Salafi-Jihadi Global Tracker

The Salafi-Jihadi Global Tracker provides analysis and assessments of major developments related to the Salafi-jihadi movement.{{authorBox.message}}



Salafi-Jihadi Global Tracker: Salafi-Jihadi Groups Threaten India After Political Controversy

[Notice: The Critical Threats Project frequently cites sources from foreign domains. All such links are identified with an asterisk (*) for the reader’s awareness.]

Key Takeaway: Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are conducting attack and messaging campaigns against Indian politicians and religious groups in response to a party spokesperson’s controversial comments about Islam. An IS affiliate in Afghanistan already conducted a retaliatory attack. Al Qaeda and IS may pursue additional attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan, the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan. An attack in India is unlikely but would be potentially destabilizing under current political conditions.

Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are attempting to incite attacks against Indian politicians and religious groups. A spokesperson for India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) made controversial remarks about the Prophet Muhammad and Islam on May 27, and Salafi-jihadi groups have threatened to attack India and Indian interests in response. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab, and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) threatened attacks in June and July 2022. ISKP is so far the only group to make good on its threat by *attacking a Sikh temple in Kabul, eastern Afghanistan, on June 18 and killing a worshipper and security guard. Suspected IS-linked militants killed a Hindu shopkeeper in Udaipur, western India, on June 28, but IS has not claimed the attack.

Al Qaeda affiliates’ rhetorical responses to the BJP remarks continue a trend of escalating anti-India messaging. Al Qaeda has ramped up its India-focused propaganda since late 2021, releasing three consecutive videos in October and November 2021 urging Indian Muslims to take up arms against the state. AQAP in Yemen and al Shabaab in Somalia threatened Indian interests in June, continuing a trend of al Qaeda affiliates projecting unity through global messaging campaigns. An AQAP-aligned media unit released a chant on June 8 inciting violence against Hindus in revenge for the BJP’s statements.[1] Al Shabaab attempted to provoke attacks against Hindus on June 19, saying the BJP’s comments represent a “war” against Muslims in India.[2] Al Shabaab, more than AQAP, could move beyond messaging to target Indian interests. The group could seek to target Indian diplomatic or economic targets in Kenya, where al Shabaab has historically operated an attack network.

Figure 1. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State Threaten Attacks Against India: June–July 2022

Source: Author.

India has faced a low terror threat in recent years, but new risks are emerging. Al Qaeda associates have carried out major attacks in India in the past—most notably the large 2008 bombings in Mumbai perpetrated by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba—but India has generally encountered much less Salafi-jihadi activity than neighboring countries in South Asia. Changing conditions may now raise the threat level to India, however. The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has created an opportunity for IS—a Taliban rival—to expand and may have also created more opportunities for al Qaeda—a Taliban partner—to resume operating there. Salafi-jihadi groups also have a greater motivation to attack in response to the BJP’s comments. Ongoing competition between al Qaeda and IS for recruits in South Asia incentivizes the groups to carry out attacks to demonstrate legitimacy and tactical prowess. Rising Hindu-Muslim tensions in India also risk creating a more favorable environment for Salafi-jihadi recruitment.

AQIS may attempt an attack in India but has limited capabilities and no significant record of success there. Al Qaeda established AQIS in September 2014 to organize various jihadist factions under a single banner and compete with IS for leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. AQIS has its largest base in Afghanistan but also operates in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. It has claimed responsibility for numerous militant attacks since 2014, including the attempted seizure of a Pakistan navy frigate in Karachi, Pakistan, on September 6, 2014.

AQIS threatened on June 7 to attack BJP members with suicide bombings in Delhi, Gujarat, Mumbai, and Uttar Pradesh, which are in western and northern India.[3] AQIS has never conducted a major attack in India and, as of 2021, was comprised mostly of Afghan and Pakistani nationals. Joint US-Afghan counterterrorism operations since 2015 have weakened the group. AQIS has not claimed an attack since April 2016, when militants killed two gay rights activists in Dhaka, Bangladesh. There are some indicators that AQIS may be attempting to strengthen its network in India, however. AQIS’s English and Urdu online propaganda has repeatedly targeted Indian Muslims for recruitment. Indian security forces *disrupted plans by al Qaeda–linked militants to conduct suicide bombings in India as recently as July 2021.

Islamic State affiliates in India and Pakistan have not previously conducted a major attack in India and will likely continue to prioritize attacks in the areas where they operate, including Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan. IS announced new provinces in India—Islamic State Hind Province (ISHP)— (ISHP) and Pakistan—Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP)—in May 2019 after the ISKP, which originally encompassed India and Pakistan, suffered a series of setbacks in 2018. ISHP and ISPP have only conducted approximately one to two small-scale attacks per year since 2019. ISHP first attacked in mainland India in April 2021, when militants burned crops suspected of belonging to a Hindu farmer in the Uttar Pradesh region, but the group has not claimed an attack in India since.[4] ISPP has never conducted an attack in mainland India.

ISHP is focused on small-scale attacks and, in May 2022, encouraged Indian Muslims to adopt “lone wolf” jihad instead of waiting to join ISHP physically.[5] ISHP also has a small and disorganized fighting force. There may be fewer than 15 militants linked to ISHP, and they suffer from logistical challenges, such as inadequate resources and a lack of weapons. IS recruits in India may be even more inclined to join ISKP in Afghanistan than ISHP. ISHP may also inflate attack casualties to exaggerate its strength to prospective recruits. ISHP shot at Indian police officers in Srinagar, western Kashmir, on July 12 and claimed to kill three officers and wound one other. Indian press outlets, however, *reported that the attack killed one officer and injured two others. ISHP media outlets continue to reach out to Indian Muslims through online channels, suggesting it is possible but not imminent that ISHP could successfully recruit in parts of India beyond is bases in Kashmir. A 2020 UN report claimed that there were “significant” numbers of ISHP operatives in India’s southern Kerala and Karnataka states, and *recent arrests show cells continue to try to recruit in this region.

The ISKP is more likely to escalate attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan than to attack in India. IS announced its expansion to parts of modern day Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in 2015 and has since conducted several high-profile attacks. ISKP mostly consists of Afghans but *includes foreign fighters, including Indian nationals. ISKP regularly attacks religious minorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and could claim these attacks as revenge against India.[6] ISKP may also target Indian interests in Afghanistan to undermine the Taliban’s *efforts to build diplomatic ties with India. ISKP attacked a Sikh temple and killed two people in Kabul, eastern Afghanistan, on June 18, claiming the attack was in revenge for the BJP incident.[7] ISKP media emphasized that the Taliban would fail to protect Hindus after its June 18 attack, suggesting the attack was also meant to undermine Taliban governance and security. ISKP could attempt to obstruct Taliban efforts to normalize its government internationally by attacking the Indian embassy in Kabul, which India has begun to reopen and the Taliban has promised to protect.

ISKP may leverage its Indian national members to conduct an external attack in India in the future, but this would mark a significant expansion of ISKP’s recent attack zones. An ISKP-aligned media unit warned on June 15 that ISKP would attack religious minorities as revenge for the BJP’s comments about Islam. ISKP supporters are likely still present in India; Indian authorities most recently arrested a suspected ISKP supporter in August 2020. ISKP activity in India appears to be focused on *recruitment and training, which could be a precursor to attacks. ISKP also has Indian national members that it could redirect toward attacks in their home country. ISKP suicide bombers from Kerala in southern India bombed a Sikh temple in Kabul in March 2020. India nationals from ISKP also conducted a prison break in August 2020 in Jalalabad, northeastern Afghanistan. ISKP could send Indian recruits back to India to establish cells, an IS strategy employed in other theaters. Foreign fighters likely do not threaten India while ISKP is actively engaged in a campaign in Afghanistan, but these recruits could still pose a risk in the long term.

Even a small-scale attack could cause disproportionate effects in India’s volatile political and religious environment. India’s Hindu nationalist government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has exacerbated tensions between Hindus and Muslims corresponding with a rise in incidents of religion-based hate crimes in India since 2014. Protests and rioting erupted across India in June after the BJP spokesperson’s comments. Major protests ended in mid-June, but the killing of a Hindu man for supporting the BJP on June 28 in Udaipur, northwestern India, was a flash point for renewed turmoil. Protests *broke out in Udaipur on June 28 after the attack, prompting authorities to deploy hundreds of additional police to the area and ban large gatherings for a month. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but some local officials linked the attackers to IS, and online IS supporters lauded the execution and promoted acts of violence against Hindus on June 28.[8]

India’s inexperience with recent al Qaeda and IS attacks could cause Indian authorities to mishandle a terror attack and contribute to a cycle of violence. Indian security forces have taken a heavy-handed approach to protests, and authorities could use similar tactics following an act of terrorism. Indian authorities demolished the homes of several Muslims accused of rioting in Uttar Pradesh, northern India, between June 11 and 13, sparking political backlash. Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and IS could exploit an excessive crackdown in the wake of an attack for further recruitment and incitement.

Al Qaeda or the Islamic State could coordinate a major attack in India in the long term. Salafi-jihadi groups have carried out attacks in response to similar political controversies years after the event. Al Qaedalinked militants killed six people when they bombed the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in February 2008, in response to Danish newspapers reprinting cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad from 2005. AQAP coordinated an attack on the Charlie Hebdo newspaper office in Paris, France, in January 2015, in retaliation for the newspaper’s depiction of the Prophet Muhammad several years earlier. A pro–al Qaeda media unit drew parallels between the BJP’s comments and Charlie Hebdo’s depictions of Muhammad on June 5.[9] An AQAP veteran commander on July 9 called for attacks on anyone who insults the Prophet Muhammad, singling out Indian Hindus and French nationals.[10] There could be a long buildup to retaliatory attacks, and the inability of al Qaeda or IS affiliates to attack immediately after the controversy does not rule out future attacks in India or elsewhere.

[1] SITE Intelligence Group, “Pro-AQAP Media Unit Releases Chant Inciting Revenge for Prophet in India,” June 8, 2022, available by subscription at

[2] SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Advocates Revenge Attacks on Hindus for Insult to Prophet by Members of India’s Ruling Party,” June 19, 2022, available by subscription at

[3] SITE Intelligence Group, “AQIS Raises Specter of Death, Destruction in India in Revenge for Insults to Prophet,” June 7, 2022, available by subscription at

[4] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Reveals Clash with MONUSCO Forces in DRC, Burning Farmland in India in Naba 282 Exclusives,” April 15, 2021, available by subscription at

[5] SITE Intelligence Group, “‘Voice of Hind’ Issue 27 Instructs Muslims in India to Adopt Lone Wolf Jihad over Joining IS, Announces Media Consolidation,” May 9, 2022, available by subscription at

[6] SITE Intelligence Group, “Pakistan-Division of ISKP Claims Shooting Death of Sikh Man in Peshawar,” September 30, 2021, available by subscription at

[7] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISKP Claims Attack on Sikh Temple in Kabul as Revenge for BJP Insults to Prophet Muhammad,” June 18, 2022, available by subscription at

[8] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Supporters Laud Executors of Hindu Tailor in Rajasthan, Share Video of Attack and Confession,” June 28, 2022, available by subscription at

[9] SITE Intelligence Group, “Recalling Charlie Hebdo Attack, Pro-AQ Unit Incites Muslims in India Avenge Insult to Prophet by BJP Members,” June 6, 2022, available by subscription at

[10] SITE Intelligence Group, “AQAP Official Demands Muslims Strike All Who Insult Prophet, Says Ukraine-Russia War Exposes Western Hypocrisy and Hate for Islam,” July 12, 2022, available by subscription at

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Salafi-Jihadi Global Tracker: Assessing the Islamic State’s Role in the Owo Church Massacre in Nigeria 

[Notice: The Critical Threats Project frequently cites sources from foreign domains. All such links are identified with an asterisk (*) for the reader’s awareness.]

Key Takeaway: The Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWA) is most likely not responsible for the June 5 massacre of at least 40 churchgoers in southwestern Nigeria. The Owo church attack underscores the complexity and ambiguity of Nigeria’s deteriorating security situation, in which an array of armed actors, including Salafi-jihadis, are increasingly active.

At least four gunmen massacred Catholic churchgoers in Owo, a town in southwestern Nigeria’s Ondo State, on June 5. The attackers detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at the church entrance before opening fire on the congregation, killing at least *40 people. Ondo State frequently experiences violence, including farmer-herder* killings* relating to land disputes and bandit robberies,* but the Owo attack stands out for its high casualty count. No armed group has claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Nigerian Security Council attributed* the Owo attack to the ISWA on June 9. It is possible, but not likely, that ISWA is responsible. ISWA has increased its operations outside northeastern Nigeria in 2022, though the northeast remains its primary area of operations. As part of this increase, ISWA conducted bombings in May in the southern Kogi State, just over 50 miles northeast of Owo, but those were not as coordinated or deadly as the Owo attack. In fact, ISWA has never conducted an attack of this magnitude outside of northeastern Nigeria. The Owo attack would mark an inflection in both scale and geographical reach if ISWA is responsible. The Owo attack would also mark an escalation in ISWA’s campaign targeting Christians. ISWA has targeted Christians outside of northeastern Nigeria with IEDs in bars* and other public places. Escalating attacks targeting Christians would align with broader Islamic State objectives. Other Islamic State affiliates in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have also targeted Christians in recent attacks and statements.[1]  

Figure 1: Salafi-Jihadi Activity Outside Northeastern Nigeria in 2022 

Source: Author.

The lack of ISWA media about the Owo attack indicates that ISWA is likely not responsible. ISWA has issued no claim for the Owo massacre. The lack of a claim breaks with ISWA’s usual pattern. The group claimed two bombings in south-central Nigeria within two days in May and June, for example. Neither ISWA nor other Islamic State media have commented on the Owo massacre, despite its scale and its alignment with other attacks and rhetoric targeting Christians. ISWA did wait several months to claim some attacks in early 2022, but this rare occurrence was meant to sync the claims with a global Islamic State media campaign, and none of the delayed claims were for attacks as high-profile as the Owo massacre.[2]

The proliferation of armed conflict across Nigeria means several other groups could be responsible for the Owo attack. Bandit groups entrenched in the northwest are spreading into other areas of Nigeria, kidnapping, extorting, and killing civilians. Predominantly Fulani Muslim herders are increasingly clashing with non-Fulani Christian farmers over land use, an issue that climate change will further exacerbate. Militants from the ethnic-based secessionist group Indigenous People of Biafra are attacking government forces and civilians in a low-level insurgency* concentrated in the southeast. These various actors* are* active in Ondo or neighboring states and have attacked* churches* in the past. Uncertainty over responsibility for the Owo attack reflects the broader deterioration of security across large parts of Nigeria.

Salafi-jihadi groups are not the primary drivers of this destabilization but are participating in it and adapting to new trends. ISWA has increased its activity outside of northeastern Nigeria in 2022, claiming attacks in Taraba, Niger, Kaduna, and Kogi States. This shift in operations may indicate that ISWA is attempting to expand the battlefield in response to military pressure* in its primary areas of operations in northeastern Nigeria, as it attempted to do in 2015-2016. Al Qaeda–linked Ansaru has also strengthened in 2022. It began to exercise control of terrain in June after several years of embedding itself into northwestern Nigerian communities by offering them protection from bandit groups.

Expanding Salafi-jihadi activity compounds the security challenges that the beleaguered Nigerian government faces before the February 2023 elections. Violence could affect* voter registration and participation in the 2023 elections, further undermining the Nigerian government’s popular legitimacy. Quick fixes such as disrupting ISWA cells* will not substitute for long-term solutions to growing societal problems.

[1] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Documents Burning Congolese Christian-Owned Vehicles in Photo Report, ‘Amaq Video,” May 17, 2022, available by subscription at

[2] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISWAP Claims Attack on Nigerian Priest’s House, Reveals Responsibility for Attacks in Past Months in Kogi and Taraba,” April 29, 2022, available by subscription at

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Salafi-Jihadi Global Tracker: Islamic State Media Exaggerates Strength and Cohesion in Revenge Campaign

Key Takeaway: The Islamic State (IS) announced a global attack campaign to exaggerate its strength and cohesion following senior leaders’ deaths, continuing a pattern from prior years. This attack campaign is an effort to brand ongoing IS affiliate activity as a coordinated effort and does not indicate a noteworthy change in IS global capabilities. Some participating affiliates expanded the scope of their attacks during the campaign. These inflections likely reflect the affiliates’ preexisting objectives rather than new IS leadership guidance, however.

IS continued a trend of promoting a global named operation in the aftermath of a senior leadership change. The IS spokesperson, Abu Umar al Muhajir, announced the “Revenge Battle for the Two Sheikhs” campaign on April 17 and called on supporters to conduct attacks to avenge the deaths of late IS leader Abu Ibrahim al Qurayshi and late IS spokesperson Abu Hamza al Qurayshi.[1] Abu Ibrahim al Qurayshi killed himself during a US raid in February 2022. The new IS spokesperson confirmed on March 10 that the late spokesperson died.[2] IS affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, India, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and Syria have claimed attacks under the campaign as of April 29, 2022.

IS previously promoted a revenge campaign from December 22 to December 31, 2019, after the death of former IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. IS affiliates in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria escalated attacks during this period.[3] IS Sinai Province and IS Yemen Province also claimed attacks under this 2019 campaign. More than double the number of affiliates have participated in the 2022 campaign compared to the 2019 campaign, rising from five to 11.

The Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWA) continued to expand its area of operations during the Revenge Battle campaign. ISWA fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) purportedly targeting Christian civilians in northern Taraba state, eastern Nigeria, on April 20.[4] This attack claim is the group’s first in Taraba state, indicating a southeastward shift in its area of operations from neighboring Adamawa state. ISWA also began claiming attacks in Kogi state, central Nigeria, targeting Nigerian police on April 23.[5] IS reporting on April 29 claimed that ISWA conducted prior attacks in Taraba in January and February 2022 and in Kogi in March 2022.[6] These attacks extend preexisting ISWA campaigns targeting Christians and security forces into new areas of Nigeria.

ISWA has claimed several routine attacks under the Revenge Battle campaign, likely to benefit from increased media attention and demonstrate its continued allegiance to IS. ISWA activity is concentrated in northeastern Nigeria in Borno and Yobe states. The recent claimed attacks include assaults on Nigerian soldiers and Christian civilians in Borno on April 20 and April 23,[7] an IED attack targeting Nigerian soldiers and Christian civilians in Yobe state on April 24,[8] and four attacks targeting Christians just across Nigeria’s border in Diffa, southeastern Niger between April 22 and April 26.[9]

Figure 1. Islamic State Affiliates in Africa Claim Attacks for Revenge Campaign: April 2022

Source: Author.

The Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacked into Uzbekistan for the first time. ISKP fired 10 rockets at an Uzbek military base in Termez, southern Uzbekistan on April 18.[10] ISKP has escalated its activities in Afghanistan since US forces withdrew in August 2021. ISKP did not participate in the 2019 IS revenge campaign. The April 18 attack may advance ISKP’s goal to attract more recruits from Central Asia. ISKP may be also expanding attacks during the spring and summer fighting season.

ISKP has continued targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority and the Afghan Taliban in attacks claimed under the Revenge Battle campaign. This activity includes IED attacks on April 21, one  targeting a Shia mosque in Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan and another targeting airport workers on a bus in Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan.[11] ISKP conducted two more IED attacks targeting Shia in Mazar-e Sharif on April 28.[12] ISKP also struck the Taliban several times, including attacks in Kabul, Kunar, and Nangarhar provinces in eastern Afghanistan on April 18 and April 19.

Figure 2. Islamic State Affiliates in the Middle East and Asia Claim Attacks for Revenge Campaign: April 2022

Source: Author.

Four weak IS affiliates claimed attacks under the April 2022 campaign to demonstrate their continued belonging to the IS network. These groups did not claim attacks under the December 2019 IS revenge campaign. The 2022 claims by IS affiliates in India, Pakistan, Somalia, and Libya show continued communications between these groups and IS’s media network but do not indicate inflections in their capabilities, which are limited to intermittent attacks in remote areas. IS Hind Province (ISHP) conducted a grenade attack on an Indian police post in Srinagar in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir on April 18.[13] ISHP has conducted one to two minor attacks per year since its formation in 2019. The IS affiliate in Pakistan continued targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and shot a “polytheist” under the campaign on April 28 in western Pakistan. IS-Pakistan has conducted one to two small-scale attacks per year since 2019, similar to ISHP. The IS branch in Somalia detonated an IED and claimed to kill three Somali police officers in the capital Mogadishu on April 20. IS-Somalia has run an assassination campaign targeting Mogadishu police since 2020, and also attacks security and political personnel in northern Somalia. IS fighters in Libya detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a Libyan militia outpost near Sebha in southwestern Libya on April 18, claiming to kill one militiaman.[14] IS-Libya debuted a VBIED capability in southwestern Libya in June 2021 but has attacked only sporadically since.

More IS affiliates will likely claim attacks under the campaign, which will likely conclude at the end of Ramadan in early May. IS Central Africa Province’s Mozambique branch, IS Sahel Province, and IS Yemen Province have not yet claimed attacks. Of these, the group most likely to participate in the Revenge Battle campaign is IS-Sahel. IS media recently began promoting IS-Sahel attacks under this name, distinguishing it from ISWA, in March 2022.[15]

[1] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Spokesman Announces New Military Campaign, Urges Lone Wolves Exploit Ukraine War and Draw Inspiration from Recent Attacks in Israel,” April 17, 2022, available by subscription at

[2] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Confirms Death of Leader and Announces Passing of Spokesman,” March 10, 2022, available by subscription at

[3] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS Launches Revenge Campaign for Killing of Former Leaders, Claims Attack on Russian Soldiers in Daraa,” December 22, 2019, available by subscription at; and SITE Intelligence Group, “Weekly inSITE on the Islamic State for December 18-24, 2019,” December 26, 2019, available by subscription at

[4] SITE Intelligence Group, “Marking Another 1st During Military Campaign, IS Claims Attack in Taraba that Targeted Bar of Nigerian Christians,” April 20, 2022, available by subscription at

[5] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISWAP Claims Bombing at 2nd Bar in Taraba, Expands Operations in Nigeria to Kogi State,” April 23, 2022, available by subscription at

[6] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISWAP Claims Attack on Nigerian Priest's House, Reveals Responsibility for Attacks in Past Months in Kogi and Taraba,” April 29, 2022, available by subscription at

[7] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISWAP Photo Reports Document Attacks in Bijibiji and Molai, Claims 2 Suicide Bombings in Arege and Banki,” April 22, 2022, available by subscription at; and SITE Intelligence Group, “Amaq Video Shows Aftermath of ISWAP Attack on Nigerian Troops in Mallam Fatori,” April 28, 2022, available by subscription at

[8] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISWAP Claims Bomb Blast at 3rd Bar in Nigeria in a Week,” April 25, 2022, available by subscription at

[9] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISWAP Claims Executing 11 Christians After Capturing Them in Niger, Concentrating Activity in Diffa,” April 26, 2022, available by subscription at

[10] SITE Intelligence Group, “In First for Group, ISKP Claims Rocket Strike in Uzbekistan and Provides Video Documentation of Launch,” April 18, 2022, available by subscription at

[11] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISKP Claims Blast Inside Shi'a Mosque in Mazar-e Sharif, Reports Over 100 Casualties,” April 21, 2022, available by subscription at; and SITE Intelligence Group, “After Major Attack in Mazar-e Sharif, ISKP Reports 20 Casualties in Bomb Blast on Kunduz Airport Staff,” April 21, 2022, available by subscription at

[12] SITE Intelligence Group, “ISKP Claims Blasts on Buses Carrying Shi'a Hazara in Mazar-e Sharif, Reports 30 Casualties,” April 28, 2022, available by subscription at

[13] SITE Intelligence Group, “Amaq Video Shows IS Petrol Bomb Attack on Police Post in Srinagar (Kashmir),” April 20, 2022, available by subscription at

[14] SITE Intelligence Group, “IS' Libya Province Claims Car Bombing at LNA Camp in Sabha,” April 19, 2022, available by subscription at

[15] SITE Intelligence Group, “Using New "Sahel Province" Designation, IS Claims Attack on Malian Army Base in Gao,” March 22, 2022, available by subscription at

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