Africa File
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
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Challenges to Sustainable DRC-M23 Peace
See the PDF of this report here.
Read the full update with graphics here. Shapefiles are available by request via email to [email protected].
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Key Takeaway
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), M23, and Rwanda will likely remain involved with Qatari-brokered negotiations and the broader US-backed regional peace framework without quickly reaching a deal to avoid making concessions while reaping the rewards of US engagement. Both sides have been unwilling to concede their maximalist positions on M23’s territorial control, which will likely prolong talks and make a sustainable and lasting agreement unlikely.
Peace Platforms
Actors’ Incentives to Engage in Peace Talks
- DRC Government: The US-backed peace framework would bring significant US investment in the government-controlled mining sector, strengthen the Congolese army, and possibly help isolate opposition political factions.
- Rwanda: The US-backed peace framework will bring significant US investment and help legitimize Rwanda’s stake in the mineral trade in the eastern DRC.
- M23: Peace talks give M23 time to consolidate its de facto control over occupied areas and strengthen its military.
Obstacles to a Sustainable Agreement
- M23 Territorial Control: Both sides have stuck to their maximalist demands on M23’s territorial control. M23—with Rwandan support—is pushing for autonomy, while the DRC demands M23’s unconditional withdrawal.
- Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The DRC rejected M23’s proposed demilitarized zone, and the two sides have not established a joint ceasefire monitoring mechanism.
Implications and Outlook
- Sustainable Agreement Unlikely: The lack of clarity and willingness to negotiate on M23 control and the return of government authority will likely be a major obstacle in the upcoming round of talks.
- External Pressure Needed: US and Qatari pressure could lead both sides to make and follow through on concessions to retain the advantages of the US-backed peace framework.
- Military Escalation Possible: M23 may already have the requisite strength to relaunch its military campaign and could conduct southward or westward offensives to gain leverage if talks stall or collapse.
- Other Spoilers: Other local and regional actors excluded from ongoing talks, such as pro-Congolese government militias, Burundi, or Uganda, could undermine the sustainability of the broader peace framework.
Kabila’s Return to the DRC
See the PDF of this report here.
Read the full update with graphics here. Shapefiles are available by request via email to [email protected].
To receive the weekly Africa File and the tri-weekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.
Summary
Former Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila has reentered Congolese politics to capitalize on the eastern DRC crisis and regain power by positioning himself as the leader of a broad opposition bloc that includes Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. Kabila’s reemergence risks convoluting the domestic peace process, which is necessary for long-term peace and stable economic investment in the DRC.
Key Development
- Kabila has reentered Congolese politics amid the eastern DRC crisis after a multi-year hiatus. Kabila returned to the DRC in late May through M23-controlled Goma for the first time in over a year and gave his first public address since he left office in 2019.
Kabila's Objective
- Kabila likely seeks to capitalize on M23’s advantageous position to strengthen his own political influence and lead a unified opposition bloc—which includes M23—against DRC President Félix Tshisekedi.
- Kabila likely aims to use his position to regain power in some form through a national dialogue, which would work toward establishing a transitional government in the DRC.
- Kabila may have hastened his return to the DRC after the Congolese government began to retaliate against his networks in early 2025.
Implications
- Expanded Conflict Unlikely: Kabila’s relationship with M23 is transactional and opportunistic, which makes him unlikely to use M23 to seize power militarily.
- Strengthened M23 Leverage: M23 gains legitimacy from Kabila’s support, as Kabila’s backing undermines the DRC government’s narrative that M23 is a foreign Rwandan problem.
- Convoluted Domestic Peace Talks: Kabila is one of many actors whom multilateral peace processes will need to consider. The DRC government’s actions against Kabila were reportedly a “source of tension” in Qatari-mediated DRC-M23 talks in late April.
Uganda's Role in the DRC's M23 Conflict
See the PDF of this report here.
Read the full update with graphics here. Shapefiles are available by request via email to [email protected].
To receive the weekly Africa File and/or the daily Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.
Summary
Uganda is working with actors on multiple sides of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to protect its sphere of influence. Ugandan meddling perpetuates conflict in the eastern DRC, including rebellions such as M23, by proliferating the number of armed actors, injecting regional competition into local conflicts, and complicating peace efforts.
Key Actors
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Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC):
- Uganda and the FARDC have conducted combined operations against IS Central Africa Province—known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces—under Operation Shujaa in the eastern DRC since 2021.
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M23 and Rwanda
- Uganda separately maintains ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement, which has captured significant portions of the eastern DRC. Uganda permits M23 to recruit fighters and hold meetings in Uganda and move across the DRC-Uganda border.
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Ugandan Proxy Groups
- Uganda mobilized its own proxy groups in the eastern DRC in 2025. Thomas Lubanga launched the Convention pour la Revolution populaire (CRP), and Innocent Kaina launched the Coalition Nationale pour la Libération du Congo (CNLC). Lubanga and Kaina are both sanctioned war criminals with longstanding ties to Uganda and M23.
Objectives
- Economic: Strengthen Uganda’s economic sphere of influence in the eastern DRC, which supports Ugandan exports to the DRC and Ugandan smuggling from the DRC.
- Military: Target anti-Ugandan armed groups that threaten Uganda and its sphere of influence through partnerships with FARDC and Ugandan proxies.
- Contain Rwandan Influence: Dilute Rwandan domination of M23 and other rebel networks in the eastern DRC.
- Influence Peace Negotiations: Utilize proxy groups to promote Ugandan interests in Congolese negotiations on the eastern DRC.
Implications
- Regional Risk: Rwanda’s and Uganda’s proxy competition in the eastern DRC contributes to the perpetual violence in the eastern DRC. The jockeying proliferates armed actors in the eastern DRC and adds regional interests to already complex local conflicts. This rivalry has led to common conflict between Rwandan and Ugandan proxies since the Second Congo War and even between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in rare instances.
- Peace Efforts: Uganda will be able to influence negotiations regarding the M23 conflict and potential restructuring of power in the DRC due to its ties with M23 and other armed groups in the DRC.
- Humanitarian Outlook: Ugandan-linked actors who are convicted of war crimes are remobilizing in the eastern DRC.
