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SAF Approaches Key City in Central Sudan; FRN Takes Bunyakiri in Eastern DRC: Africa File, November 19, 2026
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Contributor: Ziv Zellars
Key Takeaways:
- Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has made its first sustained operationally significant westward advance in central Sudan since early 2025, as it secures key terrain along multiple axes to enable an eventual offensive on Rapid Support Forces (RSF)–controlled western Sudan. Another wave of defections has weakened the RSF internally and threatens to hamper its mobilization efforts amid the SAF’s advance.
- Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN) captured and consolidated control of Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu province in a significant military offensive in early November. The FRN likely sought to deny Congolese government forces access to Bunyakiri as a key supply hub in the North-South Kivu border area and disrupt logistic routes that threaten FRN-controlled areas.
Figure 1. Africa File, November 19, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke.
Assessments:
Sudan
Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr and Ziv Zellars
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has made its first sustained operationally significant westward advance in central Sudan since early 2025, as it secures key terrain along multiple axes to enable an eventual offensive on Rapid Support Forces (RSF)–controlled western Sudan. The SAF has advanced approximately 50 miles further west along Sudan’s main east–west highway into West Kordofan state since early November. The military captured al Khawai—a midpoint town 70 miles west of the SAF’s central Sudan headquarters in the North Kordofan state capital, el Obeid, and approximately 60 miles east of An Nahud, a key gateway town between the Kordofan and Darfur regions—on November 13.[1] The SAF advanced from the east along the main highway after taking Um Sumeima on November 5 and from the north along secondary roads through desert areas, allowing it to flank RSF positions on the highway.[2] The SAF has since established positions at least as far west as Markib, which is less than 40 miles from An Nahud.[3] The Sudanese outlets Sudan War Monitor and Darfur24 reported that the RSF has sent reinforcements into West Kordofan amid the SAF advance, although open-source analyst Rich Tedd claimed on November 18 that the RSF has withdrawn some forces from An Nahud.[4]
Figure 2. SAF Offensive in Central Sudan

Note: SAF stands for Sudanese Armed Forces. RSF stands for Rapid Support Forces.
Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr; Ziv Zellars.
Capturing An Nahud is the next major operational objective for the SAF as it pursues staging grounds for an eventual offensive on RSF-controlled Darfur. SAF Special Operations Spokesperson Mohammed Dindan stated on November 14 that the military is surrounding Ah Nahud and intends to take the city.[5] An Nahud connects to el Fasher, which is the North Darfur state capital 245 miles to the northwest, via the main highway. SAF head and leader of the SAF-led Sudanese government Abdel Fattah al Burhan and other senior SAF officials have repeatedly stated that retaking el Fasher is a priority since the RSF captured the city in October 2025.[6] An Nahud also offers an alternative axis of advance into Darfur via secondary roads that link to Ad Daein, the East Darfur state capital approximately 195 miles to the southwest.
The SAF has also separately advanced on a southern axis that contains secondary lines of advance toward RSF-controlled areas of South and West Kordofan states and Darfur. The military reportedly advanced south from um Sumeima to capture several villages in the al Saatat area, which is approximately 35 miles northeast of Abu Zabad, on October 16.[7] Abu Zabad is on a secondary highway that connects to central Sudan’s main north-south highway 45 miles to the east at al Dabibat. Al Dabibat is part of an RSF salient between el Obeid and Dilling, a SAF-controlled town 100 miles south of el Obeid.[8] The Abu Zabad highway also links to al Fula, the RSF-controlled West Kordofan state capital approximately 80 miles to the southwest, and secondary roads into Darfur.
The recent advances are the SAF’s first sustained operationally significant westward advances toward Darfur since early 2025. The SAF broke the RSF’s full siege of el Obeid in February 2025 and then advanced west along the main highway, almost breaking the RSF’s siege of An Nahud.[9] The RSF launched a counteroffensive, however, capturing An Nahud and repelling the SAF back to the outskirts of el Obeid by June 2025.[10] The SAF had then repeatedly failed to hold um Sumeima and advance into West Kordofan until the ongoing offensive.[11]
Another wave of defections has weakened the RSF internally and threatens to hamper its mobilization efforts amid the SAF’s advance. The SAF has conducted a defections campaign throughout 2026, with the French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reporting that the SAF is using outreach efforts, financial incentives, and covert operations to spur defections from the RSF.[12] The RSF faced an initial spate of defections in mid-2026, including by two generals who had led combat operations on front lines in Darfur and Kordofan.[13]
The RSF has recently faced another wave of high-level defections, which could hinder its mobilization efforts. The Critical Threats Project has recorded at least nine sets of defections involving at least several hundred fighters since August 2026. These defections have reportedly included the RSF’s North Kordofan state governor, its intelligence head in North Kordofan, a special operations commander, and several other senior commanders.[14] A leader of the Arab Misseriya tribe also reportedly defected in mid-November.[15] The RSF has relied on primarily Arab tribes to replenish its ranks as part of its mobilization efforts.[16] Africa Intelligence reported that RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) established a security and intelligence body in late October to centralize command and prevent further defections.[17]
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Author: Yale Ford
The Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN) captured Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu province and consolidated control of surrounding areas in a significant military offensive in early November. FRN, which succeeded M23 and its political branch when former DRC President Joseph Kabila announced its formation in mid-October, launched the operation from on the edge of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) on November 6. FRN forces advanced about 30 miles northwest from Tshivanga village near the RN2 highway through the eastern section of the PNKB on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri by November 8.[18] Bunyakiri is a population and commercial center in the western part of Kalehe district, which is situated in the northeastern corner of South Kivu between Lake Kivu and the western section of the PNKB. FRN has reportedly advanced on the RN3 as far as the village Ebisha in Kalehe district, which is about four miles past Bunyakiri on the RN3 and 17 miles from Hombo village in Walikale district in North Kivu on the border between North and South Kivu.[19] The Congolese army (FARDC) announced after Bunyakiri fell that it would mount a counteroffensive, but thus far it has been unable to retake key positions from FRN.[20]
Figure 3. FRN Conducts Offensive on Bunyakiri

Note: FRN stands for Front pour la Refondation de la Nation. AFC stands for Alliance Fleuve Congo.
Source: Yale Ford and Henry Wilder.
FRN contingents also advanced along a second axis from within the PNKB in South Kivu. FRN used its positions captured in the PNKB after advancing from Tshivanga during the initial stage of the operation to move southwest into the Kalonge groupment around Cifunzi village in the Buhavu chiefdom in Kabare district in early November.[21] Cifunzi is about 20 miles west of Tshivanga and 30 miles south of Bunyakiri. FRN then likely used its positions in the Buhavu chiefdom to push about 15–20 miles further south into southwestern Kabare’s Nindja chiefdom, which it reportedly had taken full control of by November 12.[22] The Nindja chiefdom is situated slightly north of the RP503 road, which provides access eastward to the RN2 into southern Walungu district in South Kivu on a southwestern axis from Bukavu, the FRN-controlled provincial capital.
FRN likely sought to deny Congolese government forces access to Bunyakiri as a key supply hub in the North-South Kivu border area and disrupt logistic routes that threaten FRN-controlled areas. Government forces have escalated attacks on FRN positions in the provincial border area since February 2026. FARDC and pro-Congolese government Wazalendo militia fighters conducted targeted airstrikes and unsuccessful ground offensives on Rubaya, which is a major FRN-controlled mining town in southern Masisi district in North Kivu that the United States has expressed its interest in as part of the agreements it reached with the Congolese government, in February and May.[23] Many remote villages on the front lines further south of Rubaya in Masisi district in North Kivu and in northern Kalehe district in South Kivu, notably in the Ziralo groupment near the border with North Kivu, have changed hands between FRN and government troops repeatedly as a result of FARDC-Wazalendo offensives on FRN positions in February through May and from late June to early October.[24] Wazalendo fighters likely based in the eastern section of the PNKB in South Kivu also have periodically attacked FRN positions and civilians on the roughly seven-mile stretch of the RN2 between Katana and Kavumu towns in Kabare district since early 2025. FRN activity has largely remained reactive in these areas, pursuing tactical counterattacks and clearing operations in peripheral villages rather than attempting to establish fixed defensive positions and fully secure these areas.
Bunyakiri is an important logistic, transportation, and trade hub in this contested border area. Bunyakiri connects Walikale and southern Masisi districts in North Kivu with Kalehe district and parts of northern South Kivu through the RN3 and rural roads and mountain trails. Bunyakiri also connects the provincial border area with the eastern PNKB region further south and the RN2 through eastern Kabare district toward Bukavu, the FRN-controlled South Kivu provincial capital. Bunyakiri sits on the RN3, which is a vital corridor for regional trade and movement, serving as a key stop along the RN3 trade route—especially between Kalehe district in South Kivu and Walikale district in North Kivu—and also supplying goods and timber to Bukavu. The town also has important local administrative and health infrastructure.
FRN control of Bunyakiri will allow the group to exert more control over these regional lines of communication and disrupt government supply lines. Military logistics in the eastern DRC often rely on a mix of air supply and regional roads, local roads, and forest routes and trails, especially in remote, hilly, and densely forested areas. The RN3 is in poor condition, which limits the government’s ability to move troops and supplies on the ground and increases its reliance on air supply. The Bunyakiri area has an airfield capable of accommodating helicopters and has reportedly served as the main supply hub for government forces operating across Kalehe district in South Kivu, and a forward command center for FARDC-Wazalendo operations against FRN in Kalehe, Kabare, and Masisi districts in South and North Kivu.[25] The UN mission in the DRC had operated a base in Bunyakiri before handing it over to the FARDC in April 2024 as part of its withdrawal from South Kivu.[26] The loss of Bunyakiri will make it more difficult for government forces to deploy and supply its forces on the front lines near FRN-controlled areas by forcing the government to rely on longer, more exposed, and more difficult supply routes. FRN can also use its control of Bunyakiri and the RN3 corridor to monitor, tax, and benefit from commercial traffic and economic activity, including the mineral trade.
Control of Bunyakiri and other areas around the provincial border also enables the FRN to strengthen and expand a buffer around Goma, the FRN-controlled North Kivu provincial capital. This operational buffer zone spans Minova town on the RN2 along the western shore of Lake Kivu, southern Masisi district in North Kivu, and the highland plateaus of northern Kalehe district in South Kivu. Minova is the first major town in South Kivu on the RN2 to the east of southern Masisi district and functions as a choke point controlling movement along the RN2—toward Goma to the north and through Kalehe district toward Bukavu, the FRN-controlled South Kivu provincial capital, to the south in South Kivu. The high ground in southern Masisi district links southward across the provincial border into the Kalehe plateaus in South Kivu, which descend eastward to Minova on the lake while also linking to the Bunyakiri area in central Kalehe to the southwest, and to the direct south around the northern tip of the eastern section of the PNKB and the Kalehe district capital on the RN2—about 50 miles south of Minova along the lake. FRN has already moved troops between northern Kalehe district and Bunyakiri within the South Kivu section of this zone, as it reportedly redeployed troops from the Ziralo groupment in northern Kalehe toward the Bunyakiri axis around November 10 after it had secured control of Bunyakiri.[27]
The capture of Bunyakiri also strengthens FRN’s ability to defend Bukavu as it expands its control across South Kivu. Control of Bunyakiri gives the group greater influence over the main northern approach to Bukavu on the RN2 and enables it to extend this operational buffer zone westward from the road deeper into South Kivu. FRN has also expanded into the Buhavu and Nindja chiefdoms in Kabare district, extending its presence into areas on the outskirts of Bukavu where it had a smaller foothold before the Bunyakiri offensive. FRN can consolidate its positions in the Bukavu and Nindja chiefdoms to strengthen this buffer along Bukavu’s northwestern and southwestern flanks, including by maintaining greater pressure on the RP503 road, which runs eastward into southern Walungu district in South Kivu.
Bunyakiri additionally opens secondary lines of advance within and beyond the Kivus for FRN in any potential future offensive, although such offensives remain unlikely, given that CTP continues to assess that the FRN’s primary strategic objective is to incrementally consolidate control over the Kivu provinces. Bunyakiri provides an alternative approach from the south through Hombo on the RN3 to Walikale district, which is rich in minerals and an important area that links North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Tshopo provinces. Walikale district is a gateway to Kisangani town, which is one of the DRC’s largest cities in the north central part of the country and a major military hub, particularly for drone operations, for the war effort against FRN and Rwanda. Bunyakiri also provides access on a southwest line of advance to Shabunda district in southwestern South Kivu, opening a potential route toward Kindu, which is another military hub in the mineral-rich Maniema province.
Any such offensives would face significant military and political obstacles and diverge from FRN’s main strategic objective to control and administer the Kivus, however. Advances along these axes would likely draw additional diplomatic and political pressure on both the group and Rwanda. Such offensives would also require FRN to operate over long distances—hundreds of miles in some cases—in extremely remote areas on poor roads, making it increasingly difficult to maintain supply lines and resupply forces further from its rear bases near the Rwandan border. CTP has assessed previously that FRN’s military leadership and Rwanda likely favor the consolidation of control over the Kivu region, as opposed to the extension of military operations beyond the region advocated by political leaders within the movement.[28]
Africa File Data Cutoff: November 19, 2026, at 10 a.m.
The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

[1] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/53a; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-returns-to-west-kordofan; https://sudantribune dot com/article/321179; https://www.sudanspost dot com/territorial-control-map-sudan-conflict-as-of-november-17-2026
[2] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-returns-to-west-kordofan; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2121228610417922167; https://x.com/EekadFacts/status/2121672570474832382; https://x.com/Majakovsk73/status/2121606497406702052
[3] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/2be; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-returns-to-west-kordofan; https://www.sudanspost dot com/territorial-control-map-sudan-conflict-as-of-november-17-2026
[4] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/2be; https://darfur24 dot com/2026/11/18/%d8%ad%d8%b4%d9%88%d8%af-%d8%b9%d8%b3%d9%83%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b5%d9%81-%d9%85%d9%83%d8%ab%d9%81-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ba%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%b4; https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2123091151184150642
[5] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/2be; https://sudanhorizon dot com/spokesperson-for-special-operations-our-forces-just-a-few-kms-away-from-el-nuhoud
[6] https://sudantribune dot com/article/317710; https://suna dot sd/posts/oaly-shmal-darfor-thryr-sodry-rsal-hasm-lltamaayn-oymhd-laaod-alfashr; https://suna dot sd/posts/alfrk-alsads-msha-akmlna-alaad-lthryr-alfashr-osaaa-alsfr-aktrbt; https://suna dot sd/posts/kayd-alfrk-alsads-ygdd-alaahd-bthryr-alfashr-odarfor; https://sudanhorizon dot com/saf-chief-of-staff-in-an-interview-with-al-shorouk-no-future-for-the-rsf-in-sudan; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/fall-of-el-fasher
[7] https://www.sudanspost dot com/territorial-control-map-sudan-conflict-as-of-november-17-2026; https://x.com/atafmohamed3/status/2122334736538308668; https://x.com/AbedaMoham6183/status/2122308721476862283
[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/fgs-sfc-al-shabaab-somalia-sudan-saf-rsf#Sudan
[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-27-2025-saf-advances-west-toward-darfur-m23-and-drc-reset-as-pressure-grows-rwanda-issp-transnational-threat-al-shabaab-central-somalia-offensive#Sudan
[10] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-seizes-control-of-al-nahud; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/uae-regionalization-sudan-war-jnim-expands-benin-nigeria-gulf-of-guinea-mali-sahel-mining-tuareg-fla-africa-corps-shabaab-shabelle-mogadishu-offensive-africa-file-june-2025#Sudan
[11] https://darfur24 dot com/2025/07/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4; https://sudantribune dot com/article/305464; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/heavy-fighting-outside-el-obeid
[12] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/04/24/burhan-undermines-the-rsf-from-within,110711227-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/07/02/riyadh-wires-millions-of-dollars-for-two-rsf-defectors,110834219-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/09/07/ex-rsf-chief-musa-khamsin-wants-to-set-his-terms-for-joining-burhan-s-ranks,110871843-art
[13] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/04/24/burhan-undermines-the-rsf-from-within,110711227-art; https://storage.googleapis dot com/madamasr/en/2026/04/17/news/u/sudan-nashra-dengue-outbreak-in-khartoum-medical-sources-say-capital-still-unprepared-measles-outbreak-causes-daily-deaths-in-north-darfur-displacement-hubs-mahamid-rsf-commander-forces-defect/index.html; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/fc2; https://storage.googleapis dot com/madamasr/en/2026/05/15/news/u/sudan-nashra-ethiopia-revokes-sudanese-ambassador-designates-credentials-juba-asks-cairo-to-evacuate-military-base-near-ethiopian-border-as-preemptive-move-another-mahamid-field-commander-defec/index.html; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/us-nigeria-isis-iswap-sahel-rsf-saf-sudan-africa-file-may-21-2026#Sudan
[14] https://x.com/AlArabiya_Brk/status/2087482121015132299; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/11/03/faced-with-defections-hemeti-sets-up-new-intelligence-service-to-monitor-generals,110912573-art; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/rsf-special-tasks-commander-defects-with-300-officers-soldiers-in-sudan/4082248; https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2113982390750052540; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/10/31/rsf-senior-commander-defects-accusing-sudan-groups-leadership-of-nepotism; https://www.newarab dot com/news/rsf-commander-defects-army-makes-ground-kordofan
[15] https://x.com/alrougui/status/2120834052202565656; https://x.com/hashsudan/status/2120827739930341808; https://x.com/SudaneseEcho/status/2121262470908305558
[16] https://sudantribune dot com/article/317017; https://acleddata.com/report/how-rsf-infighting-reshaping-war-sudan
[17] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/11/03/faced-with-defections-hemeti-sets-up-new-intelligence-service-to-monitor-generals,110912573-art
[18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/november-11-2026
[19] https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/12/sud-kivu-le-frn-prend-ebisha-et-progresse-vers-hombo-sur-la-rn3; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121954708596150395; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2122408097503461808
[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/november-11-2026
[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/november-11-2026
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