DRC and Rwanda Sign US Economic Framework: Africa File, November 13, 2025

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Contributor: Hannah Ochs 

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC and Rwanda signed the US-brokered Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF), but the REIF is contingent on security aspects of the US-brokered DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, which will likely face numerous challenges in the coming weeks. The long-term success of the entire US-backed peace framework will depend on separate talks between the Congolese government and Rwandan-backed M23, which are expected to result in a framework agreement soon but are far from a full peace deal.
• Ethiopia. Tensions between rival Tigrayan forces resulted in the Ethiopian military allegedly conducting its first drone strike on Tigrayan forces since the end of the Tigray war. Increasing tensions threaten the peace agreement that ended the war and could spark a broader conflict.
• Lake Chad. Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are engaged in the deadliest period of inter-jihadi fighting in years. The fighting will affect both groups’ presence in the lucrative fishing and smuggling networks in the Lake Chad Basin and risks strengthening the IS network in West Africa.

Figure 1. Africa File, November 13, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed the US-brokered Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF). Representatives from the DRC and Rwanda signed the REIF during the fourth Joint Oversight Committee meeting in Washington, DC, on November 7.[1] The Joint Oversight Committee serves as a dispute resolution mechanism between the DRC and Rwanda from the US-brokered peace agreement in late June and has members from the DRC, Rwanda, Qatar, Togo as the African Union representative, and the United States.[2] The text of the REIF had been prepared since late August, but the Congolese government refused to sign it over security concerns in early October. The US State Department said that the signing marked a “significant step forward” in implementing the peace agreement.[3] The United States has proposed to host the signing ceremony between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Kagame to consummate the peace framework on November 21.[4]

The DRC and Rwanda have explored joint investments by the US government and US companies in the energy, infrastructure, mining, national park management and tourism, and public health sectors as part of the peace agreement in 2025. [5] The flagship project is the Ruzizi hydropower plant, which will benefit about 30 million people across Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda.[6] The US International Development Finance Corporation took a 10 percent stake in the project after the French government pulled out in early 2025.[7] The upstream and midstream aspects of each country’s critical mineral supply chains has also been a key sector of investment.[8] The Congolese government signed a deal with US critical minerals firm KoBold Metals in July to develop the largest hard-rock lithium deposit in the world and launch large-scale exploration using artificial intelligence for lithium, coltan, and rare earths.[9] Other projects and potential ventures reportedly include aeronautics, power generation in the southern DRC, US-Rwanda nuclear power cooperation, methane gas conversion on Lake Kivu, and oil and gas development in the DRC.[10]

The REIF is contingent on the effective implementation of the security aspects of the US-brokered DRC-Rwanda peace agreement. The peace agreement ties US investment to security to incentivize the DRC and Rwanda to align their national interests and pursue peace and long-term stability. The concept resembles post–World War II Europe, where economic integration was key to stabilizing the continent and deterring future conflict. The framework also aims to dismantle the drivers of the conflict economy by encouraging transparency and gradually raising the opportunity cost of “wartime” profiteering as billions of dollars of investment materialize over the next few years.

The security component of the peace agreement centers on a dual-sided plan for the Congolese government to launch operations against the Hutu extremist Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) as Rwanda withdraws its troops and military equipment from the eastern DRC.[11] The FDLR is an ethnic Hutu armed group that Rwanda views as a threat due to the FDLR’s ties to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and a history of targeted hate speech against Rwandaphone communities in the eastern DRC. Rwanda deployed at least 6,000 troops to the DRC in early 2025 and has provided material support to back M23 in the eastern DRC, in part to combat the FDLR.[12] The Joint Oversight Committee agreed on “specific near-term actions” related to the plan, discussed preparations for military operations against the FDLR in a “named area of interest,” and adopted an implementing agreement on November 7.[13] The readout from the oversight committee meeting said that the REIF’s implementation hinges on the “satisfactory execution” of the military plan.[14]

The military plan will likely face numerous challenges in the coming weeks. The lack of clarity concerning the sequence and measures of success of the plan could limit its successful execution. The DRC and Rwanda have disagreed on the number of FDLR combatants in North and South Kivu.[15] The Congolese government had refused to sign the REIF in early October until “90 percent” of Rwandan troops withdrew, which Rwanda denied was part of the REIF negotiations—although this concern was resolved at the Joint Oversight Committee meeting, according to the Congolese government spokesperson.[16] Rwanda has said that neutralizing the FDLR is “solely the responsibility” of the FARDC and conditioned its withdrawal from the eastern DRC on the “success” of anti-FDLR operations.[17] Senior Rwandan officials have said repeatedly that Rwanda will not withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC until after the FARDC defeats the FDLR—not before or in parallel with anti-FDLR operations.[18]

CTP assessed previously that many FDLR positions are in areas under Rwandan-backed M23 control, which will likely be an obstacle to the FARDC’s campaign.[19] The Congolese government dispatched senior army (FARDC) officials to government-controlled areas in North Kivu to call on FDLR fighters to surrender, indicating that at least some FDLR fighters are outside of M23 territory, however.[20] The FDLR has refused to disarm since early October and said that it would not surrender until the Rwandan government opens an inter-Rwandan dialogue and allows the return of refugees.[21]

Figure 2. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

Close ties between the FARDC and FDLR will almost certainly undermine the upcoming campaign. Past anti-FDLR operations suffered because of FARDC tolerance and active collaboration with the FDLR. The DRC has long relied on the FDLR as an anti-Rwandan proxy force, and previous efforts to integrate the FDLR into the FARDC mean that there are FDLR ties throughout the Congolese army. Senior FARDC officers have undermined anti-FDLR operations by warning FDLR fighters of future attacks—most notably in late 2024, when the FARDC North Kivu military governor leaked operational plans to the FDLR, which allow the group’s high command to evade death or capture.[22] The July UN report said the FARDC restored relations with the FDLR after brief anti-FDLR operations in late 2024, transferred more money and weapons to the FDLR, and has continued to rely on the FDLR “systematically” to fight M23 in 2025.[23]

Previous FARDC counterinsurgency operations resembling the US-backed plan failed to defeat the FDLR. The FARDC conducted military campaigns against the FDLR in 2002–07, 2009, 2010–12, 2015, 2020, and 2024. The FARDC conducted the 2009 and 2015–20 campaigns jointly with Rwanda—the latter of which was done informally and was the last major offensive against the FDLR, aside from M23’s operations in 2025.[24] The campaigns pushed the FDLR out of its main bases but failed to significantly degrade the group’s command and support structures and prevent its retreat into desolate and hard-to-reach mountainous areas or stop retaliatory attacks on civilians.[25] The UN has reported that compressed timelines and the FARDC’s combat ineffectiveness held back the success of previous operations.[26]

The long-term success of the US-backed peace framework will depend on separate talks between the Congolese government and M23, which are expected to result in a framework agreement soon but are far from a full peace deal. Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, said in late September that a sustainable deal between the DRC and M23 is the “last piece of the puzzle.”[27] The resolution of the M23 conflict is reportedly central to significant investment from US companies in the DRC-Rwanda border region.[28] Tshisekedi said on two occasions in November that he and Kagame would ratify the US-backed peace agreement in the signing ceremony soon only after the Congolese government signs an agreement with M23.[29]

Figure 3. Peace Processes Multiply in the African Great Lakes Region

Source: Yale Ford.

The Congolese government and M23 have made progress in the last few weeks after months of deadlock. The two sides convened for the first meeting of the ceasefire verification mechanism under Qatar’s auspices on November 5.[30] Qatar said at the early November oversight meeting that the two sides have made progress on prisoner exchanges.[31] The ceasefire mechanism and the issue of prisoner exchanges have been the two most contentious preconditions to negotiating a final deal. The two sides have been negotiating an agreement—the thirteenth iteration of a deal—since at least late October and are reportedly expected to sign it in Doha, the Qatari capital, soon.[32]

An agreement between the DRC and M23 is a prerequisite to the US-hosted signing ceremony, but the allegedly impending agreement does not resemble a comprehensive, long-term deal. The content of the agreement has not been released publicly, but it reportedly contains a five-pillar peace framework with separate negotiations for each pillar and designated procedures for implementation and monitoring.[33] Belgian media characterized it as a “roadmap” agreement that will facilitate future discussions, ostensibly not building significantly on the declaration of principles agreement from late July.[34] Qatar reportedly failed to broker a “compromise text” only on points they could agree on or even include unresolved disputes in the final version of the text.[35] The return of state authority remained an obstacle to progress and discussing the “root causes” of conflict in the final stages of the talks, which CTP had assessed in August would likely prolong talks and undermine a sustainable deal.[36] Qatar reportedly wants to transfer the mediation process to Togo, the African Union–designated mediator for the conflict between the DRC, M23, and Rwanda, after they sign a roadmap deal.[37]

Ethiopia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Hannah Ochs

Tensions between rival Tigrayan forces resulted in the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) allegedly conducting its first drone strike on Tigray Defense Forces’ (TDF) positions since signing the Pretoria peace agreement. The Ethiopian federal government-aligned Afar regional government and independent sources said that the TDF—a military force aligned with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—raided several villages and conducted artillery strikes in Megale district on November 5 in violation of the Pretoria agreement.^[38] A TDF general denied that the TDF had raided villages but confirmed its presence in Afar, which Afar residents have protested against.^[39] The TPLF accused the ENDF of conducting a drone strike against the TDF on the Afar-Tigray border on November 7.^[40] The TPLF filed a complaint to the United Nations and African Union claiming that the ENDF violated the Pretoria agreement, which bars the the ENDF and Tigrayan forces from attacking each other.^[41]

Figure 4. Alleged Attacks in Afar

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

The TDF conducted the incursion to degrade the Tigray Peace Forces (TPF)—an anti-TPLF Tigrayan force based in Afar near the Tigray border—and create a buffer zone.^[42] The TPF split from the TPLF in March 2025 in response to the TPLF’s de facto coup against the federal government–backed Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) leadership.^[43] The TPF’s stated goal is to remove the TPLF as the primary political and security broker in Tigray.^[44] The TPF has launched intermittent attacks against TDF positions since its formation.^[45]

The TPLF has accused the federal government of supporting the TPF in violation of the Pretoria agreement.^[46] Former TIA officials are reportedly involved with the TPF’s “political wing.”^[47] Getachew Reda—the former head of the TIA whom pro-TPLF forces deposed in March—is now an adviser to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Independent reports have not directly linked the federal government to the TPF, however.^[48]

Increasing tensions between the federal government and TPLF threaten to end the Pretoria agreement and cause a broader conflict. The TPLF launched a de facto coup against the TIA leadership in March due to the leadership’s perceived collusion with the federal government, leading to TDF head Tadesse Werede taking control of the interim regional government.^[49] The federal government revoked the legal status of the TPLF as a political party in May, which the TPLF denounced as a violation of the Pretoria agreement.^[50]

Werede and the TPLF have continued to criticize the federal government over various Pretoria agreement-related issues, including the TPLF’s legal status and the presence of Amhara ethno-nationalist forces in disputed areas of Tigray.^[51] The presence of Amhara forces is contributing to the displacement of approximately one million Tigrayans, which violates the Pretoria agreement.^[52] The TDF has cited these factors when slowing its demobilization, which the Pretoria agreement also mandates.^[53] The TDF did not meet the June target of 75,000 soldiers demobilized.^[54] TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael accused the federal government on November 8 of refusing to engage in talks on the implementation of the Pretoria agreement, including issues related to the TPLF’s legal status and displacement.^[55] CTP has previously assessed that issues over disputed territory, displacement, and demobilization threaten to kill the Pretoria agreement.^[56]

Figure 5. Ethno-Nationalist Militias Area of Operations in Northern Ethiopia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The TPLF’s growing ties with Eritrea have also worsened tensions with the federal government. Ethiopia excluded Eritrea from the talks that produced the Pretoria agreement, which requires Eritrea to withdraw forces from Tigray.^[57] Eritrea’s refusal to withdraw and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy’s stated desire to control Eritrea’s port of Assab have deteriorated Eritrea-Ethiopia relations.^[58] Eritrea and Ethiopia massed forces at the eastern Eritrea-Ethiopia border in early 2025.^[59] Eritrea and the TPLF have reportedly increased communication since, and the TPLF has publicly stated that it intends to continue improving relations with Eritrea.^[60]

The federal government and Tigrayan forces have recently escalated their rhetoric against each other, with the federal government also targeting Eritrea. Werede stated on September 13 that the TDF was prepared for war if relations with the federal government collapsed.^[61] Ethiopia filed a complaint to the UN in early October accusing Eritrea and the TPLF of supporting Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano offensives against the federal government in Amhara region.^[62] The ENDF’s chief of staff accused the TPLF of Pretoria agreement violations that justified war and said that certain TPLF leaders “should be eliminated” to achieve peace on October 24 and November 3, respectively.^[63] A senior TPLF official affirmed the TPLF’s readiness for war in late October.[64] Abiy repeated his claim that Ethiopia has a right to Red Sea access and said that Ethiopia would win a potential war on October 28 despite previously stating that Ethiopia would not go to war with Eritrea.^[65]

Lake Chad

Author: Miles Charles and Chris Dayton

Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have engaged in an escalatory cycle of retaliation since October 2025, resulting in the deadliest period of inter-jihadi fighting in years. The uptick in infighting began after Boko Haram attacked civilians in two villages within ISWAP’s sphere of influence near the Sambisa Forest and Mandara Mountains on the Cameroonian border on September 5 and 30.[66] ISWAP retaliated in early October by killing a senior tax collector and fighters from Boko Haram’s Mandara Mountains–based Nglude faction.[67] This sparked a cycle of retaliatory clashes over the next month, including the assassination of Boko Haram’s second in command on October 27.[68]

The groups escalated attacks on each other’s core support zones throughout October. Boko Haram’s Bakura faction, based in the Lake Chad Basin, attacked ISWAP strongholds in Abadam LGA on October 8 and 26, killing 22 ISWAP fighters.[69] ISWAP retaliated on October 30 by attacking strongholds of the Gazuwa faction, the weakest of the three major Boko Haram factions, based in in the Sambisa Forest.[70] The Nglude faction sent reinforcements to slow ISWAP’s advance.[71] ISWAP has since engaged fighters from the Nglude faction in the Sambisa Forest and near the Mandara mountains in November.[72]

Fighting has since shifted north to both groups’ core support zones in the Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram’s Lake Chad–based Bakura faction retaliated with a complex assault on at least eight ISWAP encampments in the Lake Chad Basin from November 5 to 8, seizing several camps and killing dozens of ISWAP fighters.[73] ISWAP then recaptured several of the Lake Chad Basin camps on November 7 and launched two large-scale attacks on November 9 to recapture the remaining camps, but the Bakura faction repelled the November 9 assault.[74] ISWAP and Boko Haram have both mobilized a significant number of fighters toward the Lake Chad Basin in the following days.[75]

Figure 6. Boko Haram and ISWAP Infighting Escalates in Northwestern Nigeria

Source: Miles Charles

ISWAP will likely struggle to make advances against the Nglude and Bakura factions due to challenging terrain and the Boko Haram factions’ numerical strength. The two groups are the largest Boko Haram factions, and the Lake Chad Basin and the Mandara mountains are both advantageous terrain for defenders.[76] ISWAP has already incurred more than 280 deaths at the hands of the Bakura faction since November 5.[77]

The recent clashes are part of a historical rivalry to control the Lake Chad Basin. The two jihadist groups have clashed regularly since ISWAP broke away from Boko Haram in 2016.[78] ISWAP launched an offensive against Boko Haram’s stronghold in the Lake Chad Basin in 2021, killing Boko Haram’s longtime leader Abubakar Shekau, seizing control over much of the Lake Chad Basin, and absorbing Boko Haram defectors.[79] Ibrahim Bakura Doro took control of Boko Haram and then led an offensive against ISWAP in late 2022, recapturing many of the Lake Chad islands, the Mandara Mountains, and parts of the Sambisa Forest.[80] Sporadic clashes between the two factions continued through 2023 and 2024, but territorial control has remained largely static.[81]

The infighting will affect both groups’ control over lucrative fishing and smuggling networks in the Lake Chad Basin. ISWAP collects $183 million of its $190 million annual revenue from taxing fishers and fish buyers in the Lake Chad Basin.[82] The group generates the bulk of its revenue from taxing each carton of fish captured and sold by fishers and fish dealers.[83] ISWAP also imposes a Haraji tax—a payment made by nonresidents who enter ISWAP territory for livelihood purposes—on fishers, farmers, and fish sellers who use ISWAP-controlled islands.[84] Boko Haram is also heavily involved in these networks, taxing fishers in the territory that it controls throughout the Lake Chad Basin.[85] Haraji revenue fluctuates depending on the security situation, with attacks between rivals or temporary suspensions of fishing significantly impacting the groups’ income.[86]

The Lake Chad Basin also serves as a hub for drug and arms smuggling corridors that ISWAP and Boko Haram exploit.[87] Interpol reported in 2024 that a supplier-client relationship exists between extremist organizations and criminal syndicates along these networks in the Lake Chad Basin.[88] The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported the following year that drug smuggling in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel generates $400 billion in revenue annually.[89] The UN Security Council also reported that traffickers smuggle components for explosive devices from markets in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger into the hands of groups like Boko Haram.[90]

ISWAP defeating Boko Haram would strengthen the entire IS network in West Africa. ISWAP has lost thousands of fighters defecting to Boko Haram since 2016.[91] Defeating Boko Haram would allow ISWAP to move into Boko Haram controlled territory in the Lake Chad Basin and Cameroon-Nigeria border, increasing its taxable population and operational freedom.[92]

ISWAP is already strengthening ties with IS Sahel Province. The UN has reported since 2024 that cells in southwestern Niger have linked the two Islamic State affiliates. These cells are coordinated by the head of the Al-Furqan office and facilitate the movement of ISWAP weapons, fuel, equipment, and fighters to support IS activity in Burkina Faso and Mali.[93]

The Nigerian government may escalate operations against ISWAP and Boko Haram, taking advantage of the infighting to degrade both groups. Local media reported that the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff addressed troops of Operation Hadin Kai on November 8, directing them to prepare for a critical stage of its counterinsurgency campaign against Boko Haram and ISWAP.[94] The Chief of Army Staff also disclosed that experienced officers and new equipment had been deployed to the northeast.[95] Nigerian forces destroyed a major Boko Haram camp in Burati, Borno state on November 9.[96] The operation rescued 86 kidnapped victims and resulted in the arrest of 29 Boko Haram logistic suppliers.[97]

Africa File Data Cutoff: November 13, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.