First Trump Africa Summit; DRC Tensions; Shabaab Momentum: Africa File, July 10, 2025

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Contributors: Ellery White and Edie Tesfaye

Key Takeaways:

• US-Africa Summit. The United States will discuss critical minerals, defense partnerships, economic cooperation, and migration during a three-day summit with leaders from five coastal West African countries. Stronger partnerships with Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal provide various opportunities to address Chinese and Russian influence off Africa’s Atlantic coast, the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in West Africa, and supply chains for critical minerals, such as manganese.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels and the Congolese army have both reinforced their positions in South Kivu and traded accusations that each is planning an imminent offensive. Renewed fighting could derail already-struggling Qatari-mediated peace efforts between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and M23 and undermine the US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda.
• Somalia. Al Shabaab recaptured another district capital in central Somalia and is threatening to expand its control beyond the pre-2022 status quo. Al Shabaab’s gains are a strategic setback for the Somali Federal Government and set conditions for al Shabaab to increase pressure on major government-controlled population centers in central Somalia and along the Ethiopian border.
• Uganda. Uganda expanded the footprint of its joint military cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to target IS Central Africa Province’s largest cell in the eastern DRC’s Ituri province. Uganda uses its military partnership with the DRC to simultaneously strengthen its sphere of influence in the eastern DRC.
• Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces are contesting key ground lines of communication that are key to supporting their isolated enclaves in southern Sudan.

Assessments:

US-Africa Summit

Authors: Liam Karr and Miles Charles

US President Donald Trump kicked off a three-day summit with five West African leaders on July 9. Trump invited the heads of state from Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal to attend the summit from July 9 to 11.[i] US State Department officials said that the summit will focus on critical minerals, economic cooperation, trade opportunities, and regional security.[ii]

Figure 1. US-Africa Summit Participants

Source: Liam Karr.

The US partnership with Gabon and Guinea-Bissau helps offset growing Chinese and Russian influence on Africa’s Atlantic coast. Gabon’s former president verbally promised to allow China to build its first Atlantic naval base in Gabon in 2023.^[iii] Current Gabonese President Brice Oligui Nguema, who is leading a junta that took power in August 2023, has remained noncommittal and balanced ties with the US and China.^[iv] China has still conducted joint exercises with the Gabonese navy in 2025 on maritime rescue and evacuation, however, highlighting that China remains engaged and committed to growing defense ties.^[v]

Russia has significantly grown its security cooperation with Guinea-Bissau since 2021. Bissau-Guinean President Umaro Sissoco Embaló has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin four times since 2022.^[vi] CTP assessed in May 2024 that Embaló might be seeking greater security cooperation with Russia after he survived a coup attempt in 2023.^[vii] The two presidents raised the annual number of Guinean officers who will study at Russian military colleges during their most recent meeting in 2025.^[viii] Embaló agreed in 2024 to send Bissau-Guinean troops for joint training exercises at the Russian University of Special Forces Chechnya, and Russia has already trained more than 5,000 Guinean officers.^[ix] Guinea-Bissau has also maintained bilateral partnerships with pro-Western states since 2022, however, including Ukraine.^[x]

The United States has preexisting defense ties with both countries that help offset Chinese and Russian influence and provide foundations for further growth. Gabon participated in Obangame Express exercises—a US-led maritime security initiative—in 2017 and 2024.^[xi] Gabonese and Bissau-Guinean security forces have participated in training programs led by US Africa Command, the US Army, and the US National Guard since 2023.^[xii] Guinea-Bissau signed a defense agreement with the US in 2023 that provided a legal framework for security, cooperation, training, and defense aid.^[xiii] The US also supported the construction of two new Gabonese radar surveillance facilities, provided technical assistance for surveillance facilitates, and donated maritime patrol vessels in 2024.^[xiv]

US cooperation with Mauritania and Senegal helps advance US objectives to contain the growing Salafi-jihadi threat in the Sahel. The United States has grown cooperation with countries surrounding the Sahel to contain the Salafi-Jihadi insurgency in recent years. US Africa Command head General. Michael Langley described the Sahel as the “epicenter” of global terrorism and warned that Salafi-jihadi groups—particularly al Qaeda’s Sahelian Affiliate, Jam’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)—”could have the capacity to attack the homeland” as they continue to grow their capabilities and capacity.^[xv] CTP has warned that IS Sahel Province is attempting to establish attack capabilities in Morocco, which IS could use as a bridge to support transnational plots in Europe.^[xvi]

Mauritania and Senegal are facing heightened insecurity along their borders with Mali due to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel. JNIM targeted two towns near the Mali-Mauritania border and another town along the Mali-Senegal border in a series of attacks across western Mali on July 1.^[xvii] The Senegal-based Timbuktu Institute reported in early 2025 that JNIM uses its presence in western Mali to establish rear support zones and cross-border networks in Mauritania and Senegal that enable it to fundraise and recruit in both countries.^[xviii]

Figure 2. JNIM Areas of Operation in Western Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The United States has pre-existing partnerships with Mauritania and Senegal that provide a solid foundation to help both countries combat these shared security challenges. Mauritania is a regular participant and previous host of the US-led Flintlock exercise, an annual special operations counterterrorism exercise in Africa, and hosts US vessels for port calls.^[xix] Senegal and the US signed a defense agreement in 2016 that allows the US to use Senegalese facilities for joint training and crisis response.[xx] Mauritania and Senegal both participated in the US-led African Lion exercises in 2025, and Senegal hosted parts of the exercise.^[xxi] Senegal needs new security partners after decreasing defense cooperation with France in recent years, which creates a void that Russia has filled in other places in West Africa.[xxii]

Gabon is a major producer of manganese, which multiple US government agencies list as a critical mineral. Manganese is vital for both civilian and defense technology due to its role in steel production and lithium-ion battery manufacturing.^[xxiii] Manganese is Gabon’s most lucrative mineral and export. Gabon ranks second globally in manganese production and fifth in reserves in 2025.^[xxiv] Gabonese manganese exports were valued at $1.52 billion in 2023 and accounted for 48 percent of total Gabonese mining production in 2024.^[xxv] A partially Gabonese-owned, French-based subsidiary is currently the largest manganese producer in Gabon.^[xxvi]

Gabon is a major manganese exporter to China but is looking to boost its domestic refinement capacity.^[xxvii] Gabon has little domestic refinement capabilities, contributing to it exporting nearly 54 percent of its manganese to China.^[xxviii] Gabonese manganese makes up 22 percent of China’s total manganese imports.^[xxix] Nguema announced plans to stop all raw manganese exports by 2029 to grow domestic processing capabilities.^[xxx] Gabon secured a $1 billion partnership with the African Export-Import Bank to expand manganese processing plants in 2024.^[xxxi] Nguema publicly urged Trump and American investors to bid for electricity projects to power domestic processing during the opening press conference of the summit.[xxxii]

Trump also plans to discuss migration issues with all five countries. The Wall Street Journal reported that the US State Department privately sent all five countries proposals to accept third-country migrants deported from the United States and instructed US diplomats to make it clear that hosting third-country nationals was the “most important” issue for Trump.^[xxxiii] The Associated Press reported in June that US diplomats in all the countries but Guinea-Bissau pushed the host countries’ to crack down on illegal immigration to the United States or face travel bans.[xxxiv]

Mauritania and Senegal play significant roles in African migration routes to the West. Both countries have become a growing destination for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa attempting to reach Europe by sea, and the United States—to a lesser extent—via the southern border after flying to Mexico.[xxxv] Mauritania signed an agreement in 2024 with the European Union to crack down on illegal migration in exchange for over $600 million in investment in aid, green energy projects, and security.[xxxvi] The EU has spent nearly $200 million on development projects in Senegal to curb the “root causes” of migration since 2015 and committed another $35 million to such projects in 2024.[xxxvii]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels and the Congolese army (FARDC) have both reportedly reinforced their positions in South Kivu in recent days. Videos circulated on social media of several truckloads of M23 reinforcements moving toward a military camp in Bukavu, the M23-controlled South Kivu provincial capital, in early July.[xxxviii] The FARDC flew in at least several hundred troops to Kalemie—the Tanganyika provincial capital—who then deployed to several key areas south of Bukavu in South Kivu. Some Congolese reinforcements arrived in Uvira, which is the second-most-populated city in South Kivu and a transportation hub with access to Lake Tanganyika and Burundi’s economic capital, Bujumbura, roughly 16 miles to the east.[xxxix] Other Congolese reinforcements deployed to the Fizi district, where the FARDC and its Burundian army allies shot down a civilian aircraft that the FARDC suspected of transporting weapons over Minembwe in late June and early July.[xl] M23 condemned the attack, and pro-M23 journalist Steve Wembi cited a “security source close to the FARDC” who claimed that the drone operators who shot down the aircraft were based in Bujumbura.[xli] More Congolese forces deployed about 30 miles south of Bukavu in Kamanyola, where the front line between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces has been frozen since March.[xlii]

Figure 3. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Yale Ford; Calvin Hodges.

Both sides have accused each other of threatening to launch an offensive with the recent deployments. The DRC’s defense minister said that the new FARDC deployments, which also included reinforcements to North Kivu, were warranted due to a potential M23 advance on Uvira during a cabinet meeting on July 4.[xliii] M23 advanced within roughly 20 miles of Uvira at the peak of its southward advance in late February 2025 before it voluntarily withdrew to Kamanyola, which CTP assessed at the time was likely due to an agreement between Burundi and Rwanda.[xliv] M23 officials denounced the FARDC reinforcements and military equipment as a “blatant disregard and a direct insult” to the peace talks and said that M23 would “defend itself, no matter what happens.”[xlv] M23 used the pretext of a threat from the FARDC to justify its advances in the eastern DRC in early 2025 despite declaring a unilateral ceasefire.

Renewed fighting could derail already-struggling Qatari-mediated peace efforts between the DRC and M23, which would undermine the US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda. The Qatari-led talks have not made significant progress since they began in April. Congolese and M23 officials both confirmed that their respective sides will participate in a fifth round of negotiations in Doha, the Qatari capital, this week.[xlvi] French media reported in early July that Qatar has continued to try to broker a final agreement but that the talks have stalled over counterproposals and nonstarter demands from both sides.[xlvii]

The Qatari-mediated talks are closely coordinated with the US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa envoy, told French state media in early July that the United States would participate in the talks, which he said the United States “hopes” will be the “last and final round.”[xlviii] Boulos said that the two sides had reached a final agreement, which would be “fine-tuned” in the next round of talks.[xlix] M23 officials have denied Boulos’s statement that the two sides are nearing a final agreement, however, and demanded that the DRC government implement a series of “confidence-building measures,” some of which are pre-existing demands that the DRC has been unwilling to concede to since April.[l] CTP assessed previously that the long-term success of the US-led peace agreement will likely be contingent on the more fragile Qatari-mediated talks, and the United States has made the resolution of DRC-M23 talks a precondition to a future economic deal on critical mineral investment.[li]

An escalation in fighting in South Kivu could directly undermine the US-brokered peace deal. The US-brokered peace agreement mandates that the DRC and Rwanda “take all possible measures” to prevent nonstate armed groups from engaging in fighting and “not allow any military or hostile activities against each other on or from their respective territories or provide support for such activities abroad.”[lii] Both the FARDC and Rwandan forces have decreased direct involvement since March.[liii]

Military escalation in South Kivu could lead to renewed Rwandan military action in the eastern DRC. Rwandan President Paul Kagame implied after the two sides signed the US peace deal that Rwanda would continue to take unilateral military action in the eastern DRC if the DRC “plays tricks.”[liv] Kagame said that the US-brokered agreement and the Qatari-mediated talks between the DRC and M23 must be seen as “two sides of the same coin.”[lv] Kagame’s rhetoric sets conditions to justify renewed Rwandan engagement, especially given the front lines at Kamanyola are along the Rwandan border. M23’s early 2025 offensive in North and South Kivu involved direct Rwandan command and control over M23 and substantial Rwandan military support to the group, according to the UN.[lvi]

Fighting in South Kivu would almost certainly lead to increased collaboration between the FARDC and allied militias. Low-intensity fighting between M23 and FARDC-allied Wazalendo groups has continued despite the US-brokered agreement, in which the DRC also agreed to end support for nonstate armed groups. Wazalendo fighters, who are not directly involved in the various peace processes, clashed regularly with M23 in June, notably in southern North Kivu and in South Kivu on several fronts around Bukavu.[lvii] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data assessed that Wazalendos increased their activity significantly ahead of the signing of the US agreement and the new round of Qatari-led talks, likely to put pressure on M23’s negotiating position and enhance their own leverage.[lviii]

Central Somalia

Author: Liam Karr with Edie Tesfaye

Al Shabaab recaptured another district capital in central Somalia as it continues to reverse nearly all major gains made during a landmark Somali-led, US-backed counterterrorism offensive in 2022. Al Shabaab captured Moqokori on July 7 after overwhelming local forces with a complex suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack, which the group claimed killed 47 soldiers and allied militia fighters and wounded another 65.[lix] Local Somali politicians blamed slow federal support for the loss, citing unanswered weekend requests for air support and failure to send reinforcements or basic supplies.[lx] Somali forces have remained in the area to prepare a counteroffensive to retake the town.[lxi] Moqokori sits on a network of roads that connects the Hiraan region to other regions within central Somalia.

Figure 4. Al Shabaab Retakes Central Somalia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Somali forces captured Moqokori and several other district capitals in 2022 as part of a landmark Somali-led, US-backed offensive. The offensive disrupted al Shabaab’s ground lines of communication between central and southern Somalia by clearing al Shabaab from the eastern halves of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions east of the Shabelle River.[lxii] These gains cut off al Shabaab’s forces further north in central Somalia.[lxiii]

Al Shabaab has reversed these gains throughout 2025. Fighters from the group’s core territories in southern Somalia initially overwhelmed Somali forces in the Shabelle River Valley north of Mogadishu in January, while the group’s fighters in central Somalia targeted Somali forces hundreds of miles northwest in the Adan Yabal district.[lxiv] The two al Shabaab pincers from central and southern Somalia successfully reinfiltrated previously cleared areas of the Middle Shabelle region for the first time since 2022 and linked in the Adale district in March.[lxv] The group then captured key areas along the road west of Moqokori as well as Adan Yabal town in April. These advances put the group within 45 miles of Moqokori from the east, west, and south by mid-April, and unspecified local security officials told Somali media in June that al Shabaab aimed to capture the town.[lxvi]

Al Shabaab will likely target Mahas in the coming days and weeks if it holds Moqokori, which would be the first major town that al Shabaab has captured in central Somalia in 2025 that it did not control before 2022. Mahas is the last district capital that Somali forces control in this part of central Somalia and is fewer than 25 miles north of Moqokori. Unspecified local officials told Somali media in June that al Shabaab intended to capture Mahas and warned after the Moqokori attack that al Shabaab began moving toward Mahas.[lxvii] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) has controlled Mahas for over a decade.

The group’s gains have relinked al Shabaab–controlled territory in central and southern Somalia. The group reinforced and resupplied its forces in central Somalia en masse in March for the first time in nearly three years and has continued to rotate fresh forces into central Somalia in the months since.[lxviii] The group’s latest advance in Moqokori creates a second supply line between al Shabaab–controlled central and southern Somalia. Al Shabaab control of Mahas would open another ground line of communication and the most direct route between southern Somalia and the group’s administrative center in central Somalia—El Bur—since 2022.

Al Shabaab’s gains set conditions for the group to increase the frequency and severity of attacks on major government-controlled towns across central Somalia, including along the Ethiopian border. Al Shabaab’s advances have degraded Somali ground lines of communication stretching from Mogadishu across central Somalia, isolating several large, government-controlled towns. Most of the district capitals that the SFG still controls in central Somalia lie in the Shabelle River Valley near a major highway that runs from Mogadishu to the Ethiopian border—Bal’ad, Jowhar, Jalalaqsi, Bulo Burde, Halgan, and Beledweyne. Al Shabaab had conducted fewer attacks on these towns from 2023-2024 than 2021-2022—with Halgan as the lone exception—because of the 2022 Somali offensive.[lxix] Al Shabaab has increasingly contested or captured operationally key areas in the valley between these towns in 2025 to reestablish its support zones between central and southern Somalia. The group can use these new support zones and supply lines to stage more frequent and severe attacks on these towns as it did before 2022.

Al Shabaab is pressuring another key ground line of communication between Mogadishu and government-controlled towns near the Somali coastline in central Somalia. Somali forces retook key areas along the road in late June but have not retaken key interior areas, which will enable al Shabaab to sustain pressure on the road.[lxx] The group has already carried out more attacks around Adale town, which lies 10 miles from the road along the coast, in 2025 than it has in the previous four years combined.[lxxi] Al Shabaab degrading government control of the road will isolate El Dheere and Harardhere—the two northern-most district capitals that Somali forces liberated in 2022.

Al Shabaab will likely use its new support zones and the decreased pressure on its core support zones to increase the frequency and severity of attacks along the Ethiopian border. The group regularly attacked security forces and towns along another major highway that runs near the Ethiopian border from Beledweyne to northern Somalia. The frequency and severity of attacks had decreased substantially since the 2022 offensive, however, much like in the Shabelle River Valley.[lxxii]

Increased al Shabaab activity on the Ethiopian border poses a direct threat to Ethiopia. Al Shabaab invaded Ethiopia from this area in central Somalia in early 2022 as part of its first-ever offensive into Ethiopia.[lxxiii] The 2022 Somali offensive helped Ethiopian forces enforce a relatively stable buffer zone. Al Shabaab has continued to probe the Ethiopian border since 2022, however, and can use its new support zones and supply lines to support more regular and larger-scale activity against Ethiopia.[lxxiv]

Figure 5. Al Shabaab Ethiopia Offensive: July 2022

Source: Liam Karr.

The SFG’s losses are a strategic setback. Al Shabaab’s gains undermine Somalis’ trust in the SFG, particularly in central Somalia. Local politicians in central Somalia have blamed slow SFG support as the cause for the deteriorating security situation.[lxxv] Other militia groups who had supported the 2022 offensive against al Shabaab have since withdrawn or struck deals with the group, citing a lack of support from the SFG, including salary payments.[lxxvi]

These losses undermine the SFG’s international credibility in its ability to retake its national territory from al Shabaab. Many of Somalia’s international partners praised the 2022 offensive as the first Somali-led counterterrorism offensive to retake significant territory from al Shabaab.[lxxvii] The offensive stalled in 2023, however, and the SFG’s clan-based coalition began to collapse in 2024 due to domestic and regional political issues.[lxxviii] The offensive benefited from al Shabaab’s missteps that alienated locals in the area, the Somali president’s clan ties in the area, and the prevalence of strong clan militias in the area.[lxxix] The SFG was unable to consolidate its gains despite these favorable conditions, which are not present in al Shabaab’s center of gravity in southern Somalia.

Uganda

Author: Yale Ford

Uganda expanded its military footprint in partnership with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to target IS Central Africa Province in the eastern DRC’s Ituri province. The Ugandan army (UPDF) and Congolese army (FARDC) launched a major offensive against IS Central Africa Province—known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—in an area along the RN4 near the Mambasa and Irumu district border in Ituri on July 6.[lxxx] The offensive is part of a joint counterterrorism effort, dubbed Operation Shujaa, against ADF and other anti-Ugandan armed groups that has been underway since 2021. The offensive marks the first time that joint forces have conducted large-scale operations this far north in Mambasa district since Operation Shujaa began.[lxxxi]

Figure 6. UPDF and ISCAP Activity in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford.

FARDC-UPDF forces targeted ADF’s largest cell, which operates near the RN4. Joint forces began attacking ADF positions in the forest near Lolwa and Mungamba villages on July 6.[lxxxii] The ADF subgroup north of the RN4 is led by ADF leader Seka Baluku and is commonly referred to as the “Madina” camp.[lxxxiii]

Baluku’s camp is ADF’s largest and most administratively important subgroup. ADF split off into numerous subgroups in mid-2024 after Shujaa operations significantly degraded the group’s operational capacity.[lxxxiv] Baluku authorizes all large operations by ADF subgroup commanders, and the Madina group comprises the group’s top leadership and an estimated 1,000 individuals, including at least 200 fighters, as of late 2024.[lxxxv] Baluku’s group began moving north of Lolwa into a remote forested area after Shujaa operations intensified and inflicted heavy casualties on his group in mid-2024.[lxxxvi] The UN and the UPDF assessed in late 2024 and early 2025 that Baluku’s group and several ADF cells continued moving westward into Mambasa district and the adjacent Tshopo province and northward into the bush.[lxxxvii] The movement likely aimed to evade Shujaa’s official area of operations, reestablish supply lines, and reconstitute its capabilities. The UN reported in June 2025 that Shujaa operations in Irumu to the southeast of the RN4 in Mambasa had failed to weaken the Madina group in early 2025.[lxxxviii]

Operation Shujaa has expanded multiple times in recent months as Uganda has increased its military involvement in Ituri and the eastern DRC at large. FARDC-UPDF forces launched the latest offensive after the UPDF commander and the Congolese president agreed to formally expand Operation Shujaa’s mandate to parts of North Kivu and Ituri, including Mambasa, in late June.[lxxxix] The UPDF and the FARDC agreed to target “all armed groups,” including anti-Ugandan rebel groups other than the ADF, as part of a Shujaa extension in Ituri in late March.[xc] The UPDF already unilaterally deployed up to 4,000 additional troops to Ituri province in early 2025 and now has an estimated 10,000 active soldiers in the eastern DRC.[xci]

Uganda uses its military partnership with the DRC to strengthen its sphere of influence in the eastern DRC. UPDF counterterrorism deployments allow Uganda to maintain a buffer zone on the DRC-Uganda border to limit the ability of ADF and other armed groups to conduct cross-border attacks into Uganda.[xcii] The UN and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) have reported on several occasions that Operation Shujaa has weakened ADF and pushed the group from the DRC-Uganda border. Shujaa has failed to decrease the intensity of ADF attacks on Congolese civilians, however.[xciii] ACLED reported a more than 75 percent decrease in FARDC-UPDF clashes with the ADF in the first quarter of 2025 as the group tried to move outside of Shujaa’s operational zone compared to the quarterly average in 2024, despite the UPDF’s bolstered military presence in 2025.[xciv] Shujaa has not targeted the ADF’s most lethal subgroup in Lubero district in North Kivu, which accounts for more than 40 percent of civilian fatalities perpetrated by ADF in the eastern DRC.[xcv]

The timing of Operation Shujaa’s extension corresponds loosely with a recent ADF attack inside Uganda, although the two events are likely unrelated. ADF attempted its first suicide bombing attack since late 2023 in Uganda in early June.[xcvi] CTP assessed previously that the attack signaled that ADF had reconstituted attack capabilities inside Uganda despite Uganda’s efforts to degrade ADF networks and ADF’s ability to support Uganda-based cells from the eastern DRC.[xcvii] ADF has perpetrated previous suicide attacks in Uganda by using these Uganda-based networks.[xcviii] Shujaa’s extension and the recent suicide attack in Uganda are likely unrelated, however, given that ADF’s top bomb expert leads the ADF subgroup in Lubero, which Shujaa has not targeted.[xcix]

Ugandan operations in the eastern DRC support Ugandan economic interests, some of which are mutually beneficial for the DRC. Uganda began repairing roadways on key cross-border trade routes in late 2021 in order to export more to the DRC, which is already Uganda’s second most important export market.[c] French state media cited sources close to Ugandan authorities in late June who said that Uganda “intends to play its part” as a major economic player within the US-brokered framework for regional economic development and trade.[ci] Improved road infrastructure also helps boost the local economy. UPDF soldiers have deployed under Operation Shujaa to protect the construction of these roadways as well as Ugandan oil sites on Lake Albert in western Uganda from attacks by anti-Ugandan groups.[cii]

Operation Shujaa’s extension in June 2025 included a renewed mandate for joint forces to protect the reconstruction of one of these major roadways.[ciii] Congolese media reported that joint forces have attempted to secure the Komanda-Mambasa stretch of the RN4 as part of the early July offensive against ADF.[civ] The RN4 is another key road in Ituri that connects to the RN27—a major trade route for Uganda in the eastern DRC that runs through Bunia, the Ituri provincial capital, to Mahagi town and on to the Ugandan border post of Goli.[cv]

Uganda co-opts Operation Shujaa to gain access to Congolese resources, such as gold and timber. Gold is among Uganda’s most lucrative exports and comprised almost 45 percent of Uganda’s total export earnings in 2023.[cvi] Uganda acquires a significant portion of this gold from the DRC via smugglers, according to the UN.[cvii] Almost 80 percent of timber smuggled from the DRC goes to Uganda.[cviii] Operation Shujaa offers Uganda a pretext to secure the smuggling routes to ensure continued Ugandan access to Congolese resources.[cix]

Sudan

Author: Liam Karr with Ellery White

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are conducting operations in southeastern Sudan and along the border with South Sudan against the last remaining enclave of Rapid Support Force (RSF)-aligned militia fighters east of the Nile River. The SAF spokesperson announced that SAF forces cleared RSF-aligned militias from the Baldago area and adjacent parts of Maban County, South Sudan, with video footage showing militants surrendering.[cx] The SAF separately regained control of a critical stretch of highway approximately 40 miles north.[cxi] The road connects the Blue Nile state capital, ad Damazin, to an area along the South Sudan border that the RSF had taken in February.[cxii]

Clearing the enclave will secure Blue Nile state and deny the RSF an avenue to pressure the SAF’s flank east of the Nile River. RSF-aligned militias along the border have enabled the RSF to contest the SAF in Blue Nile state despite major SAF gains north of the state since 2024. A faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) militia has controlled the area in the southernmost part of the Blue Nile state since June 2023 and used it as an operational base.[cxiii] SAF offensives in 2024 regained significant territory in al Jazira and Sennar states in central Sudan and forced RSF fighters to retreat southward into Blue Nile state.[cxiv] The RSF and SPLM-N subgroup—known as al Hilu faction—agreed to a political pact, which enabled RSF troops to regroup in SPLM-N-controlled areas in southern Sudan, and launched joint training camps in Blue Nile in early 2025.[cxv] The RSF then launched its first offensive on ad Damazin in March 2025, but the SAF repelled the attack and subsequently pushed the RSF and al Hilu faction farther south.[cxvi]

Figure 8. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr, Kathryn Tyson, Thomas van Linge, and Vista Maps.

Blue Nile state is economically and geographically vital for the SAF. The state dam generates 40 percent of Sudan’s electricity and plays a crucial role in water supply for one of the largest irrigation projects in the world.[cxvii] This is even more critical given the RSF’s capture of another power station in southern Sudan and RSF attacks on energy infrastructure in northern Sudan.[cxviii]

The al Hilu faction’s alleged ties to the South Sudanese President create the risk that the RSF could use South Sudan as a rear base to flank SAF positions east of the Nile River via the SPLM-N in Blue Nile.[cxix] The SAF has targeted SPLM-N al Hilu enclaves to sever RSF logistic lines and contain the RSF west of the Nile.[cxx] The SAF’s recent gains cut ground lines of communication between SPLM-N territories along the South Sudan border and denied RSF-aligned militias an axis of advance toward ad Damazin.[cxxi]

Figure 8. Control of Terrain in Southern Sudan

Source: Liam Karr, Kathryn Tyson, Thomas van Linge, and Vista Maps.

The SAF and RSF are separately contesting control over ground lines of communication that are critical for besieged SAF-controlled enclaves in southern Sudan. The SAF retook al Dashoul, which is a key area along the highway between SAF-controlled Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan state, on June 28 after the RSF briefly captured the area on June 22.[cxxii] Kadugli is the South Kordofan state capital, and Dilling is the second-largest city in the state.[cxxiii] The RSF had besieged Dilling and Kadugli from June 2023 to February 2025, when the SAF partially broke the blockades by securing al Dashoul and reopening the 71 mile stretch of road between the towns.[cxxiv]

The RSF has escalated pressure on other key nodes, however, to increase pressure on Dilling and Kadugli. The RSF has repelled multiple SAF offensives toward Dilling from El Obeid, the SAF-controlled district capital of North Kordofan in central Sudan.[cxxv] The SAF briefly regained control of areas in North Kordofan along the road between Dilling and El Obeid in May and July, but the RSF recaptured them in the following days.[cxxvi] The RSF has increased patrols along the Ostrich Market road in the contested Abyei region along the border with South Sudan since early July.[cxxvii] Sudanese media reported that the RSF closed the road, which runs to central Sudan via South Kordofan and is a key food supply corridor for Kadugli.[cxxviii]

Control of these ground lines of communication is critical to the SAF’s aims to relieve pressure on besieged SAF units and advance west toward the RSF’s strongholds in Darfur. Securing the corridor from Dilling to El Obeid would ensure the flow of reinforcements and supplies between Khartoum and the besieged forces in southern Sudan. Opening this route would also strengthen the SAF’s potential options to advance westward. El Obeid is the primary SAF hub on its main westward line of advance toward Darfur. RSF soldiers west of El Obeid have withdrawn amid salary disputes, which creates more opportunities for the SAF to advance along this axis.[cxxix] RSF control of South Kordofan, however, would expose the SAF’s overextended flank. There is a key crossroads town between Dilling and El Obeid—al Dabibat—that links to another road running west to Darfur. SAF control of al Dabibat would both relieve pressure on El Obeid and Dilling while simultaneously providing a potential secondary line of advance.[cxxx] The RSF repelled an SAF offensive in late May and early June to capture the town.[cxxxi]

The same lines of communication support the RSF’s efforts to consolidate control over western Sudan and de facto partition Sudan. The RSF is trying to tighten the sieges on Dilling and Kadugli to isolate the two major SAF bases and consolidate control over South Kordofan. Reinstituting a complete siege over the SAF bases in the area denies the SAF from using these areas to support a westward advance that would threaten the RSF’s core territory in Darfur. Capturing the besieged areas would help the RSF de facto partition Sudan by consolidating control over the western half of the country.

Africa File Data Cutoff: July 10, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.