Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2026

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Western reporting suggests that the United States has accepted Russia's demanded sequence of having Ukraine cede territory to Russia before receiving formal US or European security guarantee commitments. Western reporting suggests that the United States will not finalize a security agreement with Ukraine until after Ukraine and Russia reach a peace agreement and that the United States is pushing Ukraine to make concessions in order to conclude a peace agreement by Summer 2026.^[i] The Kremlin has continuously attempted to convince the Trump administration that territory is the only significant issue left unresolved in peace negotiations, particularly Russia's claim to the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and in southern Ukraine, and has attempted to portray Ukraine as the intransigent negotiating party for refusing to cede strategically important territory that Russian forces have been unable to capture through force.^[ii] Ukraine, however, has indicated multiple times that it is willing to consider withdrawing its forces from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast (although not to recognize Russian control over the parts of the oblast it does not currently occupy) in exchange for meaningful Western security guarantees — a significant Ukrainian concession.^[iii] Russia has refused to compromise on its demands for additional territory beyond the current line of control in Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin has been publicly focusing on territory in part to distract from its own rejection of any meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine — a refusal that senior Kremlin officials have constantly reiterated around the recent trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE).[iv] Kremlin officials have consistently objected to Western security guarantees for Ukraine, particularly the deployment of any Western troops or military assets to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping contingent or ceasefire monitoring mechanism — continuing to demonstrate that territorial discussions are not the only significant issue left unresolved in negotiations and that Russia, not Ukraine, remains inflexible in its demands.^[v] Russia is rejecting the guarantees Ukraine requires to be able to safely conclude the war and make any territorial concessions, should Ukraine choose to do so. Russia is unlikely to accept any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine even if the United States and Ukraine concede to Russia's territorial demands, however. The sequence of agreements that Russia is insisting on and that the United States has reportedly accepted thus entails Ukrainian surrender of critical territory with no assurance of receiving necessary guarantees against future Russian aggression.

Meaningful security guarantees are crucial to any peace agreement that allows Russia to occupy parts of Ukraine, especially if Ukraine withdraws from territory it currently holds. Ukraine has repeatedly offered to freeze the frontline as a basis for territorial negotiations, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand additional territory that Russian forces have been unable to occupy in over 10 years of conflict and nearly four years of full-scale war.^[vi] A Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast would have Ukraine cede its Fortress Belt, the fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that has served as the backbone of Ukraine’s defenses in the oblast since 2014.^[vii] Russia has spent years attempting to seize the Fortress Belt militarily, and Russian forces could take at least two to three more years to seize the Fortress Belt based on their rate of advance as of November 2025, which has slowed in the first month of 2026.^[viii] A Ukrainian concession of its most valuable defense line to the Kremlin would provide Russia with more advantageous positions to renew aggression against southwestern and central Ukraine in the future while depriving Ukraine of extensive fortified positions it would need to defend against this aggression.^[ix] A peace agreement acceptable to Russia would certainly include territorial stipulations given the current Russian demands, and the reported US refusal to conclude a security agreement with Ukraine before Ukraine agrees to such stipulations means that the territorial stipulations and any Ukrainian withdrawals would come into effect before US-Ukrainian security guarantees are in place and without any guarantee that Russia would accept meaningful guarantees. Ukraine would therefore likely have to conduct a withdrawal without these protections amid the threat of a renewed Russian effort. This sequencing of agreements runs the high risk of leaving Ukraine open to rapidly renewed Russian attack with no assurance of US or other partner military support to deter or respond to such an attack.^[x]

Putin’s rejection of meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine is a greater impediment to a prospective peace deal than Ukraine’s position on ceding its territories. The Kremlin has continuously attempted to portray Ukraine as the main impediment to a peace in Ukraine to disguise Russia's own refusal to make concessions and participate in good-faith negotiations.^[xi] The Kremlin has continuously stalled and delayed peace negotiations and doubled down on accomplishing Putin's original war aims. These aims include Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations and commitment to neutrality; Ukraine’s demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), Ukraine’s denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government), international recognition of Russia’s illegal annexations of the four Ukrainian oblasts and Crimea in international agreements; and the lifting of all Western sanctions against Russia.^[xii] Ukraine has offered significant concessions to some Russian demands in pursuit of peace, including ceding territory, changing Ukrainian law, and holding elections in wartime, as long as Ukraine receives the security guarantees it needs to cede territories and hold elections safely. The Kremlin is attempting to distract from the fact that its refusal to compromise is the main impediment to peace by falsely insisting that Ukraine's refusal to make territorial concessions without security guarantees is the one and only impediment to peace, therefore deflecting US pressure from Russia to Ukraine.[xiii]

The Kremlin likely sees an opportunity to manipulate the US-led negotiations process into another means through which Russia can achieve its unchanging military and political objectives, which it has failed to achieve in nearly four years of war. Russia's demand that Ukraine withdraw from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast without preconditions and the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire to conduct negotiations are further evidence that Russia will accept nothing short of its full war demands.^[xiv] The Kremlin has continuously doubled down on its pre-war demands, which extend beyond Ukraine and include demands of NATO, and has indicated that it will seek to achieve these goals militarily if it cannot achieve them diplomatically.^[xv] The Kremlin has been pursuing a balancing act between posturing strength to its populace and allies while engaging the United States in negotiations enough to avoid additional US pressure while continuing to achieve its military and political objectives in Ukraine.[xvi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwavering determination to conquer more Ukrainian territory and gain full political control over Ukraine is severely degrading Russia's military and economy at the cost of the Russian population, and Russia will increasingly have to reckon with this degradation in the coming year. Putin and other Kremlin officials are engaged in a cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Ukrainian defenses as on the brink of imminent collapse and a Russian victory as inevitable in an attempt to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia’s demands now before Ukraine's battlefield situation worsens.^[xvii] Russia is feeling the effects of four years of attritional war, however, suffering significant material, manpower, and economic challenges that Putin's commitment to the war is only exacerbating.^[xviii] The Russian rate of advance is constrained to a footpace at its fastest, and costs disproportionately high infantry casualties relative to Russia's marginal rate of advance.^[xix] The Kremlin’s force generation apparatus has also shown signs of strain as it has had to meet Russia's replacement rate, struggling to sustain high payments to recruits and to recruit from its existing manpower pools, forcing the Kremlin to target new demographics, including students.^[xx] Putin’s commitment to his war aims is causing and exacerbating high losses on the battlefield, labor shortages, and economic problems that will likely only grow and have disproportionate effects on the civilian populace. ISW has long assessed that Russia would begin suffering more severe economic and military issues in 2026-2027, and these stress points in the war effort are beginning to show.[xxi] These stressors in combination with increased Western military support to Ukraine and harsher economic pressure could force Putin to change his calculus and consider making actual negotiations.

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time in 2026 and fifth time in the last 12 months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and maintain the facade of domestic economic stability.[xxii] The Russian Central Bank announced on February 13 that it lowered its key interest rate from 16 to 15.5 percent.^[xxiii] The Russian Central Bank claimed that Russian unemployment is at a historical low and that wage growth is outpacing productivity growth. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages, however, and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation.^[xxiv] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged on February 13 that inflation accelerated in January 2026 but claimed that this was a “one-off” and that Russia passed the peak of inflationary pressure in December 2025 and January 2026.^[xxv] The Russian government has struggled to finance its DIB amidst heavy Western sanctions and restrictions and has introduced a series of measures to increase the capital available to the Russian DIB, including through the Industrial Development Fund, off-budget subsidies, and policies strongarming banks into providing preferential lending to defense industrial enterprises.^[xxvi] The Central Bank lowered its key interest rate four times between June and October 2025 from an initial rate of 21 percent and likely lowered it again on February 13, 2026 to make more capital available to the Russian DIB and to lower the price of borrowing money for DIB producers, as Russia struggles with liquidity problems due to its unsustainable wartime spending.^[xxvii] The Russian Central Bank stated on February 13 that it intends to lower the key rate to between 13.5 and 14.5 percent in 2026, likely in order to maintain the facade of economic stability.[xxviii]

Russia is incurring high levels of external debt and has gradually depleted its liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine, ignoring the long-term economic implications of the Kremlin’s economic policies. The Russian Ministry of Finance claimed on February 13 that the Russian government's external debt (debt owed to nonresident debtors) exceeded $60 billion for the first time since 2006.[xxix] Russian outlet RBK reported that the Russian Central Bank estimates that Russia’s total external debt, including government and private debt, is roughly $319.8 billion as of January 1, 2026, a $30 billion (10 percent) increase from January 1, 2025.^[xxx] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war and has had to resort to selling its physical gold reserves in November 2025 due to unsustainable spending.^[xxxi] Russia also raised its value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026, in an attempt to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, placing the burden of Putin’s costly war in Ukraine directly on the Russian population.^[xxxii] Putin’s economic policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as the Kremlin is attempting to project and is therefore vulnerable to increased Western pressure.^[xxxiii]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine through the Ramstein format, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced on February 13 that Ukraine’s Western partners will provide Ukraine with a series of aid packages totaling $38 billion that will fund drones, air defense, artillery, and other military assistance in 2026.^[xxxiv] Fedorov reported that over $6 billion is earmarked for specific military assistance, including over $2.5 billion for Ukrainian drones, nearly $2 billion for air defense, and more than $500 million for the purchase of US weapons through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative that funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 13 that Norway and France signed a new agreement to provide Ukraine with surveillance, situational awareness, and air-to ground capabilities, the first stage of which includes a Norwegian loan of about 365 million euros (about $433 million) and a French loan of 260 million euros (about $309 million) for procuring French-made guided aerial bombs for Ukraine.[xxxv] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson stated on February 13 that the EU is providing Ukraine with a loan of 90 billion euros (roughly $106.8 billion) to purchase Swedish Gripen fighter jets and unspecified air defenses.^[xxxvi] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on February 12 that Germany will supply Ukraine with five additional PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missiles if other partner countries agree to supply 30 PAC-3 interceptors.^[xxxvii] Fedorov’s $38 billion figure includes aid packages from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands that were reported on February 12.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Western reporting suggests that the United States has accepted Russia's demanded sequence of having Ukraine cede territory to Russia before receiving formal US or European security guarantee commitments.
• Meaningful security guarantees are crucial to any peace agreement that allows Russia to occupy parts of Ukraine, especially if Ukraine withdraws from territory it currently holds.
• Putin’s rejection of meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine is a greater impediment to a prospective peace deal than Ukraine’s position on ceding its territories.
• The Kremlin likely sees an opportunity to manipulate the US-led negotiations process into another means through which Russia can achieve its unchanging military and political objectives, which it has failed to achieve in nearly four years of war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwavering determination to conquer more Ukrainian territory and gain full political control over Ukraine is severely degrading Russia's military and economy at the cost of the Russian population, and Russia will increasingly have to reckon with this degradation in the coming year.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwavering determination to conquer more Ukrainian territory and gain full political control over Ukraine is severely degrading Russia's military and economy at the cost of the Russian population, and Russia will increasingly have to reckon with this degradation in the coming year.
• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time in 2026 and fifth time in the last 12 months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and maintain the facade of domestic economic stability.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine through the Ramstein format, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on February 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Varachyne, and Andriivka and toward Mala Korchakivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Myropillya; and southeast of Glushkovo near Milayevka on February 12 and 13.^[xxxix]

A Russian milblogger claimed on February 13 that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are waiting for weather conditions in the Sumy direction to worsen before conducting offensive operations, as such conditions degrade first-person view (FPV) drone operations.^[xl] The Russian milblogger claimed that well-prepared Ukrainian fortifications are hindering Russian forces from making even marginal advances in the Sumy direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).^[xli] Drone operators of the Krechet unit of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.^[xlii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Lyman, Prylipka, Rybalkyne, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, Starytsya, Symynivka, and Vilcha and toward Okhrimivka on February 12 and 13.^[xliii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on February 12 and 13 but did not advance.^[xliv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and toward Kivsharivka on February 12 and 13.^[xlv]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 13 that recent Starlink outages are hindering Russian assaults.^[xlvi] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on February 13 that Russian forces in central Kupyansk are operating without food, medicine, and water, and criticized the Russian military command for its lack of attention to Russian forces’ dire situation.^[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Air defense elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.^[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and south of Borova near Serednie and Oleksandrivka on February 12 and 13.^[xlix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).^[l] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Rubtsi (Borova) direction.^[li]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of February 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on February 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kirova electrical substation in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 100 kilometers behind the frontline).^[lii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman and in northern Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).^[liii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 13 that Russian forces advanced east of Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).^[liv]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southeastern Lyman, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces had advanced.^[lv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Platonivka and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Svyato-Pokrovske and toward Kryva Luka and Rai-Oleksandrivka; southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and Riznykivka, and toward Lypivka and Fedorivka Druha on February 12 and 13.^[lvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.^[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on February 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 13 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Holubivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).^[lviii]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 13 shows Ukrainian forces operating along the T-0504 highway in eastern Kostyantynivka, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.^[lix]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya and toward Tykhonivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Holubivka, and Novomarkove; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on February 12 and 13.^[lx]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian artillery in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).^[lxi] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Druzhkivka.^[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on February 12 and 13.^[lxiii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Toretske.^[lxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 13 that Russian forces advanced in central Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).^[lxv]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novopidhorodne, Udachne, and Molodetske on February 12 and 13.^[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne.^[lxvii]

A senior officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 12 that Russian forces recently resumed using heavy equipment in the area and attempted to use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to enter Pokrovsk.^[lxviii] The spokesperson reported that Starlink disruptions temporarily reduced the intensity of Russian assaults, but Russian forces are now adapting by establishing analog radio communications.

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 13 that the intensity of Russian assaults fluctuates due to weather and periodic Starlink outages.^[lxix] The spokesperson noted that recent frosts reduced Russian ground activity and limited infantry movement, but Russian forces continue to use drones heavily, Molniya fixed-wing and other FPV drones. The spokesperson reported that Russian drone reconnaissance remains effective but has slightly degraded due to internet disruptions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Pokrovsk direction, including near Bilytske.^[lxx] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Svitle (east of Pokrovsk) and Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).^[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne on February 12 and 13 but did not advance.^[lxxii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 13 shows drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) striking Ukrainian positions in central Vidradne (south of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.^[lxxiii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).^[lxxiv]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on February 13 that Russian forces are currently conducting minimal to no infantry assaults, including small group missions, but continue to actively conduct Gerbera- and Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukrainian command posts and logistics.^[lxxv] The spokesperson stated that it remains unclear whether Starlink cutoffs or Telegram restrictions impacted Russian ground activity.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment concentration near occupied Komyshuvakha, Donetsk Oblast (southeast of Oleksandrivka and approximately eight kilometers from the frontline) on the night of February 12 to 13.^[lxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 12 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole), Pryluky, and Olenokostyantynivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), forcing Russian forces to retreat eastward across the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway.^[lxxvii]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Ternuvate, Kosivtseve, and Tsvitkove; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne and Zlahoda; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Zahirne; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne on February 12 and 13.^[lxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole) and Rybne (northeast of Hulyaipole).^[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Bombers of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), and Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole).^[lxxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Lukyanivske and northeast of Stepnohirsk (both northwest of Orikhiv).^[lxxxi]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Plavni, and Novoandriivka and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Pavlivka, and Lukyanivske and toward Mahdalynivka, Novoyakovlivka, and Novoboikivske on February 12 and 13.^[lxxxii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and Stepnohirsk and toward Mahdalynivka on February 12 and 13.^[lxxxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.^[lxxxiv] First-person view (FPV) and bomber drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.^[lxxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast between February 11 and 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 13 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentrations near occupied Solodkovodne (approximately 37 kilometers from the frontline) and Lyubimivka (approximately 46 kilometers from the frontline) and Russian drone operator deployment points near occupied Tokmak (approximately 27 kilometers from the frontline) and Mykhailivka (approximately 20 kilometers from the frontline).^[lxxxvi] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on February 13 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in occupied Rozivka (approximately 61 kilometers from the frontline) on February 11 and a data center in occupied Prymorsk (approximately 90 kilometers from the frontline) on February 12.^[lxxxvii] Geolocated footage published on February 13 shows a damaged building in occupied Prymorsk.^[lxxxviii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 13.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.^[lxxxix]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on February 12 and 13. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on February 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Hvardiiske military airfield (approximately 185 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea on February 12.^[xc] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 55Zh6U Nebo-U radar station near occupied Yevpatoria (approximately 153 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on February 12 to 13.^[xci]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 12 and 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 154 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 100 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.^[xcii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 111 drones; that the missile and 22 drones struck 18 locations; and that drone debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, residential, commercial, port, railway, and energy infrastructure in Rivne, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts.^[xciii] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that the strikes significantly damaged a DTEK energy facility in Odesa City.^[xciv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian forces continue to test counter-drone systems. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on February 13 that Belarusian forces tested the Russian-manufactured Molot interceptor drone, which operators launch from a handheld device.^[xcv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial.