Congo War Security Review

Data Cutoff: October 7, 2026, at 1 P.M. EST

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Key Takeaway: DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s special envoy undertook a regional tour to rally support for the DRC’s plan to demobilize the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Three of the African Union mediators for the DRC peace process visited Goma and Kigali to meet with regional stakeholders. Pro-Congolese government forces retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district in North Kivu as significant fighting continued into early October. The US-backed Ruzizi hydropower plant project is reportedly back in limbo after a Chinese firm withdrew from the project’s consortium.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Nothing significant to report.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters reportedly attacked M23 on the front line in Lubero district in North Kivu. M23’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed in a statement on social media that pro-Congolese government forces operating from Kipese town shelled Mutondi village on September 28.[1] Mutondi is roughly four miles south of Kipese on a local road.[2] The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported that Wazalendo fighters attacked and clashed with M23 in several villages in the Batangi chiefdom in south-central Lubero, including Kandole, Kirivu, Vyanze, between October 1 and 4.[3] The report from October 5 claimed that Wazalendo fighters had captured Kandole and Kirvu and advanced toward Mutondi, as M23 deployed reinforcements to Vyanze from Kitsombiro on the RN2 via Kasusa and Luvereya and before Wazalendo fighters then retreated.[4] Kandole and Vyanze are south of Kipese, closer to Lake Edward and roughly 20 and 14 miles east of Alimbongo on the RN2, respectively. Kanyuka claimed that a helicopter operated by pro-Congolese government forces dropped two explosives on Pitakongo in Lubero on October 3.[5] CTP is unable to verify the precise location of Pitakongo.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Numerous villages changed hands between pro-Congolese government forces and M23 in the northern Kalehe district highlands in South Kivu in early October. Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that the Congolese army (FARDC) and Wazalendo fighters took control of several villages in the Ziralo group in northern Kalehe from M23, including Katale, Kafufula, Chambombo et Kudépôt, as early as October 3 after significant clashes with M23.[6] This represents the fourth pro-Congolese government offensive against M23 in northern Kalehe since late June. Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly captured Lumbishi, Shanje, and several other localities in the area around October 5, before advancing on and capturing the mining town of Numbi on October 6 after M23 had withdrawn.[7] Clashes continued on October 7, and M23 reportedly recaptured Numbi, Shanje, and Kavumu near Numbi before advancing toward Chambombo.[8] Wazalendo fighters reportedly set fire to dozens of houses and shops in the public market and looted livestock belonging to locals in Shanje as they were withdrawing from the town between October 6 and 7.[9]

Fighting between M23-allied militia fighters and pro-Congolese government forces continued in the highlands and midlands in South Kivu. M23-allied Twirwaneho and reported RED–Tabara fighters reportedly clashed with pro-Congolese government forces in the midlands between September 24 and 27, capturing Magunda, Maheta, Kakuku, Mushojo, and Nanjale villages in the Basimukindji second group in the Itombwe sector in Mwenga district around September 26.[10] The Basimukindji second group is in a mountainous area northwest of Uvira town in the Bavira chiefdom. M23-allied fighters reportedly also captured Mibunda, which is a few miles north of Magunda on a rural road, around September 26.[11]

Clashes continued further south around Minembwe town in the Fizi highlands. An independent Congolese journalist reported on social media that M23-Twirwaneho fighters conducted a drone attack on a pro-Congolese government position at Mulima near Point Zéro, which is an operationally significant hilltop east of Minembwe, on September 24.[12] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly intensified attacks on numerous villages, including Rugezi, Gipimo, and Wihene, to the south of Minembwe on September 26 and 27.[13] Kanyuka claimed on social media on September 27 that pro-Congolese government forces also attacked Point Zéro.[14] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media on September 28 that Twirwaneho repelled the attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo.[15] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media on September 28 that pro-Congolese government forces shot down a drone, reportedly Ukrainian-made, over Rugezi.[16] One M23-aligned source claimed on social media that Bafulero fighters featured in videos that circulated after the drone was downed said that the drones belonged to pro-Congolese government forces.[17] The Burundian army (FDNB) spokesman, Brig. Gen. Gaspard Baratuza, confirmed at a press conference on September 29 that military authorities had arrested two FDNB officers in South Kivu in late August but denied that they were transferred to Kinshasa.[18] Baratuza also denied reports that have circulated since September 21 that Tanzanian troops entered Burundi and have deployed to the eastern DRC in FDNB military uniforms.[19] Fighting reportedly continued around Rugezi and Gipimo and in the Basimimbi group in the Lulenge sector on September 29 and 30.[20] Fighting also continued in an area known as Avocat, near Kanguli and close to Point Zéro, on September 30.[21] Congolese-government aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured Wihene on September 30 after clashes with M23-allied fighters.[22] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks on Nyaruhinga, Point Zéro, and other areas near Minembwe on September 30.[23] A Burundian human rights activist opposed to the Burundian government claimed on social media on October 2 that FDNB Captain Sylvestre Barutwanayo died fighting in combat at Rugezi in late September or early October.[24] M23-aligned sources claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on its positions in Gipimo on October 2.[25] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Wihene using one-way (OWA) attack drones on October 3.[26] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Point Zéro and Mukoko on October 4.[27] Kanyula claimed that pro-Congolese government forces conducted OWA attacks on Rugezi on October 6 and 7.[28] The FARDC claimed on October 7 that 17 fighters from the M23 alliance surrendered near Abala, Nyaruhinga, and Kabanja on October 6.[29]

Fighting broke out near Katana town and the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) in Kabare district in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly clashed with M23 in Kabushwa village on the outskirts of Katana town on the RN2 and the edge of the PNKB on September 28.[30] Congolese-government aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured several positions overlooking Katana as early as September 30.[31] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kabushwa, Kahungu, and the Mbinga Sud group on October 6.[32]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district in North Kivu as significant fighting on this axis continued into early October. CTP last reported in late September that M23 reinforced its positions with troops and military equipment from Ngungu toward the front line and launched attacks to recapture operationally significant areas near Remeka town in the Ufamandu first group in southern Masisi.[33] M23 reportedly continued to reinforce its positions as clashes between the group and pro-Congolese government forces resumed in Remeka and Nkokwe on September 25.[34] M23 then reportedly recaptured Remeka, Nkokwe, and Muhororo on September 25, before the group advanced to and clashed with pro-Congolese government forces using drones in Kaleta and Miko hill, which is near Katuunda, on September 26.[35] Clashes reportedly resumed around Kaleta and Miko on September 27.[36] M23 reportedly targeted two Wazalendo positions in Kaleta and Bitoyi in Ufamandu using drones on September 28.[37] Significant fighting reportedly did not resume until October 3, when Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters recaptured Remeka, Muhororo, Kamuhobe, Nyamiri, and Mihano after clashing with M23.[38] This is the fourth time that Remeka has changed hands since late August. Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that fighting resumed further west as Wazalendo fighters captured Mushongi village—near the Katoyi sector capital to the west of Remeka—as part of a Wazalendo effort to put pressure on Katoyi and Mitimingi, on October 4.[39] Congolese military authorities claimed on October 4 that pro-Congolese government forces captured 10 M23 fighters during recent clashes in Remeka, Mohololo, Biriko, and Miko.[40] Fighting resumed closer to Remeka on October 5, as pro-Congolese government forces claimed control of Nyakigano, Nkokwe and Kashovu villages near Kasake.[41] Wazalendo fighters reportedly also claimed control of Changayi, Ruseme, and Kasheke villages further north and closer to Katoyi in the Nyamaboko group in the Osso Banyungu sector on October 5.[42] Wazalendo fighters then claimed control of Mitimingi on October 5.[43] Clashes between the two sides reportedly resumed in several areas in southern Masisi on October 6 and 7, including Kasake, Katoyi, Kashovu, Burora.[44]

M23 reportedly conducted a drone attack on Pinga town, as clashes resumed on the RP1030 on the Masisi-Walikale district border in North Kivu. Actualite.cd reported that fighting between the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters and M23 resumed on the hills of Kazumba, Kasumba and Chad in the Kisimba group near Minjenje on the RP1030 on September 26.[45] Wazalendo fighters and possible militants from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) reportedly infiltrated Burungu village, which is further south on the RP1030—about six miles south of Kitchanga town—in M23 uniforms and attacked M23 elements and civilians on September 26.[46] M23 then reportedly conducted a drone attack on an FARDC position at the Pinga airfield in the first reported M23 air attack on the town on September 28.[47] The Congolese representative to the UN claimed at a UN Security Council hearing on September 29 that the Rwandan army was responsible for the attack and used a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2-type medium-altitude long-endurance drone.[48] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly recaptured several positions above Minjenje and Malemo on the RP1030 after clashes with M23 on September 28.[49]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s special envoy undertook a regional tour to rally support for the DRC’s plan to demobilize the FDLR. Floribert Anzuluni, the Congolese Minister of Regional Integration, traveled to Togo and met with Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé in Lomé to discuss the plan on September 29.[50] Gnassingbé is the designated mediator for the African Union (AU) in the DRC peace process. Anzuluni and Sumbu Sita Mambu, who oversees the M23 file in Tshisekedi’s office, then traveled to Brazzaville in the Republic of the Congo and met with President Denis Sassou Nguesso to discuss the plan on September 30.[51] Anzuluni and Sita Mambu traveled to Luanda in Angola on the same day and met with Angolan President João Lourenço to discuss the plan.[52] Anzuluni then traveled to Bujumbura in Burundi to meet with Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye on October 1.[53] Ndayishimiye currently serves as Chairman of the African Union. Anzuluni and Sita Mambu then traveled to Entebbe in Uganda and met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on October 5.[54] Tanzanian President Samia Hassan then received Anzuluni and Sita Mambu in Dar es Salaam on October 6.[55] The Congolese Ministry of Regional Integration said that the meeting with Hassan focused on “significant progress” made in the process since Anzuluni conducted a previous regional tour to rally support for the plan and the Congolese government publicly revealed it in late July.[56]

Three of the AU mediators for the DRC peace process visited Goma and Kigali to meet with regional stakeholders. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on September 30 that the panel of AU facilitators plans to visit Goma, Kigali, and Kinshasa by mid-October.[57] A delegation that included three of the facilitators—former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, former Botswanan president Mokgweetsi Masisi, and former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde— and accompanied by the Togolese deputy foreign minister and a senior AU official met with the senior leadership of Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)–M23 at the Serena Hotel in Goma on October 5.[58] The two other facilitators, former Central African Republic President Catherine Samba-Panza and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, were reportedly absent due to health reasons and separate diplomatic efforts related to the war in the Horn of Africa, respectively.[59] The facilitators then met with representatives from the UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in Goma.[60] The delegation also met with UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.[61] The panel then traveled to Kigali, and Kenyatta met with Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe on October 6.[62] The facilitators called for all sides to respect the ceasefire and resume engagement under the Doha process in a statement on October 7.[63] The facilitators then met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame on October 7.[64]

Burundi banned entry to individuals from M23-controlled areas. The Burundian interior minister, Léonidas Ndaruzaniye, announced on October 1 that the Burundian government would henceforth refuse entry to people coming from areas controlled by M23 or transiting through them.[65] Ndaruzaniye said that the ban also applies to UN personnel in these areas.[66] Ndaruzaniye said he had received “numerous calls from people asking him to reverse his decision” but reportedly said that he stayed the policy because Burundi was “Kinshasa’s ally,” according to the independent Burundian media outlet SOS Médias Burundi in a report on October 2.[67]

New reporting adds detail to the US-DRC security memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in December 2025. The US military and the FARDC had held limited technical exchanges in July 2025, a few weeks after the United States brokered the June 2025 DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, and reportedly began negotiating the details of a security partnership around September 2025.[68] These negotiations culminated in the signing an MOU an expanded security partnership under the Washington Peace Accords in early December 2025.[69] CTP assessed in early 2026 that the security partnership had already led to greater defense cooperation and could materialize into a formalized defense agreement, which would reportedly entail US training support, arms transfers, and intelligence sharing.[70] The French state media outlet Radio France Internationale (RFI) reported on the contents of the MOU in a report on October 3.[71] The report said that one of the partnership’s main aims is to protect the DRC’s territorial integrity and Congolese mineral assets and infrastructure.[72] RFI reported that the partnership aims to strengthen the Congolese army in what would be the “largest professional military training program in Central Africa,” specifically mentioning training in intelligence, logistics, and military engineering.[73] The report said that the memorandum also provides for cooperation on border control and information sharing, while US assistance for modernizing the DRC’s armed forces would be contingent on progress in military professionalization, human rights, and accountability, with no funding guaranteed.[74] The report said that the five-year memorandum is non-binding and that additional agreements would establish specific implementation.[75]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

The US-backed Ruzizi hydropower plant project is reportedly back in limbo after a Chinese firm withdrew from the project’s consortium. CTP reported previously that the Ruzizi III hydropower dam in the tri-border area, which is the flagship project under the US-brokered Regional Economic Integration Framework, has faced delays since mid-2025, in part due to the Congolese government’s refusal to support a demilitarized zone around the project.[76] The project, which is developed as a public-private partnership between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, will cost $760 million and benefit about 30 million people across the Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda.[77] The United States formally asked the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi to move forward with the project amid delays and designate it as a confidence-building measure in mid-March.[78] CTP reported in late June 2026 that the project had made recent progress, with development finance institutions expected to release funding after the DRC’s water and energy minister began advocating in May for government measures to advance the project.[79] Africa Intelligence reported on September 28 that the project is now in jeopardy again, however, after the Chinese government instructed Chinese firm Dongfang Electric Corp., which was responsible for a key construction component, to pull out of negotiations with the project’s consortium.[80] The report said that a contract setting prices with the project’s contractors, including Dongfang, was expected to be awarded by the end of August, but an announcement is now not expected until the end of the year or possibly early 2027.[81] The report said that the US decision to include the project among confidence-building measures intended to support peace on the ground may have influenced the Chinese firm’s decision to pull out.[82]