Iran Update, October 26, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran deal in concert with ongoing Pakistani and Qatari efforts. The United States and Iran reportedly continue to face roadblocks regarding the sequencing of the agreement.
• The Mecca Pact parties also likely attempted to end current Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and prevent future Iranian strikes on the kingdom. Gulf-based diplomatic sources told Israeli media that Saudi Arabia attempted to negotiate a ceasefire with the Houthis during a meeting with Iranian officials.
• The Houthis may seek to avoid striking US targets in support of Iran if the United States and Israel resume strikes in Iran to prevent US retaliation could weaken the group’s current position relative to Saudi Arabia.
• Iran has reportedly continued to fund Hezbollah’s reconstitution of its military forces and capabilities.
• Current indicators suggest that Hezbollah may not participate in a renewed Iranian conflict by attacking Israel in the near term. The Iranian regime may prefer to limit Hezbollah’s involvement in such a round of conflict in order to prioritize Hezbollah’s military reconstitution, given that any Hezbollah attacks on Israel would almost certainly provoke an Israeli response.

Toplines

Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed a mutual defense agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defense Pact, in August 2026.[i] Saudi Defense Minister Khalid Bin Salman, Pakistani Army Commander Asim Munir, and Turkish National Intelligence Organization Director Ibrahim Kalin, who are the primary representatives of the pact thus far, discussed “regional security” with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei.[ii] The Mecca Pact officials reportedly traveled to Tehran in concert with ongoing Pakistani and Qatari efforts to reach an agreement between the United States and Iran that prevents a wider regional war.[iii] Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period."[iv] The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. An unspecified Gulf official told the New York Times that the Mecca Pact signatories’ talks with Iran intended to ”urge Iran to show flexibility.”[v] The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.[vi] Iran has repeatedly maintained that the United States must lift the naval blockade, provide sanctions relief, and recognize Iranian control over the strait before Iran makes any concessions.[vii] The United States and Israel have reportedly prepared for another possible round of airstrikes in Iran after the US midterms.[viii]

The Mecca Pact parties likely sought to secure an end to current Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and prevent future Iranian strikes on the kingdom during the visit to Tehran.[ix] The Mecca Pact officials’ visit to Tehran marks the first instance in which the Mecca Pact signatories have traveled to a foreign country for a diplomatic engagement since signing the agreement in early August. Saudi Arabia is currently contending with daily Houthi missile and drone fire targeting Saudi military facilities and critical infrastructure, including airports and oil facilities.[x] Several Saudi partners are providing air defense support to the kingdom, but Saudi Arabia almost certainly seeks to avoid a scenario in which it faces simultaneous fire from the Houthis to the south and Iran to the northeast.[xi] Iran has repeatedly attacked Saudi Arabia since March 2026 and has struck US and Saudi military bases, oil infrastructure, US diplomatic infrastructure, and other civilian sites.[xii] Iran has threatened to “expand” its target bank in the event that the United States or Israel resume strikes on Iran by targeting regional energy infrastructure.[xiii] Sources familiar with recent warnings told the Wall Street Journal that Iran specifically warned Arab officials and mediators that it could strike Saudi oil facilities.[xiv] Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton also recently warned that Iran is in the ”advanced stages” of planning attacks against US targets in the region, referring to US assets in the Gulf countries.[xv]

Gulf-based diplomatic sources told Israeli media that Saudi Arabia attempted to negotiate a ceasefire with the Houthis during a meeting with Iranian officials. Saudi Arabia would send $1 billion USD to the Houthis under the agreement, according to the sources.[xvi] It is unclear if the Houthis responded to the Saudi offer at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously observed on September 22 that the Houthis may be unwilling to accept truce offers that do not improve their long-term economic position through either control of Yemeni oil and gas or increased revenues from salary payments.[xvii] The Houthis are not directly responsive to Iranian direction, which suggests that Iran is acting as a mediator or interlocutor between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, assuming that the reporting is accurate.

The Houthis likely believe that they currently hold the upper hand over Saudi Arabia, which may lead them to refrain from striking US targets in support of Iran in the event of a renewed regional conflict. Two sources familiar with US intelligence assessments told CNN on October 26 that the Houthis would likely strike US targets in the region if the US and Israel attack Iran.[xviii]  CTP-ISW cannot independently evaluate this assessment, given that the sources did not provide any more details. CTP-ISW has not observed open-source indicators that suggest the Houthis will attack US targets in retaliation for possible future US strikes on Iran, such as explicit Houthi threats against the United States, Iranian requests for the Houthis to join a regional campaign, or military preparations to do so. It is plausible that the Houthis would be able to sustain attacks against US assets in the region, such as US military personnel in Saudi Arabia or US-linked vessels, even as the Houthis wage a campaign against Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

The Houthis may seek to avoid attacks on US targets in support of Iran if the United States and Israel resume strikes in Iran to avoid provoking US retaliation that could weaken the group’s current position relative to Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have constrained Saudi Arabia's ability to export oil and disrupted international air traffic to the kingdom through near-daily attacks on critical infrastructure, including Saudi oil export infrastructure and civilian airports.[xix] The Houthis have also made significant territorial gains since September 9, including seizing territory along the Red Sea coastal plain close to the Bab al Mandeb’s shipping lanes and encircling Taiz City, which is Yemen’s third-largest city and a bastion of support for the Yemeni government.[xx] The Houthis’ rejections of other Saudi ceasefire proposals in recent months emphasize that the group believes it currently has the upper hand over Saudi Arabia.[xxi] The Houthis almost certainly calculate that involvement in a future regional conflict to support Iran could provoke significant retaliation that would undermine recent gains.

It is unclear whether requests from Iran would be sufficient to compel the Houthis to attack US targets if doing so would jeopardize their domestic position. Houthi and Iranian interests have thus far aligned as the Houthis’ current campaign against Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government advances Iran's regional campaign objectives to drive up energy prices and raise pressure on the United States.^[xxii] The Houthis are an independent partner of Iran, rather than a proxy, however. The Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s.[xxiii]  CTP-ISW assessed in early April 2026 that the Houthis did not join Iran’s regional economic warfare campaign in order to avoid retaliation from the United States and its allies that might jeopardize the Houthis’ domestic position, for example.^[xxiv]

Iran has reportedly continued to fund Hezbollah’s reconstitution of its military forces and capabilities. Lebanese security sources told Reuters on October 26 that Hezbollah has exploited its ceasefire with Israel in June 2026 to try to reconstitute military capabilities that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has degraded since March 2026.[xxv] The sources added that Hezbollah has focused primarily on rebuilding its command-and-control structures, drone capabilities, and explosives arsenals.[xxvi] One of the Lebanese security sources and one source close to Hezbollah stated that Iran has provided ⁠tens of millions of dollars to finance these reconstitution efforts.[xxvii] This payment is distinct from the $200 million that Iran reportedly transferred to Hezbollah in September 2026 to pay Lebanese families impacted by the Israel-Hezbollah war.[xxviii]

CTP-ISW has repeatedly assessed that Hezbollah will likely use the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire in Lebanon to reconstitute its military forces and prepare for future conflict with Israel with Iranian support.[xxix] Lebanese military sources told Emirati media on October 15 that Iran is working to decentralize Hezbollah's command-and-control structure, an effort that Iran reportedly began in late 2024 following Israeli strikes that decapitated Hezbollah’s senior leadership and imposed a state of shock upon the group.[xxx] Israeli media reported on October 12 that Hezbollah is also working to expand the range and payload capacity of its first-person view drones.[xxxi] A Hezbollah official and a Lebanese security source told Reuters on October 26 that the nearly 800 kilograms of explosives that Lebanese security forces seized on October 5 were intended for Hezbollah’s drone program.[xxxii]

Current indicators suggest that Hezbollah may not participate in a renewed Iranian conflict by attacking Israel in the near term. Lebanese parliamentary sources told UK-based, Saudi-owned media on October 24 that Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saed Khatibzadeh recently told Hezbollah and the Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement that Iran will not ask Hezbollah to participate in a renewed regional conflict if the United States strikes Iran.[xxxiii] Khatibzaheh reportedly delivered this message during his visit to Lebanon between October 14 and 15 amid growing concerns among Iranian leaders over the possibility that United States and Israeli strikes might renew strikes on Iran after the November 3 midterm elections.[xxxiv] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah claimed that Iran has "not asked” Hezbollah to join in on the fighting in a speech on October 26.[xxxv] Hezbollah has historically taken military and political action to support Iranian objectives in the region.[xxxvi] The Iranian regime may prefer to limit Hezbollah’s involvement in such a round of conflict in order to prioritize Hezbollah’s military reconstitution, given that any Hezbollah attacks on Israel would almost certainly provoke an Israeli response.[xxxvii]  

It is possible that neither Iran nor Hezbollah view possible renewed US-Israeli strikes on Iran as an existential threat to the regime at this time. Hezbollah intervened in March 2026 by firing rockets at Israel after the United States and Israel killed then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[xxxviii] Hezbollah likely viewed the threat to the Iranian regime at the time as existential and intervened because the collapse of the regime would be a major setback for Hezbollah and its regional goals.[xxxix] Hezbollah’s lack of participation during the 12-day War in June 2025 demonstrated that Hezbollah may not always intervene on Iran’s behalf if it views the threat to the regime as non-existential. The US strikes on Iran in June 2025 aimed to degrade Iran’s nuclear program, not to topple the regime.[xl]

Hezbollah may also seek to avoid another bout of fighting that could erode its public support in southern Lebanon. A senior Hezbollah leader responsible for the group's border and resources department and Israeli affairs stated on October 26 that Hezbollah seeks to spare southern Lebanese civilians from further IDF attacks.[xli] The Hezbollah media office similarly told Reuters on October 26 that the group is "weary of giving Israeli leaders any justification to escalate in Lebanon" and is concerned about its constituents in southern Lebanon being further displaced by IDF attacks.[xlii] Hezbollah’s concern about exposing its constituents in southern Lebanon to further IDF attacks likely reflects the group‘s increasingly unpopular domestic standing since October 2023 due to its initiation of several destructive wars with Israel.[xliii] Hezbollah likely views recouping popular support, particularly among its Shia base, as a requirement of its political and military reconstitution.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states.

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iran may try to expand alternative trade and transit routes through Afghanistan to mitigate the economic effects of disrupted overland trade channels through Pakistan and Iraq. Islamic Development Organization (IDO)-affiliated outlet Mehr News Agency argued in an op-ed on October 26 that Iran should expand its alternative transit routes through Afghanistan in order to strengthen Iran’s access to regional markets, including by expanding routes along the Khaf-Herat railway, the proposed Herat-Mazar Sharif line, and a longer-term corridor that links Iran to Central Asia and China.[xliv] Mehr’s op-ed comes as Iran faces growing constraints on overland trade with and through neighboring countries, likely due to US pressure.[xlv] Pakistan temporarily suspended trade with Iran through the Taftan and Gabd-Rimdan crossings on October 17.[xlvi] A Pakistani Foreign Office official stated on October 23 that Pakistan closed the crossings in compliance with “all applicable sanctions regimes,” which is notable given that Pakistan has historically stated that it is not obligated to comply with US sanctions.[xlvii] Iraq separately closed the al Sheeb border crossing between Iraq’s Maysan Province and Iran’s Khuzestan Province on October 21.[xlviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the closure of these three border crossings will likely exacerbate the effects of the economic restrictions that Iran currently faces because Iran has increasingly relied on overland trade routes in recent months as the United States has constrained Iran’s ability to trade by sea and air.[xlix] Mehr News acknowledged that the proposed projects to expand trade through Afghanistan face major challenges related to financing, customs, infrastructure, and sanctions and therefore would not provide Iran with immediate economic relief.[l]

Lebanon

See topline section.

Iraq

Unspecified sources told Saudi-owned regional media on October 24 that the Iraqi federal government believes that Israel struck sites storing People’s Republic of China -made man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) at a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) base in Baghdad on October 17.[li] The PMF is an Iraqi security service composed of many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lii] The sources claimed that the attack occurred after an unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia transferred the MANPADS from Iran to the PMF base.[liii] Iraqi media reported an explosion at a PMF base on October 17, which the PMF blamed on an "internal malfunction."[liv] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi ordered the formation of a committee to investigate the incident on October 17, which has yet to release its findings.^[lv] Israeli media appeared to confirm on October 26 that the Israeli Air Force recently struck an unspecified site storing anti-aircraft missiles to prevent militia attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[lvi] Israel previously struck Iranian-backed Iraqi militia weapons depots to prevent militia attacks on Israel in 2019.[lvii] Iraqi authorities initially attributed at least one of those incidents to poor storage conditions.[lviii] Poor storage, limited safety regulations, and high summer temperatures can occasionally cause explosions at ammunition depots in Iraq, however.[lix] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the October 17 explosion.
Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have continued to attack critical infrastructure, including airports, across Saudi Arabia to compel Saudi Arabia to surrender to Houthi demands. The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 25, which Saudi air defenses intercepted after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.[lx] Saudi Arabia retaliated with airstrikes on five Houthi ballistic missile storage sites and four ballistic missile launch platforms, including the missile platform that targeted King Khalid Airport, in Houthi-controlled Sanaa Governorate on October 25.^[lxi] Saudi Joint Forces Command intercepted three additional Houthi drones near Riyadh and in southern Saudi Arabia on October 26.[lxii] The Houthis have conducted near-daily attacks targeting sites in and around Riyadh since October 1, including the King Khalid International Airport.[lxiii] The Houthis seek to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis’ demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[lxiv] 

The Egyptian Parliament approved sending defensive military aid to Saudi Arabia on October 26.[lxv] The Egyptian Parliament's statement did not specify what type of defensive military aid Egypt would provide Saudi Arabia, but the deputy head of the Egyptian Parliament's legislative committee told Reuters on October 26 that Egypt would send forces to the kingdom.[lxvi] Egypt’s approval of defensive support comes after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi stated on October 18 that Egypt would provide defensive military aid to Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia requested support.[lxvii] Reuters added that neither side has announced a formal Saudi request for Egyptian troops, however.[lxviii] Egypt is part of Saudi Arabia's anti-Houthi coalition and has previously supported Saudi counter-Houthi operations in Yemen, including by providing air and naval support to strike Houthi targets in Yemen in 2015.[lxix] 

Yemeni government-aligned forces have continued to engage Houthi forces south of Taiz City in order to try to break the Houthi encirclement of the city and central Taiz Governorate. Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly advanced southward to a hill that overlooks Houthi-controlled al Dhabab, Taiz Governorate, on October 26, according to anti-Houthi sources and Saudi media.[lxx] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this advance at this time. Yemeni government-aligned forces also continued to engage Houthi forces near the contested areas of Jabal Han and al Aqroud, Misrakh District, on October 26, according to anti-Houthi sources.[lxxi] Geolocated footage posted on October 25 showed that Yemeni government-aligned forces dropped bombs on Houthi forces using drones in al Misrakh District on October 25, which indicates that the Houthis retain at least some forces in the area.[lxxii] The Houthi encirclement of central Taiz likely continues to constrain reliable routes for Yemeni government-aligned forces to resupply and send reinforcements to Taiz City.[lxxiii]

The Houthis targeted Yemeni government weapons depots in Aden Governorate to degrade the government’s ability to sustain operations against the Houthis. The Houthis claimed that they targeted Yemeni government-aligned forces and weapons depots in Aden Governorate near Aden City, the Yemeni government's de facto capital.[lxxiv] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi weapons shipments and Yemeni government weapons depots in Aden in recent weeks.[lxxv] The Houthis very likely targeted Yemeni government-aligned forces and weapons depots in Aden Governorate as part of the Houthis‘ ongoing effort to degrade the government's ability to sustain offensive and defensive operations, including potential government efforts to break the Houthi encirclement of Taiz City.[lxxvi] The Houthis may also be attempting to degrade Aden-based forces’ capabilities in an effort to set conditions for any Houthi offensive in Aden City.