Africa File
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
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Uganda's Role in the DRC's M23 Conflict
See the PDF of this report here.
Read the full update with graphics here. Shapefiles are available by request via email to [email protected].
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Summary
Uganda is working with actors on multiple sides of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to protect its sphere of influence. Ugandan meddling perpetuates conflict in the eastern DRC, including rebellions such as M23, by proliferating the number of armed actors, injecting regional competition into local conflicts, and complicating peace efforts.
Key Actors
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Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC):
- Uganda and the FARDC have conducted combined operations against IS Central Africa Province—known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces—under Operation Shujaa in the eastern DRC since 2021.
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M23 and Rwanda
- Uganda separately maintains ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement, which has captured significant portions of the eastern DRC. Uganda permits M23 to recruit fighters and hold meetings in Uganda and move across the DRC-Uganda border.
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Ugandan Proxy Groups
- Uganda mobilized its own proxy groups in the eastern DRC in 2025. Thomas Lubanga launched the Convention pour la Revolution populaire (CRP), and Innocent Kaina launched the Coalition Nationale pour la Libération du Congo (CNLC). Lubanga and Kaina are both sanctioned war criminals with longstanding ties to Uganda and M23.
Objectives
- Economic: Strengthen Uganda’s economic sphere of influence in the eastern DRC, which supports Ugandan exports to the DRC and Ugandan smuggling from the DRC.
- Military: Target anti-Ugandan armed groups that threaten Uganda and its sphere of influence through partnerships with FARDC and Ugandan proxies.
- Contain Rwandan Influence: Dilute Rwandan domination of M23 and other rebel networks in the eastern DRC.
- Influence Peace Negotiations: Utilize proxy groups to promote Ugandan interests in Congolese negotiations on the eastern DRC.
Implications
- Regional Risk: Rwanda’s and Uganda’s proxy competition in the eastern DRC contributes to the perpetual violence in the eastern DRC. The jockeying proliferates armed actors in the eastern DRC and adds regional interests to already complex local conflicts. This rivalry has led to common conflict between Rwandan and Ugandan proxies since the Second Congo War and even between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in rare instances.
- Peace Efforts: Uganda will be able to influence negotiations regarding the M23 conflict and potential restructuring of power in the DRC due to its ties with M23 and other armed groups in the DRC.
- Humanitarian Outlook: Ugandan-linked actors who are convicted of war crimes are remobilizing in the eastern DRC.
See the PDF of this brief here.
Key Takeaway: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have fought a civil war in Sudan since April 2023. Countries such as Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates are fueling the war to the detriment of US interests in the Red Sea.
US Interests in the Red Sea Region:
- Secure Key Maritime Routes for Global Trade
- Boost Regional Security and Counterterrorism
- Counter Rivals like Iran and Russia
- Strengthen Regional Partnerships
Key External Actors and Objectives:
Turkey
Supports: SAF
Objectives:
- Secure mining and port deals
- Counter the UAE
Areas of Cooperation:
- Provides Turkish drones and missiles
- Offers to mediate ceasefire deal
Egypt
Supports: SAF
Objectives:
- Control spillover of conflict and refugees into Egypt
- Counter the UAE and Ethiopia
Areas of Cooperation:
- Provides Turkish drones
- Trained SAF pilots
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Supports: RSF
Objectives:
- Increase port investments and gold trade
- Maintain RSF military partnership
Areas of Cooperation:
- Provides arms and drones
- Hosts RSF financial infrastructure
Iran
Supports: SAF
Objectives:
- Secure a Red Sea naval base to support Yemeni Houthi attacks in the Red Sea
- Increase trade
Areas of Cooperation:
- Provides Iranian drones
- Signed trade agreements
Russia
Supports: SAF
Objectives:
- Secure a Red Sea naval base to bolster logistics in Africa
- Project power into the Red Sea
- Gain mining and port deals
Areas of Cooperation:
- Provides weapons
- Signed new mining and oil deals
Sudanese Armed Forces Retake Central Khartoum in Ongoing Battle for Political Legitimacy
See the PDF executive summary of this development here.
Key Development
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on March 26 fully retook central Khartoum and are clearing the last pockets of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) resistance from the greater Khartoum area, marking a major military and political victory for the SAF.
What's Next
SAF Clearing in Khartoum: The SAF has encircled the remaining RSF elements in southwestern Khartoum, where hundreds of RSF fighters are retreating into White Nile state across the Jebel Awliya Bridge—the RSF’s only exit out the city.
SAF Advances in Omdurman: The SAF has advanced in Omdurman--Khartoum's twin city on the west bank of the Nile River--over the past week, where the RSF has used its positions to shell and conduct drone strikes against the SAF in the greater capital area since the beginning of the civil war.
Implications
More Military Advances: The capture of Khartoum is a military victory that gives the SAF control of the eastern bank of the Nile River, which the SAF can use to prepare for future offensives against the RSF center of gravity in western Sudan.
Political Legitimacy: SAF control over Khartoum bolsters the SAF political claim to be the only legitimate ruler in Sudan. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan said on March 27 that Sudan is preparing for a civilian, technocratic government to take power.
External Involvement: Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt have sent weapons--including drones--that the SAF have been critical in fighting in Khartoum, while the UAE has provided weapons and drone support to the RSF.
Future Outlook
SAF Advances West: The SAF has advanced westward from positions in central Sudan and recaptured several key state capitals from the RSF since November 2024.
RSF Doubles Down in Darfur: The RSF has intensified its efforts to defeat the SAF in western Sudan to consolidate control over the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition.
Read the full report in the latest Africa File here.
