] The Iranian regime has experience building a police and surveillance state and likely seeks to share this expertise to enhance the already strong Houthi control over Yemen’s telecommunications sector and advance Houthi efforts to build a similarly strong authoritarian state.

 

The United States authorized limited communications-related transactions with the Houthis that would otherwise be prohibited under US terrorism sanctions from March 5, 2025.[xli] The license permits telecommunications transmissions within Yemen involving the Houthis but does not permit the sale of equipment or network capacity. The waiver allows internet-based communications services to Yemen, including messaging, social media, email, and cloud services, and permits mail delivery between the United States and Yemen, as long as these activities do not involve other sanctioned individuals. Financial transfers to Houthis remain largely prohibited except for specific purposes like taxes and utility payments. This updated license replaces the previous version from January 2024.

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is unlikely to accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on April 16 that uranium enrichment is a “real and undeniable right” and “not subject to negotiation.”
• US Drawdown in Syria: Recent statements by unspecified US officials suggested the reported US drawdown in Syria will decrease US forces to no less than 1,000, which is roughly the same amount of US forces present in Syria prior to the recent increase in 2024.
• Syrian Democratic Forces and Tribal Relations: At least 25 Arab tribes have condemned the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since April 14, probably in reaction to continued SDF demands to decentralize Damascus’s control in northeastern Syria.
• Yemeni Ground Offensive: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is probably exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government offensive against the Houthis while the UAE also attempts to avoid triggering Houthi attacks on the Emirates. A senior Emirati official denied reports that the UAE is involved in a ground campaign plan, probably out of concern that Emirati involvement in a Yemeni government offensive would trigger attacks.
• Houthi Telecommunications: Oman-based Houthi spokesperson and chief negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam has a multitude of different responsibilities within the Houthi regime, including smuggling and intelligence operations, according to Yemeni media investigations. The Houthis, supported by Iran, have long used communications equipment to maintain internal control and oppress the Yemeni population.

Iran Update, April 15, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving Iranian regime stability. Khamenei discussed the United States-Iran nuclear talks and economic priorities during a meeting with senior Iranian government officials on April 15.[i] Khamenei called for mitigating the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy while simultaneously expressing support for nuclear talks with the United States. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. The New York Times reported on April 11 that President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf convinced Khamenei to approve nuclear talks with the United States to avoid a potential “two-front war” against both external military threats and internal unrest.[ii] Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Senior Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that Iran’s worsening economic conditions could cause internal unrest.[iii] Khamenei would likely be skeptical of any agreement that Iran signs with the Trump administration, however, given that US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Khamenei stated that Iran must “proceed carefully” in the negotiations with the United States and emphasized Iran’s distrust toward the United States during the meeting with government officials.

Khamenei also likely seeks to manage domestic expectations about the possibility of Iran reaching a nuclear agreement with the United States. Khamenei cautioned against both "excessive optimism and pessimism" and stressed that Iran’s progress must continue “independently of the negotiations” during his meeting with government officials.[iv]  Khamenei's cautious position may seek to protect the regime from internal backlash if the talks fail or produce only limited economic benefits.

US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15.[v] The United States and Iran began nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[vi] Axios reported on April 15 that there is “intense debate” in the administration about the trajectory of the talks and potential US compromises. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12.[vii] Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance.[viii] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[ix] This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during negotiations that it has already distanced itself from the Axis of Resistance. This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions. Iran and the United States are scheduled to hold a second round of talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 19.[x]

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated in an interview on April 14 that Iran “do[es] not need” to enrich uranium past 3.67 percent.[xi] Witkoff later posted on X (Twitter) on April 15 that any nuclear deal with Iran must “stop and eliminate” the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.[xii] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[xiii] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[xiv] Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[xv]

Witkoff stated on April 14 that nuclear negotiations with Iran would also focus on ensuring “verification on weaponization,” which includes monitoring the kinds of missiles that Iran has.[xvi] United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in 2015, stipulated that Iran cannot undertake “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons...until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.”[xvii] The missile restrictions in UNSC Resolution 2231 expired in October 2023. Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed in recent weeks that Iran is unwilling to negotiate on the Iranian drone and missile programs.[xviii] Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program because doing so would cause it to lose one of its primary deterrent powers and means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to pressure its adversaries and increase its military influence in the region.[xix]

The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it will dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. Eighth Brigade spokesperson Muhammad al Hourani announced the group’s “complete” dissolution and readiness to hand over all “human and military resources” to the Syrian MoD.[xx] The Eighth Brigade, which is based in southeastern Daraa and led by Ahmed al Awda, is comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime. The militia has operated as an independent organization in recent weeks despite nominally integrating into the General Security Services (GSS) since February 2025.[xxi] The transitional government deployed significant forces to Busra al Sham after Eighth Brigade members in the Busra al Sham GSS shot an MoD official on April 10.[xxii] The transitional government negotiated the handover of the Eighth Brigade members who committed the attack and pressured the Eighth Brigade to dissolve during these negotiations.[xxiii] Eighth Brigade Commander Ahmed al Awda has not publicly confirmed the group’s dissolution, but it is unlikely that Hourani would announce the Eighth Brigade's dissolution without Awda's approval. The government assumed control over all former Eighth Brigade positions in Busra al Sham and confiscated the group’s remaining military equipment and assets in the city and surrounding countryside.[xxiv] GSS members called on all residents in the area to hand in their weapons at GSS checkpoints.[xxv]  

The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa. Senior Daraa provincial and security officials discussed on April 12 opening a new GSS center in Busra al Sham that would be led by reliable GSS members from outside of the area.[xxvi] The GSS appears to recruit local fighters, which enabled the Eighth Brigade to effectively reflag themselves as a GSS unit and continue to control the southeastern Daraa countryside. Deploying non-local GSS members to Busra al Sham could reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence in the area and serve as a model for integrating other militias into Syrian security services.  

Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[xxvii] Unspecified European and regional security officials cited by the Washington Post on April 12 claimed that Iran has reached out to Sunni extremist groups to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and facilitate smuggling.[xxviii] The sources did not specify how Iran is working with extremist groups to try to destabilize the transitional government. Iran has previously cooperated with other Sunni extremist groups, including al Qaeda, to pursue various regional objectives.[xxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria.[xxx] Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025.[xxxi] There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups to try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria.

 

There appear to be emerging localized formations in Hasakah Province, northeastern Syria, that seek to undermine the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A group called the Free Hasakah Forces released a statement on April 14 urging Arab tribal leaders to distance themselves from the SDF.[xxxii] The group threatened to assassinate four tribal leaders who they claim have cooperated with the SDF and urged others to defect from the SDF. This group’s statement closely mirrors a recent statement from another anti-SDF group called the Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade.[xxxiii] The Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade claimed that it assassinated an alleged SDF informant in Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on April 13.[xxxiv] Both groups included the Syrian revolutionary flag in their statements, which suggests that the groups likely do not oppose the Syrian transitional government. The SDF has historically relied on support from Arab tribal networks to maintain its presence in areas under its control and to conduct anti-ISIS operations.[xxxv] Continued threats against pro-SDF tribal leaders in Hasakah Province could cause these leaders to reduce support for the SDF, which would in turn likely undermine SDF influence in the area.

Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[xxxvi] A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. National Resistance Front (NRF) leader and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Tariq Saleh met with the Yemeni Defense Ministry operations chief on April 14 in Mokha to discuss cooperation among anti-Houthi factions.[xxxvii] Saleh has argued that “military action [is] the only way to end the threat” posed by the Houthis, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxxviii] The NRF controls territory in southwestern Yemen near Mokha and would therefore likely be involved in an offensive on Hudaydah Governorate.[xxxix] The Joint Forces on the West Coast, which is a militia that supports the internationally-recognized Yemeni government, stated that the Joint Forces on the West Coast is ready to “liberate Hudaydah and all areas [under] Houthi control – with or without American involvement.”[xl]  The Joint Forces on the West Coast is backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and includes around 40,000 fighters from the Guards of the Republic, the Southern Giants Brigades, and the Tihama Resistance.[xli]

The UAE, which provides financial and military support to anti-Houthi Yemeni factions, has discussed the ground campaign plan with US officials in recent weeks, according to the US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[xlii] The US officials noted that the United States has not decided whether it would support a ground offensive against the Houthis.  Unspecified Saudi officials have stated that Saudi Arabia would not get involved in a ground offensive because the Saudi government is concerned that participating in such a military operation would cause the Houthis to resume drone and missile attacks targeting Saudi territory.[xliii]  The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[xliv]

The US and Yemeni officials stated that US private security contractors have been advising Yemeni factions on a potential ground offensive.[xlv] Private security contractors have previously worked alongside the Yemeni Armed Forces and UAE-backed anti-Houthi militias in Yemen.[xlvi] 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 14.[xlvii] CENTCOM conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting reported Houthi barracks and weapons depots on Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate. These airstrikes mark the ninth time that CENTCOM has targeted Houthi infrastructure on Kamaran Island since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign on March 15.[xlviii]

CENTCOM has continued to target Houthi military bases near the al Jawf Junction that connects Houthi supply lines from Sanaa City to the Houthis’ eastern front in Marib and al Jawf governorates.[xlix] Many of these bases, including the Mass Military Base, were previously Yemeni Armed Forces bases before the Houthis occupied western Marib and al Jawf governorates in 2020.[l] These bases include Houthi underground facilities, weapons depots, missile and drone launch sites, and command and control centers, according to an independent Yemeni defense outlet.[li] The outlet reported on April 15 that the Houthis control the Nihm and Heelan mountain ranges in the area, which is where the Salb Gold Extraction Company is based. This company is an important source of income for the Houthis.[lii] The outlet added that the Houthis have recently moved heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and military equipment, to its eastern front.[liii]

 

US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media.[liv] The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025.[lv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there.[lvi] US Central Command warned in July 2024 that ISIS is trying to reconstitute.[lvii]  A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute.[lviii]

Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan.[lix] Jordanian authorities said that the Muslim Brotherhood trained and financed some of the individuals in Lebanon. Jordanian security services located dozens of rockets at a rocket manufacturing facility and a drone factory on the outskirts of Amman. The suspects had manufactured rockets with a three-to-five-kilometer range to strike Jordanian targets and had enough material to produce 300 rockets.[lx] There is currently no evidence that links Iran or Iranian-backed actors to this incident. The incident is notable given that Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy, however.[lxi] Israeli and Jordanian police thwarted multiple Iranian-led attempts to smuggle small arms and other weapons to the West Bank via Jordan in 2024.[lxii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to invest further in building networks in Jordan to develop Iranian-backed militia infrastructure in the West Bank. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia separately claimed in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, planned to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons.[lxiii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States is the best option for preserving Iranian regime stability. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States will improve Iranian economic conditions and prevent a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump discussed the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran with senior US foreign policy and national security officials on April 15. Unspecified individuals briefed on the talks told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that the Trump administration intends to discuss Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance with Iran but that “the topic didn’t come up for discussion” on April 12. Iranian sources previously stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its support for the Axis of Resistance. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have conducted an information operation targeting the West in recent weeks that seeks to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance.
• Syrian Militia Integration: The Eighth Brigade announced on April 13 that it will dissolve itself and surrender its weapons to the Syrian transitional government amid government pressure on the group. The transitional government appears to be trying to reduce the Eighth Brigade’s influence over security in southeastern Daraa.
• Iranian Efforts in Syria: Iran is reportedly cooperating with Sunni extremist groups in Syria, including ISIS, following the collapse of its networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to inflame sectarian tensions in Syria, likely to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government and thereby re-entrench itself in Syria. Several Sunni extremist groups have formed in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and the transitional government has fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the areas where these groups operate since early March 2025. There is currently no evidence that these groups have any connections to Iran, but Iran could seek to work with these groups try to advance its strategic objectives in Syria.
• Potential Ground Offensive Against the Houthis: Anti-Houthi Yemeni factions are reportedly planning a ground offensive against the Houthis to recapture the western coast of Yemen, including Hudaydah Port, according to US and Yemeni officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal. A successful ground operation against the Houthis would require some degree of political and military coordination among the fragmented anti-Houthi Yemeni factions. The Joint Forces on the West Coast spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that a ground campaign against the Houthis would require the support of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-Emirati military coalition.[lxiv]
• Potential US Military Withdrawal from the Middle East: US forces will reportedly begin withdrawing from Syria by mid-June 2025, according to Israeli media. The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025. CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISIS could resurge in Syria in 12 to 24 months without a US presence there.
• Jordan Attack Plot: Jordanian authorities arrested 16 individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on April 15 for planning rocket and drone attacks in Jordan. There is currently no evidence that links Iran or Iranian-backed actors to this incident. The incident is notable given that Iran has recently placed greater importance on Jordan in its regional strategy, however.

Iran Update, April 14, 2025

Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[1] The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China, according to Iranian and Arab officials.[2] It would be very difficult for the United States to guarantee permanent sanctions relief, given that such a requirement would have to span multiple US presidential administrations. The issue of guaranteeing sanctions relief was a point of contention between Iran and the United States under the Biden administration.[3] Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program.[4] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.[5] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[6]

It is unclear if Iran would agree to dismantle its advanced centrifuges in addition to reducing its current stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran has installed advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear facilities—Natanz and Fordow—in recent years. These advanced centrifuges have increased the rate at which Iran can enrich uranium. Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[7]

It is unclear whether Iran seeks to return to the JCPOA in its current format. The JCPOA contains various restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program that will expire in 2030. These restrictions are referred to as “sunset provisions.” It is unclear, if Iran were to agree to return to the JCPOA, whether the sunset provisions would renew for an additional 15 years. It is also unclear whether Iran would agree to a new nuclear deal that included permanent restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program. US President Donald Trump repeatedly criticized the existence of sunset provisions in the JCPOA prior to withdrawing from the agreement in 2018.[8]

Iran could rebuild its nuclear program at a faster pace after the expiration of sunset provisions, or if a new agreement collapses, if Iran maintains its current advanced centrifuge technology. Iran has increased its number of operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[9] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[10] Even if Iran were to agree to downblend its stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran would likely be able to re-enrich this stockpile at a relatively fast pace, compared to before 2015, if it maintains its current advanced centrifuges.

The United States presented its demands and red lines ahead of the nuclear talks on April 12. Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal on April 11 that the United States' “opening demand” would be the dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program but acknowledged that the United States is open to “find[ing] compromise” with Iran.[12] Witkoff stressed that the United States’ “red line” is preventing Iranian weaponization. Trump similarly stated on April 14 that Iran must abandon the “concept of a nuclear weapon.”[13]

Iranian and US officials presented the April 12 talks as “positive” and “constructive.” Significant obstacles and challenges remain before a deal can be reached, however.[14] Araghchi stated on April 12 that the United States and Iran expressed their intention to reach an agreement in “the shortest possible time,” but acknowledged that reaching a deal will “not be an easy task.”[15] The White House released a statement on April 12 that called the talks “positive and constructive,” while acknowledging that solving the Iranian nuclear issue is “very complicated.”[16] Iran and the United States agreed to hold a second round of nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 19.[17]

Iran is increasing its diplomatic activity with third parties ahead of the April 19 nuclear talks. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi announced on April 14 that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi will visit Tehran on April 16.[18] Gharibabadi traveled to Moscow on April 14 and met with Russian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Sergei Vershinin.[19] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will also travel to Moscow in the coming days.[20] Iran has consistently engaged with Russia on the nuclear issue in recent weeks.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on the Iranian armed forces to maintain maximum “hardware and software readiness” during a meeting with senior military officials and commanders on April 13.[21] Khamenei described the Iranian armed forces as Iran’s “shield” and praised the diverse and unified command structure of the Iranian armed forces. Khamenei criticized the West’s double standards, claiming that Western countries possess “the most catastrophic weapons” but try to prevent Iranian "defense growth." Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri presented a report during the meeting about regional developments and Iran‘s response to the October 7 War. Bagheri highlighted Iranian deterrence efforts, weapons development, and joint exercises.

Senior Iranian officials continue to be concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness.[22] Sabahi Fard emphasized that expanding missile and defense systems is essential for protecting Iranian airspace against potential threats. The visit is part of a series of inspections that Sabahi Fard has conducted to Iranian air defense sites in recent days. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.[23]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14.[24] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12.[25] Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.[26] The SNA is nominally integrated under the Syrian Defense Ministry’s command, but the groups that comprise the SNA still receive salaries from Turkey.[27] The transfer of control of the dam comes after the successful integration of two historically Kurdish areas of Aleppo City into the transitional government’s area of control.[28] The deployment of government forces to the Tishreen Dam reduces the risk of an SNA or Turkish military operation against the SDF and promotes the transitional government’s ceasefire with the SDF.

Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts.[29] Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara agreed on an integration framework on March 10 and have since taken several concrete steps toward peace and integration.[30] The SDF has ceded control of disputed territory in Aleppo City and eastern Aleppo Province to the transitional government since April 1.[31] The SDF has also granted the transitional government control over its hydrocarbon resources to “meet its oil and gas needs.”[32] Abdi hinted on April 14 at future areas of progress between Damascus and the SDF, including transferring control of Arab-majority Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces to the transitional government after SDF institutions are integrated into the government.[33] Abdi also outlined two long-held “red lines” that Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc.[34] Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”[35] Neither of these demands are new or surprising, and neither issue was addressed in the March 10 integration framework. Kurdish groups have previously expressed serious concern about Shara’s consolidation of power though the draft Syrian constitution.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• April 12 Nuclear Talks Between Iran and the United States: Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12. The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China. Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.
• Iranian Air Defense Readiness: Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.
• SDF Withdrawal from Tishreen Dam: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12. Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.
• SDF Integration into the Syrian Transitional Government: Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi outlined two long-held “red lines” that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc. Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”

Iran Update, April 11, 2025

Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions. Axios reported on April 11 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[i] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[ii] US President Donald Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement, which will begin on April 12.[iii] Trump previously warned on March 30 that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[iv]

Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories. The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) threatened to impose snapback sanctions on Iran in June 2025 if a new nuclear deal was not reached.[v] The June snapback deadline coincides with Trump’s reported 60-day deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal.[vi] Snapback sanctions are a mechanism established by the JCPOA that allows current signatories to reimpose sanctions on Iran within thirty days in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[vii] The United States cannot unilaterally trigger snapback sanctions as it withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.[viii] The snapback sanction mechanism is set to expire in October 2025.[ix]

Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people.[x] The New York Times reported on April 11 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Khamenei in March to convince Khamenei to change his position on negotiations, citing two unspecified senior Iranian officials familiar with the meeting.[xi] Khamenei repeatedly and explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States in February and March. [xii] Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Ghalibaf reportedly warned Khamenei that rejecting negotiations may trigger a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities that could escalate into a ”two-front war,” which reportedly convinced Khamenei to approve indirect negotiations with the United States in late March.[xiii]  The three stressed that a two-front war could worsen Iran's economy and stoke internal unrest, which may pose a threat to regime stability. The Iranian rial hit a record low—at that time—after Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States for the first time on February 7.[xiv] Khamenei reportedly ultimately agreed to a two-step process that starts with indirect talks and potentially moves to direct talks.[xv] Khamenei laid out conditions for negotiations, stating that Iran was willing to negotiate on its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment, but Iran's missile program was off-limits. Khamenei also appointed his close advisors, Kamal Kharazi, Ali Larijani, and Mohammad Forouzandeh, to manage negotiations with the United States along with the Iranian foreign ministry, according to four unspecified Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times.

Khamenei agreed to these negotiations as a means to preserve regime stability rather than solely a desire to improve his economy. Khamenei reportedly only decided to approve negotiations after he was convinced that a failure to accept negotiations could lead to a war that, in combination with a poor economic situation, would seriously threaten the regime’s stability. The negotiations buy Khamenei more time to address regime stability, even if negotiations ultimately fail and the United States or Israel strike Iran.

IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on April 11 that Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi will mediate indirect talks between Iran and the United States in Oman on April 12.[xvi] Tasnim reported that Iran will emphasize its red lines—no threats, no excessive demands, and no discussion of its defense sector—and signal readiness for "continued negotiations" if the United States acts in good faith. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff told The Wall Street Journal on April 11 that the United States’ "red line" is to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.[xvii] Unnamed sources told Tasnim that Iran remains open to confidence-building steps "if sanctions are lifted" but warned that the United States will be responsible if talks collapse.[xviii] Iranian ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali separately stated on April 11 that the meeting in Oman will likely focus on “defining a framework” for future negotiations, indicating that Iran may aim to draw negotiations out over multiple sessions.[xix] Iran's messaging may indicate that Iran will try to limit the scope of the talks strictly to the nuclear issue while preemptively blaming the United States for any failure.

Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat reported on April 10 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in late 2024 to prepare to defend unidentified Iranian interests if negotiations with the United States “falter.”[xx] Iran remains concerned that the United States or Israel would strike Iran if Iran-US negotiations fail. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently threatened to target US forces in response to attacks on Iran.[xxi]

Iran also deployed a “small Iranian team” to ensure Iraqi militias respond as directed, illustrating the degree of coordination between Iran and its proxies and partners in Iraq. Asharq al Awsat reported that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani assigned a “small Iranian team” to ensure that the militias do not target US forces in Iraq and Syria, per previous Iranian direction.[xxii] Ghaani previously ordered the militias to halt attacks targeting US forces in early January 2024 after a militia attack killed 3 US soldiers in northeastern Jordan.[xxiii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted sporadic attacks targeting US forces after Ghaani’s order and did not claim an overwhelming majority of these attacks.[xxiv] Ghaani’s reported enforcement of Iranian directives demonstrates Iran’s continued ability to exert control over members of its Axis of Resistance.

An armed group in Daraa Province has only nominally integrated into government security forces and continues to pursue its own parochial interests, which demonstrates the political challenges Damascus faces as it attempts to exert its own control over Syria’s armed groups. The Eighth Brigade remains an independent organization and still exercises a “degree of autonomy” over some of eastern Daraa, such as Busra al Sham, even though it has nominally integrated its fighters into government forces since February 2024.[xxv] The Eighth Brigade is a Daraa-based faction led by Ahmed al Awda that is comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime.[xxvi] Awda is an experienced militia commander from Busra al Sham, Daraa Province, and initially fought against the regime from the start of the civil war until he reconciled with the regime.[xxvii]

The government appears to have permitted the Eighth Brigade to reflag themselves as the General Security Services (GSS), which enabled the Eighth Brigade to continue to dominate certain areas. All GSS members in Busra al Sham are former Eighth Brigade members.[xxviii] The GSS is a gendarmerie. It is not clear if the government intentionally allowed the Eighth Brigade to reflag some of its elements to secure Awda’s support. Eighth Brigade militiamen in the Busra al Sham GSS shot Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) official Bilal al Droubi on April 10.[xxix] Droubi is a former Eighth Brigade member whose recent recruitment of Eighth Brigade fighters into the MoD reportedly angered the group, which highlights the group’s continued interest in its own parochial interests.[xxx] The GSS is not part of the MoD. Several MoD and GSS convoys deployed from Damascus to the eastern Daraa countryside on April 11.[xxxi] An Eighth Brigade militiaman in the GSS told Syrian media that the Eighth Brigade had gathered forces within the city and prepared to defend the city against government forces.[xxxii] The government negotiated the surrender of the four Eighth Brigade members involved in the attack on Droubi and called on Eighth Brigade members to surrender their weapons in several nearby towns.[xxxiii] That the Eighth Brigade directly challenged the government demonstrates that it continues to value its own parochial interests over the government’s own objectives.

The government has not contained this command-and-control issue because it has failed to exert its control over Awda. Awda's significant influence among eastern Daraa-based security forces demonstrates Damascus’s weak command-and-control in the area and suggests that the government may face similar command-and-control issues across Syria. Awda has not publicly pledged support for the Eighth Brigades’ dissolution and integration into the government, though Awda’s subordinates have negotiated with government officials to set up integration processes.[xxxiv] The integration of these groups will be irrelevant unless they answer to the formal chain of command. Awda did not surrender to authorities on April 11.[xxxv] Shara will continue to face challenges from armed groups and local commanders because local commanders will almost certainly resist Shara’s efforts to subordinate them to a national army or police force like the GSS. 

This incident and other reports also demonstrate the mixed reliability of the GSS. The GSS appears to recruit from local fighters—thereby reflagging local militias as GSS—as well as unaffiliated individuals and directly from the more disciplined HTS outfits.[xxxvi] The GSS in Busra al Sham were not beholden to any command authority, but an Alawite resident of Homs said the professional GSS units in Homs City successfully prevented massacres of the Alawite population during the coastal massacres in early March.[xxxvii] The fact that the government decided to deploy GSS units from Damascus to Busra al Sham also indicates that the GSS’s reliability is not uniform.

President Ahmed al Shara extended the mandate of a commission to investigate violence on the Syrian coast by three more months.[xxxviii] The commission spokesperson, Yasser al Farhan, reported on April 7 that the commission has not completed its investigations within the initial one-month timeframe due to procedural delays and would not release its findings until it completed a full legal and evidentiary review.[xxxix] Farhan said the large scope of the investigation is the primary cause of the delay.[xl] Shara established the commission in late March to investigate crimes that government forces committed during the pro-Assad Alawite insurgent uprising in early March in coastal Syria.[xli]

The success of the commission will be determined by the government’s ability to prosecute the perpetrators of the violence, regardless of their sect. The commission can present its findings to the government, but it cannot prosecute perpetrators itself. The government’s ability to transparently and fairly prosecute all perpetrators of sectarian violence will create an opportunity for the government to curtail the root causes of the burgeoning insurgency in western Syria.

The commission has reported that unspecified groups are intimidating western Syrian residents. This intimidation indicates that either insurgents retain significant influence in the countryside or the Sunni groups responsible for sectarian violence have continued to intimidate civilians. Farhan noted that several unspecified groups intimidated families to prevent them from cooperating with the investigators.[xlii] Intimidation by government-affiliated groups involved in sectarian violence and revenge killings against Alawites will erode public trust in the commission and risk discrediting its findings as partial or compromised. Attempts by insurgents to obstruct the investigation also reveal that Assadist factions continue to wield considerable influence in coastal Syria, particularly within Alawite communities. The committee must prevent these groups from intimidating families in order to avoid obscuring the commission’s findings. Shara must take concrete legal steps, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, to ensure the commission’s overall credibility.

The US military deployed a Patriot battalion from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.[xliii]

CENTCOM also published footage of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group working alongside the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group in the Red Sea on April 10.[xliv] Vinson recently sailed from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.[xlv]

An open-source analyst also published satellite imagery of two US-flagged oil tankers at Diego Garcia Island on April 10.[xlvi] The tankers were likely the US oil tanker STENA IMPERATIVE and the USNS Guadalupe, which is a replenishment oiler for the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group. The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island by deploying B2 Spirit bombers.[xlvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Nuclear Negotiations with Iran: Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions.
• Iranian Negotiation Calculus: Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people. Khamenei agreed to these negotiations as a means to preserve regime stability rather than solely a desire to improve his economy.
• Iranian Red Lines in Negotiations: An IRGC-affiliated outlet reported that Iran will emphasize its red lines—no threats, no excessive demands, and no discussion of its defense sector—and signal readiness for "continued negotiations" if the United States acts in good faith during negotiations.
• Iran in Iraq: Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat reported on April 10 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in late 2024 to prepare to defend unidentified Iranian interests if negotiations with the United States “falter.” Iran also deployed a “small Iranian team” to ensure Iraqi militias respond as directed, illustrating the degree of coordination between Iran and its proxies and partners in Iraq.
• Syrian Government and Security Forces: An armed group in Daraa Province has only nominally integrated into government security forces and continues to pursue its own parochial interests, which demonstrates the political challenges Damascus faces as it attempts to exert its own control over Syria’s armed groups. Recent violence in Daraa Province and other reports also demonstrate the mixed reliability of the General Security Service, the Syrian transitional government’s gendarmerie.
• Truth and Reconciliation in Syria: President Ahmed al Shara extended the mandate of a commission to investigate violence on the Syrian coast by three more months. The success of the commission will be determined by the government’s ability to prosecute the perpetrators of the violence, regardless of their sect. The commission has reported that unspecified groups are intimidating western Syrian residents. This intimidation indicates that either insurgents retain significant influence in the countryside or the Sunni groups responsible for sectarian violence have continued to intimidate civilians.
• US Deployments in the Middle East: The US military deployed a Patriot battalion from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. An open-source analyst also published satellite imagery of two US-flagged oil tankers at Diego Garcia Island on April 10.

Iran Update, April 10, 2025

A Senior Iranian official threatened to reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if external threats against Iran continue. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 10 that Iran could expel IAEA inspectors, halt cooperation with the agency, or move enriched uranium to “safe and unknown locations” if external threats and military pressure continue.[i] Iran has already restricted IAEA oversight, including withdrawing the designation of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[ii] Shamkhani’s remarks may possibly aim to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities and may also seek to instill urgency among Western officials for renewed negotiations.

China increased its Iranian oil imports by at least 80 percent in March compared to February.[iii] This undermines the US "maximum pressure" campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, and illustrates cooperation between two major US adversaries. Reuters reported on April 10 that China's imports of Iranian oil increased significantly in March amid concerns that new US sanctions could further restrict the Iranian oil supply, citing unspecified traders and analysts.[iv] Estimates show that Iran shipped between 1.3 to 1.8 million barrels per day to China in March. Most of these exports are transferred off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore and reflagged as Malaysian. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, buying 90 percent of Iran's total oil exports. China's Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions. Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement in mid-March condemning the US "maximum pressure" strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[v] Chinese officials have echoed this statement since.[vi]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 9 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 9.[vii] CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots in Mount Nuqum, which is on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City, for the second consecutive day.[viii] CENTCOM conducted at least five airstrikes targeting two other Houthi weapons depots around Sanaa City.[ix]  CENTCOM targeted Houthi barracks and weapons depots on Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate, for the eighth time since the start of CENTCOM’s airstrike campaign on March 15.[x]

One airstrike may have killed a relatively more high-value Houthi leader in central Sanaa City on April 9. A Yemeni journalist reported that a CENTCOM airstrike on April 9 targeted a car at the roundabout between al Saleh Mosque and the gate of the Presidential Palace in al Sabeen District, central Sanaa City, and killed three likely Houthi fighters.[xi] Armed Houthi fighters surrounded the destroyed vehicle, preventing Sanaa residents from identifying the dead or approaching the vehicle until April 10. Airstrikes targeting vehicles, especially in sensitive areas like the middle of a major population center, usually intend to eliminate senior enemy commanders rather than ordinary foot soldiers or low-level commanders.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 9 that he discussed “eliminating the threat of the Houthis,” in addition to developments in the Gaza Strip and Syria, with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Washington, DC.[xii] Farhan also met with US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz on April 9.[xiii] US Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin separately discussed the role the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) can play “in restoring peace and prosperity to Yemen,“ as well as “US efforts to end the Houthi threat to freedom of maritime navigation,” with PLC Vice President Tareq Saleh.[xiv] These meetings follow CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla’s most recent regional Middle East tour between April 1 and 5. [xv] Kurilla met with the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sagheer Ahmed Aziz, and the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, General Fayyad bin Hamed al Ruwayli, in Riyadh between April 3 and 5.[xvi]

CENTCOM announced the arrival of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility on April 10.[xvii] CENTCOM published footage of the Vinson working alongside the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group in the Red Sea. CENTCOM has been launching airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in Yemen from the Truman since March 15.[xviii]

Syrian Kurds and Druze communities and political factions have signaled concern over the trajectory of the transitional government. Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (AANES) official Badran Jia Kurd told Reuters on April 10 that Kurdish political parties have agreed on a “common political vision” for northeastern Syrian that would include "local legislative councils within the region, executive bodies to manage the region's affairs, and internal security forces affiliated with them.”[xix] These ”political parties” include the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), and these unified demands have emerged from recent talks between the two parties.[xx] Both parties are longtime rivals, making their unity against the transitional government notable. Jia Kurd said that the Syrian state must preserve each region’s “specificities” by enshrining these "federal" mechanisms in the Syrian constitution.”[xxi] KNC leader Suleiman Oso said that the joint parties’ ”vision” is expected to be announced by the end of April.[xxii] The Druze community, which is predominantly located in southwestern Syria and remains fractured into several distinct armed factions in political groups, holds similar reservations about joining the transitional government. Major Druze leaders, including Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri and the spokesperson for the Men of Dignity Movement, have expressed that there is ”no consensus” with Damascus while adding that they have significant reservations about the transitional government. Both the Kurds and the Druze community have inked some agreements with the transitional government. But the demands by the Kurds and the statements from the Druze community reflect deeply held fears over the trajectory of the transitional government, especially after Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara‘s loyalists retained control over all key Syrian ministries in the transitional cabinet formed on March 29.[xxiii] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected any decentralization or federalization of the country.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran Nuclear Talks: A Senior Iranian official threatened to reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if external threats against Iran continue, which may seek to instill urgency in the nuclear negotiations while deterring a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
• Maximum Pressure: China increased its Iranian oil imports by at least 80 percent in March compared to February. This undermines the US "maximum pressure" campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, and illustrates cooperation between two major US adversaries.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: CENTCOM has conducted nine airstrikes in Yemen since April 9. One strike may have killed Houthi commanders. The USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group also arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
• US Diplomacy in the Middle East: The US secretary of state discussed Yemen and “eliminating the Houthi threat,” among other issues, with the Saudi foreign minister. CNN previously reported that regional diplomatic efforts were under way for a Yemeni government ground offensive in Yemen.
• Syrian Centralization: Syrian Kurds and Druze communities and political factions have signaled concern over the trajectory of the transitional government. Both the Kurds and the Druze community have inked some agreements with the transitional government, but recent demands by the Kurds and statements from the Druze community reflect deeply held fears over the trajectory of the transitional government.

Iran Update, April 9, 2025

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand.[i] A senior Hezbollah official told Reuters on April 9 that Hezbollah is willing to discuss disarmament with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[ii] Iranian media separately argued on April 9 that the United States must negotiate with Axis of Resistance groups directly because these groups operate "independently.”[iii] These reports follow similar reports in recent days that claimed that Iran is reducing its support for the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iv] This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iranian support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions.

 

Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.[v] Iran has financially supported the military reconstitution of Lebanese Hezbollah since the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire went into effect in November 2024.[vi] UK-based outlet The Times reported on April 9 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force sent advanced missiles to unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in early April 2025.[vii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sources separately told Emirati media on April 9 that the militias disagree about whether to disarm.[viii] This report refutes earlier statements made by members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to Western media on April 7 that the militias had agreed to disarm.[ix] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to abandon its support for the Axis of Resistance as it serves as a key component of Iran’s long-standing regional strategy and deterrence against the United States and Israel.

 

Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. Some senior US and Israeli officials have recently called for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program.[x] IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs."[xi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[xii] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 9 that Iran's network of nuclear facilities and technology is "stabilized, irreversible, and indestructible."[xiii] An unspecified Iranian official similarly told Western media that the Iranian nuclear program "cannot be dismantled."[xiv]

 

Israeli media reported on April 9 that the United States set a 60-day deadline, starting on April 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[xv] Iran and the United States are expected to hold nuclear talks in Oman on April 12. Negotiations for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took around 20 months.[xvi]  Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal. Iran has explicitly rejected some of these demands, including the full dismantlement of its nuclear program.[xvii] Trump previously warned in late March 2025 that "there will be a bombing" if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xviii] Senior Iranian officials have threatened to attack US bases and forces in the Middle East in response to a potential strike on Iran.[xix]

 

Iran reportedly recently delivered advanced missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, possibly in order to diversify its strike options in response to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. The Times reported on April 8 that Iran delivered an unspecified number of Arqab cruise missiles and Jamal 69 ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xx] Arqab cruise missiles, also known as Paveh missiles, have a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[xxi] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, frequently used Arqab missiles to attack Israel between May and November 2024.[xxii] Iran has reportedly supplied Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with Jamal 69 ballistic missiles, or Iranian Zolfaghar missiles, since 2018.[xxiii]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent days. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai implied on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[xxiv] The Popular Campain to Expel the American Occupation threatened to target the US Embassy in Baghdad if Iran is attacked.[xxv] These threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq.

 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City.[xxvi] The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.[xxvii] Mashat largely serves as a figurehead in the Houthi regime, while the head of the presidential office, Ahmed Hamed, exerts control and influences decision-making behind the scenes.[xxviii] Hamed has close ties to Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi and fought alongside Abdulmalik in the early 2000s.[xxix] Abdulmalik appointed Hamed as head of the presidential office in January 2018.[xxx]

 

CENTCOM has conducted at least 20 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 8.[xxxi] The military base that CENTCOM struck on Mount Nuqum reportedly contains underground weapons depots and tunnel networks.[xxxii] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting communications sites. These sites likely support Houthi operations in Houthi territory as well as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel.[xxxiii] CENTCOM targeted likely Houthi barracks in Amin Muqbil on the outskirts of Hudaydah City.[xxxiv] Airstrikes targeting communications sites and strategic points near Houthi-controlled ports will likely impede the Houthis’ logistics, including the Houthis’ ability to move military supplies and coordinate operations.[xxxv]

 

Internationally recognized Yemeni government officials argued on April 8 and 9 that a ground offensive, in addition to airstrikes, against the Houthis is the only way to eliminate the Houthi threat to international shipping.[xxxvi] These officials called for international support for a ground offensive. CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla separately met with several US defense partners and allies in the Middle East between April 1 and 5 to discuss regional developments.[xxxvii] Kurilla held separate meetings with the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sagheer Ahmed Aziz, and the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, General Fayyad bin Hamed al Ruwayli, in Riyadh between April 3 and 5.[xxxviii] The officials likely discussed the CENTCOM airstrike campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and may have discussed cooperation with the Yemeni Armed Forces and Saudi Arabian Armed Forces to address the Houthi threat.

 

A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025.[xxxix] Mohammed Jabar acknowledged in an interview with a UAE-based outlet that he coordinated the March 6 attacks against transitional government forces.[xl] Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad.[xli]  Tartous security forces previously said that Assadist insurgents received salaries from abroad and used foreign communications equipment.[xlii] Jabar’s admission supports the assessment that Iran and Iranian-backed militias did not fund or oversee the Assadist insurgency in March.

Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.  Jabar echoed a sectarian justification for the Alawite insurgency, claiming that his forces rose up without preparation in self-defense after transitional government forces targeted Alawites across coastal Syria.[xliii] Jabar also expressed personal grievances against the Shara government for seizing his property in Latakia.[xliv] The tactical proficiency of the insurgents’ actions, such as blocking the transitional government’s route to the Syrian coast, suggest that insurgents planned and coordinated the attacks in advance, contrary to Jabar’s claims.[xlv]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Information Operation: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand. Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs." Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal.
• CENTCOM Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City. The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.
• Syrian Insurgency: A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025. Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad. Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.

Iran Update, April 8, 2025

Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands.[i] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations.[ii] US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that the US and Iran will hold “direct” talks on April 12, while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected direct negotiations multiple times in recent months.[iii] Araghchi published an English-language op-ed in Western media on April 8 that emphasized that talks will be “indirect” and compared the proposed format to the indirect Russia-Ukraine talks mediated by the United States and the indirect US-Iran nuclear talks mediated by the European Union in 2021.[iv] Some reported US demands include significant limits to Iran’s uranium enrichment, a decrease in support to Iran’s proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, and limits to Iran’s drone and missile program.[v] Some senior US officials also indicated that the United States seeks a deal that would fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, something that Iranian officials have stated is unacceptable.[vi] To accept these demands would require Iran to abandon key components of its regional strategy and severely limit Iran’s deterrence against the United States and Israel. Iran has long anchored its regional strategy on the development of proxies and partners, and it has only abandoned key partners like Bashar al Assad in the face of military defeat.

Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations. Iranian officials have recently told Western media outlets that Iran is distancing itself from various proxies in the Axis of Resistance, namely the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[vii] Iranian officials could calculate that launching this information campaign will enable them to successfully argue that Iran is stepping back its support for its proxies. This campaign is a continuation of a long-running Iranian campaign in which Iran denies its support for many of its proxies. Iran, for example, denies that it violates the UN arms embargo to Yemen despite clear evidence that Iran ships weapons to the Houthis.[viii] Iran similarly obfuscates its role in the Axis of Resistance despite its clear leadership role--including its ability to direct some groups to do Tehran’s bidding. Iran and its partners and proxies have continued to state publicly in Arabic and Farsi that they will support one another while simultaneously denying their close relationships in English to Western outlets.[ix]

Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, further illustrating the interaction between major US adversaries. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Chinese and Russian counterparts in Moscow on April 8 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue and lifting sanctions.[x] Iran, China, and Russia issued similar statements following the meeting, emphasizing the importance of ongoing cooperation on these issues.[xi] Iran, China, and Russia previously issued a joint statement in mid-March condemning the US "maximum pressure" strategy vis-a-vis Iran following a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.[xii] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia or China plan to support Tehran amid growing US pressure. Russia and China, both UN Security Council members, may help block the passage of resolutions against Iran. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil. China’s Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions.[xiii]

Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials.[xiv] Another unspecified source "familiar with Turkish-Israeli tensions” told Middle East Eye on April 7 that the talks between Turkey and Israel began after Israel struck Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province.[xv] Israel has struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21, March 24, and April 2.[xvi] Israeli officials called the strikes a “warning” to Turkey.[xvii] Reuters reported on April 7 that Turkey has evaluated establishing airbases at Tiyas and at least two other Syrian bases.[xviii] The unspecified Western officials said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told his Turkish counterparts that Israel had a “limited window” to strike Tiyas before Turkey positioned assets there, which would make the base “off-limits” to Israeli strikes.[xix] The Turkish Defense Ministry denied that it held talks with Israel on April 8.[xx] An open line of communication between Turkey and Israel could possibly prevent a potential stand-off between the two parties, particularly one that may be triggered if Israel continues to strike Syrian bases and Turkey continues to develop plans to base its forces in Syria. One of the unspecified sources said that Netanyahu maintained that Israel insists on a fully demilitarized southern Syria, which would preclude Turkey from forming a presence there.[xxi] The Turkish government is unlikely to halt plans to establish Turkish presence at Syrian bases like Tiyas or Palmyra. Turkish officials have maintained that doing so is critical to Turkey’s counter-ISIS efforts.[xxii]

 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah Governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks. CENTCOM conducted an airstrike on April 2 targeting al Fazah, Hudaydah Governorate, southwest of Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen near the Red Sea, reportedly killing at least 70 Houthi fighters.[xxiii] Several mid-ranking Houthi military and intelligence officials reportedly died in the airstrike, including the al Tuhayta Axis Commander Najib Kashri.[xxiv] The Tuhayta area is south of Hudaydah and close to the frontline between Houthi and pro-Yemeni government forces. CENTCOM strikes eliminating mid-level commanders along this frontline could create opportunities for pro-government forces to exploit if the CENTCOM strikes were to be coordinated with pro-government forces. These strikes and their possible impacts on the frontline are notable in the context of CNN reporting on April 6 that the Yemeni Government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis, citing unspecified regional diplomatic sources.[xxv] These mid-level commanders will be quickly replaced, however. The Tuhayta area is also probably important for Houthi smuggling efforts and drone and missile operations.[xxvi] CENTCOM reportedly targeted the Houthis’ Red Sea Coastal Region Commander Abu Taleb in this airstrike as well.[xxvii] Abu Taleb’s status remains unknown.

CENTCOM also reportedly conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting 13 Houthi military officials meeting at Sheikh Saleh al Suhaili’s house in the eastern suburbs of Sanaa City, according to local sources.[xxviii] Houthi media reported that the airstrikes killed at least four people and injured 25, but did not name the casualties.[xxix] Suhaili’s brother is close to the founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein al Houthi, and is himself reportedly affiliated with the Houthis internal security apparatus and the Houthis’ smuggling operations.[xxx] Suhaili has also previously hosted former Iranian Ambassador to the Houthis and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force member Hassan Irloo in the same house when Irloo was ambassador between 2019 and 2021.[xxxi]

A Saudi news outlet reported that the Houthis arrested Houthi Security and Intelligence Services Deputy chief Major General Abdulqader al Shami for leaking Houthi military sites’ locations, citing unspecified sources.[xxxii] Shami previously served in intelligence roles under President Ali Abdullah Saleh and continued to work under the Houthis after the Houthis took over Sanaa in 2014.[xxxiii] Shami’s superior, Abdulhakim al Khaywani, does not trust Shami because of Shami’s connections to the pre-Houthi government, according to local media reports from 2022.[xxxiv] Shami presents an easy scapegoat for intelligence failures. Shami could have motivations for leaking information if he has been increasingly marginalized, though CTP-ISW has not observed reports suggesting that Shami leaked any possible military locations.

 

US Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin met with PLC President Rashad al Alimi on April 8 in Riyadh to discuss US efforts to end the Houthi blockade and restore freedom of navigation.[xxxv] This meeting is notable after unspecified regional diplomatic sources told CNN on April 6 that the Yemeni government is preparing a ground offensive against the Houthis with US and Saudi naval support to retake Hudaydah Port, though as US ambassador, Fagin regularly meets with Alimi.[xxxvi]

 

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan arrived in the United States on April 8 for an official visit and is set to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 9.[xxxvii] Faisal will reportedly discuss developments with the Houthis and in the Gaza Strip, according to unspecified US government officials.[xxxviii]  Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman separately held a phone call on April 7 with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to discuss defense cooperation and CENTCOM’s airstrike campaign targeting the Houthis.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations. Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations.
• Iran, Russia, and China Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, further illustrating the interaction between major US adversaries.
• Turkey and Israel in Syria: Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks.

Iran Update, April 7, 2025

Regional diplomatic sources told CNN on April 6 that the Yemeni government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis. The offensive would reportedly consist of advances from the south and east and along the western Yemeni coast to take Hudaydah.[i] The Yemeni government is led by the Presidential Leadership Council, which is an eight-person council consisting of all major anti-Houthi factions in Yemen and led by President Rashad al Alimi.[ii] An operation of this scale would require significant political coordination between multiple anti-Houthi factions with disparate political goals. Yemeni President Rashad al Alimi and Information Minister Muammar al Eryani both called for unity on April 7 and April 5, respectively.[iii]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 26 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 4.[iv] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes, reportedly targeting a Houthi command and control site on 50th Street in Hudaydah City, Hudaydah Governorate.[v] CENTCOM conducted at least two airstrikes targeting a Houthi military base in Kahlan, east of Sadaa City, Sadaa Governorate, on April 4 and at least three airstrikes targeting the Houthi underground facilities at al Sabaha military complex on Jabal Awsad, north of Sanaa City, Sanaa Governorate, on April 6.[vi] CENTCOM has previously targeted both Houthi military bases on March 27, April 2, and April 3.[vii] CENTCOM also conducted at least nine airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting likely Houthi naval sites on Kamran Island, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 5 and 6.[viii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely running an information operation to dissuade the United States from striking militia targets in Iraq as part of a broader Iranian information campaign targeting the West. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commanders from Kataib Hezbollah, Harkat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada told Reuters on April 7 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are prepared to disarm to “make whatever decisions necessary” to avoid conflict with the United States and Israel.[ix] The militia commanders said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supports this decision. These statements are very similar to other articles quoting Iranian officials in recent days that seek to alter US decision-making ahead of a possible strike on Iran‘s nuclear facilities. Iranian officials on April 3 told Western media that Iran is “abandoning“ the Houthis without providing any evidence.

Iranian officials and Iranian partners are not making any claims about disarmament or decreases in Iranian support in Persian or Arabic language media, suggesting that these reports are part of a concerted information effort targeting a Western audience. Kataib Hezbollah, for example, denied that it is prepared to disarm in an April 7 statement in Arabic.[x] Iranian officials similarly gave statements in Persian highlighting Iranian support to the Houthis on April 3, the same day unspecified Iranian officials told Western media that Iran is “abandoning the Houthis.”[xi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to abandon their decade-long objective to expel the US from Iraq and the region unless they suffer serious political setbacks in Iraq due to their military activities. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024 in pursuit of the removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria.[xii] The militias have previously conducted these attacks to both encourage a US withdrawal and to fulfill other strategic objectives. CTP-ISW assessed on April 4 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria recently, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure that US forces withdraw from Iraq and Syria.[xiii] Such threats are directly at odds with an effort by the militias to ”disarm.”

Iran continued to push for indirect negotiations with the United States while rejecting direct negotiations prior to US President Donald Trump’s April 7 announcement that Iran and the United States would hold direct talks on April 12.[xiv] Reuters reported on April 6 that Iran is pushing back on US demands to engage in direct nuclear talks, citing an unspecified senior Iranian official.[xv] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri similarly stated on April 7 that indirect talks with the United States are "acceptable," but “there will be no direct negotiations.”[xvi] This is the first time a senior Iranian military official has echoed Iran’s official line on nuclear negotiations by expressing openness to indirect negotiations, though rejecting direct talks.[xvii] Iran reportedly seeks a "secret" two-step process that starts with indirect talks and "potentially moves” to direct talks.[xviii] The senior Iranian official told Reuters that indirect talks give Iran a chance to "evaluate Washington's seriousness."[xix] Iran may use reported US demands for Iran to curtail its missile program and its role in leading the Axis of Resistance to claim that the United States is not ”serious.”[xx] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly and explicitly rejected any concessions on issues its nuclear program.[xxi] Iranian officials also stated on April 7 that Iran wants Oman to mediate talks between the United States and Iran.[xxii] CTP-ISW has not observed any official Iranian responses to Trump’s announcement. CTP-ISW will provide more details and analysis in the April 8 Iran Update.

Iran continued to threaten to attack US allies or any country that may support a US strike on Iran, likely to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Western media reported in recent days that Iran has warned Persian Gulf countries hosting US military bases, including Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Bahrain, not to support any potential strike on Iran.[xxiii] An unspecified Iranian official told The Times that Iran would view such support as an ”act of hostility.”[xxiv] Reuters reported on April 6 that neighboring countries with US bases "may be in the firing line," according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[xxv] An unspecified senior Iranian military official previously told the Telegraph in late March that Iran would attack any base "used by Americans" to attack Iran.[xxvi] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has held several calls with his counterparts in the region in recent days, likely to encourage these states to dissuade the United States from attacking Iran.[xxvii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran previously employed this strategy in October 2024 to dissuade states in the Middle East from providing Israel with assistance to launch an attack on Iran.[xxviii]

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited Iran's Southern Air Defense Zone based in Bushehr Province on April 6 to conduct an operational assessment of military units and defense capabilities in the zone.[xxix] The visit follows a similar inspection at the Southeastern Air Defense Zone based in Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4.[xxx] These ongoing inspections likely reflect Iranian efforts to ensure air defense readiness and prepare for a possible strike on its nuclear facilities. An unspecified senior Israeli official told Axios on April 4 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump planned to discuss a potential strike on nuclear facilities—if diplomatic efforts fail—during their meeting on April 7.[xxxi]  US President Donald Trump has previously warned on March 30 that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Air Campaign in Yemen: Regional diplomatic sources told CNN on April 6 that the Yemeni government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis. The offensive would reportedly consist of advances from the south and east and along the western Yemeni coast to take Hudaydah. US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 26 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 4.
• Iranian Information Operations: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely running an information operation to dissuade the United States from striking militia targets in Iraq as part of a broader Iranian information campaign targeting the West. Iranian officials and Iranian partners are not making any claims about disarmament or decreases in Iranian support in Persian or Arabic language media, suggesting that these reports are part of a concerted information effort targeting a Western audience.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to push for indirect negotiations with the United States while rejecting direct negotiations prior to US President Donald Trump’s April 7 announcement that Iran and the United States would hold direct talks on April 12. Iran continued to threaten to attack US allies or any country that may support a US strike on Iran, likely to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran Update, April 4, 2025

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. US President Donald Trump ordered the US military to restore the freedom of navigation and prevent attacks on US shipping in the Red Sea.[i] Western media reported on April 4 that Pentagon officials have told Congress and US allies that the US air campaign in Yemen has had only limited success in destroying Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen.[ii] There are likely multiple different operational concepts that would successfully render the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue attacks targeting international shipping. A focus solely on missiles, drones, and launchers would be very unlikely to make the Houthis unwilling or unable to target international shipping because it would be very difficult to destroy all Houthi weapons stockpiles and missile launchers. Such an operation would not seriously threaten Houthi control in Yemen. The Houthis’ top priority remains maintaining control over Houthi-controlled territory and ultimately defeating the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

CENTCOM can render the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue attacks without destroying all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. Yemeni media and officials and US officials have reported that CENTCOM has targeted Houthi communications, training centers, underground facilities, leaders, and other assets.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot currently assess the overall impact of these strikes on Houthi decision-making. These strikes could degrade the Houthi ability to target shipping by disrupting targeting cycles and command networks, however. Leadership strikes, particularly against mid-level leaders responsible for imposing local Houthi control, could disrupt Houthi internal security over time.[iv] US officials currently assess that the initial US strikes targeting Houthi assets have disrupted the Houthi command-and-control network and limited the Houthi ability to target international shipping. This would suggest that the air campaign has achieved some temporary military effects, though these effects are temporary without continued pressure on the Houthis.  

A US airstrike killed a Houthi Hudaydah Governorate Police supervisor on April 4.[v] Continued US airstrikes targeting Houthi supervisors could destabilize Houthi internal security over time. The Houthi regime uses a ”supervisory” system to maintain control over its governance structures. Supervisors fill a similar role to political commissars in the Soviet Union by ensuring that non-Houthi government leaders remain loyal to the Houthi movement.[vi] A sustained air campaign against these individuals could seriously disrupt Houthi internal security in certain areas.

CENTCOM has conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 3.[vii] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate, northern Yemen, including likely command and control sites in Saada City and eastern Saada Governorate.[viii] The Houthis conducted a combined cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on April 4.[ix] CENTCOM did not confirm the attack.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq. Newly-formed militia Harakat al Ashtar said on April 3 that its fighters are “preparing major surprises” for US forces and swore to burn US vehicles.[x] The Popular Campaign to Expel the American Occupation, another likely pro-Iranian Iraqi militia formed in early February 2025, posted a video on April 3 threatening US forces and said that the United States has no choice but to withdraw ”humiliated, defeated, and broken.”[xi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, a larger Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw by the end of 2025.[xii] Other militias have implied that they would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[xiii] These militia threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously conducted attacks targeting US forces to both encourage a US withdrawal and to fulfill other strategic objectives.  The militias have continued to threaten to attack US forces since January 2024 but have claimed few attacks since that date.[xiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xv] The removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria is a long-standing Iranian objective, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xvi]

Najaf-based Iraqi Shia cleric Sadr al Din al Qabanji separately threatened that US bases in Iraq are within the striking range of Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during a sermon on April 4.[xvii] Qabanji urged US President Donald Trump not to start or threaten war, referring to Trump’s threat to bomb Iran if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xviii] Qabanji is a member of an Iranian-aligned Iraqi Shia political party and has ties to Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xix]

Senior Iranian officials appear increasingly concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and IRGC Aerospace Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone based in Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 to conduct an operational assessment of military units and defense capabilities at the zone.[xx] The visit comes as Iran continues to pursue efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid growing concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[xxi]

The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that will fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.[xxii] US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 3 that direct talks "go faster."[xxiii] Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected direct negotiations with the United States.[xxiv] An Iranian expert close to the regime told the Atlantic on April 3 that Iran seeks a ”secret,” two-step process that starts with indirect talks and “potentially” moves to direct negotiations.[xxv] US officials have previously warned that the United States will pursue military options if the Iranian regime does not engage in direct negotiations.[xxvi] Indirect talks likely allow Iran to buy time, avoid public pressure, and preserve its image while quietly weighing US demands it may eventually have to accept in some form.

Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government.[xxvii] Velayati stated on April 4 that the Syrian government has ”no legitimacy” and has targeted ”innocent civilians“ in Latakia, likely referring to a period of violence in coastal Syria in early March.[xxviii] Velayati also criticized the government’s inaction against Israeli operations in Syria.[xxix]

Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.[xxx] Anti-government actors, including Alawite social media accounts and Alawite insurgents, are driving sectarian narratives in the Syrian information space that support insurgent objectives.[xxxi] Both Iran and the insurgents likely calculate that highlighting the Syrian government’s sectarian tendencies will make it more difficult for the government to secure foreign aid and make it more likely that the government becomes increasingly unstable. This would provide an opportunity for Iran to reinsert itself into Syria, as it has expressed interest in doing.

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. The current air campaign could render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks in the Red Sea by disrupting Houthi targeting cycles and command-and-control networks.
• Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that fully dismantles Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.
• Iran and Syria’s Insurgency: Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government. Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.

Iran Update, April 3, 2025

Iran is continuing to try to bolster its air defenses in preparation for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Iran has built a new Ghadir phased-array radar in West Azerbaijan Province in northwestern Iran in recent months, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[i] An open-source analyst reported on April 2 that Iran also recently built two Ghadir radars in southern Iran near the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The October 2024 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran damaged two Ghadir radars in southwestern Iran.[ii] The operational status of these radars is unclear. Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent months, particularly around Iranian nuclear facilities.[iii] The construction of new radars and recent exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid the Iranian regime’s concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.

Russia remains an unviable mediator between the United States and Iran given Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activity in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on April 1 that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program.[iv] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, met with Ryabkov in Moscow on April 2 to discuss Iranian nuclear negotiations.[v] Ravanchi and Ryabkov emphasized the importance of "resolving misunderstandings about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities." A senior Russian official similarly downplayed the threat of the Iranian nuclear program in early March 2025, claiming that Iran's production of 60 percent enriched uranium has "no weapons risk."[vi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[vii] Senior Russian officials have also previously criticized the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran and called US threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities "unacceptable.”[viii]

Russia has also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel and the United States. Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting data to support Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea, according to Western media.[ix] The Telegraph reported on April 3 that there is currently a Russian military expert in Yemen who is advising the Houthis on how to conduct attacks.”[x] Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activities in the region make it extremely unlikely that Russia would be able to help the United States secure its interests in the Middle East.

A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph on April 3 that Iran is “abandoning” the Houthis.[xi] This statement is very likely part of an Iranian information operation to try to obfuscate Iran’s leading role in the Axis of Resistance and absolve Iran of responsibility for proxy attacks against the United States and Israel. The official told The Telegraph that the Iranian regime has pivoted its focus to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian territory.[xii] Iran is almost certainly concerned about a potential strike, but that concern has not precluded continued Iranian support for the Houthis. Iranian officials have continued to express support for the Houthis in Persian- and Arabic-language media, including in Houthi media, in recent days.[xiii] The official also claimed that the Iranian regime ordered Iranian military personnel to leave Yemen because Iran is concerned that the death of an Iranian military official in a US airstrike in Yemen could lead to a “direct confrontation” with the United States.[xiv] The deaths of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force personnel in other Axis of Resistance theaters, such as Iraq and Syria, has not previously caused Iran to leave those theaters.[xv]  It is therefore unlikely that Iran would leave Yemen and abandon its decades-old strategy of building up proxies across the region to confront the United States and Israel out of concern that a US airstrike could kill Iranian personnel.

The official also claimed that Iran is abandoning the Houthis because it believes that the Houthis are “living their final months.”[xvi] This statement contradicts Iran’s approach to other Iranian proxies that have been severely degraded since October 2023.[xvii] The IDF severely degraded Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but Iran continues to support both groups.[xviii] Iran has attempted in recent months to transfer funds to Hezbollah to aid Hezbollah’s reconstitution in Lebanon, for example.[xix] Iran is also attempting to stoke sectarian tensions and rebuild Iranian networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xx] The Houthis’ ability to disrupt international trade and attack Israel makes them a strategic and valuable partner for Iran, which Iran is unlikely to abandon.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 28 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 2.[xxi] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi sites near Taiz Airport for the first time since the start of the US air campaign on March 15.[xxii] CENTCOM also targeted a Yemeni-Omani telecommunications site in Jablah District, Ibb Governorate, that reportedly contained Houthi radars and air defense systems.[xxiii] CENTCOM conducted an airstrike targeting a vehicle south of Sanaa. The strike reportedly killed the personal assistant of Houthi Interior Minister Abdulkarim al Houthi, who is Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s uncle.[xxiv] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. CENTCOM also likely targeted Houthi fighters in a separate airstrike targeting a vehicle northwest of Saada.[xxv]

The IDF engaged armed Syrians during an Israeli incursion 13 kilometers into Syrian territory near Nawa, Daraa Province, on April 2. Syrian media reported that an Israeli convoy of tanks and vehicles entered a forest near al Jabaliya Dam, approximately 13 kilometers from the disengagement zone.[xxvi] The IDF said that several “terrorists” fired at IDF 210th Division forces while they were confiscating weapons and destroying infrastructure in the area.[xxvii] The IDF killed several of the gunmen from the ground and air.[xxviii] Syrian media reported that unspecified Syrian gunmen fired heavy machine guns at Israeli aircraft and that Israeli forces shelled numerous targets near Tal al Jamou.[xxix] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that its fighters engaged the IDF with "appropriate weapons” near Nawa and Tasil.[xxx] The fighting killed nine Syrian men and reportedly injured over 20 others.[xxxi] The Syrian Interim Foreign Ministry accused Israel of deliberately attempting to “destabilize Syria.”[xxxii] This incident marks the second time that Syrians have attacked Israeli forces advancing into southern Syrian territory since the IDF killed at least four armed Syrians in Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25.[xxxiii]

This incident may present anti-Israel and anti-interim government armed groups with an opportunity to gain support and recruit new fighters. The leader of the prominent Suwayda-based Druze militia Mudafa al Karama, Leith al Balous, praised the Syrians who “defended” southern Syria from Israel as martyrs who fought against Israel in a “battle of existence and dignity.”[xxxiv] Over a thousand Syrians participated in a funeral in Nawa on April 3 for the men who died during the fighting.[xxxv] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which claimed that its fighters engaged Israeli forces, amplified calls to attend the funeral.[xxxvi] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria uses iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors and has referred to the current government as an “internal enemy,” suggesting that the group is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[xxxvii] The growth of anti-Israel, anti-government activity may provide an opportunity for external actors, such as Iranian-backed actors, to exploit anti-Israel grievances in southern Syria.

The IDF has continued to strike military assets in Syria, including a site where Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase. The IDF struck Hama Military Airport in Hama Province, Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert, and the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh, Damascus, on April 2.[xxxviii] The Syrian interim government said that the strikes injured several Syrians and “destroyed” Hama Military Airport.[xxxix] Several local Syrian sources reported that the strikes destroyed the airport’s aircraft, hangars, arms depots, and runway.[xl] The new Syrian Air Force has used aircraft at the Hama Airport in recent days, according to local media.[xli] Local media reported that the strike on the airport killed a Syrian Jaysh al Izza soldier.[xlii] The new Syrian 74th Division, which is reportedly comprised of mostly Jaysh al Izza soldiers, is based in Hama Province.[xliii] Syrian media also reported that the IDF struck former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions near Damascus on April 3.[xliv] Local sources reported that the IDF targeted a former SAA air defense battalion.[xlv]

Israel previously attacked Hama Military Airport and former SAA positions near Damascus in December 2024 to destroy equipment and weapons left over from the Assad regime.[xlvi] Israel recently struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21 and March 24.[xlvii] Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase at Tiyas as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.[xlviii] Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on April 2 that the IDF conducted the strikes to send a message to Turkey that Israel will not allow Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.[xlix] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz called the strikes “a warning for the future.”[l]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Air Defenses: Iran is continuing to try to bolster its air defenses in preparation for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Iran has built a new Ghadir phased-array radar in West Azerbaijan Province in northwestern Iran in recent months, according to commercially available satellite imagery. Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent months, particularly around Iranian nuclear facilities. The construction of new radars and recent exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid the Iranian regime’s concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.
• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia remains an unviable mediator between the United States and Iran given Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activity in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on April 1 that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, met with Ryabkov in Moscow on April 2 to discuss Iranian nuclear negotiations. Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activities in the region make it extremely unlikely that Russia would be able to help the United States secure its interests in the Middle East.
• Iranian Support for the Houthis: A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph on April 3 that Iran is “abandoning” the Houthis. This statement is very likely part of an Iranian information operation to try to obfuscate Iran’s leading role in the Axis of Resistance and absolve Iran of responsibility for proxy attacks against the United States and Israel. The Houthis’ ability to disrupt international trade and attack Israel makes them a strategic and valuable partner for Iran, which Iran is unlikely to abandon.
• Israeli Activity in Syria: The IDF engaged armed Syrians during an Israeli incursion 13 kilometers into Syrian territory near Nawa, Daraa Province, on April 2. This incident marks the second time that Syrians have attacked Israeli forces advancing into southern Syrian territory since the IDF killed at least four armed Syrians in Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25. This incident may present anti-Israel and anti-interim government armed groups with an opportunity to gain support and recruit new fighters.
• Israeli Activity in Syria: The IDF has continued to strike military assets in Syria, including a site where Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase. The IDF struck Hama Military Airport in Hama Province, Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert, and the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh, Damascus, on April 2. Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on April 2 that the IDF conducted the strikes to send a message to Turkey that Israel will not allow Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.

Iran Update, April 2, 2025

Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on April 2 claiming that Iran "certainly has sufficient weapons" to attack Diego Garcia Island.[i] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island.[ii] The piece stated that US Air Force and Navy "strategic assets" and "4000 US soldiers" at Diego Garcia would be "at risk of complete destruction" if the United States attacked Iran.[iii] There are normally roughly 400 US military personnel and 2,000 civilian contractors at Diego Garcia.[iv] The article outlined the following options for an Iranian attack on US assets at Diego Garcia.

• Missile and drone attack: Defa Press stated that Iran could conduct a drone attack "using advanced Shahed 136 drones."[v] Iran unveiled the Shahed-136B drone in September 2024 and claimed it has a range of 4000 kilometers (km).[vi] The original Shahed-136 drone has a maximum speed of 185 km per hour, which means it would take about 20 hours to reach Diego Garcia from the southernmost city in Iran. Iran previously launched about 170 drones in their April 2024 attack on Israel, none of which entered Israeli airspace, in part because the drone’s slow speed enabled allied aircraft to intercept and destroy the drones.[vii] The drones launched from Iran would have taken roughly nine hours to reach Israel, though Israel had the benefit of a plethora of Israeli and allied land-based aircraft available to intercept drones.[viii] Defa Press also stated that Iran could use ballistic and cruise missiles, including Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, at "close range" to Diego Garcia.[ix] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles and ability to manufacture some advanced ballistic missiles have been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, but Iran would presumably expend a large proportion of its remaining stockpile in the event of a strike on its nuclear facilities.[x] Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of its drones and missiles or otherwise alter the weight of the drones and missiles themselves to launch a land-based attack with sufficient range to hit Diego Garcia.
• Naval drone and missile attack launched from surface vessels: Defa Press also threatened that Iran could hit targets in the Indian Ocean using surface vessels, presumably its drone carriers and others, to launch cruise missiles and drones.[xi] This would—in theory—allow Iranian ships to get closer to Diego Garcia. Such vessels lack the necessary countermeasures to seriously defend themselves against US naval action, however.

Iran still retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike other US bases in the Middle East, however. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent weeks to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries.[xii] An unspecified Iranian official told the Wall Street Journal that "each American soldier will be an individual target" if the United States attacks Iran.[xiii] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh similarly stated that the United States has "at least 10 bases and over 50,000 troops" near Iran that Iran could target.[xiv] Iran has previously attacked US bases in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, and the Houthis have previously targeted al Dhafra Airbase in Abu Dhabi, which hosts US and French personnel.[xv]

Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah.[xvi] Hezbollah has probably long used its international networks to procure some weapons and drone components, though it could decide to prioritize these efforts after the collapse of Assad and the setbacks caused by Israel.[xvii]

These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.[xviii] Spanish media reported that the three individuals arrested on April 1 resided on the same street as another group of Hezbollah-affiliated individuals that Spanish police detained in 2024 for producing over 1,000 drones for Hezbollah.[xix] Spanish media noted that the investigation that led to the arrest of the three individuals on April 1 has also led to the arrests of an unspecified number of individuals in France and the United Kingdom.[xx]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.[xxi] The SDF agreed to withdraw from two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 1.[xxii] An interim government official said that the withdrawal agreement is the first step toward the comprehensive agreement between the SDF and interim government.[xxiii] Local sources subsequently reported that the SDF withdrew from the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge on April 2, where they have fought the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) since December 2024.[xxiv] An anti-SDF source also claimed that the SDF would withdraw from Deir Hafer, Nasiriyah, and Maskanah south of the dam along Highway 4 after leaving Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[xxv] Syrian sources, including those close to the interim government, claimed that the SDF’s withdrawal was the result of “a preliminary agreement” to create a demilitarized zone around frequent engagement sites.[xxvi]  A “special administration,” possibly consisting of dam employees, will be in control of the Tishreen Dam area.[xxvii] Dam employees were allowed to remain in the area to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions during the last ceasefire agreement between the SDF and the SNA in December 2024.[xxviii]  Syrian Kurdish sources have refuted the reports that the SDF withdrew from its positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[xxix] Official SDF and interim government sources have not commented on the rumored SDF withdrawal or agreement at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian media said that Iran could attack Diego Garcia using very long-range one-way attack drones or by using a naval surface combatant to launch drones and cruise missiles.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah. These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.
• SDF-Syrian Interim Government Agreement: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.

Iran Update, April 1, 2025

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad.[i]  The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1.[ii] A Lebanese security source told Reuters that Badir was a mid-ranking commander whose responsibilities included the "Palestinian file."[iii] Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.”[iv]

It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack. Hezbollah and Iran may have planned the attack to impose a heavy cost on Israel to try to increase pressure on the IDF to withdraw from the five remaining IDF positions in southern Lebanon.[v]  It is also possible that hardline Hezbollah elements who disagree with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s position of inaction vis-a-vis Israel independently planned this attack.[vi] Qassem has repeatedly stated that the Lebanese state, rather than Hezbollah, is responsible for responding to Israeli operations in Lebanon.[vii] It is unclear if Hezbollah central leadership approved the attack plan. It is further possible that Hezbollah and Iran calculated, after suffering significant losses throughout the past year, that they must change their strategy and conduct external terror attacks. The Israeli National Security Council warned on April 1 ahead of the Jewish Passover holiday that Iran, either directly or through its proxies, may try to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad against the backdrop of renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip.[viii]  

Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security."[ix] Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[x] Hardline Iranian Parliamentarian Ahmad Naderi separately stated on March 31 that the United States "wouldn't dare threaten to bomb" Iran if Iran "had an atomic bomb."[xi] Naderi previously made similar statements in November and December 2024.[xii] Larijani and Naderi's comments echo recent calls from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials for the Supreme Leader to allow the development of a nuclear weapon.[xiii] The recent Iranian threats come after US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xiv]

Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site.[xv] This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.[xvi] Middle East Eye reported that negotiations for the defense pact have "quietly” continued since December 2024.[xvii] One of the sources said that Turkey plans to deploy Hisar air defense systems and surveillance and attack drones to provide air cover for the base while construction is underway. The Hisar-A and Hisar-O systems are Turkish short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, respectively.[xviii] A second unspecified source claimed that the presence of Turkish drones and air defense systems at the base would “likely deter Israel” from conducting strikes in the area.[xix] The IDF recently struck “strategic military infrastructure” at Tiyas Airbase on March 21 and 25.[xx] The strikes destroyed at least one Su-24 fighter jet and rendered the airstrip unusable.[xxi] An unspecified Israeli defense official told Israeli media that the IDF conducted these strikes to send a message to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara that Israel will not tolerate any reduction of its “freedom of action” in Syrian airspace.[xxii] An unspecified Israeli security official stated on March 31 that a Turkish airbase in Syria would undermine Israel’s freedom to operate in Syria and that Israel would view such a base as a “potential threat.”[xxiii] The location of Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert would allow Turkey to establish “aerial control” over the area and support Turkish counter-ISIS efforts, according to one of the sources speaking to Middle East Eye.[xxiv]

Turkey and the Syrian interim government have begun construction efforts at the Menagh Airbase, near the Syria-Turkey border in Aleppo Province, in recent weeks.[xxv] Turkey may deploy air defense systems and fighter jets to the Menagh Airbase once renovations are complete, according to Syrian media.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Thwarted Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian Attack: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad. The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1. Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.” It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack.
• Iranian Weaponization Threats: Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security." Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.
• Turkish Military Bases in Syria: Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site. This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.

Iran Update, March 31, 2025

Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal.[i] Trump added that he would impose secondary tariffs on Iran if Iran makes no progress towards a deal.[ii] Secondary tariffs would impose sanctions on countries that trade with Iran. US officials have previously threatened military action against Iran if there were no direct negotiations.[iii] Iranian officials have said they are open to indirect negotiations, though they reject direct negotiations with the United States.[iv] Senior Iranian officials have also repeatedly threatened to strike US interests in the region since at least January 2025, likely to shape US decision-making and discourage a US or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program.[v] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told the Telegraph on March 29 that Iran would attack any base "used by Americans" to attack Iran.[vi] Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation.

Iranian officials have recently threatened the following responses to a US-Israeli strike on Iran. These courses of action are not mutually exclusive.

• Attack US bases and forces: Iranian officials have repeatedly explicitly threatened to attack US bases and forces in the region in recent months.[vii] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told Western media on March 29 that Iran would target Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean if the United States attacked Iran.[viii] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[ix] An anonymous official also told Tehran Times that Iran's missile launchers at its underground bases are loaded with missiles and "ready for launch."[x] Iran's reported current maximum missile range is 2000 kilometers (km), and its reported maximum drone range is around 2500km.[xi] Diego Garcia Island is located about 3700km from Iran's southernmost city, Pasabandar. Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of the warhead on its medium-range missiles or otherwise decrease missile weight to launch a successful attack on Diego Garcia. Iran could target other US facilities in the region if it chose to do so. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh threatened on March 31 that US bases in the region are ”sitting in a glass house" near Iran.[xii]
• Disrupt international trade: IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri suggested on March 29 that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[xiii] Tangsiri also threatened to seize ships if Iranian ships were seized.
• Conduct a direct attack on Israel: Senior Iranian military commanders have recently resurfaced threats to conduct another missile attack on Israel.[xiv] Iran unveiled its latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[xv] Iranian media referred to the missile as the “Israeli ballistic missile” because it can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[xvi] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles, or missiles that can reach Israel, has been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, however.

Iranian officials have publicly stated that they are unwilling to make concessions to reach a new nuclear deal with the United States under President Trump's desired timeline or terms. Iranian sources stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance.[xvii] A senior Iranian military official stated on March 29 that Iran will "never negotiate” on its missiles or the “capabilities” of the Axis of Resistance.[xviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to expel the United States from the region and establish itself as the regional hegemon. An unspecified senior Iranian source separately told a UK-based, Gulf-linked outlet that Trump's letter refers to the "zero enrichment" approach.[xix] It remains unclear if Iran is willing to reverse significant progress on its nuclear program to meet the terms. Western media also reported in mid-March that Trump's letter set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal.[xx] Prior negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), took 20 months to negotiate.

Iran is likely rebuilding its solid-fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.[xxi] The sanctioned Iranian cargo vessel Jairan, which is carrying sodium perchlorate, a chemical used to make solid missile fuel, arrived near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, around March 29.[xxii] Marine Traffic and Maritime Executive confirmed that the Jairan, one of two Iranian Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessels sanctioned for transporting missile materials, is waiting near the Gheshm and Hormoz islands. Western officials told The Financial Times in January 2025 that Golbon and Jairan would deliver over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran.[xxiii] The IRGC’s Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which partially oversees Iran’s missile research and development, received most of the shipment offloaded by Golbon on February 13.[xxiv] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[xxv] The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to one of these locations would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.

Iran continues to coordinate with Russia and China on nuclear issues. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov in Tehran on March 31 to discuss nuclear talks and sanctions relief.[xxvi] Gharibabadi said Iran, Russia, and China will continue trilateral meetings and that Russia invited him to a UN Charter group meeting in Moscow in mid-April. The meeting follows a March 14 joint statement from Russia, China, and Iran that condemned US sanctions and described Iran’s nuclear activities as “peaceful.”[xxvii] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia and China plan to support Tehran under growing US pressure. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests through mediation, particularly in talks on Iran’s nuclear program and support of the Axis of Resistance.[xxviii]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara announced the appointments of 23 transitional ministers to his cabinet during a press conference on March 29.[xxix] These ministers are expected to remain in power until the transitional government cedes power to a new, elected government after a five-year interim period.[xxx] Shara replaced the majority of former interim ministers with new appointments and appointed one woman, one Christian, one Alawite, one Druze, and two Kurds to lead ministries within his government.[xxxi] Shara also appointed nine ”independent” ministers, including various professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[xxxii] He also dismissed the former interim justice minister, who was an ex-Jabhat al Nusra official.[xxxiii] These are undoubtedly positive steps towards a representative transitional government, but Shara still prioritized maintaining his control over key ministries such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice by appointing Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated officials or former HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) officials to these posts.[xxxiv] He also appointed former HTS and SSG officials to the less important ministries of energy, local administration and environment, public works and housing, youth and sports, and administrative development.[xxxv] The decision to expand his transitional cabinet to include minorities and “newcomers” follows widespread concern that Shara is personalizing power and appointing loyalists while blocking opportunities to represent Syria’s various minority communities in the transitional government.[xxxvi] Shara previously appointed a cabinet nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based SSG.[xxxvii]

Shara’s appointments of long-time loyalists to key positions suggests Shara hopes to continue to maintain his own and HTS’s influence within the transitional government. Shara has appointed or reappointed close advisers and allies from HTS to oversee portfolios directly concerning internal security and state stability. Shara has retained two of his most trusted advisors, Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Asaad al Shaibani, as ministers of defense and foreign affairs, respectively.[xxxviii] Former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Khattab has transitioned from intelligence chief to Interior Minister, where he will oversee the state’s General Security Services, border control, and intelligence services.[xxxix] The United States and the UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[xl] It is not clear if or who Shara will appoint to directly oversee Syrian intelligence services, given the expansion of Khattab’s role. Shara also appointed “key HTS ideologue” and Sunni scholar Mazhar al Wais as his Justice Minister.[xli] Arab media has reported that Wais has served as a ”senior legal figure” in HTS and has accompanied Shara to numerous high-level meetings without having been appointed to an official role.[xlii] Shara’s decision to position these loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the trajectory of the Syrian government and its security services, which could allow him to maintain his rule well into the future. Qasra, Shaibani, Khattab, and Wais’s appointments suggest that Shara intends to maintain significant control over ministries that directly concern internal security and state stability, and it could enable him to sideline rivals as he did during his rule of Idlib.

Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[xliii] These ministries—particularly education—can be used to remake the next generation of a country by altering textbooks. The Assad regime and other Middle Eastern autocratic regimes—like the Houthis in Yemen and ISIS—have created educational materials to brainwash the next generation. Shara probably recognized that placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have earned him significant international blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions. Shara could still employ a ”supervisory” system in which deputy ministers make the decisions and hold the real power while the minister serves as a figurehead.

Shara’s new transitional government is unlikely to assuage fears from minority communities about the future of minority representation in the transitional government and the trajectory of Shara’s rule. Shara’s clear preference for Sunni Arabs, the very few minorities, and the lack of appointees from other strong Syrian parties like the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) or Kurdish National Council (KNC) has already led several minority-dominated groups to condemn his “one-party government.”[xliv] The Alawite community, for its part, remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. The SDC decried the new government as “largely homogenous.”[xlv] A KNC official told Kurdish media that the KNC ”will not participate in a government that does not recognize the rights of the Kurdish people.”[xlvi] The official warned that the Kurds have been ignored for the ”third time,” likely referring to widespread Kurdish criticism over exclusion from the National Dialogue Conference, the drafting of the constitutional declaration, and the recent appointments.[xlvii] Fear among key Kurdish powerbrokers that Shara will continue to exclude their parties from a voice in his government’s formation risks disrupting the Syrian interim government’s efforts to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state.

The separatist Druze-majority Suwayda Military Council (SMC) also rejected Shara’s “one-color" government during a press conference on March 30.[xlviii] The group called on Shara to form a government that ”represents all Syrian components.”[xlix] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[l] A Western analyst recently reported that it is ”well known” within the Druze community that the SMC has connections to Israel through members of the Israeli Druze community.[li] It does not appear that the SMC represents a majority of the Syrian Druze population. That multiple camps across Syria continue to reject Shara’s transitional government will not help grow the government’s legitimacy, however.

Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28.[lii] Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.[liii] The Supreme Council of Fatwa will rule on decisions by majority vote, and Shara will vote as a tiebreaker if needed.[liv] HTS established a Supreme Fatwa Council in Idlib in 2019 that Shara effectively controlled and used to sideline his hardline Islamist rivals.[lv] Shara’s ability to use the council against his rivals will depend on his level of influence over a majority of its council members. Several notable HTS-affiliated scholars, including Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atun, former HTS-backed Supreme Fatwa Council member Anas Ayrut, and new Minister of Justice Mazhar al Wais, sit on the new council.[lvi]

Shara appointed Sheikh Osama al Rifai as the council’s chairman.[lvii] The Syrian Islamic Council, which was a body of Sunni Islamic scholars that opposed the Assad regime, appointed Rifai as the Grand Mufti in Syria in 2021 after the regime abolished the office.[lviii] Rifai has connections to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood.[lix]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies enabling a strike, may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel.
• Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities. The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to product long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.
• Syrian Transitional Government: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.
• Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council: Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28. Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.

Iran Update, March 28, 2025

Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[i] Iran signaled openness to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions.  Senior Iranian officials expressing support for indirect negotiations likely aim to reassure the Iranian public that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief amid Iran's deteriorating economic situation. Senior Iranian officials have, however, heavily caveated that Iran should remain cautious in negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on March 28 that Iran's response to Trump's letter is “restrained” and emphasized Iran's readiness to "confront" threats.[ii] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized US attempts to "impose [its] demands" on Iran.[iii] Iranian officials have also explicitly rejected any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[iv] These statements likely aim to appease hardline elements within the regime that oppose negotiations with the West.

Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[v] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments."[vi] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi asked the E3 to "reconsider its approach" towards Iran during a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on March 28.[vii] A Wall Street Journal reporter also reported on March 28 that Iran and the E3 held "technical talks" in Geneva this week.[viii] Iranian efforts to signal openness to indirect negotiations and discussions with the E3 likely aim to deter the E3 from triggering the “snapback” mechanism.

Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has engaged in a concerted effort since at least January 2025 to shape US-Israeli decision-making and deter a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. A senior Iranian military commander warned in February 2024 that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist" an Israeli attack on Iran, likely referring to US bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries.[ix] Ghalibaf separately stated on March 28 that US allies and bases in the region "will be as vulnerable as a powder keg" if the United States and Israel threaten Iran.[x] Iran has recently unveiled new missile bases and conducted air defense exercises around nuclear sites, likely to highlight its missile capabilities and prepare for a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[xi] Iran may be signaling a willingness to engage in indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States to further shape US-Israeli decision-making and avoid a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official stated on March 25 that Trump's letter said "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[xii] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.

The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. [xiii] The government-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Aden announced on March 16 that eight Sanaa-based banks will move to Aden to avoid being subject to sanctions after the United States designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2025.[xiv] Remaining in Houthi-controlled areas would risk these banks coming under US sanctions.[xv] The Houthis have already arrested five employees at checkpoints as of March 27, according to anonymous sources talking to a Saudi news outlet.[xvi] The relocation of banks will likely further damage the Houthis' already unstable economy, which could lead to unrest and weaken the Houthis’ control over these areas in Yemen.

A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[xvii] The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE in July 2024 if the two states did not pressure the Yemeni government to stop efforts to remove the Houthi-controlled Central Bank from the SWIFT international banking network.[xviii]  The Houthis' threats worked, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE convinced the Yemeni government to drop their campaign. The Houthis recognize that Saudi Arabia and the UAE fear a resumption of Houthi attacks targeting key Saudi and Emirati commercial centers.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[xix] CENTCOM conducted at least eight airstrikes on a Houthi military base and Houthi underground facilities and communication infrastructure in the Jabal al Aswad area, Amran Governorate.[xx]  CENTCOM also targeted the Houthis‘ military command headquarters in Sanaa City.[xxi] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi denied that CENTCOM’s airstrikes have impacted their capabilities in his Quds Day speech on March 27.[xxii] A published list of dead Houthi fighters released on March 26 indicated that CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 41 Houthi fighters.[xxiii] The Houthis are unlikely to report the real number of casualties in the CENTCOM airstrikes among their fighters or release the names of Houthi senior officials killed in action. An anonymous US defense official confirmed that CENTCOM has killed several Houthi leaders since the start of their airstrike campaign, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxiv] The Wall Street Journal also reported that Abdulmalik has ordered Houthi leadership to not carry cellphones to avoid being tracked.[xxv]

Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes. A senior Houthi political official condemned the UAE for their cooperation with the United States, threatening to attack Abu Dhabi and Dubai in a post on X on March 27.[xxvi]

A Houthi delegation met with Egyptian intelligence officials in Cairo on March 26, at the Houthis’ request, to discuss deescalating regional tensions, according to anonymous sources speaking to a Saudi news outlet.[xxvii] These Egyptian officials reportedly passed on a message from the United States requesting the Houthis to not pursue an offensive campaign targeting international shipping. The source added that it was unclear if the message mentioned anything about the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have consistently linked their attacks on international shipping and Israel to their support for the Palestinian people.[xxviii] The Houthis halted their attacks when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was initially implemented in January 2025.[xxix]

Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[xxx] Sadr called on his followers to completely boycott the elections. Sadr urged Sadrists to update their voter registration on February 19 but had refused to announce whether his movement would participate in the elections.[xxxi] Sadr’s boycott of the elections is noteworthy given that his movement, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections to exclude Iranian-backed Shia political parties from government formation.[xxxii] The Sadrist political bloc’s withdrawal from Parliament in 2022 enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in Parliament.[xxxiii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could have threatened the Shia Coordination Framework’s strength in Parliament.

Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Multiple parliamentarians, including from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, the KDP, and a Turkmen bloc, called on Sadr to reverse his decision on March 28.[xxxiv] These calls follow other recent calls for Sadr to participate in the elections from senior Iraqi politicians, including Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai.[xxxv] Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xxxvi]  Iraqi political leaders across the political spectrum are likely concerned that Sadr could call for protests against governmental corruption if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xxxvii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xxxviii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xxxix]

Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Unknown actors in Lebanon launched two rockets at Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel, on March 28, which is the second rocket attack targeting Israel in the past week.[xl] The March 28 attack did not strike Kiryat Shmona.[xli] Both Hezbollah and the Lebanese president said that Hezbollah was not responsible.[xlii] Hezbollah’s central leadership is unlikely to approve any attacks targeting Israel, which would risk major Israeli reprisals. Hezbollah faces serious threats to its control, including substantial reconstruction costs that it is having trouble meeting. Israeli airstrikes would only further imperil Hezbollah. The IDF conducted an airstrike that destroyed a Hezbollah drone storage facility in Beirut, Lebanon, in response to the rocket attack.[xliii] The Israeli campaign in Lebanon badly weakened Hezbollah’s military wing in southern Lebanon, destroying approximately 80% of its 40-kilometer range rocket stockpiles and killing many senior commanders.[xliv]

Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there. Hezbollah has historically maintained de facto security control over southern Lebanon and smaller armed factions operating there, and it would be able to prevent these attacks if it were not badly damaged. It has also historically maintained good command and control over its forces, as demonstrated by the carefully calibrated attack campaign into northern Israel between October 2023 and October 2024. That Hezbollah cannot control its fighters or prevent them from conducting these attacks—which risk drawing a devastating Israeli response contrary to Hezbollah’s interests—suggests that Hezbollah lacks strong commanders who can discipline their forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Houthi Economy: The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27. Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes.
• Iraqi Politics: Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.
• Rocket Attacks in Lebanon: Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there.

Iran Update, March 27, 2025

Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[i] Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Trump sent a letter to Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, and Iran responded to the letter via Oman on March 26.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States, though it rejects direct negotiations under the current US “maximum pressure” campaign and US-Israeli threat of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated on March 25 that Trump's letter to Iran proposed "direct talks" and emphasized that "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[iii] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to grant sanctions relief or avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.

This likely suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approved indirect negotiations with the United States. Araghchi said that Iran conducted such indirect talks under former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Kamal Kharazi, have also recently expressed willingness to engage in indirect negotiations with the United States.[iv] That Kharazi spoke to state media may suggest that Iranian officials are concerned about internal unrest over Iran’s economic situation and want to signal to the Iranian population that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief.[v]

 

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors (see graphic below). A media official from the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria told Lebanese media on March 27 that the group does not receive “internal or external” support from Iran or Iranian-backed actors in the region.[vi] The official described the group as an “integrated organization” with political, social, military, and legal offices.[vii] There is no evidence that the group has any affiliations with external actors, but it is unclear why an independent local actor would decide to use iconography that many Syrians and people in the region and the world widely associate with Iran and its proxies and partners.[viii] The group initially established itself on January 8 as the ”Southern Liberation Front” and used red, green, and black text over a grey map of Syria as its logo until January 12, when it changed to the current logo.[ix]

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria said it communicated with the Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, but broke off communications after the Coastal Shield Brigades launched its military offensive in early March.[x] The media official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria opposed the killing of any Syrians, indicating that the group is attempting to present itself as cross-sectarian. The official also referred to the current government as an ”internal enemy,” suggesting that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[xi] The official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria cannot conduct many operations due to the interim government’s ”movements.” Fourteen members of the group have been killed in operations against the Israelis, however.[xii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations. Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely approved indirect negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations.
• Anti-Government Militias in Syria: The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors. This group also referred to the interim government as an “internal enemy” and communicated with other anti-government insurgents in western Syria before early March.

Iran Update, March 26, 2025

The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters.[i] Unspecified US and Syrian sources told Reuters on March 25 that US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi gave a list of US conditions for partial sanctions relief to Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[ii] The conditions reportedly include counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing structure.”[iii] The United States is considering extending an existing sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions exemption if the Syrian interim government fulfills these conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[iv] The United States would also reportedly issue a statement expressing support for Syria’s territorial integrity.[v]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. “Foreign fighters” likely refers to non-Syrian fighters whom Shara has promoted within the ranks of the Defense Ministry since coming to power. These fighters include Abdul Rahman al Khatib, a Jordanian, and Omar Mohammad Ciftci, a Turk.[vi] Khatib and Ciftci are HTS fighters who are loyal to Shara and have fought alongside Shara for over a decade.[vii] Shara recently appointed Khatib and Ciftci to command the Republican Guard and Damascus Division of the new Syrian army, respectively.[viii] These positions are key to maintaining security in Damascus and protecting Shara and the interim government, underscoring Shara’s trust in both men to protect his nascent rule over the country. Shara will likely oppose dismissing Khatib and Ciftci from their posts and appointing other, potentially less trusted, commanders to their posts. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.

Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. These militias include elements that operate outside of the PMF.[ix] “Informed political sources” told Iraqi media on March 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework has reached a “preliminary agreement,” with Iranian approval, to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF.[x] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq.[xi] The agreement also stipulates that PMF brigades and units can only carry out orders that the Iraqi prime minister gives them. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.[xii] The integration of militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[xiii]

This agreement comes amid US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reported plans to sanction PMF leaders.[xiv] This agreement also comes as the Iraqi parliament is debating the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which is meant to replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law and clarify the PMF’s structure and administrative functions.[xv]

Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25.[xvi] This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.[xvii] The facility contains both solid- and liquid-fuel ballistic missiles, including Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, Sejjil, Emad, and Haj Qassem missiles. Iran used Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, and Emad ballistic missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[xviii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri claimed on March 25 that the new facility includes enough missiles for Iran to conduct an attack “dozens of times” greater than its October 2024 attack on Israel.[xix]

Open-source reports suggest that the United States recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.[xx] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that B-2 Stealth Bombers, KC-135 refueling tankers, and a C-17 cargo plane recently arrived at Diego Garcia Island.[xxi] The United States has not confirmed the arrival of these aircraft at the time of this writing. The military buildup comes amid the US air campaign targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Yemen.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Integration into the PMF: Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.
• Iranian Deterrence Efforts: Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25. This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.

Iran Update, March 25, 2025

Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime.[i] It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin ”any diplomatic initiative,” but the supreme leader would almost certainly make such a decision. Araghchi has historically taken a softer line on nuclear negotiations with the United States compared to the regime’s hardline elements. Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[ii] Former President Hassan Rouhani and former leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team Mohammad Javad Zarif were previously given "full authority" to advance nuclear talks during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations.[iii]

An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch. Shara announced on March 25 that the interim government will comprise 22 ministerial portfolios led by a majority of “newcomers,” suggesting that he will replace the 22 existing ministers.[iv] This likely includes dissolving the office of Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir.[v] Emirati media reported in late February that Shara’s ministerial changes are imminent and are supposed to reflect that Shara understands the concerns about his consolidation of power.[vi] This follows widespread concern over Shara’s concentration of executive authority and the lack of checks and balances on the Presidency outlined in the recently announced constitutional declaration.[vii]

Shara’s current roster of transitional ministers is nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based, HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[viii] At least 18 of the 22 ministers that Shara appointed shortly after coming to power in December 2024 have close ties to or deep experience working with Shara, either through the SSG or through direct participation in HTS.[ix] The SSG was nominally independent of HTS but, in practice, subordinate to HTS. Men who have been deeply loyal to Shara and have worked with him since his Jabhat al Nusra days currently hold the largest and highest priority ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs and intelligence.[x]

Shara’s appointments in the coming days will be a strong indicator of the sort of government and state Shara intends to lead. A bias towards non-SSG, non-Sunni, non-Islamist, and non-HTS backgrounds would indicate Shara’s willingness to form a representative government that represents all of Syria. An opposite bias towards Sunni Arabs, Sunni Islamists, or former HTS and SSG members would indicate that Shara is not willing to form a representative or inclusive government at this time and instead seeks to cement his own control. This would also likely increase the distrust of the Shara government among minority communities, including the Alawites, Kurds, and Druze communities.

The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.[xi] Local media reported on March 24 that Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis at the Sarfait border crossing with Oman in southeastern Yemen.[xii] The Houthis have previously procured dual-use items on the international market for drone and missile components.[xiii] The Houthis smuggle these shipments through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and through land borders, particularly from the Omani-Yemeni border via Yemeni government-controlled Mahra and Hadramawt governorates in eastern Yemen.[xiv]  The United States sanctioned China-based electronics companies for selling dual-use components to the Houthis in October 2024.[xv] The Houthis also imported hydrogen fuel cylinders from unspecified Chinese suppliers in August 2024, which were aimed to increase the range and payloads of the Houthis’ drones.[xvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime. It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin ”any diplomatic initiative,” but such a decision would almost certainly be made by the supreme leader.
• Syrian Transitional Government Formation: An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch.
• Houthi Arms Smuggling: The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.

Iran Update, March 24, 2025

Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. [i] Top Trump Administration Envoy Steve Witkoff said that the proposal sought to put in place verification mechanisms and prevent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear material.[ii] Witkoff added that Iran did express interest in the proposal by reaching back out via multiple intermediaries, and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[iii]

Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic.[iv] An Iranian expert close to the regime and an Iranian media outlet close to a former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary both said that Iran would not negotiate over its missile program.[v] The Iranian expert also added that Iranian officials could not negotiate over its role in the Axis of Resistance because its proxy and partner militias “are not proxies.”[vi] This is a continuation of a long-running Iranian information operation that seeks to obfuscate Tehran’s role as the leader of the Axis of Resistance. These positions echo previous statements from senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei rejecting any measures to "set new expectations" for Iran's missile range.[vii]

Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran seeks to expel the United States from the region to exert itself as the regional hegemon and shape the region in its image. Its missile program forms one part of this effort. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to coerce its adversaries and provide new capabilities to its allies. Expelling the United States and emerging as a regional hegemon also requires like-minded partners and proxies that can actualize Iran’s vision in regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. An Iranian decision to curtail its proxy and partner network would be akin to an Iranian surrender and would require top Iranian leaders to give up on key ideological positions they have held for their entire adult lives.

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.[viii]  CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base and ammunition depots in al Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen on March 22 and a Houthi storage facility in western Sanaa suburbs on March 23.[ix] CENTCOM also struck Houthi ports and an airport in Hudaydah on March 22, reportedly injuring Houthi naval operations chief Mansour al Saadi, also known as Abu Sajjad.[x] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told CBS on March 23 that CENTCOM eliminated the Houthis’ missile unit chief.[xi] Local media also reported that US airstrikes killed three Houthi commanders in Majzar, Maarib Governorate, on March 22.[xii] The Houthis launched a retaliatory drone attack and a separate combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xiii]

The Houthis modified their military communication encryption codes and enhanced personal security measures for Houthi leadership in response to CENTCOM airstrikes targeting Houthi officials, according to a March 22 report in Yemeni media.[xiv] The Houthis have also reportedly increased security around military sites and imposed further censorship restrictions on the Yemeni population in Houthi-controlled territory, to prevent leaks showing Houthi military activities, sites, and leaders. Waltz also confirmed that CENTCOM will continue to target Houthi military infrastructure, weapons production sites, and communication lines, alongside Houthi leadership, to deter and weaken the Houthis’ capabilities to conduct attacks on Israel and international shipping.[xv]  Regional sources reported that CENTCOM struck the Houthis’ Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in the capital city Sanaa on March 19.[xvi]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed on March 22 that the United States ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail to the Red Sea because the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group failed to confront the Houthis.[xvii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Vinson to deploy to the Red Sea and extended Truman’s deployment by one month to maintain a continuous carrier presence in the region.[xviii]

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 21 and 23, respectively.[xix] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both Houthi missiles before they entered Israeli airspace.[xx] An Israeli war correspondent, citing an anonymous defense source, reported that the Houthis also launched a missile on March 22. The March 22 missile fell short of Israel and landed in an unidentified location in Saudi Arabia.[xxi]

The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.[xxii] The Central Bank added that this move will impact the Houthis’ economy. The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the Yemeni government attempted to remove the Houthi-controlled wing of the Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa from the SWIFT system in July 2024.[xxiii] The Saudis and Emiratis promptly and successfully pressured the Yemeni government to cease its plan to remove the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank from SWIFT.

The Houthis evacuated their headquarters in Baghdad and are considering closing their other two offices in Iraq after Iran warned the United States may strike Houthi targets, according to a Saudi news report on March 22.[xxiv] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned Iraqi militia leaders that US airstrikes against Houthi facilities could ”quickly backfire on Baghdad.” Ghaani called for ”avoiding any military activity during this sensitive period.”

Iran and the Iraqi federal government continue to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to “avoid all provocations” with Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxv] An unspecified source told Saudi media on March 21 that Ghaani, during his visit to Baghdad on March 19, told Iranian-backed militia and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to avoid provoking the United States or Israel.[xxvi] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein separately acknowledged in a recent interview that the federal government’s failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli attacks in Iraq.[xxvii] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[xxviii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some parties with Iranian-backed armed wings. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq, including via the transfer of weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night.[xxix]

The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxx] The Iraqi parliament first read through the draft law, titled the “Popular Mobilization Authority Law,” in a session on March 24 and Parliament will reportedly vote on the law on April 1.[xxxi] Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians have debated the Popular Mobilization Authority Law’s components for weeks.[xxxii] Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the Iraqi federal government sought to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which has been debated in parliament several times in recent months, with a rewritten law--presumably the new Popular Mobilization Authority Law--that would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces.[xxxiii] This effort to restructure the PMF occurred as the United States pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxxiv]

Kurdish media reported on March 24 that the draft Popular Mobilization Authority law will replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law that formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxv] The current form of the PMF law clarifies the PMF’s structure and administrative functions, including the Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman’s authorities and the number of departments and directorates associated with the PMF.[xxxvi] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) is formally responsible for ensuring that the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[xxxvii] The draft law adds that the PMF will have a military academy like other Iraqi security institutions.[xxxviii] The draft law also prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties, as did the 2016 version.[xxxix]

The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties. Most Iraqi political leaders instead control their parties from outside government, unlike in most parliamentary systems. This means that Iranian-backed Iraqi figures like Qais al Khazali or Hadi al Ameri—leaders of Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization respectively—could easily continue to control both their military organizations and their political organizations without technically violating this law. The law also does not make any changes that would impede Iran’s ability to command and control the PMF, which does not listen to its official commander-in-chief, the Iraqi prime minister. Many elements of the PMF instead take their orders from Iran or Iranian-backed commanders.

Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[xl] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[xli] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[xlii] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[xliii] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[xliv] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[xlv] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[xlvi] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[xlvii]

The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran presented new evidence on March 14 that demonstrates ongoing and systematic human rights violations by the Iranian regime in response to the protests that sparked in September 2022.[xlviii] The report states that women are increasingly summoned to court for alleged non-compliance with mandatory Hijab laws. Penalties include fines, flogging, and bank account closure and are often based on photos or reports submitted by police or loyalist groups. The report states that Iranian authorities also rely heavily on advanced surveillance tools to monitor hijab violations. These include facial recognition systems, aerial drones, and mobile apps such as Nazer, which allows approved users to report women not wearing the hijab—even in private vehicles or ambulances. These developments reflect the Iranian regime’s broader effort to tighten control over the population by expanding surveillance and leveraging informal enforcement networks.

Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions. A large crowd gathered at Iranian poet Ferdowsi’s tomb near Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi on March 20 and chanted anti-regime slogans.[xlix] The governor of Mashhad confirmed that 15 individuals were arrested for what he described as “subversive slogans,” and stated they would face legal consequences.[l] Citizens in Fars Province gathered at Hafezieh in Shiraz on March 20, where many women appeared without the mandatory hijab, some participants danced in celebration and chanted pro-monarchy slogans.[li] Kurdistan Province Chief Prosecutor separately reported the arrest of seven individuals on March 23, accusing them of organizing anti-state activities under the guise of Nowruz events in the province.[lii] The Prosecutor claimed that the suspects had “organizational ties” and aimed to spread propaganda and insult religious sentiments. Independent human rights group Hengaw confirmed three of the arrests but noted the exact charges remain unclear.[liii] The arrests during Nowruz celebrations highlight the regime’s deepening fear of public gatherings that could evolve into anti-regime protests.

Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21.[liv] This marked the first rocket attack from Lebanon into Israel since early December 2024.[lv] The IDF intercepted three rockets, and the other three landed in Lebanese territory.[lvi] The IDF conducted counterbattery fire against the rocket launch site and later conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers across Lebanon on March 22 and 23.[lvii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) destroyed three rudimentary rocket launchers that consisted of simple wood and metal launch rails in two towns in Nabatieh District, southern Lebanon, on March 22.[lviii]

Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lix]  Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now. Hezbollah released a statement on March 18 condemning the renewed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has not said that it would resume attacks against Israel.[lx]

The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade.[lxi] Likely anti-government insurgents killed a Hayat Tahrir al Sham commander and two other pro-government fighters in separate areas of Idlib province on March 22 and March 24 respectively.[lxii] These attacks come after Coastal Shield Brigade commander Miqdad Fatiha stated on March 12 that the insurgency would begin to target interim government forces with improvised explosive devices and assassinations as part of the insurgency’s second phase.[lxiii] Insurgent leaders can use public statements as a way to signal intent to their followers.[lxiv] These attacks, combined with the discovery of two rudimentary IEDs on the Jableh-Latakia road on March 19 suggest that the insurgency may be adopting new tactics that are consistent with Fatiha’s second phase of operations.[lxv]

Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence. Interim government forces launched a search operation in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Province, on March 23 targeting former regime members who failed to register with the interim government and arrested individuals who refused to disarm.[lxvi] It is unclear if government forces cordoned off the area before conducting its search. Former Assad regime members previously ambushed interim government forces on February 19 along the Maarat al Numan-Khan Sheikhoun road.[lxvii] Government forces also arrested approximately 15 individuals in Jisr al Shughur, Idlib Province, on March 24 charged with collaboration under the former Assad regime.[lxviii] Pro-Assad insurgents killed approximately 25 individuals, primarily interim government forces, in Jisr al Shughur in the coordinated attack in early March.[lxix]

Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state.[lxx] The “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance,” or “Tamasuk,” identified itself as an alliance that transcends ”ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and even political and ideological” affiliations that seek to encourage a "civil, democratic, and pluralistic state” during its first press conference in Damascus on March 22.[lxxi] The Tamasuk alliance comprises at least 34 political and civil groups, including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other Kurdish, Christian, and Druze-affiliated groups.[lxxii] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing. A leader from the leftist ”People's Will Party” said that Tamasuk does not see itself as an “opposition” group but a group that is willing to engage ”all forces,” including the Shara government, in dialogue.[lxxiii] The alliances’ founding statement confirmed that it seeks to work towards a ”unified Syria” under a single state and single army and called for a “just, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.”[lxxiv] The coalition, while relatively small, is the first organized political alliance in Syria outside of the government itself since the fall of the regime.

The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government. Many of these parties and groups have previously criticized the Shara government for its exclusionary organization of the National Dialogue Conference.[lxxv] Many groups, like the SDC, have rejected Shara’s constitution for granting the executive branch “absolute powers.”[lxxvi] Tamasuk called for the writing of a new constitution that better defines the dispersion of decentralized powers in order to allow the people to exercise direct authority within their regions while centralizing affairs like foreign affairs, defense, and the economy under the central government.[lxxvii] The Shara government has so far ignored local calls from Syria’s various communities demanding decentralized powers.[lxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic. Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives.
• US Air Campaign against the Houthis: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.
• Houthi-Gulf Relations: The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties.
• Ethnic Tension in Iran: Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam. The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.
• Iranian Social Control: The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. Iran is using mobile applications, drones, and other tactics and technologies as part of this effort.
• Protests in Iran: Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions.
• Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire: Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21. Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[lxxix] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade. Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence.
• Syrian Politics: Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state. The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government.

Previous Iran Updates

• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023