Iran Update, May 28, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The US Treasury lifted most sanctions on Syria on May 23. The US Treasury issued Syria General License (GL) 25 to provide “immediate sanctions relief” to Syria in accordance with US President Donald Trump’s May 13 order to lift all sanctions on Syria.[i] The removal of sanctions will allow the United States to conduct transactions with the Syrian transitional government, the Syrian Central Bank, and state-owned businesses.[ii] GL 25 also removed the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designations on Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Interior Minister Anas Khattab.[iii] The United States previously designated both individuals as SDGTs for their membership in al Qaeda in Iraq in 2013 and 2012, respectively.[iv]  The US Treasury noted that GL 25 does not lift sanctions on ”terrorist organizations,” perpetrators of human rights abuses, drug traffickers, or former Assad regime members.[v] GL 25 does not have an expiration date, but the US Treasury stated that the United States implemented GL 25 with the understanding that Syria will not provide a “safe haven for terrorist organizations” and will protect its ethno-religious minority communities.[vi] The US State Department separately issued a 180-day waiver under the Caesar Act on May 23 to ensure that the Caesar Act does not obstruct economic investment in Syria or prevent the provision of critical humanitarian assistance to Syrians.[vii] US congressional approval is required to permanently repeal the Caesar Act. The State Department’s temporary waiver may allow for the international community to provide short-term reconstruction assistance to Syria, however.

The European Union (EU) adopted a resolution to lift economic sanctions on Syria on May 28 but also imposed sanctions on Turkish-backed Syrian army commanders and armed factions that committed human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March 2025.[viii] The European Union removed sanctions on 24 entities, including the Syrian Central Bank and oil and media companies.[ix] The EU Council released a statement that it lifted “all” economic sanctions on Syria except those “based on security grounds.”[x] EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas stated that the decision to remove sanctions is “reversible and conditional” and warned that the European Union can re-impose sanctions on Syria if the Syrian transitional government does not continue to make “progress.”[xi]

The European Union imposed new sanctions on two Syrian army commanders and three Turkish-backed armed factions for committing human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March.[xii] The EU Council sanctioned 62nd Division Commander Mohammad al Jassem (Abu Amsha) and 76th Division Commander Saif al Din Boulad (Sayf Abu Bakr) for commanding forces that conducted arbitrary killings, torture, and other targeted violence against civilians, particularly Alawites, in early March 2025.[xiii] The European Union also sanctioned Abu Amsha’s Suleiman Shah Brigade and Abu Bakr’s Hamza Division.[xiv] The European Union sanctioned another Turkish-backed militia, the Sultan Murad Division, for its involvement in human rights abuses on the coast, though the European Union did not sanction Sultan Murad Division Commander Fahim Issa.[xv] Issa currently holds a prominent role in the Ministry of Defense (MoD)  as the defense minister’s assistant for the northern region.[xvi]

Shara’s promotion of militants who have committed human rights abuses to prominent defense positions will threaten Syria’s long-term stability. Shara has allowed men, such as Abu Amsha, Sayf Abu Bakr, and others, to continue to operate with relative impunity in Syria and has even promoted several of these men to high-ranking positions within the new Syrian army.[xvii]  The promotion of these commanders, and the fact that these commanders have remained in their positions even after widespread allegations of participation in the coastal massacres, suggests that Damascus will not hold these men accountable for their previous and recent abuses.[xviii] Shara likely promoted men such as Abu Amsha, Abu Bakr, and Fahim Issa to senior positions within the Syrian army and government because he is reliant on their support and loyalty to consolidate his control over Syria. Shara appears to be prioritizing the near-term centralization of state authority over longer-term security and stability in doing so.

Shara’s promotion of individuals who have previously committed human rights abuses against Syrian minority communities will likely increase these communities’ distrust in the transitional government, which threatens to destabilize the Syrian transition. Syrian minority communities, such as the Alawites and the Kurds, will likely look at Damascus’s elevation of these commanders as a threat to their safety and as an indicator that Damascus prioritizes maintaining the loyalty of extremist Sunni Arabs over protecting minorities. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) condemned Damascus's appointment of Abu Hatem Shaqra and stated that the decision “taint[s] state institutions.”[xix] Locals from Ismaili-majority Salamiyah in Hama Province recently expressed alarm after the MoD deployed Abu Amsha and his division to the area.[xx] Syrian social media users circulated rumors in late April 2025 that Abu Amsha and his 62nd Division were deploying to Jaramana to conduct violence against Druze citizens, which generated immense fear in the Druze community.[xxi] Alawite insurgents have used the massacres that Sunni Arabs committed against Alawites on the coast in early March to recruit support for the insurgency.[xxii] These incidents highlight how Damascus’s retention of thugs and warlords in positions of power creates an atmosphere of distrust between minority communities and the transitional government. Long-term stability requires most Syrians to trust the government and for the government to represent all Syrians. Damascus’s potential alienation of minority communities is not conducive to building an inclusive state over the next five years. The removal of destabilizing elements from the transitional government could reduce the risk of renewed major internal conflict. 

The international community, including the United States, should maintain individual sanctions on these commanders even as it removes sanctions that target Syrian government and economic institutions. The United States has already sanctioned Abu Amsha, Abu Bakr, and Abu Hatem Shaqra, who recently assumed command of the 86th Division and has been accused of committing abuses against civilians.[xxiii] Other commanders who lead sanctioned factions, such as Sultan Murad leader Fahim Issa, should be held responsible for actions taken before the fall of the Assad regime and actions taken as leaders within the new Syrian army. It is unclear if Shara will make efforts to curb the influence of these commanders in the future given the possible political ramifications of doing so. Targeted sanctions by the international community may incentivize Shara to remove these powerful faction leaders or give him the necessary political cover to do so.  

Iran and the United States appear to be trying to secure an interim nuclear deal before negotiating a comprehensive nuclear agreement. It is unclear if the reported interim deal that Iran seeks will satisfy US demands. Western media reported in late April 2025 that Iran asked the United States to negotiate an interim deal.[xxiv] The New York Times reported on May 28 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff has dropped his opposition to an interim deal, citing unspecified participants in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxv] Reuters separately reported on May 28 that Iran may be willing to agree to an interim "political deal" that would require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment for one year and ship part of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad or convert it into fuel plates. The United States would reportedly release frozen Iranian funds and recognize Iran's right to uranium enrichment in exchange, according to two Iranian sources.[xxvi] The United States previously agreed to release $6 billion of frozen Iranian assets as part of a prisoner swap agreement with Iran in August 2023, but Iran did not gain access to these funds due to the start of the October 7 War in October 2023.[xxvii]  It is unclear whether the United States would agree to acknowledge Iran’s right to uranium enrichment given that US officials have repeatedly emphasized that Iran cannot maintain its uranium enrichment program.[xxviii] The Iranian sources also told Reuters that Iran would not dismantle its nuclear program or infrastructure or close its nuclear installations.[xxix] It is unclear whether the United States would accept an interim deal in which Iran could maintain its nuclear infrastructure because such a deal would allow Iran to keep its centrifuges. Iran could quickly restore its highly enriched uranium stockpile if it retains its centrifuges. Former UN Weapons Inspector David Albright warned on April 18 that Iran could enrich enough weapons-grade uranium in 25 days for a nuclear weapon, even with a small low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, if it maintains all of its current centrifuges.[xxx]

Iran may be portraying itself as willing to make concessions in order to prevent the talks from collapsing and potentially triggering an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami claimed on May 28 that Iran could "reconsider the acceptance of American inspectors through the IAEA" if "Iran's demands are taken into account and an agreement is reached."[xxxi] Eslami may have made this statement to try to portray Iran as making a concession to the United States given that Iran has previously excluded US inspectors from inspections of its nuclear sites.[xxxii] Eslami’s statement, as well as Iran’s reported willingness to reach an interim ”political deal,” come amid reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear talks collapse.[xxxiii] Axios reported on May 27 that US officials are concerned that Israel may strike Iran’s nuclear facilities or take other actions to undermine the talks.[xxxiv] Trump recently called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxxv] Iran has conducted military inspections and air defense exercises in recent months in preparation for a potential strike.[xxxvi]

Iran is continuing to deepen ties with non-Western countries to try to challenge the US-led world order. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with several senior officials in Moscow on May 27 and 28 on the sidelines of the 13th Moscow International Security Conference.[xxxvii] Ahmadian met with the following individuals:

• Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji: Ahmadian and Araji discussed the implementation of the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement.[xxxviii] This agreement requires Iraq to disarm and relocate Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region away from the Iranian border.[xxxix] Ahmadian emphasized the need to remove "espionage networks” near the Iranian border.
• Brazilian Presidential Adviser Celso Amorim: Ahmadian and Amorim called for expanding scientific and commercial cooperation between Iran and Brazil. Iran and Brazil are both members of BRICS.[xl] Amorim affirmed Brazil’s support for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy and enrichment activities. Ahmadian previously traveled to Brazil in April 2025 to attend a BRICS security summit, where he discussed security arrangements among BRICS member states.[xli] Iran separately participated in a defense exhibition in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in early Aprill 2025.[xlii]
• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu: Shoigu stated that bilateral cooperation between Russia and Iran is developing “in all fields” based on the guidance of the two countries’ leaders.[xliii]
• Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev: Ahmadian and Patrushev discussed the bilateral agreements and the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[xliv] The INSTC is a trade route that connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[xlv]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted four airstrikes targeting the Houthi-controlled Sanaa Airport on May 28, rendering the airport temporarily inoperable.[xlvi] The IDF airstrikes destroyed the airport's runway and the last operational Yemenia Airways airplane, according to the airport’s director.[xlvii] Previous Israeli airstrikes on May 6 destroyed three other Yemenia Airways airplanes.[xlviii] The IDF stated that the Houthis used the aircraft destroyed on May 28 to transport Houthi fighters.[xlix] Yemenia Airways, which is the only airline that operates at Sanaa Airport, halted flights to and from the airport on May 28 until further notice.[l]

The IDF conducted these airstrikes in response to repeated Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting Israel, including recent attacks that targeted key Israeli entry points, such as Ben Gurion Airport and Haifa Port.[li] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on May 28 that Israeli airstrikes will not deter the Houthis from launching drone and missile attacks on Israel.[lii] The Houthis have claimed at least 24 drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel in May 2025. Israeli air defense systems intercepted most of the attacks.[liii] Israeli air defense systems failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport on May 4, however. The attack injured eight people.[liv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria Sanctions and Stability: The US Treasury lifted most sanctions on Syria on May 23. The European Union (EU) separately adopted a resolution to lift economic sanctions on Syria on May 28 but also imposed sanctions on Turkish-backed Syrian army commanders and armed factions that committed human rights abuses during the Syrian coastal massacres in early March 2025. The EU Council sanctioned 62nd Division Commander Mohammad al Jassem (Abu Amsha) and 76th Division Commander Saif al Din Boulad (Sayf Abu Bakr) for commanding forces that conducted arbitrary killings, torture, and other targeted violence against civilians, particularly Alawites, in early March 2025. Shara has allowed men, such as Abu Amsha, Sayf Abu Bakr, and others, to continue to operate with relative impunity in Syria and has even promoted several of these men to high-ranking positions within the new Syrian army. Shara’s promotion of individuals who have previously committed human rights abuses against Syrian minority communities will likely increase these communities’ distrust in the transitional government, which threatens to destabilize the Syrian transition.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran and the United States appear to be trying to secure an interim nuclear deal before negotiating a comprehensive nuclear agreement. It is unclear if the reported interim deal that Iran seeks will satisfy US demands. Western media reported in late April 2025 that Iran asked the United States to negotiate an interim deal. The New York Times reported on May 28 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff has dropped his opposition to an interim deal, citing unspecified participants in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Reuters separately reported on May 28 that Iran may be willing to agree to an interim "political deal" that would require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment for one year and ship part of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad or convert it into fuel plates. Iran would reportedly not dismantle its nuclear program or infrastructure or close its nuclear installations under this deal. It is unclear whether the United States would accept an interim deal in which Iran could maintain its nuclear infrastructure because such a deal would allow Iran to keep its centrifuges. Iran could quickly restore its highly enriched uranium stockpile if it retains its centrifuges.
• Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary in Russia: Iran is continuing to deepen ties with non-Western countries to try to challenge the US-led world order. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with several senior officials, including Russian, Iraqi, and Brazilian officials, in Moscow on May 27 and 28 on the sidelines of the 13th Moscow International Security Conference.
• IDF Strikes in Yemen: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted four airstrikes targeting the Houthi-controlled Sanaa Airport on May 28, rendering the airport temporarily inoperable. The IDF airstrikes destroyed the airport's runway and the last operational Yemenia Airways airplane, according to the airport’s director. Previous Israeli airstrikes on May 6 destroyed three other Yemenia Airways airplanes. The IDF conducted these airstrikes in response to repeated Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting Israel, including recent attacks that targeted key Israeli entry points, such as Ben Gurion Airport and Haifa Port.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with senior Omani officials in Muscat, Oman, on May 27 and 28. Pezeshkian met with Omani Sultan Haitham al Tariq, Deputy Prime Minister Fahd bin Mahmoud al Said, and Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi to discuss efforts to strengthen bilateral cooperation and address regional issues.[lv] Pezeshkian emphasized the need to increase connectivity between Iran and Oman through seaports and air routes in order to bolster trade, investment, and industrial cooperation between the two countries.[lvi] Pezeshkian and senior Omani officials signed 18 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) covering legal, economic, political, health, defense, energy, and mining cooperation.[lvii] Pezeshkian also likely discussed the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations during his visit to Muscat given that Oman is mediating these negotiations.

Iran is increasingly taking steps to facilitate its removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. The FATF blacklisted Iran in 2020.[lviii] Iran’s blacklist designation requires the 40 FATF member countries to sanction and limit economic engagement with Iran.[lix] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council reviewed the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws on May 28, but did not reach a consensus and decided to continue discussing the CFT measures in a future meeting.[lx] The CFT is a set of laws that aim to restricting state funding for terrorist organizations.[lxi] Iran must approve and implement both the CFT and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also known as the Palermo Convention, for the FATF to remove Iran from its blacklist.[lxii] The Expediency Discernment Council approved the Palermo Convention on May 14.[lxiii]  An Iranian delegation separately discussed Iranian efforts to rejoin the FATF with representatives of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) on in Moscow on May 26.[lxiv] The EAG is an associate member of the FATF that is comprised of nine countries, including China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[lxv]

The recent Iranian efforts to rejoin the FATF are notable given that Iran’s FATF membership has historically been a controversial issue within the Iranian regime.[lxvi] The FATF will decide whether to suspend countermeasures imposed on Iran, such as sanctions, if Iran ratifies and implements the Palermo Convention and CFT in line with FATF standards.[lxvii] It is very unlikely that Iran would cease financial support for US-designated terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, even if the Expediency Discernment Council approved the CFT.

Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite military setbacks that Israel imposed on the Axis of Resistance throughout the October 7 War. Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) representative to Iran Nasser Abu Sharif and Hamas representative to Iran Khaled Qaddoumi in Tehran on May 28.[lxviii] Velayati reiterated Iran’s longstanding objective to destroy the state of Israel by using proxy groups.[lxix] Sharif stated on May 14 that Iran has continued to fund PIJ.[lxx] Velayati also praised the Houthis for their continued attacks targeting Israel.[lxxi]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri inspected the Shahid Bahmad Bagheri Specialized Center for Electronic Warfare and Information Technology on May 28.[lxxii] Tangsiri and unspecified military commanders inspected production sheds at the center. Tangsiri’s visit to a center that specializes in electronic warfare follows recent reports that several vessels experienced Global Position System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz on May 18.[lxxiii]

Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi appointed Colonel Alireza Shirpour as the new commander of the 8th Tactical Air Base in Esfahan on May 28.[lxxiv] Shirpour previously served as the operations deputy of the 8th Tactical Air Base.[lxxv] Vahedi emphasized the base’s critical role in defending eastern and southwestern Iran. The 8th Tactical Air Base, hosts F-14 Tomcats, J-7 fighter aircraft, and Yak-130 training jets, and is located near key Iranian nuclear facilities, including Fordow, Natanz, and the Arak heavy water reactor.[lxxvi] The IDF struck a Tomb Stone target engagement radar that was part of an Iranian S-300 air defense system at the 8th Tactical Air Base in April 2024 following Iran’s first-ever direct attack on Israel.[lxxvii]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 827,500 rials to one US dollar on May 27 to 828,800 rials to one US dollar on May 28.[lxxviii]

Syria

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) registered recruits for the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-led 86th Division in SNA-controlled territory on May 27.[lxxix] A northern Syria-based source reported on May 27 that an MoD committee registered fighters for the 86th Division in Suluk City, Raqqa Province.[lxxx] Suluk is located in SNA-controlled territory near the Turkish border. The MoD has taken steps to integrate fighters from northeastern Syria into the new Syrian army following the April 2025 ceasefire between the SNA and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[lxxxi] Ahrar al Sharqiya Commander Abu Hatem Shaqra commands the 86th Division. [lxxxii] The 86th Division will reportedly operate in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez Zor provinces.[lxxxiii]

An Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) delegation arrived in Damascus on May 28 to continue negotiations with the Syrian transitional government. Damascus and the SDF signed an eight-point framework agreement on March 10 to politically and militarily integrate the SDF into the Syrian state.[lxxxiv] The agreement did not resolve the main issues between Damascus and the SDF and appeared to lay out starting positions for future negotiations, which have taken place in the months since. Both Damascus and the SDF continue to disagree on the form of government administration in the northeast and the terms of the SDF’s integration into the MoD.[lxxxv] The AANES delegation consists of representatives from the SDF, Democratic Union Party (PYD), and Arab and Syriac communities.[lxxxvi] A senior SDF commander said on May 28 that the delegation seeks to find a “comprehensive and sustainable solution” to strengthening Syrian unity.[lxxxvii]

Coastal Shield Brigade Commander Midad Fatiha released a video statement on May 28 to reassure the group’s supporters that the group will continue its campaign to expel the transitional government from coastal Syria.[lxxxviii] The Coastal Shield Brigade is an Alawite insurgent group that is primarily composed of former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Assad regime members. Fatiha claimed that the Coastal Shield Brigade has conducted attacks “in silence” and without documentation. Fatiha called on the transitional government to release Alawite sheikhs and influential individuals who he claimed the government arrested arbitrarily. Fatiha threatened to detain twice as many prisoners as the transitional government is allegedly holding. Fatiha thanked members of the Syrian diaspora community for continuing to enable Coastal Shield Brigade operations. Prominent Syrian businessman and maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad Rami Makhlouf has repeatedly claimed to have assembled forces in coastal Syria and framed himself as a defender of Alawites.[lxxxix] Mohammed Jaber, a UAE-based Syrian businessman and former Assad regime militia commander, also admitted on April 8 that he cooperated with the Alawite insurgency in early April 2025.[xc] It is unclear if Makhlouf or Jaber support the Coastal Shield Brigade. Insurgencies are sustained through popular support and perceived legitimacy within a population.[xci] An Alawite insurgency that relies on external actors will likely struggle to build and maintain legitimacy among the Syrian population.

There has been a decline in sectarian-motivated attacks in Syria since May 14, possibly due to security measures that the transitional government has taken to prevent such attacks.  CTP-ISW has observed a decline in sectarian violence in major cities such as Homs, Aleppo, Hama, Latakia, and Damascus since May 14.[xcii] CTP-ISW recorded one sectarian-motivated attack on May 27 in which unknown gunmen abducted and executed an Alawite man in the al Waer neighborhood of Homs City.[xciii] CTP-ISW observed 15 instances of sectarian violence, primarily against Alawites in Homs, Latakia, and Hama provinces, between May 1 and 14 by comparison.  The Syrian transitional government has enacted several security measures to prevent attacks in these areas. The General Security Service (GSS) banned motorcycle usage at night in Homs City on May 6 and issued similar bans in Deir ez Zor on May 14 and Latakia on May 15.[xciv] Gunmen have used motorcycles to conduct extrajudicial killings across Syria since the fall of Assad.[xcv] CTP-ISW has not recorded any killings conducted by gunmen on motorcycles since May 15.  This measure, along with recent GSS deployments across major cities, may have contributed to the decline in sectarian-motivated attacks across Syria over the past two weeks.[xcvi]

Revenge killings targeting former Assadists have decreased across Syria since May 15. CTP-ISW has recorded eight revenge killings targeting former Assad regime members, primarily in Hama, Aleppo, and Daraa provinces, since May 15.[xcvii]  CTP-ISW, in contrast, recorded 17 revenge killings targeting former Assad regime members between May 1 and 15.[xcviii] Revenge killings and assassinations of Assad regime officials have occurred in Daraa since before the Assad regime fell in December 2024.[xcix] Revenge killings are in part due to a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war, which causes vigilantes to take matters into their own hands.

The International Coalition is repositioning its forces in northeastern Syria to continue combat operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The International Coalition announced on May 27 that it is repositioning forces in northeastern Syria as part of a “deliberate and conditions-based process.”[c] ISIS has conducted a relatively higher rate of attacks since the United States began to draw down forces in April 2025 as compared to January through March 2025.[ci]

Iraq

The Shia Coordination Framework appears to be adopting different electoral strategies in different areas of Iraq for the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. Iraqi media reported on May 28 that multiple Shia Coordination Framework leaders will compete separately in Baghdad Province in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[cii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, and Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi will reportedly compete against each other in Baghdad Province.[ciii] Competing on separate lists will increase competition among Shia Coordination Framework parties in Baghdad. There was previously immense competition among Iranian-backed political parties to win seats in Baghdad in the October 2021 parliamentary elections. Iraqi media also reported that Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim will reportedly run together in Baghdad.[civ] Abadi attempted to form a political party with Hakim in 2020 that supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[cv]

This report comes after the Shia Coordination Framework announced on May 27 that it will compete in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din provinces in “unified alliances.”[cvi] The Shia Coordination Framework likely wants to run together in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din to ensure that they do not split the vote and enable more unified Kurdish or Sunni parties to win more seats.[cvii] Iran has reportedly pressured Shia Coordination Framework leaders to remain unified ahead of the elections to increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties can influence the formation of the Iraqi government.[cviii]

Iraqi media additionally reported on May 28 that former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi may compete in the upcoming elections in Baghdad Province instead of in Anbar Province.[cix] Halbousi competed in Anbar Province in previous elections.[cx]  Halbousi will reportedly compete in Baghdad unless Maliki’s State of Law Coalition refrains from running in Karbala Province and Ameri’s party refrains from running in Diyala Province.[cxi]  The State of Law Coalition won a third of the seats in Shia-majority Karbala Province in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[cxii] Ameri’s party won half of the seats in Diyala Province in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[cxiii] A member of Halbousi’s party won the second highest number of votes after a member of Ameri’s party in a Diyala district in the 2021 elections.[cxiv] It is unclear why Halbousi seeks to diminish Maliki and Ameri’s influence in Karbala and Diyala provinces specifically.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg recently discussed the US-Houthi ceasefire agreement with senior Houthi, Iranian, and Omani officials in Muscat, Oman.[cxv] Grundberg stressed that the Houthis must release UN workers whom they are holding hostage and return to the Saudi-led peace roadmap.[cxvi]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.