Libya-Turkey Mediterranean Deal; Ethiopian Federal Consolidation in Tigray; South West Opposition Offensive in Somalia: Africa File, October 22, 2026

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Contributors: Alexander Brown and Victoria Hutchinson

Key Takeaways:

• Libya. The eastern Libya–based House of Representatives approved a contentious maritime deal with Turkey, which will use the deal to increase its economic and military influence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea amid tensions with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel. The deal could strain Turkey’s ties with Europe and the United States, undermining cohesion along NATO’s southern flank, although it is unlikely to seriously undermine the ongoing rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt.
• Ethiopia. The Ethiopian federal government is prioritizing consolidating military and political control over Tigray.
• Somalia. South West state opposition forces seized several key towns in the state as part of a monthslong dispute with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) over control of the state government, which has caused tensions involving the FGS’s international partners. The national Somali opposition is simultaneously increasing pressure on the FGS to return to negotiations over federal elections, which have been at the center of Somalia’s political crisis since 2026.
• Mali. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has retaliated against civilians and security forces in northeastern Mali after the Malian army launched operations targeting top ISSP leaders and ISSP’s primary rear support zones in the area. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen could attempt to exploit the situation to strengthen its position vis-à-vis ISSP in the contested tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Assessments:

Figure 1: Africa File, October 22, 2026.

Source: Emily Bjerke

Assessments:

Libya

Author: Liam Karr

The eastern Libya–based House of Representatives approved a contentious maritime deal with Turkey, which will use the deal to increase its economic and military influence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The House of Representatives, which is controlled by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and his family, approved a 2019 agreement to establish a shared maritime zone in the Mediterranean Sea divided between Libya and Turkey on October 20.^[1] Turkey initially approved the contentious maritime deal with the Turkish-backed and internationally recognized western Libyan government in 2019, but the Haftar-controlled government in eastern Libya, where the proposed zone would connect to the Libyan coast, withheld approval. The agreement delimits Libyan and Turkish exclusive economic zones (EEZ) east of the Greek Mediterranean islands of Crete and Rhodes between the eastern Libyan coast and southwestern Turkish coast.

Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, and the EU reiterated their previous condemnations of the agreement, although Egypt has not yet commented on the deal’s ratification.^[2] The Cypriot and Greek foreign ministries separately released statements calling the agreement “illegal, null and void,” as it violates both the UN conventions on the law of the sea and the sovereign rights of third states in the region.^[3] The Israeli foreign ministry said on October 21 that it “strongly” condemned the agreement and accused Turkey of “working to destabilize the east Mediterranean region.”^[4] Cyprus, Greece, and Israel all have long-standing disagreements with Turkey on several issues in the eastern Mediterranean, including ethnically divided Cyprus and territorial disputes in the eastern Mediterranean. The three allies hold regular trilateral summits to coordinate diplomatic, defense, and economic cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel and Turkey have also become strategic rivals across the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Each views the other as threatening to strategically contain and encircle it, given their ongoing competition in the eastern Mediterranean, across the Levant, and in Somalia.^[5]

Turkey will use the deal to conduct economic activity in Libya’s EEZ and reinforce its contested claims in the Mediterranean, including through an increased naval presence. Turkey and Libya have discussed ways to increase economic cooperation as part of talks surrounding the agreement. Khalif Haftar’s son and handpicked heir Saddam Haftar, who heads the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF, also known as the Libyan National Army, or LNA) discussed the deal and Turkish hydrocarbon investments in Libyan territorial waters when he met with Turkish officials in Ankara in April 2025.^[6] The Turkish Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement with Libya’s National Oil Corporation in 2025 to cooperate on seismic surveys and other studies in four Libyan offshore areas.^[7] Turkey has increased exploration and drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean since 2018, including in disputed areas with Cyprus and Greece.^[8] Turkey frequently deploys warships to protect civilian vessels involved in fishing and oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.^[9]

The agreement will likely exacerbate growing political and military tensions between Turkey and the opposing trio of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel. Cyprus, Greece, and Israel will cooperate to undermine the agreement, including through intensified economic cooperation in disputed EEZs. The three partners are collaborating on major energy projects, such as the Great Sea Interconnector (formerly known as the EuroAsia Interconnector) electricity grid project and EastMed natural gas pipeline, that run through areas that the recently ratified agreement claims as Libyan and Turkish EEZs.^[10] The Great Sea/EuroAsia Interconnector is a $2.1 billion project to install subsea, high-voltage direct-current power cables to connect the Cypriot, Greek, and Israeli electrical grids.^[11] The proposed East Med pipeline is a nearly $7 billion project that would link Cypriot and Israeli offshore natural gas reserves to Greece and eventually Europe.^[12] The three allies also formed the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2021 with several non-Turkish stakeholders across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa to better coordinate economic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and protect economic projects.^[13]

Cyprus, Greece, and Israel have also signed several defense agreements that pertain to the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Israel and Cyprus signed an agreement to delimit their exclusive economic zones in 2010 and a follow-on defense agreement in 2011 that allows Israeli forces to protect shared Mediterranean energy infrastructure, including in Cypriot airspace and territorial waters.^[14] Israel and Cyprus have tightened defense cooperation in 2026 with a bilateral military cooperation work plan that aims to expand joint exercises, strategic dialogue, and regional security coordination, and a bilateral arms deal that includes naval vessels and missile systems for the Cypriot navy.^[15] Israel and Greece signed a $3.5 billion air defense deal for Israeli defense firms to supply the systems for an Iron Dome–like “Achilles Shield.”^[16] Greece and Cyprus are the only countries besides the United States to have a Status of Forces Agreement with Israel to provide legal protections, jurisdiction guidelines, and logistic clarity for joint military exercises, defense cooperation, and training deployments.^[17] Cyprus, Israel, and Greece signed a trilateral defense agreement in December 2025 that established regular summits and joint frameworks, with the goal of aligning their responses in the eastern Mediterranean and coordinating infrastructure protection, including through a possible rapid response force.^[18]

Efforts to enforce the contested EEZs could lead to major naval standoffs. Greece and Turkey engaged in a multi-month naval standoff in the eastern Mediterranean in mid-2020 after Turkey announced plans to explore gas deposits in disputed waters between Greek island of Kastellorizo and the Turkish coast.^[19] A Turkish warship protecting an exploration vessel collided with a Greek frigate before the two sides de-escalated.^[20] The two sides engaged in a smaller 40-hour standoff in 2024, when Turkey deployed five warships to stop an Italian survey ship conducting research within contested waters near Greek Mediterranean islands for planned underwater cables as part of the EU-backed Great Sea/Euro Asia Interconnector project.^[21] Greece and Turkey have also disputed which is legally responsible for issuing maritime warnings for ongoing Eunomia 2026 naval exercises involving Cyprus, France, Greece, and Italy in contested areas of the eastern Mediterranean, scheduled to run through October 22.^[22]

The escalating dispute will likely lead to an increased rate of gray-zone incidents in the eastern Mediterranean. Gray-zone operations aim to avoid a full-scale naval confrontation by swarming EEZs with civilian fishing vessels and smaller coast guard or militia vessels to crowd out, intimidate, and disrupt rival maritime and naval activity in the area.^[23] The Turkish military flew an Akıncı high-altitude long-endurance heavy strike drone along the boundaries of the 2019 maritime zone in April 2026 while en route to participate in US-led Flintlock counterterrorism exercise in Sirte, Libya.^[24] Turkey has also engaged in various gray-zone operations against Greece in other areas, including several standoffs in the Aegean Sea and hundreds of Turkish violations of Greek airspace.^[25]

The deal could strain Turkey’s ties with Europe and the United States, undermining cohesion along NATO’s southern flank. Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States have continued to grow the 3+1 strategic platform, which they formed in 2019 to better coordinate economic and defense cooperation with the United States in the eastern Mediterranean. The US Congress has introduced multiple bills in recent years seeking to further strengthen defense cooperation with the 3+1 platform and formalize a more strategic partnership with it and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, given US energy security and other defense interests in the region.^[26] Individual US Congress members have also spoken out against the recently ratified Libya-Turkey agreement.^[27] The 3+1 platform created the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in 2026 to further enhance energy security and cooperation.^[28] The United States has also given strong diplomatic backing to the Great Sea/EuroAsia Interconnector and EastMed pipeline to bolster regional and global energy resiliency amid energy disruptions stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Iran war.^[29]

The EU has also strongly supported Cyprus and Greece and views the eastern Mediterranean as important to its strategic energy security interests. The EU released a statement that echoed the Cypriot and Greek condemnations of the agreement and reiterated its solidarity with Cyprus and Greece as EU members.^[30] The EU has also branded both the Great Sea/EuroAsia Interconnector and the EastMed pipeline as projects of common interest, which receive fast-track permitting and special funding.^[31] Several EU-based companies are also involved in the projects, which aim to bolster European energy security writ large as the EU looks to lessen its reliance on Russian energy supplies and weather disruptions related to the Iran war.

The deal is unlikely to seriously undermine the ongoing rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt, which has signaled that it likely aims to compartmentalize the dispute to not jeopardize cooperation in other theaters. Egypt belatedly rejected the deal on October 21, echoing other rejections that the deal was “null and void” with no legal effect.^[32] Egypt and Greece signed a retaliatory deal in 2020 that designated their own exclusive economic zone in contested parts of the eastern Mediterranean in 2020, which Turkey rejected.^[33] Egypt and the Haftar-controlled government also announced plans to delimit their own maritime borders in December 2025.^[34] The Egyptian and Greek foreign ministers spoke on the phone on October 20 to discuss the agreement “and their ramifications on security and stability in the eastern Mediterranean.”^[35] Egypt and Greece had called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Libya and voiced their support for a UN-unification plan just days before following the third round of Egyptian-Greek Consultations on Libya, which were in Athens from October 15 to 17.^[36]

Egypt and Turkey have reached a major détente since Turkey initially announced the deal in 2019, however. Egypt and Turkey had been major regional rivals throughout much of the 2010s and lacked diplomatic ties from 2013 to 2021 due to Turkish support for Islamist groups and Turkey’s rejection of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi’s seizure of power from the post–Arab Spring Islamist Egyptian government in 2013. Islamism became less of an animating factor in both countries’ policy around the beginning of the 2020s, however, and economic shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine exacerbated both countries’ already troubled economies.^[37] These factors incentivized a détente, with the two reestablishing diplomatic ties in 2021 and coordinating on previous problem areas, including Libya.^[38]

This détente eventually paved the way for a broader rapprochement as Egypt and Turkey became increasingly aligned on issues in the Horn of Africa and Middle East, where they have increased cooperation in recent years. Egyptian and Turkish forces are both present in Somalia supporting the Federal Government of Somalia, which they view as important to their respective Horn and Red Sea strategies.^[39] Both countries have offered varying degrees of military support to their Saudi partners to counter the Yemeni Houthis as the conflict in the Arabian Peninsula has escalated since mid-2026.^[40] The two countries are coordinating to help the Sudanese Armed Forces—another important partner in their respective Horn and Red Sea strategies—in Sudan, where they’ve coordinated drone strikes using Turkish drones based in Egyptian territory targeting Rapid Support Force supply lines.^[41] Egypt and Turkey have also largely aligned their positions on several Middle East issues, including their desire to rebuild a stable and unified Syria, secure Palestinian statehood, and contain what they view as destabilizing Israeli activity in both areas.^[42] The two signed a series of agreements in February 2026 to upgrade their “strategic” ties and increase intelligence sharing and defense industrial production.^[43]

The Haftar family likely greenlighted the deal as part of an ongoing rapprochement with Turkey, which is a major player in ongoing efforts to reunify Libya. Turkey is a primary backer of the rival internationally recognized, western-based Government of National Unity but has sought to hedge and grow ties with the Haftars in recent years and accelerated these efforts as part of broader US-backed efforts to reunify Libya. Turkey became directly involved in the Libyan civil war after it supplied the faltering western Libyan government with drones, advisers, air defense systems, and Syrian mercenaries in 2019, when Haftar launched an offensive with Russian support to seize Tripoli.^[44] Saddam Haftar visited Turkey for the first time in April 2025, however, and Turkish Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın visited eastern Libya in August 2025 for the first time since the ouster of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.^[45] US officials shortly thereafter began engaging with officials from the eastern and western Libyan governments to strike a power-sharing deal to unify Libya and have heavily coordinated with Turkey.^[46] US officials have intensified these efforts since mid-2026 and outlined a deal that would include Saddam Haftar becoming president and western Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh retaining his position in a unified government.^[47]

The Haftars have sought to grow ties with other international actors, including in the Mediterranean, to balance relations and strengthen international support in reunification talks. The Haftars sought out closer ties with Turkey in 2025 as part of efforts to position the family for dynastic succession and lessen its reliance on Russia, which has been preoccupied with its invasion of Ukraine and struggled to maintain its eastern Mediterranean positions in Syria.^[48] Key figures in the Haftar family had met with Greek and Israeli officials since late September.^[49] Saddam Haftar met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the United Arab Emirates in late September 2026 to discuss security cooperation and Saddam’s bid for the Libyan presidency.^[50] Netanyahu separately displayed a map showing Haftar-controlled eastern Libya as neutral during a public security briefing in October 2026.^[51] The Haftars have also met with US officials multiple times since 2025, helped broker prisoner releases for Russian and US citizens in the Sahel in August 2026, and have continued allowing the United Arab Emirates and Russia to use eastern Libya as a logistic hub for Emirati and Russian military activity in Africa to build goodwill from these key actors.^[52]

Ethiopia

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr with Alexander Brown

The Ethiopian military (Ethiopian National Defense Force, ENDF) has redeployed southward away from the Eritrean border, likely to concentrate its forces in the Tigray city belt to clear the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF’s) main havens in the mountainous Tigray interior. The Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)—the TPLF’s military wing—launched a counteroffensive contesting key supply lines in central Tigray in mid-October 2026 following the ENDF’s capture of multiple key localities and advance north toward the Eritrean border. The TDF conducted several attacks on the C23 and D23, which are secondary roads linked to Mekele—the Tigray regional capital—and main highways in northern Tigray.^[53] The TDF captured Abiy Addi—approximately 60 miles west of Mekele—on October 14 and also contested Hagere Selam, which is approximately 35 miles northwest of Mekele.^[54]

Figure 2. Ethiopian Military and Tigray Defense Forces Battle for the Tigray Interior

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo; Alexander Brown; Ziv Zellars.

Note: ENDF is short for Ethiopian National Defense Force, TPLF is short for Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and TDF is short for Tigray Defense Forces.

The ENDF withdrew south from multiple areas near the Eritrean border in the days that followed. The ENDF withdrew from Zalambessa and Rama, which are approximately 25 miles north of Adigrat and Adwa, respectively, between October 17 and 19.^[55] Conflict reporter Sajid Nadeem also reported on October 16 that ENDF military convoys were transiting from Koneba—a district in the neighboring Afar region—toward Atsbi, which is approximately 60 miles southeast of Adigrat and 45 miles northeast of Mekele.^[56]

Ethiopian federal forces simultaneously responded to the TDF counteroffensive and increased pressure on the TDF’s support zones in the mountainous interior of central Tigray. The ENDF has supplemented federal ground operations with sustained air and drone strikes, reportedly conducting strikes across the area, including Abiy Addi, Hagere Selam, and Semema.^[57] Federal forces have subsequently made gains in central Tigray. Federal forces reportedly captured Semema on October 20 and Abiy Addi on October 21, although The Ethiopian Conflict Map, an open-source mapper, reported that fighting has continued in Abiy Addi.^[58] The ENDF also reportedly advanced west along the B30 highway on October 20, capturing Bizet and Inticho, which are approximately 35 and 40 miles west of Adigrat, respectively.^[59]

The Ethiopian federal government has continued to pursue plans to reinstitute a Tigray regional government in advance of planned regional elections within six months. The Ethiopian federal government suspended the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) and appointed a caretaker government on October 16 after declaring the TPLF’s defeat.^[60] The stated goals of the new administration include restoring infrastructure and services damaged during the war, returning displaced individuals to their homes, resolving ongoing security challenges within Tigray, and creating a political climate for elections to be held within six months.^[61] Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed five officials associated with the federally backed Tigray Peace Force and former TIA head and current Abiy adviser Getachew Reda’s political party, Simret, to the administration.^[62] The news outlet UMD Media reported that four of the interim administration members will rotate as head of the administration until elections, with Getachew, Ethiopian intelligence head Redwan Husssein, and federal minister Abraham Belay overseeing the administration.^[63]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo and Ziv Zellars with Liam Karr

South West state opposition forces seized several key towns in the state as part of a monthslong dispute over control of the state government. Forces aligned with former South West President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen) conducted an offensive from October 8 to 16, capturing five key towns in Bay region: Awdiinle, Berdale, Buurhakaba, Dinsoor, and Qansahdhere.^[64] Somali news outlets reported heavy fighting between opposition and federal and South West state forces only in Buurhakaba.^[65] The capture of Buurhakaba, Dinsoor, and Qansahdhere leaves opposition forces in control of three of the four district capitals in Bay. Positions in Awdiinle and Berdale also give the opposition forces control of both sides of the main highway running through Baidoa, as Awdiinle is approximately 20 miles west of Baidoa, while Buurhakaba is 40 miles southeast of Baidoa. The South West state government announced on October 18 that it would initiate a counteroffensive.^[66]

Figure 3. South West Opposition Offensive Against Federally Backed State Government

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Ziv Zellars.

The opposition forces have sought to overthrow the South West state government since the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) deposed Laftagareen to establish a pro-FGS state administration. Laftagareen had historically supported the FGS, but he cut South West’s ties with the FGS in March 2026 amid reports that the FGS was seeking to replace him with a more pliant leader.^[67] The FGS subsequently overthrew Laftagareen’s administration later that month and set up an FGS-led interim administration.^[68] The FGS then held state elections in May and June in which FGS-backed Aden Madobe secured the state presidency.^[69] Laftagareen-aligned forces responded to the FGS’s intervention by mobilizing across South West and have frequently clashed with federal and South West state forces around Baidoa since May. The Critical Threats Project has recorded seven sets of clashes between opposition and state forces in or on the outskirts of Baidoa, the most recent occurring on September 28. The opposition forces have advanced into Baidoa multiple times, including on September 28, although the federal and state forces have repelled them.^[70]

The FGS and South West state government have repeatedly accused the South West opposition forces of collaborating with al Shabaab.^[71] The FGS side claimed that al Shabaab took part in South West opposition attacks throughout August, September, and October.^[72] The FGS sanctioned Laftagareen and several other officials on October 13 for financially supporting al Shabaab.^[73] Suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) have reportedly targeted federal and South West state forces during clashes with the opposition forces.^[74] Al Shabaab has historically employed SVBIEDs as a key tactic in operations against government forces. Laftagareen and other opposition officials have repeatedly denied that the opposition forces are collaborating with al Shabaab.^[75]

The dispute has caused tensions involving the FGS’s international partners. Ethiopia’s neutrality has reportedly caused tensions with the FGS, highlighting long-standing tensions and mistrust over Ethiopia’s role in areas near the Ethiopia-Somalia border. Ethiopia has established a de facto buffer zone in parts of Somalia along the Ethiopian border to secure its border from al Shabaab in coordination with the FGS. Ethiopian forces also intervened in clashes between the FGS and Jubbaland state forces in 2024 and 2025 on the side of Jubbaland state government, however, as Ethiopia has strong ties with the state administration.^[76] Ethiopian forces did not intervene on behalf of Laftagareen, with whom Ethiopia also had strong ties, when the FGS deposed him, although Ethiopian forces have not sided with the federal and South West state forces in the ongoing fighting with the opposition forces, either.^[77] Federal and South West state officials accused Ethiopian troops of surrendering the recently captured towns to the opposition forces.^[78] These tensions fit into the broader strained relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, particularly amid Ethiopian engagement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region and Somalia’s cooperation with Ethiopia's regional rivals Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan.^[79]

South West opposition officials have separately accused FGS backers Egypt and Turkey of supporting the FGS in the dispute. The officials have accused Egypt and Turkey of providing weapons that the FGS has used to depose Laftagareen’s administration and help it consolidate control.^[80] The FGS used Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces units in the takeover.^[81] Laftagareen has also accused Turkey of conducting airstrikes in South West, including during the September 28 clashes.^[82] Turkey stations F-16 fighter jets in Somalia, and multiple Somali news sources reported that F-16s conducted strikes in South West on September 28.^[83]

The national Somali opposition is simultaneously increasing pressure on the FGS to return to negotiations over federal elections, which have been at the center of Somalia’s political crisis since 2026. The Somali electoral commission announced on October 14 that federal parliamentary and presidential elections will occur on April 15 and May 15, 2027, respectively.^[84] This timeline is aligned with the controversial federal constitution enacted in March 2026 that delays the planned mid-2026 federal elections by one year and implements direct parliamentary elections.^[85] The national opposition, which is led by the Somali Future Council (SFC) coalition including leading opposition figures and the Jubbaland and Puntland states, has denounced the FGS’s constitution overhaul as a unilateral power grab and demanded federal compromises on the date and format of the elections.^[86] Numerous rounds of internationally mediated talks between the FGS and SFC have broken down, and clashes broke out between the two sides in Mogadishu—the Somali capital—in June.^[87]

The SFC has challenged the Somali electoral commission’s recent announcement of election dates. SFC leader and former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed filed a petition with the Somali Supreme Court to overturn the new constitution, with the Supreme Court giving the FGS until October 22 to provide a defense.^[88] The SFC also reportedly plans to hold a summit in Kenya in the near future to coordinate next steps.^[89] Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud rejected the prospect of dialogue with the SFC on October 15 and portrayed the FGS’s election plan as non-negotiable.^[90]

Mali

Author: Liam Karr and Victoria Hutchinson

IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has retaliated against civilians and security forces in northeastern Mali after the Malian army launched operations targeting top ISSP leaders and the ISSP’s primary rear support zones in the area. The Malian Armed Forces (les Forces arms Maliennes, FAMa) and partner forces launched operations against ISSP from October 15 to 17. FAMa, its local Daoussak Tuareg militia partners in the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad, MSA), and Russian Africa Corps auxiliaries attacked several ISSP bases near the Mali-Niger border in northern Mali’s Mnaka region on October 15.^[91] The operations included several raids targeting senior ISSP leaders, including senior ISSP military commander Youssef Ould Chouaib.^[92] Chouaib and several ISSP fighters fled, but security forces captured his wife.^[93] FAMa conducted further airstrikes in the region, reportedly killing several militants at in rural desert areas 40 miles southwest and 62 miles northwest of the town of Ménaka, from October 15 through 17.^[94]

ISSP retaliated by targeting communities and MSA leaders across the Mnaka region. ISSP attacked at least five Daoussak villages roughly 31 miles from Mnaka between October 18 and 19.^[95] Multiple reports claim that ISSP killed upward of 100 civilians across the attacks, which forced women, children, and the elderly to flee Mnaka.^[96] ISSP allegedly targeted civilians they accused of revealing ISSP positions to FAMa, allegedly enabling the recent FAMa airstrikes and operations.^[97] ISSP also directly targeted the MSA and its leader Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, reportedly killing 33 MSA members in an attack on Ag Acharatoumane’s residence in Ménaka on October 18.^[98]

ISSP likely aims to coerce the Malian army and allied militias to return ISSP prisoners and deter further civilian and military support for counter-ISSP operations against its rear support bases. ISSP expanded its areas of control in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after the withdrawal of French forces in 2021.^[99] The UN observed that the territory controlled by ISSP doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali that its al Qaeda–linked rivals and communal militias, such as the MSA, previously controlled.^[100] ISSP began increasing political and governance efforts in these areas during the spring of 2023, implementing various economic, health, infrastructure, judicial, and security initiatives.^[101] The group has also besieged Mali’s easternmost regional capital, Ménaka, causing a humanitarian crisis as the town grappled with inflation and refugees that fled ISSP’s violence.^[102]

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) could attempt to exploit the situation to strengthen its position vis-à-vis ISSP in the contested tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. ISSP and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM have engaged in several large-scale clashes in the tri-border area since September as each group tries to establish dominance in the area. ISSP most recently initiated a major attack on JNIM fighters across the Mali–Burkina Faso border area on October 9 that killed at least 60 fighters and that ISSP claimed killed more than 400 JNIM fighters.^[103] The attack is the latest move in an escalatory cycle that began in mid-2026 and has escalated into possibly the deadliest period of fighting between the two groups since at least 2022.^[104] CTP previously assessed that the latest fighting was likely partially connected to competition for influence over and access to support corridors via eastern Burkina Faso to border areas further south, as both groups compete to be the dominant actor in northern Benin and northwestern Nigeria.^[105] CTP also noted that ISSP may have also been seeking to capitalize on and undermine JNIM’s other countrywide efforts across Mali, which led JNIM to deprioritize directly fighting ISSP but bolstered its status over ISSP as the dominant group in the region.^[106]

JNIM previously sought to exploit ISSP abuses to make inroads with Daoussak communities in the Ménaka region and position itself as a local protector. JNIM aimed to fill the security vacuum in northern Mali following the French withdrawal in 2022, taking advantage of the deteriorating situation to cultivate partnerships with vulnerable local communities.^[107] ISSP was also exploiting the vacuum and attacking Daoussak communities that had previously partnered with French forces against ISSP.^[108] JNIM quickly moved to present itself as a security partner and strengthen its ties with Daoussak communities as these ISSP attacks approached traditionally JNIM-dominated areas of Mnaka in mid-2022.^[109] ISSP ultimately emerged victorious over JNIM in Mnaka, however, limiting the group’s presence in the region. JNIM is also facing increased Malian and Russian pressure in northern Mali’s Kidal region, which limits its capacity to devote substantial resources in Mnaka.^[110]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 22, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.