DRC-M23 Ceasefire: Africa File, July 24, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC government and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels signed a preliminary peace agreement with a ceasefire for the first time in the latest step of a US- and Qatari-led regional peace framework. Fighting will likely continue, however, and negotiations for a long-term peace agreement could collapse given that the ceasefire agreement does not address the central issue of M23 territorial control and provides a compressed timeline to address this highly contentious topic.
• Ethiopia. Rising tensions among Eritrea, Ethiopia, and rival factions in Ethiopia’s Tigray region could spark a low-intensity conflict in Tigray. A large-scale war is unlikely, but miscalculation or external meddling could fuel a wider conflict.

Figure 1. Africa File, July 24, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels signed a preliminary peace agreement with a formal ceasefire provision for the first time in the latest step of a US- and Qatari-led regional peace framework. Representatives from the DRC government and M23 signed the declaration of principles agreement in Doha, the Qatari capital, on July 19.^[i] The new agreement aims to “create favorable conditions” for future peace talks and binds “all forces engaged in the conflict” to observe a ceasefire monitored by an oversight mechanism and cease all attacks, acts of sabotage, and attempts to gain new territory.^[ii] The two sides also committed to implement “confidence building measures,” including the release of prisoners and detainees, which will seek to foster mutual goodwill.^[iii] The agreement does not include a mechanism to penalize non-compliance, however, and Qatar said that the successful implementation of the agreement “lies primarily with both parties.”^[iv]

The declaration represents a notable step in the peace process between the DRC and M23 after months of shaky negotiations. The agreement is the result of over three months of Qatari-mediated discussions that began around early April. The pace and progress of the Qatari-led negotiations had been slow and minimal since the talks began, despite the release of a joint statement in late April. The two sides had committed to work toward a ceasefire in the joint statement, but a stable peace deal did not materialize and fighting between M23 and Congolese militia fighters allied to the DRC government continued.^[v] The international community and both Congolese and M23 officials hailed the declaration agreement as an important achievement in the peace process.^[vi]

The ceasefire agreement between the DRC and M23 formally ties M23 to a separate US-backed peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda from late June.^[vii] The peace agreement included security provisions and plans for a regional economic framework that aims to spur economic growth and facilitate US investment in the DRC and Rwanda.^[viii] The US-led process deferred the resolution of the M23 conflict to the Qatari-talks but made a DRC-M23 peace deal a precondition to the future investment deal.^[ix] A Congolese government source told Reuters on July 18 that “American pressure was very strong” in reaching the declaration agreement.^[x] The new declaration states explicitly that upcoming negotiations to solidify a peace deal will aim to “align” with the US-brokered June agreement.^[xi] CTP continues to assess that the long-term success of the US-led agreement will likely be contingent on the DRC-M23 peace talks.^[xii]

Fighting will likely continue despite the ceasefire, however. M23 has already clashed with pro-Congolese government Wazalendo militia fighters in several areas in North Kivu since it signed the ceasefire.^[xiii] M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka accused the DRC government of deploying troops and heavy weaponry “on all fronts” in the eastern DRC and attacking civilians in South Kivu in violation of the ceasefire agreement on July 20.^[xiv]

Figure  2. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr.

The DRC’s inability to control allied militia groups in the eastern DRC will almost certainly contribute to further clashes. The declaration agreement calls on the DRC and M23 to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict,” which presumably includes Wazalendo militia groups allied to the DRC government.^[xv] The Congolese army has faced long-standing difficulties in constraining, demobilizing, and integrating militia fighters into its ranks, however, and Wazalendo fighters have said previously that they will keep fighting regardless of the outcome of DRC-M23 peace talks since they were not directly included in negotiations.^[xvi]

The ceasefire agreement between the DRC and M23 rebels represents a significant diplomatic victory for M23 and Rwanda. The DRC’s unwillingness to negotiate with M23 had caused previous peace talks to fail. Congolese officials had called M23 “terrorists” repeatedly, refused to negotiate directly with its representatives, and labeled M23 as an illegitimate Rwandan proxy.^[xvii] Angolan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda, which were the forerunner to the US-led peace agreement, broke down in December 2024 when Rwanda insisted that the DRC negotiate directly with M23 for the talks to continue.^[xviii] Rwanda then provided “decisive” support—6,000 troops and advanced military technology—to back an M23 offensive in the first quarter of 2025 that ended in M23’s capture of the North and South Kivu provincial capitals.^[xix] These gains gave M23 the leverage that it needed to force direct peace talks with the DRC.

The Qatari-mediated agreement is a significant DRC government concession as it places the two sides on equal footing as negotiating partners. Congolese officials said shortly after signing the declaration that the DRC wants a “lasting peace” in the eastern DRC, and the declaration agreement effectively means that the DRC government will have to take measures—at least on the surface—to work with M23 to address its grievances and reach a definitive peace deal.^[xx] The DRC interior minister told the French news outlet Le Monde that “peace is a choice” and that “it was necessary to know how to make ‘concessions’” in the talks.^[xxi]

The declaration agreement is also a victory for Rwanda because it does not require M23 to disarm, which will enable continued Rwandan support for the group. Rwanda committed to ceasing support for nonstate armed groups and helping disarm these groups—including M23—as part of the US-brokered DRC-Rwanda agreement. The DRC-M23 deal, however, does not stipulate that M23 must disarm. The DRC-Rwanda deal did not mandate that Rwanda immediately withdraw its troops, leaving networks in place for it to continue covertly aiding M23.^[xxii] Rwandan President Paul Kagame implied after the two sides signed the US peace deal that Rwanda would continue to take unilateral military action in the eastern DRC if the DRC “plays tricks.”^[xxiii] CTP assessed previously that Kagame’s rhetoric set conditions to justify continued Rwandan engagement in the eastern DRC.^[xxiv]

The declaration does not address the central issue of M23’s territorial control in the eastern DRC, which means that the future talks for a long-term peace agreement could still collapse over this contentious point. A central component of the agreement calls for the “restoration of government authority on all national territories” as the “logical consequence” of a final peace deal.^[xxv] Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior Africa adviser, said that this provision was “one of the most important clauses” of the declaration agreement.^[xxvi] An anonymous insider source told the French magazine Jeune Afrique that the declaration outlines a “roadmap for the restoration of state authority in the eastern DRC once a peace agreement is signed.”^[xxvii] It remains unclear, however, what the timetable, steps, or stipulations will be for a future deal that sees M23 replaced by or incorporated into a Congolese government administration.

The lack of clear expectations around M23 control and the return of government authority will likely be a major obstacle in future peace talks. DRC and M23 officials offered differing interpretations of what “restoring state authority” means within hours of signing the declaration agreement. The Congolese communications minister said that the restoration provision encompasses M23’s “nonnegotiable” withdrawal and the return of the Congolese army, the police, and judicial and civil authorities to M23-occupied areas.^[xxviii] M23 officials said that “nowhere” in the declaration agreement “does it say that M23 must withdraw” from occupied territory and reiterated that M23 will not withdraw from occupied areas.^[xxix] The M23 president implied on social media that M23 is the “State” and that the declaration agreement “is not about withdrawal but about mechanisms to empower the State.”^[xxx]

The DRC and M23 are sticking to their maximalist demands regarding M23 territorial control. Officials from both sides claimed that M23 proposed various arrangements during the talks that would legitimize M23 control of the Kivu provinces.^[xxxi] The UN assessed in July 2025 that M23 has not “showed a genuine commitment” to peace talks with the DRC government and that M23 and that Rwandan officials have said that M23 will refuse to vacate occupied territory, “whatever the outcome of negotiations,” and that “the time for agreements has passed.”^[xxxii] The UN also noted that M23’s efforts to build a parallel administrative with Rwandan backing indicates that the group intends to govern occupied areas in the long-term through an “autonomous region” in the eastern DRC.^[xxxiii] The DRC has continued to demand M23’s unconditional withdrawal, however, and refused to integrate M23 forces into Congolese institutions.

The DRC and M23 will likely be unable to resolve this central issue within less than a two-week time frame the declaration gives to reach a final deal. The declaration agreement went into effect immediately on July 19—with a grace period until July 29—and set an ambitious timeline to start negotiations for a final agreement by August 8 and sign the final deal by August 18.^[xxxiv] Qatari, M23, and Rwandan officials said that the “root causes” of the conflict will be negotiated during this less than two-week window between August 8 and August 18.^[xxxv] Previous rounds of talks had fractured after both sides rejected each other’s demands on much smaller disputes over the course of several months. “Root cause” issues such as territorial control, refugee resettlement, and ethnic issues have gone unsolved for years and—in some cases—decades.^[xxxvi]

Ethiopia

Author: Liam Karr

Tensions among Eritrea, Ethiopia, and rival factions in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have escalated over the past month. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed traded ominous warnings in July. Afwerki warned in a July 19 interview that Eritrea “does not aspire to wage war” but “knows how to defend itself” if forced.[xxxvii] Abiy made similar comments in a July 3 speech to Ethiopian parliament, when he said that Ethiopia “has no intention of engaging in any form of conflict” but that “Ethiopia possess the full capacity to defend itself.”[xxxviii]

Eritrea and Ethiopia briefly cooperated during the Tigray war but have returned to their decades-old rivalry. Eritrea was not party to the deal that ended the Tigray war—the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement. Abiy has made inflammatory statements since 2023 that Ethiopian Red Sea access, which Ethiopia lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993, is an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight to acquire if not through diplomacy.[xxxix] Eritrea has responded by increasing cooperation with Ethiopia’s domestic opposition and regional rivals.[xl]

The dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia has exacerbated the widening schism in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has split into two factions since the TPLF signed the Pretoria agreement.[xli] The Ethiopian government has backed one faction, while TPLF hardliners have grown ties with Eritrea. Armed groups aligned with the hardline TPLF faction forcibly seized power from the federal government–backed interim administration in parts of Tigray in March 2025.[xlii] Abiy warned in his July 3 speech that the government has “no intention” of fighting in Tigray but that urgent mediation is needed to prevent conflict and threatened that peace efforts would be “worthless” if it comes too late.[xliii] A senior commander of TPLF-aligned military forces said that Tigrayan forces were “making preparations” in response to perceived threats after Abiy’s address.[xliv]

A large-scale war is unlikely, but miscalculation or external meddling could help spark a wider conflict. Ethiopia’s capacity to engage in a full-scale war is limited, given that it faces several other threats both within and outside the country. Ethiopian forces are fighting several other ethnic-based armed groups.[xlv] A resurgent al Shabaab poses an increasing threat to Ethiopia’s border and the thousands of Ethiopian troops in Somalia.[xlvi]

The various factions are likely unable to afford the political cost of a new war. The region is still scarred from the Tigray war and dealing with the continued humanitarian fallout.[xlvii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stressed the importance of regional stability for US investment in Ethiopia during a phone call with Abiy on July 22.[xlviii] Eritrea already faces heavy international scrutiny and sanctions that would presumably worsen if it became involved in a war.

Military mobilization and bellicose rhetoric create a risk of miscalculation, however. Eritrea implemented a nationwide military mobilization in February, and Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March.[xlix] Rival Tigrayan forces clashed in in early July for the first time since March in Tigray’s South Eastern zone.[l]

Figure 3. Rising Tensions in the Tigray Region

Source: Liam Karr.

Eritrea and Ethiopia can mitigate potential constraints to war, especially by securing external sponsors. The UN lifted the arms embargo on Eritrea in 2018, and Afwerki has strengthened defense ties with Russia since.[li] Ethiopia has also built defense partnerships with Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey.[lii] These same countries are fueling the conflict in neighboring Sudan and could do the same in Ethiopia.[liii] China has ties with both countries and—like Russia—sold weapons to both sides during the Eritrea-Ethiopia war.[liv] Ethiopia has addressed its internal disunity historically by creating temporary alliances of convenience to sideline or co-opt rival factions.[lv] For example, it worked with the same Amhara militias it is now fighting against to combat the TPLF during the Tigray war and could try to reestablish this partnership in the event of a major conflict.[lvi]

The interlocking tensions could spark a low-intensity conflict in Tigray. The mini TPLF coup in March and continued disenfranchisement of the TPLF has strained ties between the TPLF and federal government and nearly killed the Pretoria agreement, putting both sides on a path to war.[lvii] Getachew Reda—the leader of the pro-Ethiopian government faction—tweeted on July 21 that the TPLF is attempting to seize power by force and warned that “the foreseeable and forewarned outcome” of the TPLF-Eritrea alliance is the resumption of war in Tigray.[lviii] Tigrayan leadership announced on July 23 that it would reshuffle leadership positions in the Southern zone, which local leaders framed as another de facto coup that undermined local autonomy and served “Eritrean interests.”[lix] A low-intensity proxy conflict would mitigate Eritrean, Ethiopia, and Tigrayan concerns with a wider war while enabling all sides to fight for leverage.

Ethiopia’s quest for sea access will continue to destabilize the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia caused another regional dispute in its pursuit for access when it signed a deal for a naval base with the de facto independent Somaliland region in exchange for potentially recognizing Somaliland in January 2024.[lx] The deal caused a crisis in which Somalia threatened to expel thousands of Ethiopian troops fighting al Shabaab—al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate—and increased cooperation with Ethiopia’s regional rivals, including Eritrea.[lxi] Turkey mediated a tentative agreement in December 2024 that would grant Ethiopia sea access through Somalia, but French outlet Africa Intelligence reported on July 9 that negotiations had collapsed.[lxii] CTP warned in December that the Turkish-brokered deal did not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions or the feasibility of safe and reliable Ethiopian sea access through Somalia given Somalia’s security situation.[lxiii] The collapse of the Somalia deal removes a peaceful off-ramp to avoid conflict over Ethiopian sea access.

Africa File Data Cutoff: July 24, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.