Iran Update, October 13, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is attempting to deter renewed US military operations against Iran through back-channel threats against US forces and regional allies while simultaneously conducting drone, missile, and anti-aircraft system tests in preparation for future conflict.
• Saudi Arabia struck Houthi oil and fuel storage and transport infrastructure in Yemen on October 13, which could exacerbate the Houthis’ economic crisis and constrain Houthi military forces.
• The Houthis have continued to threaten and attack Saudi civilian infrastructure following the Saudi strikes on fuel facilities.

Toplines

Iran is attempting to deter renewed US military operations against Iran by threatening attacks against US forces and regional allies while simultaneously testing drone, missile, and air defense systems in preparation for future conflict. Iranian officials warned Arab officials and mediators that it would “more aggressively” target US forces and naval vessels in the event of renewed conflict, according to people familiar with the warnings speaking to the Wall Street Journal on October 12.[i] Iranian officials also reportedly warned that Iran would target regional energy infrastructure, and some of the sources noted that Iran specified that Saudi oil facilities would be targets.[ii] Iran repeatedly attacked energy and other critical infrastructure in the Gulf states during the war, citing the presence of US bases in these countries as justification for its attacks.^[iii] Iran targeted these facilities in order to drive up global energy prices as part of their broader effort to coerce the Gulf states to pressure the United States and Israel to halt their campaign against Iran.[iv] Iranian threats against Gulf energy infrastructure at this time likely similarly aim to coerce Gulf states to pressure the United States to refrain from renewing major operations against Iran. The reported specific Iranian threat against Saudi oil facilities likely aims to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia at a time when the kingdom’s oil industry is already under significant strain from persistent Houthi missile and drone attacks. The Journal also reported that some Iranian officials  ”hinted” that Iranian forces could conduct “land incursions into neighboring countries,” citing people familiar with the matter.[v] The Journal described Iranian officials’ threats of possible ground incursions as ”an attempt to deter a potential attack.“^[vi] Iranian threats against US forces and partners come amid Western media reporting that US President Donald Trump is considering renewed airstrikes on Iran in an effort to reach a new diplomatic settlement with Iran.[vii]

Iran has reportedly tested its drone, missile, and air defense systems in recent days, almost certainly in preparation for a possible renewed conflict with the United States. An independent Iran-based outlet reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted more than 30 medium-range solid-fuel Emad and Kheibar Sheikan ballistic missile tests in the vicinity of multiple unspecified Iranian cities on October 11.[viii] An Iran-based researcher also shared footage from the reported October 11 exercise.[ix] The researcher claimed that Iran had launched approximately 30 ballistic missiles, including Emad and Khorramshahr variants, from Tehran Province, Alborz Province, and other sites in central Iran.[x] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account similarly shared footage on October 11 that showed launches of Shahed-136 one-way attack drones and unspecified missiles.[xi] An Israeli OSINT analyst separately reported that Iran launched several one-way attack drones from Kashan, Esfahan Province, and ballistic and surface-to-air missiles from Esfahan and Yazd provinces and Damanvand, Alborz Province.[xii] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these reports of drone and missile tests, but it is notable that Iran is reportedly testing systems that it would presumably use to attack US forces and regional partners in the event of a renewed conflict. Iran is also reportedly testing air defense systems, likely in preparation for a possible future US attack. An Iranian regime outlet separately reported on October 11 that Iran tested its Jaljaleh anti-aircraft mine system.[xiii] The IRGC introduced the Jaljaleh system to target low-altitude targets such as drones and helicopters in November 2025.[xiv]

Saudi Arabia struck Houthi oil and fuel storage and transport infrastructure in Yemen on October 13, which could exacerbate the Houthis’ economic crisis and constrain Houthi military capabilities. The Saudi Joint Forces Command (JFC) announced that Saudi forces conducted airstrikes targeting several Houthi oil and fuel facilities in Sanaa, Dhamar, and Hudaydah governorates on October 13.[xv] The JFC issued a warning to Yemeni civilians on October 13 before attacking the al Sabahah fuel depot outside of Sanaa City, which a Yemen-based journalist described as one of the Houthis’ most significant oil storage facilities.[xvi] Yemeni media and independent researchers also published reports and footage of fires and smoke plumes at several fuel depots in Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory on October 13.[xvii]

Saudi attacks on Houthi oil and fuel facilities likely intend to both maximize economic pressure on the Houthi political organization and constrain the Houthis’ ability to sustain their military forces.[xviii] The Houthis currently lack access to Yemen’s oil and gas resources and acquire a significant amount of annual revenue from the sale and distribution of imported oil products.^[xix] The JFC said that it struck fuel unloading berths as part of the strikes.[xx] Attacks on Houthi oil storage facilities and transport infrastructure likely aim to reduce the Houthis’ ability to fund their military operations, particularly given the worsening economic conditions in Houthi-controlled territory.[xxi] CTP-ISW has assessed that the Houthis resumed their war with Saudi Arabia in July 2026 to secure concessions that would alleviate the dire economic situation in Houthi-controlled areas, which poses a threat to Houthi rule over northern and western Yemen.[xxii] Saudi attacks on fuel facilities could also exacerbate ongoing fuel shortages in Houthi-controlled territory and may force the Houthis to raise fuel prices, which imposes constraints on the group’s military and political efforts.[xxiii] Fuel shortages further hinder the Houthis’ combat capabilities and logistics because supply convoys, reinforcements, and frontline forces rely on vehicles that require fuel. The Houthis may increasingly requisition fuel from civilians to avoid logistical disruptions that could jeopardize the group’s offensives, although this could heighten civilians’ discontent with Houthi rule.[xxiv]  Saudi media reported on September 21 that the Houthis are already requisitioning fuel to sustain military operations in southwestern Yemen.[xxv]

Saudi Arabia almost certainly conducted these attacks in retaliation for Houthi strikes on Saudi territory in recent days and seeks to compel the Houthis to cease their attacks on Saudi military and civilian targets. The JFC demanded that the Houthis immediately stop targeting Saudi airports, ports, oil facilities, and other civilian infrastructure when it announced Saudi forces’ strikes on Houthi fuel facilities on October 13.[xxvi] The Houthis have frequently launched missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi airports, oil infrastructure, and military bases in recent days, including an attack on King Khalid International Airport on October 10 that killed at least 13 people.[xxvii]

The Houthis have continued to threaten and attack Saudi civilian infrastructure following the Saudi strikes on fuel facilities, however. Unspecified sources told Reuters on October 13 that a missile or missile debris impacted and started a fire at the Saudi Aramco headquarters in Dhahran, Eastern Province, more than 1,100 kilometers from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.[xxviii] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree issued a warning for civilians to evacuate the Dhahran headquarters on October 13, at about the same time that Yemeni media reported Saudi airstrikes on Houthi fuel facilities.[xxix] The Houthis claimed responsibility for a ballistic missile attack on King Khalid International Airport and a drone attack on King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, Asir Province, on October 12 but have not claimed responsibility for the attack in Dhahran at the time of this writing.[xxx]

The Houthis are attempting to capture Taiz City by securing a key roadway into the city. Houthi fighters engaged Yemeni government-aligned forces in heavy combat in the vicinity of al Dhabab, on the southwestern outskirts of Taiz City, on October 12 and 13.[xxxi] The Houthis have attempted to capture the Hangar Checkpoint, on the main road leading into Taiz City from the southwest, although multiple videos of Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces at the site on October 12 and 13 suggest that control over the checkpoint remains contested.[xxxii] The Houthis also launched several rounds of heavy artillery fire on Yemeni government-controlled areas within Taiz City on October 12 and 13, according to Yemeni media and a DC-based Yemen analyst.[xxxiii] These combined military efforts are consistent with the Houthis’ efforts to geographically isolate Taiz City in recent weeks and are likely intended in part to compel Yemeni government-aligned forces to surrender the city.[xxxiv]

The main concentration of Houthi and Yemeni government combat in the immediate vicinity of Taiz City comes amid continued engagements in other areas of central Taiz Governorate and a lack of reports of kinetic activity on the Red Sea coastal plain.[xxxv] CTP-ISW has not observed reports indicating major combat developments or territorial changes on the coastal plain since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 12. Local Yemeni sources purportedly told Iranian media on October 13 that the Houthis are launching an offensive south into Madaribah wa al Arah District in Lahij Governorate, immediately south of Taiz Governorate’s Waziyah District.[xxxvi] The Southern Giants Brigades, which are a Yemeni government-aligned military faction, announced on October 12 that their forces have begun to reinforce tribal areas in Madaribah wa al Arah District to prevent Houthi attacks in the vicinity.^[xxxvii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

See topline section.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.

Lebanon

Israeli media reported on October 12 that Hezbollah is attempting to improve its first-person view (FPV) drone capabilities.[xxxviii] Israel Public Broadcasting (Kann) reported that Hezbollah is working to increase the explosive payload of its FPV drones from 2.5 kilograms (kg) to between four and six kg. The broadcaster also reported that Hezbollah is attempting to extend the range of its drones from 20 kilometers (km) to 30 km.[xxxix] Hezbollah increasingly deployed FPV systems in its asymmetric campaign against Israel between March and June 2026, likely as part of an early effort to integrate more precise FPV strike capabilities into its operations.[xl] ISW previously assessed in late July that Hezbollah’s early battlefield successes with tactical FPV systems against Israeli forces will almost certainly lead Hezbollah to invest further in its development of FPV systems.[xli] ISW also assessed that Hezbollah would likely use the ceasefire in Lebanon to reconstitute its military forces and prepare for renewed fighting with Israel.[xlii] Israeli forces have only launched limited strikes against Hezbollah drone targets or launch positions in response to Hezbollah attacks against Israeli forces.[xliii]

Hezbollah announced a financial support program for displaced Lebanese civilians on October 13 that is almost certainly intended to compete with Lebanese government reconstruction efforts and recoup popular support.[xliv] Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush announced that Hezbollah will initiate the “Promise and Commitment” housing allowance and reconstruction payment program for displaced families across Lebanon, which will offer both rent support payments and funds to replace damaged property.[xlv] Damoush said that families in Beirut and the southern suburbs could receive up to $14,000 USD based on the level of need. Families outside of Beirut and the suburbs could receive up to $12,000 USD, which would be divided into four installments paid over one year.[xlvi] Hezbollah has offered multiple reconstruction and rent support payments to Lebanese citizens since 2024, but Hezbollah has also repeatedly been forced to halt these payments due to the group's liquidity challenges.[xlvii]

Hezbollah’s ability to provide financial support to Lebanese citizens is essential in order to rehabilitate the group’s image among the Lebanese population, particularly its Shia support base, as the group has grown increasingly unpopular after initiating two costly wars against Israel in the past two years.[xlviii] Hezbollah relies upon public support to both justify its existence and resist Lebanese government disarmament efforts. Hezbollah has long framed itself as the primary and legitimate representative of Lebanese civilians and popular interests.[xlix] Hezbollah must also encourage civilians to not cooperate with Lebanese government and LAF efforts to disarm the group in order for the group to survive.

Hezbollah is likely simultaneously attempting to undermine recent Lebanese government efforts to initiate reconstruction projects in Lebanon. The Lebanese government announced 23 reconstruction programs to rebuild Nabatieh City and other areas in southern Lebanon on October 2.[l] Hezbollah officials have repeatedly attempted to portray the Lebanese government as unwilling and unable to provide reconstruction aid to Lebanese civilians.[li] Hezbollah’s announcement of the program likely attempts to demonstrate to the Lebanese population that Hezbollah is more capable than the Lebanese government in providing reconstruction aid to further discredit and distract the government’s recent reconstruction efforts.

The announcement of Hezbollah's new round of reconstruction payments comes amid reports that Iran transferred $200 million USD to Hezbollah in September 2026, according to two unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on October 7.[lii] The sources did not specify how Iran allegedly transferred the funds to Hezbollah but claimed that Hezbollah planned to use $150 million USD of the total sum to provide $3,000 USD payments to 50,000 Lebanese families impacted by the Israel-Hezbollah war.[liii] The US State Department denied Reuters’ reporting and accused Hezbollah of “trying to save face with fake stories,” however.[liv]

Iraq

Shia Coordination Framework parties are resisting Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi's ongoing efforts to frame himself as an independent decisionmaker. Unspecified government sources told Iraqi media on October 13 that framework actors are attempting to constrain Zaydi’s actions by exploiting certain conditions that Zaydi must consult the framework on all matters. The Shia Coordination Framework instituted these preconditions, which include forbidding the prime minister from running in elections or establishing his own party, due to the framework's experience with former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[lv] Zaydi agreed to these conditions before becoming prime minister.[lvi] Framework actors are reportedly trying to limit Zaydi's independent decision-making due to some of his recent decisions, including his revival of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.[lvii] Zaydi merged several offices, including the Interior and Defense ministries and the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), into the Office of the Commander-in-Chief in July 2026.[lviii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Zaydi revived this office, last used under former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, as part of an effort to consolidate his personal power as prime minister, which framework actors expressed concern over in September 2026.[lix] The unspecified governmental sources told Iraqi media on October 13 that framework actors also raised concerns over former Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari running the office and the additional expenses that such an office would require.[lx]

Zaydi has demonstrated his willingness to at least attempt to stand up to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including those in the framework, in recent months. Zaydi has continued to lead a government crackdown on the Iraqi militias, despite the relative strength of the militias and the Iranian infiltration of Iraqi institutions blunting the force of this effort, for example.[lxi] Zaydi has also pursued individual disarmament negotiations with the militias outside of the framework's negotiations and has considered avenues for PMF reform that would attempt to meet US demands regarding the militias.[lxii]

The Iraqi Parliament scheduled a session on October 13, 2026, to complete Iraq's government formation.[lxiii]  The parliamentary session will include a vote to choose deputy prime minister candidates and to fill Iraqi ministries that have remained empty since Zaydi took office in May 2026 due to disputes between the framework and other Iraqi politicians.[lxiv] Zaydi sent a letter to Parliament on October 13 requesting the session but did not specify which government ministries the session will seek to fill.[lxv] Parliament scheduling this session follows reports that the framework is planning to allocate deputy prime minister positions and control over new ministries to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members.[lxvi] The United States has firmly rejected any Iraqi militia member, even from disarmed militias, serving in any senior capacity in the Iraqi federal government.[lxvii]

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.