Congo War Security Review

Data Cutoff: November 10, 2026, at 1 P.M. EST*

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Key Takeaway: FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Officials from the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan governments attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in late October. Numerous Congolese army officers and fighters have reportedly defected to FRN since Joseph Kabila became its head on October 12. The United States and the DRC held the second meeting of the Joint Steering Committee for the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement in Paris.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

FRN clashed with pro-Congolese government Wazalendo and fighters from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. The FRN-aligned media outlet Kivu Morning Post reported that clashes occurred in the Tongo and Bambo groups in the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru on November 2 as part of military operations that FRN carried out against Wazalendo and FDLR elements in the area near the Virunga National Park for several days.[1] Congolese government-aligned sources then claimed on social media on November 10 that Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN positions in Kakoro locality near Nyamilima town in the Binza group in Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru close to the border with Uganda.[2]

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Fighting between FRN-aligned Twirwaneho fighters and pro-Congolese government fighters continued in the South Kivu highlands. A Twirwaneho-aligned media outlet claimed on social media that fighting broke out in the Kuwamabuye area on October 29 after pro-Congolese government forces attacked Twirwaneho positions.[3] Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, and another Twirwaneho-aligned source claimed on social media that Twirwaneho had repelled the attacks in Kuwamabuye and that pro-Congolese government forces had shelled Nyamabuguma and Point Zéro on October 29.[4] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe on a local road. FRN reportedly targeted several Congolese army (FARDC) special force fighters further north of Minembwe in the area around the Bijombo group in Masango village in a drone strike on October 30, reportedly killing at least seven soldiers.[5] Masango is in the Basimukinji first group in the midlands northeast of Minembwe and has been the scene of significant fighting in recent months. One possible FARDC special force fighter claimed on social media that the strike may have been conducted by a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2.[6] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that Twirwaneho commander Charles Sematama was present in Kuwamabuye around October 30 after several days of clashes.[7] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that fighting resumed on October 31 and November 1 and that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Kuwamabuye and three other operationally significant hills on the front line south of Minembwe, known as Natulonge, Kabanja, and Bissakara.[8] The Congolese media outlet Radio Maendeleo reported on social media on November 1 that the FARDC had captured several villages and consolidated their positions around Masango.[9] Rugabo denied that the FARDC captured the four hills south of Minembwe and Rugabo and Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government force attacks on Kuwamabuye and Gipimo on November 2.[10] FRN’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Wihene near Rugezi south of Minembwe and on Point Zéro on November 1 and 2.[11] Twirwaneho-aligned sources, Congolese journalist Héritier Munyampfura, and Congolese journalist Steve Mulindwa claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces continued conducting drone attacks on Wihene and Minembwe center, reportedly targeting Madegu center, Kakenge, and Irundu in two successive attacks, on November 3.[12] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Minembwe center on November 3.[13] Rugabo denounced the attacks on Minembwe and Kakenge on social media on November 4.[14] The Congolese government-aligned media outlet Tazama RDC claimed on social media that the FARDC conducted the strike and had targeted a Twirwaneho military position.[15] Mulindwa reported on social media on November 4 that pro-Congolese government forces conducted new attacks on FRN in the Lulenge sector south of Minembwe near Lulimba at the crossroads of the RP1121 and RN5 since the weekend and had deployed several battalions to Lulenge.[16] Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly conducted another drone attack on Kakenge on November 5, killing two children.[17] Rugabo denounced the attack on social media on November 5.[18] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks and clashed with Twirwaneho fighters on the Rugezi axis near Rugomero and Nyarurango and the Mukoko, Nyrauhinga, and Nyamabuguma areas east of Minembwe on November 6.[19] Kanyuka and Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Point Zéro and Rugezi on November 8.[20] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled a pro-Congolese government force attack on the axis between Kuwamabuye and Kabanju on November 9, as fighting reportedly continued in the area.[21] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Point Zéro, Rugezi, Kimete, Nyarurango and Rugomero on November 9.[22] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho dislodged pro-Congolese government forces and retook control control of Kimete and Kabanju on November 9.[23] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces then conducted attacks on the Ndondo area of Bijombo, particularly in Rubarati, Ruhuha, and Marimba to the northeast of Minembwe.[24] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces retook control of Kabanza, a hill above Kuwamabuye, and Kimete and Kashamata villages on November 10.[25] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted a drone strike that killed several Twirwaneho commanders near Kaziba on November 10.[26]

Clashes broke out briefly in the Ruzizi Plain. Significant fighting had broken out in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu and near the Ruzizi Plain in mid-October and continued in lower intensity into late October.[27] Clashes reportedly occurred briefly near Mino village between Luvungi and Katagota and Rwege, an area between Katogota and Lubarika, on November 1, as both sides continued to reinforce their positions.[28] Kanyuka claimed in a statement on social media on November 4 that FRN did not maintain the intention to march on Uvira.[29]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Clashes reportedly broke out in PNKB near Tshivanga on the edge of the park and the Kalonge cheifdom—serving as the junction between the RN3 in the PNKB and the Kabare district toward Cifunzi—as FRN launched the offensive on November 6.[30] Videos circulated on November 7 of FRN fighters reportedly in Bitale—roughly 20 miles west of Tshivanga on the RN3 through the PNKB—as FRN fighters reportedly advanced from the PNKB using drones and anti-air defense systems, took control of Cifunzi as the main center in Kalonge, and dislodged pro-Congolese government fighters from Bitale and several other villages on the second axis toward Bunyakiri.[31] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted counterattacks on FRN positions and captured Katasomwa, Nyawaronga and a place called Checheni near the northern tip of the PNKB in the Mubugu highlands on November 8.[32] The Mbugu area connects further north toward the Ziralo group in northern Kalehe near the border with North Kivu through mountain trails. Radio Maendeleo reported on social media that FRN reinforced its position heavily in Bushaku, which is close to Katasomwa to the east toward the RN2, in a likely attempt to stop any Wazalendo advance from Katasomwa toward the RN2 on November 8, as some sources claimed that FRN had already recaptured Katasomwa.[33] Fighting reportedly resumed on the Bunyakiri axis on November 8, as pro-Congolese government forces attempted to halt the FRN advance around Bitale but failed as FRN consolidated their positions between Kalonge and the front line and captured Bulambika—about two miles from Bunyakiri center and three miles from the Kichanga airfield and supply center—on the second axis before capturing Bunyakiri center and continuing their advance on the RN3 toward Kambale.[34] Local civil society reportedly estimated that FRN advanced and took control of somewhere between 12 and 37 miles of the RN3 within just two days.[35] The distance between Tshivanga on the eastern side of the PNKB and Kambale is about 33 miles on the poorly maintained RN3. Bulambika is the largest town in the Kalima chiefdom in the Buhavu chiefdom in Kalehe.[36] Kichanga was the main supply center for all Wazalendo and FARDC troops operating throughout Kalehe and also used for operations in Kabare and Masisi.[37] Bulambika has administrative offices, a general hospital, a health zone office, a Catholic parish, and a central prison.[38] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly withdrew toward Irangi in the Hombo Sud sector after FRN captured Bulambika and Bunyakiri.[39] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces recaptured Katasomwa on November 8.[40] Rumors circulated that eco-guards from the PNKB and some FARDC officers on the RN3 supported the FRN’s capture of Bitale on November 7, which the eco-guards denied in a statement issued on November 9.[41] Some sources indicated that FRN had regained control of Katsomwa around November 9.[42] FRN reportedly stopped their advance at Kambale on November 9, although other sources reported that FRN had advanced a few miles further on the RN3 as far as Kambegeti.[43] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Katasomwa, Kidoveri, and Kalongi, the latter two likely in the highlands near the Ziralo group, on November 9.[44] The FARDC said on November 9 that it would mount a counteroffensive and retake positions that it lost on the Bunyakiri axis.[45] Fighting reportedly resumed near Kambale on November 9 as pro-Congolese government forces tried to retake lost positions.[46] Munyampfura reported on social media on November 9 that FRN fighters were deployed as far as Colobera on the Kalonge axis.[47] Radio Maendeleo reported on November 9 that the Kalonge chiefdom was almost entirely under FRN control and that the rebels had occupied a former camp that served as an FARDC headquarters and another camp considered a Wazalendo stronghold.[48] The FRN announced salongo in Bunyakiri and captured areas for November 14 around November 10.[49] FRN reportedly captured several localities around Katasomwa and the Bushaku area on November 10, including Kitendebwa, Kalongi, Kiduveri, Nyamugari, Mwamiwaijwi, and Mushunguti, after dislodging pro-Congolese government fighters.[50] Wazalendo fighters announced an offensive in Ziralo on November 10 with the aim to capture Numbi.[51] Wazalendo fighters then claimed that they retook Chambombo in Ziralo on November 10.[52] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambegeti on the RN3 on November 10 after pro-Congolese government fighters failed to conduct a counteroffensive on Kambale and were pushed back.[53] The FARDC denounced a disinformation campaign on November 10 that it said circulated accusations on social media that portrayed certain FARDC commanders as being in collusion with FRN.[54]

Pro-Congolese government forces launched an offensive against FRN near the RP529 around Kazinga town in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly conducted attacks on and clashed with FRN on the hills of Burubi near Muhanga between Kibati and Kashebere on October 30.[55] Fighting reportedly broke out further south in Kazinga on October 31, as pro-government forces launched attacks on FRN positions around the town and then claimed control of it.[56] Fighting then reportedly moved toward Mahanga center and Kilongo on November 3 as pro-Congolese government forces continued their offensive.[57] Mahanga is roughly 10 miles southwest of Nyabiondo. Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga, Buhimba, and Kazinga on November 3.[58] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly attacked and claimed control of Mirindano village, which is about five miles south of Mahanga on a local road, on November 3 and 4.[59] The FARDC reportedly then took control of Mahanga, Kilongo, and Kibanda, from FRN on November 4, after two days of combat.[60] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kibati on the RP529 on November 5, after FARDC-Wazalendo fighters conducted attacks on FRN positions.[61] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga and Buhimba on November 6.[62] Clashes reportedly continued in Mahanga and Buhimba on November 6, as the two sides split control of Mahanga and FRN attempted to recapture full control of the town.[63] Actualite.cd reported that clashes continued in Kibati for the second day on November 6 as the two sides continued to share control of the area.[64] Actualite.cd reported on November 7 that pro-Congolese government forces repelled the FRN counterattacks on Mahanga.[65] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN position further south in southern Masisi in Muhayirwa and Katoyi on November 7 and 8.[66] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga and Buhimba on November 8.[67] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kazinga and Mahanga on November 9.[68]

Fighting reportedly briefly broke out on the RP1030 near the Masisi-Walikale border in North Kivu. Actualite.cd reported that FRN targeted Wazalendo and FARDC positions in Minjenje in drone attacks on November 4.[69] Actualite.cd reported separately that fighting then broke out on November 7 after FRN attacked pro-Congolese government positions in Malemo.[70]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Pro-Congolese government fighters attacked FRN in several areas near the RP503 on the Nzibira axis in the Walungu district highlands southwest of Bukavu in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters had conducted an incursion in Kaniola near Walungu town and clashed with FRN on October 21.[71] Radio Maendeleo reported that clashes between FRN and Wazalendo fighters in several villages in the Kamisimbi group, which is about six miles south of Bukavu center near the RN2, on November 3.[72] Fighting reportedly resumed on November 5, when Wazalendo fighters clashed with FRN in Nzibira, Luntukulu, Nyamargehe, Kishadu, and Kaniola, likely initiated by Wazalendo elements.[73] Kaniola is about six miles west of Walungu town. Luntukulu is about 10 miles south of Nzibira in the Luindi chiefdom in northern Mwenga. Kishadu is about six miles west of Nzibira on the RP503. Nyamarhege is about six miles from Nzibira. Tazama RDC claimed on social media that fighting also took place in several remote localities in the Luhago group, which is about eight miles north of Nzibira on a local road in the Ninja chiefdom in southern Kabare district, on November 5.[74] Congolese-government aligned sources also claimed that Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN positions in Chulwe and Nzibira on November 5.[75] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Nyamarhege, Lulaba, and Chulwe in the Nzibira area on November 5.[76] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that Wazalendo fighters took control of Chulwe on November 6, as fighting reportedly continued on the RP503 axis and between Nzibira and Luntukulu.[77] Local sources told Actualite.cd on November 6 that the FARDC and its allies had launched an offensive against FRN.[78]

Pro-Congolese government fighters likely also attacked FRN on the front line on the RN2 in Mwenga district in South Kivu. Fighting reportedly broke out in Kasika village, which is the seat of Luindi about 14 miles north of the government-controlled town of Mwenga on the RN2, and Kidasa, Kalambi, Kionvu, and Kigongo villages on November 5.[79] Kidasa and Kalambi are about three and six miles further south of Kasika on the RN2, respectively. Kionvu is a small village to the east of Kalambi off the RN2.[80] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces initiated the engagements in Kasika.[81] Kanyula claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kasika again on November 6.[82] Fighting reportedly continued around Kasika on November 6, with both sides largely maintaining their positions.[83]

Major Political Developments

Officials from the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan governments attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in late October. Russian President Vladimir Putin co-chaired the third Russia-Africa Summit with Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye as African Union chair in Moscow on October 28 and 29.[84] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan Prime Minister Justin Nsengiyumva also attended the summit.[85] Tshisekedi said that he was seeking Russian support to enforce UN resolutions related to the war in the eastern DRC.[86] Rwanda and Russia’s Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding to advance the assessment and development of Rwanda’s nuclear infrastructure, including plans for a small modular reactor, on October 28.[87] The DRC and Russia signed three bilateral agreements that included formalizing the creation of an intergovernmental commission.[88] Ndayishimiye held a bilateral meeting with Putin on October 29.[89] Tshisekedi held bilateral talks with Putin at the Kremlin on October 30.[90] Tshisekedi told Putin that the Washington and Doha peace processes had failed to deliver, sought increased bilateral cooperation, and urged him to help secure an extension of MONUSCO’s mandate.[91] Putin said that the DRC was one of Russia’s “most promising partners in Africa.”[92] Tshisekedi and Ndayishimiye also received honorary doctorates from a university in Moscow.[93]

Tshisekedi held a press conference with a Congolese diaspora audience in Moscow to discuss a range of issues on October 30.[94] Tshisekedi said that Russia will become an “even more important” partner for the DRC.[95] Tshisekedi dismissed the judicial investigation launched by Belgian authorities into alleged corruption involving his family as a “plot” concocted by his “enemies” and a “fake lawyer who has been dealing with Rwandans for 30 years” and said that he had directed his lawyers to “counterattack.”[96] The searches of several properties in Belgium linked to Tshisekedi’s initiated by Belgian authorities in October had required an independent judicial assessment of the allegations.[97] Tshisekedi claimed that former DRC President Joseph Kabila had once remarked to him when they were on good terms that he was not fond of Rwanda, claiming again that Kabila was a puppet president serving Rwandan interests.[98] Tshisekedi reiterated the DRC’s position that the FDLR issue was a “pretext” used by Rwanda and claimed that the Congolese government had begun gathering FDLR members in Kitona, pending their transfer to host countries or voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.[99] Tshisekedi claimed further that an unnamed African head of state had agreed to host them but was subsequently threatened by Rwandan President Paul Kagame who warned against assisting the DRC.[100] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported that Congolese regional integration minister Floribert Anzuluni had considered Togo and Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé as a potential host country for demobilized FDLR fighters.[101] The report said that Togo had “politely declined” to host FDLR members, however, and cited two sources who said that the decision was not due to pressure from Rwanda.[102] An unnamed source close to Togolese mediation told Jeune Afrique that Togolese authorities were “surprised” that the Congolese government was unilaterally advancing the demobilization plan and “acting as the mouthpiece for the FDLR.”[103] Tshisekedi also announced on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit that a Congolese national dialogue was making progress but the government would only include those who have “nothing to do with Rwanda.”[104] Tshisekedi explained why he was “combatting” the current Congolese constitution, referring to issues with the current constitution and sovereignty-related concerns.[105] Tshisekedi also reiterated the government’s position that the death of Manassé Lomboto, a bodyguard for opposition leader Prince Epenge who was likely killed by militants linked to Tshisekedi’s political party during protests in Kinshasa in mid-September, was due to “illness” and defended Epenge’s arrest for comments he made related to Lomboto.[106] The Congolese political opposition denounced Tshisekedi’s remarks on Lomboto and accused the president of trying to influence and coopt the justice system.[107]

Numerous FARDC officers and fighters have reportedly defected to FRN since Kabila became its head on October 12. The Congolese defense minister had instructed the FARDC chief of staff to issue an indefinite ban on FARDC officers from leaving the country without prior authorization on October 15 after a defense council meeting that Tshisekedi chaired on October 14.[108] A copy of the order was sent to the Maison Militaire, Congolese military intelligence, and the DRC’s directorate of migration.[109] Kanyuka claimed on October 18 that more than 120 “compatriots who came from Kinshasa” had joined FRN.[110] FARDC Brigadier General François Kamanzi, commander of military operations in Kongo Central province, reportedly defected from the FARDC and joined FRN by transiting through Angola in late October.[111] Kamanzi is reportedly a Congolese Tutsi from Rutshuru district in North Kivu and previously served in other Tutsi-led movements in the eastern DRC.[112] Kanyuka had also claimed on October 27 that two other FARDC officers had defected to FRN.[113] Manzi Willy, the FRN vice governor of North Kivu, claimed on social media on October 27 that Lieutenant Arnold Lemba Lula from the Garde républicaine (GR) had defected to join FRN.[114] Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu, a military and security analyst, said on social media on October 27 after Kamanzi’s defection that several other FARDC general and senior officers were also preparing to join FRN in the coming weeks.[115] FARDC Colonel Ghislain Umba Ndolo, the deputy commander for operations and intelligence of an infantry brigade based in Tanganyika province, reportedly defected around October 28.[116] FARDC Major Jean Twite Kumwimba, a member of the GR, reportedly then defected and arrived in Goma.[117] FRN-aligned sources claimed on October 30 that Germain Katanga, a former FARDC Brigadier General, joined FRN.[118] An unverified report from Rwandan media outlet KT Press on October 30 claimed that these officers and more than 600 FARDC soldiers had joined FRN.[119] The outlet cited regional accounts that claimed that 635 FARDC soldiers, led by seven officers, crossed into FRN-controlled territory through Nzibira in South Kivu on October 28.[120] The FARDC’s spokesperson claimed in early November that Kamanzi was a double agent and had several AFC-M23 military officers killed by providing information on their positions when he was in the army.[121]

The International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG) expressed concern over the creation of FRN and urged all parties to remain committed to the Washington and Doha process in its first statement since August. The ICG, which France chairs and which includes the United States, Canada, the European Union, and several other European countries, released a statement on October 30 encouraging all parties to remain committed to a “peace resolution of the conflict and to fulfill their obligations without delay.”[122] The ICG said that it “categorically rejects the pursuit of political objectives through the use of violence,” a position directed at the newly formed FRN.[123] The statement did not call for FRN’s exclusion from a political settlement or explicitly rule out negotiations with its representatives. The group reiterated the need for all parties to “respect the rule of law” and the Congolese constitution, noting the “importance of a peaceful and inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue involving all key Congolese stakeholders as an essential prerequisite for lasting peace in the DRC.”[124] Tshisekedi had said on October 24 in a meeting with his political coalition that he “did not like” the constitution, a day after the National Assembly had adopted the law for organizing a referendum on constitutional revision.[125] The group also noted that the rule of law and the “protection of fundamental rights is crucial to ensure that all political parties and civil society organizations can freely exercise their role.”[126] ICG recalled its previous statement on the FDLR demobilization plan and called on Congolese authorities to present an “action plan and timeline” for the protocol.[127]

Envoys representing Tshisekedi and Kabila reportedly attempted to broker some form of understanding shortly before Kabila formally launched the FRN in mid-October. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on November 11 that Kabila envoy Jean Mbuyu Luyongola initiated a mediation effort with Tshisekedi adviser Fortunat Biselele a few weeks before Kabila announced the FRN on October 12.[128] The report said that Kabila conveyed through Luyongola that he wanted to establish a channel of communication with Tshisekedi.[129] The report said that Luyongola then met with Bisele and Tshisekedi in Tshisekedi’s office in Kinshasa for two hours.[130] The report said that Luyongola raised the issue of the death sentence that the government leveled on Kabila in September 2025.[131] Tshisekedi reportedly said the sentence could be discussed if Kabila left Goma, condemned Rwanda, and cut all ties with the rebels.[132] Kabila said through Luyongola that the outcome of the discussions and any commitments made by the Congolese government must be put in writing.[133] The report said that the effort came to nothing, and Kabila announced the formation of the FRN on October 12.[134] Kabila denied through M23-aligned journalist Steve Wembi on social media on November 2 that Kabila had dispatched an envoy to meet with Tshisekedi.[135] Exiled Congolese journalist Pero Luwara said on social media on November 2 that a “rapprochement” between the two heavyweights’ envoys, including by François Muamba on Kabila’s side, was a “rumor” and offered an alternative explanation of the fiasco.[136] Luwara claimed that around early October Biselele and Eberande Kolongele, a Tshisekedi security adviser, had brought in Luyongola from his home “almost by force of arms” to deliver a message to Kabila that he wanted to establish a channel of communication.[137] Luwara claimed that Kabila rejected the overture and indicated that he had “nothing to say” to Tshisekedi, ending the matter.[138] Kabila’s close associates accused Tshisekedi of disseminating a “truncated” version of the affair.[139]

The United States announced that it would terminate Rwanda from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preference program. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on November 2 that the United States would exclude Rwanda and South Africa for “engaging in practices that are inconsistent with AGOA’s eligibility criteria” beginning in January 2027.[140] Greer’s office said that these practices included those that “pose a threat to US national security and foreign policy interests” in Africa.[141] Greer said that the Trump administration was concerned about “trade and investment barriers, rule of law, political pluralism, internationally recognized worker rights, human rights, and threats to US national security and foreign policy interests” in Rwanda.[142] The United States has significantly increased diplomatic and political pressure on Rwanda related to the war in the eastern DRC since early 2026. Rwandan or M23-linked persons and entities account for 15 of the 16 individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in the Great Lakes region in 2026.[143] The United States has framed these actions as enforcement measures to support the implementation of the Washington Peace Accords (WPA). Cameron Hudson, former State Department and National Security Council official on Africa, told the French outlet Le Monde on November 4 after Rwanda’s exclusion from AGOA that the United States has “only one strategic interest in the DRC: to get its hands on the minerals. Its entire policy in the region serves this objective.”[144]

MONUSCO head James Swan traveled to Goma to meet with senior FRN officials in early November. Swan and a delegation of senior UN officials arrived in Goma on November 2 and met with Kabila and other senior FRN officials on November 3.[145] This is the first exchange between senior UN officials and Kabila since he launched FRN. The exchanges reportedly focused on the ceasefire, the peace process, the debate on changing the Congolese constitution, and MONUSCO’s mandate.[146] MONUSCO framed the trip as part of Swan’s regular consultations in the eastern DRC.[147] Swan also met with officials from the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.[148] Bertrand Bisimwa, one of the FRN vice presidents, said after the meeting with Swan that FRN was not in favor of the renewal or expansion of MONUSCO’s mandate but recognized the role that it plays under the Doha process to support the ceasefire verification mechanism.[149] Bisimwa claimed that FRN inherited AFC-M23’s commitments to the Doha process and remain committed to them.[150] Bisimwa said the FRN views the Doha agreements as based on the current constitutional order, arguing that any challenge to it would erode the trust necessary for their implementation and risk the “collapse” of the Doha process.[151] These comments effectively place the constitutional question at the center of international mediators’ concerns, rather than framing it solely as an internal Congolese dispute.[152] FRN demanded an “official clarification” from the Congolese government regarding the referendum law and Tshisekedi’s October 24 and 30 remarks on the constitution and requested that the issue be included on the agenda for the next round of talks in a November 1 letter to Qatari mediators.[153]

The Congolese interior minister threatened to take legal action against Article 64 Coalition (C64) members who travel to FRN-controlled areas to discuss an inclusive national dialogue. C64 members had met in Italy in late October for their first-in person meeting the coalition’s creation in May.[154] The C64’s five leaders, Martin Fayulu, Jean-Marc Kabund, Moïse Katumbi, Augustin Matata Ponyo, and Delly Sesanga, said in a statement on October 27 that they rejected both constitutional change and armed rebellion and would seek to meet Tshisekedi and Kabila separately “to find a Congolese solution to the crisis” and agree to a “genuine inclusive national dialogue.”[155] C64 leaders then met with European officials in Brussels on October 29 and Paris on November 2.[156] Moïse Katumbi reaffirmed the coalition’s opposition to constitutional revision and armed rebellion in an interview with Jeune Afrique on November 3 and said that its leaders planned to travel to Togo, Kenya, South Africa, Angola, Uganda, and Ethiopia.[157] Katumbi said that C64 would begin the tour to promote an inclusive national dialogue with a meeting with Tshisekedi in Kinshasa but that he and former DRC Prime Minister Matata Ponyo would not attend.[158] Katumbi said that C64 members would then all travel to Goma to meet with Kabila publicly.[159] Katumbi argued that “Goma is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kabila is Congolese,” and that the Congolese government is negotiating with FRN directly in Doha.[160] Katumbi said that he had no intention of meeting with Kagame and recalled that he and Tshisekedi had met with Kagame when they were both in the opposition.[161] Jacquemin Shabani, the DRC Deputy Prime Minister for the Interior, responded to Katumbi’s remarks in his own interview with Jeune Afrique on November 4, threatening that any political figure traveling to Goma to meet with Kabila would face “criminal penalties” similar to the death penalty issued against Kabila.[162]

The Congolese government is reportedly trying to formulate a more assertive diplomatic campaign within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) against Eswatini and other member states it views as sympathetic to Kabila. Africa Intelligence reported on November 6 that the Congolese government is trying to counter the influence of Eswatini, which issued Kabila a diplomatic passport, and other SADC member states, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, that maintain close ties with Kabila.[163] The report said that Tshisekedi’s government views Eswatini as Kabila’s primary diplomatic ally in SADC and is strengthening its diplomatic efforts to counter Eswatini and Kabila’s other supporters in the bloc.[164] The report noted that Eswatini officials and other regional leaders and diplomats are displeased with the Tshisekedi government’s treatment of Kabila, particularly the death penalty conviction in 2025.[165] The report said that the DRC’s national security council, Floribert Anzuluni, and the Congolese ambassador to Botswana and permanent representative to SADC are “closely monitoring” the issue with Eswatini.[166]

The Congolese government is threatening to withdraw from the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) if Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo wins a third term as the organization’s secretary-general at an upcoming summit. Leaders of the OIF’s 53 member states will choose the next secretary-general at a summit in Cambodia on November 15 and 16.[167] The DRC nominated Juliana Amato Lumumba, who is the daughter of Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, in early 2026 to challenge Rwandan Louise Mushikiwabo, a former Rwandan foreign minister who has led the OIF since January 2019. The Congolese government has long accused Mushikiwabo and the OIF of failing to adequately criticize Rwanda’s alleged actions, describing the organization under her leadership as a “second Rwandan embassy” in Paris.[168] Rwandan officials have rejected attempts to frame the election as a bilateral dispute and defended Mushikiwabo’s candidacy on the basis of her record as OIF head.[169] Jeune Afrique reported that Tshisekedi told the French foreign minister during a meeting on October 2 in Kinshasa that the DRC could withdraw from the OIF if Mushikiwabo secured a third term, prompting French officials to increase diplomatic efforts between the DRC and Rwanda to avoid the DRC’s withdrawal, including a reported proposal by French President Emmanuel Macron to delay the election by one or two years while retaining Mushikiwabo—which Tshisekedi rejected—among other stopgap measures.[170] The Congolese government is still reportedly considering leaving the OIF if Mushikiwabo is reelected.[171] Most observers see the race as primarily a contest between Mushikiwabo and Romania’s Dacian Cioloș, as Lumumba is less well-known and her campaign has lost momentum following multiple difficulties.[172] Congolese government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya cited “Congolese public opinion” on November 10 as reaffirmation that DRC was considering withdrawing from the organization if Mushikiwabo was reelected.[173]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

The United States and the DRC held the second meeting of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in Paris. Senior US and Congolese officials met in Paris on November 5 for the JSC’s second meeting, co-chaired by Congolese economy minister Daniel Mukoko Samba and attended by the DRC’s minister for mines.[174] The readout said that the SPA was making progress since the inaugural JSC meeting in February, welcoming growing US private-sector interest in the Strategic Assert Reserve (SAR) and an expanding investment pipeline.[175] The readout said that the JSC received a briefing from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) on its growing investment pipeline in the DRC.[176] The JSC highlighted progress on several priority initiatives, including the signing of a 30-year concession agreement with a Portuguese construction company to upgrade and manage a key railway section between a town on the DRC-Angola border and another town on the DRC-Zambia border in August, ongoing discussions surrounding the Grand Inga hydropower project, and potential opportunities for US firms in critical minerals processing, exports, and energy development.[177] The JSC also noted the DRC’s recent adoption of legislation setting tax and customs rules for projects under the agreement.[178] Samba said on November 6 that the DRC wants to see the partnership translate into tangible economic benefits, arguing that its success should be judged by completed projects.[179] The readout from the meeting outlined no new investment pledges or specific projects slated to receive financing.