Houthis Threaten the Bab al Mandeb; Sahel-Sahara Rivalries Fuel Rebel Groups: Africa File, September 17, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Red Sea. Littoral African countries, almost all of which recently joined a Saudi-led naval coalition, have not yet signaled interest in directly joining any military action against the Yemeni Houthis after the group captured the northern entrance to the Bab al Mandeb Strait, demonstrating the limits of emerging regional coalitions and partnerships. The African countries are likely accepting Houthi statements that the group does not intend to target international shipping or close the Bab al Mandeb, although there is no guarantee that the Houthis will perpetually refrain from leveraging their improved coastal positioning to attack or threaten international shipping as it pursues greater regional influence. 
• Sahel-Sahara. Multiple rebel groups are growing stronger in the Sahel-Sahara border zones between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, likely as a partial result of tacit or direct support from national authorities in the region, who are using rebel groups as proxies to strengthen their own influences in the border zone. These armed groups create significant economic and political threats to African governments and could create substantial instability for national governments as they strengthen.

Figure 1. Africa File, September 17, 2026

Source: Emily Bjerke

Assessments:

Red Sea

Author: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr

The Yemeni Houthis took control of the northern entrance to the Bab al Mandeb Strait, bolstering their ability to disrupt the global economy. The Houthis launched an offensive to advance south along Yemen’s Red Sea coast in early September 2026. The group captured at least two of the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea and Mokha—a port town approximately 240 miles southwest of the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital, Sanaa—on September 10.^[1] The Houthis then took Dhubab, which was the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s last remaining Red Sea port city, on September 11.^[2] The group continued advancing to Yemen’s al Aradi area and also seized the nearby Perim Island, which is in the middle of the Bab al Mandeb.^[3] Yemeni government forces, potentially with Saudi backing, have since prevented the Houthis from pivoting east along southern Yemen’s coastal highway.^[4]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Hudaydah, Taiz, and Lahij Governorates

Source: Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute; Institute for the Study of War.

The ground offensive is part of a broader Houthi campaign to use the Red Sea to gain leverage over Saudi Arabia and the international community. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) and Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed in the September 10 Iran Update that the Houthis have four primary objectives for this campaign: ending Saudi military operations in Yemen, lifting the Saudi blockade of Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports and airports, coercing Saudi Arabia to pay Houthi civil servant salaries, and coercing Saudi Arabia to pay reparations to Yemeni civilians.^[5] The Houthis are simultaneously advancing an Axis of Resistance effort to disrupt global energy markets, thereby further increasing the cost of the Iran war for the United States and its allies.^[6]

The Houthis have ramped up pressure on Saudi Arabia since July, ending a ceasefire that had largely held since 2022. The Houthis began enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia in late July 2026, striking vessels transiting to and from Saudi Red Sea ports.^[7] The group then increased its targeting of Saudi oil infrastructure in early September, which CTP-ISW assessed was likely due to the Houthi blockade failing to achieve its objectives after Saudi Arabia largely rerouted shipping traffic north through the Suez Canal to avoid the Bab al Mandeb.^[8] The Houthis claimed on September 15 to have conducted drone and missile strikes on the Red Sea port city of Yanbu following a Saudi Civil Defense warning of threats to the city, although the strikes are unverified.^[9] An Iraqi militia that is part of the Axis of Resistance had already struck the east–west oil pipeline going through Yanbu on September 11, forcing the Saudi Ministry of Energy to shut down the pipeline, a closure that could last for weeks.^[10] Yanbu has become a vital node in global energy markets, as Saudi Arabia responded to Iran war–related disruptions in the Strait of Hurmuz by rerouting oil west via the pipeline and quadrupling its exports from the city. Oil prices for European consumers rose roughly 15 percent to $122 per barrel on September 15, the highest price since at least May, following Saudi Arabia’s cancellation of some oil shipments to Europe.^[11] Economists previously forecast that oil prices could rise to $150 per barrel if the Houthis close the Bab al Mandeb.^[12]

Littoral African countries, almost all of which recently joined a Saudi-led naval coalition, have not yet signaled interest in directly joining any military action against the Houthis, demonstrating the limits of new regional coalitions. Saudi Arabia launched the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance on July 30 to primarily counter Houthi disruptions to Red Sea shipping, particularly the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia, by coordinating training, intelligence sharing, and maritime security operations among members.^[13] Fourteen other countries have joined thus far, including Djibouti, Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan.^[14] Egypt serves as the northern anchor of the coalition due to the unrivaled size of its navy.^[15] Egypt is also the only littoral African member with a navy capable of sustaining open-ocean operations.^[16]

Figure 3. Saudi-led Red Sea Task Force

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

Egypt has strongly denounced the Houthi offensive but has taken a diplomatic approach to avoid becoming entangled militarily amid Saudi efforts to rally international support for a response against the Houthis. The de facto Saudi ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi in Egypt on September 15.^[17] Sisi’s office released a statement offering “unwavering” support for Saudi Arabia and emphasizing the need to “intensify” bilateral cooperation to address the Houthi threat to shipping.^[18] The London-based New Arab news outlet cited a “senior” Egyptian source claiming that Egypt has not rejected the possibility of indirect dialogue with the Houthis despite Egypt reportedly refusing a recent Houthi proposal for direct dialogue on shipping through the Bab al Mandeb.^[19] The source also stated that the Egyptian government is seeking to prevent attacks on shipping going through the Bab al Mandeb while avoiding Houthi control of the strait.^[20] A “regional” official separately claimed to the Associated Press that Egypt has pursued de-escalation rather than joining any Saudi military response, even though Saudi Arabia has reportedly asked Egypt for air-defense support.^[21]

Egypt’s seeming reluctance to join a military effort mirrors its past inaction in response to Houthi attacks against Red Sea shipping despite the negative effects on its economy. Egypt’s tax revenues from shipping through the Suez Canal fell by approximately 40 percent, or $4 billion, from 2023 to 2024 during the height of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.^[22] Egypt did not join a US-led naval coalition to protect vessels, however, and never responded militarily to the Houthis.^[23] Egypt has repeatedly opposed military escalation in the Red Sea, instead seeking political settlements to avoid becoming entangled in a regional military conflict and staking out a role as an independent regional power.^[24]

Djibouti has also come out against Houthi escalation but avoided supporting any military response that could threaten its vital port traffic. The Djiboutian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia on September 10.^[25] The ministry then stated on September 11 that it was committed to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea but also called for de-escalation.^[26] Djibouti only possesses a small air force and navy, which likely limits its willingness to engage in military action.^[27] CTP previously assessed that Djibouti has likely withheld support for military campaigns against the Houthis and instead pursued political efforts to avoid any Houthi retaliation that would threaten its status as a major international basing and shipping hub.^[28] Djibouti is particularly reliant on Red Sea trade transiting through its ports, as roughly 50 percent Djiboutian government revenue comes from port fees.^[29] Djibouti refused to condemn the Houthi retaliatory campaign in the Red Sea beginning in 2023 as a show of support for Palestinians.^[30] Djibouti also refused to allow the United States to launch operations against the Houthis from the US military base in Djibouti.^[31]

Somalia has given political support to Saudi Arabia but faces serious constraints on its naval capabilities. The Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia on September 8 and called the Houthi maritime campaign a threat to freedom of navigation.^[32] Saudi Arabia has increased its economic and military backing of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2026, including by funding Somali military training.^[33] The Somali navy is unlikely to provide notable military support to Saudi Arabia, however, as it only consists of a small coastal patrol force.^[34] Local governments and forces that control the northern Somali coast near the Bab al Mandeb are also not aligned with the FGS and operate outside federal control.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)–led Sudanese government has also voiced its support for Saudi Arabia but faces military and political constraints to any major response. The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation condemned Houthi attacks on September 8 and September 12, affirming its “solidarity” with Saudi Arabia.^[35] Saudi Arabia is a key political backer of the SAF in the Sudanese civil war and has considered providing military support to the SAF.^[36] The SAF is unlikely to provide notable military support to Saudi Arabia, however, as it is burdened by the Sudanese civil war and possesses only a small naval patrol force.^[37] Some Islamist militias within the SAF coalition are also sympathetic to the Houthis and reportedly have smuggling links to Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory.^[38] Any Houthi retaliation could additionally affect ports on the SAF-controlled Red Sea coast.

Eritrea declared its opposition to military action against the Houthis despite having grown closer to Saudi Arabia in recent years. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh stated in a September 11 interview with the investigative outlet Middle East Eye that “there is no military option in Yemen” and external actors would not be able to defeat the Houthis.^[39] Eritrea is not yet a member of the Saudi-led naval coalition, but Business Insider Africa had referenced it as a possible member.^[40] Saudi Arabia has also increased ties with Eritrea in recent years amid a Saudi-Emirati regional competition in which the United Arab Emirates backs Eritrea’s archrival Ethiopia.^[41] Saudi Arabia has discussed economic investment opportunities with Eritrea, including a potential multibillion dollar deal at Eritrea’s port of Assab.^[42] Eritrea and Saudi Arabia have also had high-level diplomatic engagement since late 2025, including a five-day visit by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to Saudi Arabia in September 2025.^[43]

Eritrea may view Houthi control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast as an opportunity to leverage its own coastal positioning. Vessels in the Red Sea will likely transit nearer and potentially through Eritrean waters now that the Houthis control the other side of the waterway. International law may permit Eritrea to tax vessels to transit through its waters.^[44] Saleh did not rule out the possibility of Eritrea taxing vessels in his September 11 interview.^[45] The Ethiopian think tank Horn Review posited that Eritrea may also try to leverage its positioning to secure favorable bilateral terms with other countries while maintaining its autonomy free of any coalition.^[46]

Littoral African countries are likely accepting Houthi statements that the group does not intend to target international shipping or close the Bab al Mandeb, despite the negative impact the Houthi offensive has had on shipping traffic and the risk of future Houthi action. The Houthis denials are part of a diplomatic effort that likely intends to discourage international support for a Saudi counteroffensive against the Houthis.[47] US President Donald Trump said on September 12 that the Houthis had contacted US officials in an effort to keep the United States from intervening against the group in Yemen.^[48] Reuters reported that Houthi officials told US counterparts during a meeting in Oman on September 13 that they had no intention of attacking US vessels.^[49] One Yemeni source told Reuters that the Houthis offered to extend the nonaggression pledge to all non-Saudi vessels, including Israeli ships and all commercial ships, during the meeting.^[50] The Houthi foreign minister stated on September 15 that the Houthis are not planning to halt shipping or close the Bab al Mandeb.[51] CTP-ISW assessed at the beginning of the Iran war that the Houthis would likely manage escalation to avoid blowback from all of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the wider international community.^[52] The part of that assessment that the Houthis were unlikely to attack Gulf energy infrastructure due to the group’s economic reliance on Saudi salary transfers, which were tied to the 2022 ceasefire, was incorrect, however.^[53]

Houthi denials of plans to escalate in the Red Sea still do not account for the ongoing damage to international shipping that their offensive caused or guarantee that the group will perpetually refrain from attacking commercial shipping or vessels belonging to the United States and its regional allies.[54] The 2022 ceasefire did not prevent this recent offensive, and the group is still pursuing its primary objectives related to Saudi Arabia and its ultimate goal of controlling all of Yemen. The Houthis’ improved coastal positioning gives it the option to attack vessels at close range, either in the short-term or in future disputes beyond the current campaign.^[55] The Houthis may also not have to formally close the Bab al Mandeb to gain significant leverage over Saudi Arabia and the international community, as traffic through the Bab al Mandeb has already decreased by up to 90 percent since the Houthi offensive, according to the International Monetary Fund.^[56]

Sahel-Sahara

Author: Liam Karr

Multiple rebel groups are growing stronger in the Sahel-Sahara border zones of Algeria, Chad, Libya, and Niger. Libyan rebels from southern Libya are increasingly challenging the eastern Libya–based Haftar regime’s yearslong effort to assert greater control over Libya’s southern border. A brand-new Libyan rebel group calling itself the Fezzan Revolutionary Forces announced on September 12 that it was closing Libya’s southern border to all trucks and commercial transport vehicles in response to a “siege” by pro-Haftar Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF, also known as the Libyan National Army, or LNA) on Qatrun, Libya, which is the nearest village outpost to the al Tumu border crossing nearly 200 miles south, on the Niger-Libya border near Chad.[57] The announcement followed weeks of rising tensions over pro-Haftar forces cracking down on fuel smuggling, which the Fezzan Revolutionary Forces said was preventing cooking gas and fuel from reaching Qatrun.[58] Pro-Haftar forces from the 87th brigade then killed an ethnic Toubou teenager at a gas station on September 3, which led to clashes between the 87th brigade and local militias that resulted in the death of another Toubou civilian before local elders defused the situation.[59]

Saddam Haftar, who is the LAAF chief of staff as well as son and apparent heir of eastern Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, has led the regime’s efforts to assert greater control over the southern Libyan border’s lucrative cross-border smuggling networks since 2023. The Haftars have oscillated between cooperation and competition with the Arab Ouled Suleiman tribe and the sub-Saharan Toubou ethnic group over control of the gold mines and trafficking routes in the border region as part of a divide-and-rule approach that seeks to exploit communal tensions.^[60] Saddam Haftar deployed the 87th brigade to Qatrun in January and February 2025 to sideline the prominent al Zadma family, which is from the Arab Ould Suleiman tribe, and dissolve the al Zadma–controlled LAAF 128th brigade that controlled the area.[61]

The Haftar regime’s efforts have alienated segments of the local Arab and Toubou communities, fueling the rise of rebel groups in the area. The fighting in early 2025 alienated both al Zadma’s Ouled Suleiman tribe, which comprised the majority of 128th brigade forces, as well as ethnic Toubous in the 128th brigade and surrounding community.[62] The LAAF then arrested Toubou rebel leader Hassan Moussa Keley in southern Libya in June 2025.[63] The Southern Liberation Operations Room (SLOR)—a Libyan Toubou rebel group linked with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU)—has launched numerous attacks on LAAF forces since early 2026, and multiple sources reported that the Fezzan Revolutionary Forces are linked with SLOR.^[64] The latest flare-up in Qatrun and subsequent house raids and arrests against dozens of Toubou civilians and other local officials will further strained LAAF relations with segments of the Toubou community.[65]

The Nigerien rebel group Patriotic Liberation Front (Front Patriotique de Libération, FPL) has mobilized hundreds of militants in the border zone in recent months and threatened to resume attacks against the Nigerien junta for the first time since 2024. The FPL released a video in July calling for a general mobilization, and it released another set of recruitment videos in Arabic, Fulfulde, Hausa, Tamazight, Toubou, and Zarma in September.[66] The FPL’s media releases have displayed roughly 100 soldiers, more than a dozen vehicles, and dozens more fighters undergoing training, although the group itself claims to have mobilized “thousands” of fighters.[67] The FPL has not claimed an attack since 2024, partly due to eastern Libyan authorities detaining its leader Mahmoud Sallah from February 2025 to June 2026.[68]

The FPL and other Nigerien rebel groups have recently sought to bolster coordination with each other to launch joint campaigns to destabilize the Nigerien junta. The Toubou-led FPL announced in a July video that it had restructured its command hierarchy to operationalize the Coordination of Free Forces of Niger (Coordination des forces libres du Niger, CFLN), a coalition of Nigerien rebel groups formed in late 2024 to oppose the current junta and secure the release of overthrown President Mohamed Bazoum.[69] CFLN partner groups include the Toubou-led Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice (Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice, MPLJ) and other Arab, Toubou, and Tuareg groups.[70] The FPL and MPLJ have previously targeted Nigerien forces and local officials in northern Niger and repeatedly attacked the lucrative Benin–Niger oil pipeline and gold mining activity in eastern and northern Niger.[71] The $4.5 billion pipeline transports roughly 90,000 barrels of crude oil per day, generating billions in annual gross export revenues, of which the Nigerien government keeps $400 to $800 million as part of its 25 percent stake in the pipeline.[72]

Figure 4. Rebel Networks in the Sahel-Sahara Border Zone

Note: CCMSR stands for Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République (Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic). CFLN stands for Coordination des forces libres du Niger (Coordination of Free Forces of Niger). FACT stands for Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (Front for Change and Concord in Chad). FAL stands for Forces Armées Libres (Free Armed Forces). FLA stands for Front de Libération de l'Azawad (Tuareg Azawad Liberation Front). FPJ stands for Front Patriotique pour la Justice (Patriotic Front for Justice). FPL stands for Front Patriotique de Libération (Patriotic Liberation Front). GNS stands for Government of National Stability. GNU stands for Government of National Unity (GNU). MADP stands for Mouvement armé pour la défense du peuple (Armed Movement for the Defense of the People). MPLJ stands for Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice). MPN stands for Mouvement patriotique nigérien (Nigerien Patriotic Movement). SLOR stands for Southern Liberation Operations Room.

Source: Critical Threats Project.

The Sahara border zone serves as a critical rear base for these rebels and numerous other armed groups operating across the Sahel-Sahara region. The border area provides rebel groups with natural sanctuary and resources, as it is a largely ungoverned space with gold and oil deposits and trafficking networks that move arms, fuel, and people between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Both Hassan al Zadma, who commanded the LAAF’s 128th brigade, and Mohamed Wardougou, who leads SLOR, are based in the northern Niger area of the Sahara border zone, as are multiple Chadian rebel groups.[73] The FPL and other CFLN members have their rear support zones in the border area, including parts of northern Niger, southern Libya, and northwestern Chad.[74] The Tuareg Azawad Liberation Front (Front de libération de l'Azawad, FLA), which currently controls the Malian regional capital Kidal and aims to capture all of northern Mali alongside its allies in al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), has long-standing rear-support networks in Algeria and also established rear logistics networks that extend from southern Libya to northern Mali via northern Niger.[75]

Figure 5. Trans-Sahara Trafficking and Threat Finance

Source: Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses (RHIPTO).

Rebel groups have benefited from tacit or direct support from national authorities in the region, who are using rebel groups as proxies to strengthen their own influences in the border zone. Niger has been unable and possibly unwilling to degrade rebel support zones on its side of the border, which has led Chadian and Libyan rebel groups to relocate to northern Niger and raised tensions with Chad and the Haftar regime. The Haftar regime initially cultivated ties with Chad and the Nigerien junta in 2024 to crack down on rebel havens in their shared border area as part of efforts to assert greater control over the border zone and trafficking networks.^[76] The Nigerien junta has lacked the capacity to control its portion of the border, however, given more pressing Salafi-jihadi insurgencies near the capital in western Niger and in the Lake Chad Basin in eastern Niger. The Nigerien government also has long-standing patronage networks linked to illicit trans-Saharan trafficking activity that runs through northern Niger, although it is unclear whether Nigerien rebels have co-opted or disrupted these networks.[77]

Chadian and eastern Libyan authorities responded by prioritizing cooperation with each other and turning a blind eye to Nigerien rebel groups in the border area. The two partners operationalized a joint border force in February 2026 and launched LAAF-led operations into Chadian and Nigerien territory to target Chadian and Libyan rebels throughout 2026.[78] These efforts have seemingly not targeted the Nigerien rebel groups, including the FPL or MPLJ, which have rear bases in Chad and Libya.[79] The LAAF has also cracked down on all fuel trade with Niger to prevent fuel from reaching rebel groups based in the northern Niger border area, indirectly impacting Nigerien border communities and patronage networks.[80]

The LAAF reportedly began directly supporting Nigerien rebel groups in mid-2026, at least partly in retaliation for Niger’s growing ties with the GNU. The Nigerien junta released 18 Libyans to GNU authorities in late June as part of a prisoner swap involving Nigerien soldiers in SLOR custody.[81] One of the prisoners was a GNU-linked officer from Fezzan that both rival Libyan governments had demanded be turned over to their control. The swap was part of a growing rapprochement between the Nigerien junta and the GNU that included high-level meetings between GNU and Nigerien officials in April, June, and July to outline and implement defense and economic cooperation.[82] The Haftar regime retaliated by releasing FPL leader Mahmoud Sallah, who promptly launched the FPL’s ongoing restructuring and recruitment drive.[83] Multiple Paris-based investigative outlets reported that the Haftar regime provided the FPL with vehicles and weapons as part of Sallah’s release and promised to provide additional equipment “in the coming months,” including more weapons and “nearly 150 vehicles.”[84] The Haftar regime also released Hassan Keley in late June, which alongside Sallah’s release may indicate a broader effort to repair the regime’s ties with segments of the Toubou community.[85]

Chad has maintained ties with Nigerien rebel groups to counter Chadian rebel groups, which has contributed to deteriorating relations between Chad and Niger throughout 2026. Chadian President Mahamat Déby and other influential Chadian figures have Toubou ethnic ties, and French media reported that Déby views maintaining ties with Nigerien Toubou rebel groups as a key factor in isolating Chadian rebel groups operating in the border area.[86] Chadian sources told the Paris-based news outlet Africa Report that FPL or MPLJ members had been in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, in 2026.[87] Chad also reestablished defense cooperation in 2026 with France, which Niger’s anti-French junta views as a malignant influence on its border, in 2026.[88] The Nigerien junta accused Chad, several other neighboring countries, France, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of supporting the major coup attempt in Niger in late August.[89] A captured captain who was allegedly involved in the coup claimed on national television in early September that a Chadian officer told him that Chadian authorities and French special forces soldiers were on their way from Chad to reinforce pro-coup forces.[90] Chad and France denied the accusations, and the junta did not provide further evidence to support its claim.

Algeria and the Haftar regime have attempted to use ties with the FLA to maintain good relations with the Tuareg community and bolster their international prestige as mediators. Algeria has long maintained ties with Tuareg rebels in northern Mali to serve as a mediator and prevent any refugee crisis or the emergence of an independent Tuareg state, either of which would undermine stability among the Tuareg communities spread across southern Algeria and the wider border zone.[91] Algeria has also sought to use its role as a mediator to cultivate regional and international influence so that it can advance other Algerian objectives related to its rivalry with Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara region. The Haftar regime has avoided cracking down on the FLA to keep Tuareg elements within its LAAF border coalition and position itself as another mediator in northern Mali, given that Algeria’s bilateral ties with Mali have been severely strained in recent years.[92] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) previously noted that the Haftar regime’s involvement in prisoner swaps involving armed groups in Mali sought to leverage the regime‘s regional connections to position itself as an indispensable partner for major international actors.[93]

Algeria may more assertively use regional partnerships to counter the Haftar regime’s growing influence. Algeria has been a staunch political supporter of the GNU, criticized the Haftar regime as a destabilizing influence, and specifically signaled that it views LAAF military activity in southwestern Libya as a threat.[94] The Haftar regime is now undermining Niger, which is key to Algeria’s influence in the Sahel, and threatening to supplant Algeria’s role as the main interlocutor for Tuareg rebel groups. The Nigerien junta is Algeria’s closest partner in the central Sahel, where it has helped mend ties between Algeria and Mali and is working with Algeria to build the $13 billion Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which runs from Nigeria to Algeria via rebel-afflicted northern Niger. CTP assessed in early September that Algeria’s decision to deploy two air-patrol squadrons to protect the Nigerien junta in the aftermath of the August coup—Algeria’s first official foreign military deployment since 1973—may signal that Algeria is taking a more assertive approach in the Sahel.[95] Algeria could support Libyan rebel groups to counter the Haftar regime as part of such an approach, and a former Nigerien rebel speculated, in a May 2026 Afrique XXI report by independent African investigative journalists, that Algeria may already be supporting SLOR .[96]

These armed groups create significant economic and political threats to African governments in the region. Chadian and Nigerien rebels based in the Sahara border zone intend to overthrow the regimes they are opposing. Chadian rebels based in Libya launched a failed offensive to overthrow the Chadian government in 2021, during which Chadian President Idriss Déby was killed.[97] The FPL and its rebel coalition explicitly aim to overthrow the Nigerien junta to restore constitutional and democratic governance in Niger and secure the release of ousted Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum. The FPL denied any involvement in the August coup attempt in Niger, although it praised the coup plotters.[98]

Malian and Libyan rebels based in the Sahara border zone have more local aims but undermine the authority of Malian and eastern Libyan authorities and are working with actors that pose a more national, existential threat. SLOR and the FLA have more limited aims focused on greater autonomy in southern Libya and northern Mali, respectively. These aims still challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of rival authorities, however. Southern Libya is a key battleground for influence for the Haftar regime as it seeks to maximize its leverage amid intensified international efforts to unify Libya. The Malian junta has made regaining control over northern Mali a key part of the pro-sovereigntist narrative that underpins its popular support and legitimacy. SLOR also has ties with the GNU, and the FLA is working with JNIM. These ties pose a more direct, existential threat to the eastern Libyan and Malian authorities.

These rebel groups are also contesting government control over local economies and patronage networks tied to cross-border economic activity. The LAAF has sought to replace makeshift rebel taxation checkpoints with their own and cracked down on other smuggling in the border area between Libya and Chad as part of its efforts to assert control over the border region in recent years.^[99] A Chadian customs officer said that state forces manning official checkpoints at the Kouri Bougoudi crossing and gold field between northwestern Chad and Libya generated tens of thousands of US dollars in “a few weeks” after negotiating customs duties with Chadian and Libyan trade unions in 2025.^[100] Paris-based Africa Intelligence reported that the al Toum and Salvador pass border crossings between southeastern Libya and northern Niger generate around $3 million dinars (nearly $475,000 US dollars) per month in taxes on oil tanker trucks.^[101] SLOR-linked fighters temporarily seized the al Toum crossing in January 2026, continued sporadic attacks targeting LAAF forces along the border through 2026, and have now publicly threatened to target any economic activity transiting Libya’s southern border.[102] Shutdowns related to rebel attacks on the Benin–Niger oil pipeline have cost the Nigerien government and Chinese investors $10 million per day.[103]

Figure x. Saharan Rebels Wage Economic Warfare in Border Zone

Note: CFLN stands for Coordination des forces libres du Niger (Coordination of Free Forces of Niger). FPJ stands for Front Patriotique pour la Justice (Patriotic Front for Justice). FPL stands for Front Patriotique de Libération (Patriotic Liberation Front). MPLJ stands for Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice). SLOR stands for Southern Liberation Operations Room.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Rebel activity also threatens the ability of Chadian and Libyan authorities to use the border zone to support the regional military activity of their external sponsors in exchange for vital military and economic support. The LAAF claimed that SLOR clashed with the LAAF-aligned Salafist Subul al Salam brigade near the Matan al Sara’a airbase in late August, marking SLOR’s first engagement in eastern Libya.[104] Russia has used Matan al Sara’a airbase in southeastern Libya alongside several other LAAF-controlled air bases as key transportation hubs for military shipments to the Sahelian juntas.^[105] The LAAF has separately supported Emirati efforts to use southeastern Libya as a critical rear base for the RSF in the Sudanese civil war, establishing training camps in the Libyan desert and supply lines from al Kufra airport to western Sudan via smuggling routes in the Chad and Libya border areas.^[106] Russia and the UAE have continued providing the LAAF with military and political support in exchange, and the UAE has provided billions of dollars in investment pledges and loans to the fragile and debt-burdened Chadian economy.[107]

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