Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2025

Assessment as of December 11: 8:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on December 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov effectively rejected the following provisions:

• Freezing the current line of contact in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts;
• Restarting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rather than Russia;
• Requiring NATO only to cease further enlargement rather than insisting on rolling NATO back to its pre-1997 borders;
• Permitting European fighter jets to be stationed in Poland;
• Providing reliable security guarantees to Ukraine;
• Confirming Ukraine's sovereignty; and
• Accepting EU regulations on the protection of religious minorities as the required basis for Ukrainian laws on the subject.

Lavrov stated that the Russian Constitution recognized illegally annexed Crimea and Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as "integral and equal subjects of the Russian Federation" and implied that Russia cannot give away territories enshrined in its constitution.[1] Lavrov also claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding at the Alaska Summit on August 15 based on the proposals that summarized Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 14, 2024, speech — in which Putin demanded complete Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as one of the prerequisites for peace negotiations.[2] Lavrov's reiteration of the Russian demand for Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts contradicts the 21st point of the original peace plan, which states that Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will be frozen along the line of contact and that both Ukraine and Russia would de facto recognize the line of contact.[3] Russia's commitment to establishing full control of Zaporizhia Oblast also contradicts the 19th point of the original peace plan, which states that the ZNPP would restart its operations under the IAEA and would equally distribute electricity between Russia and Ukraine.

Lavrov effectively rejected the third, fifth, and ninth points of the original peace plan, which respectively required only that NATO would not expand further, that European jets would be stationed in Poland, and that Ukraine would receive "reliable" security guarantees.[4] Lavrov stated that Russia "cannot agree" to any security guarantees for Ukraine that it would see as preparations for "another attack" against Russia and demanded that Russia receive security guarantees. Lavrov threatened that Russia would deem any "peacekeepers" in Ukraine "legitimate military targets," effectively ruling out any meaningful Western security guarantees that could plausibly deter or defend against a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine as provided for under the fifth point. Point 8 of the 28-point plan reads: "NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine," but there is no discussion of a NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. The 28-point plan did not preclude the deployment of forces from individual NATO member states as part of a security guarantee force. The Russians choosing to read that point as precluding the deployment of forces to guarantee the security of Ukraine would constitute a revision of the plan and would render any security guarantee toothless.

Lavrov proposed the December 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO as the basis for security guarantees for Russia. The 2021 ultimatums notably demanded "security guarantees" from the United States and NATO that amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance — such as halting the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member-states that joined NATO after 1997.[5] The Kremlin also demanded in January 2022 (as part of the extended negotiations on the 2021 suite of demands) that NATO roll back to the borders it had in 1997 borders when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed.[6] Lavrov thus effectively insisted on a rollback of NATO forces rather than the freeze on further NATO expansion included in the 28 points. An agreement based on the 2021 ultimatums would preclude the deployment of European fighter jets to Poland as well, since Poland joined NATO after 1997.

Lavrov also effectively rejected the 1st point of the original peace plan, which would confirm Ukraine's sovereignty.[7] Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine "must return to a non-aligned, neutral, and non-nuclear status" and that these principles are the "foundation of its statehood." Lavrov claimed that Russia's original recognition of Ukraine in 1990 was conditional on Ukraine's neutral and non-aligned status. He made clear that Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty would be permanently conditional on Ukraine's foreign policy.

Lavrov rejected the 20th point of the original peace plan, which would accept Ukraine's adoption of "EU rules" on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities as sufficient to address Russia's claimed concerns on the matter.[8] Lavrov explicitly stated that it is "unacceptable" for the 20th point to limit Ukraine's obligations to just "EU rules" and that the "EU rules" on religious tolerance and protection of minorities are insufficient. Lavrov falsely implied on December 10 that the original 28-point peace plan did not feature the clause on "EU rules."[9]

Lavrov's December 11 statements indicate that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept the original 28-point peace plan but that Russia will instead demand further modifications should Ukraine agree to it. Lavrov's effective rejection of key elements of the 28-point peace plan is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin's November 27 statement that the 28-point plan could be the basis for future negotiations, but not a final agreement in itself.[10]

Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin, have similarly rejected key points of the 28-point plan in recent weeks. The Kremlin signaled that it would not be satisfied with Ukraine holding elections in 100 days after the signing of the deal, as specified by the 25th point of the original peace plan. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and other lower-level Kremlin officials responded negatively on December 9 to Zelensky's expressed willingness to hold elections as early as the next 60 to 90 days.[11] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 26 that “there can be no talk of any concessions or any surrender” of the “key aspects” of Russia’s objectives in Ukraine in response to the US peace plan.[12] Ryabkov stated Russia “is prepared to achieve its stated goals” in negotiations — referring to Russia’s long-held and oft-repeated demands, including demands that Russia gain control over all of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and force the Ukrainian government to capitulate — and noted that Russia will continue its war in Ukraine if there are “any setbacks” in negotiations.[13] Lavrov and lower-level Russian State Duma officials notably began setting informational conditions to reject reliable security guarantees for Ukraine on December 10, with Lavrov threatening Russian retaliation against the deployment of European military contingents to Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin's position on peace negotiations and territorial swaps has not changed in 2025, with Putin stating in March 2025 that Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or "give" up illegally annexed territories.[15]

Russian State Duma deputies, whom the Kremlin uses to shape Russian public opinion, also made clear that Russia remains disinterested in signing any peace agreements, including the original 28-point peace plan. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on December 11 that he had not yet seen a single peace plan that "would be in line with [Russia's] interests" and denounced any plans that involve freezing the frontline along the line of contact.[16] State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov stated on Russian state television on December 11 that any peace agreement that Russia signs will not guarantee "anything;" that physical force is more authoritative than law; and that Russia's goal in Ukraine were not to confined to seizing Donbas but was rather to ensure "global security" - likely a nod to the Russian 2021 demands for "security guarantees" for Russia from the United States and NATO.[17]

The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk as part of the Kremlin’s intensified cognitive warfare effort that seeks to portray Ukraine’s frontline as on the verge of collapse, and Russian battlefield victory as inevitable. Neither is true, and the Russian seizure of Siversk is unconfirmed as of December 11. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a virtual meeting with various echelons of commanders of the Russian Joint Group of Forces on December 11, in which Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Medvedev claimed that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Siversk.^[18] 3rd CAA Commander Lieutenant General Igor Kuzmenkov claimed that Russian forces flanked Siversk from the north and south to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and avoid urban warfare, and relied heavily on drones, artillery, and airstrikes to facilitate advances near and within Siversk. While geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Russian forces have likely seized eastern Siversk, the Russian seizure of western Siversk remains unconfirmed.^[19] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets rejected Russia's claims of seizing Siversk on December 11 and stated that fighting continues throughout Siversk and that Russian forces are taking advantage of near-constant poor weather conditions to infiltrate into the town.[20]  direction also reported that Russian forces are leveraging bad weather to infiltrate in small groups and ostentatiously raise flags to assert that Russian forces control terrain and achieve informational efforts — in line with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are relying on flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[21] Some Russian milbloggers also claimed on December 10 and 11 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Siversk but that Russian forces control at least 90 percent of Siversk.^[22]

The Kremlin is attempting to portray the claimed fall of Siversk as the start of the battle for Slovyansk — a battle the Kremlin has not set conditions on the ground to begin. Medvedev claimed to Putin that Russia's alleged seizure of Siversk sets conditions for a Russian drive on Slovyansk, the northernmost tip of Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast to portray Russia as able to imminently and quickly advance on the northern part of the Fortress Belt.[23] Russian forces are at least several months away from being able to begin an offensive, conducting ground assaults against Slovyansk, however. Russian forces would have to complete the seizure of Lyman and advance the 14 kilometers from Lyman to Slovyansk (including crossing the Siverskyi Donets River) or traverse the 30 kilometers from Siversk to Slovyansk before assaulting the city itself. The Russian efforts for Lyman and Siversk have been years-long endeavors. Russian forces have been attempting to advance on Siversk since the fall of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in early July 2022, and it took Russian forces 41 months to advance 19 kilometers from the western outskirts of Lysychansk to central Siversk.[24] Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman in early October 2022 during their successful September-October 2022 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have been attempting to recapture the town since then.[25] Only after one or both of these advances would Russian forces be able to begin an assault on Slovyansk directly, and it will likely take a year for Russian forces to make these advances at their current rate of advance in the area. Russian forces have historically taken several months to seize relatively large urban areas, including Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk — the seizure of which is not yet complete — and would likely take another several months to seize Slovyansk after reaching it.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to portray Russian forces as imminently threatening the northern part of the Fortress Belt as part of its broader effort to portray Russian forces as making significant simultaneous advances across the theater, such that the frontline is imminently collapsing.

Putin's December 11 meeting is part of a pattern of senior Russian officials aggrandizing claimed battlefield victories in the past several weeks to create the false perception that the frontlines are collapsing to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse. Putin has held several meetings with Russian military commanders in recent weeks to falsely inflate the claims of Russian advances in various sectors of the frontline, including the Vovchansk direction in northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk direction in eastern Kharkiv Oblast, the Pokrovsk direction in Donetsk Oblast, and the Hulyaipole direction in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[27] These officials have made exaggerated claims of advances in every meeting, and Russian ultranationalist milbloggers have rejected many of these claims as inflated.[28] The Kremlin is attempting to use these claims to portray a Russian military victory in Ukraine as inevitable, such that the West should stop supporting Ukraine and push Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands. The battlefield situation is serious in several sectors of the frontline, but the frontlines are far from collapsing, however. Russian forces have not been able to sustain tactically-significant gains across more than a few areas of the battlefield simultaneously, and there are several areas where Russian advances remain stagnant, including in southern Ukraine and in northern Sumy Oblast.[29] Russian forces have been able to make tactically-significant gains in certain sectors of the frontline largely through monthslong efforts to achieve partial battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in these sectors and degrade Ukrainian defenses ahead of intensified ground operations.[30]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed to Putin on December 11 that Russian forces had advanced south and southeast of Yunakivka, northeast of Sumy City.[31] Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast have stalled since late June 2025 and have not made any tactically-significant gains in the area.[32] Russian forces have also redeployed elements of the relatively elite naval infantry and airborne (VDV) elements that were leading the offensive operations to other areas of the frontline, including to the Pokrovsk direction and southern Ukraine.[33] Russian milbloggers, including a milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, have stated that Russian assaults near Yunakivka have been failing for several weeks and complained that the Russian military command orders Russian forces go conduct attritional assaults using the same unsuccessful tactics.[34]

Russian forces are only making tactical gains across most of the theater. ISW assesses that there are roughly 16 distinct tactical areas and operational directions in the theater. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced 4,652.2 square kilometers thus far in 2025, of which almost 80 percent occurred in only six directions: the Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions. Russian forces seized 964.01 square kilometers thus far in 2025 in the remaining 10 directions, only roughly 21 percent of the total Russian advances. These directions include the Sumy, northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Velykyi Burluk directions, where Russian forces have failed to make significant gains despite much-publicized efforts to create "buffer zones" near the Ukraine-Russia border, and the Kherson direction, where Russian forces have remained stagnant since a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive forced them to withdraw from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[35] Russian forces have made the most dramatic advances in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions — places where Russian forces have concentrated over two combined arms armies’ worth of combat power, each, and dedicated extensive time and effort to advance.[36] The Russian military command is not able to simultaneously dedicate the manpower and resources necessary to make similar advances across the theater, and even the most extensive Russian advances are constrained to foot pace.[37] Russian forces have thus failed to make significant gains in any direction without a significant commitment of forces along relatively narrow tactical and operational areas, demonstrating that Russian advances remain concentrated along a few narrow areas of the frontline rather than the broad advance that the Kremlin promotes.[38] The Kremlin continues to engage in a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and flag raising infiltration missions in an attempt to portray them as a sweeping, broad-front advance to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[39]

Ukrainian forces struck an oil platform in the Caspian Sea for the first time and struck other Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 10 to 11. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne and a person familiar with the matter told Bloomberg on December 11 that at least four Ukrainian long-range drones struck Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft's Filanovsky Oil Field in the Caspian Sea overnight, halting oil and natural gas production at over 20 production wells.[40] Suspilne reported that the Filanovsky Oil Field is one of the largest explored oil fields in Russia and in the Russian part of the Caspian Sea, with reserves estimated at 129 million tons of oil and 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on December 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Dorogobuzh Combined Heating and Power Plant (CHPP) that provides power to the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant in Verkhnedneprovsky, Smolensk Oblast, overnight.[41] Kovalenko reported that the chemical plant produces chemicals critical to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), including ammonia, nitrates, and nitrogen fertilizers. Russian opposition outlet Astra geolocated footage of overnight explosions in Verkhnedneprovsky to nearby the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant.[42] Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows a fire and explosions at the Akron Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Veliky Novgorod, Novgorod Oblast.[43] An Astra source within the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at the Akron plant, halting operations at five workshops.[44] Astra reported that the plant produces ammonium nitrate for both military and civilian use.[45] Novgorod Oblast Governor Aleksander Dronov claimed on December 11 that falling drone debris damaged buildings in unspecified areas of Novgorod Oblast.[46] Astra geolocated footage of damaged buildings in Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast, published on December 10 to near a CHPP and the Voronezhsintezkauchuk Plant, a manufacturer of thermoplastic elastomers and synthetic rubber products.[47] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev claimed that falling drone debris damaged a power line in Voronezh City, leading to power outages, and an industrial building in an unspecified location in southern Voronezh Oblast late on December 10 and overnight.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 11 that Russian forces downed 287 Ukrainian drones overnight, including six over Smolensk Oblast, 19 over Novgorod Oblast, and four over Voronezh Oblast.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine.
• Lavrov's December 11 statements indicate that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept the original 28-point peace plan but that Russia will instead demand further modifications should Ukraine agree to it.
• Lavrov's effective rejection of key elements of the 28-point peace plan is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin's November 27 statement that the 28-point plan could be the basis for future negotiations, but not a final agreement in itself.
• Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin, have similarly rejected key points of the 28-point plan in recent weeks.
• The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk as part of the Kremlin’s intensified cognitive warfare effort that seeks to portray Ukraine’s frontline as on the verge of collapse, and Russian battlefield victory as inevitable. Neither is true, and the Russian seizure of Siversk is unconfirmed as of December 11.
• The Kremlin is attempting to portray the claimed fall of Siversk as the start of the battle for Slovyansk – a battle the Kremlin has not set conditions on the ground to begin.
• Putin's December 11 meeting is part of a pattern of senior Russian officials aggrandizing claimed battlefield victories in the past several weeks to create the false perception that the frontlines are collapsing to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse.
• Russian forces are only making tactical gains across most of the theater.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil platform in the Caspian Sea for the first time and struck other Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 10 to 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on December 10 and 11.[50] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 11 that military command of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD])  ordered casualty evacuations near Oleksiivka and Varachyne (both north of Sumy City), but Russian servicemembers refused to conduct the evacuations themselves due to fear of Ukrainian drone strikes.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[52] Drone operators and other elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and the 1st Battalion of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[53]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 11 that Russian forces seized Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City).[54] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Lyman.[55] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Lyman.[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, Synelnykove, Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, Lyman, and toward Okhrimivka and Izbytske on December 10 and 11.[57]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 11 that Russian forces are pressing Ukrainian positions near and within Vovchansk and are attempting to push Ukrainian forces out of the area.[58] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Vovchansk, but that Russian forces are attempting to advance towards the city center and are exploiting their numerical superiority in manpower. Trehubov added that continuous Russian pressure and glide bomb strikes are constraining Ukrainian logistics and Ukrainian forces’ ability to maneuver.

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on December 10 and 11, but did not advance.[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the H-26 Kupyansk-Kharkiv City highway southwest of Kupyansk.[60]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 10 and 11.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and Radkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[63] 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka, and toward Cherneshchyna on December 10 and 11.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into western Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[65]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Yarova, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve and toward Oleksandrivka and Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on December 10 and 11.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Lyman.[67]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

See topline text for additional reports on recent Russian advances and unconfirmed claims in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Svyato-Pokrovske.[68]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 11 shows groups of two Russian servicemembers raising multiple flags throughout Siversk during what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at the time.[69] A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger reported on December 8 that "the presence of a two-man assault team in the center of Siversk does not necessarily mean the entire area is [under Russian control]. Unfortunately, there are plenty of examples of a pair of fighters breaking ahead and finding themselves cut off from logistics.”[70]

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Yampil, Zakitne, and Dronivka and toward Ozerne and Dibrova; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske on December 10 and 11.[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Yampil.[72] The Russian Ministry of Defense credited elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the seizure of Siversk.[73] Russian sources also credited elements of the 7th, 123rd, 88th, and 85th motorized rifle brigades and the 2nd Artillery Brigade (all 3rd CAA) with the claimed seizure of Siversk.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 10 and 11.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions north of Chasiv Yar.[76] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[78]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas and Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on December 10 and 11.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division) and of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[80]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[81]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Razine, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on December 10 and 11.[82]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 11 that Russian servicemembers are moving alone or in pairs in Pokrovsk, as larger groups become targets for Ukrainian drones.[83]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting tactical withdrawals from Myrnohrad to areas near Svitle (east of Pokrovsk and west of Myrnohrad).[84]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Myrnohrad.[85]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on December 10 and 11 but did not advance.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novoselivka, Stepove, Vorone, Sosnivka, Vyshneve, Verbove, and Krasnohirske on December 10 and 11.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe (east of Oleksandrivka).[88]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 11 that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate through gaps within Ukrainian defenses in small groups and take advantage of adverse weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to attack.[89] The officer noted that Russian anti-thermal imaging cloaks are insufficient to avoid infrared observation and that Ukrainian forces are more easily able to detect Russian forces against snow.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[90] Drone operators and armored and assault elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast direction.[91]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Hulyaipole.[92]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Andriivka and toward Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, Yehorivka, Pryvillya, Uspenivka, and Pryvilne; and east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke on December 10 and 11.[93]

The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service reported on December 11 that two Russian servicemembers dressed in civilian clothes attempted to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole on December 10, taking advantage of bad weather, but that Ukrainian forces eliminated them.[94] ISW has recently observed multiple reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy across the frontline while employing infiltration tactics.[95]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have fire control over Hulyaipole itself and the T-0814 Hulyaipole-Tavriiske road (west of Hulyaipole), hindering Ukrainian logistics into Hulyaipole.[96]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate within Hulyaipole.[97] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Zaliznyche (west of Hulyaipole).[98]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Ukrainian forces operating northeast of Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[99]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on December 10 and 11.[100]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian forces on the eastern outskirts of Kamyanske.[101] Drone operators from the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[102] Elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[103]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on December 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 10 and 11.[104]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces’ air interdiction efforts along the M-14 Kherson City-Mykolaiv City highway have been insufficient to prevent Ukrainian resupply in northern Kherson City.[105] Russian forces have dedicated significant resources to their air interdiction campaign in the Kherson direction and yet have been notably unable to cut off all Ukrainian logistics into Kherson City.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 151 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which roughly 120 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[106] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 83 drones and two missiles and that 69 drones and one missile struck 34 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and civilian infrastructure in Poltava and Odesa oblasts, causing power outages.[107]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.